



THE NIGERIAN ARMY QUARTERLY JOURNAL

Vol. 4 No. 1

ISSN: 0794-8201

March 2008

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	<i>Annually</i>	<i>Quarterly</i>	<i>Postage/copy</i>
a. Nigeria	N=1,200.00	N=500.00	N=1,000
b. African Union	N=1,200.00	N=500.00	N=2,500
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- Outside Nigeria – Payment by international money order or through Western Union in favour of NAQJ, Institute of Army Education.

Advertisement

International – Per volume, full page (\$500), half page (\$300).

Inside Nigeria – Please request.

© Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal

Published by Institute of Army Education, Nigerian Army Cantonment,

PMB 21109, Ikeja, Lagos. Tel. & Fax: 01-7227026

E-Mail: hqinstitutearmyeduction@yahoo.com

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The manuscript should be in English and not exceed 20 pages quarto sized paper. To simplify communication across disciplines, jargon should be minimized. Submit three double spaced throughout, including tables, legends, and citations. Size preferred is 8 1/2 x 11." Pages should be numbered consecutively, including the title page. (Manuscript are generally not returned).

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The essential contents of each paper should be briefly stated in an abstract following the title page.

Tables should be submitted on separate sheets of paper, be numbered consequently, and should have information titles. Their positions in the manuscript should be indicated.

The endnote system of reference (Turabian style) is used in this journal e.g.

The Nigerian Army has proven once again ... that the ECOMOG experiences was a platform which the NA showcased its military prowess as a "giant of Africa" and "a regional policeman" was never in doubt.

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NOTE

The views expressed in the articles and other contributions which appear in this Journal are those of the individual authors and should not be interpreted as the views of the Nigerian Army, the Editorial Advisory Board, or the Editorial Committee.

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

Nigeria since its admission to the United Nations as its 99th member, on 7 October 1960, has been relentless in contributing positively towards the enhancement and maintenance of international peace and security.

The Nigerian military have carved a niche for itself and made the nation proud in the international arena. From the United Nation Peace Keeping Operation in Congo in the 60's to the African Union (UN) and ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) the Nigerian military are held in very high esteem.

In recognition of the nations resolve and commitment to uphold the principles of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and its quest for regional peace and security, the Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal (NAQJ) Volume 4 No1 presents four of six articles that dwell extensively on international peace and security to our esteemed readers.

Brigadier General Aindigh in his paper "Dimensions of Nigeria's contributions to international peace and security," explains that, peace and security remain the twin basic values of man for the development of his potential. He further explained Nigeria's contribution to the UN, highlighting the basis and dimensions of her contribution to the world body.

Dr Remi Aiyede in his article "The Military and Sustenance of Democracy in Nigeria" explore the roles of the military in democratic development world wide. The paper stresses the role of the military in the demise and sustenance of democracies in different parts of the world. He also x-rays the challenges of the military to democracy and measures adopted to deal with it.


Conflict is an inevitable phenomenon as long as individuals, communities and nations interact. Conflicts has its good and bad effects. If managed properly, it improves relations and advancement of societies; If not, it degenerates to violence, sometimes deadly and protracted. Dr Antonia Okoosi-Simbine in her paper "Political Violence and Peace Making in West Africa: Turning Guns to Ploughshares" extensively discusses the causes and effects of conflicts particularly in West Africa. She further categorizes the nature of political violence in the sub-region.

The importance of health care delivery system for the Nigerian Army and the nation can not be over emphasized. However, the fact remains that only very few individuals can afford the cost of the health services, hence the promulgation of National Health Insurance Scheme by the Federal Government. In the paper "National Health Insurance Scheme in the Nigerian Army Health Care Delivery System: Challenges and prospects," Major General Ejeh and Colonel Ajemba explained how financial resources are pooled together from a large population for the benefit of individuals needing the service at any time. It is further explained that the system works because members with high income subsidize low income earners, while those who are healthy subsidize to those who are sick.

The UN Security Council resolution 1674 of 28 April 2006 condemned in strong terms all acts of sexual exploitation and trafficking of women and children by UN personnel. Dr Mohammed Eneikele dwells extensively on this in his paper "Issues and challenges confronting the UN code of conduct against sexual exploitation and abuse in Peace Support Operation."

Roosevelt Idehen in his paper "Bakassi: The green tree accord and the future" x-rays the Nigeria-Cameroon relationship over the disputed Bakassi peninsula. The feud which originated from the colonial period, persisted even after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling gave the peninsula to Cameroon in October 2002, as well as the 'green tree accord' of 12 June 2006. The paper therefore examines the post green tree accord period expressing fears of possible resurgence.

While assuring our esteemed readers of the Editorial Board's resolve to keep you informed with the current happenings around the globe, we also welcome contributions from individuals on military or topical issues for publication in subsequent editions



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Editor

THE MILITARY AND THE SUSTENANCE OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

BY

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the role of the military in democratic development worldwide. It argues that although the military is implicated in the demise of democracy in several countries, the establishment and sustenance of major democracies owe to the achievement of a strong military force. New democracies like Nigeria faced a real challenge concerning the role of the military in governance and were at critical moments unsure of what to do. The pressures for democracy while calling for the removal of the military from governance raises the issue of how to ensure capable and stable military institutions and ensure that they remain confined to their constitutional and public policy roles. The military is a democratic necessity with a paradoxical challenge to democratic order. Hence, the paper examines how the challenge of the military to democracy is characterised and the measures adopted to deal with it worldwide. It then examines the constitutional roles and policy tasks of the Nigerian military, teases out the peculiar challenges of the military for Nigeria and provides insight for repositioning the military to proficiently execute its functions in order to sustain democracy in the country.

Keywords: Military, Sustenance, Democracy, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

Early literature on political development in Africa viewed the military as the prototype of modernity and was portrayed as a bulwark against social unrest, "a modernising and stabilising source of organisational strength in society, and a last stand-by reserve which could be called in, or could take over, to prevent subversion or total collapse of the political order². Unlike politicians who were prone to corruption, ethnicity and indiscipline, the military was regarded to be disciplined, technically rational, nationalist in character and interest. The military was considered predisposed by training and organisation to promote modernisation. But experiences of military rule in Latin America and Africa showed quite clearly that there was nothing final about the military mindset and organisation that make them modernising agencies³. Indeed, military involvement in politics has become a problem for positive social transformation, as many countries witnessed despotic rule and economic decay under military rule.

The process of democratisation for many countries involved not just the return of the military to the barracks but the quest for civilian control of the military. Thus, in the post-military rule era, the question of the role of the military in a democratic context and the specific role the military as an apparatus of the state regarding state politics has become a critical issue. The question relates not just to the political neutrality of the military but the specific positive role that the military can play to protect the democratic order and prevent it from being disrupted by enemies of the state both from within the country and from outside. This has to be done within an appropriate civil-military relation framework that subordinates the military to civilian control without removing from the dignity and eminence of the military as a pre-eminent and defining feature of the modern state. Indeed, most writers on the military in Nigeria have focused on the place and role of the military in the transition to democracy. The central issue relates to the ability and willingness of the military to return to the barracks and provide an appropriate foundation for democratic politics⁴. An important work focused on the dominance of the retired military officers in democratic politics

as a result the experience and wealth accumulated while the military was in direct control of political power for over two decades⁵. Few efforts have focused on the place and role of the military in consolidating democracy⁶.

This paper begins by exploring the role of the military in democratic development worldwide. It argues that although the military is implicated in the demise of democracy in several countries, the establishment and sustenance of major democracies owes to the achievement of a strong military force. Hence, it examines how the challenge of the military to democracy is characterised and the measures adopted to deal with it. The paper then examines the constitutional roles and tasks of the Nigerian military, defines the peculiar challenges of the military for Nigeria and provides insight for repositioning the military to proficiently execute these functions in order to sustain democracy in the country.

MILITARY AND DEMOCRATIC SUSTENANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

As Diamond contends, for the contemporary wave of democratisation to endure, the overriding imperative in the coming years is to consolidate new democracies, such as Nigeria. Democratic consolidation is defined as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimating for democracy, such that all political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine⁷. As Linz and Stepan, among others, have stressed, this legitimating must be more than a commitment to democracy in the abstract. It must also involve a shift in political culture, a transition from "instrumental" to "principled" commitment to the democratic framework, a growth in trust and co-operation among the political competitors and a socialisation of the general population. This can be achieved through both deliberative efforts and the practice of democracy in politics and civil society⁸. Democratic consolidation thus involves a shared normative and behavioural commitment to the specific rules and practices of the country's

constitutional system. Sustaining democracy requires political institutionalisation, behavioural and attitudinal changes that normalise politics and narrow uncertainty. The challenge of sustaining democracy is therefore to ensure that democracy "becomes the only game in town".

According to these authors new democracies can become consolidated by making their electoral democracies deeper and more liberal. This requires greater executive (and military) accountability to both the law and the scrutiny of other branches of the government, as well as the public. It demands the reduction of barriers to political participation and mobilisation by marginalised groups, and more effective protection for the political and civil rights of all citizens. Deepening of democracy will also be facilitated by the institutionalisation of political party system that stimulates mass participation, incorporates marginalised groups and forges vibrant linkages with civil society organisations and party branches and officials at the grassroots.

It is hoped that these measures will improve governance directly by strengthening state capacity. Democratic consolidation and sustenance involves making the economy work, securing social and political order, maintaining basic freedoms, improving horizontal accountability and the rule of law and reducing corruption. In addition to this institutional reforms and strengthening, it also requires a steady programme of reforms to reduce military involvement in non-military issues and subject the military and intelligence establishments to oversight and control by elected civilian leaders.

For countries coming out of military dictatorships, such as the experience in Latin America, Stepan identifies three areas of potential conflicts between armed forces and democratic government which can pose problems for democratic development:

- a. the question of accountability for human rights abuses which continues to generate public distrust of the army;
- b. political institutions are weak and parliament is not equipped to exercise effective oversight, appropriate

- mechanism for oversight has not been established, how to exert control over the military becomes very difficult;
- c. There are no appropriate criteria for defence budget and their post allocation supervision¹⁰.

The net consequence of the failure to resolve these dilemmas, according to Cruz and Diamint is that the military enjoys new forms of autonomy that they describe as 'feudal sovereignty'. For them, to support peace and democracy as they relate to the military, civil society must take an active interest in things military. Democratic political actors must develop and exercise ministerial, legislative and party-based oversight capabilities vis-à-vis the military. They then call on established democracies to implement policies that support the achievement of the above two suggestions¹¹.

To appreciate both the significance of the internal and external factors needed to make the military contribute to the sustenance and consolidation of democracy, it is important to explore the positive and negative roles of the military in sustaining democracy worldwide. This is the perspective of Alum Preece in his essay on 'Democracy and the Military: The Role of Military in the Evolution and Maintenance of Democracy'.

Preece argued that uninterrupted democracy was a rarity. Only six countries went through the 20th century without authoritarian rule: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States, Sweden and Switzerland. The United Kingdom is a marginal case, as a section of it was occupied during World War II. He also argues that the military has played pivotal role in the establishment and sustenance of democracy in these countries. Indeed, democracy could not be established and sustained without a strong military force. Even the democratic states of Greece were defeated by the non-democratic and militarist Sparta in the Peloponnesian war. Democracy in Switzerland was linked to the need to maintain an armed force to protect the country. Democracy in the United Kingdom, and in its ex-colonies of Canada, Australia, United States and New Zealand, has been able to ward off threats to it by superior military strength. The military was used to further the establishment of democracy in

Germany and Japan by the victorious allies after World War II. He identifies other military related factors that conduce to long term sustenance of democracy:

- (a) Geographic isolation, this conduces to democracy because it insulates an existing system from outside military forces.
- (b) Strong alliance in which stronger democratic countries protect the weaker
- (c) Adequate defence arrangement deters invaders, strong organisation and traditions of the military forces affect the likelihood of coups.

He however noted that the collapse of democracy in many countries was accounted for by the following military related reasons:

- i. invasion and conquest
- ii. military coups
- iii. insurrection/civil war (Russia 1917), from coup to civil war (Spain from 1936-1939)
- iv. Other reasons are (1) subversion of democratic institutions by those who originally came to power by virtue of these institutions (Germany 1933, immediate post independence Africa) and (2) miscellaneous revolutions/wars (Ayatollah Khomeini return from exile in the revolution against the Shah of Iran in 1978)¹².

The relationship between the military and democracy can be viewed at three levels. Two of these levels relate to countries that have not been able to establish stable civil-military relations and are experiencing one form of military rule or the other. The question here is how to return the military back to the barracks and restore democratic rule—the question of military disengagement from politics. The second relates to new democracies, those that have successfully returned the military to the barracks and now face the task of ensuring that they remain under civilian control. The third relates to the question of militarism, the influence and implications of military policies and culture for democratic practice

in governance. This applies to all countries with military establishments, a hallmark of the modern state system¹³.

Luckham observes that the military has the capacity to block expansion of the political space, reverse democratisation process or return mid-way. They are also able to determine the terms, conditions and character of the return to constitutional rule¹⁴. These provide a particular challenge of objective civilian control of the military once an elected government is put in place. What does objective civilian control of the military entail? How do we establish objective civilian control?

According to Huntington there are historically two types of control of the military in the west: subjective and objective control. Under subjective control, the military is subjected to the influence and control of the dominant civilian group or leadership within the nation. In other words, subjective civilian control is not a unified civilian control of the military. The varied character and conflicting interest of civilian groups come to bear on the nature of control over the military. Thus, the full civilian control of the military is only a reflection of the full control of a particular group or groups. In this wise subjective control is a reflection of the power relations between the groups in the nation. Subjective control is fraught with difficulties. The most powerful group, which controls the army, may be tempted to use it to acquire and retain political power at the expense of the rest of society. The emphasis of civilian control becomes merely a slogan rather than a universal end in itself.

Subjective control has occurred in various forms in history. It may appear in the form of the maximisation of the power of particular governmental institutions, particular social class, particular constitutional forms, and sub-national groups¹⁵. Subjective control of the military has been dominant in the various authoritarian/military regimes in Africa. Among the methods employed by these regimes include the following: formal legal and constitutional restraints; manipulation of the armed forces' ethnic composition; professional indoctrination; restricting the military's "mission" to external defence rather than domestic public order, material and professional pay-offs (pay, promotions, barracks, equipment);

privileged access to rent-seeking opportunities, such as land and government contracts; co-optation of officers into government positions; political commissariats and party branches in the armed forces; establishment of paramilitary units to counter balance the armed forces, and reliance on foreign military protection¹⁶. While military incursion into politics has been successfully averted in few African countries some of these methods have deepened the problem of military control such that few countries have imploded under the weight of the subsequent contradictions. The lesson from Africa is that subjective control of the military is not only antithetical to democratic practice, it also holds the possibility of swamping democratisation in a tide of armed conflicts between warring factions as in Liberia and Somalia when the military itself falls apart.

According to Huntington objective civilian control of the military involves four elements. The first element is the development of a high level of military professionalism and recognition by the military of the limit of their professional competence. That is, the recognition that there is an independent military sphere. The military's attention is then focused on this sphere, removed from the politicking among the various groups in society. The second element is the effective subordination of the military to civilian political leaders who make the basic decision on foreign and military policy. The military being highly professionalized is ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group, which secures legitimate authority within the state. The military is politically neutral. The third element is the recognition and acceptance by political leaders of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military. The final element is the minimisation of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military¹⁷. Thus, as Cruz and Diamint state very clearly, democracy depends on organised coercive power, armed forces that are endowed with sufficient institutional autonomy that enable them to perform their duties well. But such armed forces have to remain functionally integrated with the state and subordinated to legitimate authority for them to be effective. The idea of autonomy is to "allow the military the discretionary decision-making authority and reserved zones of

expertise and action," but this is done to enable it "harness its institutional prerogatives to the service of a higher order that it does not determine"¹⁸.

However, it is difficult to achieve complete objective civilian control over the military. This is the case because of the tendency of many civilian groups to see such control in subjective terms. Rather than allow the military to be neutral, dominant groups seek to subordinate the officer corps to their own interests. The situation is even more difficult in countries like Nigeria, with a history of military participation in politics.

While in countries like Nigeria, how to bring the military under civilian control and avoid coups takes on particular significance, its military involvement in PKO/PSO the West African sub-region and beyond, makes it imperative that we also address the likely impact of military policies on democratic culture and practice. Nigeria's role in military intervention in conflicts situations in the West African sub-region and its aspiration as a regional power, renders it susceptible to this challenge inevitable.

Johansen¹⁹ has elaborated critical areas where the state system and military policies impede democratic practices in the USA that is of relevance to Nigeria. This threat to democratic deepening is the offshoot of the recognition of the sphere of military competence which should be removed from political interference, as accentuated by the modern state system that we have inherited from the British. According to him, there is an increasingly dysfunctional connection between national military power and liberal democratic requirements in the global state system. The first is the spread of the military mind; the second is the complexity of modern war and weaponry. Others are speed of world events and warfare, secrecy and deception as instruments of security, the concentration of military decision-making power, and traditional national sovereignty.

The first point of relevance to new democracies like Nigeria is the conflict between the military worldview and culture and democratic values. The military mind upholds organisation, and commends the subordination of the individual to the group. The

emphasis is on hierarchy, loyalty, order, discipline and obedience. Democracy places premium on non-conformity and freedom of thought and expression. The emphasis is on constant questioning of authority, discussion of issues and consideration of policy options that are non-violent and respectful of the lives of others. The ascendance of the military especially in times of war often meant that liberal democratic values are compromised. Indeed, the military mentality is one major reason why Ake argued that military rule is a negation of what is uniquely human to rule. He in fact believed that military could never engender democracy because it is an anti-thesis of democracy in regard to its norms, values, purposes and structure. He states further:

The military addresses the extreme and the extraordinary while democracy addresses the routine; the military values discipline and hierarchy, democracy, freedom and equality; the military is oriented to law and order, democracy to diversity, contradiction and competition; the method of the military is violent aggression, that of democracy is persuasion, negotiation and consensus-building²⁰.

Two decades of military rule in Nigeria has left very strong authoritarian imprint on civil life and civil society that conscious effort has to be made to engineer the cultivation of civic virtue to advance democracy. This is very important to remove violence that continues to characterise electoral competition, itself crucial to the effort to crystallise civilian control of the military. So long as authoritarian practices continue to pervade society, democracy will remain fragile, and the threat of military incursion into politics real.

Secondly, modern warfare and weaponry has become so complex, with technical, political and moral dimensions that they defy the comprehension of ordinary citizens. Even those saddled with the responsibility of policy outside the military may not have adequate knowledge to be able to make informed judgement on the matters. Hence, few insiders of the military establishment often take decisions on such matters in secret and sometimes in violation of the legalities of democratic procedures. Thus, in modern representative democracies, decisions on national security have been 'insulated from popular knowledge and control'²¹.

Furthermore, secrecy and deception as part of modern military and security policies promotes public ignorance and misinformation on security matters. They also make it impossible for the public to monitor implementation of agreed policy preferences. Thus, officials could prevent embarrassment even at the expense of national security. Johansen provides ample examples of such incidences in the USA, such as release of radiation, leaking radioactive wastes that caused hazards to employees and extensive radioactive contamination of the earth and atmosphere of which the public were not informed and the responsible officers never held to account²². In Nigeria, this is a particularly difficult area, considering the literacy levels and closeness of government organisations.

In general, therefore, new democracies face great challenges in making their military establishment supportive of democracy in the effort to establish objective civilian control as part of the process of democratic consolidation. Reform has involved the purging of top military leaders across board, placing limitations on political involvement and other constraints on the military, replacement of military officers who occupied high political offices by civilians, creation and strengthening of defence ministries and central staff to exercise control over the military, and privatising military run businesses, the rewriting of the doctrines and revision of the curricula of the academies and military schools to emphasise professionalism and the acquisition of modern equipment for the armed forces.

Huntington is of the view that many countries have done well in these efforts because military officers realised that there are no easy solutions to intractable economic and social problems. They have also realised that sustained involvement in politics has had disastrous effects on the 'coherence, efficiency, and discipline of the army'. Elected leaders have also realised that 'playing politics with the military is playing with a two-edged sword and that a politically neutral professional establishment is most congruent with their interests'. Military reform unlike economic reform imposes few costs on society and produces widespread benefits in terms of reduction in military service, cuts in military spending, curtailment of abuses of human rights, and the transfer of military-run enterprises to private hands²³.

To explore the Nigerian situation further, it is pertinent to investigate the role of the military as stated in public policy and the constitutions and how these roles have not been delivered over the years. This will enable us understand the issues as they manifest in Nigeria and thereby provide appropriate insight into making the military supportive of the sustenance of the democracy.

THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

The role of the military is clearly stated in Chapter VI Part III (C.) Sections 217 to 220 of the 1999 Constitution. According to the constitution, the functions include the following

- (a) Defending Nigeria from external aggression
- (b) Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air;
- (c) Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and
- (d) Performing such other functions as may be prescribed by the national Assembly.

Section 217 (3) requires the army to reflect federal character in the composition of the officer corps and other ranks, while section 218(1) gives power to determine the operational use of the armed forces to the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the Federal Republic.

The constitution also provides limited policy roles for the armed forces through the membership of its leadership in the National Defence Council (NDC) and the National Security Council (NSC). The Third Schedule of the constitution names the Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff as members of the NDC. This Council is to advise the president on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria. The Chief of Defence Staff is also named as member of the NSC that advises the president on matters relating to public security and law enforcement in the country²⁴.

The Constitution also recognises that the military is an important domestic and foreign political fact that influences the formulation of many government policies. The 2004 National Defence Policy²⁵ outlines the specific tasks of the military to include:

- a. Providing advice and information to government on developments in defence worldwide.
- b. Protecting the sovereignty of Nigeria through surveillance and control of Nigeria's land and maritime territory as well as airspace.
- c. Protecting Nigeria's onshore and offshore strategic assets.
- d. Coordinating National Search and Rescue Programmes.
- e. Participating in disaster management and humanitarian relief missions both at home and abroad.
- f. Providing Military aid to Civil Power (MACP), and Military aid to Civil Authority (MACA).

- g. Embarking on non-combatant evacuation of Nigerians in crisis-ridden countries in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- h. Initiating bi-lateral and multi-lateral contacts and exchanges with selected countries.
- i. Participating in multi-national operations to stabilise any state or group of states in the West African sub-region.
- j. Participating in Peace Support missions sponsored by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Organisation (UNO).
- k. Attaining the capabilities to carry out other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

From the above constitutional and policy provisions, the Nigerian military, though a legacy of colonial rule, is underscored by the need to enhance the safety and defence of the nation's social, economic and political institutions against threat arising from other independent states. The safety and security of the country's assets and resources requires internal security, the capacity to deal with any attempt or design to weaken or destroy the state by forces operating within its territorial and institutional confines. Although this is the traditional jurisdiction of the police and other security outfits, the military could be called upon in exceptional circumstances. The military is to be put under civilian control. This failed in 1966 when Nigeria experienced its first military coup that led to the first spell of military dictatorship and a civil war. Subsequent return to democracy was unsuccessful as the mutual constraints between elected political leaders and military commanders proved difficult. Military take-over of governments became the rule rather than the exception. The practical question of how to ensure that the activities of the military are confined to this constitutional role and policy which accords with the western traditions of a non-political role for the military has become Nigeria's major challenge once it returned to democratic rule in 1999.

Consolidating democracy in Nigeria cannot end by conducting an election to replace military dictators with civilians. As experience has shown in the last three general elections, democracy has to be established and gradually institutionalised by conscious efforts by the elite and political leaders over time. To understand the question of the role of the military in Nigeria, it is useful to revisit public debate on the direction for the military that occurred during the transition to democratic rule. Under the General Abdulsalami Abubakar military government, there were open calls for restructuring and reform.

The first and central issue relates to how to keep the military permanently in the barracks. That is how to prevent military seizure of power, once the country successfully returns to democratic rule. Underlying all of these is the question of the appropriate civil-military regime for Nigeria. That is having a military that exists and relates with civil society without being involved in politics.

The second has to do with the regional domination of the military institution. It was argued that the north's dominance of the officer corps of the military has enabled it to use the establishment as an instrument of perpetuating its hold on power at the centre. The objective situation is described by Ali: "With the Northern control of the Army thus established and consolidated, it was not long for the vital interests of the north to dominate the incipient political inversion of the Army into a political arm of the northern hegemonic resurgence"²⁶.

The third perspective from the human rights movement accused the military of having an entrenched interest in politics. This of course refers to the privileges, rapid promotions and stupendous wealth that political soldiers have enjoyed after they succeeded with a coup. The typical question raised in this regard is that put forward by Adekanye. "Whether soldiers, who have been accustomed to being treated like lords as the politicians before them, would be content with the drab and unprestigious life of the

barracks"²⁷. The challenge is to evolve a culture and tradition within the military that uphold professionalism with its prestige and honour. According to this reading people now join the army as a way to achieving political office.

Four suggestions have been put forward as a solution to these challenges. The first calls for a complete overhaul or disbanding of the military. The point has been emphasised by Ake who argued that perhaps the time has come for Africa to consider abolishing the military altogether in favour of an enhanced police force and civil defence – an arrangement that is cheaper, more democratic and inimical to coups. According to him, our military is very expensively redundant in the absence of a credible external threat and very expensively useless against a credible threat²⁸.

The second was made by Nnamdi Azikiwe who proposed the formation of a 'combined civil military government' (diarchy) for a period of at least five years after the withdrawal of the military from politics and the restoration of constitutional government.

The third calls for the decentralisation of the military structure into zonal commands. This is to ensure that no particular region or ethnic group captures the military.

The fourth suggestion is a moderate view, which emphasises the need for civilian control of the military establishment. Experience, since the return to democratic rule in 1999, shows that Nigeria has taken this last option of finding an appropriate civil-military relations framework, as seen in the reform of the military under the Obasanjo government.

The civilian leadership under Obasanjo and Yar'Adua have retired and changed the military top leadership several times, underlining civilian control of the armed forces. In 1999 over 60 generals and other officers in the middle ranks across the three services that held political offices in the past were retired. Many of those retired in this great purge were former ministers, military

state administrators and notable chiefs of task forces. This purge was to make a 'clean break from the years of military incursion into politics which had been a disaster, and to refocus the attention of the military on the urgent reprofessionalisation of the armed forces and the preparation of its officers to meet their constitutional responsibilities'²⁹.

Efforts are being made to professionalize the military, re-indoctrinate it on values of subordination to civilian rule, improve its capacity and give it a national apolitical outlook. These efforts particularly under the Obasanjo regime, involved a partnership between the government of Nigeria and the United States using the Military Professionals Resource International (MPRI) a private corporation made up of senior retired US military officers and other government officials. The intervention by IMPRI covers four critical areas: civil-military relations, resource management, doctrine and training systems and armed forces simulation centre. Beyond these efforts by the political leadership, the top leadership of the armed forces have expressed commitment to security sector transformation. But there are several challenges that are yet to be resolved³⁰.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What the foregoing illustrates is the fact that new democracies like Nigeria face a real challenge concerning the role of the military in governance and were at critical moments unsure of what to do. The pressures for democracy while calling for the removal of the military from governance raises the issue of how to ensure capable and stable military institutions and ensure that they remain confined to their constitutional roles. The military is a democratic necessity with a paradoxical challenge to democratic order. As we have seen, democracy requires a strong coercive force that can defend it from external aggression and

ward off internal insurrection. Thus, without the military, democracy cannot be secured. But democracy as a preferred form of governance throws up the challenge of dealing with the role of the military within the political system in countries like Nigeria that have experienced unstable civil-military relations.

Four issues are germane here: democratic subordination of the military and civilian supremacy, the economic sustainability of the military to improve military efficiency and capability, institutional stability of the military establishment and the need for the military institution to have national outlook, and check on militarism by demilitarising society. These call for re-professionalizing the army in order to improve its capability, efficiency, effectiveness, prestige and self-image as an organisation. This will involve modernisation, strengthening research and development to promote the economic and social relevance of the military. More critical is the need to rework the military's internal processes and procedures to shore up transparency and accountability in order to reduce corruption.

Also important is the need to develop and inculcate a culture within the military that recognises the military as a part of civil society. This means that the military elite should not be too distinct from the general public without actually getting involved in politics. This process has to begin with the training content of the military academies. The content should reflect the military's relations with civil society in meeting the challenges of security and defence in an age where there is a blurring of the spheres of the military and civil jurisdiction in terms of technology, roles and risks. The military must be trained to accept the constitutional provisions that empower civilian government to control the armed forces. Full time members of the military must not become members of political parties or parliament even covertly.

There should be a policy to establish a large reserve force as part of the military. This will enable the army not to get out of tune with popular feeling. It will also mediate against the centralist organisation that is advantageous to those organising coups. Finally, Nigeria needs to sustain and expand existing links with other countries' armed forces, especially democratic countries, to foster military cooperation and exposure to military roles and status in a democracy. Particularly important are programmes designed to raise standards of training and professionalism.

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