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Religion and the Consolidation  
of Democracy in Mali:  
The Dog that Doesn't Bark

*Stephen A. Harmon*

Religion and Citizenship in  
Northern Nigeria:  
The Politics of Shari'ah

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The Stabilising Role of  
Muslim Brotherhoods in  
Senegal:  
The Case of Mouridism

*Alpha Diedhiou*

Briefings

Reviews

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## 'Pay Back Time': Ethno-religious Violence In Nigeria, 1999-2004.

By Rasheed Olaniyi<sup>1</sup>

### French Abstract (Résumé)

*Depuis le retour à un régime civil en 1999, la translocation du génocide réciproque sous forme de violence ethno-religieuse a ravagé des communautés au Nigeria. Les hostilités et l'intolérance sont en augmentation, et les attaques de représailles se multiplient. Cette période a connu l'agitation de la jeunesse, la résurgence de milices ethniques, religieuses et politiques, d'armées privées ainsi que de mercenaires recrutés dans les pays voisins usant d'armes sophistiquées pour un carnage massif. Entre 1999 et 2004, plus de 1 000 affrontements communaux ont eu lieu faisant plus de 50 000 morts, et plus d'un million de citoyens intérieurement déplacés, et des milliards de Nairas perdus par les victimes et par l'économie locale. Les points traditionnels de violence ont continué de faire l'objet de carnage régulier, tandis que des zones qui étaient jusque là relativement paisibles se sont transformées en champs de bataille, comme on l'a constaté dans l'Etat du Plateau. Cet article soutient que la translocation de la violence ethno-religieuse a mis en lumière la fragilité de la Nation nigérienne, la faiblesse du constitutionalisme tel qu'il se rapporte au principe de citoyenneté et la militarisation accrue des identités ethno-religieuses. Il conclut que la spirale de violence ethno-religieuse était caractérisée par un débordement des conflits mais une telle violence avait des questions saillantes, notamment le contrôle des ressources, la dichotomie indigène/colonisateur, un espace politique contracté, l'exclusion sociale et les réponses à la récession économique.*

### Introduction: The Trans-location of Ethno-religious violence

Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the trans-location of mutual genocide in the form of ethno-religious violence has ravaged communities in Nigeria. Hostilities and intolerance are on the increase and reprisal attacks are burgeoning. The era witnessed youth restiveness, the resurgence of ethnic, religious and political militias, private armies as well as hired mercenaries from neighbouring countries using sophisticated weapons for massive carnage. Between 1999 and 2004, over 1,000 violent communal clashes occurred with over 50,000 lives lost, over one million citizens internally displaced and billions of Naira lost by the victims and the local economy. The traditional flashpoints of violence have continued to experience more regular carnage, while areas that were hitherto relatively peaceful, transformed into battlefields as witnessed in Kano and Plateau States respectively. This paper argues that the translocation of ethno-religious

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violence exposed the fragility of the Nigerian nation, the weakness of constitutionalism as it relates to the principle of citizenship and the increasing militarisation of ethno-religious identities. It concludes that the spiral of ethno-religious violence were characterised by spill-over conflicts, but such violence had salient issues including resource control, indigene/settler dichotomy, contracted political space, social exclusion and responses to economic recession.

Indeed, the period 1999 to 2004 could only be compared to the genocide witnessed from 1966 to 1970 in the entire history of Nigeria. In the context of hegemonic control and competition for resource control, the politics of identity has been militarised and directed at eliminating other interest groups, re-negotiating ethnic boundaries and ethno-religious space. The trans-location of ethno-religious violence implies mutual genocide in which violence has given rise to violence and counter-violence in several communities. This has led to the wanton destruction of lives and property and a frightening state of insecurity. As one community recovers from an orgy of violence, the spillover erupts in another community with more devastating consequences that reverberate across the country. Violence became contagious, spreading from one part of the country to another and from rural to urban. Nigeria is witnessing a recrudescence of seemingly endless hostilities among communities. There are increasing attempts by Nigerians to resist subjugations from the yoke of either the 'settlers' or the 'indigenes.' The spillover conflicts were nurtured passionately to either avenge the killings of one's ethnic group and/or of religious faith that engulfed parts of Northern Nigeria since the Maitatsine religious violence in the 1980s. The violence of genocide has been enormous not only because of the apparent lack of institutional mechanism to prosecute the perpetrators, but because the perpetrators are either protected by governments or escape with impunity. Equally, the processes of memory associated with the traumatic experience of ethno-religious genocide and refugee crisis were fundamental elements in the trans-location of violence in Nigeria. Ethnic and religious violence is the extreme manifestation of conflicts rooted in the crises of identity. Although it involves grievances directed against state incapacity and the unequal distribution of social and economic power, it can hardly be ascribed with attributes of social emancipation often associated with revolutionary violence.<sup>2</sup>

When the boundaries overlap between those who control political power, the economy and an ethnic group, the conflicts become more complicated at the ethnic level.<sup>3</sup> This has been the experience of the Hausa and Yoruba episodic conflicts on the one hand and with other ethnic groups on others since the transition from military to civilian rule in 1999.<sup>4</sup> For example, as noted by Gasa:

<sup>2</sup> S.G. Egwu, *Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria* (Jos: African Centre for Democratic Governance - AFRIGOV, 2001), p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> T.D. Sisk, 'Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Region: From Classification to Explanation', in: Goor Luc Van De, et al, eds., *Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States* (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), p. vii.

<sup>4</sup> R. Olaniyi, 'Urban Violence, Ethnic Conflicts and Diaspora Identity: The Travails of the Yoruba Community in Metropolitan Kano' in A.E. Eruvbetine, ed., *The Humanistic Management of Pluralism: A formula for Development in Nigeria* (Lagos: Faculty of Arts, University of Lagos, 2001), pp. 222-231.

There has been an increase in the incidence of conflicts between the Hausa and Yoruba settler communities living outside their respective home regions; within the Niger Delta; between Ilaje and Ijaw in the riverine part of Ondo state; between pan-Yoruba activists (OPC) fighting alongside Itsekiri against Ijaw in metropolitan Lagos (partly a spill-over of the Niger Delta crisis); between Ijaw and Yoruba in Port Harcourt and other cities and towns in the Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states; and between Yoruba and Hausa Fulani in the major cities of South-western and far Northern Nigeria. There have also arisen fierce and extremely bloody clashes involving communities of otherwise similar ethnic and linguistic identities.... These rising inter-ethnic and communal conflicts and clashes have already resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and massive destruction. Combatants on both sides have used all means for the prosecution of their objectives, including criminal acts like abductions, torture, rape, physical mutilations and murders.<sup>5</sup>

Hate memories aggravated ethno-religious genocide, while a mass of ethnic, religious and political entrepreneurs who mobilised primordial sentiments contributed to its trans-location through calumny campaigns in the media, sponsoring of militia groups and incendiary remarks. The protracted genocide has created a deep sense of xenophobia and nostalgia among Nigerians and intensified the push for a re-negotiation of the Nigeria nation by the persistent clamour for a Sovereign National Conference from organised ethnic, religious and regional groups, politicians, human rights activists and government officials. For example, a group of Muslim organisations led by Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed after an emergency meeting in Kaduna on 11 May, 2004 observed that:

It is either Sovereign National Conference or we go to war because the Federal Government has failed and the system has collapsed.<sup>6</sup>

This paper presents three case studies of genocide in Yelwa, Kano and Numan during which the militarisation of identities was displayed, leading to reprisal attacks both in time and location.

### **Yelwa Genocide, 2-7 May, 2004**

This presents an apt example of the spiral of ethno-religious violence that has engulfed Nigeria since the return to democratic rule. For four years, violence engulfed communities in Plateau State with reprisal attacks in Kano. Political intrigues among the power elites snowballed into ethno-religious violence. Land scarcity, chieftaincy disputes and political competition set communities against their neighbours. Political competition fuelled the riots in Jos over the Chairmanship of Jos North Local Government in 1994. This was compounded by the long-standing contested hierarchies of citizenship leading to the deepening of the dichotomy between the socially stratified categories of 'indigenes and settlers.' In this way, ethno-religious identities were deployed in militarised fashion. Both the democratically elected leaders and traditional

<sup>5</sup> N. Gasa, ed., *Democracy in Nigeria* (Sweden: International IDEA, 2001), p. 376.

<sup>6</sup> J. Lohor, I. Adoba, A. Madugba, B. Nasir and F. Peter-Omale, 'Yelwa: Datti Ahmed Threatens War', *Thisday Newspaper* (May 13, 2004), p. 1-2.

rulers remained combatants in the violence through provocative pronouncements or deliberate security laxity. Indeed, Plateau State has a large pool of disenchanting retired and decommissioned soldiers, some of whom emerged as traditional rulers. For example, paramount rulers of Ngas, Mwaghavul, Ankwoi, Doma Wamba and more recently Jos, where violence has festered for years are either former soldiers or policemen. The state was equally a 'trough of poverty' despite the abundance of agricultural produce and solid mineral deposits. While agriculture has collapsed due to poor facilities, the illegal mining of minerals by immigrants who repatriate their gains could not boost the local economy. In all, recurrent conflicts caused by competition over resources created a large population of refugees, large scale destruction of lives and property depleting the food reserves and accumulated capital of those affected.<sup>7</sup>

The build-up to the protracted crisis in Plateau State had its roots in the conflicts between local farmers and Fulani pastoralists over recriminations on the destruction of crops by cattle or killing of cattle by local farmers. At Quann Pan, communal disturbances occurred in March 2001 when some Fulani pastoralists attacked the Tiv compounds in Kundum village of Bakin Ciyawa in Kwande district that led to the killing of one Mr. Anthony Dafaan, a Kwan man and some members of his family. This resulted in a reprisal attack by Kwan mercenaries hired to avenge the death of their Kwan kinsmen. In May of the same year, marauders attacked Shendam and unleashed violence on Gidan Zuru village. Between 11-15 April, 2001, there was another outburst of violence in Wase following a lingering dispute as to who should harvest a locust bean tree in Nassarawa village of Wase between a Taroh and Bogghom Muslim man. By 20 May, 2001, a reprisal attack on the Muslims in Langtang occurred after most of their people became refugees as a result of the spill over war in Wase. The violence was largely due to the inter-ethnic strife in nearby Kanam Local Government Area that led to the displacement of the Taroh of Wase who became refugees in Langtang North. The spiral of conflicts, refugee crisis and memory of hate culminated into a bigger violence in Jos metropolis between 7 and 12 September, 2001.

In September, 2001 violence broke out in Jos metropolis due to the agitation of Christians against the attempt to introduce Sharia in the state. After Juma'at Services in the Congo Russia area of Jos, Muslim and Christian youths carried out attacks and counter attacks against each other's interests and institutions. The violence was alleged to have been sparked off when a young Christian lady, 21-year-old Rhoda Haruna Nyam attempted to pass through a blocked section of the street meant for Muslim prayers. Muslims persuaded her to turn back but she refused. She was eventually beaten and chased off. The reprisal began between Christians and Muslims. The fratricidal war was a fall-out of age-long intrigues of resource control and political rivalry over the ownership of Jos. The intrigues were between the Berom, Anaguta and the Afizere predominantly Christians categorised as indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani Muslims who were categorised as settlers. Arms were freely employed. Over 1,000 people were killed; 5 Mosques, 3 Churches, 41 vehicles and 56 houses were burnt; 7,000 persons were displaced as refugees and over N80 million worth of property were lost to looting and fires.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> N. Gasa, *Democracy in Nigeria*, (2001), p. 299.

<sup>8</sup> A. Philip, 'Killing in the name of God', *Newswatch Magazine* (May 2004), p. 21; Ayoola Olajide, 'Crisis in Plateau: The Road to State of Emergency', *The Comet Newspaper*, (May 20, 2004), p. 6.

The Jos mayhem sparked off crises and reprisal attacks in other parts of the country as the displaced persons arrived in their towns. In Onitsha, the arrival of three corpses sparked off demonstrations. Hence, Hausa Muslims numbering over 700 took refuge at the 302 Artillery Barracks Onitsha. In an unprecedented manner, many were stunned when the dreaded Bakassi Boys, rather than fighting on the side of the rampaging youths, controlled the mob and appealed to them not to take revenge on the Hausa living in Onitsha. At Uyo, the capital of Akwa Ibom State, Hausa/Fulani Muslim residents fled their homes and business premises in the wake of the crisis. They were attacked by angry youths following the gory tales relayed by twelve students from Uyo who were in Jos for a Law conference but managed to escape.<sup>9</sup> These reprisal attacks had their antecedents in the history of conflicts in Nigeria. Between June 1978 and December 1989, 34 religious clashes involving Christians and Muslims were recorded. In December 1980, the Maitatsine riot started in Kano and engulfed other Northern cities. Between December 1980 and April 1985, Maitatsine struck in five states: Borno State (October 26, 1982); Kaduna State (October 29, 1982); Kano State (October, 1983); Defunct Gongola State (February 27, 1984); and Bauchi State (April, 1985). In 1987, Kafanchan riots spilled over into Kaduna, Zaria and Katsina as Muslims attacked Christians and their businesses in retaliation for the death of their fellow Muslims in Kafanchan. In 1999, the Yoruba-Hausa genocide in Sagamu was revenged in Kano; Lagos and Ibadan in 2000 and 2001. In February 2000, similar reprisal attacks were carried out on the Hausa/Fulani residents in Aba, Umuahia, Owerri and Okigwe over the Sharia riots in Kaduna State that affected Igbo residents. The Sharia riots between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna and its environs led to the killing of over 600 people; 67,208 persons displaced; 961 houses destroyed; 746 vehicles burnt; 123 Churches and 55 Mosques burnt; 100 persons sustained injuries and one police out-post burnt.<sup>10</sup>

From 30 December, 2001, various communities in Plateau State continued to live in turmoil, constant apprehension and pandemonium. Turu, Vwang, Fwul, Dagey, Kwall and several communities were attacked by groups of Hausa and Fulani. Many people were killed and property destroyed. In these attacks, many people were killed with the use of sophisticated weapons such as AK 47.<sup>11</sup> On 12 June, 2002 the communities of Kwi, Kassa, Sho, Gwei, Rakot and surrounding hamlets were attacked with sophisticated weapons in another round of attacks. On 26 June, 2002, violence erupted in Yelwa. Many people were killed and rendered homeless. Churches were destroyed. This violence spread to Shendam, parts of Langtang, Dadin Kowa, Quan Pan and Mabudi. By 1 July 2002, it had spread to Kadarko, Wadata-Garga, Farin Ruwa, Wase, Chepkwai and parts of Kanam. The attacks were allegedly perpetrated by armed bandits of Fulani stock. The state government lost the ability to ensure the security of lives and properties, redressing the scale of fighting, revenge and counter revenge. Taroh people alongside some other Plateau ethnic groups signed a memo demanding for a Wase South Local Government to be carved out of Wase Emirate. But the Wase Emir conferred on Governor Joshua Dariye the title of *Sardaunan Wase*, thus making him a senior counsellor or adviser of the Wase Emirate Council. The Taroh Elders' Forum (TEF) and the Taroh Progressive Youth Association (TAPYA)

<sup>9</sup> S. Offi and M. Adeyi, 'The Fallout of a Carnage', *Tell Magazine* (October 1, 2001), p. 60.

<sup>10</sup> H. Abdu, 'Ethno-Religious Crisis in Kaduna: Impact on Women and Children' in E.E.O. Alemika and F. Okoye, *Ethno-Religious and Democracy in Nigeria: Challenges* (Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor, 2002), pp. 127-128.

<sup>11</sup> N. Bagudu, 'Chaos Galore on the Plateau', *Our Vision News Magazine* (September, 2002), p. 9.



observed that Dariye had romanced with the Hausa/Fulani since he was out of favour with the indigenes. According to the Taroh Elders Forum, the massacre started on a deceptive note. The Emir of Wase, Alhaji Haruna Abdullahi invited Taroh Community leaders and elders all over Wase LGA to come to his palace for a meeting to discuss the rising crisis. However, the Taroh leaders were ambushed by Hausa/Fulani. Some of the leaders were killed. The killing-spree spread over the entire Wase Local Government Area. About 94 villages and towns were deserted and over 300,000 refugees were camped at Gazum, Bwaret, Pil-Gani, Langtang, Mabudi, Talwang Jidadi.<sup>12</sup>

In February, 2004 Hausa/Fulani Muslims launched an armed attack on the indigenous Gamai and Christian neighbours in Yelwa, killing over 300 people, 49 of them in a Church where they took refuge. For ten weeks, the Gamai and Christians furtively planned their revenge mission. According to one of their war commanders, Danjuma Mugnan:

For how long shall we continue to live outside our domain (as refugees)?  
We have to re-group and fight for where we belong. This is our land; it's  
not as if we came from somewhere to settle.<sup>13</sup>

The attacks were influenced by religious sentiments, given the hoisting of the portraits of Osama Bin Laden in Yelwa Shendam. The town was also declared as part of Zamfara State where Sharia was first introduced as part of the criminal law in 1999. Churches and houses belonging to Christians were razed.<sup>14</sup> The leadership of the Christian Association alleged that Muslims invited mercenaries from neighbouring states and countries.<sup>15</sup>

On 3 May, Christians who thought they had lost out in previous genocides carried out a revenge mission on the Hausa/Fulani Muslims. The devastation of the attack was allegedly masterminded by serving and retired army officers. This was because of the level of professionalism shown in the way attacks and retreats were conducted; the quality and quantity of guns and bullets used and the level of destruction suffered by women and children. Heavily armed Taroh militia invaded Yelwa on foot and in jeeps, shooting semi-automatic rifles and burning houses. The attack rendered 15,000 people homeless. Many took refuge in Bauchi and Nassarawa States and over 630 people were killed<sup>16</sup>. According to Prof. Igna Gabriel, Federal Commissioner, National Commission for Refugees, Plateau State had the lion's share of the 800,000 people in relief camps across the country.<sup>17</sup> The Ulama indicted the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Shendam, in conjunction with the Christian Association of Nigeria, as the brain behind this orchestrated 'genocide'.

<sup>12</sup> M. Damisa, 'How Tarok People Were Massacred', *Our Vision New Magazine* (September 2002), pp. 18-20.

<sup>13</sup> S. Odufa, 'Fire and Brimstone in Yelwa', *BBC Focus on Africa* (June 2004), p. 26.

<sup>14</sup> A. M. Lar, 'They (Muslims) Said They Were Followers of Bin Laden', *Insider Weekly* (June 14, 2004), pp. 22-26.

<sup>15</sup> Y. Pam, 'Terrorists Were Invited', *Insider Weekly* (June 14, 2004), p. 28.

<sup>16</sup> Ulama/Elders Council, Plateau State, 'The Christians' Plot to Eliminate Us', *Insider Weekly* (June 14, 2004), p. 20-23.

<sup>17</sup> G. Ogundare, 'Curfew on the Plateau', *The News Magazine* (May 17, 2004), p. 33.

The Governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye was accused of being partisan in his responses to the crises and indeed, his actions inflamed the embers of hatred among the warring groups. Dariye considered the 2004 ethno-religious war in Plateau State as a Fulani/Hausa Muslim agenda to celebrate the bicentenary of the Sokoto Jihad that was fought by Shehu Usman Dan Fodiyo in 1804. He further questioned the citizenship status of the Hausa/ Fulani and categorised them as settlers without any right to claim any part of Plateau State. According to him:

Jos, capital of Plateau state is owned by the natives. Simple. Every Hausa man in Jos is a settler whether he likes it or not... Even if I spend 150 years in Bukuru, I cannot become an indigene of Du.... It is an Al Qaeda agenda to bring down Plateau State....<sup>18</sup>

Dariye's policy of exclusion was reinforced by Victor Dung Pam, the paramount ruler, Gbong Gwon Jos who stated that 'even if the Hausa/ Fulani spent 1,000 years in Plateau, they cannot claim indigeneship. The Hausa/Fulani will not be indigenes here'.<sup>19</sup>

The concept of settlers or the non-native syndrome hardened into the theory of ethnic exclusiveness, moulded and propagated to foist a pejorative meaning to advance economic and political control among competing elite groups. Since the riots in Yelwa, the resurgence of vendetta has been repeatedly invoked in response to communal or religious violence in Nigeria. Those from Yelwa maintained that their action was meant to avenge the genocide of their kinsmen in Taroh. The genocide in Taroh was equally an act of vengeance.<sup>20</sup>

It was indeed an endless circle. The continual deployment of vendetta indicates that the Nigerian state has failed in its statutory obligation to guarantee peace and stability forcing people to revert to violence in settling scores. There is a growing disenchantment with the state in respect of its ability to guarantee the rule of law. This has given rise to extra-judicial political, religious and ethnic militias such as the Bakassi Boys, Oodua Peoples' Congress, Ijaw Youth Congress, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Tiv Defence Corps and *Hisbah* (Sharia Police). These groups compete with the state in the use of violence and are sometimes financed officially by state agents. For example, between January 1999 and January 2000, the youth wing of the Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC) was alleged to have launched 53 violent attacks in Lagos and masterminded about 60 per cent of the 200 violent conflicts recorded nationwide.<sup>21</sup> In both Western Nigeria and the Niger Delta, youth mobilisation challenged the erstwhile culture of class compromise that has characterised the traditional and modern elite with the state, and replaced it with a culture of confrontation and heightening ethnic tension.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>18</sup> 'What Dariye Did Say', *Weekly Trust* (May 15, 2004).

<sup>19</sup> V.D. Pam, 'Hausa/Fulani Have No Claim to Land in Plateau' by Shola Oshunkeye in *Tell Magazine* (May 31, 2004), p. 22-23.

<sup>20</sup> J. Salihu, 'The Culture of Vendetta', *The Guardian Newspaper* (May 25, 2004), p. 75.

<sup>21</sup> A. Ikelegbe, 'The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society, Evidence from Nigeria', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39, 1 (2001), p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> C. Obi, as cited by A. R. Mustapha, 'Intra-State Challenges to the Nation-state Project in Africa Report of the 2002 CODESRIA Governance Institute', *CODESRIA Bulletin*, Special Issue, 2, 3 & 4 (2003), p. 29.

For four years, the government of Plateau State showed incapacity in dealing with the spiral of genocide, exposing citizens to attacks from ethnic militias and mercenaries on both sides of the divide until the culmination of the process in the Yelwa genocide. Large-scale killings in the form of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by mercenaries took place in Langtang South and Langtang North. Mercenaries were recruited and were allegedly offered N15,000.00 per day. While the Taroh recruited the demobilised soldiers whose pensions and welfare had not been met by the state, the Hausa/Fulani recruited mercenaries from neighbouring states and countries.

In his special national broadcast on the State of Emergency in Plateau, President Obasanjo averred that:

Since 2001...the situation has steadily deteriorated politically largely due to the failure of governance and the gross inefficiency in managing the rich and robust diversity of the state. Tension and social differences have been exacerbated rather than building new bridges of harmony, tolerance, inclusion, and accommodation....Violence has reached unprecedented levels and hundreds have been killed with much more wounded or displaced from their homes on account of their ethnic or religious identification.

...it has become imperative that the bloodshed in Plateau which has reverberated in Kano and is threatening Kaduna, Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe, Benue and Nassarawa, even the Federal Capital Territory, should and must be stopped. The spillover from Kano is already threatening Owerri and Umuahia.<sup>23</sup>

The slamming of the State of Emergency in Plateau State (leading to the suspension of the State Governor and the House of Assembly) merely gave credence to President Obasanjo's autocratic rule, but did not in any way serve as panacea to the violence.

Despite the State of Emergency, violence continued unabated in Plateau State because the fundamental causes of unequal access to justice, power and resources were not addressed. On 18 May, 2004, militiamen from Atiri and Azara villages in Nassarawa invaded Sabon-Gida village at Shendam, killing five persons. On 20 May, Fulani insurgents killed 30 persons in Quaan Pan Local Government Area. By 22 May, the number of casualties had reached 74 in the renewed fighting in five Gamai villages of Quaan Pan. According to Stephen Sarki Musa, the Secretary General of Gamai Unity Development Association:

Those armed men used the neighbouring border villages of Atiri and Azara in Nassarawa, killed 24 people in Barkin Giyawa, 10 in Sabon-Gida, 15 in Jirin, 18 in Gidan Sabon and 7 in Saminaka village.<sup>24</sup>

On 25 May, five persons were killed during the genocide in Lyangjit village of Wase Local Government and on 2 June, militiamen killed 13 persons at a border town between Benue and Plateau States.

Since the declaration of Emergency Rule on Plateau State on 18 May, 2004 violence has not only

<sup>23</sup> 'State of Emergency in Plateau', *New Nigerian Newspaper* (May 19, 2004), p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> C. Ndujihe, 'Violent Clashes Blemish on Emergency Rule', *The Guardian Newspaper* (June 25, 2004), p. 8.

continued in the state, but also spread to states such as Benue, Adamawa, Cross River and Rivers. Over 13 violent clashes occurred in these states with over 205 persons killed and several others displaced as refugees. For example, the Tiv Defence Corps (TDC), an ethnic militia group, invaded Adikpo village in Kwande Local Government Area of Benue State and killed five persons during a politically motivated crisis. Between 28 May and 16 June, further communal clashes in Benue State claimed 18 lives: the Ullam/Ugambe crisis and the Igubua in Kwande crisis. On 17<sup>th</sup> June, 10 persons were killed when the Tiv Defence Corps (TDC) militiamen attacked Jato-Aka community in Benue State.<sup>25</sup> Some ex-servicemen in Benue State were indicted by the Senate Committee on the crisis in Benue as the militant leaders responsible for the procurement of arms and training of the militia in the politically motivated crisis. Large quantities of illegally acquired arms abound in the state especially in the hands of militia groups. Most of the houses destroyed were done by means of sophisticated weapons.<sup>26</sup>

The spiral of violence produced thousands of internally displaced persons. In Lafia, Nassarawa State, there were 8,000 refugees; 25 camps in Bauchi State spread across nine local government areas had 30,000 refugees; there were 25,000 refugees at Ibbi in Taraba State and 25,000 refugees in Boki, Cross River State.<sup>27</sup>

By 31 May, reprisal attacks of the ethno-religious violence in Yelwa-Shendam had spread to Jega, the commercial nerve centre of Kebbi State. Two persons were killed, eight Churches and two residential houses were burnt, while 28 shops were vandalised.<sup>28</sup>

In the South - South, on 4 June, a team of police and military personnel revisited the Odi massacre on three Rivers State communities killing 30 persons. They had been sent to rescue two of their colleagues kidnapped by some militia men. On 12 June, eight persons were killed in communal violence between the people of Ikot Efut Inwang and Ifiang at Isighi in Akpabuyo, Cross River State over a land dispute. The war of cults in Rivers State has claimed over 500 lives with violent clashes in Port Harcourt, Okrika, Buguma, Tombia, Ogbukiri and Amadiama. According to the revelation of the leader of Ijaw Youths Congress and Egbesu Boys, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari:

The streets of Port Harcourt are no longer safe. Night life has equally vanished due to attack and counter attack of the various cults.... Our old beautiful Port Harcourt has lost its beauty.... Buguma is laid waste. Tombia is desolate. Amadiama has become a battle ground. Okrika is the centre of cannibalism. Our streets are no longer safe for children.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> C. Ndujihe, 'Violent Clashes Blemish on Emergency Rule', *The Guardian Newspaper* (June 2004), p. 8.

<sup>26</sup> K. Ologbondiyan, 'Senate Blames Ayu, Unongo for Benue Crisis, Unmasks Sponsors of Arma Procurement, Militia Training', *Thisday Newspaper* (June 25, 2004), pp. 1 & 4.

<sup>27</sup> S.S. Makarfi, 'You cannot be a Refugee in Your Country-DG NEMA' in *Daily Trust Newspaper* (May 17, 2004), p. 21.

<sup>28</sup> M. Abraham, 'Two Die in Communal Clash in Kebbi' p. 5; 'Jega Crisis: Aliero Promises to Rebuild Burnt Churches', *Nigerian Tribune Newspaper* (May 31, 2004), p. 40; 'Religious Violence Rocks Kebbi', *Daily Champion Newspaper* (May 31, 2004), p.1..

<sup>29</sup> U. Usoro, 'Bizarre! Cult Members Eat Human Flesh, Drink Blood and Initiate Primary School Pupils', *Saturday Sun Newspaper* (June 19, 2004), p. 30.

Babarinsa sums up the situation:

If the Middle-Belt is the manufacturer of refugees, the Delta region is the creator of cemeteries. Who can count the weeks since 1999 that Delta region had been freed of communal violence? Who can remember when last the region had witnessed a week without violence against outsiders?<sup>30</sup>

### Kano Mayhem, 11-13 May, 2004

The Yelwa-Shendam reprisal in Kano had its root cause in the occupation of Iraq, the imprisonment of President Saddam Hussein, the continued presence of America in the country; and the opposition against the full implementation of Sharia legal system in Kano State by the Christian and non-indigene associations. Urban violence in Kano particularly in 1953, 1966, 1967-1970, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004 were characterised by four basic traditional tendencies. The first explanatory schema is its reprisal characteristics. Most of these conflicts were rooted in deep-seated local grievances triggered by national and/or international events. For example, the May 1953 riots occurred as a violent revenge of the assault on northern Nigerian parliamentarians in Lagos and the stance of the Action Group to launch a self-government campaign in Kano; the 1966 riots were in retaliation of the brutal killing of Northern Nigerian leaders and politicians and the 2001 ethno-religious violence was a spill-over of the occupation of Afghanistan by the Allied Forces led by the United States of America. The second explanatory schema is the early warning sign. Special prayers, peaceful processions and assaults often preceded urban violence in Kano. The third is the actors. Most of these violent acts were perpetrated by dreadful youth gangs including the Yandaba, Yandoka Amarya, street urchins and Almajiri. The fourth is the target in which the politics of violence is selective. The targets of these violent acts were the non-indigenes and their socio-economic institutions.

Some weeks before the May 2004 mayhem, tension was rife in Kano over the American presence in Iraq, the killing of Muslim civilians and assaults on prisoners. In Kano, some non-indigenes and Christians opposed the 2004 Amended Bill by the State House of Assembly, which places a N50,000 fine and/or one year prison term for any non-Muslim caught consuming alcohol while a Muslim that commits the same offence would receive 80 lashes.<sup>31</sup>

The President of the Hotel and Liquor Licences Association of Nigeria, Kano State Branch, Chief Olayiwola Adio Adeaga noted that there are about 350 hotels, 500 beer parlours and over 250 taverns, stressing that if the Sharia bill should be passed, at least 500,000 people would be put out of business.<sup>32</sup> Christian associations considered the Sharia law as an attempt to forcefully Islamise the Christians in Kano State. The situation was aggravated by the resurgence of ethno-religious violence in Plateau in which many Muslims were killed and some victims forced to relocate to Kano as refugees. The arrival of the refugees and corpses from the

<sup>30</sup> D. Babarinsa, 'Still Searching for Paradise', *Tell Magazine* (May 17, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>31</sup> K. Oyelere, 'Christians Fault Kano Government's Law on Alcohol', *Nigerian Tribune Newspaper* (May 10, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> C. Nwankwo, 'Shekarau Advised on Signing Anti-Christian Law' in *The Comet Newspaper*, May 11, 2004; A. Abuh, 'Kano Assembly Okays Tougher Laws Against Alcohol', *The Guardian Newspaper* (May 10, 2004), p. 7.

Yelwa-Shendam genocide triggered reprisal attacks in Kano. The intelligence community, the Federal government, concerned citizens and the Kano Emirate Council alerted the Kano State Government on the simmering tension and warned against protests under any guise.

On 11 May, 2004, some leading members of the *Ulamah* (Islamic scholars) in Kano organised a special prayer at the Ali Ibn Abu Talib Mosque, situated along Zaria Road to demonstrate their protest against what they perceived as anti-Islamic policies of international and local leaders particularly in the Middle East and Plateau State, Nigeria. After the prayer session, the Islamic scholars, including the state Chairman of the Council of *Ulamah*, Sheikh Umar Kabo; and the Chief Imam of Kano Central Mosque, Sheikh Idris Kuliya Alkali led the procession of 10,000 Muslims to the official residence of Malam Ibrahim Shekarau, the Executive Governor of Kano State to present letters of protest to him for onward transmission to President Olusegun Obasanjo and the United Nations Secretary- General, Mr. Kofi Anan. Sheikh Umar Kabo remarked that since the Kafanchan crisis 17 years ago and the Zango Kataf massacre, genocide on Muslims continued unabated without caution from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). Sheikh Kabo accused the USA of sponsoring the killing of Muslims, not only in Nigeria, but also in many parts of the world. He urged Muslims to stop patronising the American dollar and US made products. The demonstrators burnt the effigies of President George W. Bush of USA, Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister of Israel and Governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau State.

Governor Shekarau told the protesters that up to 11.00 pm on Monday, he was on the telephone speaking with President Obasanjo during which conversation he told the President that he was part and parcel of the organising committee for the protest. Shekarau said the 'organised massacre' against Muslims globally would rather give fillip to Muslims than force them to submission. He said:

I personally told Chief Obasanjo that living peacefully has its yardstick, which Muslims in Nigeria for long time faithfully followed; but reckless killings by non-Muslims would no longer be tolerated in the country.<sup>33</sup>

The Governor persuaded the protesters to return home peacefully and await the response of the appropriate authorities. He calmed down the angry youths and convinced them not to take the law into their hands. He reminded them that doing anything to harm or kill a fellow human being who is innocent of the charge for which s/he is being attacked is grossly un-Islamic. As the address at Government House was going on, there were violent demonstrations and attacks at Zoo Road, Unguwa Uku, Zaria Road, Shagari quarters, Tukuntawa, Sharada, Kofar Kabuga, Gadon Kaya, Gwammaja, Dadinshere, Kofar Ruwa, Ja'en, Panshekara, Rijiyar Zaki and the old campus of the Bayero University, Kano. The killing, maiming and looting took place simultaneously in many parts of the town and aimed at engulfing the whole town in mayhem.<sup>34</sup> Non-indigenes were cringing with terror and some relocated to safe zones including the houses of trusted Hausa neighbours, Sabongari, military and police barracks. Official statistics stated that the violence claimed 30 lives.<sup>35</sup> But the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Kano branch

<sup>33</sup> Y. Sabo, 'Factors Behind Kano Riots', *New Nigeria* (June 28, 2004), p. 8.

<sup>34</sup> M. Kabir, '10 feared Killed as Kano Boils', *Daily Champion Newspaper* (May 13, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>35</sup> Anselm Okolo, Murphy Gana-Gana & Ibrahim Barde, 'Hell on Earth: Agony of a man who lost family of 6 in Kano Riots', *Saturday Sun Newspaper* (May 22, 2004), pp. 39-40.

claimed that the human casualty number was over 1,000 with 40 people hospitalised for treatment of various injuries and 30,000 displaced, over N150 million worth of properties were destroyed. An estimated 17,000 persons fleeing from the rioters sought refuge in Sabongari, police and army barracks. Despite growing starvation, the refugees rejected the relief items donated by the Kano State government on account that the government had fuelled the crisis that led to the killings. Most of the victims were entrepreneurs, professionals and casual workers. The Sharada and Chalawa Industrial Layouts were worst hit by the violence. The National Union of Chemical Footwear Products Employees (NULFRLAMPE) lost 35 of its members and N35 million worth of members' properties.<sup>36</sup> The National Union of Textile and Garment Workers (NUTG) lost 26 members in the mayhem when rioters invaded the African Textile Mills and killed 20 workers; six workers at the Angel Spinning and one at the Bagco Super Sack factory.<sup>37</sup> At Bayero University, Kano, six people were reportedly killed while 16 senior and junior staff houses were burnt and property destroyed by Almajiri and Yandaba groups.<sup>38</sup>

Similar to what happened during the 2001 riots, Igbo Christians in Sabongari burnt six Mosques belonging to Yoruba Muslims while Hausa Muslims burnt twelve Churches. The riot led to the burning of the house of the Eze Igbo of Kano, Barrister O.T. Nnadi. He observed that:

In all my 34 years in Kano and 11<sup>th</sup> year as the Eze Igbo, the May 11 riot was the highest and the most destructive. Many Igbo whose number is yet to be known lost their lives. I have interacted freely with people in my number 20, Court Road residence. I don't know why it should be burnt.<sup>39</sup>

Various factors were advanced for the Kano mayhem. The official explanation by the Kano State Government was that the killings were politically masterminded and that the peaceful protest was permitted in the spirit of a constitutionally guaranteed democratic freedom of assembly. It was argued that prior to the protest, the Kano State Government from March 2004 had permitted different pressure groups to carry out demonstrations to impress their needs to the government. The examples of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) protesting against the over N1000 increase in accommodation rate; the Association of Motor Cycle Riders in Kano and Kofar Wambai Traders demonstrated by marching to Government House to hand over their letters of protests to the Governor. The Quadiriyya Muslim Sect staged a peaceful procession to Government House demanding for some adjustments in the structure and composition of the state cabinet.

It was equally argued that political opponents perpetrated the violence. The defeated PDP Governorship candidate who was then incumbent governor and now Minister of Defence, Engineer Rabi'u Musa Kwankwaso was indicted to have instigated and financed the mayhem in his bid to escape his trial for alleged financial scandal while in office.<sup>40</sup> Kwankwaso was indicted to have sponsored electoral violence during the local government election of March 2004. It

<sup>36</sup> Y. Majekodunmi, 'Union loses 35 Members to Kano Riots', *The Guardian Newspaper* (May 25, 2004), p. 37.

<sup>37</sup> A. Garba, 'NUTG Loses 26 Members to Kano Crisis', *New Nigerian Newspaper* (June 8, 2004), p. 11.

<sup>38</sup> A. Okolo, Murphy Gana-Gana and Ibrahim Barde, 'Echoes of the Kano Mayhem: It was systematic genocide in BUK-University Don', *Saturday Sun Newspaper* (May 22, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> C. Nwankwo, 'Igbo Read Riot Act to Shekarau', *The Comet* (May 31, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Yahya Sabo, 'Factors Behind Kano Riots', *New Nigeria* (June 28, 2004), p. 8.

was argued that most of the killings unprecedentedly took place in Kano West, an area considered to be the stronghold of Kwankwaso's political base. Contrary to this view, it was in this area that most of the refugees and corpses from the Yelwa Shendam genocide were dumped. In fact, many of the displaced persons took refuge at the Sharada Central Mosque. This was another reason why Sharada and Panchekara areas were devastated by the mayhem.

There was an argument that hoodlums and social miscreants who were idlers and unemployed and who often unleashed violence at the slightest provocation had fomented the violence. It was further argued that Kano people are very tolerant and accommodating and that foreigners were behind the Kano crisis<sup>41</sup>. Another reason was the unprecedented rise in religious fundamentalism that has given rise to the resurgence of the Maitatsine sect and the infiltration of Kano State by a killer group called Tubawa from Niger Republic, alleged to be mercenaries who attacked the Taroh in Plateau State.

The riot generated mixed reactions across the federation. In his letter to the Governor of Kano State, President Olusegun Obasanjo stated that the highly regarded ancient city of Kano had produced some of Nigeria's best leaders, but had rapidly acquired the reputation for intolerance, violence and political rascality. He warned that the 'tactical miscalculation' of the State Government should not be allowed to occur in the future<sup>42</sup>. Governor Shekarau replied to the president that some disgruntled elements in the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) who had lost out in the gubernatorial elections in the state fomented the riots that led to the killings and had planned to make the state ungovernable. He pointed out that the peaceful protest and the violence that ensued were not correlated. His special prayers and peaceful procession, which took place within half a kilometre of Government House in Kano, could not have triggered off mob riots that erupted in places as far as ten kilometres from the scene of the procession. He argued that his government encouraged peaceful co-existence with the non-indigenes in Kano State and had embarked on road rehabilitation in the Sabongari area that was abandoned for almost two decades.<sup>43</sup> PDP leaders in Kano State, Alhaji Uba Lawan Jigo and Senator Bello Hayatu observed that:

There is just no way Shekarau can exonerate himself or his government from blame in what happened in Kano. It is on record that some very senior members of his government led the procession to Government House.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Umoru Faruk Salifu, 'Foreigners Behind Kano Crisis - Hassan Hadejia', *New Nigerian* (May 22, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> 'The President's Letters', *New Nigerian* (May 19, 2004), p. 5.; Edwin Olofu, 'Trading Blames', *The Week Magazine* (June 21, 2004), p. 33.

<sup>43</sup> S. Ojeifo, 'Shekarau Replies Obasanjo on Kano Killings: You Don't Need My Undertaking' in *Sunday Vanguard* (May 30 2004), p.1.

<sup>44</sup> J. Ushigiale, 'When Egwu, Shekarau Trade Words over Kano riots', *Thisday Newspaper* (June 28, 2004), p. 15. Also, B. Duru, 'Hausa go into Hiding in Owerri', *Daily Independent* (May 14, 2004), p. A5.; M. Oditta, 'No Reprisal Against Hausa Muslims in Lagos', *Daily Independent* (May 14, 2004), p. A5; V. Ebimomi, 'OPC Denies Reprisal Attack on Hausa/Fulani', *Daily Independent* (May 31, 2004), p. A3; and B. Duru, 'Igbo Group Condemns Killing of Non-Indigenes in the North', *Daily Independent* (June 7, 2004), p. A12; U. Iniodu, 'Akwa Ibom Beefs Up Security Around Hausa Indigenes', *Daily Independence*, (May 31, 2004), p. 1.; S. Ogefere, 'Anambra Donates N1.5 million to Kano Riot Victims', *The Guardian Newspaper*, (June 7, 2004), p. 5.; S. Ogefere, 'Delta Evacuates Displaced Indigenes from Kano', *The Guardian* (June 7, 2004), p. 5.



Governor Sam Egwu of Ebonyi State insisted that Shekarau be held responsible for the tragic fate of non-Muslims, particularly Igbo Christians during the Kano mayhem. According to him:

I am constrained to reaffirm that you are to be held responsible for the tragic fate of non-Muslims during the Kano mayhem... in view of the volatile nature of Kano and its antecedents as a religious hotbed, your posture and utterances in such period of tension have all the trappings of an organised incitement....<sup>45</sup>

Other state governments whose indigenes were affected in the Kano riots provided security for the Hausa Muslim migrants in order to forestall possible reprisal attacks.<sup>46</sup> In Akwa Ibom State, security was beefed up around locations inhabited by the Hausa people as the first batch of victims of the Kano mayhem arrived in Uyo. The arrival of over 200 displaced persons from Kano and Jos in two luxury buses provided by the State Government swelled the anger of indigenes that mobilised with a plan to attack the Hausa Muslims.<sup>47</sup> Various state governments including Anambra and Benue sent relief materials to their indigenes affected by the riots<sup>48</sup>. The Delta State Government evacuated 41 families made up of 52 persons back to the home state from Kano.<sup>49</sup>

Other groups threatened to pay back the violence in future attacks. According to Pastor Joseph Ajayi, the Chairman of the Pentacostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN), Kaduna State:

We have realised that the growing trend of terror has become a global phenomena that cannot be wished away or begged to stop. We have, therefore, decided to alert all pastors and Christians in Kaduna State, and indeed the whole North, to immediately commence training in minimum self-defence techniques as we will no longer wait to be killed like chicken or slaughtered like goats for sacrifice during attacks by Muslim fundamentalists.<sup>50</sup>

### Numan Massacre, 8 June, 2004

Two weeks before the violence broke out, the politically embattled Governor Boni Haruna of Adamawa State whose victory in the 2003 elections was being challenged in a law court raised alarm over the impending violence in Adamawa State. The deadline was 8 June, 2004. Prior to the violent attacks, Bachama Christian youths had applied to the security operatives and the

<sup>45</sup> J. Ushigiale, 'When Egwu, Shekarau Trade Words over Kano riots', *Thisday Newspaper* (June 28, 2004), p. 15.

<sup>46</sup> B. Duru, 'Hausa go into Hiding in Owerri', *Daily Independent* (May 14, 2004), p. A5; M. Oditta, 'No Reprisal Against Hausa Muslims in Lagos', *Daily Independent* (May 14, 2004), p. A5; V. Ebimomi, 'OPC Denies Reprisal Attack on Hausa/Fulani', *Daily Independent* (May 31, 2004), p. A3; and B. Duru, 'Igbo Group Condemns Killing of Non-Indigenes in the North', *Daily Independent* (June 7, 2004), p. A12.

<sup>47</sup> U. Iniodu, 'Akwa Ibom Beefs Up Security Around Hausa Indigenes', *Daily Independence*, (May 31, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>48</sup> S. Ogefere, 'Anambra Donates N1.5 million to Kano Riot Victims', *The Guardian Newspaper*, (June 7, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>49</sup> S. Ogefere, 'Delta Evacuates Displaced Indigenes from Kano', *The Guardian* (June 7, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>50</sup> J. Shiklam, 'Sectarian Clashes: Northern Christians Prepare for Future Attacks', *Daily Champion Newspaper* (June 21, 2004), pp. 1 and 2.

local government to observe the commemoration of the one year anniversary of the killing of Lady Evangelist Jinkai Ethan which was turned down. Evangelist Ethan was killed by a Hausa water vendor, Muhammad Salisu on 8 June, 2003. The killing led to further violence between the Hausa Muslims and Bachama Christians leading to the destruction of the Central Mosque on the pretext that it was within the precinct of the palace of the paramount ruler. Since the violence of 8 June, 2003, the state government made futile efforts through peace committees to resolve the issue. Muslim youths insisted on the reconstruction of the Mosque destroyed by the Bachama Christian youths who claimed that the Mosque was directly overlooking the palace of the paramount ruler of Numan. The Bachama youths claimed that the site of the Mosque was an affront to their traditional institution, religion and culture.<sup>51</sup> The Security Council in the local government resolved that the Mosque be reconstructed without the minaret overlooking the palace, but the Muslim youths insisted on reconstructing the entire Mosque. The fragile peace that Numan town had enjoyed for a year was shattered on Tuesday, 8 June, 2004 when the palace guards and Christian youths attacked the Hausa/Fulani masons reconstructing the Central Mosque. According to Musa Yakubu, one of the masons, they were stunned when the Bachama palace guards of the paramount ruler of Numan attacked them with horsewhips for defying the order of the monarch against the reconstruction of the Mosque and by claiming equal rights with the indigenes. He said:

As we were struggling with the guards, Bachama youths numbering about 50 cordoned the area armed with guns, machetes, and spears everybody ran for his life towards the market, but it was too late, about 16 people had been killed.<sup>52</sup>

The killing spree began between the predominantly Christian Bachama who claimed the indigeneship of Numan and the Muslim Hausa/Fulani, who though settled in the town for about a century, are still categorised as settlers. As the Bachama youths who had slated 8 June for a procession to mark the first anniversary of the killing of the Evangelist burnt down houses of the Hausa in the Angwan Kwata and Sabon Pegi areas, the Hausa also resisted. According to Red Cross officials, the number of deaths recorded was 24. The number, however, shot up to 68 in the evening when the police recovered more bodies. More than 50 casualties of various degrees ranging from gunshots, machete cuts and people burnt with petrol were recorded.

In order to halt the spread of the genocide, Governor Boni Haruna took a stern decision by deposing the paramount ruler of Numan, Freddie Soditi Bongo and ordered the relocation of the Central Mosque from the disputed area. Adamawa State government charged Bongo with polarisation of the Numan Chieftdom by pursuing a policy of exclusion, made with his connivance and approval since the first violence of 2003 up to the advent of the second one in 2004. Bongo was indicted for acts of impropriety and corrupt practices, which included illegal acquisition of his subjects' farmlands; building plots of land, miscarriages of justice and vindictive disposition that advanced internal bickering within the Chieftdom.<sup>53</sup> The deposed ruler was also accused of a security breach and possession of arms. While the violence in Numan was

<sup>51</sup> A. T. Abubakar, 'Bachama Chief's Deposition Irreversible' in *Daily Trust Newspaper* (June 17, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>52</sup> A. Lawal, 'Boni Haruna's Burden', *Tell Magazine* (June 28, 2004), pp. 26-27.

<sup>53</sup> D. Molomo, 'Adamawa Crisis: Security Report That Nailed Paramount Ruler', *Sunday Sun*, (June 19, 2004), p. 5.

going on, he was found with a gun and ammunition in his official vehicle by the police on patrol.<sup>54</sup> In addition, Bongo had pressurised the police to release one private soldier who was intercepted with 30 rounds of ammunition and a rifle. Unlike Bongo, the traditional rulers of communities bordering Numan such as Hama Batta, Murum Mbula and Adamawa Emirate sealed their borders against troublemakers and prevented the conflict from escalating.

However, the decisions of the state government to depose the monarch and to relocate the Central Mosque were rejected by the Bachama Christians on one hand and the Hausa/Fulani on the other. The Bachama Christians argued that the Adamawa State Government favoured the Hausa Muslim community for political considerations while the Adamawa Muslim Council faulted the relocation of a nearly century old Central Mosque. The discontent of both parties to the resolutions of the state government constitutes the potential for future violence.

## Conclusion

The rollback of the state in social provisioning coincided with neo-liberal economic reforms. This was coupled with the tenuous concept of citizenship, institutionalised corruption, distorted federalism and unitarist hegemony, bureaucratic and authoritarian democracy. In this way, there was a resurgence of ethno-religious identities to assuage the suffering of the masses through informal networks for providing social security, welfare, neo-liberal political and economic reforms and shrinking democratic space were interpreted in ethnic terms. Genocide was unleashed on groups perceived to be exploitative and domineering. Genocide became a resource deployed by the cultural brokers in the form of ethnic, religious and political entrepreneurs to challenge the existence of the state. Cultural brokers in collaboration with the militarised youths used warfare strategies including ethnic cleansing, child soldiery, banditry and mercenaries to exert pressure on the state.

The cultural diversity of the Nigerian nation and enormously endowed resources have been mismanaged through corruption, overlaid ethnicity and hierarchies of citizenship, over-centralisation of power and elite manipulation. In this process, militarised identities were deployed by disenfranchised youths under the aegis of ethnicity and religion. Mutual genocide and the trans-location of violence have been deployed as a way of renegotiating the structure of the nation, access to resources and equal justice. The spiral of violence compounded the problems of underdevelopment, mutual insecurity and suspicion, poverty and depletion of resources. Xenophobia consumed the nation, blemished the cordial relations which communities had hitherto enjoyed with their neighbours and decimated the will to keep Nigeria together. There is a proliferation of dreadful ethnic, political and religious militias across the geo-political zones and communities in Nigeria. In the post-military era, the trans-location of violence has become a ready tool of political discourse and crisis management, which exposes the contracted nature of political space for dialogue and inclusion under the civilian administration. In order to curtail genocide, a review of the constitution is imperative to address the entrenched dichotomy between settlers and indigenes, the tenuous concept of citizenship as well as the centralisation of the police.

<sup>54</sup> T. Ailemen, 'Adamawa Crisis: Why Bachama King was Deposed', *Sunday Champion* (June 20, 2004), p. 3.