

THE YORUBA NEWS.

WHY NO AIR RAID OVER GERMANY.

Many people who hastily understood why we do not make a frontal attack on the Maginot Line, and why we do not raid German open towns, are still very puzzled to know why we have not attacked military objectives in Germany, that is to say, armament factories and naval bases.

It cannot too often be repeated that every month's delay in beginning the war on a large scale (for the war can hardly be said to have begun yet) is one up to us and one down to the Germans. Germany has devoted the whole of her energy and resources to preparing for this war ever since Hitler came into power in 1933. The peace-loving democracies of Great Britain and France have been very reluctant to turn their energies from trade to re-armament, and had at the outbreak of war still a great deal to do to catch up with Germany.

One thing is absolutely certain, that any raid by the Allies on a large scale on Germany would meet with immediate retaliation by a German raid on the industrial areas of Great Britain.

The important thing to remember about Great Britain is that it is a very small area with a very large population, and that its population is not evenly spread over the country but the vast majority of it is concentrated in roughly five main industrial areas, namely London, Birmingham and the Black Country, Liverpool and Manchester, the Tyne and in Scotland, Glasgow. These industrial areas are of vast extent, very thickly populated, and of immense importance in the life of Great Britain. There is nothing comparable in either Germany or France to this concentration of the bulk of the population in a few areas. Moreover, the German industrial areas which are numerous and scattered are mostly much further from the nearest Allied air base than any of our industrial areas are from the nearest German air base.

No German airman could be so bad a shot with a bomb as to fail to inflict tremendous damage during any air raid over these industrial areas. It follows, therefore, that we must strain every effort to attain not merely equality in the air but overwhelming superiority in defence against air raids, in fighter airplanes, in anti-aircraft guns, in balloons, and in the perfection of burrages, and in the perfection of every kind of air raid prevention. Moreover, even before the war began we had started a policy of scattering our important factories over the countryside, and even organising factories in distant parts of the Empire, such as Canada which is quite outside the range of air attack in order to minimize this very risk of a knock-out blow.

Every month that Hitler delays we are pressing on with these preparations. We are ourselves in no great hurry to begin the war, because we are absolutely certain that in a long war we are bound to outlast Germany, since we have wealth and resources denied to Germany.

That we should have been given even so much as a three months' breathing space in which to perfect our arrangements is nothing less than astonishing. The peoples who ask why the British are not more active should rather ask why on earth Hitler is giving us this magnificent opportunity, an opportunity we never dared to hope for! and the only answer probably is that he is not sufficiently sure of his own strength.

STATEMENT BY

The Rt. Hon.
Neville Chamberlain, M.P.,

The British Prime Minister

In The House of Commons,

1st DECEMBER, 1939.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain).

I do not propose to say when action might be taken, or to say whether these proposals are in this House required. I should like to say that the responsibility might not fall upon us to ask this country to accept the awful settlement of war, I fear that I may not be able to avoid that responsibility. But as my rate, I cannot wish for conditions in which such a burden should fall upon us, in which I should feel clearly that I do so-day as to where my duty lies. No man does more to try to keep open the way for an honorable and equitable settlement of the dispute between Germany and Poland. We have requested any means of making it crystal clear to the German Government that if they insisted on using force again, in the manner in which they had used it,

in the past we were resolved to oppose them by force. Now that all the relevant documents are being made public we shall stand at the bar of history knowing that the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man—the German Chancellor—who had not hesitated to plunge the world into misery in order to serve his own monstrous ambitions.

I would like to thank the House for the feedback which they have shown on two recent resolutions not demanding from us information which they requested I could not give while these negotiations were still in progress. I have had all the correspondence with the German Government put into the form of a White Paper on account of mechanical difficulties I can avoid, there are still but a few copies available, but I understand that they will be coming in relays while the House is sitting. I do not think it is necessary for me to refer in detail now to these documents, which are already past history. They speak of perfectly clear that our object has been to try and bring about discussions of the Polish-German dispute between the two countries themselves on terms of equality, the settlement to be one which safeguarded the independence of Poland and of which the due observance would be accepted by international guarantees. There is just one passage from a recent communication, which was dated 23rd August which I should like to quote, because it shows how well the final clash might have been avoided had there been the least desire on the part of the German Government to arrive at a peaceful settlement. In this document we said

'His Majesty's Government fully recognize the need for speed in the initiation of discussions and they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two mobilised armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should undertake that during the negotiations no aggressive military movements should take place. His Majesty's Government feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking from the Polish Government. If the German Government would give similar assurances,

That telegram which was repeated in Poland brought an instantaneous reply from the Polish Government dated 23rd August in which they said:

'The Polish Government are also prepared to undertake both to give a formal guarantee in the event of negotiations failing and that Polish troops will not retreat. The founders of the German Reich provided that no violation of the frontiers of Poland by troops of the German Reich.'

We never had any reply from the German Government to that suggestion—one which if it had been followed—might have saved the catastrophe which took place this morning. In the German broadcast last night which recited the 15 points of the proposals which they have put forward there occurred this sentence:

'In these circumstances the Reich Government considers the proposals rejected.'

I must examine that statement. I used to begin with the use of the word 'that' of those proposals has never been communicated by Germany to Poland at all. The history of the matter is this. On Tuesday 23rd August in replying to a Note which we had sent to them that the German Government should show us proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and

'... will if possible phrase these as the disponent of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator'.

It will be seen by examination of the

White Paper that the German Government had stated that they wanted upon the central of a plenipotentiary from Poland in Berlin on the 30th that is to say on the following day. In the meantime, of course we were awaiting these proposals. The next evening, when our Ambassador saw Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Secretary he urged upon the latter that when these proposals were ready—we had heard no more about them—he should invite the Polish Ambassador to call and should hand him the proposals for transmission to his Government. Thereupon, reports our Ambassador, in the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if the Polish Ambassador asked him for an interview it might be different.

The House will see that this was on Wednesday night, which, according to the German statement of last night, is now claimed to be the final date after which no negotiation with Poland was acceptable. It is plain, therefore, that Germany claims to treat Poland as in the wrong because she had not by Wednesday night entered upon discussions with Germany about a set of proposals of which she had never heard.

Now what of ourselves? On that Wednesday night, at the interview to which I have just referred, Herr von Ribbentrop produced a lengthy document which he read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Naturally after this reading our Ambassador asked for a copy of the document but the reply was that it was not too late as the Polish representatives had not arrived in Berlin by midnight. And so Sir, we never got a copy of those proposals and the first time we heard them—we heard them—was on the broadcast of last night. Well Sir, these are the circumstances in which the German Government said that they would consider that their proposals were justified, is it not clear that their conception of a negotiation was that on almost instantaneous demand a Polish plenipotentiary should go to Berlin—where others had been before him—and should there receive a statement of demands to be accepted in their entirety or refused? I am not pronouncing any opinion upon the terms themselves for I do not feel called upon to do so. The proper course in our view—in the view of all of us—was that these proposals should have been put before the Public who should have been given time to consider them and to say whether, in their opinion they did or did not infringe those vital interests of Poland which Germany had assured us on a previous occasion she intended to respect. Only last night the Polish Ambassador did see the German Foreign Secretary Herr von Ribbentrop. Once again he expressed to him what indeed the Polish Government had already said publicly that they were willing to negotiate on an equal basis. What was the reply of the German Government? The reply was that without another word the German troops crossed the Polish frontier, this morning at dawn and are now reported to be looting upon towns [An Hon. Member: "Gaw?"] In this circumstance there is only one course open to us His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin and the French Ambassador have been instructed to hand to the German Government the following document:

Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German Army which intimated clearly that he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France that by their action the German Government have created

conditions, namely, an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland, which call for the implementation by the the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurance that the German Government have suspended all aggressive actions against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland."

[An Hon. Member: "Time limit?"]

If a reply to this last warning is unacceptable, and I do not suggest that it is likely to be otherwise, His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to ask for his passports. In that case we are ready. Yesterday, we took further steps towards the completion of our defensive preparations. This morning we ordered complete mobilization of the whole of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force. We have also taken a number of other measures, both at home and abroad, which the House will not perhaps expect me to specify in detail. Briefly, they represent the final steps in accordance with great-arranged plans. These last can be put into force rapidly, and are of such a nature that they can be deferred until we come to them. Steps have also been taken under the powers conferred by the House last week to safeguard the position in regard to stocks of commodities of various kinds.

The thoughts of many of us must at this moment inevitably be turning back to 1914 and to a comparison of our position now with that which existed then. How do we stand this time? The answer is that all three Services are ready, and that the situation in all directions is far more favourable and reassuring than in 1914, while behind the fighting lines we have built up a vast organization of Civil Defence and a far superior air-raid Protection. As regards the immediate man-power requirements, the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force are in the fortunate position of having almost as many men as they can conveniently handle at this moment. There are, however, certain categories of service in which men are immediately required both for Military and Civil Defence. These will be mentioned in detail through the Press and the B.B.C. The main and most satisfactory point to observe is that there is to-day to need to make no appeal in a general way for recruits such as was issued by Lord Kitchener 25 years ago. That appeal has been anticipated by many months, and the men are already available.

So much for the immediate present. Now we must look to the future. It is essential in the face of the tremendous task which confronts us, more especially in view of our past experiences in this to organize our man-power this time upon as methodical equitable and economical a basis as possible. We, therefore, propose immediately to introduce legislation directed to that end. A Bill will be laid before you which for all general purposes will amount to an expansion of the Military Training Act. Under its operation all fit men between the ages of 18 and 41 will be rendered liable to military service if and when called upon. It is not intended at the outset that any considerable number of men other than those already liable shall be called up and steps will be taken to assure that the man-power essentially required by industry shall not be taken away.

There is one other allusion which I should like to make before I end my speech and that is to record my satisfaction and the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government that throughout these last days of crisis

Sir George Messersmith has been doing his best to reach a solution.

It may only remain for us to set our teeth and to enter upon this struggle which we ourselves recently endeavoured to avoid with determination to see it through to the end. We shall enter it with a clear conscience with the support of the Dominions and the British Empire and the moral approval of the German people and of the world. We have no quarrel with the German people except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi Government. As long as that Government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years there will be no peace in Europe. We shall surely pass from one crisis to another and see our country after another attacked by methods which have now become familiar to us in their subtlety and technique. We are resolved that these methods must come to an end. If out of the struggle we appear as victors in the world the cause of good faith and the regeneration of Europe, why then even the sacrifices that will be entailed upon us will find their full justification.

Jibiti

O See Idu sju Idu Kudu

o di ilota ponun, owo yi ni nwon wa gbe kale fun Oshun, pe, ki lo bu ba a woye pe ki o le di ogunun ponun, gbe ni o ti npe e.

Awe ni, "To-o Mardala," so won o le duro di oju koto? Nwon ni, o dara. Awe a kun o gun inkun ti oun o fi se wutu fun Aghun Egipti, tori owo ni se u di popo O ni ki won mo agun funfun gbo kun wa, oti gberja funfun, igbo agbo oduyo kar, ikoko tunun kan, owo ti o la gharu oun o si tun gbe ponun mewa owo sataki.

Bi nwon ti gbo oyo ti o dahan so yi ni nwon hery ti i ba ara won so pe, "Ka i owo tun ni ti owo ni owo inkun ti Oni-Ibiti nfo gbe yi?" Se lofo fo ti npe e fun won ti? "Awe, a-b'ci-hin jara bi owo, ti gbo; were fo o feji pe, "Owo ni i ba owo, bi nwon ba ti le nwo sa a, ko nwo rara lati se."

Eikan ninu awon arabi dahan pe se injowo yi ko e ja ponun ni kela adu lo, eyi ko poju lati fi ki owo ti o so soko yi, se awon babu wa ni i mi so wipe, "B'cedu ba so soko, igbimo ni a fi ki ka?" Eboyin ni, bi awon ba da owo yi bi ni sile mi-kan-abo—mekanta-aby nisyi ni owo ni vto pe.

Eti keta ti o ja abrobyo ninu won so pe, bi awon ba da owo yi pe, ki awon fi ponun marun lele poju aguntan kan, so clofo, 190 ni awon inkun yoko; nighti owo awon bi te owo ni ti ki awon to san ponun marun ti o ki.

Kwon fi oyo yi siwoja odukan po awon o mu gba 190, 190 ni awon inkun yoko wa, awon o san ponun marun liye di igbati o ba pari igbo na ki awon to san ponun marun yoko. A ki a gbon bi onni nnon ni: Awo ti ni mo inkun ti o nfo se, dahan pe, "Howe!" bi ki on bi mi owo wa do, oun bi ki bi ponun marun ti o ku kuro nige bi awon to ko tyoko la won lwo? O dara, ki won ko owo ni wa.

