GLOBALISATION AND THE NIGERIAN STATE

BY

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ABSTRACT

Globalisation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon with diverse consequences. The nature of the consequences has, however, remained contentious. There are contending perspectives on the effects of globalisation on modern states, particularly developing countries. In-depth studies that examined the cogency of these perspectives in relation to the Nigerian State are sparse. This study examined the manifestation of globalisation in Nigeria between 1985 and 2007 and its effects on the State and implications for democratic consolidation.

The study was anchored on transformationalists’ theoretical strand and adopted a qualitative research design. It reviewed documents such as textbooks, journals, newspaper articles and Internet resources regarding globalisation and the Nigerian State. Other sources included official documents such as past and present Constitutions of Nigeria, policy statements by Presidents and Heads of States, Legislative Acts and Reports of the Political Bureau. Three components of globalisation, namely, global spread of ideas and norms, multiple sites of governance and the infrastructure of global technologies, were examined to ascertain their effects on the functions, power and State-Society relations in the Nigerian State. The data were content analysed.

The infrastructure of new forms of technologies, adaptation of domestic policies to global developments and increasing involvement of non-state actors in the political process are manifestations of contemporary globalisation in Nigeria. The effects on the Nigerian State included stimulation of domestic policies as evident in the integration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) into Nigeria’s development strategies, dispersal of governance and external scrutiny of domestic policies visible in the activities of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The ascendency of issues of good governance intensified the anti-corruption initiatives while global spread of democratic ideas facilitated democratisation initiatives that led to restoration of civil rule in 1999. The implementation of privatisation and commercialisation policies since the 1980s transformed the role of the Nigerian State from direct provision of services to enabler and facilitator of a private sector driven economy and also spurred public-private partnership in service delivery and infrastructural development. Others included application of the internet and other Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) which engendered e-government and online transactions and reconstructed the administrative and organisational functions of government. The Internet and CMC also provided platform for social networking and political activism beyond the direct censorship of the latter in Nigeria and capable of deepening democracy. Contradictions such as retrenchment of welfare policies and safety nets for the citizens generated by privatisation and commercialisation, diminishing state capacity and security challenges resulting from perversion of the Internet were identified as threat to democratic consolidation.

Globalisation has engendered profound transformation of the character of the Nigerian State spawning contradictory effects on governance. Mitigating the observed contradictions and consolidating democracy in Nigeria require proper adaptation to the realities of globalisation and management of its processes.

Key words: Globalisation, Democratic consolidation, Governance, Nigerian State, State-Society relations.

Word count: 470.
CERTIFICATION

I certify that this work was carried out by Ariyo Andrew TOBI in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

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Professor of Political Science,
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.
DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to the Almighty God.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work, in utmost and primary sense, drew from a rich repertoire of goodwill and support to become a reality. First and foremost I wish to acknowledge the greatness of the Almighty God whose grace, mercy and love have been tremendously marvellous and scintillatingly overwhelming. Words of mouth are not sufficient to express my gratitude to God for His ever present support and faithfulness.

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Ariyo Andre Tobi
June, 2013.
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Action Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>ANPP</td>
<td>All Nigerian Peoples Party</td>
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<td>APGA</td>
<td>All Progressive Grand Alliance.</td>
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<td>APP</td>
<td>All Peoples Party.</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>ARPANET</td>
<td>Advanced Research Project Agency Network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Automated Teller Machine</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBN</td>
<td>Central Bank of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPPS</td>
<td>Consortium of Electoral and Political Processes</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Constitution Drafting Committee.</td>
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<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Computer Mediated Communication.</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African State.</td>
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<td>EFCC</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industrial Transparency Initiatives</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment.</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Federal Executive Council</td>
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<td>GDM</td>
<td>Grassroots Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>GSM</td>
<td>Global System of Mobile Communication</td>
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<td>HRVIC</td>
<td>Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission(HRVIC)</td>
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<td>ICPC</td>
<td>Independent Corrupt and Related Practices Commission</td>
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<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
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<td>JAMB</td>
<td>Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>IPPA</td>
<td>Investment Promotion and Provision Agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Internet Service Provider</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japanese International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals.</td>
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<td>MCID</td>
<td>Mississippi Consortium for International Development</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>Nigerian Communications Commissions</td>
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<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council for Nigerian Citizens</td>
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<td>NDCI</td>
<td>Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDLEA</td>
<td>National Drug Law Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEEDS</td>
<td>National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEITI</td>
<td>Nigeria Extractive Industrial Transparency Initiatives</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NERC</td>
<td>Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NES</td>
<td>Nigerian Economic Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFIU</td>
<td>Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Planning Commission.</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northern Peoples Congress</td>
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<td>NPN</td>
<td>National Party of Nigeria</td>
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<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Political Reform Conference</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Republican Convention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSIWA</td>
<td>Open Society for West Africa (OSIWA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHCN</td>
<td>Power Holding Company of Nigeria.</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTDF</td>
<td>Petroleum Training and Development Fund.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Sovereign National Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCAC</td>
<td>United Nations Convention Against Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAI</td>
<td>War Against Indiscipline</td>
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WAEC  West African Examination Council.
WTO  World Trade Organisation
WWW  World Wide Web
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

In recent years, globalisation has become a buzzword frequently used to describe changes in the contemporary society. In spite of its popularity, however, its usage in the literature is surrounded by controversies over such issues as its meaning, origin, nature, dimensions and perhaps the most widely debated, which is its effects on different states and regions, especially in the developing countries. With respect to the state, some perspectives on globalisation convey the impression that it is a process that undermines the power, functions, sovereignty and autonomy of the modern state\(^1\). Yet there are perspectives that suggest that globalisation is an instrument of transformation. That is, the power, autonomy and functions of the state are being transformed as a result of the strategies being adopted by states in the process of adjusting to global developments and changes\(^2\). Viewed in this sense, globalisation may be described as a contradictory phenomenon. This is because, at one end of the spectrum, it is being celebrated, and at the other end it is vilified. This ambivalence in the perceptions and construction of globalisation is reflected in the view of Thandika Mkandawire who asserts, inter alia, that globalisation is

\[ \ldots \text{a multifaceted process that defies unique definition. Different authors emphasise different things about the causes and effects of globalisation, partly because of differences in the definition of the process; partly because of differences in focus; and partly because of different ideological predispositions about the process itself}^3 \]

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\(^3\) Mkandawire, T. 2005, Maladjusted African economies and globalisation. *Africa Development* xxx.1 & 2.1-33
Globalisation is a multi-faceted process that has been loosely conceptualised by different writers. Many accounts of globalisation in the literature, however, see it in terms of interconnectedness of states and regions. For instance, David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, have advanced the view that globalisation is

…a process that transforms the spatial organisations of social relations and transactions, assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact-generating transcontinental and interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power⁴.

Held et al. argue that globalisation is the main catalyst for the rapid social, political and economic changes that are shaping the modern world. The changes are making governments and society to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between domestic and international affairs.⁵ Samir Amin posits that, in its broadest sense, globalisation refers to the existence of relations between the different regions of the world and, as a corollary, the reciprocal influence that societies exert upon one another⁶. Anthony Giddens claims that globalisation is about the intensification of worldwide social relations which links distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa⁷.

Globalisation is a complex phenomenon in which economic, political and cultural interactions among nation-states are being deterritorialised. It is this construction and understanding of the idea of globalisation that informed Manuel Castells assertion that “we lived through one of those rare intervals in history. An interval characterised by the transformation of our material culture, by the work of a new technological paradigm organised around information technologies.”⁸

The bourgeoning of new technologies is central to the globalisation process and has resulted in unprecedented interconnectedness and interactions among different states and regions of the world. This process is rendering distance which hitherto posed

⁵ Ibid 7
a major obstacle to social interactions among states and non state-actors irrelevant. Roland Axmann has observed that the interaction is not only in terms of an increase in the density of contact between locations worldwide but it has become almost instantaneous⁹. This conception of globalisation reflects in Waters Malcolm’s assertion that globalisation is a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people increasingly become aware that they are receding¹⁰. Globalisation in this sense is associated with the diminishing importance of distance in the socio-economic and political interactions of states. The new forms of technologies are not only accelerating interactions among states but they are redefining state-market balance of power.¹¹ John Thompson has argued that the increasing role of new technologies in the globalisation process can be attributed to three inter-related developments. These are, first, the use of extensive and sophisticated cable systems which provide much greater capacity for transmission of electronically encoded information. Second, the increasing use of satellites for the purposes of long distance communication and third, the use of digital methods of information processing, storage and retrieval¹².

Luard Evan has observed the effects of burgeoning technologies on the society. He claims that those who live ten thousand miles away can now be reached as quickly and can be seen and heard far more easily than those who lived in the next village a century ago. The neighbourhood is no longer a few villages. It is a continent, even the world as a whole.¹³ On his own part, Anthony McGrew has asserted that globalisation involves the following:

(i) the stressing of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers so that events, decisions and activities in one part of the world come to have significant implications for individuals and communities in distant places of the globe;

(ii) the intensification or the growing magnitude of interconnectedness in almost every sphere of social existence;

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¹¹ Strange, S. op.cit.7.
(iii). the accelerating pace of global interactions and processes as the evolution of worldwide systems of transport and communication increase the rapidity or velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information capital and technology move around the world;

(iv). the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global\textsuperscript{14}.

These developments, as highlighted by Anthony McGrew, create a situation in which the world has become a global village in which local events trigger global consequences and global events equally having local consequences. Conceived in this sense, globalisation is about the interconnectedness and flow of images and ideas across the borders of nation-states and manifests in the growing variety of social activities which take place irrespective of the geographical location of the participants. Central to the globalisation process is the Internet which is changing socio-economic and political relations. It allows people to communicate and share ideas and information with each other irrespective of the geographical distance. It is small wonder that Hamid Mowlana claims that with globalisation:

\begin{quote}
\textit{a new power structure is emerging based on information, data, and knowledge and leaving behind it levelling effects on traditional and existing social strata. Many decisions affecting the global socio-cultural environment are now largely occurring outside local and even national political and economic systems. Not only are communication networks as cultural ecology affecting the socio-cultural environment, but information and cultural relations are becoming ever more central to the conduct of international and global systems\textsuperscript{15}.}
\end{quote}

Apart from the intensification of interconnectedness, globalisation also manifests in the spread of ideas, norms and values. This involves democratic principles, ascendancy of issues of good governance, support for human rights, neo-liberal economic postures such as privatisation, trade liberalisation and deregulation, to mention but a few. This spread of ideas and norms on a global scale, particularly neo-liberal economic policies, has made many writers to posit that the power of the state is being threatened. Furthermore, the multiple sites of political action has resulted in the


internationalisation of policy making which is seen as dislodging the state as the sole centre of political action. Moreover, the blurring distinction between external and domestic issues is seen as threatening the sovereignty of the modern state. Evan Luard captures the basic political features of globalisation when he asserts, inter alia, that the change in political consciousness is altering the conception of political objectives. Both the needs to be met and the means of meeting them as political action at the national level are seen as increasingly irrelevant except possibly as the means to international action. He adds that tasks which were once considered as the responsibility of national governments are now recognised as being beyond their capabilities.16

Essentially, what states initially considered as internal affairs are now global issues. The advancement in information technology is making distance less relevant in the affairs of states, while the spread of global norms and ideas is engendering adaptation and imitation of policies and practices worldwide. All these have formidable effects on the existing configuration of the power of the modern states and the pattern of governance. They equally have effects on democracy and its consolidation in the modern states, both of the ‘North’ and of the ‘South’.

1.2. Statement of the Problem.

Globalisation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon with diverse consequences for both developed and developing countries. In the literature, there is the consensus that the proliferation of high speed technologies, economic and political liberalisation, the ascendancy of issues of good governance, the spread of global norms and values as well as the attendant changes in the economic, cultural and political activities of different states and regions associated with globalisation have formidable effects on the modern state. The nature of the consequences is, however, being debated. The debate is complex due to the multiple perspectives and ideas associated with globalisation. Writers such as Linda Weiss17 and Susan Strange18 argue that the state is becoming irrelevant in the context of the enmeshment of the state with global forces, stressing the diminution of the power, functions, autonomy, sovereignty and capacity of the state which are seen as undermining democracy in the modern states.

16 Luard, E. 1990. op.cit. 189-190.
17 Strange, S. 1999. op.cit
18 See Weiss, L. 2000. op.cit. 1-15
In recent years, however, these arguments are being increasingly contested. The notion that globalisation is undermining the power and functions of the state has been refuted with counter arguments that global forces are redefining the power of the state and that democratic deficits have existed independently of globalisation. These analytical postulations are collectively challenging some of the sweeping conclusions that pitched globalisation against the state.

Since the mid-1980s, a whole series of events and developments have taken place in the Nigerian state, including a renewed effort at democratising the state, economic liberalisation (which entails the privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises), gender issues, anti-graft crusade, and a host of others. While some of these developments and initiatives have antecedents in Nigeria, their intensification in the current dispensation in which globalisation has become a paradigm for explaining socio-economic and political changes worldwide demands that the examination of combined exogenous and endogenous variables that shaped them is necessary to ascertain the extent they were shaped by globalisation.

The orientation of the literature on globalisation in relation to the Nigerian state, in particular since the mid-1980s, has focused on the analysis of neo-liberal economic policies associated with economic globalisation such as commercialisation and privatisation of public enterprises, deregulation and other related issues that have come to characterise the Nigerian state since the 1980s. The literature has not fully delved into the political dimension of globalisation. In-depth studies that examine the nexus between globalisation and the functions, power of the state, pattern of governance, state-society relations as well as democracy in Nigeria are sparse. Simply put, the effects of globalisation on the Nigerian state have not been fully explored. This suggests that the nexus between globalisation and the Nigerian State has not been adequately investigated to ascertain the consequences of the forces of globalisation for the state and the effects on democracy in Nigeria. The nature of the consequences of globalisation has, therefore, remained contentious, manifesting in a series of sweeping conclusions on the effects of globalisation on the Nigerian state. The need to fill this observed gap defines the central focus of this study.

19 There are also writers who have questioned the presumed threat of globalisation to the state. The transformationalists argue that the state is being transformed by global forces. See Held, D et.al op.cit.
1.3 Research Questions.

Certain fundamental questions which lie at the heart of this study have emerged from the foregoing. They are:

(i) What is the linkage between globalisation and the state?
(ii) What were the salient features of the Nigerian State, particularly the nature and pattern of governance prior to the era of contemporary globalisation?
(iii) In what ways did globalisation manifest in Nigeria between 1985 and 2007 and to what extent did such manifestations shape significant developments in the Nigerian State?
(iv) What are the consequences of globalisation for the Nigerian State, particularly the functions, power and state-society relations as well as the pattern of governance?
(v) What impact does globalisation have on democracy and its consolidation in Nigeria?

Answers to these questions have the capacity for unveiling the effects of globalisation on the Nigerian state.

1.4. Aim and Objectives of the Study

Amidst the controversies surrounding the linkage between globalisation and the state, this study aims at examining the linkage between globalisation and the Nigerian state. This is designed specifically to:

(i) analyse the globalisation process, its attributes and dimensions and critically examine the theoretical linkage between globalisation and the state;
(ii) discuss the nature and character of the Nigerian state between 1960 and 1984 with a view to highlighting its institutional and governmental processes as well as the pattern of governance;
(iii) explore the manifestation of globalisation in the Nigerian State between 1985 and 2007 and the effects on state-society relations, functions and power of the state;
(iv) highlight the emerging pattern of governance induced by globalisation;
(v) discuss the effects of globalisation on democracy and prospects for its consolidation in the Nigerian state.
1.5 Justification for the Study.

Since the mid-1980s, globalisation has become one of the most contested concepts in the academia and among policy-makers. The reasons for this are not difficult to understand. While globalisation has received a considerable attention from different writers, its effects on the Nigerian state have mostly been analysed from economic perspectives. While existing works adequately explore economic dimensions of globalisation, the very fact that they tend to view the process as an economic phenomenon is sufficient to stir up the conclusion that the assessments and conclusions about globalisation in Nigeria have been one-sided and thus not adequate to offer a holistic view of the process. The need to bridge the gap aptly forms part of the objectives of this study. Consequently, this study is significant in many respects.

First, it is a departure from existing globalisation literature on Nigeria that tends to focus attention on the economic aspects of the phenomenon thus giving little attention to other dimensions of the process. This study sees globalisation as a process that encompasses economic, political, cultural and technological aspects of life. Second, this study differs from the bulk of earlier studies which view globalisation as a phenomenon that vitiates the power, functions, sovereignty and autonomy of the state. It considers the state as a central element in the contemporary era of globalisation, and thus feeds into the analytical discourse that questions the much amplified negative relationship between global forces and the modern state. Third, this study sees globalisation as a multi-dimensional process that transforms the modern state. It perceives the process as being characterised by a wide range of networks and interactions institutionalised in such a way that the local community has to explicitly react and relate itself to global developments. It argues that some of the conclusions drawn regarding the implications of globalisation for the state have negative connotations because of the wrong conception of globalisation.

Fourth, using Nigeria as a case study is very significant for various reasons. Various developments in Nigeria, particularly since the mid-1980s when the Nigerian state was perceived as having been interlocked with globalisation, have essentially been a bag of mixed consequences and have remained contentious. Sorting them out

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20 The 2003 Nigerian Economic Society conference centred on globalisation. The theme of the Conference was ‘Globalisation and Africa’s economic development.'
has the capacity for explaining the extent to which globalisation is driving the Nigerian state, the consequences of globalisation in Nigeria as well as the attendant effects of globalisation on the consolidation of democracy.

Fifth, the central goal of this study is to examine the effects of globalisation on the Nigerian state. Most existing works on the effects of globalisation in Nigeria have tended to view globalisation as antithetical to democracy. This study, however, stresses how globalisation intensified the democratisation process in Nigeria and how it is engendering developments capable of deepening democracy. It sees globalisation as a phenomenon transforming the Nigerian state i.e. its power, functions and state-society relations. The analysis essentially feeds into those rejecting the diminution of the state in the contemporary global political order.

1.6. Scope of the Study:

This study examines the effects of globalisation in the Nigerian state between 1985 and 2007. Globalisation is not essentially a new phenomenon; it has gone through various phases. The year 1985 is adopted in this study as marking the beginning of contemporary era of globalisation in Nigeria. The adoption of the year 1985 could be justified on the ground that, the 1980s marked the beginning of the intensification of neo-liberal ideology that stresses economic liberalisation, particularly privatisation and commercialisation in Nigeria. Furthermore, World Wide Web (www), the heart of modern technology (that is, the Internet) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) came into being in the 1990s. Hence, post 1985 developments in Nigeria are seen to have occurred in the contemporary era of globalisation.

1.7 Methodology

The term ‘globalisation’ implies many things; hence it has been interpreted in different ways. In order to establish the linkage between globalisation and the Nigerian state, there is the need for a proper conceptualisation of globalisation with a view to specifying the aspect that is being analysed. Though the various dimensions of globalisation overlap and may thus appear difficult in separating them, the broad nature of globalisation nevertheless demands that there is need to narrow globalisation down to its specific dimensions so as to capture its salient attributes and relate such attributes to the state. Consequently, the conception of globalisation, as employed in this study, sees it as a process that involves the knitting of different nation-states and
regions together where time and space are compressed, thus resulting in instantaneous events, made possible by the advancement of information technology. Essentially, globalisation is seen in the context of the accelerating pace of global interactions and processes, as the evolution of worldwide systems of transport and communication, increase in the rapidity or velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information capital and technology move around the world and the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global\textsuperscript{21}. These interactions are manifesting in the economic, political and cultural spheres of the modern society and they are driven by advancement in information and communication technology (ICT) manifesting in the burgeoning of new forms of technologies, particularly the Internet, the World Wide Web (www), Satellite television technologies, mobile telephony system and other Computer Mediated Communication (CMC). In this study, globalisation is narrowed down to the burgeoning of new forms of technologies, the spread of ideas and norms such as democracy, economic liberalisation and multiple sites of political action (seen in terms of the blurring face between domestic and external issues, non state actors and the internationalisation of policies). For the Nigerian State, the functions, power, and state-society relations were mapped out for analysis.

The analysis centres on the nature and pattern of governance prior to 1985; the transformation that occurred in governance as results of the processes of globalisation; and the effects of the transformation for democracy and its consolidation in Nigeria.

**Sources of Data and Methods of Data Analysis**

The study utilised data mainly from secondary sources. These included official pronouncements by Heads of State and Presidents, the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Legislative Acts, Decrees and published reports of committees and commissions on political and economic reforms. Others sources included textbooks, journals, magazines and newspapers. Data were also collected from the archives of centres dedicated to the study of globalisation and related issues such as the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation of the University of Warwick, Centre for Global Governance of the London School of Economics and Politics (LSE), the Centre for Globalisation and Policy Research of the

\textsuperscript{21} McGrew A.2008 .op.cit.
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) among others. This was done through the Internet. The method of analysis was essentially multi-dimensional. A review of selected journal articles and textbooks that focused on globalisation and the Nigerian state was undertaken. A synthesis of the contents of Presidential pronouncements, relevant sections of the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, selected Legislative Acts, Decrees as well as newspapers and magazines were also reviewed. These data were all content analysed.

1.8. Organisation of Study
This study is divided into six chapters as outlined below:

**Chapter One: Introduction.** This is the introductory aspect of the study. It gives the background to the study, research problem, aims and objectives, justification as well as methodology.

**Chapter Two: Literature Review and theoretical Framework.** This chapter delves into the review of related literature. It focuses on the meaning, origin, nature, dimensions, as well as the nexus between globalisation and the state. It also encompasses the theoretical framework of analysis.

**Chapter Three: The Nigerian State.** This chapter analyses the nature of the Nigerian state with a view to providing a deep understanding and clear insights of its nature, character and pattern of governance prior to the contemporary era of globalisation.

**Chapter Four: Effects of Globalisation on the Nigerian State:** This chapter examines the manifestation of globalisation in the Nigerian State. It also focuses on the effects of globalisation on the Nigerian state, particularly the functions, autonomy, sovereignty and state-society relations.

**Chapter Five: Globalisation and Democracy in Nigeria:** This chapter discusses how globalisation intensified the renewed democratic agenda in Nigeria. It also examines the impact of globalisation on democracy in Nigeria as well as the prospect for the consolidation of democracy in the context of the opportunities and challenges presented by globalisation.

**Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion.** This chapter is the concluding part of the study. It gives the summary of the study, analysis of the major findings, contribution to knowledge and conclusion.
1.9. Operational Definition of Terms.

**Autonomy:** Autonomy is seen as the degree to which a state can formulate and implement policies irrespective of the opposition and resistance from the society. It also refers to the degree to which the state is able to work with the society in achieving its goals and objectives.

**Commercialisation:** Commercialisation refers to a situation where by state owned enterprises cease to function in the ideology of public service, but rather operate them in a manner of commercially oriented, profit-driven entity.

**Democratic Consolidation:** The process of institutionalising ethos, values and behaviour capable of enhancing the maturity of new democracy in such a way that it is unlikely to revert to authoritarianism.

**Globalisation:** The stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers so that events, decisions and activities in one part of the world come to have significant implications for individuals and communities in distant places of the globe.

**Governance:** The exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.

**Privatisation:** The sale/transfer of state owned enterprises to the private sector.

**State Capacity:** The degree to which a state is able to discharge its basic functions.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

In order to have a clear understanding of the effects of globalisation on the Nigerian state, there is need for a conceptual clarification of globalisation, its dimensions and the telling examples of globalisation-state debate. This chapter is, therefore, devoted to reviewing relevant literature and unknotting theoretical issues. It encompasses perspectives and dimensions, origin, and questions that border on whether globalisation is a myth or a reality, new or old phenomenon. Furthermore, the review covers the nexus between globalisation and the state as well as the theoretical framework of analysis.

2.2.1 Globalisation in Perspectives

The term ‘globalisation’ first appeared in 1961 in the Webster Third New International Dictionary. Since then, the word has spread to other major world languages. For instance, it is known as lil alam in Arabic, quanquihua in Chinese, globalizatsia in Russia, globalissatio in Finnish, gukje hwa in Korea, mondialisation in French, globalizacion in Spanish and globalisierung in German. Though widely used across various disciplines, the ideas and issues associated with it have remained largely loose. This is what informed Douglas Kellner’s assertion to the effect that globalisation “…is a theoretical construct that is itself contested and opens for various meanings and reflection”.

Kellner also observes that; “it is a code-word that stands for a tremendous diversity of issues and problems and serves as a front for a variety of theoretical and

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political positions\textsuperscript{4}. This seeming ambiguity is also what informed Cesare Poppi’s observation that:

The literature stemming from the debate on globalization has grown beyond any individual’s capability of extracting a workable definition of the concept. In a sense, the meaning of the concept is self evident, in another, it is as vague and obscure as its readers are wide and constantly shifting. Perhaps, more than any other concept, globalisation is the debate about it\textsuperscript{5}.

The multiplicity of definitions of globalisation in the literature is indicative of the fact that, to a very large extent, it is an elusive concept with no agreement on its exact meaning. The effect of this ambiguity has been the burgeoning of conceptions and the conflation of globalisation with terms such as ‘internationalisation’, ‘Americanization’ and ‘universalisation’ as well as sweeping generalisations in some cases in terms of its effects on the modern nation-state particularly developing nations\textsuperscript{6}. Given this controversy surrounding globalisation, it is necessary, before delving into the nexus between globalisation and the state, to review the competing perspectives of the meaning, features and dimensions of the concept. This is the main preoccupation of this section.

Jan Aart Scholte, in his work \textit{what is globalization? The definitional issue-again}, examines related concepts often conflated and used interchangeably with globalisation in the literature\textsuperscript{7}. First, he examines globalisation as internationalisation which means the extension of the activities of a nation across its borders. Scholte advances the view that when globalisation is defined in terms of internationalisation, it is seen as the growth of transactions and interdependence between countries. He argues that if it is viewed from this perspective, then, the more we have ideas and images, trade, money among others, being transacted across the borders of states, the more global we become\textsuperscript{8}. Globalisation, in this context, is measured in terms of the volume of trade, membership of international

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{5} See Kumar, V. S, 2003, A critical methodology of globalization: politics of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. \textit{Indian Journal of Global Legal Studies} 10.2, 87-111.
\textsuperscript{6} Scholte J A distinguishes globalisation, internationalisation, Americanisation, Universalisation and Westernisation. He argues that defining globalisation as internationalisation, Americanisation, Westernisation and universalisation does not capture the real meaning of globalisation. See Scholte,J.A 2002.op.cit.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.
organisations, international telephone traffics and foreign direct investment. Viewing globalisation in this way has implication for how it is perceived as a new or an old phenomenon. It is possible to conclude that international trade, international organisations, foreign direct investment, and international telephone traffics are not essentially new and that they have been part and parcel of the society. Consequently, if globalisation is defined in terms of their intensification, such definition suggests that contemporary globalisation is more or less a replay of developments that characterised previous era.

Imtiaz Ahmed has however noted that there exists a subtle difference between the internationalisation of economy and globalisation\(^9\). He asserts that the former refers to the internationalisation of trade and the later on the internationalisation of finance and investment, each coming in the wake of precise historical moments of capitalism. Globalisation refers to the complex combination of all these but, more importantly, one that is inclusive of a thoroughly transformed production structure. To Ahmed, globalisation is a denationalised form of production in which a fully finished product no longer has one single birthmark; it has multiple birthmarks since several countries have gone to produce it\(^10\).

Second, Scholte examines the implication of conflating globalisation with liberalisation. Scholte advances the view that when globalisation is defined as liberalisation, it is tantamount to celebrating the triumph of neo-liberal policies such as the removal of trade restrictions and barriers, privatisation and commercialisation, etc. In this contemporary era of globalisation, these policies have been dominant in many countries. This, however, should not be reason enough for us to equate globalisation with liberalisation. Recent developments, however, have shown that an economy that is exclusively driven by market forces does not exist as government at one point or the other still intervenes to correct the contradictions spawned by market forces. This has been demonstrated by government’s intervention in the context of the global financial crisis often described as global economic meltdown.

Scholte also distinguishes globalisation from westernisation. Westernisation is seen as a process where societies embrace the western culture in different walks of life

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\(^{10}\) Ibid.
such as industry, law, politics and economics. It also reflects in lifestyle, diet and language. Scholte argues that, when globalisation is defined as westernisation, it is used to describe the way certain ideas of modernity, such as capitalism, urbanism, rationalism and industrialism, are spread across countries. In this sense, globalisation is equated with colonialism and imperialism. This conception of globalisation is usually advanced by those that may be described as critics of globalisation who often stress the danger of western culture and values propagated by western media on the people and culture of developing countries. To these people, starting with the English language which has become a global language, music, food and architectural designs are mainly western. Their spread to the developing nations has the capacity of leading to hybridisation of practices or, in the final analysis, total annihilation of the local practices in such countries.

The fourth related concept which Scholte examines in relation to globalisation is universalisation. He argues that equating globalisation with universalisation is tantamount to identifying globalisation with the spread of ideas on a global scale. The ideas and norms being spread however emanated from western societies. In this sense, globalisation is seen to be homogenising cultural practices across the world and in most cases in developing countries; local practices stand the danger of being overwhelmed by these ideas. This is seen as a threat to local culture and practices.

Fifth, Scholte argues that conflating globalisation with internationalisation, westernisation, universalisation and liberalisation may not adequately unveil the processes of globalisation. He further argues that globalisation should be seen in the context of the spread of transplanetary and supraterritorial phenomena. He sees it as the reduction in the barriers to transworld contacts. This is marked by people becoming more able-physically, legally, culturally and psychologically to engage with each other in one world. These transplanetary and supraterritorial activities are enhanced by the new form of technologies11.

Giovanni E. Reyes in *Theory of Globalization: Fundamental Basis* writes that globalisation can be interpreted in two ways. First, as a phenomenon, it implies that a greater interdependence is happening among different regions and countries of the

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world in terms of finance, trade and communication; Second, as a theory of economic development, one of its major assumptions is that a greater level of integration is taking place among different regions of the world, and that this integration is having an important impact on economic growth and social indicators.\textsuperscript{12}

Iain Watson notes in the preface to his book, \textit{Rethinking the Politics of Globalization Theory, Concept and Strategy}, that globalisation is a descriptive and prescriptive term originally used by free-market economists who argued that the world economy was quite magnificently driven by ever larger institutions of business and finance that seemed to be outstripping the sovereign power of national government.\textsuperscript{13}

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have observed that we should be talking about globalism rather than globalisation. To them, globalisation is just the processes of facilitating globalism.\textsuperscript{14} They assert that globalism refers to a state of the world involving network of interdependence at multi-intercontinental distances; hence globalisation and deglobalisation refer to the increase or decline of globalism. The view expressed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye could be interpreted to mean that globalism has been a feature of the world manifesting in the military, economic, environmental, social and cultural spheres. Invariably, the argument of Keohane and Nye is that globalisation is a process of increasing the interdependence and connectivity in flows. To them, globalism is not the same thing as globalisation, as a state of globalism must exist in the first instance before talking about globalisation.

Anthony Giddens’s view of the meaning of globalisation is in the realm of increase in global interdependence. He asserts that globalisation in its simplest sense denotes an increasing global interdependence, an action at distance, complex mixture of process which often act in contradictory ways, producing conflicts, disjuncture and new forms of stratification.\textsuperscript{15} In another context, Giddens in \textit{The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy}, sees globalisation

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\textsuperscript{13} Watson, I. 2000. \textit{Rethinking the politics of globalization. theory, concept and strategy}, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company. vii


as process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transaction assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact generating transcontinental or interregional flows of network of activity, interaction and the exercises of power.\textsuperscript{16}

Roland Robertson, on his own part, sees globalisation as a concept that refers both to the “compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”\textsuperscript{17}. This conception of globalisation is about the way the world is being knit as well as the awareness of such process. Critics have observed that, it is one thing to talk about the linking of people together and another thing entirely to be referring to one single world which they claim is utopia.

Smith, Baylis and Owens offer a more precise conception of globalisation similar to the view expressed by Giddens. They assert that by globalisation,

\[\ldots\text{ we simply mean the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on people and societies far away. A globalised world is one in which political, economic, cultural and social events become more and more interconnected, and also one in which they have more impact. In other words, societies are affected more and more extensively and more and more deeply by events of other societies. These events can conveniently be divided into three types, social, economic and political.}\textsuperscript{18}\]

While elements of variation can be discerned in the foregoing conceptions and perceptions of globalisation, there is the agreement that it is concerned with the extensive interconnectedness that questions distance in social interactions to the extent that events happening in one place have the capacity of spilling over to other areas. This growing interconnectedness is rendering distance, which has hitherto constrained social interactions, less relevant. It is this construction of globalisation that influenced Anthony Giddens’ assertion to the effect that globalisation is about the intensification of worldwide social relations which links distant localities in such a way that local


\textsuperscript{17} Cited in Watson, I. op.cit.

happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa.\(^\text{19}\)

Globalisation in this sense is about the growing interconnectedness among nation-states in such a way that events and developments in one state tend to have impact on others and vice-versa. It is about the growing interdependence in nearly all facets of life facilitated by the advancement in information technology.

### 2.2.2. Dimensions of Contemporary Globalisation

Nurullah Ardic asserts that although globalisation is casually used every day to refer to a single phenomenon, it is not a single, unified process. Rather, it has several dimensions\(^\text{20}\). Peter Newell observes that the literature on globalisation exhibits two basic characteristics\(^\text{21}\). First, it is triad focused and, second, globalisation is seen as apolitical, neutral and inevitable\(^\text{22}\). Ulrich Beck’s assertion tilts towards Newell views when he notes that globalisation is,

…nobody’s world. No one is in charge, no one started it; no one can stop it. It is a kind of organized, irresponsibility. You keep looking for someone who is responsible, you can complain to, but there is nobody on the other side of the phone, no e-mail address\(^\text{23}\).

The above view suggests that globalisation is apolitical and not emanating from any centre of power or activity. Peter Newell has observed that such conception of globalisation does not provide basis for real understanding of the process of globalisation. He argues that power relations are central to the globalisation process\(^\text{24}\).

If the above observation captures globalisation, the question that becomes germane at this point is: what stimulates its processes and what are its dimensions?

It is important to state that economic issues dominate globalisation yet limiting

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\(^{22}\) Ibid


\(^{24}\) Newell, P. op.cit.
globalisation to economic activities may not have the capacity of capturing the reality of growing interconnectedness between different spheres of the society which a multi-dimensional approach has the capacity of explaining. There is agreement in the literature that globalisation is a multi-faceted phenomenon having economic, political and cultural dimensions.

Economic globalisation has received considerable attention than other dimensions. Economic globalisation manifests itself through a global commodity chain and a global division of labour, the global mobility of capital, the increasing concentration of industries in a small number of transnational corporations, the development of global regulatory institutions and a shift in world trade from goods and services to financial instrument. Globalisation in economic terms represents the contemporary process of greater integration of the global political economy facilitated by the improvement in information technology. Sidney Weintraub argues that globalisation is usually used to describe increase in trade, investment flows, improved communication, and greater ability to move goods, services and capital efficiently.

Thus, economic globalisation is used to denote the breakdown of economic barriers and removal of obstacles to transborder trade.

The history of economic globalisation is usually traced to 14th Century but it is seen to have accelerated in recent years because of the post 1960s electronic revolution. In its current form, the features of economic globalisation centre on the Washington Consensus which encompasses the following ten principles:

(a) Fiscal policy discipline;
(b) redirection of public spending from indiscriminate (and often regressive) subsidies toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services such as primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment;
(c) tax reform - broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates;
(d) Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real

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25 Ulrich, B. 2001. op.cit
(e) competitive exchange rates;
(f) trade liberalization - liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs;
(g) liberalisation of inward foreign direct investments;
(h) privatisation of public enterprises
(i) deregulation - abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions; and,
(j) legal security for property rights.

The realisation that some of the principles of economic globalisation have devastating impact led to a reconsideration of the strict market fundamentalism of the Washington Consensus. This led to the thinking that there is the need to regulate the excesses of the market. This new thinking is what is now called the post-Washington Consensus.

The principles of the post-Washington Consensus became the driving force of the global political economic order as a result of the developments in the mid-1990s when leaders of some Western states started turning away from the pure liberal principles of the Thatcher/Reagan years. Though still emphasizing market fundamentalism, leaders such as former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and former President Bill Clinton of the United States started canvassing for the restructuring of their economies so as to tamper with the excesses of the market while at the same time making the economy more competitive. Consequently, contemporary economic globalisation is not about the pure government for the market, emphasis is now placed on the mechanisms that could also be used to tame the excesses of the market.

The political dimension of globalisation is seen in the context of the state. This is linked to many developments at the global level. These include, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union which signalled the end of an era—the end of the polarisation of the world into two opposing ideological groups, multiple

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sites for political action, increasing role of non-state actors and the triumph of western liberal democratic order in which democracy and its attendant elements (such as respect for human rights, press freedom, rule of law, transparency and accountability) are dominant.  

The cultural dimension of globalisation focuses on the transformation of local cultures and practices. Technology is seen as spreading dominant cultural values of contemporary society to the different parts of the world. In this sense, the media is seen as the medium through which such diffusion is being accomplished. The consequences of this cultural diffusion have, over the years, become controversial as many critics of globalisation are of the view that there are certain homogenising elements in the globalisation process. Norman Backhaus has advanced the view that: First, the way goods and services are produced has become standardised in a manner that increases compatibility considerably. Second, most computers are configured with software that permits easy exchange of information. Third, there is the presence of global food chains which serve same food in different parts of the world. Fourth, the same music can be heard from radio stations all over the world. Fifth, many TV series are increasingly becoming known to the global public. Finally, English is becoming a global means of communication. The argument of the critics is that local cultural practices are under threat due to the hegemonising effects of Western culture disseminated by Western media.

While the existence of increasing homogeneity of practices tends to lend credence to the claims of the critics, it is, however, misleading to equate globalisation with homogenisation or cultural convergence. Van Der Bly clearly questions the homogenisation effects of globalisation. She declares that nothing that grows from nature is uniform and that if a hundred different people were provided with the same materials and were asked to build a house, a hundred different houses would be built.

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30 Ibid.
Yet if one company was asked to build a hundred houses for a hundred people and was provided with the same materials for each house, a hundred identical houses might be built\textsuperscript{31}.

Polly Toynbee argues that the fear expressed in relation to the retreat of local cultural practices is all about “culture panic.” He specifically asserts that “culture panic is a close cousin of moral panic (moral decline), intellectual panic (dumbing down) and patriotic panic (loss of national identity)”. He notes further that most of the debate about cultural globalisation is a surrogate debate about America and the value or damage done by its growing influence\textsuperscript{32}.

The dominance of Western culture and values in contemporary era of globalisation has essentially been the fear of the potential effects of Western culture on local practices and values. This may not necessarily lead to a convergence or homogenisation of practices as it may also lead to fragmentation. To be sure, local people, as argued by Norman Backhaus, may react negatively to external forces in different forms such as showing preference for local music rather than foreign or seeing things from the West as evil and clamping a ban on them\textsuperscript{33}. Such reactions often negate claims in some quarters which present the state as being helpless in the context of globalisation. The realisation of the potential threat of a new culture may even spawn reaction by local group to protect their local identity. Globalisation, rather than undermining local cultural practices, may even create the consciousness for cultural revival. It is thus misleading to equate globalisation with homogenisation and uniformity.

Technology also looms large in most of the accounts of contemporary globalisation. The origin of the new forms of technologies can be traced to the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century which was characterised by the pervasive influence of technological revolution and the attendant democratisation of technologies of information processing and transmission\textsuperscript{34}. Manuel Castells, while analysing the features of the information technology paradigm, states \textit{inter alia} that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Van Der Bly, M. C. E. 2005. \textit{The triumph of ambiguity} 53.6.875-893.
  \item Backhaus,,N. op.cit.
  \item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
(a) Information is the raw material of the Information Technology, thus we have technology acting on information and not just information acting on technology.

(b) The pervasive effects of the new technologies spawn across all human endeavours and activities in these spheres are directly shaped but not just determined by the new technology.

(c) The networking logic of systems, a set of relationship using these information technologies.

(d) The flexibility of the process and

(e) The convergence of specific technology into highly integrated system\(^{35}\).

Prominent among these new forms of technologies are the Internet and other Computer Mediated Communication (CMC). Although various accounts exist in the literature regarding the origin and diffusion of ICT, particularly the Internet, there is agreement that the development of the Internet could be traced to the 1960s and associated with the activities of big corporations and military innovations, particularly in the United States. The Internet emerged from the work of United States Defense Department’s Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA). Consequently, the ARPA Network (ARPANET) that came out of this innovation was the first computer network which went online in the month of September 1969 with the first four nodes established at the University of California, Los Angeles, Stanford Research Institute, University of California, Santa Barbara and the University of Utah. ARPANET was opened to research centres cooperating with the US Defense Department but the scientists were equally using the facilities for their own personal work. This led to a situation where it was difficult to separate military oriented research from personal communication. This led to the splitting of ARPANET in 1983, a trend that gave birth to the MILNET. In spite of this, however, the ARPANET continued to serve as the backbone of the Internet.

As rightly observed by Manuel Castells, many applications of the Internet at that stage came from unexpected inventions of its users, inducing a practice and technological trajectory that would become essential features of the Internet. Thus, in

the early stages of ARPANET, the rationale for computer linkage was the possibility of time-sharing through remote computing so that scattered computer resources could be fully utilised on line\textsuperscript{36}. Castells notes further that in spite of the innovation, by the 1990s, the Internet was still very difficult to use by the uninitiated. It was characterised by limited graphic transmission capability and it was extremely difficult to locate and retrieve information. A new development, however, occurred in the early 1990s in the Internet world which allowed for the diffusion of the Internet into the main stream of the society. This was the World Wide Web (www). This innovation took place at the Centre European Pour Recherché Nucléaire (CERN) in Geneva. The team of researchers at the centre created a format for the hyper text markup language (html). They also set up the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (http) to guide communication between browsers and web servers. They also created standard address format known as the Standard Resources Location (URL). The development of the Internet also spread to the telephone- the mobile telephony spearheaded by Sweden based Ericsson, Finland based Nokia and America’s Motorola\textsuperscript{37}. This led to the possibility of accessing the Internet from mobile telephony devices.

Schirato and Webb have advanced the view that information technology driving contemporary globalisation is not restricted to the Internet but entails a wide range of processes. They argue \textit{inter alia} that;

\begin{quote}
...information technology encompasses the revolution in technological changes manifesting in the emergence of computers and other related technologies which have led to the compression of time and space. It involves a long list which includes computers, electronic mail, the Internet, digital cable and fibre optic, technologies, mobile telephone, satellite technology television, films and telephone video conferencing. Each of these, they contend further, can be located within the general categories of digitalization, networking and information processing\textsuperscript{38}.
\end{quote}

Information technology is seen to be the driving force of contemporary society linking different geographical locations in such a way that the distinction that hitherto existed between domestic and external spheres is fast disappearing. The advancement in information technology is accelerating the pace of global interactions as well as

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.  \\
\end{flushright}
increasing the rapidity or velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information, capital and technology move around the world. There is also the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global\textsuperscript{39}. The consequences of these include the stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers so that events, decisions and activities in one part of the world now have significant implications for individuals and communities in distant places of the globe as well as the intensification or the growing magnitude of interconnectedness in almost every sphere of social existence.\textsuperscript{40} These developments have far reaching complex consequences for the modern state.

The United Nations Report on the Public Sector of 2001 amplifies the nature and power of the new forms of technologies. It notes, among other things, that

\ldots there is no field of technological progress, which has evolved more rapidly in the past 20 years than Information Technology (IT). Taking shape through the conversion of semiconductors, computer, telecommunication and soft technologies, the information technology has produced and sustained rapid falls in the cost of processing, storing and transmitting information. Thus, it makes promises to make available information and knowledge base of humankind, anywhere, anytime, in any language.\textsuperscript{41}

Manuel Castells, who has devoted much attention to the global infrastructure of technologies, equally notes that the advent of micro-electronic based communication networks is so central and significant as to have introduced a qualitatively new kind of human society which is now able to operate on a global scale\textsuperscript{42}. He asserts further that

\ldots technological revolution centred on information technologies is reshaping at an accelerated pace, the material base of the
society, the way we communicate with each other, the way get things done and the way we fit ourselves to time and space.  

Revolution in the world of technology has pervasive effects on the way the world understands time and space which in turn has transformed all the main spheres of human activity, economic, cultural, social and political. This overview of the perspectives and dimensions of globalisation shows that it is a complex and multi-dimension process that covers nearly every aspects of life. It has economic, cultural, political and technological dimensions.

2.3.1. Globalisation Debate.

There is the need as a point of departure to probe the nature and substance of the globalisation debate. Anthony Giddens in 2000 notes that the debate was initially about whether globalisation existed at all because of the claim of sceptics who were comparing trans-border activities in the past centuries with contemporary global developments. To the sceptics, globalisation was hype, but to Giddens that debate is over given the developments that showed that globalisation is real and argues that the second debate is about the consequences of the phenomenon. Joseph Stiglitz however notes that the globalisation debate has moved beyond the issues bordering on the consequences of global infrastructures and their manifestations in various forms in the modern state. He argues that both advocates and critics of globalisation have come to realise that globalisation has uneven benefits for the modern state and harbours devastating consequences not only for the less developed countries of the South but also for the developed countries of the North. Consequently, the current issues in the globalisation debate centre on how to manage its processes to harness the benefits and minimise its devastating consequences.

In spite of the above caveat, there are major two perspectives on the effects of globalisation. The first perspective views globalisation as a benign and beneficent
phenomenon. Those who express this view are usually called the protagonists or supporters of globalisation. The argument of the protagonists is that globalisation is an agent of development. The second perspective views globalisation as a human design for the expansion of trans-national capital. This view is expressed by critics of globalisation who argue that globalisation is bringing about denationalisation of economic activities through the creation of transnational flows which manifest in an array of network activity as well as the integration of the world economy into a single global economy. This development tends to diminish the capacity of the state in the realm of policy making functions. The states in this context are not in a position to initiate policies; instead trans-national institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO now exercise the traditional function of policy decision making. The autonomy of the state is, therefore, undermined and its capacity reduced.

In addition, technology is also considered as a threat to the power of the state. The hyperglobalisers argue that contemporary globalisation is leading to the loss of the modern state’s control of information, ideas and images across its territories. Similarly, the neo-liberal economic ideology that prevails in the contemporary society and which manifests in the burgeoning of neo-liberal economic policies (such as trade liberalisation, economic integration, privatisation and deregulation) are seen to be undermining the sovereignty, power and functions of states and the patterns of state-society relations. The conclusion is usually the diminution of state capacity and the erosion of democratic values and practices. There is however, a perspective that globalisation harbours positive and negative consequences. In the words of Joseph Stiglitz, globalisation is neither a good or bad phenomenon. It has uneven consequences for both the developed and developing nations.

The ongoing globalisation debate centres on varied issues such as the meaning and interpretation, namely whether it is a new or an old process, its dimensions-


economic, political and cultural, evaluation and effects as well as how to tame its negative consequences. The review in the subsequent sections of this chapter captures some of the issues in the globalisation debate.

2.3.2. Globalisation: Myth or Reality, Old or New Phenomenon?

Is globalisation a myth or a reality? Is it a new or an old phenomenon? These are questions that loom large in the literature. There are two schools of thought on the origin of globalisation. The first school of thought is of the view that globalisation is not a new phenomenon. To this group of writers, globalisation has been with us for long and that recent developments are not qualitatively different from what transpired in the past. Emma Rothschild amplifies this position by stating that

…one way of looking at globalisation from a historical perspective has to do with the economic and social history of interactions, relationship and in particular with the history of earlier periods of rapid increase in international trade, investment communication and influence.  

Specifically, Rothschild asserts that the export investment booms of the 1860s and the early 20th Century are just two of the most dramatic examples. Other major events and forces that shaped globalisation included the 325 BC exploit of the Buddhist Chandragupta, many of which combined the expansive power of the world religion, economy and imperial armies for the first time to connect the Mediterranean, Persia, India and Central Asia. Also, Christopher Columbus in 1402 and Vasco Dagama in 1498 navigated the world water ways in an effort to connect the globe. This historical posture of globalisation forms the basis of the argument of the sceptics that globalisation has a long history and, therefore, is not a new phenomenon. Much of the claims are presented in a manner that suggests that contemporary globalisation is a rehash of an earlier process of capitalism.

The view that globalisation is not a new phenomenon can also be deduced from argument of the sceptics. While the hyperglobalisers acknowledge that

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globalisation ushers in a new era in which the machinery of the state is becoming a mere transmission belt, the sceptics, using statistics, reject the claim that globalisation represents a new epoch. Leading members of this group includes Hirst and Thompson who argue that:

(a) The present highly internationalised economy is not unprecedented; it is one of distinct conjunctures or states of the international economy that have existed since an economy based on modern industrial technology began to be generalised from the 1860s. In some respects, the current international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914.

(b) Genuinely, transnational companies appear to be relatively rare. Most companies are based nationally and trade multi-nationally on the strength of a major national location of assets, production and sales and there seems to be no major tendency towards the growth of a truly international companies.

(c) Capital mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment from the advanced to the developing countries. Rather, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is highly concentrated among the advanced industrial economies and the Third World Remains marginal in both investment and trade, a small minority of newly industrialising countries apart.

(d) As some of the extreme advocates of globalisation recognize that the world economy is far from being genuinely ‘global’. Rather, trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan, and North America and this dominance seems set to continue.

(e) These major economic powers, the G3, thus have the capacity, especially if they coordinate policy, to exert powerful governance pressures over financial markets and other economic tendencies. Global markets are, thus, by no means beyond regulation and control, even though the current scope and objectives of economic
governance are limited by the divergent interests of the great power and the economic doctrines prevalent among the elites. In another context, Hirst and Thompson argue inter alia that globalisation, as conceived by the more extreme globalisers, is largely a myth... the world economy is far from being genuinely global. The sceptics, while questioning the novelty of recent developments associated with the globalisation, argue that there is the trend towards regionalisation. To them, the modern state is not as helpless as presented by the hyperglobalists because the state is still central in the contemporary era as transnational institutions still need the state to operate. In spite of this, they hold the view that the contemporary global political economy is not evenly ordered as the gap between the developed countries of the ‘North’ and the less developed countries in the ‘South’ still exists. The current socio-economic and political order is not unprecedented; nevertheless, this should not be a sufficient reason to claim that nothing new is happening.

To hold on fast to this position would be tantamount to a denial, especially of the instantaneous interaction which now characterised the present global order and the changes in the configuration in the power of the nation states in face of increasing engagement with global forces. Traits of contemporary globalisation have antecedent but this should not make us to deny the uniqueness of some of its current manifestations in the modern state.

The second group, while acknowledging that the events in the contemporary society have antecedents, nevertheless argue that the forces of new global technologies make it qualitatively different from earlier epochs of history. Mike Kwanashie stresses this view when he declares that “... although globalisation is not a new phenomenon, the speed with which the present process is unfolding has created elements of

54 The state has not diminished. This view is pervasive in the literature and it is based on the argument that transnational institutions and corporations still operate through the state and as such the state is still central in global politics. Jameson F. 2000. Globalisation and politic strategy. New Left Review. 4 49-68. Retrieved March 2,2005 from http://webcache.googleusercontent.com
propaganda around it.” Anao also expresses a similar view when he notes, *inter alia*, that:

Globalisation is a new historical reality which is not simply one that has been invented by neo-liberal ideology designed to persuade nationals of a country to surrender to foreign induced market forces. Rather it is one which is inscribed and embedded in processes of capitalist restructuring, innovation and competition, and enacted through the powerful medium of new information and communication technologies.

J. J Lim identified three distinct nature of the present time which shows that it is a departure from the past. These are:

(i) First, the overwhelming advances in information and communications technology which has made it impossible to remain a hermit to events happening in other parts of the world.

(ii) Second, and as a consequence of the first, real time interactivity is sensitizing nations to the need to confront these episodes in the nations around them.

(iii) Third, the break up of the Soviet Union, coupled with the subsequent retreat of Marxism worldwide, implies that ideological distinctions are taking a back seat to socio-cultural differences and -for better or worse -these tend to be more permissive toward syncretism.

Insights from the foregoing two schools of thought show that we have two views on the origin of globalisation. First, those who doubt the novelty of the globalisation process and are quick to reject its existence by arguing that globalisation is a myth. Second, we have those who acknowledge the reality of its processes maintaining that globalisation is a force that explains social change in the contemporary society. While the advocates argue that the world is entering new and qualitatively unique phases of development, the critics claim that recent developments are not qualitatively different from what had happened in the past and, as such, they

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57 Lim, J. J. 2005. op.cit.
are not unique.

We may, at this juncture, highlight the implications of viewing globalisation as a new or old phenomenon. Indeed, while the contemporary society has the traits of previous epochs of globalisation, the infrastructure of global technologies, as widely observed in the literature, makes it a new phenomenon that has no rival in world history. The contention of those who doubt the existence of the phenomenon could be explained from their conception of globalisation which is principally from economic perspective. Advocates of globalisation contend that a simple way of demonstrating the novelty of recent world developments is to consider the transformational technologies of transport and communication as well as rapid innovation and diffusion of new technologies. The implication of this is that to ascertain the reality and novelty of globalisation, a comparison of recent developments with past events becomes an important point of departure in evaluating the nature and significance of current global process.

The claims of both groups, however, have relative merits. Those who deny the novelty of the process lay claim to previous developments which contemporary globalisation share with many of their features. Consequently, to them, nothing is new. Those who see globalisation as a reality and a new process rest their claim on the distinctive features of the modern society which they consider different from the previous developments. It is, however, misleading to deny the novelty of globalisation simply because it shares the traits of previous epoch.

From the above analysis, it is clear that globalisation is a process that actually started many years back and has gone through different phases and is assuming new shape in the contemporary era. The current socio-economic and political order is not unprecedented but this should not be a sufficient reason to claim that nothing new is happening. To hold on fast to this position would be tantamount to a denial especially of the instantaneous interaction which now characterised the present global order and the changes in the configuration in the power of the nation states in face of the increasing engagement with global forces. Traits of contemporary globalisation have antecedent but this should not make us deny the uniqueness of some of its current manifestations in the modern state.

Thus, it is misleading to conclude that globalisation is not new because the
process has antecedents. Similarly, it would be out of context to deny the antecedents of globalisation on the basis of the uniqueness of the characteristics of contemporary global era.

2.3.3. Globalisation: A Process or Condition?

The conceptions of globalisation in the previous sections tend to see it both as a process and a condition, with such writers as Held, Giddens and Robertson considering it a process. The literature is also replete with conceptions of globalisation as a condition describing what is happening or the direction of the process. The distinction between globalisation as a process and globalisation as a condition therefore has been a source of controversy in the globalisation literature. This has been captured by Manfred Steger who asserts that:

Given the different meanings of these concepts, their indiscriminate usage invites confusion. A slopping conflation of process and condition, for instance encourages circular definitions that possess little explanatory power. For instance the often-repeated truism that globalisation (the process) leads to more globalisation (the condition) does not allow us to draw meaningful distinction between causes and effects  

The question then is, what does it mean if globalisation is viewed as a process or condition? In her contribution to the debate, Van Der Bly writes that the distinction between globalisation as a process or condition raises fundamental questions in terms of what is happening (condition) and what could happen in the future (process). She, however, advances the view that on the one hand, when globalisation is seen as a process; such a definition invariably ignores what is actually happening now. Rather, it defines what is supposedly the destination of the different processes which can be contrasted with the past 59. On the other hand, when globalisation is viewed as a condition, emphasis is usually placed on the prevailing features or characteristics of the contemporary global political and economic order. The emphasis is on the empirical condition of rapidly developing and the ever dense network of interconnectedness and interdependence that now characterise the contemporary society. Held et al. assert that,

59 Van Der Bly. M.C.E. op.cit. 
sceptics and hyperglobalisers have the tendency of conceptualising globalisation as a single condition or end-state, that is, a fully integrated global market. They argue that socio-historical approaches to globalisation regard it as a process which has no fixed condition. Viewing globalisation as a condition suggests that it is about what is happening in our contemporary society including the integration of national economies and the convergence of tastes and consumption.

What can be deduced from the foregoing is that, first; there is no agreement as to whether globalisation is a process or a condition. Second, the foregoing analysis suggests that globalisation is neither exclusively about the present condition of the global political, socio and economic order nor is it about the direction or envisaged outcome of the dynamics of contemporary order. In most analyses of globalisation, reference is usually made to the empirical conditions of the contemporary society which distinguish contemporary globalisation from previous eras. For instance, recent technologies, particularly the Internet and other CMC, are qualitatively new and unique to the contemporary society. In the same vein, the way and manner the Internet and other CMC are shaping socio-economic and political relations have no rival in the history of mankind. In this sense, the process may eventually lead to a particular condition. In essence, globalisation is both a process and a condition.

2.3.4. Globalisation and the State

One of the most controversial issues in the globalisation literature and, perhaps the most discussed, has been that of the effects of the processes of globalisation on the modern state. Simply put, the linkage between globalisation and the state has been a subject of debate. The debate covers a wide range of issues including whether globalisation is creating a single world or a global village in which the homogenisation of practices is dominant, whether its economic dimension, which permits the growing influence of transnational institutions, is threatening the basis of the power, functions and capacity of the modern state, and whether it is benefiting both the developed and developing nations.

Different views have been expressed in this context. While some writers

60. Held, D. McGrew, A. Goldblatt, D and Perraton, J, 1999, op.cit.1-.31
celebrate globalisation, others continue to vilify it. For instance, Kunle Amuwo explains the complex consequences of globalisation for the modern state. He asserts, *inter alia*, that globalisation is nothing but a mixed grill which, on the one hand, has the potentiality of eroding national sovereignty of weak and poor state and, on the other hand, has the potential of providing environment for the respect for human rights and gender equality. He sees globalisation as an economic orthodoxy that is failing the people but also enriching investors and big corporations\(^{61}\).

Martin Shaw, who has devoted time to the analysis of the nexus between globalisation and the state, argues that the modern states are no longer autonomous in the classic sense because the most recent phase of globalisation has certainly involved a decline in the autonomy of the nation-state which resulted from the outcomes of their own projection\(^ {62}\). He asserts further that one of the fundamental changes the modern state is experiencing in the current phase of globalisation is that the control of violence is no longer divided vertically between different nation-states and empires. Rather, it is being divided horizontally between different levels of power, each of which claims some legitimacy and thus fragments the nature of state\(^ {63}\).

Linda Weiss also argues along the same line as Martin Shaw, asserting that though the exact meaning of globalisation is elusive, those who champion the global idea always believe that it undermines the power to influence policies. She expresses the view that national governments are becoming less relevant because they are losing their power to influence macroeconomic outcomes, social programmes and the determination of strategies for managing the industrial economy. Weiss contends that the nation-state is a pawn in the invisible hand of the global market\(^ {64}\).

Susan Strange, one of the foremost scholars who have written extensively on the retreat of the state in the face of the forces of globalisation, explains what she refers to as paradox of the power of the state in the context of globalisation. She asserts that heads of government and their ministers may be the last to recognise that they have lost

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\(^{63}\) Ibid

the authority over national societies and economies that they used to have. \textsuperscript{65} She explains the declining authority of the states which is reflecting in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations. In relation to market, she argues that where states were once the masters of market, the reverse is the case now.

Strange, however, identifies three paradoxes on the declining authority of the state. The first paradox is that in the current era of globalisation, the regulatory function of the state is on the increase. She asserts that contrary to the impression conveyed that less and less of daily activities of men are immune from decisions of government bureaucracies; governments are now more involved in the lives of individuals than in the past. Governments now pass law, set up inspectorates and planning authorities, provide employment services and enforce customer protection against unclean water, and unsafe food, faulty buildings or transport systems. \textsuperscript{66} This questions the view that the state is becoming irrelevant in this era of contemporary globalisation.

The second paradox is that while governments of established states, most notably in North America and Western Europe, are suffering from this progressive loss of real authority, the queue of societies that want to have their own state is lengthening. The third paradox is the contradiction generated by Asian states; they have served as the means to achieve their economic growth, industrialisation, a modernised infrastructure and a rising living standard for the people.

Following the paradoxes identified by Strange, it is clear that some of the views expressed concerning the diminution of the power of the state in the context of globalisation are questionable. First, the state is now more active in regulating the activities of the citizens. Moreover, while many view the state as irrelevant, there are many societies clamouring for the emergence of their own state and, lastly, the states in Asia have proved that a strong developmental state is needed to drive and shape the pace of development in this era of globalisation.

We may therefore assert that globalisation is not making the state irrelevant. Empirical evidence from the Asian States has demonstrated and underscored the


\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
centrality of the state in the modern society. Hence, it is safer to make the claim that the state is being transformed by globalisation rather than making the state irrelevant.

2.3.5 Globalisation and the Question of Governance

In the literature, one area where the consequences of globalisation are being assessed is in the realm of governance. Two schools of thought can be identified. First, those who celebrate globalisation, and second, those who identify governance deficits spawned by globalisation. Before delving into these issues, there is the need to examine what governance entails and in the process highlight the debate on globalisation-governance nexus.

The most celebrated conception of governance is that one offered by the United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) in its 1997 reports. In that report, the UNDP defines governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. The UNDP further notes that governance has three legs, i.e. economic, political and administrative. The UNDP report highlights the attributes of good governance to include participation, transparency and accountability, rule of law, responsiveness, consensus orientation, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and strategic vision. Given these attributes and dimensions of governance, it could be argued that governance encompasses all the mechanisms of a state. It is concerned with how the power of the state is exercised, how decisions are made and the relationship between the state and the society. Sections 2.3.6, 2.3.7 and 2.3.8 focus on the nexus between globalisation and the sovereignty of the state, globalisation and the functions of the state as well as globalisation and democracy.

2.3.6. Globalisation and Sovereignty and Autonomy of the State

The most widely discussed issue of the globalisation-state nexus is probably

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68 Ibid.
the fate of the sovereignty of the state which many consider as being threatened by globalisation. As a point of departure however, we need to probe into what is meant by sovereignty which globalisation is seen to be threatening? In a simple language, sovereignty is about the power of state to make and enforce policies within its jurisdiction without any form of external control. The conception of sovereignty, particularly by writers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, presupposes that the modern state ought to have absolute sovereignty and unquestionable autonomy. This conception is based on the Westphalian political order which encompasses the following attributes:(1) The equality of all states (2) right of every state to freely choose and develop its own political, economic and cultural systems without any external interference, and (3) that States are obligated to respect the sovereignty and legal entity of other states. Indeed, the sovereignty of state under the Westphalian order was based on the notion of hardened borders of the state.

It is obvious that the deterritorialisation of state activity is making governance to escape the reach of the industrially developed as well as less developed countries. The modern states are no longer having the exclusive power and rights to determine what is appropriate for their citizens. In terms of decision-making, policy actors now consider a wide array of factors such as the possible implications of such actions on other actors -states and non states alike as well as their reactions. Schirato and Webb argue that the phenomenon of new forms of communication technologies, changes in economic practice and the increasing global flows of people (including refugees and terrorists) with related difficulty of maintaining national security are the forces of globalisation undermining the sovereignty of the state. The new forms of technologies are seen as an assault on the modern state because it is now becoming more and more difficult for governments to control the flow of images, information, arguments, and ideas into and across its territory as against the practice in the past.

Furthermore, economic practices, particularly neo-liberal policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and World Trade Organisation (WTO), are seen as vitiating sovereignty of the modern state. Apart from this, the triumph of western-style democracy with the attendant traits such as individualism,
human rights and liberalism has made the ideological differences between the Western and Eastern blocs to disappear. The argument is that in a matter of time, state would surrender all important areas such as defence, health and education to transnational institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and WTO. Specifically, there is the argument that modern states are becoming weak to maintain their security against various threats, such as terrorism and international crime. The security role of the state, is therefore being gradually transferred to international defence coalitions or bodies such as the United Nations.

Patrick O’Donnell, however, questions the presumed threat to sovereignty of the state amplified in the literature. While highlighting the challenges of global developments for the sovereignty of the modern state, he notes that neo-liberal economic principles and structural adjustment programmes represent internationally binding economic policy prescriptions which states ignore at their own peril. He adds that, though sovereign states remain the principal actors, in the international arena, it is now difficult for human rights-abuse regimes to take cover behind the mantle of internal sovereignty. He argues that sovereignty is being redefined and not undermined as it is now pooled, unbundled and complex. On the pooling of sovereignty, O’Donnell notes that in the contemporary political and economic order, several issues are no longer defined as domestic affairs but global problems that need global action. Issues that centre on the environment, democracy and human rights violations are no longer seen to fall within the domain of domestic affairs. Consequently, nation states now pooled their sovereignty together to handle them as common global problems. The pooling of sovereignty invariably entails some loss of autonomy if (autonomy) is defined in terms of the leeway a state has in taking decision.

On the issue of unbundled sovereignty, O’Donnell asserts that if sovereignty signifies a set of power, claims, rights, liberties and immunities, it may be both possible and frequently desirable to unbundle these attributes. He considers them

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70 Ibid 109.
71 Ibid 109.
73 Ibid.
necessary and desirable as this may ensure the survival of state actors and the international system to which they belong. The third dimension of contemporary sovereignty of the state, according to O’ Donnell, is that, it is not only pooled, unbundled but also complex or divided because it is parcelled and diffused. Specifically, many actors are now involved in governance particularly non-state actors which Held and McGrew claim may have the tendency of resulting in heterarchy.

If the concept of sovereignty is seen in this perspective, globalisation may not necessarily imply its diminution as we are being made to believe by some writers. First, no nation whether developed or developing, has ever enjoyed absolute sovereignty. Under the Westphalian political order, the notion of sovereignty is a farce as states constantly entered into treaties and submit themselves to the ruling of international organisations such as the League of Nations, United Nations and other regional bodies. Giddens argues in this direction when he declares that:

No state however powerful held as much sovereign control in practice as was enshrined in legal principle. The history of the past is thus not one of progressive loss of sovereignty on the part of the nation state.

The implication of the various views expressed in the literature is that, though globalisation has created a situation whereby the modern state is no longer in control of all its domestic affairs, it is nonetheless misleading to highlight the loss of sovereignty as one of the fall outs of the contemporary global society. In this context, the sovereignty of the nation-state cannot be questioned as a result of its activities and engagements of the state with the agents of global political and economic institutions.

Furthermore, the erosion of sovereignty of national government in this era of globalisation has been exaggerated. The various claims and assertions about the erosion of sovereignty have not been supported by concrete empirical evidence. As Louis Pauly has rightly noted, ‘the backlash that globalisation undermines sovereignty is common among most scholars because of their failure to distinguish between

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74 Ibid.
sovereignty and autonomy’. He asserts further that sovereignty connotes the internal supremacy and external independence of a given political authority and that states today confront tighter economic constraints, or clearer policy tradeoffs, as a result of a freer potential flow of capital, technology, and labour across their border. The erosion of their absolute freedom to pursue internally generated policies is, therefore, an erosion of their policy autonomy and not their legal sovereignty. Hence, the diminution of autonomy is not new and it constitutes no formidable threat to state sovereignty as such. The import of the foregoing is that, it is safer to talk about the changing nature of the configuration of the state instead of the sweeping generalisation about the erosion of its sovereignty, autonomy and capacity.

2.3.7 Globalisation and the Functions and Capacity of the State

The nexus between globalisation and the modern state is also analysed in the context of autonomy, capacity and functions of the state. Autonomy, like other concepts in the social sciences, has been conceptualised in different ways but two major perspectives are dominant in the literature. First, autonomy is seen as the degree to which a state can formulate and implement its policies irrespective of the opposition and resistance from the society. This is usually termed the infrastructural or despotic power of the state. In this sense, a state possessing a high degree of autonomy is identified by its ability to act independently. The second perspective is about the degree at which the state is able to work with the society in achieving its goals and objectives. The autonomy of a state, according to this perspective, is measured not by the degree at which its activities are disconnected from the influence of the society but the extent to which state policies and activities are embedded in the society. Thus, Hobson has noted that, “state would be more efficient when they are embedded across


78 Ibid.

79 This argument is usually canvassed by the transformationalists who though recognise the challenges of globalisation for the state deny the fact that it automatically vitiates state autonomy, capacity and sovereignty.


81 Ibid.

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a broad range of social action rather than exclusively with dominant class.\textsuperscript{82}

State capacity, on the other hand, refers to the

… ability of a state to undertake collective actions at least cost to society. This notwithstanding, capacity encompasses the administrative or technical capacity of the state officials but it is much broader than that. It also includes the deeper institutional mechanism that gives politicians and civil servants the flexibility, rules and restraints to enable them act in the collective interest.\textsuperscript{83}

With reference to the functions of the state, Speiser Dunja and Paul-Simon Handy identify three core functions of the state which an entity called a state must fulfil.\textsuperscript{84} These are, first, monopoly of violence, which is the most important function of the state. It refers to the capacity of a state to exert control and authority over its territory and the ability to make use of legitimate force to maintain law and order. In this sense, a state that can easily deploy its security apparatuses to maintain law and order is seen to be effective in the discharge of this function. The second function is called service functions and it relates to the capacity of a state in the provision of social services to the citizens. The general quality of infrastructure, health and education systems are the indicators for assessing whether the state is performing this function or not. Political order is the third function of the state and it is concerned with political participation, involvement in decision-making and stability of state institutions. In measuring the extent to which the state is performing these functions, consideration is usually given to variables such as repression against opponents, electoral fraud, massive human rights violations, exclusion of certain groups from the decision making process, high level of corruption and absence of the independence of the courts. When these conditions prevail, the state is seen as fragile and not discharging to this function. Dunja and Handy assert that a state becomes fragile when one of its core functions is missing or not sufficiently met.

The question is what is the fate of the autonomy, capacity and functions of the


\textsuperscript{83} This is the definition of state capacity given by the World Bank. See Cummings S.N and Norgaard O, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{84} Speiser D and Handy Paul-Simon. 2005. The State, its failure and external intervention in Africa. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper No. 175/05
state in the contemporary era of globalisation? Like the concept of sovereignty, the nexus between globalisation and the functions of the state has been given considerable attention in the literature. On the one hand, we have writers who see globalisation as reducing the economic functions of the state, particularly those that centred on the welfare of the citizens. Not left out are neo liberal economic policies such as privatisation and commercialisation which entail government withdrawal from direct production of goods or the economy and allowing market forces to allocate resources. Moreover, the power of the state is being debated in the realm of agenda setting. It is being argued that in the contemporary era of globalisation, the task of setting agenda is being transferred to transnational institutions such as the IMF and WTO. While these claims are appealing, they should not be stressed too far and exclusively attributed to globalisation. For instance, the portfolio of economic liberalisation such as privatisation and commercialisation in Nigeria, though it led to the withdrawal of the government from economic activities, nevertheless intensified other functions such as regulation. The era of globalisation has brought strong government regulation of the emerging private sector driven economy. This explains the emergence of agencies such as the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC). Apart from this, while government is withdrawing, it is however expected to provide a benign environment where the private sector driven economy can flourish. In this context, we may not conclude that globalisation vitiates the functions of the state, rather it transforms them.

In a similar vein, while the neo-liberal ideology and new form of technologies associated with globalisation have the tendencies of vitiating the capacity of the state, they also have positive effects on the state. For instance, in a situation where a state dominates economic activities, liberalisation, properly implemented, may have the capacity of redefining state-society relations by allowing the society to have control over economy that had been hitherto denied to them. Moreover, new form of technologies, while spawning security deficits for the state, have the capacity of allowing the citizens access to government information, revive the public sphere thereby redefining the power equation between the state and society. Unfortunately, these issues have not been adequately addressed and evaluated in the Nigerian State. Part of the goal of this study is to bridge this gap.
2. 3.8. Globalisation and Democracy

Democracy as a concept has been conceptualised in various ways by different writers of different orientations from different perspectives. In the literature, it is not uncommon to have different terms and adjectives such as liberal, representative, radical, participatory, guided and in the Nigerian context and nascent being used to qualify democracy. In fact, the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of democracy as a concept greatly influenced Bernard Crick (quoted by Alan Ball) to argue, among other things, that:

Democracy is perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs. She is everybody’s mistress and yet retains her magic even when her lover sees that her favours are being, in his light, illicitly shared by many another. Indeed, even amid our pain at being denied her exclusive fidelity, we are proud of her adaptability to all sorts of circumstances to all sorts of company.  

Etymologically, democracy as a political concept owes its origin to ancient Greece, i.e. it comes from two Greek words: ‘demos’ translated as people and ‘kratos’ meaning power or rule. Based on the Greek’s notion of the concept, democracy could literally be translated to mean government by the people or people’s rule. The practice among the Greeks however could well be termed direct democracy as adults were free to meet in assemblies to deliberate on issues affecting their lives. Former American President, Abraham Lincoln is however credited with conception of democracy that tells us the source of power, those who exercise power and the interest of those whose power is used. Abraham Lincoln defines democracy as government of the people by the people and for the people and this has remained the classic definition and a point of reference over the years.  

Democracy is a government that derives power from the people, that power is exercised by the same and for the interest of the people. The implication of this conception of democracy is that, it is about people, consequently any government that operates outside the will and interest of the people could not be adjudged as being democratic.

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In modern political time, direct democracy associated with the Greeks is no longer feasible hence representative democracy which entails a situation where many people decide to delegate power to few people who in turn use such power in accordance with the mandate given to them. Democracy transcends the conduct of elections and should not be conflated with the activities of political parties or electioneering. According to Larry Diamond, modern democracy is associated with the following:

(i) Extensive freedom for citizens and groups to express their opinions and beliefs, organise petition, demonstrate, write, speak and broadcast.

(ii) Extensive pluralism in the sources of information and sources of organisation independent of the state-in other words, an open and vigorous civil society.

(iii) Equality of all citizens before the law and in their rights and abilities to express and secure their interests;

(iv) Genuine and diverse opportunities at all levels of formal and informal power for citizens to participate in the decisions that affect their lives and to hold political authorities accountable.

(v) Rule of law, protected and upheld by an independent judiciary, that treats all citizens equally, ensures human rights, and holds government officials, local power brokers and the privileged accountable before the law.

(vi) Institutional checks on the power of elected officials by an independent legislature, the courts, counter-corruption commissions, auditing agencies and other instruments of horizontal accountability.

(vii) A high degree of transparency in the way government conducts its affairs, affording citizens widespread access to information; and

(viii) Civilian democratic control of the military and state security apparatus.

Basically, democracy is an elaborate and complex phenomenon which centres on the lives of the people. The above principles are expected to flourish for any polity to be considered as democratic. The question at this juncture is: what is the nexus between globalisation and democracy? Or put in another way, does globalisation

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promote democracy? David Held asserts that:

The modern theory of the sovereign state presupposes the idea of a national community of fate in a country which rightly governs itself and determines its own future. The idea is challenged fundamentally by the nature of the pattern of global interconnectedness and the issues that have to be confronted by the modern state.\(^{88}\)

The assertion of David Held highlighted above could be interpreted in two ways. First, by the pattern of global interconnectedness and second, the nature of the issues the states have to confront are on the increase and the states can no longer deal with them alone but in collaboration with other states and non-state actors. If the power to determine policy issues and governance are central to democracy, this assertion could be interpreted to mean that this increasing collaboration is shifting series of issues affecting the modern state to other actors. This tends to undermine the precepts of democracy. It is this idea and understanding of globalisation that influenced Axmann to assert that, global forces affect the life of citizens by imposing constraints and limits of democratically constituted political agency without allowing the citizens substantial control over them.\(^{89}\) The view expressed by Noreena Hertz does not deviate from that of Axmann. Hertz asserts that human rights have been relegated and democracy has also lost out to trade interest particularly in the United States of America, the world’s loudest proponent of democracy which has regularly allowed democracy to take back seat to capitalism despite its claims that it is its main priority.\(^{90}\)

Okwudibu Nnoli analysis of the nexus between globalisation and democracy in African states equally tilts toward the claim of the critics. He argues that the current phase of globalisation is exerting negative impact on democracy in Africa at two levels.\(^{91}\) First at the supranational level and second at the sub-national level. At the


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supranational level, more and more human activities especially the economies have become increasingly transnational. At the sub-national level, globalisation, he noted, is exerting its negative impact on democracy through pressure towards state decomposition into constituent linguistic, national, religious, ethnic or clan components.\(^92\)

Anthony McGrew explains how globalisation vitiates democracy. He asserts inter alia that:

Globalisation, it can be argued, is associated with a double democratic deficit. On the one hand, it has compounded the tension between democracy as a territoriality rooted system of rule and the operation of global markets and transnational networks of corporate power. For if democratic governments are losing the capacity to manage transnational forces in accordance with the expressed preferences of their citizens, then the very essence of democracy namely self-governance, is decidedly compromised. On the other hand, it is associated with the emergence of a distorted global politics in which power asymmetries and global institutions more often than not enhance the interest of global elites at the expense of the wider world community. Many of the agencies of the civil society too are highly unrepresentative of the world’s peoples. Distorted global politics, in order words, has weak democratic credentials.\(^93\)

A similar argument that has been made to explain the negative relationships between globalisation and democracy is anchored on the fact that there is a conflict between economic globalisation and democracy. This school of thought argues further that; globalisation is presented as a phenomenon beyond human control and without an alternative. Hence the acronym -‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) looms large in the globalisation discourse. Globalisation is presented as a force that has no alternative which states have to embrace.

Apart from this, globalisation is seen to be vitiating the effectiveness of civil society. It is acknowledged that civil society organisations act as mediator or buffer between the state and the citizens. In addition, they protect the individuals from the coercive manipulation of a powerful state. Furthermore, the internal mechanisms of the associations are seen as having the potential of enabling the citizen to learn the art of democracy, the capacity to cooperate

\(^{92}\)Ibid.

and compromise to work together and resolve differences. Strong civil society organisations serve as an avenue for collective action\textsuperscript{94}. To this extent, it reduces the burden of demand on the state. These invariably put civil society on the side of democracy. Critics however argue that globalisation is destructive to healthy civil society because increasing inequality, poverty and unemployment especially among people who are not yet equipped to participate fully in the global economy creates social exclusion for a growing number of people at the bottom\textsuperscript{95}. The nexus between globalisation and civil society is thus seen as destructive to democracy.

Critics of globalisation have argued that, globalisation removes major areas of authority and autonomy from the nation state. The overall effect of this has been the shift of power from the state to rootless, placeless institutions and market which are beyond the control of the state. Edighfeji amplifies this view when he contends that in this era of globalisation, national political elite are losing power and control over policy processes and outcomes to both domestic and international bureaucratic elites\textsuperscript{96}. He argues that, indeed the autonomy of African countries like most of developing countries are under attack by the policy of economic liberalisation with emphasis on a minimalist state and with the introduction of new managerialism.\textsuperscript{97}

The advocates of globalisation however reject critics’ claims by emphasising that a positive linkage exists between globalisation and democracy. They believe that rather than eroding democracy, globalisation actually strengthens. For instance at the 2001 Quebec Trade Summit, the American delegation was quoted to have equated “globalisation with democracy”, when the then United States Ambassador to Canada was said to have asserted that the purpose of the Summit was to help democracy\textsuperscript{98}. Specifically, advocates have argued that globalisation is not essentially about business and commerce but also encompasses the spread of other values which include democracy.

While some of arguments of the critics that globalisation undermines democracy are appealing and convincing, it is equally wrong to attribute the crisis of democracy mainly to globalisation because democratic deficit exists and have existed in most modern states quite

\textsuperscript{94} Simeon, R. 1997. op.cit.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
independently of globalisation. Similarly, while globalisation could spawn contradictions capable of constraining the degree of freedom for national decision making, this may not apply to all states. Strong states may not be totally vulnerable to global forces in the same manner weak states do. Moreover, while globalisation creates the same agenda for all countries, it is also pertinent to note that countries respond differently.

Furthermore, the discourse on the nexus between globalisation and democracy and the attendant democratic deficit highlighted in the literature seem to have focused and emerged from the emphasis on the effects of neo-liberal economic policies and the internationalisation of policy making. The discourse has not focused deeply on other elements of globalisation particularly, the burgeoning new forms of technologies. It has not delved into how the fledging Internet and other CMC are promoting democracy. This aspect of globalisation which has not been fully explored forms part of the gap this study seeks to fill.

2.4. The Benefits of Globalisation

The literature on globalisation also centres on its diverse and mixed benefits to different countries. While there is the consensus that globalisation has mixed and uneven benefits what accounts for the variation has been a source of controversy. While advocates of globalisation attribute the success story of globalisation notably in the industrially developed countries of the North to sound economic policies of liberalisation and efficient state institutions, the contradictions in the developing nations are attributed to the prevailing protectionism, corruption and the ineffectiveness of domestic institutions.

Additionally, critics often argue that since globalisation is driven by information technology, countries that are technologically developed tend to shape the course of the process and benefit more from the process. It is this construction of globalisation that influenced Weintraub to contend that the world is flat only for people who are able to take advantage of globalisation because of their education and the agglomeration of competitive activities in their home countries-as it is now taking

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place in China and India, but not in Africa\textsuperscript{101}. In the same vein, Nabudere argues that ‘globalisation has proceeded unevenly throughout the world and this has meant that Africa has continued to be on the margins of the globalised economy in all the phases it was incorporated into the world system. He traces such to the downsizing of the postcolonial state as well as the down grading of democracy\textsuperscript{102}.

Yash Tandon sees globalisation as the final conquest of capital over the rest of the world. He particularly stresses how the current phase of globalisation is organised through the WTO. He argues that the methods of how decisions are reached and enforced posed as danger to the African states. He argues further that, the African State has a dual character. One, the State exhibits excessive powers of control over civil society and two becomes completely weak and paralysed when faced with the power of global capital\textsuperscript{103}. Consequently the way out for the African state is to de-link from the inequitable global system by taking advantage of new global alliances. Another African scholar, Toyin Falola asserts that: Globalisation, like imperialism, supports a development ideology. The orthodoxy which emerged from colonialism is that of free enterprises; that of globalisation is the same\textsuperscript{104}. He asserts further that:

Globalisation has enhanced communication flows, and information technologies have become so widespread that one can now use cell phone from a remote village in Nigeria to speak with someone in New York. Physical boundaries are not disappearing, but the distances in space appear to shrink with the use of the telephone, fax, and computers. In its public face, globalisation sells itself as capitalism; in its hidden face, it may be nothing more than imperialism\textsuperscript{105}.

Claude Ake notes that:

\textsuperscript{101} Weintraub, S. 2006. The U.S. midterm elections and globalisation, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{105} Ake, C. 1996. \textit{The marginalisation of Africa: notes on a productive confusion}: Lagos :Malthouse Press Ltd.5-6.
Globalisation is about structural differentiation and functional specialisation in the world economy. It is about incremental interdependence, the growing spread and intensity of interactions among nations and about the nation-state coming under pressure from transnational phenomena, and so on. The process is complex, ambiguous and contradictory.\textsuperscript{106}

He notes further that; globalisation is not even in its impact. It produces winners and losers, He argues that it is not Hausa that is globalised but English, not Togolese technology but American and Japanese.\textsuperscript{107} Globalisation has mixed benefits which are unevenly felt by different countries. While poor policy orientation may explain the marginal benefits of globalisation to the countries of the South, one should not forget the role of institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in setting the rules for global trade. Again, while globalisation does not take into consideration the level of development of nation states, it would be out of context to attribute the misfortunes of the developing countries to colonialism and the integration of the global political economy, given the devastating effects of domestic distorted pattern of governance particularly corruption. In effect, the benefits of globalisation depend on such factors such as a competitive economy, sound regulatory policies, strong political and administrative institutions and strong institutional ethos. Roland Axmann, quoting Brunn and Leinbach notes that distance means little and direction means even less rather what is more important is how one is connected with other places.\textsuperscript{108} Sidney Weintraub recognises this but equally submits that;

\ldots creating winners and losers from economic change is nothing new; technology changes create winners and losers and the progress inherent in this comes from creating more winners than losers and generating higher productivity permitting wage increases for the winners.\textsuperscript{109}

\subsection*{2.5. Managing Globalisation.}

In spite of the disagreement between advocates and critics of globalisation in terms of its effects on the modern state, there is the convergence in the realm of benefits of the process. Both groups are in agreement that the benefits are unevenly

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Axmann, R1998, Globalisation, Europe and the state. introductory reflection.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Weintraub, S op.cit
\end{itemize}

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spread and that such benefits are not automatics. Moreover, there is the agreement that
globalisation harbours in the words of Richard Sandbrook ‘some uncivilised’ features
which can be civilised to make the process friendlier\textsuperscript{110}. Joseph Stiglitz in his famous
work \textit{Making Globalization Work’}, raises the following five reasons why globalisation
must be managed\textsuperscript{111}. First, that the rules that govern globalisation are unfair,
specifically designed to benefit the advanced industrial countries and that recent
changes are so unfair to have made the poor countries worse off. Second, that
globalisation advances material values over other values such as the concern for
environment and life. Third, the way globalisation has been managed has eroded the
sovereignty of the less developed countries, undermined their ability in policy/
decision making process and above all undermined democracy. Fourth, the promises of
globalisation have not been realised as there is plenty of evidence showing both in
developed and developing nations that globalisation is producing many losers and
fifth, globalisation has fostered inappropriate and grossly damaging economic system
on the developing countries\textsuperscript{112}. Though the emphasis of Stiglitz is on the economic
dimension of globalisation, the issues raised have remained central to the issues on
how to manage globalisation. Stiglitz advances the view that the globalisation debate
has gone from a general recognition that all was not well with globalisation to a deeper
analysis that links specific policies with specific failures\textsuperscript{113}.

Given the consensus that globalisation has proceeded unevenly, the central
issues therefore are, how can the modern state engage the globalisation process in
order to harness its benefits? What are the appropriate mechanisms for taming the
excesses of globalisation? How can the democratic deficit associated with global
forces be addressed? Two dominant approaches are discernible in the literature in
terms of how to manage globalisation. The first approach posits that since the
destructive tendencies of globalisation are inflicted by economic globalisation,
civilising the process entails reforming transnational institutions and democratising
global governance. The second approach entails adjusting the global markets to social
needs. The first approach was the position of former British Prime Minister Tony

\textsuperscript{110} Sandbrook R Ed. 2003, Civilising globalisation: a survival guide, Albany, SUNY, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{111} Stiglitz, J.2007. op.cit.9
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
Blair’s Third way position and originally described by the American Democrats as new progressivism. As argued by Sandbrook, The third way assumes that globalisation is more or less in its current form a broadly desirable and therefore needs minor reforms of global institutions and markets, together with national governments that see their role as adjusting their populations and industries to the exigencies of global competitiveness as humanely as possible.114

However, we need to examine the strength of this method of managing globalisation because it tends to raise more questions on the globalisation process in terms of what kind of reforms are needed at the global level and who would be the architect or driver of such reforms? The second approach tilts towards the development of mechanisms for adjusting global markets to the needs of the society. This essentially means reform of global governance in order to make the global process more humane. Joseph Stiglitz however argues that many things need to be done to make globalisation work115. He argues that intervention is needed in six core areas where the global community has recognised that things are not working well. He identifies the need to fight poverty on a global scale, the need for foreign assistance and debt relief, the need to make trade to be fair, the need to recognise the limitations of liberalisation, the need to protect the environment and the need to address the flawed system of global governance116.

To conclude this section, globalisation has not proceeded evenly. It has both positive and negative consequences. However, its benefits are not automatic but depend on a number of factors which include good governance which encapsulates transparency and accountability, rule of law, strong state institutions and infrastructure, technology, electricity to mention but a few.117

While commenting on the globalisation process and the Nigerian State, Anao argues that:

It is important to note that globalisation does not eliminate the nation state, but fundamentally redefines its role and affects its

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115 Ibid. 13-19.
116 Ibid.
operation. The real issue today is not the debate about whether globalisation is real or not, or whether it is desirable or not, but to see how the emerging technologies can be better channelled to promote more growth, more trade, greater modernization and better living standards for Nigerians -- and so help the country to re-emerge from its present social and economic difficulties. The challenges facing the nation are complex and require good visioning, a sound strategic plan which correctly identifies the viable developmental paths and the resolve to translate the strategic plan into fruitful and efficacious actions.\(^{118}\)

The implication of the foregoing is that, there is no basis for any argument that tends to push for unilateral consequences of the global process, rather it is mixed. While some states are winning, others are losing. Anthony Giddens notes this when he writes that globalisation pulls away from the state, that is removing certain activities from the state and also squeezes sideways, that is creating new economic culture that sometimes cross cut the boundaries of nation states.\(^{119}\) Similarly, to have a comprehensive understanding of the globalisation process, it is much more rewarding to go beyond the polarisation of the globalisation discourse into advocates and critics. Limiting analysis to the advocates and critics as argued by Mittelman, would obscure the varied complaints against globalising trends that have emerged from different points of the political spectrum.\(^{120}\) Consequently issues relating to managing globalisation are paramount in the globalisation discourse.

### 2.6. Direction and Missing Link in the Globalisation literature in Nigeria

The globalisation discourse is taking place everywhere and Nigeria is not an exception. However, economic issues have continued to dominate the globalisation discourse. Even in terms of definite conception of globalisation, economic indicators are usually mapped out as its basic characteristics. This explains the conflation of economic variables such as trade liberalisation and Foreign Direct Investment with globalisation. The dominance of economic issues in the analysis of globalisation in Nigeria reflects the attention given to economic issues. Writers such as Dotun Phillips,

\(^{118}\) Anao A .op.cit


Mike Obadan, Kwanashie, Sam Aluko and host of others stress the economic dimension of globalisation with little attention given to other issues.

Dotun Phillips, for instance, sees globalisation as the increasing close, international integration of markets in goods, services, finance and so on. The main thrust of his argument centres on how to reap the benefits of globalisation. His analysis focuses on the economic benefits of globalisation. Mike Obadan perceives globalisation as concerned with the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence among the world’s region, nations, government, business, institutions, communities, families and individuals. He, however, recognises the centrality of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) when he asserts that globalisation fosters the advancement of a global mentality and conjures the picture of a borderless world through the use of information technology to create partnership to foster greater financial and economic integration. His argument, nevertheless does not extend to the nexus between the bourgeoning technologies and the political processes of the state. Rather, the focus of his work is on the benefits of globalisation and Sub Saharan Africa posing and answering questions on why Africa is lagging behind other countries, challenges facing Africa’s economic development within the context of globalisation and the appropriate policy measures to cope with the challenges.

Sam Aluko sees globalisation in terms of growing interaction in world trade, national and foreign investments, capital markets and the ascribed role of the governments in national economies. He emphasises the main features of globalisation from economic perspective, without paying attention to technological diffusion and the dynamics of the political process. In similar vein, Igudia Patrick talks about globalisation and Nigeria’s economic reforms initiatives. While Adeolu Adewuyi looks at the possibilities of the Nigerian State benefiting from economic integration

121 Phillips, D. 1999. Globalisation and Nigeria’s economic development; Proceedings of the One –day seminar held at the NIIA, Lagos, Feb. 11 by the Nigerian Economic Society, 9-14
123 Ibid.
drawing statistics from 1970 and 2000\textsuperscript{126}.

The foregoing suggests that the globalisation literature in Nigeria is skewed in favour of economic issues thus marginalising other dimensions particularly the nexus between the new forms of technologies and politics. The consequences of this is that studies that focused on the effects of global tendencies such as the burgeoning technologies and the global resurgence of democratization on the political processes of the Nigerian state are sparse. Specifically, the extent to which globalisation can enhance the enthronement of democracy or facilitate its consolidation in Nigeria has remained largely under explored. This is a missing link in the direction and orientation of the globalisation debate in Nigeria. This observed missing link is thus, the central issue this study seeks to fill.

2.7. **Theoretical Framework of Analysis.**

This study is anchored on the transformationalists’ theory of globalisation. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton in their book *Global Transformation*\textsuperscript{127} amplify the components of this theory of globalisation in reaction to the arguments of the globalisers which see the modern state as being threatened by the forces of globalisation as well as the sceptics’ position that nothing has changed in the current phase of globalisation. The transformationalists’ theory neither approves nor disapproves the arguments of the globalisers and that of the sceptics. The transformationalists believe that contemporary globalisation is historically unprecedented and at the same time it is a long-term historical process with pre-modern forms. However, technological and political changes since the Second World War have led to an unprecedented growth in the extent, velocity, volume and intensity of things like global media communications, economic interdependency between countries, international political organisations, etc.\textsuperscript{128}

A leading exponent of this theory, Roberts Cox, identifies three distinct features of the current phase of globalisation to amplify the view of the


\textsuperscript{127} See Held, D., McGrew, A. Goldblatt, D and Perraton , J. op.cit.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
transformationalists. First, there is a process of interstate consensus formation regarding the needs or requirements of the world economy that takes place within a common ideological framework. Second, participation in this consensus formation is hierarchically structured. Third, the internal structures of states are adjusted so that each can best transform the global consensus into national policy and practice, taking account of the specific kinds of obstacles likely to arise in countries occupying the different hierarchically arranged positions in the world economy.

The transformationalists contend that globalisation is the driving force behind changes reshaping the world. For instance, aspects of national culture such as media, film, religion, food, fashion and music are so infused with inputs from international sources that national culture is no longer separate from the international. This driving force is changing peoples’ life experiences. Economies are becoming deterritorialised, global and transnational. In respect of the state, they contend that the sovereignty of the nation-states still remains intact but states no longer if they ever did still retain the sole command of what transpire within their territorial boundaries.

The transformationalists argue that the functions, power and autonomy of the state have not diminished as many critics of globalisation, such as Thirst and Thompson, have made us to believe but they are being reconstructed and reconfigured. States are trying to adapt to global changes and developments by seeking coherent strategies in engaging with globalisation. The consequence is that distinctive strategies are being followed such as neoliberal minimal state, developmental state as well as the catalytic state in which the state acts as a facilitator of coordinated and collective actions. In the contemporary era of globalisation, the transformationalists argue that government are more outward looking in trying to shape internal policies and development in line with global developments. Transformationalists contend that globalisation has brought into being a spectrum of adjustment strategies and in other respect a more active state. Accordingly, the powers of national government are not necessarily diminished but the autonomy is being constituted and reconstructed in response to growing complexity of globalisation.

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129 Ibid.
The transformationalists recognise element of universalism inherent in the current phase of globalisation and the consciousness of dealing collectively on a global scale with certain issues which have become global. Moreover, nation states do not participate equally in global collective actions because of the hierarchical nature of the global political and economic order. The internal organisation and structures of the state are being redefined to cope with the challenges of the global consensus. In essence, this theory rather than amplifying the demise of the state emphasises how the variables of the state such as the functions, power, autonomy as well as capacity of the state are being reconfigured as a result of the growing interconnectedness among nation states.

The consequence of the foregoing is that a meaningful discussion of the linkage between globalisation and developments in the Nigerian state can be pursued in the context of the transformationalists’ theory which postulates the transformation of the state in the context of the challenges of globalisation. Situating this study in the transformationalists’ theory has a number of advantages. First, it recognises the centrality of the state in this era of globalisation. Second, this theory argues for the changing nature of the role, functions, power autonomy and sovereign of the state rather than the diminution of the state. Consequently, anchoring this study on the transformationalists’ theory has the capacity of explaining the impact of globalisation on the functions, sovereignty, power and autonomy of the Nigerian state as well as the consequences of globalisation for the political processes in Nigeria. Furthermore, employing the transformationalists’ theory has the capacity of moving the globalisation discourse in Nigeria beyond the advocates and critics divide. It is an approach that has the capacity of unveiling the transformation induced by globalisation in the Nigerian State as well as the attendant challenges for governance.
CHAPTER THREE
THE NIGERIAN STATE

3.1 Introduction

The origin of the Nigerian state, its character, institutional and governmental processes, mechanics of governance and electoral processes have received considerable attention in the literature. The Nigerian state is mostly portrayed as an entity with malfunctioning structures and institutions.\(^1\) The central goal of this study, as highlighted in chapter one, is to examine the nexus between globalisation and the Nigerian state. In order to achieve this goal, there is need to analyse the character of the Nigerian state as well as the pattern of governance prior to the contemporary era of globalisation. This is the focus of this chapter.

3.2. 1. Perspectives on the State

The state as a concept has been variously conceptualised. The state, as conceived by Max Weber, has however remained a point of reference to many writers and point of departure for many scholars. Weber sees the state as a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. He advances the view that “a compulsory political organisation with continuous operations will be called a ‘state’ insofar as their administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”\(^2\) This conception of the state emphasises the administrative staff and the issue of legitimate use of force in enforcing order.

Speiser Dunja and Paul-Simon Handy advance the view that while the definition of the state given by Weber has been very useful in the understanding of the state by providing what can be regarded as an ideal-type of state with well structured and rationalised bureaucratic apparatus, it is still being contested in the literature. They identify three basic functions which the modern state has to discharge before it can be

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regarded as meeting the basic needs for its existence. These are monopoly of violence, the provision of services and the maintenance of political order.\(^3\)

Sam Egwu argues that, in the literature, the state is often viewed from different perspectives. These are its institutional manifestations and ensembles, its functions and coercive capacity in securing compliance. He further identifies three dominant approaches to the analysis of the state\(^4\). These are the society centred, state centred and state-in-society approaches\(^5\). Egwu argues that though there are variant versions of the state-centred approach, the view expressed by the pluralists and elite have remained dominant in the literature. According to the pluralists, the state is made up of different groups competing for power and influence. Hence, the state is a neutral arbiter which exists to regulate the contest among the various groups. Yet, there is the elite theory of the state which denies the plural nature of the state but emphasises that the elite, by virtue of their advantage in terms of skill, education and social background, monopolise power and authority, hence it has firm control of the state apparatuses. Still on the society centred approach, there are variants of the Marxist theory of the state. In spite of variation, the central argument is that the state is an instrument of domination in which the interest of the dominant class holds sway\(^6\).

The second approach according to Egwu is the state-centred analysis of the state. This approach sees the state as a defender of national interest and, hence, immune from the pressure of the society that may make it deviate from this interest. The state is thus seen as an autonomous entity that defends its goals. These goals include the maintenance of the political and economic order. The third approach is the state -in-society. While this approach recognises the analytical separation of the state from the society, it nevertheless emphasises the symbiotic relationship between the state and society. The state is seen as moulding the society and the society also moulding and determines the character of the state. The implication of this approach is the interactions between the state and society-based cleavages and forces which shape the nature and character of the state. These approaches reflect in the various characterisation of the Nigerian state, as writers focus on different aspects of the state.

\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
3.2.2. The Nigerian State in Historical and Theoretical Perspectives.

The contemporary Nigerian state is made up of over 350 ethnic nationalities, occupies 923,850sq.km and, according to the 2006 census, it has a population of 140,140,542. It is the most populous country and one of the most heterogeneous countries in sub Saharan Africa. There is a vast literature on the Nigerian state, though with diverse orientation and directions. Writers such as Claude Ake, Segun Osoba, Terisa Turner, Bjorn Beckman, Julius Ihonvbere, Eghosa Osaghae, Sam Oyovabire and Wale Olaitan, to mention but a few, have written existensively on the Nigerian state. The various conceptions and characterisation, however, as argued by Wale Olaitan, are not rooted in the particular and historical roots of Nigerian society but depend mainly on high level of abstraction and deductions from general theories about the post-colonial state from their standpoint. He asserts further that the implication of this is that most of the studies on the Nigerian state are no more than appropriation of general theories developed to the specific and particular context of Nigeria.

Sam Oyovbaire, in his work *The Nigerian State as Conceptual Variable* equally highlights the failure of both liberal and Marxist scholars to come to terms with the nature and character of the post colonial Nigerian state. He opens up with the assertion that the Nigerian state has recently been in vogue in the Nigerian Social Sciences but there are questions on its existence, that is, how it exists and discharges its functions. Oyovbaire posits that the liberal or democratic pluralist conception of the state assumes that in every social formation or organized society where anarchy or social disintegration is to be prevented, there must be a regime or a system of regulation (laws), a supreme authority which gives order to all and receives order from none. He contends further that “the state as government and regime is the

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7 According to the 2006 Provisional census results, Nigeria’s population was put at 140,003,542 made of Males 71,709,859 and Females 68,293,683 This put Nigeria as the ninth most populated country in the world. Anon. The Punch. Thursday, Jan. 11, 2007.


organisational instrument of society which provides it with the necessary cohesive factor and maintains its unity of existence.” He asserts that the extent to which the state provides or fails to provide cohesion and unity of the social formation has been the main task of explanation and theorising in liberal-democratic and conventional development studies. In relation to the Nigerian state, Oyovbaire argues that academic liberalism or neo-liberalism has not really addressed itself to the Nigerian state as a conceptual variable except that by implication, it has sought to legitimize the practical politics of the colonial and post colonial state in Nigeria. Oyovbaire argues that academic Marxists have not fared better either as they only see the state as the territorial political machinery expressing the power of a dominant social class or group of such classes. He argues further that conflating the Nigerian state with variables such as power elite, the Nigerian national bourgeoisie, foreign –dependent and pseudo-bourgeoisie raises crucial issues about the historicity, and the structural and functional specificity, of the state in Nigeria. He argues that the Nigerian state must be conceived as a structure informed by the dialectical contours of its pre-colonial formation within which it continues to nourish and functions. The implication of the foregoing is that neither the liberal nor the Marxist perspectives of the Nigerian state adequately explains in a holistic manner the structural and functional specificity of the Nigerian state.

Historically, the character of the post-colonial state in Nigeria is linked to the nature and character of the colonial state. The logic behind this is understandable. The foundation of modern Nigeria is seen to have been laid in the colonial days. Consequently, postcolonial Nigerian state is seen as the historical progeny of the colonial state, implying that a comprehensive understanding of the nature and functioning of the colonial state provides a solid pedestal towards the understanding of the institutional and governmental processes of post-colonial Nigerian state.

The colonial Nigerian state did not emerge from the Nigerian society in the manner in which states in Europe emerged; rather, it was imposed by imperial power to facilitate the realisation of the objective of colonial rule which was the exploitation of vast resources of the colonial state. It did not also emerge out of antagonism among the social classes because, as Fadakinte argues, the colonial Nigerian state was not an

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11 Ibid.
instrument of any indigenous social classes that developed to mediate between social classes whose interests were irreconcilable, but basically an agent of imperialism, an instrument of economic exploitation\textsuperscript{12}.

The colonial state in Nigeria, though poised towards the maintenance of law and order, had as its primary motive the uninterrupted supply of primary commodities to the metropole. It was an appendage of the imperial power and this reinforced the relationship between the colonial Nigerian state and the metropolitan country which exhibited a dependent relationship. This relationship should be expected since the colonial Nigerian state was a creation of the metropolitan country and which in turn exercised paternalistic control in its socio-political and economic activities. Razaq Adefulu advances the view that there were strained relations between the colonial state and the natives, i.e. subjects. He notes that, the colonial state with its clear economic and political objectives did not need to consult with Nigerians in the realm of decision making; consequently, politics and the political process were not about democratic principles of reconciling divergent views with the society and arriving at biding decision. Adefulu asserts that politics in Nigeria in the colonial era was a one-man show and governance at that time was authoritarian\textsuperscript{13}.

Wale Olaitan argues that the colonial state was imposed and this defined its functions and relations to the society. He notes that:

(i) The imposed nature of the state did not allow the citizen to see it as necessary and important, but distasteful and exploitative.

(ii) The colonial state, though very powerful and had the monopoly to employ instrument of violence to compel obedience, was nevertheless weak as it lacked legitimacy needed to operate as an effective state.

(iii) The contradictions between the colonial state and the society made the former to be bent on subjugating the society while the society was inclined not only to resist the subjugation thrust of the state but went ahead to despise, despoil and illegitimise the state.

(iv) A state-society relation during the colonial period, which was decisively


marked by pervasive contradiction between the state and society, was therefore characterised by distrust and mutual acrimony, animosity and contradiction.\textsuperscript{14}

These observations by Olaitan capture the fact that the colonial state brought into being by the instrumentality of foreign military force, and administered for close to a century by a combination of coercion and co-option, did not represent the sovereignty of the people but rather it was a direct abrogation of it\textsuperscript{15}. The legitimacy of the colonial state was questioned and undermined because of the way it emerged and the manner it operated. Its patterns of governance deviated largely from the basic ingredients of governance that focuses on the people. This has been captured by Kayode Soremekun who asserts that, despite the fact that the main colonial powers in Africa were themselves democratic countries, the institutions they created were first and foremost instruments of domination.\textsuperscript{16}. He contends further that, established to provide the means of control over vast areas containing disparate population, they stressed functional utility, law and order but not participation and reciprocity.

The colonial state in Nigeria was also authoritarian. It subjugated and displaced pre-colonial social formations. The Indirect rule system of administration introduced was not essentially designed to encourage the participation of the colonial subjects in government. Rather, it was a measure introduced to address shortage of British personnel and inadequacy of funds. Soremekun argues that the authoritarian nature of the colonial state in Nigeria manifested in the concentration of power in a structure entirely removed from local, popular mechanisms of control and reflected in vertical communication between the rulers and the ruled and as such the definition of government lacked popular components\textsuperscript{17}. Soremekun further explains that colonial power was generally removed from the scrutiny of the people; it had a remote bureaucratic and patrimonial form of policies and was a state which violated as a matter of routine the values of the normative dimension of governance\textsuperscript{18}. Haruna Sanusi equally highlights the nature of the colonial state which aptly defined the pattern of governance of that era. He asserts that the motive of colonial rule in Nigeria

\textsuperscript{14} Olaitan, A.A. 1997. Understanding the Nigerian state.op.cit
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
was the uninhibited exploitation of the vast resources within the territory. He notes also that the central role of the state machinery became that of consolidating the hegemony of the international capitalist interest and the subordination of local dynamics of growth and development of the requirements of expanded capitalist accumulation\textsuperscript{19}. Mozaffar asserts that the colonial state fostered an indigenous ruling class whose structural roots were not embedded in the underlying socio-economic foundations of African society.\textsuperscript{20}

Similarly, the Political Bureau, in its report, observed that the colonial state generated new forces and social relations of production and understandingly intended to subjugate, dominate and exploit the Nigerian people and their resources. It grossly dichotomised the state into public and the private sectors with the former as the instrument for the promotion and development of the latter\textsuperscript{21}. The colonial state in Nigeria institutionalised the exclusion of domestic population in the determination of public affairs while the state machinery was designed to keep the population subordinated and repressed\textsuperscript{22}. Consequently, the institutional and governmental processes of the colonial state created a gulf between the state and the citizens. The relevant questions, at this point, are: What is the linkage between the colonial state and the postcolonial Nigerian state and why is the post-colonial Nigerian state labelled a neo-colonial /dependent state?

Given the patterns of governance in the colonial state in Nigeria, independence was expected to redefine the patterns of governance by allowing greater participation of Nigerians in governance, foster greater accountability and bridge the gulf between the state and the citizens. The emergent elite that succeeded the colonialists, however, failed to transform the distorted pattern of governance and consequently could not over-turn the strained relations between the state and society. Those who took over the control of government at independence were carefully selected to continue to maintain the interest of the metropole. This implies that independence did not change the nature of dependency between the state in the metropole and the state in the periphery. Independence only succeeded in transforming the nature of dependence from the


erstwhile direct subordination of the colonial state to the metropole to indirect subordination of the post-colonial state to the metropole.  

Various reasons have been offered to explain this. One very influential school of thought has been widely embraced explains this within the context of the ideological character of the Nigerian state and the attitudinal disposition of the emergent post-colonial leaders who used the authoritarian structures of the state to appropriate gain to themselves, and hence did not make significant efforts at overhauling the institutional and governmental processes in the immediate years after independence. Fadakinte has rightly pointed out this when he asserts that:

Immediately after independence, the class character of the nationalist leaders began to show in their activities particularly when they began to assume political positions of authority. Not only did they immediately begin to amass wealth and privileges with their positions, they appeared not bothered about the abject conditions of their people and the inherent injustice which colonialism had created in the society.

It is small wonder that the newly independent Nigerian state was not only faced with the challenge of adapting the inherited institutions and structures but also the uphill task of endearing the state to the citizens which could not be carried out. The consequence of this was the failure of the emergent elite in the post colonial era to overturn the social relations already entrenched in the colonial days. Claude Ake rightly remarks that the emergent post independence Nigerian bourgeoisie could not transform the postcolonial Nigerian state because it did not fight the colonial system in order to change it but merely to inherent it. As noted by Naomi Chazan et al “the formal agencies transferred to the African leaders were thus alien in derivation, functionally conceived, bureaucratically designed, authoritarian in nature and primarily concerned with issues of domination rather than legitimacy”. The implication of this observation by Chazan is that at independence in 1960, the Nigerian state that emerged was not fundamentally different from the colonial state due to the character of the emergent indigenous political class that succeeded the imperial power.

24 Fadakinte M M.1999.; The Nigerian state and transition politics. op.cit
The foregoing shows that during the period under consideration, the fortunes of the Nigerian state were externally determined, its pattern of governance was characterised by the authoritarian streak inherited from the colonial state, lack of autonomy, strained relations between the state and citizens and governance driven by the few who use the state for parochial interests.

3.2.3. The Nature and Character of the Post-Colonial Nigerian State

Different adjectives and terms such over-developed, soft, irrelevant, entrepot and pensile, bedridden, comatose, expired, prebendal have been used to describe the post-colonial Nigerian state with all depicting its malfunctioning. One dominant view on the post-colonial Nigerian state is that, it is an entity that lacks autonomy or a state with relative autonomy and, as such, an agent of external forces. Most of the characterisation of the Nigerian state that employs this perspective often stresses the alliance of local bourgeoisie with imperialism and how local bourgeoisie have continued to serve the interest of foreigners.

Claude Ake, Segun Osoba and Bjorn Beckman,\(^\text{27}\) perceive the post-colonial Nigerian state as an agent of colonialism, meaning that the postcolonial state exists to serve the interest of global capital. Bjorn Beckman in his work *Whose State? State and Capitalist Development in Nigeria* asserts that the Nigerian state is an organ or agent of international capital\(^\text{28}\). He asserts further that the Nigerian state is busy promoting capitalist development which though has important roots in colonial peasant production is fed in oil. The foundation of this role was laid during colonialism but the bourgeoisie could not transform the capitalist state they inherited. They never attempted to challenge the state, because they were strategically placed to administer the state on behalf of foreign capital.

Beckman, however, notes that the assertion that the Nigerian state promotes capitalist development does not mean that it is doing so efficiently and that, by so doing, is providing answer to mass poverty and deprivation facing Nigerians\(^\text{29}\). The argument of Beckman translates to the fact that, the local or indigenous leaders who

\(^{27}\) Most of the conceptions of the postcolonial Nigerian state see it as an entity that lacks autonomy. It is a state whose fortunes are externally determined and at the domestic class, its activities are directed by the ruling class.


\(^{29}\) Ibid.
succeeded the colonialists were not the true rulers but were just protecting the interest of foreign capital. Beckman describes Nigeria as a comprador state because state institutions and officials operate as agents of imperialism. This was very much visible in the indigenisation exercise of the 1970s.

The Nigerian state is also seen as serving and promoting the interest of local bourgeoisie. This description of the Nigerian state is related to that which sees it as agent of global capitalism. The post-colonial Nigerian state is seen as agent of local or domestic bourgeoisie because of the character of the post-independence elites and their mode of operations. Segun Osoba asserts that the national bourgeoisie and the Nigerian economy are dependent on the international bourgeoisie and the global imperialist economic order in the same way a business agent is dependent on his principal with the attendant unequal exchange and relations that exist in agent-principal relations.

The description of the state as agent of global capitalism and local bourgeoisie essentially means that the Nigerian state exists to champion the course of capital in general, be it at the global or local levels. It means that its economy is tied to external actors and controlled by external forces and at the domestic level, it is being controlled by the dominant class. The implication of this description of the Nigerian state is that the state serves the interest of the dominant class at the expense of the citizens whose interests are being made to suffer. Lack of autonomy on the part of the post-colonial Nigerian state has spawned a series of contradictions which include the inability of the state to build an appreciable degree of confidence among Nigerians and ensure some discipline within the ranks of the elite and manage the economy in the interest of the people or construct platforms of inclusion, tolerance and participation.

Another dominant characterisation of the Nigerian state is that which considers it irrelevant. This characterisation was developed by Claude Ake. The Nigerian state, in this context, is seen as the one that has enormous natural resources, but can not impact the society positively because it is being controlled by external forces and agencies. The state therefore exists but is considered irrelevant to the citizen. Olaitan argues that the implication of this postulation is that of the pervasive lack of interest in the affairs of the state. The utility of this postulation lies in its capacity to explain lack of interest in the affairs of the state as well as the emergence...

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30 Osoba Segun. op.cit.
33 Ibid.
of various ethnic or communal associations or organisations that champion the cause of their members since the state has failed to live up to expectation.

Another characterisation of the Nigerian state which has bearing on its functions is its conception as an over-developed state. This conception draws insights from the work of Hamza Alavi who coined the term in relation to the nature and character of the state in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Alavi argues that the postcolonial state drew its strength from the metropole and that its task during the colonial era was to subjugate all indigenous classes in the colony. The state appropriates directly economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically direct development activity. Alavi argues that the over-developed state means that the inherited state apparatus is larger, its coercive or administrative powers weightier or more ramified, than they would be if the colonial state had not subjugated dominant pre-colonial classes. The main argument is that the post-colonial state inherited a strong military and administrative apparatus from the colonial state. These structures were based on the structures of the metropolitan state; they did not develop from the society.

Alavi refers to the bureaucracy as oligarchy and argues that the centrality of the state implies the central role of state bureaucracy which is relatively independent of the control of social groups in the society. Alavi stresses the place and role of bureaucracy in the post-colonial state. It is seen as a new class or a class in making and appropriating productive resources whether using state power to acquire private capital or directly as collective managers of the public sector. Essentially, the class character of the bureaucracy is the central issue in the over-developed thesis. Describing the Nigerian state as an over-developed entity signifies the feebleness of the institutions of the state and their mode of operations.

Nigeria is also perceived as a soft state. This description is borrowed from Gunnar Myrdal’s work on the soft state. Myrdal identifies three basic features of the soft state. These are the circumvention of laws and regulations by officials and the inconsistent application of policies and laws, secret collision between civil servants and politicians and the use of corruption to secure objectives other than those officially stated. Essentially, the soft state is that one dominated by powerful interests which

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
exploit the power of the state or government to further their own interests rather than the interest of the citizenry. Moreover, policies decided upon are often not enforced. The description of Nigeria as a soft state suggests that it is a normless state in which circumvention of laws and regulations as well as corruption are the underlying character of the state. Also implied in this notion of the Nigerian state is that, though powerful, the state in Nigeria has little control over the society. The state has not been able to translate its overarching power to claim obedience. This element of perceived weakness of the state explains the use of different adjectives such as weak, lame and soft to describe the state. Hence, the state is powerful but weak in capacity.

Nigeria has also been described as entrepot state. Olaitan argues that this conception of the state derived from the fact that the state is blessed with a bewilderingly huge pot of resources relative to other sources of resources within its domain such that the state is in a position to play a central role in determining the distribution of financial resources among its citizens and to the extent of playing the gatekeeper in mediating relations with foreign capital. The implication of this conception of the state is that since the state is the main distributor of resources, contest for the control of the state has become intense and fierce. Furthermore, since the state appears to be the main source of wealth, it is very difficult to accumulate wealth without having recourse to the vault of the state. In spite of its shortcoming, this conception of the state provides insight into the pervasiveness of corruption in the Nigerian state and the fierce contest for political power which is seen as the shortcut to affluence.

What can be deduced from the foregoing characterisation of the post-colonial Nigerian state is that, the various descriptions of the Nigerian state reflect various plausible explanations for its structure and functioning. For instance, the description of the Nigerian state as an irrelevant entity becomes useful when explaining apathy of citizens to the state. The citizens see the state as an entity that is not useful or important to their existence and are prepared to bypass and avoid it in their daily activities. It is this construction of the character of the postcolonial Nigerian state that Eghosa Osaghae claims is responsible for the exit from the state. Osaghae argues that, in the face of increased inability of the state to provide expected public goods and services, and the authoritarian assault of the military which alienated the citizens from

38 Olaitan A, A. 1997. Understanding the Nigerian state.op.cit
the state, most ordinary people turned into various parallel sites such as fundamental religious movements, ethnic self-help, black market networks to mention but a few for survival.39

### 3.2.4. The Character of the Ruling Class in Postcolonial Nigerian State

It has been noted earlier that part of the arguments explaining why the state at independence could not be transformed rest largely on the character of the ruling elite who took over the control of the state. This section is devoted to an analysis of the various views on the nature and character of the ruling elite in postcolonial Nigerian state.

Ake argues that the class issue is central in Nigeria because of the increasing differentiation and opposition of the interest of many to those of the few. He defines the many to comprise the peasant farmers and salary earners while the few are the members of the ruling class who have control of state power. He posits that the many have become the tool in the hands of the few who use them to advance their own personal interest. To further buttress his position, Ake argues that the principal competitors for political power in Nigeria have been the same because they belong to the same social class that is the petit bourgeoisie. This ruling class had its root in the colonial era when it was in its formative stage. During this period, the class was relatively small due to the discriminatory policies of the colonial administration which favoured foreigners in the award of contracts. The absence of competition explains the ascendancy of foreign bourgeoisie.

The beginning of local bourgeoisie participation in the economy however started when some regional developments were encouraged due to pressure from the nationalists. On attainment of independence, the bourgeois nationalists started making use of the state apparatuses to foster their interest. This became visible in the indigenisation exercise of the 1970s. It was revealed that local bourgeoisie acted as agent of foreign bourgeoisie in some sensitive areas where foreigners were not allowed to venture.41 It was a kind of conspiracy between the foreign and local merchants against the people of Nigeria.

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40 Ake, C. 1996. The political question .op.cit
41 Beckman B, op.cit.
One dominant character of the ruling class in post-colonial Nigerian state is the inordinate thirst for state power by its members. This is as a result of the fact that the state is everywhere, hence those who exercise state power have access to the vast resources of the state. This is why Nigerians can go to any length to acquire state power. People invest in politics like they invest in business. Thus, politics has become the shortest avenue for primitive accumulation. It is this character of the Nigerian ruling elite that explains its description as a rent-seeking state. This has been variously captured with different adjectives such as prebendal, patron-client relationship, corruption to mention but a few. Rent-seeking is carried out by local bourgeoisie in connivance with the foreign counterparts. This usually takes the form of inflation of the value of contract, the appropriation of land and the use of bureaucratic positions for corrupt enrichment.

Writers such as Bala Usman, Terisa Turner and Richard Joseph have at different times articulated how members of the ruling class have been perpetuating rent-seeking in Nigeria. Bala Usman, in explaining the crisis of the Nigerian economy, argues that the crisis was caused by the role of middle men, consultants and contractors in the Nigerian economy. This view is also shared by Terisa Turner who uses what she refers to as triangular relationships to explain how foreign business firms in collaboration with Nigerian middle men and state officials appropriate profits at the expense of the Nigerian people who are confronted by poverty and deprivation. Turner identifies three groups of actors in the ‘triangular relationships. The three actors are, first, the multinational corporations competing for government business with the aim of making profit. They are many, hence there is acute competition which involves linking up with those who have access to decision-makers. The second group of actors is made up of Nigerian middle men who act as agents or business partners of the foreign firms. The main duty of the local businessmen is to ensure that the foreign businessmen get in touch with the market which is usually the state. The third actor identified by Turner comprises state officials who have turned themselves into compradors and used their vantage positions to assist foreign firms in their dealings with the state and citizens. This function is not usually officially assigned to the state.

officials but bestowed on them as managers of the affairs of the state. In his own analysis of rent-seeking in Nigeria, Richard Joseph describes Nigeria as a prebendalised state. State power is seen as a congeries of offices which must be competed for, appropriated and then administered for the benefit of individuals and their support groups. The arguments of Usman, Turner and Joseph, to a very large extent, explain the perennial problem of corruption, particularly how state officials use their official positions to foster parochial interests.

The foregoing characterisation of the ruling class in postcolonial Nigeria shows that it is corrupt. The implication of this is that a state governed by a loose and corrupt class cannot be expected to exhibit Weberian values of rationality and efficiency. The nature of the state and the character of its ruling class have been identified as part of the obstacles to nation building in Nigeria. Thus, it can be argued that, like most African states, the Nigerian state has failed to engender development and has not demonstrated that it is capable of serving as agent of positive change because it was created to advance the interests of metropolitan capitalism. It is this character of the postcolonial state that defines its distorted pattern of governance which, arising from its failure to meet the needs of its citizens, has created strained relations between the state and the citizens. How these contradictions manifested in Nigeria prior the contemporary era of globalisation are further highlighted in the remaining part of this chapter. Emphasis is on how military rule, pattern of state-society relations, pattern of central-local relations, the role of the state in the economy as well as the perversion of the electoral process spawned distorted governance in Nigeria. Discussion also covers some attempts aimed at addressing the governance deficit in Nigeria prior to the contemporary era of globalisation.

3.3. Governance in the Post-Colonial Nigerian State.

At independence, Nigeria was bequeathed with the British model Westminster system of government of multi-party system. Structurally, it was made up of the federal government and three regions which harboured the three majority ethnic groups— the Hausa - Fulani in the Northern Region, the Ibo in the Eastern Region and

43 Turner. 1976. Multinationals and the instability of the Nigerian state.op.cit
the Yoruba in the Western Region. These political structures and arrangement aptly shaped the pattern of governance in the first republic.

The British model of Westminster system of government bequeathed to the Nigerian state could not function to provide effective pattern of governance for the Nigerian state. The political arrangement at independence was one in which ethnic based political parties held sway. The Northern People Congress (NPC) was essentially Hausa-Fulani party, and it developed from Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa. The National Council of Nigerian Citizen (NCNC) led by Dr Nnamdi Azikwe held sway among the Ibo of the Eastern Region while the Action Group led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo developed from a Yoruba socio-cultural group, Egbe Omo – Oduduwa. The Membership of the parties did not cut deeply across the various ethnic groups of the Nigerian state and the basic aim of the parties then was to protect and solidify their base and control over their region of influence. In essence, the role of the parties, as agents of interest aggregation, was sacrificed on the altar of ethnic politics.

The nature of the political parties and their shallow as well as sectional membership base reflected in the December 12, 1959 Federal Elections in which none of the parties emerged with a clear majority, a trend that resulted in a coalition government by the NPC and NCNC with the AG as the official opposition. The effects of this coalition for the governance of independent Nigerian state have been analysed from two perspectives. First, we have those who believe that the coalition enjoyed an overwhelming majority and that some members of the NPC and NCNC leaders had been closely associated with earlier government at the centre i.e. between 1951 and 1959; hence, it would be able to provide effective government.  

The second group considered the alliance as a marriage of inconvenience as ideologies of both parties were diametrically opposed. The NPC was considered a traditionalist, aristocratic, gradualist and regionalist while NCNC was seen in the context of a nationalist, radical, egalitarian and populist. In this context, though the NPC remained the senior partner in the coalition, effective governance could not be expected in a situation in which the two parties that formed the alliance had little agreement on few things. This lack of clear ideological framework aptly explains the crisis that ensued particularly in the Western Region dominated by AG between its

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47 Ibid.
leaders Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his deputy, Chief S. L. Akintola. This ideological division permeated the three majority parties and formed the basis of the electoral contests of 1964 which were marred by irregularities to the extent that President Dr Nnamdi Azikwe found it difficult to appoint Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (though he later did after consultation) as the Prime Minister. Thus, in the First Republic, lack of mutual understanding and agreement on how the state should be governed polarised the various political actors and exacerbated the acrimony among the various ethnic groups.

The Westminster governmental structure could not be institutionalised and allowed to work, and instead, the battle was in the realm of ideology among the various leaders of parties who inadvertently doubled as the spokespersons of their regions and ethnic groups. The assertion of Billy Dudley aptly captures the nature and working of the institutions of the state. He asserts that “…though most of the institutions of the First Republic drew their inspiration from the Westminster model, they nevertheless lacked those conventions and practices which make that model what it is.”

The bicephalous executive system could not provide effective governance and as such the First Republic collapsed and the military took over the control of government. A civil war broke out and lasted for thirty months. The post civil war era witnessed a series of developments aimed at addressing the fissiparous tendencies in the Nigerian State. They were not geared towards endearing the state to the citizens. The outcome of this was that major engagements and concerns of the military was on how to keep the Nigerian State together at all cost. As a result, they could not effect changes in respect of institutions and structures to foster symbiotic relations between the state and the citizens. Instead, it was easy for the military rulers to appropriate the alienating nature of the state and continued to administer the state as a structure apart from the people.

The military rulers were not responsible or accountable to the Nigerian people for their custody of the Nigerian State and, therefore, intensified the authoritarian streak of the state. State building initiatives that were embarked upon in the post war era could not equally transform the pattern of governance, hence could not endear the

state to the citizens. As rightly pointed out by Sanusi Haruna Usman, the post civil war era witnessed a tremendous concentration of power in the hands of a small managerial group of techno-bureaucrats who laid their hands on the important switches of wealth and power and whose class aspirations and interests set them apart from the usually adorn functions of public servants.

3.3.2. The Expanded Role of the State and the Pattern of Governance

Nigeria at independence emphasised the role of the private sector in economic development but the low performance of the sector altered this conception as the state later assigned dominant role for the public sector as engine of development. The role of the government in direct production, distribution and service delivery activities became visible in nearly every sector of the economy as the government assumed the commanding heights of the national economy. The growing dominance of the public sector resulted from the expansion of existing state structures and institutions, particularly state owned enterprises, and also the establishment of new ones- a trend that accounted for the increase in the number of public enterprises. The consequence of this development was the emergence of a bloated public service which invariably marginalised the private sector.

Certain developments in the Nigerian state, particularly in the post-civil war era, could be explained in the context of the bloated public sector. First, the political crises that engulfed the First Republic were linked to ethnic composition of the Nigerian State. Consequently part of the measures embarked upon to address the fissiparous tendencies inherent in the Nigerian polity found expression in administrative reconfiguration of state creation and reforms of local governments. Though the idea of creating new states/ regions did not start in the 1970s, the lessons learnt from the First Republic actually influenced the reorganisation in 1967 and 1976. This expanded the scope of the public sector as new structures and institutions emerged both at the federal and state levels.

Second was the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972 and its modification in 1977. The Decree, which was the policy framework for the nationalisation posture of the Nigerian state in the 1970s, provided it with an opportunity to assume dominant control of the economy. The private sector that ought

to acquire the holdings could not and the government had no option but to acquire them. Third, the oil boom made it possible for the government to carry out most its obligations in the economy. The effects of these developments found expression in the gradual emergence of an over bloated and inefficient state estranged from the society.

That the public sector in Nigeria became bloated was not in doubt. In 1980, it was observed that, the public sector was accounting for 50 percent of GDP and about 66 percent of employment. Furthermore, investment before 1980 was estimated in the realm of about $36,465 billion Naira, while the government was expending about 40 percent on non-salary recurrent expenditure and about 30 percent of its capital investment budget on the public enterprises. Also by 1980, there were about 1500 public enterprises in Nigeria with about 600 at the Federal level and 900 at the state and local government levels. The expansion of the public sector did not translate to its effectiveness. The agricultural and manufacturing sectors were not only abandoned, there was capacity underutilisation in the public sector.

Eme Awa, commenting on the growing influence of the public sector in Nigeria, notes this trend and explains that, in the colonial era, the main function of the state was to provide the infrastructure needed by the organised foreign private sector to function and make huge profit but that the involvement of the state in economic activities altered this role to the extent that, in the Second Republic, it became virtually impossible to distinguish between state and private sector action in the major economic issues. Claude Ake equally highlights the effects of the pervasiveness of the state. He asserts that, the state was everywhere and its power appeared boundless. There is hardly any aspect of life in which the state does not exercise power and control. That makes the capture of the state significantly important. Essentially, the expansion of the public sector turned it to be centre for primitive accumulation of wealth. The report of the Political Bureau buttressed the expansion of the public sector and the attendant contradictions it spawned. The Bureau noted, inter alia, that

… the crucial role of the state in the development of the political economy converted government and public bureaucracies into an area in which politicians as well as bureaucrats became pawn broker. Politics or the struggle to control state power and

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52 Ibid.
institutions became the primary source of wealth making by the power elite. It is in this sense that corruption became part and parcel of the political economy.\textsuperscript{55}

Corruption did not only become the norm of governance but, as observed by Julius Ihonvbere, the Nigerian state became a polity associated with a culture of indiscipline, arrogance, human rights abuses, disrespect for the rule of law, abuse of power, intimidation of popular forces, waste, mismanagement and shameless subservience to external forces.\textsuperscript{56}

Still on the increasing role of the state in economic activities, Larry Diamond observes that:

The primary source of economic crisis and political decay in Nigeria today is the lengthening shadow of the state over every other realm of society. Since independence, the state has been the chief arena for the accumulation of wealth and acquisition of resources, and has become so ever more decisively. Too much of the country’s wealth is mediated through government contracts, jobs, import license, development projects and so on.\textsuperscript{57}

Furthermore, the expansion of the public sector, as argued by Diamond, created a false picture of the commitment of the state to the welfare of the citizens. Instead, it created a system of state socialism without any socialist commitment to justice, or distribution or even growth. Lacking such commitments, state socialism reduces to state gigantism and state investments and significant private enterprise, the economy reduces to the swollen state, feeding voraciously on oil.\textsuperscript{58}

The import of the foregoing was that the expansion of the public sector, rather than accentuating the growth and development of the Nigerian State, created avenue for corruption and politics becoming warfare and as a matter of life and death.\textsuperscript{59} Basically, Nigeria assumed the role of a developmental state. This eclipsed the private sector in socio-economic activities but generated contradictions that estranged the state from the preferences and needs of the citizens it was to serve.

The cumulative effect of the foregoing was that in the early 1980s, it was becoming clear that the Nigerian State was over bloated and, therefore, the need to


\textsuperscript{57}Diamond,L.1984; Nigeria in search for democracy. \textit{Foreign Affairs} Spring.905-927

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{59}Ake, C.1996;The political question.op.cit.
overhaul it. This informed the Shagari administration’s decision to set up a Presidential Commission on Parastatals headed by Mr Gamaliel Onosode to examine the operations of public enterprises in Nigeria and make appropriate recommendations. The Onosode Commission, identified critical problems associated with public enterprises in Nigeria. These included:

(i) Defective capital practice resulting in heavy reliance on national treasury for formal operations
(ii) Mismanagement of funds and operations
(iii) Corruption
(iii) Misuse of monopoly power
(vi) Bureaucratic bottlenecks within the public enterprises on the one hand and between them and the supervisory Ministries on the other hand

The Commission reported that the above problems created ill-conceived investment, political interference in public enterprises decision making process and inefficient use of scarce resources, growing budgetary burdens and the diversion of resources meant for public enterprises to other areas. To make the public sector functional and result oriented, the Commission recommended the withdrawal of the government from areas that are not too strategic to the state and which can be effectively managed by the private sector. In specific terms, the Commission stated, *inter alia*, that an increased role by the private sector should be considered especially in those Parastatals where security and other sensitive aspects of public policy are not paramount as the satisfactorily delivery of services to the people.

Although, the increased role for the private sector later surfaced some years after the recommendations of the Onosode’s Commission as part of the Bretton Woods financial institutions sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), it was borne out of the need to salvage the Nigerian public sector. It was a situation in which global imperatives coincided with domestic needs. Hence, it should not be seen essentially as an exogenous policy measure handed over to the Nigerian state by transnational institutions and agencies.

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61 Ibid.
3.3.3. The Military and the Pattern of Governance in the Nigerian State

Most of the accounts on the reasons for military intervention in Nigerian politics focus on the failure of democratic structures and institutions. Consequently, the intervention of the military was justified on the need to restore order and prevent the disintegration of the Nigerian State. While an evaluation of military rule in Nigeria is not intended here, suffice it to say that military rule in Nigeria distorted the pattern of governance and estranged the society from the state as the latter continued to exercise hegemonic power over the rest of the society.

Rotimi Suberu emphasises how the military distorted the practice of true federalism in Nigeria. He asserts that, although soldiers have almost always expressed a firm commitment to uphold Nigeria’s federal structure, the military unified and centralised command system resulted in the distortion of the country’s federal institutions as well as their degradation beyond recognition. He goes further to identify the sources or instances of distortion. These included the complete subordination of constituent state administrations to the unified military power structure through the appointment and frequent deployment by the central military authorities. Other instances identified by Suberu are the direct interference of the central military government in the operation, composition and reforms of local government, the manipulation of statutory intergovernmental revenue sharing arrangements in such a way that it reinforced the financial hegemony of the centre. Given the utility of decentralisation and possibly devolution of power in endearing the state to the citizens, the foregoing elements of centralisation of power under the military distanced the state far from the society, hence the disillusionment of the civil society with the state.

Apart from this, one contradiction spawned by the military for governance in Nigeria was the exclusion of the citizens from participating in government. With the coming of the military, the Constitutions were suspended and all representative institutions were dissolved. The only arm of government that was not directly touched was the judiciary. The cumulative effects of this was that the public sphere was highly muzzled and censored and could not be described as an avenue for genuine political participation because the major instruments for participation were owned and

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controlled by the state. Consequently, the power equation between the state and society, without doubt, was highly in favour of the former. This further estranged the state from society.

### 3.3.4. Pattern of State-Society Relations

State-society relations refer to the interactions and interdependency between the state and society, that is, the nature of interactions between the state and society and how the society moulds the activities of the state and how the state also shapes the society. We have discussed the patterns of governance during the colonial authoritarian and how the leaders that took over the control of government on the attainment of independence failed to endear the state to the citizenry because of the personal interests of the ruling class. We have also discussed how the military fostered relations that subordinated constituents unit to federal institutions. A trend that fostered authoritarianism and exclusion and undermined the participation of the citizenry in the decision making process.

The history of the Nigerian State in the First and Second Republics as well as under military rule shows growing apathy of the citizens towards the state. Various economic policies such as the indigenisation exercise which ought to give Nigerians opportunity to participate in the economy were perverted by the elites who connived and colluded with foreigners to subvert the goal of the exercise. Under the military, the participation of the citizenry in the political process was restricted due to the initial ban of partisan politics. Apart from centralisation which the military fostered, authoritarianism and corruption became the norms of governance. In addition, the principal avenues through which the society could engage the state were dominated by the state. For instance, the mass media was dominated by the state. Though, private and independent newspapers that developed in the colonial era continued to flourish in the post independent era, the disposition of successive administrations, particularly the military, actually suppressed the mass media as a major instrument or agency of the public sphere. Under the military, press censorship, the ban of political activities and repression of civil society groups, limited the participation of civil society in the public sphere. The hegemonic influence of the state in the public sphere limited or constrained the participation of the society in the affairs of the state. In this context, the power equation between state and society was in favour of the former.
3.3.5. Patterns of Central–Local Relations

Central-local relations are used to describe not just governmental relations between central agencies and local bodies but also the interactions involving non-governmental actors from both the central and local levels.\(^63\) Central-local relations have implication for power relations among the various tiers of government, and the extent to which government policies reflect the wishes and aspirations of the citizens. In concrete terms, Nigeria central-local relations are defined in terms of the federal structure of the Nigerian state where there is constitutional division of powers between the central and state governments. Local government, though a tier of government, is placed under the residual items assigned to the state government. At independence, Nigeria emerged as a federal polity made of a central government and three regions—the Northern, Eastern and Western regions. In 1963, the Mid-Western Region was created. The need to reconfigure and reduce the regions as the theatre and amber of ethnicity, coupled with the outbreak of the civil war, led to the reorganisation of the Nigerian state into twelve states in 1967, nineteen states in 1976, twenty one states in 1987, thirty states in 1991 and thirty six states in 1996. Apart from state creation exercises, the institutions of local governance were reformed and harmonised to have a unified system of local government with functional responsibilities. Local government became a distinct tier of government duly recognised by successive Nigerian constitutions since 1979.

In spite of the constitutional division of powers, the dominant trend has always been to portray the Nigerian State as a unitary state. Instead of devolution that promotes local initiative, centralisation that encourages dominant influence of central agencies was intensified, thus the phenomenon of asymmetry central-local politics relations. In the division of powers, the central government had power to legislate on items on the Exclusive List made up of 68 items under the 1979 Constitution; both the federal and state governments have power to legislate on items on the Concurrent items made of 30 items, but in the events of any controversy the federal law would prevail.\(^64\) The state governments were however constitutionally empowered to legislate on the residual items not included in the Exclusive and Concurrent Lists. These Constitutional arrangements encouraged central–local politics relations in which

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major policy decisions evolved from the central to the local with the attendant
disempowerment of grassroots political actors.

Consequently, participation in policy decision on issues that affect the local
dwellers was determined by central political actors. This trend did not only limit the
space for participation by the local communities but created a situation in which
programmes and projects executed were at variance with the needs and aspirations of
the communities. Government activities smacked of secrecy and were not only far
away from the citizens, the impact of the state was unfelt. This explained various
demands for political and administrative reforms that were believed to truly devolve
power to the residents and inhabitants of rural areas that were hitherto excluded from
the mainstream of policy decision making process.

Central-local relations were very much visible under the military because of
the centralised tendencies of the military. Although Nigeria emerged as a federal polity
at independence, successive military administrations perverted the federal principles.
This started under the General Aguyi Ironsi administration with his Unification Decree
of 1966. The Gowon, Murtala/Obasanjo as well as other post-Second Republic military
administrations intensified the centralisation tendency. This centralisation tendency
offered little room for political participation at the grassroots; and this estranged the
citizens from the state. As expected, the demands for decentralisation and perhaps
devolution held sway in the 1980s. This informed a series of administrative reforms
aimed at bringing the government closer to the masses as well as the removal of
bottlenecks against real decentralisation. In spite of these measures, the Nigerian state
largely exhibited centralisation tendency that made the government to be far away
from the citizens and their problems. In this sense, the pattern of central-local politics
relations in Nigeria in spite of the avowed federal system fostered centralisation which
provided limited opportunity for the involvement of local institutions in governance.
Succinctly put, central-local relations intensified the marginalisation of the people in
policy decision-making process. In Nigeria, the power equation favours the central
government. In spite of the constitutional provision that local government is the third
tier level of government, local governments have essentially operated and functioned
as extension of the state government.

The effect on governance was that policies were conditioned by the
developments at the state level. This unfortunate development over the years thwarted
efforts at translating local government into a tier of government closet to the people
and as such in a better position to meet the needs of the people. For the avoidance of doubt, according to the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions, local governments are to be managed by a democratically elected people. The use of Management Committee /Care Taker Committee in many states of the federation in the Second Republic defeated the purpose of the 1976 nation-wide local government reforms aimed at bringing government closer to the people. Moreover, the paternalistic control of local government by the state government has not allowed for relative autonomy local institutions required for effective functioning.

3.3.6. Perversion of the Electoral Process

One of the highly rated elements of governance is the degree of participation in the decision-making process of the state by the citizens. Elections over time have become one of the instruments available to the citizens of the state to influence the policy-decision making process through their elected representatives. Viewed in this sense, elections serve as instrument in the hands of civil society to control the state. The political history of the Nigerian State is almost synonymous with the perversion of the electoral process. The First Republic collapsed mainly as a result of the crises generated by the electoral crises of 1964 and 1965. The manner the elections were conducted made mockery of elections as instrument that linked the citizens with the state. The rate of manipulation of the exercise was so visible that the then Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission admitted that there were irregularities. The effects were the various crises that led to the destruction of lives and property in various parts of the country; developments that eventually led to the outbreak of a thirty-month civil war.

In the Second Republic, the perversion of the electoral process also, to a large extent, sowed the seed for the return of the military to power in December 1983. Like elections in the First Republic, they were characterised by fraudulent practices. Ahmadu Kurfi, the then Secretary of the Commission, highlighted some years after the elections some of the fraudulent practices that characterised the 1979 elections to include the sale of surplus papers to the highest bidder, thumb printing of ballot papers by polling agents for those who had paid them and that deliberate invalidation of ballots by polling and counting officials indeed occurred65.

The 1983 elections did not fare better despite the fact that an additional political party, the Nigerian Advanced Party (NAP), was registered and featured in the elections. Even before the commencement of the elections, there were fears and scepticisms over the Federal Electoral Commission’s ability to conduct hitch free elections. Eventually, when the elections took place, there were multiple allegations and counter allegations of fraud. This led to a series of violence, particularly in Modakeke in the old Oyo State and Ondo State. The perversion of the electoral process had serious effects on the relationship between the state and citizens. Apart from the fact that it amounted to the non recognition of the input of the society in the political process, it also made mockery of election as instrument of political participation. Second, the people who eventually emerged as the representatives of the citizens at the various levels could not provide the much needed effective governance. Succinctly put, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led government that eventually emerged could not provide effective leadership instead it only succeeded in plundering and mismanaging the resources of the state between 1979 and 1983. Julius Ihonvbere commenting on political decay in the Second Republic, asserts that Politics in the second republic was warfare. It was normless to the core. All known rules of competition were thrown overboard and thuggery, corruption, intimidation, lies and diversions became the order of the day. Political positions were seen as avenues for getting drunk on power and looting the treasury.

The electoral process was perverted and thus made mockery of the principle of representation as a central element of democracy. The perversion of the electoral process has been summed up by Fawole who observes specifically that the nature of Nigeria’s electoral democracy dis-empowers the electorate because the people are:
(a) not involved in establishing the rules and modalities of electoral contest and participation;
(b) often marginalized or simply ignored is the process of party formation and registration;
(c) neglected in the process of determining the suitability of candidates for election;
(d) merely goaded or coerced by government into taking part in election whose;

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outcomes have been largely predetermined by the power that be;
(e) incapable of exercising control over governments once elected;

Writing further on the perversion of the electoral process in Nigeria, Fawole observes that the participation of the citizenry in the electoral process was a matter of routine without any significant meaning. Fawole notes that:

….Nigerians are regularly called out through intimidation, blackmail, bribery and even deployed threats and occasional use of state power to participate en-masse in the election ritual of voting for contestant for state power without actually choosing or determining who the winners and loser will be. The vast majority of the Nigerian electorate does not really exercise the power of choice since they are often coerced, intimidated or blackmailed into mere confirming those candidates for office who have been selected for them68.

The cumulative effect of this was that elections that ought to empower civil society were made ineffective as the votes of the citizen did not count. Hence, the power relations between the state and society remained and tilted in favour of the former.

3.4.1. State Reconstruction and Governance.

The collapse of the First Republic and the emergence of the military in the political space were the manifestations of the contradictions spawned by governance in the post-colonial Nigerian state. Consequently, the strengthening of state institutions was central in the agenda of the journey to the Second Republic. This influenced the major reforms that featured in the political space which included, the anti corruption initiatives and the purge of the public service, the state creation exercises carried out to deflate the problem of ethnic politics in Nigeria, and economic reform geared toward the promotion of indigenous control of the economy. Between 1960 and 1984, various administrative and political reforms were carried out in the Nigerian State. One of such reforms, that is political transition of power from military to civilian, will be emphasised in the next section.

3.4.2. Political and Administrative Reforms

In the immediate years of the post-civil war era, conscious efforts aimed at inventing new institutions and structures became visible with the inauguration of the five-stage programme of demilitarisation and civilianisation in October, 1975. This included the task of drafting a new constitution for the Nigerian state. In his address to the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) on 18th October, 1975, General Murtala Mohammed declared that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was committed to a federal and democratic system of government which guarantees fundamental human rights and the emergence of stable polity, best achieved through the creation of viable political institutions which will ensure maximum participation and consensus and orderly succession to power. General Mohammed asserts, inter alia, that the type of constitution that was needed has to reflect our experience, and at the same time paying attention to the equally important fact that a good constitution must also be capable of influencing the nature and orderly development of the politics of the people. Consequently, according to General Mohammed, the new constitution was expected to eliminate cut-throat political competition, discourage institutionalised opposition to the government in power, establish the principles of public accountability for all holders of public office, eliminate over-centralisation of power in few hands, evolve a free and fair electoral system and devise measures to depoliticize population.

The import of this was that the military leadership of the Murtala /Obasanjo administration realised the need for the evolution of new political structures and institutions that would be attuned to the needs and aspirations of the society, having failed to do that through the 1963 Republican Constitution. This, as later developments showed, could not materialise due to the fact that debates were limited to certain areas and as such necessary changes desired in the constitution could not be effected. This, as argued by Abubakar Momoh and Said Adejumobi, resulted from the way the Constitutional Drafting Committee, the Constituent Assembly and Federal Electoral Commission were monitored, doctored and regulated with defined no-go-areas and with introduction of the requirement for the state clearance on issues of “sensitive

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71 Akinsanya A., A. Four years of presidential democracy in Nigeria. op.cit.
national security”, clearly indicated that what was to be manufactured in 1979 was a truncated democratic system.\(^{72}\)

As already hinted, the 1975 – 1979 transition produced the 1979 Constitution which defined the institutional process and governmental structure of the Second Republic. The Constitution provides for an Executive President, meaning that the Nigerian State abandoned the parliamentary system that was practised in the First Republic. The rationale behind the choice of a monocephalous executive system was highlighted in the address of the Head of State to the CDC. He declared that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) had come to inescapable conclusion that Nigeria in a post-military era, require an executive presidential system of government in which the President and Vice-President would be elected with clearly defined power and acceptable to the people.\(^{73}\) This declaration, one could argue, was influenced by the 1964 – 1965 constitutional crises which showed how the bicephalous executive system designed to promote national unity did not only prove ineffective in addressing fundamental socio-economic and political problems but created conflict of interests and authority. The logic behind the adoption of the monocephalous executive system was premised on the need to create a structure that would ensure that the President commands national respect and not a representative of a constituency. Similarly, the separation of executive from the legislative, it was hoped, would, apart from guiding against conflicts that characterised the First Republic, ensure that the machinery of government operates in such a way that the centre becomes a melting pot especially for the elite\(^{74}\).

The 1979 constitution also introduced the Federal Character principle, which was designed to guide against the domination of the restive minority groups by the large ethnic nationalities. The constitution states, *inter alia*, that:

> The composition of the Government of the federation or any of its agencies and conduct of its affairs shall be carried out … to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or


\(^{73}\) See Akinsanya, A. A. Four years of presidential democracy,122-135

\(^{74}\) Ibid.
from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies\textsuperscript{75}.

The introduction of the Federal Character principle, apart from being an instrument against domination, was a mechanism for the accommodation of conflicting interests in the Nigerian State. Essentially, while the Federal Character could be seen as an instrument of national integration, it was not designed to endear the alienating Nigerian state to the society.

3.4.3. The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy

The failure of the First Republic and the attendant pattern of governance, particularly under the military and the need to endear the State to the society, manifested in the introduction of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in the 1979 Constitution. Indeed, it was the first time a Nigerian constitution was defining clearly the objectives of the State. According to Section 14(1) of the constitution, the Nigerian State was to be governed on democratic principles. The constitution states that: The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of democracy and social justice\textsuperscript{76}. In consequence of this, subsection 2, states that:

(a) Sovereignty belongs to the people from whom government through this constitution derives all its power and authority.
(b) The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government.
(c) The participation of the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the provision of this constitution.\textsuperscript{77}

Section 15(3) of the constitution states that, for the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the state to:

(a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage mobility of people, goods and services throughout the federation.
(b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all part of the federation.
(c) encourage, inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin or of different religion, ethnic or linguistic association or ties.

\textsuperscript{75} See Section 13(3) of The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
\textsuperscript{76} Section 14(1) of 1979 Constitution.
\textsuperscript{77} Section 14(2) of the 1979 Constitution.
(d) promote or encourage the formation of association that cut across ethnic
linguistic, religion or other social barrier.78

Sub-section (4), states that, the state shall foster a feeling of belonging and
involvement among the various peoples of the federation. To this end, Section 15(5)
states that the state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power. It was the
need to achieve these objectives that in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution there is
provision for Code of Conduct for public offices – Code of Conduct Bureau and Code
of Conduct Tribunal79.

Economically, the objectives of the Nigerian State, according to the
Constitution were to ensure that the:

(i) Control of the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum
welfare freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice
and equality of states and opportunity.

(ii) Without prejudice, to its right operate in areas of the economy other than the
major actors of the economy, manage and operate the major section of the
economy.

(iii) Without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas of the
economy within the major sector of the economic activities outside the
major sectors of the economy.80

In consequence of these objectives, the constitution shall direct its policy towards
ensuring:

(a) the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development,

(b) that the material resources of the country are harnessed and distributed as
best as possible to serve the common good,

(c) that the economic system is not operated in such manner as to permit the
concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the
hands of few individuals or of a group and,

(e) that suitable and adequate shelter suitable and adequate food, reasonable
national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions and
unemployment and such benefits are provided for all citizens81.

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78 Section 15(3) of the 1979 Constitution.
79 Section 15(5) of the 1979 Constitution
80 Section 16 of the 1979 Constitution
81 See Section 16 (2) of the 1979 Constitution
The social objectives of the Nigerian State were contained in Section 17(1) of the constitution. The constitution states that, the state social order is founded on ideas of freedom, equity and justice. The constitution states further that:

(i) every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law,

(ii) the sanctity of human person shall be recognized and human dignity shall be maintained and enhanced,

(iii) governmental actions shall be humane,

(iv) exploitation of human or natural resources in any reason, other than the good of the country shall be prevented and,

(v) the independence, impartiality and integrity of courts of law and easy accessibility thereto shall be secured and maintained\(^{82}\).

In order to achieve the above objectives, the constitution in section 13 provides that, the state shall direct its policy toward ensuring that:

(i) all citizens without discrimination on any ground whatsoever have the opportunity for securing adequate mean of livelihood as well as opportunities to secure employment

(ii) Conditions of work are just and humane and that there are adequate facilities for leisure and for social, religion and cultural life.

(iii) The health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment are safeguarded and not endangered or abused.

(iv) There are adequate, medical and health facilities for all persons

(v) There is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex or any other ground whatsoever

(vi) Children, young person and the aged are protected against exploitation whatsoever and against moral and material neglect

(vii) Provision is made for public assistance in deserving cases or other condition of need\(^{83}\)

On educational objectives, the 1979 Constitution stipulates that, government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal, adequate educational

\(^{82}\) See Section 17(2) of the 1979 Constitution

\(^{83}\) See Section 17(3) of the 1979 Constitution
opportunities at all level. In consequence of this, government shall promote science and technology.\(^{84}\)

(viii) government shall strive to eradicate illiteracy and to this government shall as when practicable provides:
- free, compulsory and universal primary education
- free secondary education
- free university education and
- free adult literacy Programme

The constitution also stipulates the foreign objectives of the state tailored towards the promotion of Africa unity as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international co-operation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all people and states and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestation.

Subsequent Nigerian Constitutions, the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions retained these Fundamental Objectives. The inclusion of the principles in the Constitution was informed by the nature of Nigerian politics, particularly in the First Republic, and pattern of governance under the military. These provisions were designed not only to address the fissiparous tendencies of the state but establish a functional and effective state with admirable institutions and pattern of governance. While the architects of the 1979 Constitutions could be praised to have made attempt at defining specific role for the state, Section 6(6) of the same 1979 Constitution, however, has a provision that negate the provisions relating to Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. The provision in this section makes them non-justiciable. The Constitution stipulates that the judicial powers of the federation or any other state:

shall not extend to any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any authority, any person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the fundamental objectives and directives principle of state policy as set out in section 15 of this constitution.\(^{85}\)

The implication of this is that no individual or group could sue the state on the basis of its failure to pursue any of the policies, and as it has been rightly argued, the fundamental objectives

\(^{84}\) Section 18 of the 1979 Constitution  
\(^{85}\) Section 6(6) of the 1979 Constitution
...by their nature, the provisions relates to policy goals or direction rather than to the existence or extent legal of rights vested in any individual or group normally subject to the jurisdiction of courts of laws. It is a field in which professional lawyers who preside over courts of law are not necessarily the most competent judges.

This shows that the constitution does not establish any legal obligation on the state to pursue them. They are just guidelines government could pursue at its convenience, with no element of compulsion and the citizens have no right to challenge the government. This tends to give credence to the view that the political elite of the post-colonial Nigerian state were not very much interested in bridging the gap between the state and citizens.

3.4.4. Economic Reforms

As already indicated, the Nigerian state, towards the ends of the first decade of independence, displaced the private sector as the agent of growth. The state became the dominant actor in the economy, a trend that explains various contradictions spawned by the Nigerian state, ranging from corruption to inefficiency. The Nigerian state at different point in time attempted to reform the economy. Apart from the various National Development Plans in the post-civil war era, some steps were taken in the economic realm to endear the state to the society. Prominent among them was the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972 which was later revised in 1977. While this policy aimed at transferring the control of the economy to Nigerians, the mode of implementation, however, made mockery of the exercise. In spite of the shortcoming of this attempt, it could be argued that it was intended to bridge the gap between the state and the citizens.

When the Second Republic was inaugurated, the economy was near to total collapse. Thus by 1982, the Shagari government instituted a belt – tightening austerity measure and even sought IMF loan facility of about 2 billion US dollars. In April 21, 1982, President Shagari presented an emergency stabilisation measures to the National Assembly which consequently approved it without delay. Thus it became a law. The provisions included Foreign Exchange control measures such as reduction of Basic Travelling Allowance (BTA) from ₦800 to ₦500 for persons of the age of sixteen and

above and the cancellation of allowance for persons below the age of sixteen, pegging the number of pilgrims to Hajj in 1982 to 50,000 though the BTA of N800 was retained, reduction of business travel allowance from #3000 to N2500 per person for registered companies. Other aspect of the reform included the re-introduction of pre-shipment inspection for spare parts, raw materials and books, frozen and can foods, limiting the power of authorised dealers to grant exemption from pre-shipment inspection to application for amount more than #5000 as against N10,000 before. The monetary measures included: Compulsory advance deposits for imports were imposed on certain classes of imports like raw material. It also entailed the revision of all interest rates upward across the board by two per cent. The fiscal policy included the total ban of frozen gaming machine, tariff charges with most the changes being increase in the rate of duties while others were the introduction of new import duties, and as a revenue yielding measure, new rate of excise duty ranging from 5 to 45 percent were imposed on a number of commodities including cigarettes, fibre cosmetics and perfume. The intensification of anti smuggling activities including the strengthening of the Task Force and the X squad giving adequate remuneration to Custom Officers and informants, introduction of more containers depot and X-ray equipment. The introduction of these measures came rather late as the Nigerian economy failed to respond positively to the new measures as the debt profile continued to be on the increase, the CBN failing on several occasions to remit payment for import due to shortage of foreign exchange.

The President Shagari administration came into being in 1979 and inherited a reserve of N1461.6 million but as at December 1983, it was having a debt which stood at above $7 billion. Total debt stood at N22.2 billion as against N8 billion it inherited in 1979. The state of the economy, coupled with political developments attendant to the 1983 general elections, which were gradually driving the Nigeria into a state of anarchy, laid the foundation for the emergence of the military which terminated democratic political institutions for the second time in the annals of Nigerian history. The Second Republic, after a shaky take off, eventually collapsed under invidious forces in December 1983, thus bringing back the military into the political scene. Thus, for the second time, a platform for endearing the state to the society through functional

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representative institutions failed as the succeeding military governments dissolved all representative institutions. This foreclosed some of the medium that link the state to the citizens and further worsened the strained relations between the state and society as power relations remained in favour of the state.

3.5. Governance in the Post Second Republic Era.

The Muhammadu Buhari administration that took over the reins of power on December 31, 1983 recognised the decay of the institutional processes of the Nigerian State and, therefore, was poised to inject sanctity and discipline into the polity. This informed the agenda of the administration which was devoted to:

(i) maintenance of national unity and stability,
(ii) giving the nation a better and more purposeful sense of direction
(iii) embarking on prudent management of the available resources and diversification of the economy
(iv) achieving self-sufficiency in its productive activities.

The way and manner the administration went about achieving the aforementioned objectives, however, smacked fierce authoritarianism. The administration launched the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) in fifty phases but only implemented ten phases before it was overthrown in 1985. Some of the authoritarian postures of the administration included the promulgation of Decree No.1 which suspended the 1979 constitution, and Decree No. 2, which provided for the arrest and detention of citizens deemed to be security risk. Decree No.3 provided for military tribunal to try former public office holders suspected of corruption and abuse of office. Decree No. 4 forbade the general public from engaging in anything that may bring government officials into ridicule or disrespect. Simply put, from all intent, the Buhari administration narrowed the space for the participation of the citizens in the affairs of the state. These and other authoritarian measures which characterised the Nigerian state during this period launched the Nigerian state into a deep crisis. The Buhari administration was authoritarian and repressive. The administration alienated the citizens from the state. Repression and authoritarianism that characterised the Buhari administration as well as the failure to put in place a programme of return to civil rule engendered public criticism and agitation for a change in the Nigerian state. It was in this context of

authoritarianism that the Babangida administration was welcomed with the hope that it would induce changes in the political space and be more accommodating.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, the focus has been the character of the Nigerian State between 1960 and 1984, highlighting the pattern of governance. Although decentralisation was embarked upon, it was essentially among the tiers of government and not necessarily between the public and private spheres. The indigenisation policy could not translate the economy to a meaningful private sector driven economy due to the mode of implementation, particularly the way local bourgeoisie connived with foreigners to venture into sensitive areas and foreigner’s participation was prohibited. Similarly, democratisation was not meaningful due to the perversion of the electoral system. The expansion of the public sector through the establishment of public enterprises conferred a developmental role on the Nigerian state. This expanded the influence of the national bourgeoisie who controlled state apparatuses and the economy. Rent-seeking, by the ruling class spawned distorted governance. Nigeria became incapacitated in service delivery, poor and decaying infrastructure, rising rate of unemployment to mention but a few. The Nigerian state was seen as a failure and irrelevant, and degree of apathy towards the state was high and in any ramification, the attributes of a state was totally absent. Chabal and Daloz note these developments and assert that “the concept of the state (in Nigeria) did not make sense, because it lacked all the attributes associated with the state in its original European conceptualisation.”89 Fawole’s observation equally capture the nature of politics in post-independence Nigerian state. He asserts that;

… since the democratic ethos did not gain root among Nigerians before independence, the political elites and the political associations that emerged during the process of transition from colonial rule to independence saw politics starkly as a crude zero-sum contest of power.90

In effect, the history of the Nigerian state between 1960 and 1984 shows a state with failed democratic experiments, centralised tendencies in spite of the federal political

structures, corruption, state dominance in economic relations with the society and over-bloated public sector.
CHAPTER FOUR

EFFECTS OF GLOBALISATION ON THE NIGERIAN STATE.

4.1. Introduction

Globalisation, as already discussed in chapter two of this study, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and characterised by the global spread of ideas and norms that cover virtually every field of human endeavour. These global ideas and norms are not just happenings or developments in other countries but also issues and developments attracting the attention and reaction of the global community and mediated by transnational institutions and agencies. Similarly, they are not just developments and events but norms and regimes that have become pervasive in the contemporary era of globalisation and visible in terms of their application in nearly every sphere of politics. Such global ideas and norms have, over the years, influenced the domestic activities of the modern state. Richard Little notes the pervasiveness of these norms in the contemporary era of globalisation when he asserts that “there is hardly any area of global politics that is devoid of regimes and where states are not circumscribed by the existence of mutually accepted sets of rules”.¹ Regimes generally manifest in form of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Charles Kegley and George Raymond identify two types of norms – ‘Permissive and Restrictive’² that have been dominant in global politics. Permissive norms give actors considerable latitude of action, while restrictive norms do not only place considerable checks or control on the actors but specific actions are usually prohibited.

We need to state, however, that global norms and regimes are not essentially new in the conduct of the activities of states; they have, however, in recent years, been intensified and transformed. Global developments, since the mid-1980s aptly show that the global political-economic order is gradually transforming from pervasive to

restrictive order. The consequence is that states more or less now have their actions and activities influenced by global norms, rules and principles. Viewed in this sense, global norms are responses to real and perceived needs of actors in the global context. Central to global norms and principles is the liberalisation of economic activities which entails the increasing role of the private sector in the economy with the attendant prescription of minimum role for the state, democracy and its attendant attributes such as the rule of law, human rights, accountability and transparency in governance.

Apart from these norms that are prevalent in the contemporary era globalisation, there is what is termed new universalism. This refers to global awareness of the complex nature of problems facing the global community and the attendant global realisation of the necessity to act globally for solution. This awareness being articulated through the works and activities of transnational institutions and various non-governmental organisations has been responsible for the hosting of a number of conferences such as the Environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), World Population (Cairo 1995), Women Issues (Beijing, 1996), the International Court Justice (Rome 1998), Empowering the International Tribunal of the Hague, the United Nations Earth conference (2000), the Conference on Global Warming (Bonn 2001) to mention but a few. This new universalism has spurred series of global actions and new thinking that are rendering obsolete certain types of reasoning. It has been argued that, it is this awareness that explains the acceptance of the liberal democratic order as a global form of government despite sporadic resistance in some states, mainly Arab states. Some of the global political and economic norms that manifested in Nigeria between 1985 and 2007 are discussed in this chapter. The chapter also analyses the effects of globalisation on the Nigeria state.

4.2 Technological Globalisation in Nigeria.

We have made the point earlier that technology is one of the dimensions of globalisation. To ascertain the manifestation of globalisation in Nigeria, an analysis of the diffusion of new technologies provides useful insight and a rewarding point of departure. The manifestations of these new forms of technologies have been visible in

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4 Ibid.
the Nigerian State since the late 1980s and particularly the 1990s. This has been in the diffusion of the Internet and other CMC. Anao, writing in 2002, highlighted the significant developments in Nigeria that were inspired and shaped by the globalisation of new technologies. He notes, *inter alia*:

Probably the most phenomenal change that Nigerians experienced in the last 3 years has arisen from developments in the information and communication technology sector. For instance, Nigeria has been experiencing an explosion in the use of wireless phone systems in recent times. It is estimated that since Nigeria got onto the GSM phone bandwagon in August 2001, only 15 months ago, about 1.11 million people acquired mobile phones. During the same period less than 30,000 lines were added to the network of the country’s landlines bringing the total to only about 600,000. It had taken the whole of the last 50 to 60 years to attain this paltry number! According to current estimates Nigeria needs a minimum capital investment of $4 billion (N500 billion) within the next 2 years to develop the telephone network that will provide additional 2 million fixed and 1.2 million mobile lines as stipulated in current National Policy on Telecommunication approved in 19995.

Interestingly Amao’s prediction has been confirmed considering the explosion of telephone subscribers and Internet users in Nigeria since the 1990s. At independence, the total number of functional telephone lines in Nigeria was put at 18,724 telephone lines for a population of over 40 million people6. As at 2001, however, with the emergence of GSM, total functional telephone lines was 866,782. This increased to 35,308, 483 in 2007 with an increase in tele-density from about 0.5 in 1960 to 0.73 in 2001 and 25.22 in 20077. The explosion in the number of active telephone lines in Nigeria in recent years, particularly the emergence of the GSM in Nigeria, has multiple and complex consequences for the Nigerian State, transcending the use of the telephone as a medium of communication.

Apart from the increase in telephone facilities, the Nigerian state also witnessed the emergence of the Internet. Prior to the early 1990s, the Internet was a rare word in Nigeria but in the mid-1990s, however, it became a household word. As at


December 2000, the total number of Internet users in Africa was put at 4,514,400, out of which Nigeria had the total number of Internet usage of 200,000, sharing the third place with Kenya and coming behind Egypt with a total number of 450,000 and South Africa, 2,400,000 users\(^8\). Expectedly, the emergence of the Internet has had varied consequences for the Nigerian State. Anao has captured the effects of the new forms of technologies for the Nigerian State when he rightly claims that:

> The emerging technologies are fundamentally transforming our society by influencing the way we live, play and interact with others. Our lives are changing as the technology/knowledge infrastructure around us continues to emerge at a very rapid rate. Many Nigerians are taking advantage of emerging technologies for better productivity\(^9\).

The question, therefore, is: in what ways did the new forms of technologies shape the Nigerian state between 1985 and 2007? These are discussed in subsequent sections below.

### 4.3.1 Effects of Bourgeoning Technologies in Nigeria.

In the last section, we identified the diffusion of new forms of technologies as evidenced in the burgeoning of the mobile telephony system, the Internet and other CMC as one of the manifestations of globalisation in Nigeria’s. These technologies affected Nigeria in various ramifications. Discussion in this section is devoted to some developments in Nigeria generated by the new technologies and their effects on the pattern of governance.

### 4.3.2. Evolution of e-Government.

The effects of technologies in Nigeria are vast. One particular area where new forms of technologies have been visible and shaped the political process of the Nigerian State since the mid-1990s is the emergence of e-government. According to Grill Paquet \textit{et al.}, quoted by Thomas B. Riley and Cathia Gilbert Riley, e-government refers to an IT-led reconfiguration of public sector governance – and how knowledge,
power and purpose are redistributed in light of new technological realities. Simply put, e-government is the migration to the cyber space by the government, corporate bodies, groups and individuals for their transactions. In other words, it refers to the application of the Internet and other related technologies to governance.

In Nigeria, until the 1990s, there was no such thing as e-government. Hence, its emergence could be seen as evolutionary and a discontinuity with the past when government dealings with the public were offline or non-virtual basis. The proliferation of global technologies has given birth to a series of Internet-based initiatives to promote efficient delivery of services and transformed the traditional manner of government interactions with the citizens. This new orientation in government operations prompted the Federal Government to develop a portal web http://www.nigeria.gov.ng. The thirty six states of the federation and their agencies equally designed their own portals to facilitate efficient service delivery. With the increasing mindset of promoting e-government, the Nigerian government launched the National-e-governance Strategies Ltd (NeGst). Apart from this, the federal government established the National IT Development Agency (NITDA) to serve as a bureau for the implementation of the National Policy on Information Technology released in 2001.

One of the consequences of the new technologies has been emergence of e-government reflecting in the migration of government activities to the cyber space. Citizens no longer troop to Federal, State or Local Government Secretariats or any of their agencies seeking information; with the emergence of the Internet and other forms of CMC, such information could easily be accessed electronically. A citizen that needs certain information about the government can access it in a cyber cafe or, for those that have Internet facilities at home, log in to the website of the government and obtain required information about the activities of the government. This is not limited to government activities; a large number of private organisations have migrated to the cyber space and embraced online activities.

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The application of the new forms of technologies has also influenced the organisational pattern of government institutions and agencies. This is reflecting in the increasing use of the fax machine, beepers, mobile telephoning, e-mails, listserv, interactive connections etc. Apart from the fact that the application of these new technologies makes work faster than the traditional photocopiers and typewriters, it has transformed the way government transacts its business. Not only do we have government activities being progressively computerised, many national assignments in Nigeria particularly since 1999 have been carried out using these technologies. For instance, the nationwide National Identity Card and registration of voters for the 2007 elections were all carried out electronically. While this observation does not have any bearing with the assessment of the exercises referred to, the point is that the new technologies have impacted the Nigerian State. At one point the computerisation of government activities now means less of physical contact between the citizens and government officers which has the capacity of abating corruption which is enhanced by the frequent contact of public officers with members of the public. The functions of the Internet and other CMC have the capacity to facilitate top-down publicity thereby creating the opportunities where the citizens can, in the comfort of their homes if they have the facilities to, learn about what is happening in the state regardless of their locations or residence.

Basically, the phenomenon of e-government is redefining the pattern of governance in Nigeria by reshaping power relations between the state and the society. This could be deduced from the new forms of technologies and the opportunities for better delivery of services. For instance, with the emergence of the Internet and other CMC, vehicle owners who want to renew their vehicle licence need not visit Licensing Office for the renewal of their vehicle particulars, online renewal of such documents could be carried out with ease. What vehicle owners need to do in this era of the Internet is to visit any of the designated banks, make payment and within a few minutes the task would be completed. Apart from the fact that citizens now save the time that would have been spent going to the licensing office, this development provides ample opportunity for better delivery of services which is built around Public Private Partnership (PPP); hence it makes room for interactive and participatory governance. Succinctly put, new forms of technologies provides the society with opportunities that were previously denied the citizens.
Apart from the government, corporate bodies and institutions of higher learning are progressively embracing online transactions. For instance, before the burgeoning information technologies in Nigeria, prospective candidates for public examination bodies such as the West African Examination Council (WAEC) and the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) would have to travel to sales centres to purchase application forms. Since the 1990s, however, this tradition has changed. In recent years, prospective candidates have the option of registering online with the use of scratch cards. Candidates now have the opportunity of checking their results in the convenience of their bedrooms or neighbourhood cyber café courtesy of the opportunities provided by the Internet and other CMC. This contrasted sharply with the old practice of waiting for the examination bodies to send results, or candidates travelling to the headquarters of the examination bodies before having access to such results. The process is fast and time-saving. This development has been embraced by many institutions of higher learning. Prospective candidates now make orders for forms and even complete such forms online with ease. The cumulative effect of these is that new forms of technologies are transforming governance. First, they are doing this by enhancing Public Private Partnership (PPP) and, second, by facilitating more efficient methods of service delivery. Related to this is the phenomenon of e-payment that has been embraced by the government and private organisations. It is faster, safer and can easily be tracked and traced if there are aberrations.

Adaptation to the new technologies is however spawning mixed consequences for the Nigerian State. While social transactions are being facilitated, it has led to reorganisations in many institutions which led to job losses to many because of the automation of tasks. While this has been a backlash of the application of ICT, it is also worthy of note that it created employment opportunities for many Nigerians. In this context, it could be seen as a double-edged sword in the Nigerian state. For instance, in a study carried out by Kajogbola on the impact of information technologies on the Western and Eastern parts of Nigeria, it was discovered that contrary to claims that information displaces workers, thus leading to job loss, the study shows that it actually expanded job opportunities for Nigerians.\(^\text{12}\)

4.3.3. Social Networking

The consequences of the new forms of technologies are also visible in the emerging social networking taking place in the cyberspace. This is not to suggest that before the emergence of the Internet and other CMC there was no social networking. The point is that these new technologies have transformed the pattern of networking. The www has created new instantaneous interaction among individuals and groups. Consequently, many socio-economic and political activities migrated to the cyber world. The manifestations of these in Nigeria transformed the pattern of governance. The Internet has become the site for political mobilisation, association and activism. An instance of this manifestation was in the month of September 2003 when Nigerians were asked to switch off their mobile telephone for twenty hours in protest against the high rate of billings and the poor services rendered by the telephone operators in Nigeria. Although, this action was not directly against the government, it was used to bring to the attention of the government the plight of Nigerian citizens. The phenomenon of this networking could be inferred from the activities of many civil society groups that now undertake their activities through the Internet. An example is the Media Group made up of 100 groups agitating for the passage of the Freedom of Information Bill in Nigeria. Many of such groups exist in different spheres of the Nigerian States, some of them focusing on human rights issues, the environment, political and electoral reforms, women empowerment and labour, to mention but a few. The point being emphasised here is that the application of new forms of technologies in Nigeria has made networking among individuals and groups easier and have the potentials of deepening democracy.

4.3.4. The Evolution of e-Commerce.

Prior to the emergence of the Internet, there was no such thing as e-commerce worldwide. However, with the emergence of the Internet, commercial activities started migrating to the cyber space. Similarly, in Nigeria, the phenomenon of e-commerce and online activities emerged as a result of the burgeoning new forms of technologies. While the intention here is not to delve into the various ways in which e-commerce were carried out in the period under consideration, the point being stressed is that by virtue of the Internet, Nigerians now have access to a variety of goods on the virtual space and the possibility of purchasing these goods on the Internet.
The phenomenon of e-commerce also reflects in the banking processes. Prior to the emergence of the Internet and other CMC in the banking sector, customers would have to present a cheque at the local branch of a bank before making withdrawal and have to carry huge cash on their person as they move from one place to another for commercial purposes with the attendant risks. With the opportunities provided by the Internet, banking processes have been transformed through the provision of facilities for e-banking services. With e-banking facilities, customers and individuals could make transactions at any local branch that is connected. This also applies to the transfer of money: the only thing needed is the bank account and with the click of the mouse the account of the receiver is credited. In the banking sector, the introduction of Internet related facilities such as the Automated Teller Machine (ATM) represented some of the novel developments in the Nigerian State associated with the globalisation of technologies. Essentially, as a result of the advancement in ICT and their subsequent diffusion in Nigeria, most banks in Nigeria have facilities for virtual or wired financial transactions. These developments were unknown in the pre-Internet era.

4.4.1. Economic Globalisation and Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Nigeria

The manifestation of economic globalisation in Nigeria is reflected in various economic reforms embarked upon by Nigeria since the mid-1980s. These included the Structural Adjustment Programme, privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises, NEEDS, reforms of the banking sector, to mention but a few.

To say that privatisation is a global phenomenon is to affirm the obvious. It has along history and has been part and parcel of global development policy since the 1980s. As a global reform policy, privatisation resurfaced in the 1980s after a long period of nationalisation policy pursued by different countries both in the erstwhile Western and Eastern blocs. It has a long history, having been in practice, particularly in the United States, since 1676 when private firms were involved in cleaning the streets of New York. The renewed emphasis on privatisation as part of the package for economic reforms is however associated with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan administrations as the Prime Minister and President of Britain and United States respectively in the early 1980s. Prior to this era, however, different countries

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had implemented nationalisation programmes in response to various socio-economic and other challenges but the dismal performance of the nationalised enterprises greatly influenced the turn towards privatisation. The 1980s witnessed the implementation of privatisation programme on a global scale, having been translated to a leading recipe by Bretton Woods Financial Institutions (i.e. the IMF and the World Bank) for countries with ailing economies. Though Chile embarked on some sort of privatisation in 1974, the impact of the exercise on other countries was not remarkable until the Thatcher experience in Britain. Essentially, the British experiment, though a local reform initiative had a formidable influence beyond its local importance.

That the idea quickly spread to other countries of the world (both developed and developing) could be deduced from the growing number of countries that embraced privatisation. In 1989, it was estimated that a total of $25 billion was realised worldwide from the sale of State Owned Enterprises. This increased to $80 billion between 1994 and 1995.\(^\text{14}\) It is no wonder then that the world wide explosion of privatisation has made the phenomenon a central policy instrument of many countries, both developed and developing.

It is important to state that economic liberalisation is not new in Nigeria as it has continued to be part of policy agenda of the Nigerian State since the mid 1970s even predating the contemporary phase of globalisation. For instance, before the 1980s, privatisation was seen as a condition for receiving aid from the Bretton Woods financial institutions and other donor agencies, but in this contemporary era of globalisation, privatisation is seen as a norm which countries are readily embracing without coercion from transnational institutions.

The history of privatisation in Nigeria could be traced to the recommendations of the Gamaliel Onosode Commission of 1984 where it was stressed that in order to improve the fortunes of the Nigerian State, government should explore the option of privatising enterprises that were not all that strategic in terms of security to the Nigerian state. As state policy, however, privatisation came into being following the coming into effect of Decree No.25 of 1988 as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme package introduced in July 1986 to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce the dependence on the oil sector and

on imports, achieve fiscal and balance of payments stability and to lay the basis for a sustainable non inflationary growth for the Nigerian state.

The legal framework of the privatisation policy in Nigeria was Decree No. 25 of 1988. The objectives of the programme in Nigeria as detailed in the enabling Decree were not at variance with the general objectives of privatisation globally. They include the following: (a) to restructure and rationalise the public sector in order to lessen the dominance of unproductive investment in that sector (b) to re-orientate the enterprises for privatisation and commercialisation towards a new horizon of performance improvement, viability and overall efficiency (c) to ensure the positive returns on public sector investment in commercialised enterprises (d) to check the present absolute dependence on the treasury for funding by otherwise commercially oriented parastatal and so encourage their approach to the Nigerian capital market (e) to initiate the process of gradual cession to the private sector of such public enterprises which by their nature and type of operation are best performed by the private sector.

The above objectives were informed by the dismal performance of public enterprises in Nigeria which relied heavily on the public treasury for their day to day operations with little or no positive returns for such subventions. Consequently, it was believed that with privatisation, such enterprises would be better managed, anchoring the belief on the private sector as a better manager. In essence, privatisation in Nigeria was informed by the need to restore fiscal balance that was expected to result from the reduction of government expenditure on public enterprises. The Decree classified public enterprises in Nigeria into different groups made up of those to be privatised and those to be commercialised. The Decree listed 111 enterprises to be privatised either partially or fully and 35 other enterprises for partial or full commercialisation. For the implementation of the privatisation and commercialisation programmes, the Decree created an oversight agency known as the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) which later metamorphosed into the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) in 1993 when the TCPC submitted its report.

The first phase of privatisation was under the military between 1988 and 1999 and the task of implementing the programme, as noted above, was placed on the TCPC. In implementing the programme, the methods adopted were within the context of globally accepted techniques of privatisation. These were:

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(a) Public Offer for sale of shares done through the Nigerian Capital Market. A total of 35 enterprises were privatised through this method.

(b) Private placement of shares carried out in situations where the TCPC could not persuade the majority shareholders to make a public offer of share. This method was used to privatise 7 enterprises.

(c) Sale of assets was used where the affected enterprises could not be sold either by public offer of shares or by private placement because such enterprises had poor track record and their future outlook was considered bleak. A total of 26 enterprises were privatised through this method.

(d) Management Buy Out. Under this method, the entire or substantial part of the assets of the enterprises was sold to the workers. It was then left to them to organise and manage the enterprise. Only 1 enterprise was privatised in this manner.

(e) Deferred Public Offer. This method was used in privatising 4 enterprises. It was used when an enterprise, which is considered viable if sold by assets, the total values of the shares would be less than the real values of the underlying assets. A willing buyer or selling price was negotiated based on the revaluation of the underlying assets of the affected enterprises. The four hotels privatised through this method were however mandated to sell not less than 40 per cent of the equity to Nigerian public within 5 years of takeover.

Before the inauguration of the Obasanjo administration on May 29, 1999, the first phase of the privatisation programme had been completed and the TCPC had submitted its report. Consequently, the reforms carried out between 1999 and 2007 coincided with the implementation of the second phase tagged ‘guided privatisation’. Guided privatisation, according to the Nigerian government, was a carefully planned and systematically implemented withdrawal from control of business enterprises which can be more effectively and efficiently run by private operators. Other features of the approach include (i) Privatising a few enterprises at a time so that the experiences at each stage will be used to modify the process (ii) Reaching workable agreement with privatised enterprises concerning some of the operating practices, product quality, pricing and contract (iii) Monitoring the behaviour of the enterprises over a period of time to ensure compliance with the agreements, etc.
Consequently, the implementation of the privatisation policy in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007, though gradual and slow, focused on the privatisation of the energy sector, petroleum, coal, bitumen, tourism and telecommunication sectors. This kicked off with the inauguration of the National Council on Privatisation by President Olusegun Obasanjo on 20th July, 1999. The President highlighted the bane of the Nigerian public sector as necessitating the privatisation programme. He declares that:

> We are privatising for the benefit of our economic recovery and social life. We are not embarking on this exercise to please the World Bank or IMF. It is not designed to share our national assets to a few rich people. We are not about to replace public monopoly with private monopoly. Rather, our determination to be unyielding and uncompromising in the pursuit of the best interest of this country, we want to remove the financial burden which these enterprises on the public and release resources for the essential functions of government.\(^\text{16}\)

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Philip Osafo Kwaako, justifying the privatisation of public enterprises in Nigeria, also notes, *inter alia*, that:

> Prior to the recent reforms (under the Obasanjo administration), the Nigerian public sector was under-performing and imposed a significant financial drain on the treasury. With the public sector, the performance of state-owned enterprises was particularly costly. State-owned enterprises often were managed poorly with great deal of both hidden and avert corruption. They in general repeated losses and require annual government transfer to remain operational\(^\text{17}\).

They further assert that the privatisation of some enterprises as well as deregulation of government activities in some sectors was needed nonetheless to improve efficiency, curb corruption and reduce financial costs to the government\(^\text{18}\).

The second phase of privatisation under the Obasanjo administration was in three phases as outlined by the President during the inauguration of the NCP. These were:

- **Phase 1** - This involved the Commercial and Merchant Banks and Cement Plants that were already quoted in the stock exchange.


\(^{18}\) Ibid.
Phase 11 - This will include Hotels and Motor and Vehicles Assembly Plants.
Phase 111 - This was to include NEPA, NITEL, NAFCON, Nigeria Airways and Petroleum Refineries.

The implementation of the programme entailed some reforms and restructuring. In the monopoly sectors like electric power and telecommunication, sectoral reforms were undertaken as follows: First, the stage of policy formulation and review which involved policy proposal and debate with stakeholders. Second, the evolvement of legal and regulatory framework - this involved the review and design of new laws and regulations encouraging de-monopolisation and competition. These new laws were in respect of regulation and rules for licensing, social obligation to the poor, rural areas and political objectives of government, a regime for regulation of tariffs and rules of interconnection, cooperation and competition. Third, restructuring and liberalisation which entails the actual transactions.

It was in this context that the privatisation policy in Nigeria was implemented. Between 1999 and 2006, about 116 enterprises were privatised, which included various loss-making-government-enterprises operating in industries such as Aluminium, Telecommunication, Petrochemical, Insurance and Hotel. The privatisation exercise also involved the unbundling of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) into 18 companies for power generation, transmission and distribution, as well as the successful sale of 51 per cent of government stake in the Hilton Hotel Abuja and the sale of the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL)\(^1\). It was also in this context that regulatory agencies such as the Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) and the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) emerged in respect of the regulation of services provided by the emerging private sector-driven economy.

Apart from privatisation, Nigeria also embarked on the commercialisation of some public utilities. Government embarked on the removal of subsidy on certain public utilities. Though this twin programme of privatisation and commercialisation was part of the emerging global economic norms, they were nevertheless necessitated by the dwindling fortunes of public enterprises in Nigeria. Privatisation of public enterprises was one of the recommendations of the Onosode Commission for the ailing Nigerian economy towards the mid-1980s. Hence, it was a situation in which global

\(^{1}\) Ibid.
forces coincided with domestic conditions. It was also a situation in which global developments intensified domestic policy initiative of the Nigerian state.

Privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises in Nigeria generated some contradictions for the Nigerian state. These contradictions resulted mainly from the manner and way economic liberalisation was carried out in Nigeria. One particular aspect of this was the fraudulent practices involved in the transfer of public enterprises. One government organisation that revealed this contradiction spawned by privatisation is NITEL. Its workers pointed out irregularities in the asset valuation carried out by the BPE which put the asset of NITEL at 25 billion Naira while an earlier valuation by a consortium of twelve estate firms under the aegis of NITEL management team in 1987 put the asset at 263.8 billion Naira. The workers also claimed that 25 billion Naira was not up to the 100 billion Naira expended on the rehabilitation of the Lagos NECOM House alone. The workers claimed that NITEL had been operating without any subvention since 1985 and in 1999 alone, it earned over 30 billion Naira with a net profit of 2 billion Naira, excluding treasury bills worth 12 billion Naira. The workers said that they were willing to take the option of employee/management buy out if the government insisted on selling NITEL at such underestimated value. Later developments confirmed the claims of the workers. After the exit of Olusegun Obasanjo, it was reported that the sale of NITEL to Transcorp for $500 Million would be reviewed. The review was purportedly due to the fact that the sale did not follow due process. Policy reversal was, however, carried out on the sale of the Kaduna and Port Harcourt refineries and NICON and Nigeria Re-Insurance because their sale did not follow due process. The import of the foregoing is that the implementation of privatisation was characterised by fraudulent practices, which negated the requirements for a successful privatisation programme. The argument in many quarters was that state owned enterprises were transferred to a few rich individuals and, as such, it was a kind of private monopoly replacing public monopoly.

Another element of fraudulent practices associated with the privatisation programme in Nigeria was the identification and appointment of Core Groups/Strategic Investors. Whereas, in the implementation of the programme, provisions were made for Core Groups/Strategic Investors identified as formidable.

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21 Ibid.
and experienced corporations or consortia with the capabilities for adding value to an enterprise and making it to operate profitably in the face of international competition, these groups or investors were also expected to possess the capabilities of turning around the fortunes of such an enterprise if by the time of their investment, the enterprise was unhealthy. Other qualities of the core investors as articulated in Privatisation Handbook are as follows: (a) They must possess the technical know-how in relation to the enterprise they wish to invest in (b) Must have solid financial resources to enable it to turn around the fortune of the enterprise and (c) must possess the managerial skill to run the enterprise. Adherence to these qualities was questionable in the privatisation of some enterprises. A typical example that readily demonstrated this was the sale of the Nigerian Airways which was purportedly sold to a UK company that had no solid capital base and cognate experience in aviation management. Also, a Singapore Airline presented as technical partner knew nothing about the purported sale. Investigation, however later showed that the Minister of Aviation only acted on the order from the presidency to bypass the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE)-the agency saddled with the privatisation exercise.

A related issue on economic liberalisation is that which has to do with the ownership and control of the privatised enterprises. The 1999 Constitution, like other post-Civil War Constitutions specifically assigned a role to the state to manage the economy in such a way that it would not be dominated by a particular set or group of individuals in the society. Privatisation in Nigeria has negated this principle overtly and covertly. Privatisation has encouraged the transfer of public enterprises from the state to privileged elite in the society. Though various mechanisms were put in place to ensure the spread of ownership, the implementation, however, pointed to the fact that ownership and wealth were being concentrated in few hands as evidenced in the sale of the Port Harcourt refineries which was later revoked by the Umaru Yar Adua administration. The effect of this could be seen in the context of widening the gap between the rich and the poor, thus not able to address many issues, particularly those bordering on fairness and equity.

Related to fairness and equity is the issue of the fortune of the Nigerian masses. One complaint by Nigerians has been on the quality of service offered by the privatised enterprises, particularly in the Telecommunication Sector. The early days of the mobile telephony system in Nigeria was characterised by complaints about exploitation resulting from the billing system and network connectivity. The Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), at the initial stage, could do little in calling the telephone operators to order. In essence, the required regulatory framework of the government was not effective in regulating the emerging private sector. The effect, as noted, has not only been about the exploitation of the citizens but also the rendering of poor services.

In a similar vein, commercialisation in the period under review meant the removal of subsidies. This entailed dismantling welfare policies for the citizens. This has had the tendency of worsening prevailing economic conditions. Thomas Biersteker and Peter Lewis note this when they assert that the contradiction between political control and economic reform had become increasingly open and create popular restiveness escalated in the face of continued austerity, listless economic performance and glaring inequities. The soaring inflation, devaluation of the Naira, the retrenchment of workers, the removal of subsidies, particularly from petroleum products, and increasing high level of poverty, generated a series of protests by Nigerians. This did not only exacerbate the acrimony between the state and the citizens but questioned the capacity of the state. The import of the foregoing is that economic liberalisation in Nigeria has not been carried out in such a way that it would bridge the gap between the rich and the poor and provide a level playing ground for all and sundry. This should not, however, be attributed to globalisation; it resulted from the way and manner privatisation and commercialisation programmes were implemented in Nigeria.

4.5.1 Political Globalisation in Nigeria.

This section focuses on the manifestation of political globalisation. Hence, it discusses how globalisation has shaped political developments in Nigeria since the mid-1980s. Emphasis is on anti-corruption crusade, domestic and foreign policy

initiatives as well as the intensification of the renewed agenda on democracy in Nigeria. The effects of globalisation on democracy in Nigeria are however discussed in chapter five of this study.

4.5.2. Global Developments and the Intensification of Anti-Corruption Crusade

One visible aspect of globalisation in the Nigerian state has been the ascendancy of the issue of good governance. Its manifestation reflected in the renewed interest in anti corruption initiatives particularly under the Obasanjo led-administration. Before the mid-1980s, the Nigerian state had put in place several mechanisms for controlling corruption. Some of the previous efforts that preceded those of the Fourth Republic, as noted by Justice Akanbi, the former Chairman of Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission (ICPC) included the following:

(i) Penal Code that was applicable to the Northern part of the Nigerian State and the Criminal code, which was applicable to the Southern part of the country. These were enactments designed to deal with cases of official corruption by public servants and had existed for over twenty years in Nigeria, yet no single case of corruption was known to have been prosecuted in the regular courts.

(ii) The Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No. 5 of 1966 designed to address corruption. This Decree formed part of the nine-point Programme of the Gowon administration.

(iii) The Corrupt Practice Decree of 1975 under the Murtala/Obasanjo administration, which was headed by Dr Lateef Adegbite under which Public Officers were tried for abuse of office.

(iv) The 1979 Constitution, which provided for a Code of Conduct and Code of Conduct Tribunal. They were charged with the task of seeing to the declaration of assets by public office holders.

(v) In the Second Republic, Alhaji Shehu Shagari initiated the Ethical Revolution under the Ministry of National Guidance to check corrupt

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practices in the Nigerian state.

(vi) The War Against Indiscipline (WAI) of the Buhari/Idiagbon administration under which public officers in the Second Republic found guilty of corrupt practices were sentenced to jail of various dimensions, sometimes up to 250 years.

(vii) The National Committee on Corruption and Other Economic Crimes in Nigeria that drafted the Corrupt Practices and Economic Crimes Decree of 1990. The Draft Committee, as observed by Justice Akanbi, provided for a wide range of public officers who must declare their assets. The idea of the Decree did not go beyond the draft stage.


(ix) The Failed Bank Decree and Tribunal and the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offence Decree of 1999.

In spite of the existence of constitutional and legal frameworks for the control of corruption in Nigeria, in the post Second Republic military era, corruption assumed an alarming proportion that suggested that it was more or less a state policy. The pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria was reflected in the ratings of Nigeria by the Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries in the world in the period under review. These ratings were coming at a time when the global community was focusing attention on the need to eradicate corruption on a global scale through regional and global conventions. Following the bad image the Nigerian state was having and the constant embarrassment Nigerians were subjected to in other countries arising from corruption, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo set the fight against corruption as the central agenda of his administration.

When President Obasanjo was sworn-in in 1999, he revived and intensified the anti-corruption crusade. In his maiden address after his inauguration, President Obasanjo, lamenting the scourge of corruption in Nigeria, asserts that official corruption is so rampant that it has earned Nigeria a very bad image at home and abroad as well as distorted and retrogressed development. He identified corruption as the greatest single bane of the Nigerian society and likened it to a full-blown cancer.

26 In the late 1990s, Nigeria was ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by the Transparency International
because under military rule it was allowed to grow unchallenged and unchecked even when it was glaring for everyone to see. Declaring the determination of his administration to fight corruption, President Olusegun Obasanjo asserted that beneficiaries of corruption would fight back with all foul means at their disposal but that would not deter the anti-corruption drive of his administration. He declared, inter alia, that “we shall be firm with them and that there will be no sacred cows.”

At the swearing-in ceremony of nineteen newly appointed Permanent Secretaries on July 3, 2000, President Obasanjo reiterated the commitment of his administration to the war against corruption. He declared that:

…under no circumstances will we relent in our resolve to fight corruption to a stand still. I have said this on numerous occasions, and I will say it again, there will be no sacred cows. And we will do everything within our power to restore sanity and morality to our system, by eliminating the twin evils of corruption and inefficiency.

These statements by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo became questionable towards the end of his administration following what appeared to be selective activities of the anti-corruption agencies against those who truncated his third term agenda. To translate the rhetoric against corruption into concrete action, the Obasanjo-led administration set in motion the anti-corruption crusade. This found expression in the establishment of the Independent Corrupt and Related Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. Apart from these agencies, the Obasanjo administration strengthened the moribund Code of Conduct Bureau and initiated various reforms in the public sector to abate corrupt practices. These initiatives were driven by globalisation. The question to ask at this juncture is: how did global forces inspire the renewed emphasis on anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria?

We need to start by saying that the renewed interest in corruption control in Nigeria was intensified by the global war against corruption. The growing global interest in corruption control could be explained from two perspectives. First, the logic of economic globalisation suggests that barriers to investment would be dismantled to facilitate trade and investment. The promise of economic globalisation can, however,

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29 Ibid.
be realised only if the process is transparent and investors have the confidence of utilising the investment opportunities worldwide. Corruption, however, would truncate such promise. Second, corruption has been identified as a major factor responsible for the high rate of poverty in many developing nations. Consequently, the global community started focusing attention on issues relating to poverty alleviation, corruption control and the promotion of accountability and transparency as central issues in governance.

Certain developments at the global sphere aptly showed that corruption control had become a global issue. Such developments included, first, increase in the number of countries waging anti-corruption crusades worldwide. The 1990s witnessed increase in the number of political leaders ousted from office over the cases of corrupt practices. For instance in 1997, Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus of Czech Republic resigned because of irregularities observed in his party’s fund raising. In Spain, Luis Roldan, ex-chief of the Civil Guard paramilitary police was sentenced to 28 years imprisonment for corrupt practices. President Carlos Perez was equally ousted as President of Venezuela for misappropriation. In a similar vein, the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) anti-corruption embarked upon in Italy in 1992 against top politicians and businessmen led to the investigation of about 4000 people in which 1063 people were indicted and 460 convicted including Bettino Craxi, a former two-time Prime Minister and Ganni De Michelis, an ex-Foreign Minister. In 1996, the rating of Pakistan as next to worst in the corruption perception index raised a tumult that brought down Benazir Bhutto’s government. These, to mention but a few, were some of the events at the global level.31

Second, the emergence of conventions and the adoption of resolutions on corruption control by regional and transnational bodies gave impetus to the anti-corruption drive in Nigeria during the period under review. Prior to this era, with the exception of the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977 that was revised in 1998, all attempts at checking corruption were based on voluntary codes.32 But in 2003, the United Nations came up with what could be termed the first global initiative on and template for corruption control with the adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on December 9, 2003 at Merida, Mexico. The adoption

of this Convention was the outcome of earlier attempts at having a global agenda on corruption control. This was coming at a time when several intergovernmental and regional organisations were devoting serious attention to the issue of corruption control and had adopted different conventions to that effect. For instance, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on November 21, 1997 adopted the Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions while the Organisation of American States adopted the Inter-American Convention against corruption on May 29, 1996. Similar conventions also evolved in Africa in line with the global agenda on corruption control. For instance, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption was adopted in Maputo in 2003 while the sub regional body, Economic Community of African States (ECOWAS) came out with the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption in Abuja in the year 2001.

The focus of most of these conventions and resolutions includes, issues of prevention, criminalisation, international cooperation, assets recovery and implementation. For instance, on prevention, the UNCAC focuses on the need for the creation of anti-corruption agencies and enhanced transparency in the financing of elections, citizens’ rights as well as the involvement of civil society organisations in creating awareness about the problem of corruption and how to tackle it. In the realm of criminalisation, the UNCAC requires member states to define what constitutes corrupt practices. Such acts include bribery, embezzlement, money laundry and the obstruction of justice. The UNCAC also requires cooperation between law enforcement agencies, protection of witnesses and the removal of bank secrecy as obstacle for prosecution. On international cooperation, the convention promotes cooperation of states to trace, freeze and confiscate proceeds from corruption. In addition, the convention makes it difficult for corrupt individual to escape prosecution. It provides for mutual legal assistance in the transfer of evidence to be used in court as well as to extradite offenders. On asset recovery, members agreed that it should be central to the global anti-corruption initiative.

In line with prevailing global agenda on corruption control, Nigeria acceded to a number of guidelines and principles aimed at ensuring transparency and financial probity in governance. These included the Guidelines for Public Debt Management, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Affairs, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal
Transparency, OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, International Accounting Standard, and International Standards in Auditing, among others. These guidelines subsequently influenced the reform agenda in Nigeria, particularly between 1999 and 2007. What could be deduced from the foregoing is that though Nigeria had the framework to fight corruption in previous eras preceding the current globalisation, the various mechanisms employed were essentially Nigerian affairs.

The argument being canvassed here is that, anti-corruption crusade was mounted and carried out in Nigeria before the current dispensation of globalisation. The global agenda on corruption control, however, intensified the renewed initiative of the Nigerian state since 1999. In this sense, the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria cannot be totally divorced from global developments and initiatives. The activities of the Transparency International, the UNCAC and host of others inspired the anti-corruption crusade. Another global dimension to this anti-graft crusade which has made it different from previous anti-corruption activities is the trial of individuals being alleged of corrupt practice. There is no need to repatriate the accused as trial now takes place outside Nigeria. Consequently, in this dispensation of globalisation, there is no hiding place for corrupt politicians who had fled the country to take refuge in other countries. The case of the former governor of Delta State, James Ibori, is a clear manifestation of the global dimension of the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. James Ibori was charged for corrupt practices in Nigeria but is standing trial outside the shores of the Nigerian State. Some of the effects of the renewed anti-graft crusade in Nigeria are discussed in the next section.

4. 5.3. The Emergence of Anti-Corruption Agencies

Elements of global forces in the development trajectories in Nigeria could be gleaned from the initiatives of the Nigerian state in setting up anti-corruption agencies. The renewed anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria since 1999 was heralded with the passage of a bill entitled “The Prohibition and Punishment of Bribery, Corruption and Other Related Offences Bill of 1999” sent by President Obasanjo barely 60 days after he assumed office as elected President. The bill was signed into law on 13th June, 2000, while the ICPC was inaugurated on 29th June, 2000. The main functions of the Commission, as stated in Section 6 of the Act, are 33:

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(i) To receive and investigate reports of corruption offences as created by the Act and in appropriate cases prosecute the offenders – Enforcement duties.

(ii) To examine, review and enforce the correction of the corruption-prone system and procedures of public bodies, with a view to eliminating or minimizing corruption in public life – Preventive duties

(iii) To educate and enlighten the public on and against corruption with a view to enlisting and fostering public support for the fight against it – Educative duties

For effective functioning, the Act provides for seven departments. These are (i) Investigation (ii) Prosecution (iii) Special Duties (iv) Public Enlightenment (v) Education, (vi) Finance and Administration and (vii) Planning, Research and Review.

The Anti-Corruption Law has 71 Sections which contain the definition of corruption and provisions specifying acts that amount to corrupt practices. For instance Section 8(1) states that any person who corruptly asks for or receives any property of any kind for himself or for any other person in relation to anything already done or about to be done or for any favour in the discharge of his official duty is liable for seven years imprisonment. Similarly, Section 13 stipulates that any person who receives anything which has been obtained by means of act constituting felony or misdemeanour by means of an act done at a place outside Nigeria, which if such an act had been done in Nigeria would amount to felony or misdemeanour, is guilty of felony. Section 22(4) states that any public officer, who in the discharge of his duties, awards or signs any contract without provision, approval and cash backing shall be guilty of offence under the ICPC Act and shall be liable to three years imprisonment. Section 23(1) makes provision for public officers to report any gratification offered or promised them in contravention of the provisions of the ICPC Act. Failure to do so without reasonable excuse is liable to imprisonment or fine or both.

The ICPC at the initial stage was in battle with the issue of legality of its existence. The governments of Ondo and Abia challenged the existence of the ICPC before the Supreme Court. The judgement of the Supreme Court held that the Act was valid. Since then it has been involved in many anti-corruption initiatives. Apart from prosecuting highly placed public officers in government establishments and

34 Ibid.
Parastatals, the ICPC’s activities have been noticeable in the area of prevention, education and public enlightenment\textsuperscript{36}. The establishment of ICPC and other anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria is one of the good things to have happened in Nigeria in recent years. Prior to Olusegun Obasanjo led civilian administration, the image of Nigeria was bad. The Transparency International in the 1990s ranked Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The high profile cases, such as the ones involving former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Salisu Buhari, former Senate President, Evans Enwerem, and other highly placed Nigerians shows that it is no longer business as usual as far as corruption is concerned in Nigeria. The euphoria that greeted the initial achievements of ICPC, however, started waning towards the end of former president Olusegun Obasanjo led-administration. It was widely believed that, President Olusegun Obasanjo was using the anti-corruption agencies to witch hunt his political opponents, particularly those that thwarted his third term agenda.

Apart from the ICPC, the Obasanjo led-administration created the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) through an Act of the National Assembly in 2003 (as Amended in 2004 and 2006). The EFCC has the following mandate\textsuperscript{37}:

(i) The enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Act.
(ii) The investigation of all financial crimes including; advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal change transfer, future market, fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer card fraud, contract scam, etc.
(iii) The coordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority.
(iv) The adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate or seize proceed derived from terrorist activities, economic and financial crimes related offences or properties the values of which corresponds to such proceeds.
(v) The adoption of measures to eradicate the commission of economic and financial crimes.
(vi) The adoption of measures which include coordinated preventive and control techniques on the prevention of economic and financial related crimes.

(vii) The facilitation of rapid exchange of scientific and technical information and the conduct of joint operation geared towards the eradication of economic and financial crimes.

(viii) The examination and investigation of all reported cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to identifying individuals and corporate bodies or groups involved.

(ix) The determination of the extent of financial loss and such other losses by government, private individuals and organizations.

Furthermore, the EFCC was mandated to carry out the following responsibilities in collaboration with other agencies.

1. The identification, determination of the whereabouts, and activities of persons suspected of involvement in economic and financial crimes;

2. The involvement of proceeds or properties for the commission of economic and other related crimes;

3. The exchange of personnel or other experts;

4. The establishment and maintenance of a system for monitoring international economic and financial crimes in order to identify suspicious transactions and persons involved;

5. Monitoring data, statistics, records and report on person, organization, and proceeds properties documents or other items or assets involved in and financial crimes;

6. Understanding research and similar works with a view to determining the manifestation, extent, magnitude and effect of economic and economic and financial crimes and advising government on the need for appropriate intervention measure for combating same;

7. Taking charge of supervising, controlling, and coordinating all responsibilities, functions and activities relating to the current investigation and prosecution of all offences committed with or relating to economic and financial crimes in consultation with the Attorney General of the Federation;

8. The coordination of all existing economic and financial crimes
investigating units;

9. Monitoring or liaising with the office of the Attorney General of the Federation, Nigerian Customs Service, the Immigration and Prison Service Board, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Cooperation (NDICI), the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and law enforcement agencies of such other financial supervisory institution in the eradication of economic and financial crimes,

10. Carrying out and sustaining vigorous public enlightenment and campaign against economic and financial crimes within and outside Nigeria and

11. Carrying out such other activities as are necessary or expected for the full discharge of all or any of the function conferred on it under the Act.

The Act also empowers the Commission to cause investigation to be conducted as to whether any person has committed an offence under the Act. 38. This is designed to ascertain whether any person has been offended under this Act or in proceeds of any such offences cause investigation to be conducted into the properties of the person if it appears to the commission that the person’s life style and extent of properties are not justified by his source of income.

The Commission is charged with the responsibility of entering the provision of 39:


v. The other law or regulating relating to economic and financial crimes.

For the effective conduct of the functions of the Commission, the Act makes provision for the following Units:

(i) the general and assets investigation units

(ii) the legal and prosecuting unit

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38 EFCC Act 2002
39 EFCC Act 2002
Furthermore, the Act states that, notwithstanding the provision in sub-section II(1), the Commission has the power to set up any committee as may be necessary to assist the commission in the performance of its duties and functions under this Act 40.

4.5.4. The Emergence of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (NEITI)

Part of the global initiatives to enhance probity and transparency was launched in September 2002 by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. The initiative was named the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI). The main thrust of EITI is to ensure transparency and increase revenue in the countries that depend on those resources. The main principles of the EITI include 41:

(a) The belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative economic and social impacts;

(b) That management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments, and it is to be exercised in the interests of their national development;

(c) That the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over many years and can be highly price dependent;

(d) That a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development;

40 EFCC, 2002 Act
(e) Recognition of the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and accountability;

(f) The recognition that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context of respect for contracts and law;

(g) Recognize that the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment which financial transparency may bring;

(h). The belief in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure;

(i). The commitment to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability in public life, government operations and in business;

(j) The belief that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.

(k) The belief that payments disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive industry companies operating in that country; and

(l) In seeking solutions, the belief that all stakeholders have important and relevant contributions to make – including governments and their agencies, extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral organizations, financial organizations, investors and non-governmental organisations.

In line with the spirit of the anti-corruption crusade of the Obasanjo administration, the Nigerian State did not only attend and sign the agreement but subsequently launched the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (NEITI) in 2003. The EITI is a global initiative aimed at curbing corruption in the Extractive industries and the NEITI has been described as the subset of the global EITI. Its main slogan is ‘Publish- What- You –Pay’ and ‘Publish-What-You –Earn’.

4.5.5. The Rejuvenation of Code of Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal

Apart from the setting up the ICPC, EFCC and NEITI, the Code of Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal were rejuvenated and featured prominently in the anti-corruption crusade of Obasanjo led-administration. Though they were introduced under the 1979 Constitution, their activities were largely felt prior to 1999 when they were rejuvenated. In the Third Schedule of 1999 Constitution, provision was made for the establishment of the Code of Conduct Bureau while the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution contains what constitutes Code of Conduct for public officers and the categories of public officers the Code of Conduct is applicable to. Some salient aspects of the code include prohibition of foreign accounts, prohibition of conflict of interest, prohibition of retired public officers from receiving emolument in more than one place in addition to their pension. Section 6(1) of the Fifth Schedule also prohibits public officers from asking for or accepting any property or benefits for himself or any other person on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of his duties. Section 10 prohibits a public officer from belonging to any society the membership of which is incompatible with the functions of his office.

In consequence of the above, the functions of the Code of Conduct Bureau include:

(a) To receive declaration by public officers made under paragraph 12 of Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to this Constitution;
(b) examine assets declaration in accordance with the requirements of Code of Conduct Bureau or any law;
(c) retain custody of such declaration and make them available for inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National assembly may prescribe;
(d) ensure compliance with and, where appropriate, enforce the provisions of the Code of Conduct or any law relating thereto;
(e) receive complaints about non-compliance with or breach of the provisions of the Code of Conduct or any law in relation thereto, and investigate the

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43 See the Fifth Schedule, Section 1-14 of the 1999 Constitution.
44 See Third Schedule Part 1, section 1-4. of the 1999 Constitution.
complaints and,
where appropriate, refer such matters to the Code of Conduct Tribunal;

(f) appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over the staff of
the Code of Conduct Bureau in accordance with the provisions of an Act of the
National Assembly enacted in that behalf; and

(g) carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by the National
Assembly.

Apart from the Code of Conduct Bureau, the constitution also provides for a
Code of Conduct Tribunal. Section 18 of the 1999 Constitution contains the powers of
the Tribunal. It states that where the Code of Conduct Tribunal finds a public officer
guilty of contravening any of the provisions of this Code, it shall impose upon that
officer any of the punishments specified under sub-paragraph 2 of this paragraph and
such other punishment as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. Section 18(2),
on the other hand, states that the punishment the Code of Conduct Tribunal may
impose shall include any of the following:

(a) vacation of office or seat in any legislative house, as the case may be

(b) disqualification from membership of a legislative house and from holding of
any public office for a period not exceeding ten years; and

(c) seizure and forfeiture to the state of any property acquired in abuse or
corruption of office. 45

Section 18(3) further states that, the sanctions mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) hereof
shall be without prejudice to the penalties that may be imposed by any law where the
conduct is also a criminal law. 46

Though the Code of Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal were
provided for in the 1979 Constitution, they were not active until the Fourth Republic
when corruption control became a central agenda in the policy activities of the
Nigerian State. Bello-Imam writes that between January 2000 and 2005, a total
number of 357 petitions were received. 164 cases were discontinued due to lack of
evidence, 8 cases referred to other organisations, 41 cases kept in view pending further
development, 23 cases sent to the Tribunal for prosecution and 49 cases at various
stages of investigation. 47 During this period, highly public placed officers, including

45 See The Fifth Schedule, section 18(1-3) of the 1999 Constitution
46 The Fifth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution.
47 Bello-Imam I.D.op.cit 189.
state Governors, were dragged to the Tribunal by the Bureau for failing to declare their assets or those who declared falsely.

4.5.6. Reforms to Promote Transparency and Accountability in Government

The spread of global norms intensified the anti-corruption crusade of the Chief Olusegun Obasanjo led-administration in Nigeria. The major effect of the anti-corruption crusade could be seen in various reforms carried out to promote transparency and accountability in government as well as the cases of prosecution made so far.

Part of the mechanisms included the reforms of the procurement mechanism which started with the commissioning of the World Bank by the Nigerian government and in collaboration with some Nigerian private sector specialists to study the financial systems of the government. The role of the World Bank was to assist the Nigerian Government Procurement and Financial Management Systems with a view to reducing the scope of corruption in public procurement and improve efficiency in the management of Nigerian Public Enterprises. Two workshops were held which led to the production of the Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR). The CPAR identified the following as the major weaknesses in the existing procurement systems:

(i) That Nigeria lacks a modern law on Public Procurement and permanent body to provide guidance and monitor purchasing entities;

(ii) That the Finance (Control and Management) Act, 1958, together with the Financial Regulations which set basic rules for managing public expenditure, have gaps, deficiencies and faulty implementation of existing regulations on procurement (e.g. lack of permanent arrangements for control and surveillance) which create opportunities for bribery and corruption;

(iii) That due to inflation and lack of regular adjustments on the thresholds of the approving limits of the tender boards, their authorisation were constantly being eroded resulting in abuses, prominent among which is the splitting of contracts.

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(iv) That there was proliferation of tender boards which were perceived by the private sector as sources of delays and non transparency. In addition, these tender boards appeared to have limited mandates with powers to decide contracts *de facto* resting with the Permanent Secretary and Minister/Commissioner;

(v) That Customs Systems and procedures were cumbersome and major causes of delay in clearing goods, and hence a source of corruption; and

(vi) That procurement is often carried out by a crop of staff who substantially lack relevant training\(^{49}\).

The CPAR recommended the following to address the weaknesses

(i) the need for a procurement law passed on the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law model, UNCITRAL;

(ii) the need to establish a Public Procurement Commission (PPC) to serve as the regulatory and oversight body on Public Sector Procurement;

(iii) the revision of key areas of the Financial Regulations to make them more transparent;

(iv) the streamlining of Tender Boards and strengthening their functional

   including powers to award contracts.

(iv) a crucial need to rebuild procurement and financial management capacity in the public sector and

(v) a comprehensive review of the businesses related to export and transit regulations, procedures and practices\(^{50}\).

The outcome of the exercise produced two reports which identified various weaknesses in the existing procurement system in Nigeria and subsequently made recommendations to correct them. The recommendations informed the reforms in the budgeting process which encompass the Policy Guidelines on Procurements and Award of Contracts and the Due Process Guidelines. Circular No F 15775 of 27\(^{th}\) June

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.
2000 on new Policy Guidelines for Procurement and Award of Contract in Government Ministries/Parastatals contains the following as the procedure to be followed in the award of government contract:\(^{51}\):

(a) Establishment of a Steering Committee on Procurement Reform Implementation Units (PRIU) to prepare the ground for the establishment and proper takeoff of a Public Procurement Commission (PPC) which would be the apex policy making body on all procurements and award of contract matters in the Public service.

(b) Abolition of Federal and Departmental Tender Boards.

(c) Permanent Secretary to approve contract of works and services, purchased up to N1,000,000.00 (approximately US $7,937.66).

(d) Establishment and Strengthening of the Ministerial Tender Boards.

(e) Strict Prohibition of Contract Splitting.

(f) Open competitive tendering procurement.

(g) Advertisement of tenders in, at least, two national dailies, and in government gazette and at least, six weeks before deadline for submitting tenders.

(h) Opening to tenders in public with or without press coverage.

(i) Clearly defined bid criteria.

(j) Committee of professionals to evaluate bids.

(k) Official involved in the tendering process to declare conflict of interest and exclude themselves.

(l) Publication of major contract awards above N20 million in two national dailies.

(m) Bid security not less than 2 percent for contract, value of N10 million and above, from a reputable bank.

(n) Performance security for all contract values at N10 million and above to attract performance security in the amount of 10 percent of bid price, performance guarantee to be issued by reputable banks.

(o) Interest on delayed payment by Government Ministries/ Extra Ministerial Department to Suppliers/contractors not settled on or before 60 days from submission of invoice or certificate of job completion.

(p) Final payment of contract worth 5 million naira to be co-signed by the

\(^{51}\)Ibid.
Auditor-General or his representatives in Ministries or Agencies and the Contract Officer.

(q) All contract values at N50 million and above to be approved by the Federal Executive Council (FEC).

The above guidelines were the processes involved in the award of contract and were put in place to ensure transparency. The ‘Due Process Compliance Principles’ was a design of rapid response mechanism for ensuring fiscal transparency, strict compliance with due process, effectiveness and efficiency in the costing, prioritisation and execution of budget expenditure items resulting in an effective ‘follow-the-money’ tracking process by utilizing international and Nigerian expertise in adapting the best of information technology to ensure that payments are made in respect of contracts that have been certified completed\(^{52}\). This was designed to guide against a situation in which contractors receive payments for job not done or for abandoned projects.

According to Oby Ezekwesili, one of the attractive features of the DPC is that it has the capacity to ensure that budget procurement and spending are not only based on authentic, reasonable and fair costing, but also on appropriate realisation of set priorities and targets that were generated from medium range strategic plans\(^{53}\). President Olusegun Obasanjo asserts that, it is simply a mechanism that certifies public spending only on projects that have passed the test of proper project implementation packaging. Such packaging must have adhered stringently to international competitive bid approach in the award of contracts\(^{54}\).

Essentially, DPC principles entail three phases:

(a) The first is to ensure that the work on a project has been completed before they are approved for inclusion in the budget.

(b) Second is to ensure that contract award system process has been followed before a contract is awarded.

(c) Third, to make sure that payments are made after it has been certified that satisfactory progress is being made toward the completion of the project\(^{55}\).

The essence of the DPC principles could be ascertained in its capacity to determine


\(^{54}\) Part of the text entitled “Nigeria: From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity”. Delivered by President Olusegun Obasanjo at the 10\(^{th}\) Anniversary celebration of Transparency International. Berlin on 7\(^{th}\) November, 2003.

\(^{55}\) See Obadan, M. 2003. op.cit.
projects that could be incorporated in the budget and ensure that laid down rules, which entails that the award of contracts remain transparent, have been duly followed. That is, the necessary advertisements should be placed on Newspapers within the stipulated time, the rules pertaining to pre-qualification and invitation to bid are adhered to. The DPC does not end with the award of the contract; after a contract has been awarded and initial payment made, subsequent payments depend on certification by the Resident Due Process Team to the effect that satisfactory progress is being made at every stage towards the completion of the project.

The rationale for the introduction of the DPC could be gleaned from the assertion of Okonjo- Ngozi Iweala and Philip Osafo-Kwaako thus:

Before the reform Programme (Due Process), there was widespread corruption in public procurement contracts in Nigeria. Corrupt practices occurred in various forms, such as inflation of contract costs up to four times the cost in neighbouring countries, award of contracts for non-existence projects, and over-invoicing. Many government projects were not announced publicly and the contract award process after was opaque. The results were highly inflated contracts that provided erroneous kickbacks to senior public official and their cronies. It also implied that genuine contractors were often denied access to government contracts.\(^{56}\)

With the introduction of Due process, Ngozi Okonjo Iweala and Philip Osafo Kwaako claim that the situation has changed. They assert, among other things, that

…the introduction of the Due Process Mechanism changed the contracting landscape significantly’. We now have situation in which public tender bills are published periodically listing of forthcoming government contracts, competitive biddings are now required for large government contracts, contract costs are now checked against a database of international prices, and payments for completed job are disbursed only after Due Certificate has been produced.\(^{57}\)

4.5.7 An Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Exercise in Nigeria.

Prior to this era of globalisation, issues relating to corruption control in Nigeria were treated as internal or domestic affairs. This was demonstrated in the 1980s when,


\(^{57}\) Ibid.
following the collapse of the Second Republic, most of the political actors fled the country to avoid prosecution for corruption and other related issues under the Muhammadu Buhari’s administration. The Nigerian State had difficulties in effecting the extradition of such political actors who fled to other countries, as evidenced by the case of Umaru Dikko. With globalisation, the strategies of the renewed anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria changed. People indicted for corruption could no longer escape prosecution by simply fleeing to other countries. It is in this context that an explanation could be made for the collaborative assistance from International Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States of America, and across the Europe. Agencies such as International Police (INTERPOL), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in US, EUROPOL, UNODC, FATF, EU and South Africa collaborated with anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria. Similarly the collaborative assistance in the recovery of the Abacha loot stashed in Swiss banks, the arrest of the former Governors of Bayelsa – DSP Alamiesyeigha and Plateau state’s Joshua Dariye, as well as the trial of the former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori, could be explained in the context of this global cooperation in the war against corruption.

We have discussed the emergence of anti-corruption agencies, that is, the ICPC and EFCC, in Nigeria as part of the developments inspired by globalisation. The existence of these agencies has transformed the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria as evidenced in the high profile corruption cases these agencies have handled since they were established. Table 1 shows the activities of the EFCC and ICPC. As at 2006, the EFCC had arraigned over 300 persons for various corruption cases, while the ICPC handled 185 cases. As at 2007, the EFCC and ICPC succeeded in convicting 145 and 20 persons respectively. Similarly, by 2006, the EFCC and ICPC had recovered assets worth N725 billion and N3.9 billion respectively. The crusade is still on and if the current momentum is kept alive and improved upon, the level of corruption may decrease in Nigeria. Table 2 also shows some of the high profile corruption cases handled by the ICPC and EFCC. These included high profile cases involving leadership of the House of Representatives and Senate, Ministers, Inspector General of Police and former Governors.

Table 1. Report Card of EFCC and ICPC as at 2006/2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Agency</th>
<th>EFCC</th>
<th>ICPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 2. List of some Culprits of Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nature of Allegations</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Former Speaker of House of Representatives, Salisu-Buhari.</td>
<td>He falsified his age and a certificate which he claimed to have obtained from the University of Chicago</td>
<td>He was impeached as Speaker of the House of Representatives, tried and sentenced but later pardoned by the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Senate President, Evan Enwerem.</td>
<td>He was indicted for the falsification of name and age.</td>
<td>He was probed and impeached as Senate President and replaced by Senator Chuba Okadigbo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senator Chuba Okadigbo, former Senate President</td>
<td>He was indicted for embezzling N22.9 million as Christmas and Sallah gifts.</td>
<td>He was impeached as Senate President and replaced by Senator Anyim Pius Anyim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deputy Senate President, Senator Haruna Abubakar.</td>
<td>He was accused of embezzling N16.9 million as Christmas and Sallah gifts.</td>
<td>He was impeached by Senate and replaced by Senator Ibrahim Mantu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Colonel Tanko Zubairu, immediate past military administrator of Imo State.</td>
<td>He was accused of embezzling N36 million belonging to the Imo State Ecological fund given by the Federal Government.</td>
<td>The Government asked the former administrator to refund the sum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PTF Headquarters Account Office, Abuja.</td>
<td>N500 million missing.</td>
<td>An Interim Management Committee (IMC) was set up for investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Imo State Judiciary.</td>
<td>N90 million belonging to the judiciary account was found missing in Abia State.</td>
<td>A panel was set up which found the Chief Judge guilty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Maurice Ibekwe, a fraudster</td>
<td>Accused of defrauding a German business of 350,000 US Dollars and 75,000 Dutch Marks defrauded a German businessman in 1993.</td>
<td>Indicted and arrested by EFCC. He was put in prison custody until his death from kidney failure at LUTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fred Ajudua, a dubious</td>
<td>Alleged to have duped two</td>
<td>Indicted and arrested</td>
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<tr>
<td>businessman and fraudster.</td>
<td>Dutch nationals of N234 million and also duped a German national of $300,000.</td>
<td>by EFCC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Edwin Onwudiwe, a fraudster</td>
<td>A fraudster defrauded Partnership Investment Limited of the sum of $345,000.</td>
<td>Indicted and arrested by EFCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Six Judges at various Election Tribunals and of the election tribunal sitting at Uyo, Akwa Ibom State. They are Justices: 1. Matilda Adamu 2. D.T. Ahura, 3. A.M Elelegwu. 4. James Onwumezile. 5. Khadi .T Mahmud. 6. Effiong Idiong;.</td>
<td>Alleged to have been involved in bribery of N6 million with a view to perverting the course of justice at their various Election Tribunals, relating to Uyo, Akwa-Ibom State. They were accused of collecting bribe from Victor Attah, the State Governor.</td>
<td>They were initially suspended and recommended for disciplinary action by the NJC. They were eventually dismissed by President Obasanjo on the advice of the NJC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Osunsade, former Macro-economic Adviser and Secretary, Economic Policy Coordinating Committee (EPCC).</td>
<td>Fraud, mismanagement of funds of the Agency and self enrichment.</td>
<td>Indicted and dismissed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Former Education Minister, Professor Alphonsus Nwosu and Austin Obasohan CMD, UNIBEN, Teaching Hospital.</td>
<td>Accused of accepting a N3 million gift from Austin Obasohan, CMD, UNIBEN Teaching Hospital</td>
<td>Investigated by ICPC and was Obasohan dismissed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Seven Senior Management staff and several top officials of NNPC</td>
<td>Alleged to have defrauded NNPC of US$150 million through over-invoicing of bills and inflating a contract to renovate the</td>
<td>Indicted staff were dismissed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>GMD’s official residence, which cost the corporation N100 million. officials of NNPC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Clement Nwanchukwu, a fraudster.</td>
<td>Alleged to have defrauded Standard Trust Bank (STB) of N392,760,000 in collaboration with Chidozie, Ezeocha, Okwu Obinuju and Dim Valentine who acted as insiders.</td>
<td>Indicted and arrested by EFCC and are being prosecuted by EFCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Julius Makanjuola, former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence.</td>
<td>He as accused of Corrupt enrichment and financial misappropriation.</td>
<td>He was sacked as Permanent Secretary, Ministry of defence. Loot of about 14 houses which were illegally acquired were confiscated, while he was tried by EFCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Isaiah Balat. Minister of State for Works</td>
<td>Corrupt enrichment.</td>
<td>Dismissed as Minister of State for Works.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sunday Afolabi. Former Minister of Internal Affairs.</td>
<td>He was accused of misappropriating the fund for the National Identity Card.</td>
<td>Detained, docked, but died before conclusion of probe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Hussaini Akwanga.</td>
<td>He was accused of misappropriating the fund for the National Identity Card. Sacked as Minister of Labour and Productivity.</td>
<td>Faced trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mahmud Shata.</td>
<td>He was accused of misappropriating the fund for the National Identity Card National Identity Card.</td>
<td>Sacked as Minister of State, and facing trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Okwesilieze Nwodo, former Secretary, PDP</td>
<td>He was accused of misappropriating the fund</td>
<td>Detained, docked and still being tried.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>T.O. Akerele.</td>
<td>He was accused of misappropriating the fund for the National Identity Card. Detained, docked and still being tried.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Niyi Adelagun</td>
<td>He was accused of misappropriating the fund for the National Identity Card. Docked and still being tried.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Senator, Adolphous Wabara, former Senate President</td>
<td>Allegation of N55 million bribe by Prof. Osuji Minister of Education Resigned as Senate President and replaced by Senator Ken Nnamani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Fabian Osuji, former Minister of Education.</td>
<td>He bribed Senator Wabara N55 million to get sympathetic consideration of his budget element Dismissed as Education Minister and on trial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>John Mbata, former vice-chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriation</td>
<td>Involvement in the Bribery allegation of N55 million by Prof. Osuji Minister of Education. Charged to Court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Badamosi Maccido, Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.</td>
<td>Involvement in the Bribery allegation of N55 million by Prof. Osuji Minister of Education. Charged to Court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Garba Shehu Matazu, Chairman House Committee on Education</td>
<td>Involvement in the Bribery allegation of N55 million by Prof. Osuji Minister of Education. Charged to Court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Osita Izunaso</td>
<td>Involvement in the Bribery allegation of N55 million by Prof. Osuji Minister of Education. Charged to Court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Charges</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mobolaji Osomo, former Minister of Housing</td>
<td>Shady transactions in the sale of Federal houses in Ikoyi, Lagos.</td>
<td>Sacked as Minister of Housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Justices Wilson Egbo-Egbo and Stanley Nnaji</td>
<td>Indicted of bribery</td>
<td>Dismissed by the president on the recommendation of the NJC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Sir Kingsley Ikpe.</td>
<td>Accused of stealing N135 million belonging to Chief Ezenna Anthony Ifeanyichukwu, Chairman of Orange Drugs Ltd. The amount was originally meant for purchase of shares in Nigerian Breweries, Nigeria Plc.</td>
<td>EFCC charge him and was jailed for 151 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Chief Drieye Alamiseigha, Governor of Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Charged for money laundering $55milion</td>
<td>Was charged in December 2005 and jailed for six months and asset worth about were seized from him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Abubakar Audu, ex-governor of Kogi State</td>
<td>Corrupt enrichment of embezzling N5biilion Naira</td>
<td>Was charged in December 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Joshua Dariye, former Governor of Plateau State</td>
<td>Arraigned on 23 State counts and corrupt enrichment of N700million</td>
<td>Was charged by EFCC in July 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Orji Kalu, former Governor of Abia State</td>
<td>Arraigned on 107 state counts and corrupt enrichment of N5biilion</td>
<td>Was charged in July 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Saminu Turaki, former Governor of Jigawa</td>
<td>Arraigned on 32 state counts and corrupt enrichment of N36biilion</td>
<td>Was charged and granted bail in July 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Nolly Nyame, former Governor of Taraba State</td>
<td>Arraigned on 41 State Counts and corrupt enrichment of N1.3 billion</td>
<td>Was charged in July 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Ayo Fayose, former Governor of Ekiti State.</td>
<td>Corrupt enrichment of N1.2 billion</td>
<td>Was charged in July 2007 and granted bail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>James Ibori, former Governor Delta State</td>
<td>Arraigned on 103 State Counts and corrupt enrichment of N10.08biilion</td>
<td>Was charged in 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Chimaroke Nnamani, Governor of Enugu State,</td>
<td>Arraigned for 105 State counts and corrupt enrichment of cN5.3 billion</td>
<td>Was charged in 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In spite of the modest achievements recorded so far, the anti-graft war, like previous attempts, became questionable towards the end of the Obasanjo administration and the early days of late President Umaru Musa Yar Adua administration. This emanated from the mode of operations of the anti-corruption agencies as well as the selective nature of the victims. One of the criticisms was that former President Olusegun Obasanjo used the anti-corruption agencies, particularly the EFCC, to hunt political opponents, especially those who foiled the infamous “Third Term agenda”. For instance, following the face-off between former President Obasanjo and his Vice President, Abubakar Atiku, the EFCC came on board and declared that Alhaji Abubakar Atiku was not eligible to contest for the office of the President. It was a court ruling that eventually cleared him to run in the election.

Apart from this, the 1999 Constitution has been identified as an obstacle to the anti-graft crusade given the provisions in the constitution that tend to shield political office holders against trial while in office. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Section 308 provides for the immunity of certain categories of public office holders. It provides that:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but subject to Sub-Section (2) of this Section,

(a) No civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom this section applies during his period of office.

(b) A person to whom this Section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that period either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and

(c) No process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom this Section applies, shall be applied for or issued.

Provided that in ascertaining whether any period of limitation has expired for the purposes of any proceedings against a person to whom this Section applies, no account shall be taken of period of office.
The provisions of sub-section (i) of this Section shall not apply to civil proceedings against a person to whom this Section applies in his official capacity to civil proceedings in which such a person is only a nominal party.\textsuperscript{59} This Section applies to a person holding the office of President or Vice President, Governor or Deputy Governor, and the reference to the period during which the person holding such office is required to perform the functions of the office. The President, Vice President, Governor and Deputy Governor cannot be arrested or imprisoned during the period of office for any civil or criminal offence, no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against them, Courts of law shall not issue any process requiring any of the persons which the Section applies to appear before it.

Many state Governors during the Obasanjo administration were said to have been involved in money laundering and misappropriation of public funds to the extent that the EFCC claimed that thirty of the thirty six Governors had questions to answer.\textsuperscript{60} The Immunity clause could not permit the Commission to prosecute the Governors. The Commission only embarked upon the prosecution of some of the Governors after they had left office. The Governors and their Deputies, as well as the President and the Vice President, swore to uphold the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Constitution they swore to uphold is the same Constitution that shielded them from prosecution. The practice where the Chief Executive at the Federal and State levels can only be arraigned after leaving office permits a situation where they would have looted funds meant for the development of the society for their personal use. Besides, the interpretation of the clause was shrouded in controversy. For instance, when former Governor Ayo Fayose of Ekiti was suspended, he could not be prosecuted on the basis of the fact that he was still covered by the immunity clause thus raising question as to whether a suspended Governor still has the same privilege as a serving Governor. Though the Immunity clause has been criticised for shielding political office holders, the fact that they were still prosecuted after leaving office aptly shows that it is no longer business as usual.

Developments that ensued immediately after the swearing-in of the late President Yar Adua also raised questions on sustainability of the anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria. First, there was a time when it was announced that the EFCC must obtain permission from the then Attorney General of the Federation before any

\textsuperscript{59} See Section 303, of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

\textsuperscript{60} Aiyetan D, 2007. Governors on their knees.Tell Magazine Lagos. 22-25
suspect could be prosecuted. Second, the comments of the former Attorney General of the Federation (AGF), Mr Aondoakaa, over the competence of the London Court to try former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori. Third, the constant face-off between the then Chairman of the EFCC Mallam Ribadu and the then AGF as well as the directive by the then Inspector General of Police, Mike Okiro, to the erstwhile EFCC Chairman, to proceed on one year course at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies at Kuru near Jos. These developments questioned the sincerity and commitment of the Yar’ Adua led- administration to continue with the anti-graft crusade initiated under the Obasanjo administration.

4. 6.1 Globalisation and Policy Orientation of the Nigerian State

One area where the effects of globalisation in Nigeria can be measured is in the realm of multiple sites of political action which manifests in the activities of non state actions, both at the domestic and external spheres. The influence of external institutions and agencies in the activities of the modern state in the era of contemporary globalisation has been captured by Harrop. Harrop asserts that:

The international environment forms much of the context of national policy making. Policy makers in each country have a policy context formed by the international economic cycle of prosperity, recession, depression recovery… international organisations ….. Also from an increasing important part of the context of national policy making…The policy agenda is also becoming international. Similar problems show up in different societies at a similar time and some solutions are considered though by no means implemented, throughout the liberal-democratic policy diffusion. Policy makers in one country seek to emulate the successes of colleagues overseas61.

If the above assertion captures the fate of the modern states in their policy making activities, there is the need to probe the extent to which this trend manifested in the Nigerian State during the period under consideration.

At the risk of repetition, one of the features of globalisation is the blurring of distinction between domestic and external developments. Indeed, most of the conceptions on globalisation stress the effects of foreign developments on domestic events and vice versa. One area where external developments shaped domestic

developments in the Nigerian state can be inferred from the growing activities of Nigeria in international organisations and the integration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) into Nigeria’s domestic policy profile. These are discussed in sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3.

4.6.2. Integration of Millennium Development Goals into Nigeria’s Domestic Policy Initiatives

The nexus between globalisation and the Nigerian state can be fruitfully analysed in the context of the integration of global development agenda into domestic policy initiatives. An example of this development was the integration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) into Nigeria’s development strategies during the Obasanjo-led administration. Nigerian state did not only accede to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) but also integrated the eight goals into domestic development initiatives. The eight interrelated MDGs are: (a) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (b) Achieve universal primary education (c) Promote gender equality and empower women (d) Reduce child mortality (e) Improve Maternal health (f) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (g) Ensure environmental sustainability (h) Develop a global partnership for development. These goals have been visible in the policy agenda of the Nigerian State since the early 2000s. The most remarkable effects on Nigeria became visible in 2004 when the Nigerian state integrated the goals into its domestic comprehensive economic framework, the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). The goals were also integrated into the NEEDS inspired State Economic Empowerment Strategy (SEEDS) at the state level. Furthermore, some of the 774 local governments also integrated NEEDS into their Local Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (LEEDS). It should be noted that some of the policy components of NEEDS had antecedents; it is worthy to remark that they nevertheless received new inspirations in the current era of globalisation. What effects did this integration have on the Nigerian State?

In discussing the effects of MDGs, emphasis is on how the global agenda on development inspired domestic policy initiatives and the degree of achievement or success. Essentially, the task is to demonstrate how the MDGs shaped the policy activity of Nigeria. Between 2004 and 2006, Nigeria produced three sets of reports on
the progress made so far on the MDGs and highlighted the prospect for achieving the goals by 2015. While remarkable achievements were being made in some sectors, the report shows that Nigeria may not be able to attain the MDGs target by 2015. The reports show that Nigeria has the potential for achieving targets in universal primary education, gender equality and women empowerment, HIV and AIDS, environmental stability and developing global partnership for development, but the country still lags behind in other areas such as child mortality, poverty reduction, maternal health and diseases.

In 2007, the Nigerian government envisaged placing the country among the most 20 leading economies of the world by 2020 and consequently launched the seven-point agenda which could be seen to be consistent with the MDGs. These included (1) sustainable growth in the real sector of the economy (2) improvement of infrastructure (power, energy and transportation) (3) agriculture and agro-industry development (4) human capital development (education and health) (5) Security, law and order (including electoral reform) (6) combating corruption and (7) conflict resolution through promoting equitable and sustainable regional development (Niger Delta development).

The consequences of the MDGs on the policy activity of the Nigerian State include the various reforms that were put in place to achieve the targets. These reforms cut across nearly all sectors of the economy. For instance, public sector financial management reforms informed the enactment and passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act to ensure prudent management of the nation’s resources. It was in the same vein that made government to pass the public procurement legislation in 2007 to enhance due process in public procurement. In 2006, the Nigerian government equally adopted MDGs-based development planning to channel investments quickly to meet the targets of MDGs. The government established the Virtual Poverty Fund into which it pooled the gains from debt relief and from which the MDGs would be funded.

To further demonstrate commitments to the MDGs, the government put in place a Presidential Committee on the assessment and Monitoring of MDGs in Nigeria. In addition, the government established the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Millennium Development Goals-OSSAP-MDGs). The mandate of the office was to act as the secretariat of the Presidential Committee on MDGs, develop a

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coherent approach for the achievement of the target of the MDGs and facilitate the design of appropriate system to tag and track debt relief-funded MDGs expenditure. The activities of the MDGs are still on and government, in its policy declaration on daily basis, continued to emphasise the need to meet the MDGs target. Indeed the MDGs have since the mid-2000s become the timelines for policy-making in the Nigerian State.63

What can be deduced from the integration of the MDGs into domestic policy aptly demonstrate the compliance of the Nigerian state with the global agenda on poverty reduction and improvement of human development. This explains the continued emphasis on poverty reduction, HIV and AIDS, universal Basic Education, and energy sector, especially with the evolvement of Independent Power Project. Apart from the integration of the MDGs into domestic development strategies, globalisation inspired various policies embarked upon under the Obasanjo administration. Two of such policies, the NEEDS and the reform of the banking sector, are discussed in the subsequent section.

(a) The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy

Given the dynamics of the Nigerian State prior to May 29, 1999 when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated, the Obasanjo administration embarked on a series of reforms in the Nigerian State so as to put it on a sound footing. The reforms were not confined to the economy but extended to nearly all sectors of the Nigerian State. Some of the initiatives, particularly the liberalisation policies, have their antecedents in the 1980s when SAP was introduced but received renewed efforts when the Obasanjo administration came to power in 1999. These initiatives, which became visible during President Obasanjo’s second tenure, were encapsulated in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). Consequently, a study of the NEEDS would offer a proper pedestal for understanding the reform agenda of the Nigerian State. This does not however suggest that all the political and economic activities under the Obasanjo administration fall under NEEDS. NEEDS only featured in the second term of Obasanjo. As a result of this, most of the developments between 1999 and 2003 which were reflected in the NEEDS predate the blue print that came into being in 2004.

63 Ibid.
According to the National Planning Commission (NPC), NEEDS was a process of development anchored on a clear vision, sound values and enduring principles. The vision, according to NPC, underscores the necessity and urgency of building a modern Nigeria that maximises the potential of every citizen and of becoming the largest and the strongest economy in Africa and a force to be reckoned with in the world before the middle of the twenty-first century. The NPC states further that the vision of the NEEDS was informed by the 2001 Kuru declaration which, *inter alia*, encompasses

the need to build a truly great Africa democratic country, politically united, integrated and stable. Economically prosperous, socially organized with equal opportunity for all and responsibility for all, to become the catalyst of Africa Renaissance and making adequate all embracing contribution, sub-regionally, regionally and globally.

The NEEDS contains four major components comprising, first, the reform of government and institutions. Second, there is the focus on the private sector as the engine of growth (which entails a redefinition of the role of government and the strengthening of its functions). Third is the implementation of a social charter, taking into account health, education, employment, security of lives and property, ownership of and participation in the country’s development. And fourth, there is value of re-orientation.

The main objectives of NEEDS centred on a tough economic and structural reform based on the following six pillars:

(i) Achieving macroeconomic stability
(ii) Fighting corruption and improving transparency and accountability
(iii) Improving public expenditure management including the introduction of fiscal rule to help manage oil sector volatility
(iv) Public Sector reforms to professionalize the Civil service
(v) Accelerating privatization, deregulation and liberalisation of key sectors of the economy
(vi) Fundamental Sectors (Banking Sector and Pension) reforms.

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65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
essence, according to the NPC, NEEDS aims to lay a solid foundation for mutual rediscovering and strong value based on the following principles; (a) Enterprise, competition and efficiency at all levels (b) Equity and care for the weak and vulnerable (c) Moral attitude, respect for traditional values and trade in Nigerian culture (d) A value system for Public service that results in efficient and effective service delivery to the citizens and (e) Discipline at all levels of leadership. The issue that demands attention at this juncture is to examine the extent which these reforms were driven by global forces.

To say that NEEDS was shaped by global forces is to affirm the obvious. This could be deduced from the contents and ideological character of the components of NEEDS. First, economic and political liberalisation programmes feature prominently in most of the analysis of contemporary globalisation. Though some of the neo-liberal postures of NEEDS have antecedent in the policy framework introduced in Nigeria in the 1980s as noted earlier on, the environment of the renewed effort since 1999 has changed. Apart from the fact that the contents of NEEDS share the traits of the development paradigm canvassed by the World Bank (such as the privatisation already alluded to, the identification of the private sector as the engine of growth, liberalisation, deregulation, downsizing or rightsizing as it is often called in Nigeria) all fall within the neo-liberal ideology associated with the principles of the Washington Consensus which lie at the heart of economic globalisation.

Second, key actors involved in the formulation of these policies were those who have links with the neo-liberal posture of the World Bank. For instance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who served as one of the Ministers of Finance under President Olusegun Obasanjo, was the Vice-President of the World Bank before her appointment. Similarly, the former Economic Adviser to the President, who later became the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Professor Charles Soludo, had worked as the Executive Director of the African Institute of Applied Economics, a research centre that consults for the World Bank. Oby Ezekwesili and El-Rufai, who were members of the Economic team of the President, also canvassed the neo-liberal posture of the IMF and World Bank.69. The presence of these actors in the policy space invariably meant that their background would come to bear on the policy

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activities of the Nigerian State. Consequently, nothing different should be expected than development strategies that have the orientation of the World Bank prescription. This should not, however, be translated to mean that NEEDS was a World Bank development blueprint and that other policies were designed by global or transnational institutions. NEEDS was a Nigeria’s home-grown poverty alleviation strategy and the various policies were implemented in response to contradictions spawned by the Nigerian State. Consequently, the engagement of the Nigerian State with global forces could be seen as a situation in which local policies coincided with global strategies to address domestic problems.

In sum, the economic policies of the Nigerian State contained in NEEDS and other reforms in the economy under the Obasanjo led civilian administration were conceived in response to the various problems associated with development confronting the Nigerian State. The environment in which they were conceived was one in which developments in the Nigerian State were influenced by happenings in other nations. An atmosphere dominated by neo-liberal ideology, which prescribes minimum role for the state and in which increasing role was and is still being assigned to the private sector as the engine of development.

(b) The Reform of the Banking Sector

The reform of the banking sector dates back to the Babangida administration, which took unprecedented steps towards the liberalisation of the economy, and it received new impetus between 1999 and 2007. In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the implementation of deregulation policies was designed to be implemented in phases with management and exchange rate policies being the first, followed by finance capital and banking sector. This led to sporadic expansion in the banking sectors. As at 1983, there were 25 commercial banks with 991 branches. These rose to 66 Banks with 2,352 branches in 199370. There were equally 10 merchant banks in 1983 but the number increased to 54 with a total of 124 in branches in 1993. Similarly, as at 1993, there were 252 branches of the Federal Mortgage Bank (FMB), 879 Community Banks and 271 Peoples Banks71. The growth in the number of Banks and the attendant expansion in terms of branches did not in any way reflect in the effectiveness of the

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71. Ibid.
banking sector as it experienced prolong distress leading to the liquidation of some of the banks, a situation that not only robbed customers of their deposits but created confidence crisis in the sector. As at December 1999, it was estimated that about N688 million had been lost by depositors\(^\text{72}\). Measures embarked upon, particularly under the Abacha administration through the Failed Bank (Recovery Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks and Related Malpractices in Banks Decree of 1994, only served as a temporary relief. Towards the end of the 1990s, the necessary confidence in the banking sector was lacking as the sector exhibited a number of problems such as high rate of insolvency, absence of coherent financial system, poor services, among others\(^\text{73}\).

As part of the reform, the strengthening of the banking sector was considered a vital area for strengthening the Nigerian economy, hence it was given priority. This found expression in the launching of the bank consolidation exercise in mid 2004 in which Banks were requested to raise the minimum capital base from about US $15 million to US $25 million by the end of 2005\(^\text{74}\). Banks which could not meet up with this requirement were expected to merge or have their licenses revoked. It was in this context that the consolidation of banks exercise in Nigeria was carried out in which banks were required to have a minimum N25 billion to remain in the industry. The then Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Charles Soludo, highlighted the need for the consolidation. He notes that:

As at end-June, 2004, there were 89 deposit money banks operating in the country, comprising institutions of various sizes and degrees of soundness. Structurally, the sector is highly concentrated, as the ten largest banks account for about 50 percent of the industry’s total assets/liabilities. Most banks in Nigeria have a capitalization of less than $10 million. Even the largest bank in Nigeria has a capital base of about US$240 million compared to US$526 million for the smallest bank in Malaysia. The small size of most of our banks, each with expensive headquarters, separate investment in software and hardware, heavy fixed costs and operating expenses, and with bunching of branches in few commercial centres--- lead to very high average cost for the industry\(^\text{75}\).

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\(^{72}\)Ibid.


\(^{74}\)Ibid.

\(^{75}\)Soludo, C. 2004. Consolidating the Nigerian banking industry to meet the development challenges of the 21\(^{st}\) century. Being an address delivered to the Special Meeting of the Bankers’ Committee, held on July 6, 2004 at the CBN Headquarters Abuja
Commenting further, the former CBN Governor highlights the implications of this trend. He notes that:

This in turn has implications for the cost of intermediation, the spread between deposit and lending rates, and puts undue pressures on banks to engage in sharp practices as means of survival. I am sure many of you would agree with me that some of our banks are not engaged in strict banking business in terms of savings intermediation--- they are traders--- trading in foreign exchange, in government treasury bills, and sometimes in direct importation of goods through phoney companies. This is not healthy for the economy.

He stressed the fact that the exercise was inspired by global developments as similar exercises had been carried out in other countries. He notes, inter alia, that:

Mergers and acquisitions especially in the banking industry is now a global phenomenon. In the United States of America, there had been over 7,000 cases of bank mergers since 1980, while the same trend occurred in the United Kingdom and other European countries. Specifically, in the period 1997-1998, 203 bank mergers and acquisitions took place in the Euro area. Cross-country mergers are also taking hold. In 1998 a merger in France resulted in a new bank with a capital base of US$688 billion, while the merger of two banks in Germany in the same year created the second largest bank in Germany with a capital base of US$541 billion. In many emerging markets, including Argentina, Brazil and Korea, consolidation has also become prominent, as banks strive to become more competitive and resilient to shocks as well as reposition their operations to cope with the challenges of the increasingly globalise banking systems.

The effect of the exercise, apart from the emergence of 25 from the hitherto 89 banks, was that the banks were able to attract about $652 million of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Nigerian banking sector. The reform of the banking sector was not limited to the capital based of the banks; the power of the Central Bank over the banks was strengthened. The recapitalisation of the banking sector has relative merit as a virile economy needs a stable and strong financial sector, the manner of the implementation was however the source of concern. Element of coercion was involved, minimum financial base and date were fixed and banks were stampeded to comply or be eased out of operations. Essentially, the whole process was against the

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76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
spirit of liberalisation. The mergers ought to have been allowed to evolve naturally. It was against the criticisms of the process of the recapitalisation exercise that led to its suspension in the insurance sector.

4.6.3. Reorientation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy.

The influence of globalisation has also been visible in the posture of foreign policy of the Nigerian State. When the Obasanjo-led civilian administration was inaugurated on May 29, 1999, the morale of Nigerians was still at its lowest ebb due to the total decay of infrastructure, malfunctioning public utilities, pervasive corruption, general waste, inefficient state utilities, soaring inflation, among others, which made the average Nigerian citizen to lose confidence in the government and faith in the country. When Obasanjo led-administration was inaugurated, the image of Nigeria’s international image was negative as it was associated with fraudulent practices, particularly with corruption. The pattern of governance, under the military, earned Nigeria the inglorious title of a pariah state. The consequence of this negative image, according to Akinterinwa, was that Nigeria was then seen as a non-conformist and a threat to efforts at globalisation, democratisation and maintenance of world peace and security.

With the return to civil rule, the Obasanjo led-administration embarked on a shuttle diplomacy to achieve intended objectives which include the need to restore confidence, to repair the image of the country and to instil confidence in the international community about the developments in the Nigerian State. President Obasanjo thus embarked on series of foreign trips even before he was sworn in May 1999. Though highly criticized, shuttle diplomacy of the Obasanjo administration was premised on the following:

(a) President Obasanjo needed to convince the international community that it would not be sufficient to return power to civilians without seeking to address some critical teething socio-economic problems confronting the Nigerian state.

(b) The need for discussion with relevant world leaders on debt relief, economic assistance, and regional cooperation to enhance national development informed the

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79 President Olusegun Obasanjo highlighted these problems as the bane of the Nigerian State in his maiden address after his inauguration on May 29, 1999. Anon1999. New dawn. The Punch May, 30. 23.952 Lagos. 18.

shuttle diplomacy which was the thrust of the foreign policy of Nigeria in the formative years of the Obasanjo led-administration.

(c) As at May 1999, the global political economic order had been transformed, hence apart from the fact that developments in Nigeria must be in alignment with the prevailing global imperatives for development, there was the need to convince the global community about the changes in the political configuration of the Nigerian state.

(d) The diplomatic shuttle was also designed to promote economic cooperation. This manifested in series of international agreements signed such as the agreement on the re-establishment of Air-link with the US, Investment Promotion and Provision Agreement (IPPA) with Germany, Trade Pack with India.

(e) The diplomacy was also informed by the need to honour invitation by other countries as well as to attend to certain critical international assignment.\(^{81}\)

It is not being suggested here that globalisation essentially inspired the various trips of the Nigerian leader, because foreign trips have formed part of state activities of the Nigerian State. The argument however is that in the current era of globalisation, they were built on international co-operation. These conditions defined the shuttle diplomacy that characterized the Obasanjo administration which, by 2002, was put at a total of number of 93 trips and a total number of 340 days.\(^{82}\)

When President Obasanjo assumed office, he made a commitment to wage war against corruption. He extended to the anti-graft crusade to the recovery of money stolen by Abacha and his cronies between 1993 and 1998 which run into billions of US dollars which were stashed in Swiss Banks. The effort yielded results as the Swiss government on the request of the Nigerian government froze about $700 million and in the early part of 2005 agreed to repatriate $498 million. The global factor came into play in this exercise.\(^{83}\) First, when Nigeria was pressing for recovering of the loots, corruption had become a global public bad issue and was perceived as one of the causes of poverty, particularly in Third World nations. Second, the Swiss authorities readily assisted in line with the global norm of zero tolerance of corruption. Third, the

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\(^{81}\) Ibid

\(^{82}\) Ibid.

Swiss government insisted that the World Bank should guarantee that the recovered loot would be channelled to the development of health and education infrastructure in Nigeria.

The debt relief granted to Nigeria under the Obasanjo administration was also inspired by globalisation. As a member and at one time Chairman of the G77, President Obasanjo used the platform to mount pressure for the cancellation of the nation’s debt. In 1999 when the Fourth Republic came into being, the external debt profile of the Nigerian state was put at US$38 billion in Paris and London Clubs, while US$1.5billion was paid annually as interest. In fact, about $ US 35billion was said to have gone into the servicing of the external debt while the foreign reserves stood at US$3billion. With this, the credit worthiness of the Nigerian State was poor, having defaulted on several occasions on the servicing of this debt. This poor credit profile coupled with the fact that Nigeria was a pariah entity affected foreign investment adversely. The pursuit of these objectives invariably meant that Nigeria must relate with actors that beyond the Africa continent, this puts Nigeria’s foreign policy beyond Africa, and in the profile of globalisation.

Globalisation aptly altered the perception of Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy and consequently situated the realisation of the foreign objectives of the country in the global sphere. This shift as explained by Akinterinwa could be located within the context of the needs of the Nigerian state which the African states have little or no answers to. Akinterinwa argues that, the rationale for the shift of Nigeria’s foreign policy was the consideration that other African countries were poor and were not in the good position to help bail out Nigeria from her own economic ordeals.\(^84\) He asserts further that “the poor situation of the Nigerian economy prompted the need to focus greater attention on extra-Africa actions without necessarily applying any form of neglect in Africa”.\(^85\) The implication of this shift is that Nigeria now looks beyond Africa in its activities; its focus is now global. Consequently, with the help of the G8 and British Government, Nigeria and other African countries were granted debt relief in June 2005. Specifically, Nigeria obtained

\(^{84}\) Ibid.
\(^{85}\) Ibid.
US$18 billion debt relief from the Paris Club\textsuperscript{86}.

Globalisation was equally visible in the policy initiatives of the Nigerian State in terms of economic cooperation and development. Although Nigeria was a principal facilitator of the formation of the ECOWAS in the mid-1970s and signatory to many economic treaties in the continent, globalisation influenced the renewed focus and interest in regional economic integration and co-operation. The global orientation of the foreign policy of the Nigerian State redefined its leading role in the African Union (AU) and the endorsement of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) - a mechanism for controlling corruption and assessing governance under the AU, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Economic Community of African State (ECOWAS). The creation of NEPAD is a global response to Africa’s problem. It has its root in the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega Plan for Africa. Essentially, NEPAD has been described by its authors as an African strategy of globalisation\textsuperscript{87}.

The assessment of the principles of the NEPAD initiative clearly shows that they are designed to alleviate poverty in the continent in line with global imperatives. While the discussion is not intended to delve into the debate surrounding NEPAD, the point of emphasis is that the objectives of NEPAD are part of the global agenda for accelerating development and eradicating poverty as encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals. Apart from the emphasis on the reduction of poverty, NEPAD is consistent with the eight (8\textsuperscript{th}) objectives of the MDGS, that is, promotion of partnership for global development. Consequently, considering the role Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria played in its formation, one would appreciate the commitment of the Nigerian State to the globalisation process.

Globalisation’s impact on emerging foreign policy of the Nigerian State can be deduced from the creation of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Integration with full ministerial status\textsuperscript{88}. The logic behind the creation of this Ministry can be gleaned from the centrality and importance of issues of economic co-operation and integration in this era of globalisation.

The changing nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy yielded positive outcomes for

\textsuperscript{86} Abegunrin, O. op.cit
\textsuperscript{88} Akinterinwa. B.A, op.cit
the Nigerian state. Apart from the recovery of the Abacha loots and the debt relief, which would not have been possible if not for the commitment of Nigerian state to the prevailing global norms, there were other areas of foreign policy of the Nigerian State which manifested positive outcomes. In the first instance, the image laundering initiatives made members of the international community to change their perceptions of the Nigerian State and consequently resumed diplomatic relations with the new Nigeria. This informed the delisting of Nigeria as drug transit state, and high power visit of renowned world leaders to the Nigerian State such as the Queen of England, two American Presidents- Bill Clinton and George Bush among others. Additionally, the Commonwealth of Nations re-admitted Nigeria into the organisation after being banned for four years following the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and other eight Ogonis by the Abacha led- junta. Nigeria was not only admitted but elected into the eight member Commonwealth Ministerial Group for the first time and also awarded the right to host the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Abuja in 2003. Apart from this, Nigeria was elected the Chairman of G77 in 2000. Nigeria was also elected into both the Economic and Social Commission and the Commission on Sustainable Development of the United Nations. These developments were unthinkable when Nigeria was a pariah entity in the days of the military. It was the restoration of civil rule and the attendant promising pattern of governance, in line with the prevailing global norms, that accounted for the exit of the Nigerian State from its pariah status as well as its new image and international repositioning among the comity of nations.

4.7. Globalisation and the Functions and Power of the Nigerian State

Discussions in the preceding sections show that global developments shaped and intensified some developments in the Nigerian State. The task at this juncture is to analyse the effects of these developments on the functions, capacity and autonomy of the Nigerian State as well as on the pattern of state-society relations.

First, we need to state that most of the policy initiatives of the Nigerian State since the mid 1980s are conscious and deliberate policy measures aimed at addressing the perennial problems of the state, which over the years manifested and became visible in the appalling pattern of governance as well

unattractive political processes. For instance, though the various reforms particularly in the economic sector which emphasised privatisation of state-owned enterprises, deregulation, poverty alleviation, as contained in NEEDS, have bearing with the neo-liberal project of the global political economy, the adoption of these policies was defined (still being) by the needs of the Nigerian State to address the problem of economic stagnation. Consequently, they did not cause the problem of the Nigerian State but were responses and reactions to existing problems.

Second, with multiple sites of political action, the Nigerian state has been able to pursue policies, which it could not hitherto pursue due to domestic resistance. This was very noticeable when the liberalisation initiatives were introduced in the 1980s. The Babangida administration was faced with resistance, criticism and condemnation. Though deregulation and liberalisation policies continued to be criticised in the Nigerian State, the international dimension of these policies created an element of external legitimacy and an impression of external compulsion and providing a new basis for political and economic action at a time when previous models of coping with the problems of development had been exhausted.

Third, multiple sites for political action can be seen as a rescue strategy for the Nigerian State in overcoming series of overwhelming constraints on political and economic policies at the domestic level which for many years failed due to political pressure on the policy making procedure. This rescue strategy removes the state and decision makers from the potential influence of the interests of the society which formerly had thwarted attempts at economic reconstruction.

Fourth, the internationalisation of the policy framework of the Nigerian state may be interpreted in various ways. First it signifies the borrowing of development paradigm from other countries which may not apply to the Nigerian situation. In this context, if such policies were imposed, this trend is likely to be interpreted to mean direct attack on the autonomy and sovereignty of the Nigerian State. This view was held in respect of the implementation of SAP of the 1980s. On the other hand if these policies were not imposed, then they could not be seen to have undermined the sovereignty and autonomy of the Nigerian State. For instance, the origin of privatisation in Nigeria predates the era of SAP. The Onosode Commission already recommended it for ailing public enterprises in 1984. Consequently, it could be argued that Nigeria would still have implemented the adjustment policies whether the IMF induced SAP included it as its policy recipe for the Nigerian economy or not.
Fifth, internationalisation of policy making could be seen as an element of external legitimacy on policy activities of the Nigerian State. This may literally be interpreted to mean creating a situation in which the state could re-invent and strengthen itself at domestic level. In this context, external legitimacy has the tendency of creating a situation in which the state may be capacitated by pursuing and implementing series of programmes, which are very consistent with the interest of globalizing international community and at the same time conditioned by the imperatives of domestic developments. A typical example that captures this argument is the anti-corruption exercise in Nigeria in which the trial of culprit can now be carried out outside the country even when the suspect decides to flee to escape trial. The international collaboration in the anti-corruption exercise has empowered the Nigerian state to do what it could not do initially.

On the functions of the state, we need to state that according to section 14(2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, security and welfare of the citizen shall be the primary purpose of government. Welfare function of the state entails what can be called provision of services such as infrastructure, education, and health to mention but a few. It has been noted that, so far, the Nigerian state has implemented some neo-liberal economic policies which did not favour the masses. Such policies include the privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises. While privatisation led to the retrenchment of many workers thus increasing the level of unemployment in the country, commercialisation found expression in the removal of subsidies from certain goods and services mainly petroleum products. Succinctly put, the implementation of privatisation and commercialisation was not properly handled. The necessary safety nets for the vulnerable in the society were not put in place. Emphasis seems to be on the improvement of government finance with little concern for what happens to the citizenry.

State failure in service delivery should not be attributed exclusively to globalisation. The inability of the state to meet the needs of its citizens predates the current phase of globalisation. The Nigerian state has not been a state committed to the welfare of the citizens. Overt failure of the state to provide services to the citizens has been one of the reasons why the state has continued to be despised by the citizens. This

suggests that deficits observed in this era of globalisation are not new and such should not be ascribed to forces of globalisation.

The effects of globalisation can equally be analysed in the context of the role the state is now playing in the economy. Owen Hughes identifies various ways through which the state can participate in the economy. These are, first, provision which entails direct government provision of goods and services and stabilisation. This involves decisions that have bearing on how to allocate resources to the various sectors. Furthermore, provision according to Hughes also entails distribution to redress some degree of inequalities. Provision also encompasses stabilisation which Hughes sees as a situation where the government aims at improving the overall economy through the budgetary policy. The second way through which the state participates in the economy is through subsidy. Production is the third form of participation identified by Hughes. He claims that production takes away from the government budget and the citizens are made to pay as if such goods were produced by the private sector. Hughes also identifies regulation as another way the government can participate in the economy. This involves using laws made by the government to affect the private sector in some way. It entails allowing or prohibiting activities in the economy through the legal and legislative enactments. Hughes distinguishes between economic and social regulations. He asserts that while the former may aim at encouraging certain business and other actors to undertake certain activities and to avoid others, the latter is usually seen as protecting the citizen, especially with regard to standard, safety levels and pollution. The question is how the Nigerian state has fared as far as the above economic functions are concerned?

It should be stated that the provision of public goods is acknowledged as one of the central functions of the modern state and has become one of the parameters for measuring state capacity. Prior to the mid 1980s not only did Nigeria have several PUE that were saddled with the task of provision and production of goods and services, most of them were highly subsidised notably in many public utilities such as postal services, air transportation and petroleum products. Table 3 below shows support to state-owned enterprises in 2001. With commercialisation the subsidy in these sectors continued to fall thereby making such enterprises to function as profit oriented organisations in Nigeria. This had effects on the welfare of the citizen.

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One area where the removal of subsidy has been visible is the oil sector. The Nigerian government in the pursuit of deregulation increased the pump price of petroleum products on several occasions during the period covered in this study. For instance, in 1990, the pump price of petrol called Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) was changed to 60kobo per litre. In 1992, it was adjusted to 70 kobo and in 1993, the price was changed to N3.25. Even in the year 2007, few days to the exit of President Olusegun Obasanjo from office, the pump price was increased to N70.00 per litre from the initial N45.00. It was a strong protest from the organised labour which paralysed economic activities for days that led to the reversal of the price to N65 in the early days of the President Umaru Yar Adua led-administration.

The adjustment in the pump price of PMS became almost an annual ritual. The government was always promising palliative measures such as the provision of Mass Transit buses to cushion the effects of the increases. Such palliative measures however were not effective because such buses were usually assigned to major towns and cities leaving out the rural areas. Even in the urban areas where they operated, such buses usually disappeared within three or four months. The overall consequence of this was the increase in the cost of transportation, goods and services and in some cases landlord increased their rents. Table 4 below shows the changes in the pump price of petrol between 1990 and 2007.

The removal of subsidy has also been visible in social services. One of such areas is in the education sector. For instance, in 1994, the Federal government allocated 8.66 billion out of N110.5 billion representing 7.83 per cent to education. In 1996, the allocation to the education sector was 12.32 per cent but this fell to 8.36 percent in 2000, 6.8 percent in 2002 and 1.83 percent in 2003. Table 5 below shows the pattern of budgetary allocation to the education sector between 1994 and 2003 in Nigeria. The effect of this dwindling allocation included the declining infrastructure and increase in tuition fees particularly in the institutions of higher learning.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Investment Grants (in millions of naira)</th>
<th>Operational Subsidy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steel mills</td>
<td>1,711.4</td>
<td>1,040.0</td>
<td>2,751.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coal company</td>
<td>283.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>303.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil refineries</td>
<td>6,998.0</td>
<td>599.6</td>
<td>7,597.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines (solid minerals)</td>
<td>4,919.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>4,966.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPA, power sector</td>
<td>3,858.4</td>
<td>431.1</td>
<td>4,289.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>504.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>509.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>283.6</td>
<td>595.1</td>
<td>878.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>718.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>629.9</td>
<td>2,255.5</td>
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<td>3,100.9</td>
<td>11,400.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>506.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>512.0</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>6,693.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,183.6</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price of PMS Per Litre.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>60kobo</td>
</tr>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>70kobo</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>N11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>N20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>N22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>N26.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>N70.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>N65.00</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Allocation to Education</th>
<th>Allocation to Education as % of Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>N110.5b</td>
<td>N8.66billion</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>N98.2billion</td>
<td>12.73billion</td>
<td>12.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>N124.2billion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>N186billion</td>
<td>21.8billion</td>
<td>11.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N260billion</td>
<td>27.7billion</td>
<td>10.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>N249billion</td>
<td>27.7billion</td>
<td>11.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>N277.5billion</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>N844billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>N765.1billion</td>
<td>13.9billion</td>
<td>1.83</td>
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</table>

There is also the need to analyse what happened to the role of the Nigerian State in the economy during the period under consideration. Privatisation in Nigeria has spawned contradictory consequences for the state. First, it has led to gradual withdrawal of the state from the functions that involved direct production. This withdrawal from direct provision of goods and services and distribution has been on the increase as a result of the massive sale of public enterprises to the private sector. Second, this withdrawal intensified other functions of the Nigerian State particularly stabilisation and regulation. The consequences of these developments included the transformation of the functions of the Nigerian State from that of an investor to that of facilitator and enabler of a private sector-driven economy. This essentially does not actually mean a diminished role for the Nigerian State, rather a transformation because the role of the state as a facilitator is equally challenging and demanding. Moreover, in spite of privatisation and commercialisation, government control of the economy was still very high. For instance, tax component of GDP remained low. It was 0.2 per cent in 2004, 0.2 in 2005, 0.1 in 2006 and 0.2 in 2007. What the Nigerian State has demonstrated is that economic globalisation in Nigeria is a phenomenon with contradictory ramifications for the functions of the state. At one level, spawning contradictions that undermined certain functions of the Nigerian State and at other level, it generated developments that intensified other functions of the state particularly that of stabilisation and regulation.

Furthermore, we have made reference to privatisation as generating and strengthening new roles for the Nigerian state particularly stabilisation and regulation. It is not being suggested here that the functions of stabilisation and regulation were generated by globalisation in Nigeria but the argument is that they are being intensified by global forces. Regulating the private sector-driven economy is a major task for any privatising economy. This informed the emergence in Nigeria of various regulatory agencies such as Nigeria Communications Commissions, Nigeria Utilities Commission to mention but a few. Essentially, the functions of these regulatory agencies include

setting standard, protecting the vulnerable against exploitation and ensuring safety measures. The intensification of the regulatory function of the Nigerian State in the current globalisation shows that functions and roles the Nigerian State ought to be playing when the state was essentially public sector-driven are being revisited and intensified. This means that with privatisation, a new regime of the functions of state has started emerging. The role of the Nigerian state in direct production and provision could be seen as retreating as a result of the implementation of privatisation and commercialisation programmes, the functions of stabilisation and regulation however continue to be strengthened as successful privatisation requires the existence of strong regulatory agencies. This shows that developments generated by the forces of globalisation are redefining the functions of the Nigerian state in the economy. This questions the widely held view that globalisation undermines the functions of the state. Viewed in this context, the effects of privatisation should not essentially be seen as reducing the functions of the state, it has intensified some other functions. As Starr rightly notes;

Privatisation does not simply involve a transfer of ownership from public to private hands, nor can privatisation be understood merely as a reduction of state capacities. Privatisation may ultimately result in less state control, but it must first require states to develop capacities they may not previously have had such as the capacity to maintain the rule of law, instil confidence among investors, supervise contracts and provide expedient administration of official rules and regulation.

In the Nigerian State, privatisation has essentially been about the transfer of ownership from public to private. It has also involved the emergence of rules that guide the operation of the emerging private sector driven the economy.

On the effects of globalisation and autonomy of the Nigerian state, we also need state as point of departure that, it is misleading to equate state autonomy with the degree of insulation of elite preferences from the society. Rather, the autonomy of a state is strengthened and enhanced by the degree at which it is entwined with societal forces. Zu Wang’s assertion stresses the fact that state autonomy is not necessarily

undermined if the state is embedded with society, rather, autonomy is eroded when the state finds it difficult to work through and with other non-state actors. He notes that:

More and more theorists have come to realize that, it is an error to equate the strength of the state with autonomy from society and with the ability of state elite to ignore other social actions or impose their will in any simple manner on society. Scholars find that since dimensions of state power have more to do with states’ ability to work through and with other social actors and therefore, that state apparent disembodied from social groups turn to be associated in many cases with weakness other than strength. In other words the state for its part needs society to achieve its objective.94

This assertion questions the widely held view that state autonomy is undermined if the state is embedded with forces of the society. Consequently, the engagement of the Nigerian state with global forces means engagement with a broad range of actors and interests which hitherto had been marginalised and excluded in Nigeria. This, over the years resulted in the personalisation of state power and its deployment to further the interests of few. The argument is that a situation in which globalisation provides opportunities for the diffusion of power in the Nigerian state could be interpreted to mean the accommodation of interests hitherto marginalised or left out in governance. In essence, the internationalisation of agenda setting in Nigeria rather than undermining or vitiating autonomy has the potential of enhancing it by virtue of the fact that greater engagement of the Nigerian state with global forces would invariably dovetail to the accommodation of diverse interest of the society.

Still on the effects of globalisation on the sovereignty and autonomy of the Nigerian State, it is important to note that states interact with other states and non-state actors for specific reasons which usually include the need to solve societal problems. This, in the modern time, demands cooperation with other actors in the global arena. In Nigeria, if such cooperation facilitates the realisation of the objective of the state, hardly would such trans-border cooperation cannot be interpreted negatively as vitiating the autonomy of the state. Beck Ulrich highlights this position when he asserts that:

Methodological nationalism is based in the equating of sovereignty with autonomy. From that point of view, cooperation between states automatically leads to loss of

autonomy and hence, loss of sovereignty. However, if sovereignty is equated with solving political problems, that is, creating economic rules, jobs, social security et cetera, then increasing transitional state co-operation that is, the loss of autonomy, results in strengthening of sovereignty.\(^95\)

On the nexus between globalisation and sovereignty, Ulrich adds that sharing sovereignty does not reduce sovereignty but increases it\(^96\). David Held’s assertion lends credence to the changing nature of sovereignty in current globalisation. He asserts inter alia that:

…the classic regime of sovereignty has been recast by changing processes and structures of regional and global order. States are locked into diverse; overlapping political and legal domains…Sovereignty can no longer be understood in terms of the categories of untrammelled effective power. Rather, a legitimate state must increasingly be recognised through the language of democracy and human rights.\(^97\)

Held’s view amplifies the argument that sovereignty as hinted in the second chapter of this study is no longer indivisible and untrammelled. In the contemporary era of globalisation, there are various issues that transcend the traditional border and authority of the modern states. The implication is that states now seek common solution to such problems. In relations to the Nigerian state, such collaboration and cooperation with other states should not be interpreted to means the erosion of the sovereignty and autonomy. The foregoing assertion, while rejecting the erosion of the sovereignty and autonomy of the Nigerian State as a result of its engagement with global forces should not make us to be blind to the challenges which such engagement may pose for the state. In this era, there is no such thing as internal or domestic affairs; consequently, the growing disappearance of the distinction between domestic and external affairs has serious implications for the Nigerian state. It means that more than ever before, activities of the Nigerian state would now be amenable to external


\(^{96}\) Ibid.

scrutiny to ascertain the extent to which they comply with international acceptable standard. Similarly, in terms of policy formulation, policy actors would have to be conscious of the likely effects which such a policy may have and the attendant reaction of other states.

**4.8. Conclusion.**

This chapter has analysed the manifestation and effects of globalisation on the Nigerian State. The diffusion and application of the Internet and other CMC redefined the power equation between the state and the society. Social networking, online activities, e-commerce and e-government were unknown developments in the era preceding the current dispensation of globalisation. The ascendancy of issues of good governance defined the renewed efforts in the realm of anti-corruption activities. Economic liberalisation apart from redefining the functions of the Nigerian State reduced the control of the state in the economy and consequently encouraged the participation of the citizens in the economy. Part of the effects can be found in the evolving synergy between the public and private sectors in service delivery expressed in Public Private Partnership (PPP). These and other developments shaped by globalisation equally have effects on democracy in Nigeria. These are discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

GLOBALISATION AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

5.1. Introduction.

In chapter two of this study, the linkage between globalisation and democracy was examined. The central issue centred on whether globalisation vitiates or promotes democracy. This chapter discusses how globalisation has contributed to the revival of democratic agenda in Nigeria, the impact of globalisation on democracy and the prospect for democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

5.2.1. The Global Context of the Renewed Democratic Agenda in Nigeria.

The 1980s could well be described as the decade of democracy. It marked an era when transnational financial institutions and donor agencies, particularly the Bretton Woods Institutions, started demanding political conditionality. It was an era in which countries could not treat democratisation as a domestic issue but to a very large extent, something being forced upon them in their bid to receive financial aids. In late 1980s, following the cessation of the Cold War and the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideology, democracy became the best form of government worldwide. It is little wonder that political and economic liberalisation became twin projects of many countries. In addition, at the global level, the influence of non-state actors in governance became visible as they began to champion the cause of the less privileged, poverty eradication, women empowerment, human rights and constitutional reforms. The burgeoning information and communication technologies also facilitated the spread of not only neo-liberal economic ideology but also of political values anchored on the supremacy of democracy as a form of government. Thus, popular movements for political liberalisation started emerging, demanding the enthronement of democracy in authoritarian states.

Samuel Paul Huntington advances the view that between 1974 and 1990, a period that can be labelled global democratic revolution era, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in
the world. Huntington argues that five major developments contributed to the global spread of democracy. First, the favourable international climate in which democracy in one country had snowballing effect and leading to the diffusion of democratic ideas through the expansion of global communication. Second, economic globalisation was seen as relating positively with democracy. Rapid economic growth and its attendant higher levels of education, the development of a strong middle class and the realisation that economic growth cannot be served by corrupt and undemocratic regime spurred the struggle for democracy. Third, there was the striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church from the defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism. Fourth, the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were accepted became an issue. Fifth, changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Union, the United States and the Soviet Union were linked to democratic values.

Apart from these developments, there were other global developments that favoured the struggle for and the enthronement of democracy in African countries. First, in the 1980s, SAP was implemented by many African countries. In its early stage, it was taken for granted that it would be unpopular and would therefore require a regime with the political will for proper implementation. There was a shift, however, as structural adjustment was linked to democratisation. Hence, apart from economic conditionality, political conditionality was added. Mkandawire argues that the experience in Asian countries led to a rethink in the West that, economic liberalisation could go along with democratisation and not in sequential order. Consequently, Africa’s brand of ‘perestroika’ should be linked to ‘glasnost’. Second, the spate of authoritarianism and corruption in many African countries made donor countries to start focusing on issues bordering on governance in the continent. Lack of accountability was identified as one of the factors responsible for the political and economic crises in African countries. Hence, this led to the thinking that an answer to

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2 Ibid.


4 Mkandawire T. op.cit
the crisis in States in Africa demands a change in the pattern of governance. This explained the new emphasis on political accountability in the agenda of donor countries and international financial institutions.

There was also the resurgence of human rights movements, particularly in the West which intensified democratisation in Africa. These movements tried to inject human rights issues into bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. This led to the call for some kind of political conditionality. Fourth, there were political upheavals in different parts of Africa, including Togo, Mali, Zambia, Benin, to mention but a few. Some of the regimes in these countries were initially backed by donor countries. The realisation that the countries they were backing were on shaky grounds and in order to be associated with the new tide of movement for democracy gave impetus to donor countries’ and agencies’ decision to embark on policies favourable to political liberalisation. Fifth, there were changes in intellectual perception about the relationship between types of government and economic growth. There was an avalanche of statistical evidence to show that authoritarian regimes are not more capable than democratic regimes in implementing economic reforms that were encapsulated in SAP.

All these developments, at the global level, served as impetus for the struggle for democracy in Nigeria.

There were other global developments that spurred democratic revival in Nigeria. Eboe Hutchful, in his *The International Dimensions of the Democratisation Process in Africa*, argues that the transition to democracy in Africa occurred in the context of simultaneous and multiple transitions in the global order. He identifies the following as some global developments that spurred democratisation movement in Africa.

(i) The balkanisation of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of an alternative hegemonic order with the attendant ascendancy of the United States and triumph of western democracy.

(ii) The globalisation of the capitalist economy and the emergence of a tripolar economic dispensation comprising the EEC (now EU), the North American Free Trade Area, and Japan and the Pacific Rim, all of which

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
influenced the growing pressures to enhance competitive efficiency among the main capitalist powers. These developments replaced the military competition that characterised the Cold War period.

(iii) The re-emergence of nationalism and ethnic and sectarian feeling as international forces.

(iv) A reshaped United Nations dominated by the US and Western powers.

(v) The rise of social and democratic movements and the attendant emergence of international civil society organisations. These organisations are autonomous, national and international in scope and their activities cut across different countries around the world.

The foregoing suggests that there was a favourable global environment for the spread of democracy. The renewed agenda on democracy in Nigeria coincided with the demands by donor agencies and international financial institutions for accountability and democratisation. According to Claude Ake, in the African context, two movements of democracy could be identified. First, there was the mass movement which was demanded second independence which was believed would be the answer to oppression and poverty. The second movement was elite-driven and, according to Ake, was more visible and articulate and supported by the political class. It was driven by the desire of those out of power and marginalised. Consequently, many of those who championed this course were those suffering from loss of status in the political hierarchy, diminishing access to government officials and government contracts, those having personal disagreement with colleagues in government as well as reaction to perceived marginalisation. Ake argues that frustrated ambition and the need to become relevant defined the struggle for democracy which was thought would be made possible by the resurgence of electoral pluralism.

The questions are: how did globalisation shape the renewed democratisation in Nigeria and what impact does globalisation have on democracy in Nigeria?

5.2.2. External Pressure and the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria

To say that globalisation intensified the pace of democratisation in Nigeria is to affirm the obvious. This could be deduced from the role played by international organisations such as the Commonwealth and European Union as well as individual

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countries such as the US, UK and Canada in the enthronement of democracy in Nigeria. When Nigeria embarked on a transition programme under the Babangida administration, it gave hope to the international community that it was on course in the effort to enthrone democratic rule. But the shifting and postponement of the terminal date of the transition programme created the impression that the leadership of Nigeria was not committed to democracy. The most significant development that attracted attention and, subsequently, reaction from the global community was the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election seen to have been won by M.K.O Abiola. The annulment came at a time when the global community was expecting Nigeria to end military rule and embrace democracy—which had become the preferred form of government. The annulment was seen as a sign of non commitment of the leadership of the Nigerian state to the prevailing global norms.

With the coming of General Sani Abacha, the apprehension heightened given the spate of human rights violations and the general pattern of governance which contrasted sharply with emerging global norms that emphasise good governance. This pitched Abacha and his cronies against the international community. The international community began to perceive Nigeria as a pariah entity leading to the application of various instruments of sanctions against the country. The sanctions were in the form of withdrawal of aids from Nigeria and denial of visa to top officials of the Nigerian military government. The sanctions were equally extended to listing Nigeria as a corrupt drug trafficking country. In addition, the Commonwealth, European Union (EU) and individual countries (notably the US and UK) limited the issuance of visa to high members of the ruling military personnel, restricted arm sales, halted economic and military aid and reduced Nigeria’s access to trade credit. To be specific, in 1994, the US cited Nigeria as a major drug trafficking country, a pronouncement that influenced its decision to vote against granting IMF loan to Nigeria. The reason for the stance of the international community on Nigeria derived mainly from the emerging internationalisation of governance in which human rights were already a global public good. Okpokpo explains what informed the various sanctions by the international community. He notes that:

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10 Ibid.
Despite immense efforts by diplomats and other officials in the Babangida and Abacha years to explain Nigeria’s stance to countries outside Africa, their efforts were fruitless because Nigeria maintained an obsolete definition of national sovereignty. They argued that human rights and related issues were Nigeria’s internal affairs about which outsiders had no say. Yet, gone are the days when any ruler could sit down within the boundaries of his country and treat citizens as he liked without reaction from the international community. In spite of the existing double standards in the field, NATO intervention in Kosovo, former Yugoslavia, is an example. Henceforth, democracy and human rights, which in the recent past were considered in law and international relations as purely internal affairs, are becoming important determinants in foreign policy.  

This explains the emergence of the Nigerian state as a pariah entity due to its failure to enthrone democratic rule and improve its human rights record at a time when democracy, human rights, accountability and transparency were spreading across the globe and states were expected to comply with them or face the risk of isolation.

The fact that sanctions by the international community on Nigeria resulted from the country’s failure to adhere to prevailing norms could be deduced from the attitudinal and policy changes towards Nigeria following the death of General Sani Abacha and the emergence of General Abdulsalam Abubakar as the Head of State. The posture of the Abdulsalam led-administration towards the organisation of a transition programme to a civil rule and the attendant shift of the position of the international community demonstrated that the sanctions were influenced by the failure of Nigeria to enthrone democracy as well as its poor human rights record. For instance, President Clinton was quoted as saying said that, Abacha’s self-succession plan would be supported by the US if Abacha subjected himself to the electoral process. Thus, with the emergence of General Abubakar Abdulsalam, the US lifted its drug-related sanctions against Nigeria, declaring that it was drug-free, whereas during the Abacha administration the lack of co-operation by the Nigerian authorities to combat drug.

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12 IDEA, op.cit.301-330
trafficking made the Clinton administration to list Nigeria among non-cooperation drug trafficking nations\textsuperscript{13}.

The US government took serious diplomatic actions against Nigeria following the annulment of the June 12 election. These included the suspension of development assistance, joint military training as well as the imposition of visa restriction for Nigerian military leaders and their family members. The US recalled its Ambassador to Nigeria following the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and the 8 Ogoni activists and pushed a UN resolution that condemned the action of Nigerian leaders. The US Congress also passed several resolutions calling for sanctions against Nigeria. For instance in 1994, the House of Representatives passed a resolution which called on the Clinton administration to impose additional sanctions against Nigeria\textsuperscript{14}. Similarly a Bill calling for the imposition of sanctions and freezing of assets was introduced in 1996 by then Senator Nancy Kassebaum and Representative Donald Payne. In May 1998, House International Relations Committee Chairman, Benjamin Gilman and Representative Donald Payne introduced the Nigerian Democracy and Civil Society Empowerment Act calling for additional sanctions and increased US aid to democratic opposition groups\textsuperscript{15}. The Clinton administration was also very critical of the transition programme organised by General Abacha. Its stance was that existing sanctions would not be relaxed and that the transition would be unacceptable if Abacha was the only candidate for the proposed election.

In the same vein, during the early part of the Abdulsalam Abubakar administration, the Canadian Foreign Minister was equally quoted as saying that the initial measures undertaken by General Abdulsalam Abubakar gave hope to friends of Nigeria and that Nigeria was following a course to meaningful democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{16} In 1998, the European Union’s President announced that the Union had assumed a new position on Nigeria, including the lifting of all sanctions relating to Visa restriction, high level visits and sporting contests. In March 1999, the IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, was equally quoted as saying that aid could come if Nigeria demonstrated that it was fully committed to democratic reforms\textsuperscript{17}.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Dagne, T. 2006. \textit{Nigerian in political transition}. CRS Report for Congress.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} IDEA, op.cit
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
What the foregoing suggests is that the renewed struggle for the enthronement of civil rule in Nigeria in the 1990s was supported by the international community. The various sanctions against Nigeria particularly under General Abacha administration were due largely to the anti-democratic posture of that administration. The new stance of the international community, which reflected in the relaxation of sanctions on Nigeria when General Abdulsalam embarked on a transition to civil rule, confirmed this. The argument is that the international community supported the struggle for democracy. Sanctions were used to compel the leadership of the Nigerian state to return the country to civil rule.

5.2.3 New Technologies and the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria

Another area globalisation spurred the struggle for democracy in Nigeria can be discerned from the role of the burgeoning technologies, particularly the Internet and other CMC. These technologies transformed the pattern of political activism in Nigeria particularly during the political struggle of the 1990s. Prior to the emergence of the *World Wide Web*, political activism in Nigeria was mainly in the form of protest, campaigns and rallies which were often suppressed by the state. The Internet altered these forms of political activism with the migration of the activities of civil society organisations to the cyber space. The Internet and other CMC were supplemented by foreign media houses which, using modern technologies, were able to monitor developments in the Nigerian State. The Internet equally permitted the civil society groups to unveil developments in the Nigerian state to the outside world. Kole Shettima amplifies the role of global technologies in the political struggle in Nigeria. He notes, *interna altia*, that.

…global changes in information technology have a profound differential impact on the effectiveness of the political struggles. During the first wave of the political struggle, what can be termed rudimentary information technology existed. Communication was very difficult. In the second, high level of technology had developed. The information machinery of Biafra was very effective. Clandestine radio stations were set-ups. Coverage of the events in Nigeria was widely available in the Diaspora. However, this is not comparable to the advantages enjoyed
by the third wave of political activists. The Internet and web sites have been very effectively used\textsuperscript{18}

During the period for the struggle for democracy the Internet and other CMC were employed to expose happenings in Nigeria to the outside world which, according to Shettima, manifested in a series of political activism through Naijanet, Listserv-net, Nigeria news, Yoruba Net, and THT. These cyber fora were used by pro-democracy activists to disseminate information about Nigeria. It was estimated that over three hundred mails per day were received each day by the Naijanet from Nigerian subscribers at home and abroad and also non-Nigerians in different parts of the world\textsuperscript{19}. In the absence of the Internet and foreign media, the state would have censored available media outfits that exposed the anti-democratic activities of the political leadership of the country and as such would not have attracted the external sympathy for the political struggle as well as sanctions on the Nigerian state by the global community. For instance, through the Internet and other CMC, political activists and human organisations drew the attention of the international community to the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and other eight Ogonis. The subsequent reaction of the international community condemning the action of the leadership of the Nigerian state was as a result of the use of the global media and techno space.

Furthermore, global technologies also manifested in the various information initiatives of the pro-democracy movements such as the launching of radio stations in Nigeria. An example of this development was the Radio Kudirat, formerly called Freedom Frequency Radio. Radio Kudirat started as Radio Freedom broadcasting first on 93.4 and later 99.9FM. Later on it claimed to be sending its signals from the Atlantic Ocean between 7.00 and 7.30 am. In June 1996, it assumed the name Radio Democrat International and could be received between 7.00 and 7.30 am on 7195KHZ on the 49 metre band and from 4.00 to 4.30 pm in the evening on 6.205KHZ on the 49 meter band. Radio Kudirat became an arrowhead of the opposition abroad. Using modern technologies, it was able to create excitement at home and feedbacks were received from different parts of the world\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
What could be deduced from the foregoing is that during the political struggle that eventually led to the enthronement of civil rule in Nigeria, the new forms of technologies were the major potent instruments utilised by the civil society to engage the state. The resort to these technologies could be deduced from the fact that such civil engagements could not be carried out using other traditional means of information and communication because most of the media outfits were owned and controlled by the state. Viewed in this sense, globalisation, particularly in the shape of the Internet and other CMC, provided a unique platform for political expression beyond the immediate control of the state. Simply put, since the 1990s, the Internet has become a tool of enrichment for large members of the society having the capacity for allowing mass majority of the population to interact with members of their families and friends in disparate parts of the world through instant communications.

5.2.4. Diasporic Community and Democratisation in Nigeria

In its current usage, the word ‘Diaspora’ has moved beyond its traditional conception in relation to the horrific experiences of Atlantic slavery. It is now used to include voluntary migrants who settle in distant lands and produce new generations and at the same time maintaining ties of affection with and making occasional visits to each other and their home land.

In the 1990s, the number of Nigerians in diaspora increased. This was partly due to youth and professionals who left the country to escape the dwindling economic conditions in the country. Others were opposition elements (such as human rights activists, pro-democracy campaigners, retired military officers and leaders of separatist minority movements) who had to flee the country under threat of assassination, detention and repression. Kole Shettima’s *Nigerian Pro-democracy Movements in the Diaspora* captures the role played by Diasporic Nigerian communities in the democratic struggles in the 1990s. Among prominent pro-democracy groups that utilised the help of the Diasporic community were the National Democratic Coalition-Abroad (NADECO) and the Association of Nigerians Abroad (ANA) which now has many branches in Europe and America. Many Nigerians that fled the country as result

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21 Olukotun, A. op.cit. 13-161.
24 Shettima, K, op.cit.
of the repressive activities of the military became the vanguard of democracy abroad. Prominent Nigerians such as Professor Wole Soyinka wrote several articles in the United States condemning the dictatorial government led by General Abacha and campaigning for sanctions against Nigeria. He formed the Liberation Movement and pro-democracy campaign abroad. Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, a NADECO chieftain who was also in exile appeared on CNN and spoke on BBC on the activities in Nigeria. These activities were geared towards exposing the atrocities of the Nigerian government and mobilise the international community against them. These organisations, in alliance with pro-democracy at home, championed the cause of democratisation. Through the activities of these Nigerians in diaspora, the international community was fully informed about the political crisis in Nigeria and the imposition of economic sanctions against Nigeria by western countries resulted partly from the activities of these Nigerians in diaspora campaigning against the military leadership of the country.

5.2.5. Foreign Media and the Democratic Struggle in Nigeria

During the military regimes of Babangida and Abacha, there was an intensification of the hegemonic contestation between the state and civil society. The latter was championed by the media. The state employed different methods in silencing all oppositions. These included the incorporationist strategies of state owned media and the buying off of dissenting groups and professional associations such as the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ). General Babangida did not even hide his determination to crush opposition to his administration when he declared that there were spoilers within the system, and once they were identified by security agencies, appropriate action would be taken in the interest of the majority of Nigerians, no matter whose interest or personalities were involved. The effect of this threat and declaration became visible when the military government headed by General Babangida descended on journalists and media houses that were critical of his administration. Some of the media houses closed included The African Concord, The Newbreed, Lagos News, The Punch, The Vanguard and The Champions. Apart from the closure of media houses, repressive measures of the government also included the sack and detention of journalists who held dissenting views. For instance, Dr Yemi Ogunbiyi of the Daily Times and Mr

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Mohammed Haruna of *New Nigerian* were sacked. Some of them were detained for varying lengths of time, sometimes for as long as months. These journalists included Lewis Obi of *African Concord*, Dele Alake of *Sunday Concord*, Paxton Idowu of *The Republic* and Chris Okolie of *Newbreed Magazine*. In spite of repressive measures by the government, many of the journalists remained resolute.

This period in Nigeria’s political history was characterised by a kind of war against the local press and other opposition groups. The foreign media, however, came to the rescue. Following the censure of the local media, the CNN, the BBC and VOA became popular during the time of the political crisis, particularly the period after the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election. The BBC and VOA vernacular programmes became popular as Nigerians resorted to them for accurate reporting. It was reported that following the murder of Saro Wiwa and eight others in 1995, there were about 3574 stories on Nigeria in the American newspapers alone. Major American newspapers wrote critical editorial opinions criticising the annulment. Olukotun asserts that such editorials appeared in *New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, the *Christian Science Monitor* and *Boston Globe*. The reactions by the international media to the local political crisis were recycled in Nigeria’s opposition media and cited as evidence that the clamour for the respect of the mandate exercised on June 12, 1993 had the support of the international community. The intense pressure from both the international community, championed by the press and opposition groups, was part of the developments that forced Babangida out of office in 1993.

The foregoing discussion on the role of the foreign media shows that during the political crisis in Nigeria, the local media outfits were censored and in some cases bought off as evidenced by the number of state owned media outfits and journalists that were harassed, arrested and detained, and the newspaper houses that were closed—all designed, as it were, to suppress and silence all opposition. This period, however, witnessed the globalisation of news in which Nigeria featured prominently albeit in a negative manner. The recycling of global reactions to the Nigerian situation

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26 See Olukotun, A. *op.cit*
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
in local opposition media as well as the vernacular programmes on the BBC and VOA intensified the struggle for the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria.

5.3.1 Impact of Globalisation on Democracy in Nigeria.

It has been demonstrated in the preceding sections of this chapter that globalisation intensified democratic renewal agenda in Nigeria and eventually led to the enthronement of civil rule in Nigeria. The task that becomes imperative at this juncture is to discuss how globalisation has impacted democracy in Nigeria.

5.3.2 Enthronement of Civil Rule

One visible impact of globalisation on democracy in Nigeria can be located in the various political reforms embarked upon which eventually led to the enthronement of civil rule. These reforms could be seen as part of the responses of the Nigerian State to global agenda on democracy. The democratisation process started with the setting up of a Political Bureau on January 13, 1986 under the Chairmanship of Samuel Cookey during the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida. The Political Bureau was given fifteen months to submit its reports and mandated to:

(i) Review Nigeria’s Political history and identity the basic problems which have led to our failure in the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems

(ii) Identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals and serve as a guide to the activities of government

(iii) Collect relevant information and data for the government as well as identify other political problems that may arise from the debate

(iv) Gather, collate and evaluate the contribution of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future and provide guidelines for the attainment of the consensus objectives, and

(v) Deliberate on other political problems as may be referred to it from time to time.

The terms of reference given to the Political Bureau aptly underscored the fact that the Nigerian state was in need of proper direction, hence the essence of a basic

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philosophy to guide government in its activities. The Political Bureau, in carrying out its task, identified thirty issues which in its view needed to be addressed in the attempt to devise a course for the Nigerian state. The issues identified included:

…a philosophy of government for the future, a variable popular and genuinely democratic political system, (human rights, economic, social, legal and political) the links between economy and politics in Nigeria, rural and country population in Nigerian politics, labour in Nigeria politics, women in Nigeria politics, youths and students in Nigeria politics, traditional rulership and administration, the armed forces in the Nigerian politics, state and religion form of representation in government formation of Nigerian political parties, their funding and administration of election and electoral processes, federalism, regionalism and statism, nationality and citizenship, creation of states, revenue allocation, ethnicity in Nigeria politics, interest of minority and under privileged groups, national census, national languages, corruption in public life, discipline, law and order, the judiciary and the administration of justice, social and political mobilization for development, the mass media and other forms of communication in Nigerian politics, bureaucracy and development and external relations 30.

Against the critical issues identified as central to the Nigerian state, the Bureau made far-reaching recommendations in its report. In particular, in reviewing the political economy of the Nigerian State, it observed that problems such as mismanagement, corruption, crass opportunism, intolerance, among others to mention but a few have been pervasive in Nigeria because of the nexus between the country’s politics or state power and its economy 31. It then recommended a socialist socio-economic system in which the Nigerian state was expected to commit itself to nationalisation and socialisation of the commanding heights of the economy. The Bureau also emphasised the need for the evolvement of a new political culture as a necessary condition for the success of the new socio-political and economic order. The need to socialise Nigerians on the new socio-political and economic order was also highlighted in the report. It was in the light of this that the Directorate of Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) was launched on July, 25, 1987 and inaugurated on September 2, 1987.

The mandate, observations and report of the Political Bureau underscored the

31 Ibid.
need for an effective political system that would be stable and viable. The submission of the report formed the basis of the longest transition programme in Nigeria’s history under the Babangida administration. The transition programme was revised on many occasions. It was under this transition programme that supportive institutions such as the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) were created and two grassroots political parties (the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) were imposed on politicians and the polity. The implementation of the transition programme was however distorted by the Babangida administration. Apart from the shifting and adjournment of the transition calendar, the banning and re-banning of old politicians and the phenomenon of new breed politicians made mockery of the exercise.

The transition programme, which was designed to create a new socio-political and economic order, was marked by a number of contradictions in terms of the way and manner the political and governmental processes were handled. These worsened the already strained relationship between the Nigerian state and the citizens. The distortion of the transition programme under the Babangida administration eventually came to the crescendo when it annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election presumed to have been won by the Presidential candidate of the SDP, M.K.O. Abiola. The annulment was viewed by many as a calculated attempt by President Babangida and his cronies to stay in power perpetually after trying and failing using various mechanisms, especially the strategy of frequently changing the terminal date of the transition programme.

The annulment of the June 12, 1993 election spawned a series of crisis in the already fragile Nigerian state. Apart from evoking ethnic chauvinism, which the two party structure that was created by the administration sought to address, it placed civil society against the state. The consequence of this was the emergence of many pro-democracy groups championing the cause of the respect for the mandate expressed by Nigerians on June 12, 1993. The pressure was so intense that General Babangida had no option but to ‘step aside’ after putting in place an Interim National Government (ING) headed by Ernest Shonekan. The interim government lasted till November 17 1993 when it was ousted by General Sani Abacha.

The emergence of the Interim National Government (ING) thwarted the democratisation process as it weakened most representative institutions. The era was marked by a number of crises that bordered on the legitimacy of the ING and this
deepened with the coming of General Sani Abacha to power in November 1993. General Abacha initiated a transition programme in which all the political parties, except the Grassroots Democratic Movement (MDG) led by M.D Yusuf, endorsed him as a consensus candidate. Political liberalisation in Nigeria during the administration of General Abacha was designed to pave way for Abacha to succeed himself. He refused to release the detained presumed winner of the June 12, 1993 presidential election M.K.O Abiola. Workers and pro-democracy groups embarked on a series of actions to express their grievances against the pattern of governance. The activities of the pro-democracy groups, such as those by NADECO, became too much for General Abacha as the crisis in the Nigerian polity intensified on daily basis. The effect of this was the repressive action taken against pro-democracy and other groups through state security agencies.

When General Abdulsalam Abubakar became the Head of State, he quickly initiated a transition programme that eventually led to the transfer of power to elected civilians on May 29, 1999. The point being made here is that, the enthronement of civil rule in Nigeria cannot be divorced from the imperatives of global forces. The commitment of the Abdulsalam administration was borne out of the fact that the international community imposed sanctions on Nigeria during the Abacha administration because of his failure to tread the path to democracy as well as the horrendous human rights posture of the administration. Consequently, one can say that, apart from spurring developments that intensified the struggle for the return to civil rule, the transition programme initiated by the Abdulsalam administration was a response to global resurgence of democracy. The transition eventually led to the enthronement of civil rule.

5.3.3. Renewed Political Liberalisation.

We have made mention of the transition programme under the military and the pressure from external actors on Nigeria to return to civil rule. The liberalisation initiative paved way for the formation of political parties and the creation of electoral institutions to oversee the conduct of elections. The opening up of the political space has led to increasing habituation of democratic values in Nigeria. One important component of this development has been the conduct of elections. The conduct of elections is central to democracy, though not all elections have the capacity of deepening democracy. Elections can only promote democracy if they are freely,
periodically and fairly conducted. Since the early 1990s, elections have been frequent in Nigeria. The first sets of such elections were those that were held in the early 1990s under the Babangida administration. Unfortunately, the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election truncated the democratic process and hence could not usher in the Third Republic. The June 12, 1993 election is often described and celebrated as the freest and fairest election ever conducted in the political history of Nigeria. Table 6 below shows the results of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election.

Though attempts were made to put in place mechanisms for the conduct of elections during the Abacha administration, the manner and ways Abacha was adopted by all the five political parties and the repressive measures against pro-democracy groups did not allow for meaningful elections. It was under the General Abdulsalam transition that other set of elections were conducted to usher in the Fourth Republic. Three major political parties took part in the 1998/1999 elections. They were the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). In the presidential election, the PDP candidate, Olusegun Obasanjo, polled 62.8% (i.e. 18.7 million votes) while Olu Falae, the joint candidate of the AD and the ANPP polled 37.2% (i.e. 11.1 million votes). For the election into the National Assembly, see Table 7. The PDP won majority of seats into the Senate and House of Representatives.

32 Dagne, T. op.cit
## Table 6. June 12 1993 Presidential Election Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>SDP</th>
<th>NRC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SDP%</th>
<th>NRC%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ABIA</td>
<td>105,273</td>
<td>151,227</td>
<td>256,500</td>
<td>41.04</td>
<td>58.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ADAMAWA</td>
<td>140,875</td>
<td>167,239</td>
<td>308,114</td>
<td>45.72</td>
<td>54.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AKWA IBOM</td>
<td>214,782</td>
<td>199,342</td>
<td>414,124</td>
<td>51.86</td>
<td>48.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ANAMBRA</td>
<td>212,024</td>
<td>159,258</td>
<td>371,282</td>
<td>58.09</td>
<td>41.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>BAUCHI</td>
<td>339,339</td>
<td>524,836</td>
<td>864,175</td>
<td>40.27</td>
<td>59.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>BENUE</td>
<td>246,830</td>
<td>186,302</td>
<td>433,132</td>
<td>56.99</td>
<td>43.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>BORNO</td>
<td>153,496</td>
<td>128,684</td>
<td>282,180</td>
<td>58.40</td>
<td>41.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CROSS RIVER</td>
<td>189,303</td>
<td>153,452</td>
<td>342,755</td>
<td>55.23</td>
<td>44.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>327,277</td>
<td>145,001</td>
<td>472,278</td>
<td>69.30</td>
<td>30.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>EDO</td>
<td>205,407</td>
<td>103,572</td>
<td>308,979</td>
<td>66.48</td>
<td>33.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ENUGU</td>
<td>263,101</td>
<td>284,050</td>
<td>547,151</td>
<td>48.09</td>
<td>51.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>159,350</td>
<td>195,836</td>
<td>355,186</td>
<td>44.86</td>
<td>55.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>JIGAWA</td>
<td>138,552</td>
<td>89,836</td>
<td>228,388</td>
<td>60.67</td>
<td>39.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>KADUNA</td>
<td>389,713</td>
<td>356,860</td>
<td>746,573</td>
<td>52.20</td>
<td>47.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>KANO</td>
<td>196,619</td>
<td>154,809</td>
<td>342,428</td>
<td>52.28</td>
<td>47.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>KASTINA</td>
<td>171,162</td>
<td>211,077</td>
<td>382,239</td>
<td>38.70</td>
<td>61.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>KEBBI</td>
<td>70,219</td>
<td>144,080</td>
<td>215,729</td>
<td>32.66</td>
<td>67.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>KOGI</td>
<td>222,760</td>
<td>265,732</td>
<td>488,492</td>
<td>45.60</td>
<td>54.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>KWARA</td>
<td>288,270</td>
<td>80,209</td>
<td>368,479</td>
<td>78.23</td>
<td>21.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>LAGOS</td>
<td>883,965</td>
<td>149,432</td>
<td>1,033,397</td>
<td>85.54</td>
<td>14.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td>136,350</td>
<td>221,437</td>
<td>357,787</td>
<td>38.11</td>
<td>61.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>OGUN</td>
<td>365,266</td>
<td>72,068</td>
<td>437,334</td>
<td>83.52</td>
<td>16.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>ONDO</td>
<td>883,024</td>
<td>162,994</td>
<td>1,046,018</td>
<td>84.42</td>
<td>15.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>OSUN</td>
<td>425,725</td>
<td>59,246</td>
<td>484,971</td>
<td>87.18</td>
<td>12.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>OYO</td>
<td>536,011</td>
<td>105,788</td>
<td>641,799</td>
<td>83.52</td>
<td>16.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>PLATEAU</td>
<td>417,565</td>
<td>259,394</td>
<td>676,959</td>
<td>61.68</td>
<td>38.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>RIVERS</td>
<td>370,578</td>
<td>640,973</td>
<td>1,011,551</td>
<td>36.63</td>
<td>63.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>SOKOTO</td>
<td>97,726</td>
<td>372,250</td>
<td>469,976</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>79.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>TARABA</td>
<td>101,887</td>
<td>64,001</td>
<td>165,868</td>
<td>61.42</td>
<td>38.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>YOBE</td>
<td>111,887</td>
<td>64,061</td>
<td>175,948</td>
<td>63.59</td>
<td>36.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>ABUJA (FCT)</td>
<td>19,968</td>
<td>18,314</td>
<td>38,281</td>
<td>52.16</td>
<td>47.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8,357,304</td>
<td>5,891,360</td>
<td>13,850,365</td>
<td>58.50</td>
<td>41.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Results of the 1999 National Assembly Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>Vacant/undeclared seat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Reps.</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled by the Author, 2012.
Similarly, when the 2003 General elections were also conducted, the outcomes were not different from the 1998/99 elections. The only difference was that they were not supervised by the military but by civilians. The number of political parties that took part in the election also increased. The entrance of other contestants could be seen as the manifestation of elements of pluralism in the political space. For the presidential election, a total number of twenty (20) political parties took part. The Presidential candidate of the PDP, Olusegun Obasanjo, won the election with a total vote of 24,456,140 representing 61.94 percent of total votes. At the bottom of the ladder was Mrs. Mojisola Obasanjo of the Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN) with a total vote of 3,757 representing 0.01 percent of the total votes. Table 8 below shows the votes secured by the candidates in the April 19, 2003 presidential election. Elections were also conducted in 2007 when the second term of the Obasanjo led administration was about to end. The elections were very decisive because they marked the beginning of a new era in Nigeria’s political history, that is, the transfer of power from one civilian leader to another. The results were not significantly different from those of the 2003, the PDP won the elections. Table 9 below shows the results of the April 14, 2007 Presidential Election.

The point being stressed here is that with the enthronement of civil rule and the ascendancy of democracy, the conduct of elections in Nigeria has been regular and this contrasted sharply with developments under the military. Although the elections were criticised, they nevertheless show that the political space is being expanded in Nigeria. The conduct of election has put an end to leadership by military leaders.
Table 8. Results of the April 19, 2003 Presidential Election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
<td>Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
<td>24,456,140</td>
<td>61.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Nigeria People Party (ANPP)</td>
<td>Muhammadu Buhari</td>
<td>12,710,022</td>
<td>32.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA)</td>
<td>Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu</td>
<td>1,297,445</td>
<td>3.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nigeria Peoples’ Party (UNPP)</td>
<td>Jim Nwobodo</td>
<td>169,609</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Conscience Party (NCP)</td>
<td>Gani Fawehimi</td>
<td>161,333</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Action Congress (PAC)</td>
<td>Sarah Jubril</td>
<td>157,560</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (NDP)</td>
<td>Ike Nwachukwu</td>
<td>132,997</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party (JP)</td>
<td>Chris Okotie</td>
<td>119,547</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Redemption Party (PRP)</td>
<td>Balarabe Musa</td>
<td>100,765</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Mandate Party (PMP)</td>
<td>Arthur Nwankwo</td>
<td>57,720</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All People’s Liberation Party (APLP)</td>
<td>Emmanuel Okereke</td>
<td>26,921</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Nigeria People’s Party</td>
<td>Kalu Idika Kalu</td>
<td>23,830</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ)</td>
<td>Muhammadu Dikko Yusuf</td>
<td>21,403</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Renaissance Party (ARP)</td>
<td>Yahaya Ndu</td>
<td>11,565</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alternative (DA)</td>
<td>Abayomi Ferreira</td>
<td>6,727</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria Advance Party (NAP)</td>
<td>Tunji Braithwaite</td>
<td>6,932</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Nigeria Progressive Party (BNPP)</td>
<td>Iheanyichukwu Godswill Nnaji</td>
<td>5,987</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Action Council (NAC)</td>
<td>Olapade Agoro</td>
<td>5,756</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria (LDPN)</td>
<td>Pere Ajuwa</td>
<td>4,473</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN)</td>
<td>Mojisola Adekunle Obasanjo</td>
<td>3,757</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Results of the April 14 2007 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Political Party</th>
<th>Candidate(Party)</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Party,(PDP)</td>
<td>Umaru Musa Yar'Adua</td>
<td>24,638,063</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)</td>
<td>Muhammadu Buhari</td>
<td>6,605,299</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Congress (AC)</td>
<td>Atiku Abubakar</td>
<td>2,637,848</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA)</td>
<td>Orji Uzor Kalu</td>
<td>608,808</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Party(DPP)</td>
<td>Attahiru Bafarawa</td>
<td>289,324</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Progressive Grand Alliance(APGA)</td>
<td>Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu,</td>
<td>155,947</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy(AD)</td>
<td>Pere Ajuwa</td>
<td>89,241</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Democratic Party(FRESH)</td>
<td>Chris Okotie</td>
<td>74,049</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Democratic Congress(ADC)</td>
<td>Patrick Utomi</td>
<td>50,849</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria People’s Congress(NPC)</td>
<td>Asakarawon Olapere</td>
<td>33,772</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope Democratic Party(HDP)</td>
<td>Ambrose Owuru</td>
<td>28,519</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Mandate Party(PMP)</td>
<td>Arthur Nwankwo</td>
<td>24,164</td>
<td>0.068%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Liberation Party(ALP)</td>
<td>Emmanuel Okereke</td>
<td>22,677</td>
<td>0.064%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Political System(APS)</td>
<td>Lawrence Adedoyin</td>
<td>22,409</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party(NDP)</td>
<td>Aliyu Habu Fari</td>
<td>21,974</td>
<td>0.062%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Nigeria People’s Party(NNPP)</td>
<td>Galtima Liman</td>
<td>21,665</td>
<td>0.061%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Popular Party(CCP)</td>
<td>Maxi Okwu</td>
<td>14,027</td>
<td>0.0396%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of Nigeria(RPN)</td>
<td>Sunny Okogwu</td>
<td>13,566</td>
<td>0.038%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Nigeria Progressive Party(BNPP)</td>
<td>Iheanyichukwu Godswill Nnaji</td>
<td>11,705</td>
<td>0.033%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Conscience Party(NCP)</td>
<td>Osagie Obayuwana</td>
<td>8,229</td>
<td>0.023%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Action Council(NAC)</td>
<td>Olapade Agoro</td>
<td>5,752</td>
<td>0.016%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Majority Democratic Party(NMDP)</td>
<td>Akpone Solomon</td>
<td>5,664</td>
<td>0.016%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic (ND)</td>
<td>Isa Odidi</td>
<td>5,408</td>
<td>0.015%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity Party (NUP)</td>
<td>Aminu Abubakar</td>
<td>4,335</td>
<td>0.0122%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masses Movement for Nigeria (MMN)</td>
<td>Mojisola Adekunle Obasanjo</td>
<td>4,309</td>
<td>0.0121%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.4. Globalisation and Democratic Reforms in Nigeria.

The impact of globalisation on democracy in Nigeria could be seen from the various political and administrative reforms carried out in Nigeria especially since the mid-1980. Part of these reforms were those instituted at the local government level aimed at bringing the institution closer to the people. The granting of relative autonomy, increase in statutory allocation and the introduction of presidentialism at the local government level were responses to globalisation aimed at promoting democracy in Nigeria.

Apart from the reforms of local government, various public sector reforms had been carried out in Nigeria especially since the enthronement of civil rule in 1999. When President Obasanjo came to power in 1999, the Nigerian State was weak. The long years of military rule undermined the existence of democratic institutions of the state. The supplanting of representative institutions of the state with unrepresentative and handpicked military and, to some extent, civilian personnel accountable to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces did not allow representative institutions to function. The long years of military rule equally left its impact on the executive arm of government. The hobnobbing of the top echelon of the civil service with the military elite compromised the neutrality of the former. The only political structure that appeared to have escaped annihilation by the military was the judiciary; this was not however without its own internal crisis resulting from conflicting pronouncements and judgements.

The morale of the public sector was low and inefficiency loomed large, corruption was synonymous with governance owing to the personalisation of office by the elite and the dominant influence of the state in the economy which had institutionalised rent seeking as state craft. The consequence of these was that the institutions of government and the governmental process were not only fragile, ill-defined but they also lacked legitimacy. There was the need to carry out reforms in the state and this informed the series of reforms that featured in the early part of the Fourth Republic.

The platform for the political reform of the Nigerian State, under the Obasanjo administration, was initiated when a committee was set up to review the 1999 constitution following growing pressure to that effect. The committee, which was inaugurated on December 6, 2004, was headed by Mohammed Makarfi, the then
Governor of Kaduna State. The terms of reference was to generate ideas and provide guidelines on such issues as how to:

(a) effect vital reforms of the structure of governance and relationships between various organs and tiers of government in order to produce rapid development of the country;

(b) ensure social-peace, community harmony and national integration, within the context of federalism;

(c) strengthen the neutrality and independence of electoral commissions;

(d) transform political parties from mere vehicles for contesting elections into viable instruments capable of deepening the contest of democratic values and nation-building;

(e) enforce party discipline and supremacy, while giving ordinary party members legitimate avenues for seeking opportunities and redress;

(f) ensure internal party democracy so as to produce high quality candidates for elective offices and party leadership;

(g) effect judicial reforms in order to promote quick dispensation of justice with fairness, equity and integrity;

(h) effectively deal with the hydra-headed issue of corruption at all levels of society;

(i) ensure that politically elected officials and political appointees are held accountable for corruption and criminal offences while still in office;

(j) re-orientate Nigerians away from the politics of patronage and materialism to politics of service;

(k) inculcate enduring values and virtues in all Nigerian society; and

(l) any other important issues that would contribute immensely to good governance, human rights, social justice and sustenance of unity, stability, security, democracy and development at all levels of governance throughout Nigeria.  

The Makarfi led committee made far-reaching recommendations which set the stage for the National Political Reform Conference (NPRC). Various issues affecting nearly every aspect of the Nigerian state were listed for discussion. Certain developments however bedevilled the activities of the Conference. First was the issue of delegates as majority of the members of the NPRC were government nominees. Second, there was apprehension in many parts of the country in respect of what would be the outcome of the Conference. The pro-democracy groups and civil society organisations were in favour of the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) where the future of the Nigerian state would be discussed. Hence, when the government came out with the idea of NPRC, the pro-democracy groups and civil society organisations were at a fix as to whether to take part or not, anchoring their argument on the fact that the NPRC would not serve as the platform for discussing and addressing the injustice and defects inherent in the Nigerian State. A similar position was maintained by these groups under the Abacha administration, particularly the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). Though the NPRC, which could have been used as a platform for effecting necessary political reforms, failed because of various crises that bordered on resource allocation as well as the smuggling into the agenda for debate issue of tenure elongation for the president, it nevertheless nudged awake the consciousness of Nigerians and also provided a platform for the expression of views on the future of the Nigerian State.

Moreover, during the period under review, series of political and administrative reforms were however carried out. These were in the public service meant to make it more effective and result-oriented. They included the monetisation policy and pension reforms.

5.3.5. Bourgeoning Technologies and Political Activism in Nigeria.

A major development generated by globalisation which is promoting democracy in Nigeria can be discussed in the context of the bourgeoning technologies, particularly the Internet and other CMC. We discussed the ramifications of the new forms of technologies in the last chapter, in particular how the Internet engendered the evolution of e-government, e-commerce and social networking. These

developments altered the pattern of state-society relations in Nigeria, permitting citizens more access to information and transact business online with ease. The bourgeoning of new technologies had varied effects on democracy in Nigeria. These are discussed in the subsequent sections.

In Nigeria, prior to the emergence of the Internet and other CMC, the public sphere was narrow and dominated by the state. The actors in the public sphere, such as the mass media, political parties, interest groups, civil society organisations and individuals, were highly constrained in terms of meaningful participation because of the presence of traditional media gatekeepers such as government censorship and other forms of control. Globalisation, however, changed this trend in two ways. First, the neo-liberal policies of economic liberalisation and global development of satellite technologies led to the emergence of privately owned newspapers, radio and television stations globally, including powerful global media organisations like the BBC, Fox, Al-Jazeera and Skye. This was also replicated at the domestic scene as private radio and television stations started emerging.

The role played by independent media outfits in the struggle for the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria became visible during the General Sani Abacha’s administration. The stance of the regime towards democracy was a serious concern for the international community. His emergence as the unanimous candidate of the five political parties was seen as part of his manoeuvre and desires to circumvent the democratic process that would pave way for him to emerge as a civilian president. His human rights record, especially the onslaught on the chieftains of pro-democracy groups, put a dent on the image of the Nigerian State. Most of the leaders of these groups had to flee the country into exile for fear of being killed. Although this era, as argued by Ayo Olukotun, witnessed the burgeoning of civil society organisations challenging the policies of the state, the control and manipulation of the mass media and the ban imposed on various forms of protests except those organised to demand General Abacha and his cronies to continue in office, weakened political contestation, hence the involvement of citizens in the affairs of the state was highly restricted.

While there were other factors (such as divisions within some of the civil society groups and the ethnic dimensions of some of them which weakened their


36 Olukotun, A. op.cit.3-161.
activities), the necessary infrastructure for expression and articulation of views was absent. Globalisation changed this trend by providing avenue and means of expression beyond the immediate control of the state. The new technologies, as stated earlier, provided a wide array of opportunities for the realisation of the freedom of expression. Basically, the proliferation of foreign media and independent media outfits reduced the control which the Nigerian state hitherto exercised over the mass media. Thus, it was not strange because at the height of political crisis that followed the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election, the foreign media became the means of expression following the censorship of state owned and controlled media. Also, the various pro-democracy and opposition groups that fled the country utilised the Internet and other CMC to monitor developments in Nigeria and at the same time reach out to the international community.

The new technologies, that is the mobile telephony system, the Internet and other social media have impacted democracy positively in Nigeria. This was very visible in the 2003 and 2007 elections. In the voters’ registration exercise for the 2007 elections, the exercise was carried out electronically. Mobile telephones and the Internet were used prior, during and after the elections. Prior to the elections, particularly during the campaign period, many politicians tapped on the new technologies to connect voters. On election days, voters, aspirants and other stakeholders in the election freely used their phones to contact themselves to give reports of what transpired in their own polling booths. The use of the social media and other technologies equally came to limelight in the post 2007 elections that is in the 2011 elections. The voters’ registration was carried out electronically with the use of Bio-data capture machine. Although this was used in the 2007 exercise, the voters registration exercise carried out in 2011 election, to a very large extent, addressed the issue of multiple registration that characterised previous exercises. Moreover, during the campaign for the 2011 elections, the effects of the social media, in particular facebook and Twitter were very visible. President Goodluck Jonathan was said to have about 300,000 fans on his facebook. Other Presidential aspirants such as Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, Ibrahim Shekarau and Dele Momodu, as well as their political parties, had Twitter and other social media accounts37.

The new forms of technologies were also used to address the shortcomings of previous elections. For instance, in the past elections, cases of disenfranchisement of eligible votes, snatching of ballot boxes and other misconducts tainted the integrity of the electoral process. The social media readily came to solve these problems. Many organisations and individuals set up social media platforms where they could monitor the electoral process and report to appropriate agencies using their mobile telephones and other Computer-Mediated Communication. It has been said that the use of the real time social media limited electoral malpractice because would-be electoral malfeasants were aware that they were on camera hence they behaved well. Professor Jega also attested to this by saying that social media made the electoral process more transparent and INEC more accountable to the public. INEC tapped on the platforms of the social media. First, it upgraded its website and set up Twitter, Facebook and Youtube accounts to facilitate communication between INEC and other stakeholders. It was reported that within three days of the presidential elections, about 70,000 people were able to connect INEC and their questions were answered. Moreover INEC was able to receive about 4000 twitter and a 25million hits on its website. 

The social media was also used in mobilising the electorate for the election. INEC also set up situation room equipped with direct numbers which citizens could call to lodge complaints concerning the handling of the elections in their areas. This explains the impressive voters turn out especially for the presidential elections. The citizens also made use of their telephone in making calls and sending text messages to other stakeholders telling them how the election was being conducted in their own areas. Moreover, INEC and security agencies provided communication channels through which citizens could engage the stakeholders and provide them with information. Citizens made use of their telephone in connecting with those agencies. 

There was also the Enough is Enough project that was initiated to mobilise Nigerians to demand for credible elections. EiE also built a platform on mobile telephone for election mapping known as Revoda. Revoda made it possible for telephone owners to register with particular polling booths. It was used in the monitoring of elections. The project 2011 switch count was designed to obtain information and disseminate such to Nigerians in regard of the 2011 elections. Apart from this, the social media allowed for the dissemination of information thus bypassing

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
the traditional gatekeepers of the traditional media houses which determine what to be aired and the type of information to be disseminated for public consumption.

The foregoing shows that new forms of technologies, in particular the social media, have transformed the electoral process in Nigeria, making it more transparent. Extensive use of the social media has been visible in the activities of INEC, campaign by aspirants, the sharing of information by citizens and civil society organisations and has reduced the incidence of electoral malpractices which characterised previous elections.

5.3.6. The Internet and Freedom of Expression.

A visible effect of globalisation on democracy in Nigeria can be gleaned from the use of the Internet as a means of expression. Prior to the emergence of the Internet, press censorship was common phenomenon. Media outfits that were critical of government policies were closed down particularly during the military era. With the emergence of the Internet however, newspapers started migrating to the cyber space, online operations meant that it was no longer possible for the government to gag newspapers and magazines that are very critical of its policies as was the case in the past. Moreover, online newspapers meant that, more than ever before, the voices of the marginalised, the activists and the civil society against the state could be heard on global scale without any form of direct censorship by the state. This indeed was a transformation of power relations between the state and society in favour of society. Since democracy is about the participation of the citizens in the affairs of the state, the empowerment of the civil society could be seen as a positive development for democracy in Nigeria.

Specifically, the Internet and other CMC have been identified as instruments for linking law makers with their representatives in Nigeria. Mobile phones, text messages, emails, facebook and twitter have become instruments for political interaction and mobilisation. This trend became visible towards the end of the Obasanjo led-administration when the issue of tenure elongation was being debated. The rejection of the tenure elongation was celebrated as a triumph of democracy. This, the USAID attributed to the application and use of the infrastructure of global technologies. The USAID captured this vividly when it asserts that:

…civil society and the public itself had roles in defeating the president’s third term gambit, signifying their
growing influence in national politics. These roles were facilitated by new technologies of communication, such as cell phones, cable TV, text messaging and web sites. For perhaps the first time since 1999, legislators felt compelled to consult with their constituents and to vote as the public wished (84 percent were against the third term amendment), even though the presidency was reportedly offering $1 million bribes to each member of the National Assembly who voted in favor of the amendment package. Private television companies provided live coverage of the debates in the Assembly, and newspaper published lists of which legislators were for or against the measures.

Moreover, with social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, individuals and groups now have the opportunity of interacting with one another. Apart from this, the emergence of the Internet and other CMC has continued to engender various Internet based activities such as e-learning, e-medical care and e-commerce. This, in the long run, may have the capacity to improve the wellbeing of Nigerian citizens and thus propel them to demand for more political liberalisation. This puts globalisation on the side of democracy.

5.3.7. Dispersal of Governance and Democracy in Nigeria

The increasing adaptation to global norms, signing of treaties and conventions as well as the involvement of non-state actors especially International Non-Governmental Organisations in the domestic affairs aptly pointed to the fact that the Nigerian state is no longer the sole actor in domestic policy arena. The effects of the dispersal of governance on democracy in Nigeria include the following.

First, the external scrutiny of domestic developments. Two of such scrutiny can be identified in this era of globalisation. These are, scrutiny voluntarily agreed to by participating countries. Under this scrutiny, there is no element of compulsion. Findings from such self-monitoring activities, however, apart from ensuring that countries conform to agreed principles, also have the capacity to keep participating states on their toes. An example of this voluntary scrutiny is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). There is also scrutiny not voluntarily subscribed to but carried out by external agencies to ensure that developments and policies of countries conform

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to best and prevailing practices at the global level. Countries whose activities conformed to prescribed parameters are tagged as conforming to globalisation while those that deviate are considered as pariah states and non conformists. In this context, it is no longer fashionable for any state to hide under the auspices of sovereignty and domestic affairs to violate the fundamental human rights of the citizen because agencies such as the Amnesty International would to raise alarm over such violation. This means that globalisation promotes respect for human rights.

One development that reveals how globalisation has promoted human rights in Nigeria was the issues of human rights violations and environmental degradation in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. While the crisis in the Niger-Delta is not a recent development, it nevertheless gained global dimension in the 1990s with the emergence of social movements and militia groups challenging government policies and the activities of various multinational companies operating in the region. Apart from the importance of oil which could be used to explain the global ramification of the crisis, the central issues bothered on human rights and environmental degradation.

The late Ken Saro Wiwa and other eight activists after unsuccessful campaign to make the oil companies and the Nigerian government to focus attention of the plight of the region moved the struggle to the international community. These activists started using every opportunity they had to draw the attention of the global community to the outright disregard to environmental degradation by the oil companies as well as human rights violations in the Niger Delta region of the Nigerian State. This marked the beginning of the involvement of Non Governmental Organisations and International Non Governmental Organisations in the environmental politics of the region. Some of these organisations included the Amnesty International, the Rainforest Action Group, Friends of the Earth, the Unrepresented Nations and People Organisations, the Green Peace Movement etc. Apart from these organisations, some international organisations such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations became actively involved in the politics of the region. The involvement of these international agencies aptly showed that the Nigerian state could no longer treat the crisis as essentially a domestic affair.

The global dimension of domestic developments in Nigeria came to full glare with the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and others under the General Sani Abacha led-

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military administration. Following the death sentence passed on Ken Saro Wiwa and others by the military tribunal, groups and individuals pleaded with leadership of the administration to reconsider the death sentence. International organisations and agencies also intervened but the execution of the sentence was carried out. The hanging of Saro Wiwa and other eight Ogonis received global condemnation and reactions from the international community. For instance, United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 50/199 on December 22, 1995 on the poor human rights record in Nigeria. The United Nations condemned the human rights violations in Nigeria and encouraged member states to impose sanctions against the Nigerian State. In April 1996, the UN Secretary General sent a fact-finding mission on a spot assessment to Nigeria. Apart from this, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a special committee to assess the extent of human rights violation in the Nigeria. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) also reacted to the crisis by the setting up of a commission to investigate the continued incarceration of labour leaders in the oil sector. This was followed by a delegation of ILO leaders to discuss with the Nigerian government in August 1998. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also reported the alarming rate of human rights violation by the Nigerian government in May 1998. These developments were part of the unfolding events that made the Nigerian State a pariah entity in the 1990s.

Similarly, the Obasanjo-led civilian administration set up the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (HRVIC) headed by Justice Chukwudifu Oputa to review human rights violation in Nigeria. That was the first time past leaders would be made to explain their action while in office. Though some past Nigerian leaders invited by the Commission failed to honour the invitation, issues raised during the sitting of the commission and the publicity given to the activities of the Commission would have embarrassed those concerned.

Other developments that showed the influence of global forces in the promotion of human rights in Nigeria can be deduced from the condemnation of encroachment on human rights in Nigeria. For instance, Safiya Hussaini and Aminat Lawal were condemned to death for committing adultery under the Sharia law introduced by their respective state governments. The death sentence received condemnation from various human rights groups including those from the international community.

42 Ibid.
Safiya and Aminat appealed their sentences and were eventually discharged and acquitted.

As mentioned earlier, the African Peer Review Mechanism has been an instrument of international scrutiny of developments among member states of the African Union (AU). The focus of the APRM includes ensuring that policies and practices of participating countries conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The grand objective is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, economic growth, and sustainable development and accelerated sub regional and continental economic integration through the sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices. The four thematic set of issues in the APRM include Democratic and Political Governance, Economic Governance, and Management, Corporate Management and Socio-Economic Development.

Nigeria signed to the APRM in 2003 and put in place mechanism for self-assessment. In a self-assessment which is the stage of the review process carried out in 2007 on Nigeria, the report on Democracy and Political Governance revealed that Nigeria was making progress as far as democracy was concerned. It pointed to the successful return to civil rule in 1999, the opening up of the political space, the conduct of the 2003 elections, and the bourgeoning civil society working in diverse areas of democracy, as some of the achievement of the Nigerian state.

The report, however, highlights challenges which border on the weaknesses in the Constitution and other regulatory mechanisms, elite fragmentation, high level of corruption in government and public agencies, high level of political apathy among members of the public and the weaknesses of civil society organisations. Assessment by the APRM has been a positive development of globalisation for democracy in Nigeria. The reports always draw the attention of government to areas where deficits have been observed.

5.3.8. Good Governance in Nigeria.

The ascendancy of good governance is one of the manifestations of globalisation in Nigeria with direct impact on democracy. Corruption, over the years, has been identified as one of the problems militating against democracy in Nigeria. The renewed
anti-corruption initiative in the country since the return to civil rule is one of the outcomes of globalisation strengthening democracy in Nigeria.

The USAID in particular acknowledges the effects of the anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria when it asserts that:

Although the third term effort clouded other acts of his presidency during late 2005-2006, President Obasanjo must be credited for implementing a range of important reforms since 2003. His introduction of the EFCC in late 2003 breathed new life into the anti-corruption agenda, after the ICPC fell into virtual disuse. The EFCC soon gained widespread public credibility for a host of arrests, culminating most spectacularly in the arrest of the Inspector General of Police and the impeached governor of Bayelsa State in 2005\(^{43}\).

The role of global forces in the anti-corruption exercise in Nigeria was discussed in chapter four but it would not be out of place to reiterate that UNCAC’s template for anti-corruption crusade, the resolution of the AU and ECOWAS, to a very large extent, intensified the anti-corruption exercise in Nigeria. Although the anti-corruption crusade has been variously criticized particularly emerging issues of plea bargaining, impunity in governance in Nigeria is progressive being addressed. It is no longer business as usual.

5.3.9. Globalisation and Emerging State-Society Relations

While the twin mantra of privatisation and commercialisation could be seen as part of economic liberalisation, it nevertheless has political consequences. Prior to the era of privatisation, the state was the dominant actor in the economy. The Nigerian state was almost everywhere to the extent that as at 1980, about 1500 state owned enterprises were in existence. This trend showed that the economy was state-driven and the participation of the organised private sector was minimal. With the implementation of privatisation, the control of the state over economic activity did not only decline but paradoxically stimulated the participation of the organised private sector in the economy.

This manifested in various forms, such as the transfer of ownership of hitherto state enterprises to the private sector, joint ventures in which public and private organisations formally worked together to provide services or infrastructure, and the

\(^{43}\)Ibid.
built-operate transfer (BOT) in which government agree to buy or lease completed facilities constructed by private investors after such projects might have been operated for some years considered sufficient to recover cost, repay debt and make reasonable return on investment. This public-private sector synergy is reducing the dominance of the state in the economy thereby transferring power to the society. The effect of this is that the traditional areas where the Nigerian state was seen as the main player are now opened to the private sector or shared with or transferred to the organised private sector. Viewed in this sense, privatisation is redefining the power equation between the state and society in favour of the latter. Economic liberalisation, in this sense, is redefining the pattern of state-society relations by empowering the society. This is a positive development for democracy.

5.3.10. Globalisation and the Strengthening of Democratic Institutions

Globalisation has impacted democracy in Nigeria through increasing donor assistance for the promotion of democracy which increased significantly following Nigeria’s return to civil rule. As at 2007, total external support for democracy was put at USD 18,790 million. The donors included Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which expanded the scope of its support to include assistance towards promoting democracy and good governance, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), USAID, France, Norway and Germany. Private Foundations that have provided democracy assistance to Nigeria included the Open Society for West Africa (OSIWA), the John and Catherine MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation. The activities of these donor countries and their development partners cover capacity building for the legislature, voters’ education, election monitoring and strengthening of civil society organisations (CSOs).

The USAID in particular has contributed to the deepening of democracy in Nigeria. During the military era, USAID assistance was restricted to humanitarian activities. However, this changed towards the end of the 1990s, as assistance was tailored toward promotion of democracy. For instance, the USAID provided the sum of USD 5 million for the training of poll workers, domestic election observers and election supplies and logistics during the 1999 elections. Similarly, it was reported that after

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
the 1999 elections, an additional USD 2 million was made available by the USAID for the training of 10,300 elected officials in the fundamentals of representative democracy, accountability, transparency, constituent relations and coalition building. The USAID also supported the Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID) with a budget of USD 4.2 million for the strengthening of state legislatures in Adamawa, Benue, Edo, Enugu, Katsina, Lagos, Niger and Rivers.47

The Consortium of Electoral and Political Processes (CEPPS) has also been involved in activities geared towards the strengthening of democracy in Nigeria. The Consortium is made up of three organisations, namely, the National Democratic Institution for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republic Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). In 1999, the NDI implemented a four-year National Assembly strengthening programme valued at USD 4.5 million. This legislative strengthening programme of the NDI was also extended to some states. Similarly, in 2004, the IFES received USD 188,000 funding from the Australian government to support INEC in the areas of voter education.

Efforts made by external donors and their development partners to deepen democracy in Nigeria also reflect in their assistance to political parties. This covered specific technical areas such as constituency building, platform development and management of relationships with civil society. The UNDP has been visible in this realm. For instance, since 2003, the UNDP democracy and governance assistance has increased. The focus of this programme has been the strengthening of the executive and legislative arms of government for good governance, human rights and gender empowerment, conflict prevention, transparency, accountability and anti-corruption, decentralisation and local governance. Other areas of focus include public sector reforms and capacity building, e-governance and public–private sector partnership.

The European Union (EU) has also been visible in the democracy project in Nigeria. In 2000, a country support strategy was signed between the EU and Nigeria for the period of 2001-2007 and had an estimated budget of EUR 600 million. The EU allocated EUR 6.5 million for the 2003 elections. It allocated EUR 40 million to support the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2006-2011. The funding was for a two-phase elections programme consisting a pre-election phase 2006-2007 and a post election phase September 2007-2010.

47 Ibid.
The International Democracy Assistance has also benefited Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Nigeria. Some were empowered to participate actively in the election process, to mitigate conflicts and also to participate in election observation and monitoring activities. The scope and quality of CSOs participation has expanded progressively with substantial assistance from donor agencies. Donor assistance has helped to expand the scope of CSOs participation in Nigerian elections and Nigerian politics in general. Apart from monitoring elections, the CSOs have been involved in civic education. These developments are indication that the political space is being widened to accommodate groups that had been hitherto excluded.

The point being stressed is that increased assistance from donor agencies and their development partners have been channelled into strengthening institutions of democracy in Nigeria especially in the area of capacity building and conflict resolution. The assistance has also been utilised for the training of election workers and domestic election observers.

5.3.11 External Election Observers and Democracy in Nigeria

Global attention on election in Nigeria could be said to have started in the 1990s when the June 12, 1993 election was monitored by local and external election observers. Since then, external monitoring of elections has been a recurrent exercise in Nigeria and reports of the external election monitoring groups have formed the basis of political reforms. External election observers at different times released reports showing that election conducts were not free. For instance, in the 2003 elections, the reports of the 118 members of the European observers of the elections showed that the elections were marred by serious irregularities in 13 states of the federation. The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) of a coalition of 170 human rights and civil society groups listed states, including Rivers, Ebonyi and Enugu, where the elections were marked by significant fraud. The Commonwealth Observers Groups’ assessment however showed that the elections were credible.

In the 2007 General elections, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), in its observations, observed that “…regrettably, the 2007 polls represent a step backward in the conduct of elections in Nigeria”49. The NDI noted that the elections were marred by delay in the distribution of ballot materials which prevented polls from opening.

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48 ThisDay April 25, 2003.13.
49 Statement of the National Democratic Institute (IDI) international Election Observer Delegation to Nigeria’s April 21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections. April 23, 2007
until late in the afternoon or not all, inadequate supply of voting materials, particularly ballots papers for both the presidential and legislative elections, and in some cases of legislative elections, there were omissions of some candidates’ names on the ballot papers. The NDI reported further that disenfranchisement due to errors in the voters registers, inconsistent application of verification procedures for identifying voters, failure to display voters register, allocation of voters per polling station that were greatly in excess of the standard 500 voters per polling station announced by the Commission (INEC), and underage voting.\textsuperscript{50}

The European Union Election Observation Mission report on the 2007 elections was not different. Commenting on the election, the Chief Observer of the EU EOM, Max ven den Berg declared that:

The people of Nigeria deserve credit for the admirable way in which they conducted themselves on Saturday and demonstrated their commitment to democracy by patiently waiting to vote in often difficult circumstances. However, preparation for the elections should have been of a higher standard and must be substantially improved in the coming days to deliver a credible and secure process at the federal elections.\textsuperscript{51}

The Chief Observer of the EU EOM categorically lamented that: “I am very disappointed... These elections have not lived up to the hopes and expectation of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible.”\textsuperscript{52} The EU EOM asserts further that the elections were marred by poor organisation, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during the result coalition process, voter’s disenfranchisement at different stages of the process and lack of equal conditions for contestants. It concludes that:

In orders for the citizens of Nigeria to have trust and confidence in the political and electoral process, urgent remedial action by relevant authorities and stakeholders is necessary to restore the conditions for credible and transparent elections to be held. In particular, concrete steps need to be taken to establish a truly independent and

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} “Election fail to meet hopes and expectations of the Nigerian people and fall far short of basic international standards”. Being the a statement of the European Union Election Observation Mission, s preliminary assessment of the election released on April 23, 2007.
capable election administration, the atmosphere of impunity for electoral violations must cease, executive immunity should be removed, and political will must be demonstrated by parties at both federal and state levels to end the practice of hiring thugs to perpetuate electoral violence.53.

The foregoing reports of the NDI and EU EOM show that the elections were not transparent. However, the reports of the election monitoring groups which highlight fraudulent practices that were perpetuated by stakeholders in the elections and the litigation by aggrieved aspirants led to the cancellation of some election results. The Courts and Election Tribunals sitting in various parts of the federation nullified elections in some states, including the election of Andy Uba in Anambra, Admiral Murtala Nyako (Rtd) in Adamawa State, Celestine Omehia in Rivers State and Ibrahim Idris in Kogi State. In a similar vein, the election of some Senators, including the Senate President, David Mark was nullified by the Election Tribunals. Even President Umaru Yar’Adua who became president on the platform of this questionable electoral process, had to admit publicly at the occasion of his inauguration that the elections were massively rigged.

The 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections were not hitch free, the observations and reports by the external election observers identified loopholes in the electoral process and informed the agitation for electoral reforms. The report on the 2007 elections and host of other factors made the Yar’Adua led-administration to inaugurate the Justice Muhammadu Uwais Political Reform Panel which made far reaching recommendations on how to make the electoral process more transparent. The argument here is that election monitoring activities in Nigeria have led to electoral reforms and have also made electoral process more transparent as demonstrated in the 2011 general elections.

5.4. Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria.

The preceding sections discussed the impact of globalisation on democracy in Nigeria. The question at this juncture is: what is the prospect for the deepening of democracy in Nigeria? The dispersal of governance, the bourgeoning technologies, external monitoring of elections, ascendancy of good governance, assistance by donor agencies and their partners for the strengthening of democratic institutions—all

53. Elections fail to meet hopes and expectations of Nigerian people and fall short of basic international Standards.
portend optimism for the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. These positive developments, however, exist side by side with contradictions that can vitiate democracy. This section discusses these contradictions. Before doing this, however, the indicators of democratic consolidation are examined.

Different parameters have been identified as indicators of consolidation of democracy. One parameter that has become influential in measuring the extent to which democracy is consolidated has been longevity. Democracy is seen to be consolidated if it remains uninterrupted over a long period of time. Thus, as argued by Ojo, democracy is consolidated when it becomes broadly and profoundly legitimated among citizen and is seen as unlikely to break down. Beatham and Schedler have advanced the view that democratic consolidation “... is about the process of making new democracies or extending their life expectancy beyond the short term of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian repression of building doors against eventual reverse wave.

The view expressed by Schedler is not at variance with that of Beatham and Schedler. He contends that democratic consolidation is about:

- Popular legitimation, diffusion of democratic values, the reutilisation of anti-system action, civilian supremacy over military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves,
- party building, the organisation of functional interest, the stabilization of state power, the introduction of mechanism of direct democracy, judicial reforms, the alleviation of poverty and economic stabilization.

Schedler’s assertion shows that democratic consolidation is not essentially about the enthronement of democracy, it is about its institutionalisation, that it becomes a way of life in such a way that political actors consider it better than other forms of government and are ready to guide against its diminution. It is not just about politics, it involves all elements that would allow democracy to flourish.

Andrea Schedler in another context provides parameters that can be used to measure the deepening of democracy. He identifies some indicators, including the behavioural disposition of political actors. In this sense, democracy is consolidated

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55 Cited in Ojo E. 2006. Imperatives of sustainable democratic values ibid.
56 Ibid.
when political actors and players conform to the game of democracy and refrain from anti-democratic behaviour. This invariably means that once they deviate from the rule of the game, there is danger for democracy. Some of the anti-democratic behaviour listed include, the use of violence in settling political grievances, the assassination of political competitors, and attacks against the liberty, physical integrity and property of political adversaries. Others are rejection of election results and transgression of authority by deviating from the rule of law to the rule of men and women.

The second parameter is the attitudinal foundation of democracy. This, according to Schedler, measures the attitude which the political elite and citizens have towards the survival of democracy. If they have strong and genuine support for democracy, meaning that they believe that it is the best form of government and are ready to defend it from any form of diminution, democracy has the tendency to flourish but if the reverse is the case, it may undermine its survival. The third parameter centres on the structural foundation of democracy. This measures the degree of the socioeconomic factors that may affect democracy. In this sense, the economic wellbeing of a country becomes the deciding factor as far as the consolidation of democracy is concerned. In simple language, democracy can not flourish in a society where there is abject poverty in the land. Under this social economic condition, social inequality and high degree of poverty may subvert the minimum conditions necessary for the exercise of those equal rights that are constitutive of democratic citizenship. Also included are institutional factors which, to a very large extent, also determine democratic consolidation. Institutions in this context refer to set of rules that may promote or diminish democracy. In this regard, in highlighting the prospects for the deepening of democracy in Nigeria, the analysis would have to be in the context of developments spawned by globalisation which are favourable to democracy as well as contradictions that are capable of vitiating democracy.

We have discussed the contradictions spawned by economic liberalisation which resulted from the mode of implementation of privatisation as well as the issue bordering on the welfare of the citizens. We have also made reference to the perversion of the electoral process, particularly the fraudulent practices associated with the 2003 and 2007 elections. Apart from these, the emerging technologies are also generating

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58 Ibid.
contradictions that may limit their use as instrument for promoting democracy. These contradictions include:

First the perversion of the Internet. With the emergence of the Internet and other CMC, new forms of cyber criminals such as hucksters, fraudsters, hackers, pirates and phisers emerged. Hucksters are those who send a large number of messages to e-mail addresses automatically retrieved from web pages using e-mail address harvesting software such as e-mail extractor. The purpose of this activity is to introduce and advertise a product to be shipped or downloaded to unsuspecting victims. Fraudsters are similar to hucksters, but small messages are sent to each harvested address. Those involved in piracy indulge in illegal reproduction and distribution of software applications, games, movies and audio Compact Disc. The pirates usually make copies available online without the express permission of the original owner of the software. Hacking refers to the activities of criminals who monitor and break or crack security codes on ATM cards, e-marketing site, credit cards among others for the purposes of illegal e-commerce. Pishing involves the stimulation of products websites to deceive innocent people into ordering products that do not exist at all. It is concerned with the imitation of products and e-commerce web pages in order to defraud unsuspecting users. These criminal activities were unknown in the pre-Internet era; hence their existence poses security challenge to the Nigerian State.

This is not to suggest that there were no fraudulent practices in Nigeria prior to the Internet era. The point being stressed is that, new forms of technologies have allowed for the migration of criminal activities to the cyber space thereby making it difficult for security agents to determine the identity and exact location of the criminals. The consequence of this is that transactions, especially e-commerce, involving financial exchanges became highly suspect, and hence people tend to show preference for offline activities to guide against the activities of fraudsters.

Second, resulting from the growing trend of cyber crime, the Nigerian state has devised measures aimed at fighting or curbing the menace of cyber crime. These measures are legislative, administrative and technical in nature. The legislative measures entailed the enactment of laws such as the Money laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004, the Computer Security and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 2004.

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Bill of 2005, the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act of 2005. The administrative measures entailed the setting up of the EFCC, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) as well as the Nigerian Cyber Working Group (NCWG). The main thrust of these legislative and administrative measures is to monitor the transfer of money suspected to have been acquired illegally. These measures are not concerned with other forms of cyber crime per se but with money from drugs and other negative activities. All this boils down to the fact that online activities in Nigeria are not trusted. This is not restricted to transactions within the country as the activities of the fraudsters, popularly called “Yahoo boys”, have ramifications in other parts of the world as victims of these activities are spread over the world. The invasion of the cyber space by criminals has become a threat to the democratic potentials of e-government in Nigeria. The implication of this development is that, unless efforts are made to instil confidence in online activities, their democratic benefits would continue to elude the Nigerian State.

Third, the increase in the number of Internet users and mobile telephone subscribers shows that Nigeria is progressively penetrating the cyber space. However considering the population of Nigeria, which stands at over 140 million people, an Internet penetration of less than 10 per cent is ridiculously low, though this has continued to increase. The implication is that, many Nigerians are not operating in the cyber space. Even if 10 per cent of Nigeria’s population represents the percentage of those who utilise the Internet and other CMC for political activities, this means that 90 per cent of the population is adopting the traditional methods of participation of the pre-Internet era.

Apart from the low Internet penetration, participants, i.e. individuals and civil society groups, are mainly urban-based; this means that rural dwellers are not benefiting from the opportunities offered by the new form of technologies. While this, to some extent, might be correct, the emergence of mobile telephones with Internet facilities has reduced the issue connected with the concentration of Internet facilities in urban areas. Those who have the facilities can log in from any part of the country where there is network. This observation brings us to another problem related to access which is the cost of connecting to the Internet. This is the major obstacle to Internet use in Nigeria[^60]. Even with the development of mobile telephone system with GPRS

[^60]: This is a major problem in terms of the use of the Internet in Nigeria. This emanated mainly from the problem of time use in connecting to the Internet.
facilities, the cost of connecting to the Internet is very high. The cost of Internet access is on the high side in Nigeria. Table 10 below captures the price basket for Internet per month and telephone call for twenty countries for the year 2004. The Table shows that as at 2004, Nigeria had an average of $85.5 -the highest among the countries listed and the lowest number of Internet users per 1000 people. The survey was based on the cheapest available tariff for accessing the Internet in 20 hours a month, 10 hours peak and 10 hours off peak.
Table 10. The cost of Internet Access and Telephone calls in Selected Countries for the year 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Internet users(per 1000 people)</th>
<th>Price basket for Internet(US$ per month)</th>
<th>Price of telephone call to US(US $ per 3 minutes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several reasons could be adduced to explain for this high cost of Internet access and telephone call rates. One of them is inadequate support facilities such as power supply. Public Internet operators continued to complain bitterly about erratic power supply. Their complaints centred on the fact that many people cannot operate Internet outfit in Nigeria without a standby functional generator. Having the generator is not however the solution but how to fuel the generator, given the problem of buying diesel which is in the range of N110-N130 Naira per litre\textsuperscript{61}. The problem of electricity is undermining the operations of mobile telephone providers in Nigeria. Telephone operators have resorted to the use of generators the cost of fuelling and maintenance of which is passed to Nigerians in form of high tariffs. In this sense, no matter how we celebrate the new forms of technologies, their full advantages are yet to be utilised by Nigerians due to the inadequacy of support facilities, especially electricity.

The emergence of e-government as a novel development in Nigeria is one of the outcomes of the manifestation of the technological dimension of globalisation. This, as already highlighted, has accelerated top-down publicity of information between the state and the public. The application of these new technologies is limited because of the following:

In Nigeria, the mounting of database, or what can be called cataloguing, has gained momentum since the 1990s as government institutions and agencies embraced the new forms of technologies in their transactions. Most of these websites, however, contain only the information they want the public to have access to. More embarrassing is the fact that most of the websites were set up many years ago without any form of upgrading or updating. Consequently, the websites held outdated information. Moreover, the Internet is designed in such a way as to facilitate interactive communication between the state and the citizens. With feedback mechanisms, citizens could react and comment on public issues. The potential gains of this in Nigeria are, however, in doubt due to the absence of these mechanisms. Most government websites are still at the cataloguing level, hence they are yet to progress to the transaction, vertical and horizontal integration stages. This has not allowed for effective communication between the state and the citizens. This is a major limitation of the democratic function of the new forms of technologies in Nigeria.

\textsuperscript{61} This is also a major problem. Apart from the cost, the product is not always available.
Furthermore, some surveys on Internet use in Nigeria aptly show that it is mainly by the youth and the purpose are not necessarily for political and civil engagement but for research, gambling, pornography and spam.\textsuperscript{62} The implication of this for the consolidation of democracy is that, the existence and diffusion of new forms of technologies, such as the Internet, should not be seen as sufficient indicator of the likelihood of increased civic engagement. The political consciousness must, in the first place, exist in the non-virtual form before it can be reinforced in the cyber space. In the absence of such consciousness, the Internet and other CMC would do little to change the pattern of political participation because those who were active in the non-virtual space would be those that are likely to migrate to the virtual or wired world.

There is also the problem of social divide that could limit the democratic role of the new forms of technologies. In the offline political space, differences in social status such as wealth, educational and family background defined those who wielded political power in the Nigerian State. Consequently, the social status of the citizenry, to a very large extent, influences participation in politics. The emergence of new forms of technologies has not fundamentally altered this trend. Social divide exists between information rich and the information poor. The educated citizens and those residing mainly in the urban areas with the means to access the Internet featured prominently as beneficiaries of the opportunities provided by the cyber space. Even most youth identified as the main users of the Internet do so at the public cyber café located in many towns and cities in Nigeria\textsuperscript{63}. What the foregoing suggests is that the hope that the Internet would produce a level playing ground for all citizens is highly exaggerated and hence it should not be stressed too far as technologies have not abolished some traditional obstacles to political participation in Nigeria. Traditional factors that influence civil engagement are still very much in existence, limiting the democratic potentials of the new forms of technologies.

Fifth, technical and regulatory measures of the Cyber Space in Nigeria are yet another set of concern. One of the building blocks of modern democracy is the existence of a flourishing civil society that depicts idea and presents alternative solution to public issues. This democratic role can only materialise if organisations of the civil society have the freedom of expressing their opinion without any form of


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
intimidation and victimisation on the part of the government. While we have discussed how this role is being progressively discharged by civil society groups in Nigeria as a result of the liberalisation of the public sphere, the perversion of the new forms of technologies prompted the Nigerian State to take some reactive technical and regulatory measures on the Internet in the name of security and public interest. The principal regulatory mechanism in Nigeria focuses on the cyber cafés and their operations; it was made mandatory for all cyber cafés to be registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), the EFCC and the NCC. Second, it is a rule that a cyber café must be run on membership basis instead of pay-as-you-go. Third, all cyber cafés must subscribe to a registered Internet Service Provider (ISP). Apart from this, the Nigerian State entered into a partnership with Microsoft by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the organisation with the aim of identifying and prosecuting cyber criminals. In the memorandum, Microsoft was expected to assist Nigerian investigators in the area of techniques of extracting useful information from personal computers, how to monitor computer network and how to identify the people behind such activities.

These technical and regulatory measures evolved because of the need to enhance security and public interest. However, developments in some parts of the world where the state attempted to regulate the Internet showed that under the guise of national security and public interest, the state could regulate the cyber space to promote its own ends. Since technology is seen as reducing the power of the state vis-à-vis the society, regulation and monitoring of the Internet may reverse this emerging trend thereby reinforcing the power of the state. Examples from Peoples Republic of China and Cuba lend credence to this possibility.

In People’s Republic of China (PRC), measures regulating Internet access exist in various forms. Apart from registration of Internet Service Providers, the ISP are expected to record such information as the time that its subscribers accessed the Internet, the subscribers' account numbers, the addresses or domain names of the Web sites, and the main telephone numbers they use. All (ISP) must keep a copy of their records for 60 days and furnish them to the relevant state authorities upon demand, in accordance with the law. Article 18 of China’s Internet Regulation states that:

State Council Department in charge of information industries, and the telecommunications administration of the relevant province, autonomous region, or municipality under the central government’s direct jurisdiction, shall exercise supervision over ISP in accordance with the law. Departments in charge of information, the publishing business, education, public health, and pharmaceuticals; departments in charge of business administration; and departments in charge of national security, must supervise the contents of Internet information in areas under their respective jurisdictions and in accordance with the law.

Similar restrictions exist in Cuba. Though the government declared Internet access as a fundamental right of the citizens, legislative and regulatory measures are in place to limit access. Restriction of access started with the ban placed on the ownership of personal computers, printers and modems in the 1990s. As at 1998 only approved foreign nationals and government officials were allowed to have Internet access on their desktops. Similarly, the Cuban 1996 Decree Law 209 requires accreditation for Internet use and outlaws Internet use in violation of Cuban society’s moral principles and laws as well as email messages that jeopardize national security. Government also restrict Internet access by having all legal Internet traffic pass through state run ISPs which has a software for detecting politically dissident information. The filtering includes the monitoring of emails before they are sent and received or delivered. Apart from this, the police were reported to have the habit of seizing personal computers and modems claiming that they are politically dangerous. Strict penalties also exist for violation. For instance, for connecting illegally, five years imprisonment and twenty years for writing counter revolutionary articles are prescribed.

The argument being canvassed here is that progressive regulations of the Internet in Nigeria may be extended to other forms of online activities such as monitoring the websites of civil society organisations that are very critical of the policy of the government. Simply put, regulation of the Internet is tantamount to censorship of the press that was common in the pre-Internet era. More dangerous is the fact that the publicity and public outcry that could follow the proscription of a media outfit is not likely to follow the blocking of a website of a civil society organisation. What is being said here is that, it is easier for the government to censor the website of an organisation in the name of security and public interest than outright closure of a

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65 See http://opennet.net/research/profiles/cuba
media outfit because of the sporadic reactions that may follow the latter. This portends cloudy and uncertain prospects for democratic consolidation in the Nigerian State.

The foregoing contradictions of the new forms of technologies cannot be exclusively attributed to globalisation. They resulted mainly from inadequacy of domestic support facilities such as electricity. Moreover, the cost of access is decreasing on daily basis. For instance, in the early years of the GSM in Nigeria, the cost of telephone and its accessories was very high. The average cost of making a call was equally high. This was in the range of 60 Naira per minute. With the emergence of other operators in the industry and activities of the NCC, the cost has started decreasing with most of the operators inducing customers with different types of market strategies. Free air-time and SMS messages are now given to subscribers to reward their patronage. This also applies to Internet facilities. In the early days of Internet in Nigeria, cyber cafés were the only places apart from big organisations where one could access the Internet. In recent times, however, telephones with Internet facilities and Internet modem are in the market. Hence, citizens in the comfort of their homes can carry out online activities. The argument is that global technologies have liberalised the public sphere, increased citizens’ knowledge, and engendered online activities such as e-commerce, e-government and series of social networking, though spawning some contradictions, especially the migration of criminals into the cyber space.

5.5. Conclusion: Globalisation and the future of democracy in Nigeria

This chapter has discussed how globalisation intensified the revival of democratic agenda in Nigeria. The global environment was seen to be favourable for the spread of democratic norms, the demand for political conditionality by donors and their agencies, the Internet and CMC that offered unprecedented platform for political activism for pro-democracy groups, the role of Nigerians in diaspora and the role of foreign media—all these contributed to the enthronement of civil rule in Nigeria. This chapter has also shown that globalisation has impacted democracy in various ramifications. These are the enthronement of civil rule, political liberalisation which has expanded the political space, the Internet and other CMC which have enhanced political activism and freedom of the press, economic liberalisation that is creating an emerging middle class, external monitoring of elections which led to electoral reforms, ascendency of good governance and the promotion of human rights. All these
developments portend optimism for the strengthening of democracy in Nigeria. Inspite of these, it has been established in this chapter that the perversion of the new forms of technologies, high cost of accessing the Internet, inadequate support facilities to mention but a few are limiting the political potentials of the new forms of technologies. The observed contradictions, however, resulted largely from the way and manner Nigeria adapted to the realities of globalisation as well as the inadequacy of domestic institutions.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

There is a consensus that globalisation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon with diverse consequences for the modern state. The nature of the consequences is, however, being debated. While some writers celebrate the processes of globalisation as having the capacity of engendering development, a large number of them continued to vilify its processes. In-depth studies devoted to the examination of the cogency of these perspectives in relation to the Nigerian State are sparse. The nature of the consequences of globalisation has therefore remained contentious. The need to fill this observed gap aptly defines the central agenda of this study which aimed at examining the nexus between globalisation and the Nigerian State with a view to ascertaining its effects and the prospects which developments generated by globalisation have for the consolidation of democracy. This chapter is the concluding part of the study and it contains the summary, major findings, contribution to knowledge and conclusion.

6.2. Summary

The review of the nature and character of Nigerian state prior to contemporary era of globalisation revealed that the foundations of its institutional and governmental processes were laid in the colonial era. It was an era that was characterised by a gulf between the state and the citizens, an era in which the state was seen as an alien institution from which resources must be expropriated and in which, in order to exert its hegemony, employed instrument of violence to compel obedience. The colonial Nigerian state was characterised by acrimony and mistrust between the state and the citizens, hence questions were not only raised about its legitimacy but also why it was despised as an entity. The attainment of political independence did not, however, alter these strained relations between the state and the citizens. Instead, it took another dimension. The emergent local elite who succeeded the British failed to endear the

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state to the citizens through purposeful institutional and governmental arrangements for effective service delivery, welfare and security.\(^2\) The analysis of the pattern of governance in the immediate post-independence period showed that the post colonial Nigerian state was everywhere and its power knew no bounds. The state became the centre for primitive accumulation and this made the struggle for state power to become fierce, as a matter of life and death.

The role of the state in the economy was very visible. It was involved in direct production, distribution and delivery of services. This became visible in nearly every sector of the economy as the government assumed the commanding heights of the national economy. The growing dominance of the public sector resulted from the expansion of existing state structures and institutions, particularly state owned enterprises, and the establishment of new ones- a trend that accounted for the increase in the number of public enterprises. Nigeria assumed a role of a developmental state which expanded the influence of the political class in the economy. This expansion did not, however, translate into the effectiveness of the state. The state could not meet the needs of its people as the ruling class continued to use state resources to further parochial interests. This increased the phenomenon of rent-seeking by the political class.

Politically, the Westminster model of government bequeathed to Nigeria by the colonial authorities collapsed few years after independence. The emergence of the military on the political scene heightened the centralisation of governance as the pattern of central-local relations fostered the subordination of constituent states and local governments to federal institutions, which distorted Nigeria’s federal structure. This trend limited the space for participation by local communities and created a situation in which programmes and projects executed were at variance with the needs and aspirations of the local communities. Government activities smacked of secrecy and were far from the citizens, and the impact of the state was not felt. The cumulative effect of this was that the power equation between the state and society was highly in favour of the former. This further estranged the state from the society.

Various political and economic reforms were embarked upon by the Nigerian state. The indigenisation exercise of the 1970s increased the stake of the national bourgeoisie who used state apparatuses to further their parochial interests. The

Fundamental Objectives and Directives Principles of State Policy entrenched in the 1979 Constitution did not succeed in endearing the state to the society. The fundamental objectives were not justiciable, but were seen more or less as mere guidelines for political action. Thus, in the early 1980s, the dwindling fortunes of the economy started manifesting in the high rate of unemployment, shortage of basic amenities and rising external debt profile.

However, in the mid-1980s at the global level, authoritarianism was becoming less fashionable as democracy and good governance were assuming global public goods which all states were expected to imbibe and domesticate. It was also an era that witnessed the resurgence of democratic initiatives, economic liberalisation (which featured privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises), the ascendency of good governance and the evolution of the Internet and other CMC. Hence, from the mid-1980s, major developments in Nigeria were shaped by global forces. These included democratisation, privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises and anti-corruption exercise.

6.3. Major Findings of the Study

Globalisation is associated with the accelerating pace of global interactions and processes as the evolution of worldwide systems of transport and communication increase the rapidity or velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information capital and technology move around the world. It is also about the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions associated with a deep enmeshment of the local and global. This interconnectedness was found to involve stressing of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers so that events, decisions and activities in one part of the world come to have significant implications for individuals and communities in distant places on the globe as well as the intensification or the growing magnitude of interconnectedness in almost every sphere of social existence.

A review of the character and nature of the Nigerian State in the period preceding the contemporary era of globalisation showed that governance was distorted. The power of the Nigerian state knew no bounds as a result of its hegemonic influence in economic activities and public sphere. The economic functions of the Nigerian state covered direct production of goods and services, provision of services, participation in the economy through subsidies and regulation and stabilisation, all of which moved the
functions of the Nigerian state beyond the orthodox role of service delivery. This, as argued by Larry Diamond, created a false picture of the commitment of the state to the welfare of the citizens and the creation of a system of state socialism without any socialist commitment to justice, or distribution or even growth. Prior to the contemporary era of globalisation, the dominance of the Nigerian State on the economy was very visible due to the growth of the public sector. The public sphere was dominated by the state, and hence there was little opportunity for political contestation due to the ownership and control of the means of communication by the state, politics of central-local relations and the phenomenon of the military which distorted pattern of governance.

The study further revealed that, from the mid-1980s and beyond, traits of contemporary globalisation started manifesting. These included the implementation of the twin mantra of privatisation and commercialisation. This exercise, which started in 1988 during the military under the leadership of General Ibrahim Babangida, became intensified in the Fourth Republic under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Decree No 25 of 1988 listed 111 enterprises to be privatised either partially or fully and 35 other enterprises for partial or full commercialisation. For the implementation of the privatisation and commercialisation programmes, the Decree created an oversight agency known as the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) which later metamorphosed into the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) when the TCPC submitted its report. The first phase of privatisation was under the military between 1988 and 1999 and the task of implementing the programme, as noted above, was placed on the TCPC. In implementing the programme, the methods adopted were within the context of globally accepted techniques of privatisation.

Between 1999 and 2006, about 116 enterprises were privatised and they included various loss-making-government-enterprises operating in industries such as Aluminium, Telecommunication, Petrochemical, Insurance and Hotel. The privatisation exercise also involved the unbundling of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) into 18 companies for power generation, transmission and distribution, as well as the successful sale of 51 per cent of government stake in the

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Hilton-Abuja and sale of the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL). It was also in this context that regulatory agencies such as the Nigeria Communications Commission and the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission emerged in respect of the regulation of services provided by the emerging private sector driven economy.

The study found that economic liberalisation particularly privatisation redefined the functions of the Nigerian state. Specifically, the implementation of privatisation policy in Nigeria was found to have altered the role of the state as a producer, major economic actor and provider of services. This amounts to the transformation of the functions of the Nigerian state. The state did not retreat. Furthermore, economic liberalisation engendered a new trend in governance, that is, Public-Private Partnership in service delivery. This synergy between the state and society dispersed power between the state and society and equally redefined the power equation between the state and the citizens in favour of the latter. The implementation of privatisation and commercialisation, however, produced a series of contradictions which included the dismantling of welfare policies for the citizens as evidenced in the removal of subsidies from social services and other similar social safety nets provided by the Nigerian state. Moreover, the mode of implementation of economic liberalisation in Nigeria failed to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor and thus could not address fundamental issues of equity and justice.

The study also revealed that while political liberalisation in Nigeria did not start in the 1980s, it was intensified by the global spread of democracy in the 1980s. The inclusion of political conditionality, that is, democratisation, by the Bretton Woods financial institutions, external pressure from Economic Union, Canada and the US, the activities of Nigerians in Diaspora, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Internet and other CMC, to limit the list to just a few, were some of the global developments that shaped the renewed democratic agenda in Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s. These developments sparked a number of events and developments that eventually led to the enthronement of civil rule on May 29, 1999.

It was also discovered that globalisation influenced domestic and foreign policy initiative of the Nigerian state. This manifested in the integration of the Millennium

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Development Goals (MDGs) into Nigeria’s domestic development initiatives, including the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) and the Seven Point agenda initiated by the Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua administration. The enmeshment of the local and global developments gave such local developments global ramifications.

The study also found that the ascendancy of issues of good governance and the global agenda on corruption control intensified the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. This global dimension of the anti-corruption crusade explains the emergence of anti-corruption agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the accession to the NEITI. The global dimension of the anti-corruption crusade could equally be deduced from the various treaties and conventions aimed at combating corruption which the Nigerian State signed and acceded to. These included the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption. Guidelines adopted included, the Guidelines for Public Debt Management, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Affairs, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, International Accounting Standard and International Standards in Auditing.

Nigeria’s compliance with global anti-corruption agenda reflected in the collaborative assistance of external agencies such as the London Metropolitan Police, and Federal Bureau of Investigation in ensuring that former Governors Joshua Dariye of Plateau State, James Ibori of Delta State and DSP Alamiesyeigha of Bayelsa State did not escape trial even outside the domain of the Nigerian State. These developments deviated sharply from the anti-corruption crusade of the previous eras, which was basically a Nigerian affair, as those indicted for corrupt practices or suspected to have been involved in corrupt activities fled the country to other countries as it happened after the Second Republic, especially the Umaru Dikko episode. While the anti-corruption crusade has not completely eradicated corruption in Nigeria, the consciousness of the existence of the EFCC and ICPC has addressed the culture of impunity in governance. This has the capacity of deepening democracy in Nigeria.

It was also found that the growing interface of domestic and external issues encouraged the external scrutiny of domestic developments in the Nigerian State.
External scrutiny included election monitoring, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the activities of many international non-governmental organisations. The reactions that followed the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and other eight Ogonis under the Abacha administration aptly confirmed this.

The study further revealed that globalisation has transformed the Nigerian state through the diffusion and application of new forms of technologies which include computers, electronic mail, the Internet, digital cable and fibre optic technologies, mobile telephone, and satellite technology television. The increase in the diffusion of digital technologies could be discerned from the growth of the Internet and the explosion of telephone teledensity, particularly with the emergence of the Global System of Mobile Communication. The emergence, diffusion and application of these new forms of information and technologies since the mid 1990s were found to have defined the migration of social, economic and political activities to the cyber space. These developments were found to have the following effects on democracy in Nigeria.

First, the emergence of e-government resulted in the cataloguing of government information and migration of government activities to the web. These websites present information about government activities, mission of agencies, location and contact addresses. This development was found to have heralded new forms of governance as citizens could access government websites for information and transact business such as renewing driver license, payment of levies, processing of tax receipts and clearance, and host of other activities. This was not limited to the government; other segments of the Nigerian society utilised the new forms of technologies in their activities. For instance, in the banking sector, modes of transactions were transformed with the application of new forms of technologies such as the Automated Teller Machine (ATM) and online banking. Similarly, public examination bodies such as Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB) and the West African Examination Council (WAEC) etc adapted the new form of technologies, in particular the Internet, in their relations with prospective candidates. This also applies to many institutions of higher learning in Nigeria where payment and registration are done online. These developments were unknown in the pre-globalisation era.

Second, Internet has enabled Nigerians to have opportunity for various online activities such as online learning, online commerce, and online medical care among others. Other features of the Internet such as social networking sites like Face
book, Youtube, and Twitters encouraged greater interactions among Nigerians and their kindred in other parts of the world. This was found to have the capacity for creating more informed interactions between the citizenry and the government, a situation which in the long run may intensify demands for political reforms.

Third, the new forms of technologies, in particular the Internet and other CMC, also transformed the political space in Nigeria. The liberalisation of the public sphere led to the transformation of political activism. The transformation was not essentially due to the liberalisation of the means of communication. Rather, it was as a result of the emergence of new forms of technologies, particularly the Internet, which gave civil society an unprecedented opportunity to operate outside the framework of direct censorship of the state. This transformed the power of the civil society in many ramifications. The migration of most Nigerian newspapers to the Internet led to the availability of newspapers online. This logically means that it is no longer easy for the government to gag newspapers and magazines that are very critical of its policies as it was the case in the past. Moreover, online newspapers meant that more than ever before the voice of the marginalised, the activists and the civil society against the state could be heard on global scale without any form of censorship.

Fourth, the Internet and other CMC equipped the civil society in Nigeria with new modes of operation beyond the immediate control of the state. The Internet has become the site for political association, mobilisation and instrument for protest. It has become a unique instrument of mobilisation with audience and participants that transcended the shores of the Nigerian State. For instance, during the height of political repression between 1993 and 1998, the local mass media, in particular radio, televisions and newspapers, were highly censored. The new forms of technologies, apart from shaping the information initiative of the pro-democracy movements (such as the launching of radio stations in Nigeria, and internationally Radio Kudirat, which was formerly called The Freedom Frequency Radio), became the instrument for political activism.

The study also found that, the Internet served as a means of association among different civil society organisations. This could also be seen from the array of coalitions that organised themselves and operated through the Internet. An example was the Media Right Agenda (MRA), a coalition of over 100 civil society groups agitating for the passage of the Freedom of Information Bill in Nigeria. Related to this freedom of association was the global links of the various civil society groups. The
links between these associations and global civil society rescued civil society from the control of the state.

The new technologies, especially the GSM and Internet, were found to have impacted on the conduct of election in Nigeria. This became visible in the 2003 and 2007 elections. Even in the post 2007 era, particularly in the 2011, the growing influence of the new forms of technologies on the election was acknowledged. The use of social media during campaign periods and election days has been acknowledged as an important development that has enhanced transparency in the electoral process in Nigeria.

Sixth, globalisation led to the liberalisation of the public sphere in Nigeria. It has meant that developments in the Nigerian State now have global ramifications. For instance, the global attention which the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and other eight Ogonis received as well as the global reaction that followed were as a result of the use of the global media and techno space. The blurring interface of domestic and external issues aptly explains the external sympathy for the political struggle as well as sanctions on the Nigerian State by the global community. The foregoing, has implications for democracy. It means that human rights abuse and other anti-democratic tendencies in the Nigerian State are now open to global scrutiny. This has the potential of constraining anti-democratic behaviour of the Nigerian State. These developments put globalisation on the side of democracy and confirmed a view that was expressed by *The Economist* in its January 24, 2003 edition on the political effects of technological changes:

... every big change in communication technology from the printing press to television has eventually produced big and often unexpected changes in politics. As the Internet becomes mobile and ubiquitous, it will bring about changes of its own. Precisely what these will be is not clear, but the earliest claims of cyber dreamers that the Internet will produce a shift of power from political elites to ordinary citizens may well become reality.

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The study, however, identified contradictions associated with the new forms of technologies capable of limiting their democratic potentials. These include the problem of access to the Internet because of cost and difficulties arising from time spent to log in, among others. This also applies to the cost of making a telephone call. The social and digital divide between the rich and the poor, the rural and urban dwellers, is another contradiction that has a tendency to undermine the democratic credentials of global technologies. Apart from this, the Internet and the mobile telephony systems were found to be ineffective in Nigeria due to inadequate support facilities, especially electricity. The cyber culture in Nigeria was found to be low as majority of Internet users were youth. E-government in Nigeria was still at its formative years as most of the government websites were still on cataloguing, out-dated and yet to attain vertical and horizontal integration with a capacity for engendering a two-way communication between the state and society.

There is also the problem posed by the perversion of the new forms of technologies which could be seen as threatening the functions and capacity of the Nigerian state. With the dwindling cost of new technologies, especially computers and mobile phones and Internet facilities, people began to engage in all sorts of cyber crimes. The increase in the spate of cyber crime in Nigeria poses a problem for e-commerce as financial transactions emanating from Nigeria have become highly suspect. Furthermore, as a result of the perversion of technologies, the government resorted to the regulation of the cyber space. This was reflected in the signing of an agreement with Microsoft in 2005 to regulate Internet activities as well as a host of regulations guiding public cyber café operators. While these steps could be justified in terms of the need to strengthen state security, continued regulation of the Internet could spell danger for democracy in Nigeria because examples of regulation of cyber space in People Republic of China and Cuba showed it could be done to enhance the power of the state thereby undermining the political gains accruing to civil society.

While these contradictions could limit the democratic functions of the Internet and other CMC, they resulted largely from the way and manner the technologies were being employed and the inadequacy of supporting facilities. The implication of this is that proper utilisation and application of the new technologies have the capacity for deepening democracy in Nigeria.
6.4. Contribution to Knowledge.

This study has questioned some of the sweeping conclusions in the literature that globalisation undermines the power of the state and also spawns democratic deficits. This thesis has shown that most of these conclusions emerged largely because adequate attention has not been directed to exploring other dimensions of globalisation. It has attempted to fill the gap in the literature by developing a comprehensive argument that globalisation has transformed the economic functions of the Nigerian state from direct producer and driver of the economy to that of an enabler, a facilitator and regulator of the economy. It has also argued that globalisation shaped the renewed democratisation in Nigeria and has contributed to the deepening democracy in Nigeria. It has done this by analysing the manifestation of globalisation in the Nigerian State and exploring the democratic potentials of the various dimensions of globalisation particularly economic liberalisation, burgeoning new forms of technologies (in particular the Internet and other CMC), the global spread of democratic ideas and values as well as the interface between domestic and external issues and developments. The study has shown that economic liberalisation, such as privatisation, has led to the redefinition of the power relations between the state and society in Nigeria. This emanated from the dispersal of governance and the diminishing control of the state on economic activities. Furthermore, the emergence and application of new forms of technologies, especially the Internet and other CMC, were found to have engendered the migration of socio-economic and political activities to the cyber space, thus providing unprecedented platform for political mobilisation, association, activism and freedom of expression beyond the immediate censorship of the state.

Similarly, the external scrutiny of domestic policies and developments means that the activities of the Nigerian state and excesses of leaders of various states can be checked by external actors. This has the capacity of curtailing the excesses of state. The foregoing aptly showed that the much amplified notion that globalisation undermines the functions, power, sovereignty and democracy in the modern state has been over exaggerated, hence it is more of a myth than an empirical reality.

6.5. Conclusions.

This study focused on the manifestations of globalisation in the Nigerian State, the effects and the prospects for the deepening of democracy. The study showed that
globalisation transformed the Nigerian State. It transformed the pattern of governance which portends optimism for democratic consolidation. It, therefore, confirmed the transformationalists’ theory which considers globalisation as a fundamental process that redefines the configuration of the state.

The observed contradictions resulted largely from the way and manner Nigeria adapted to the realities of globalisation as well as the inadequacy of domestic institutions. The implication of the foregoing is that the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria in the context of the challenges generated by globalisation requires proper adaptation to its realities, proper management of its processes and the strengthening of domestic institutions. It is in this context that the following policy measures are recommended as spring board for harnessing the spin-offs of globalisation in order to enhance the consolidation of democracy in the Nigeria:

(a) **Managing the contradictions spawned by the New Forms of Technologies.**

One of the challenges of globalisation, specially its technological dimension, in promoting democracy in Nigeria lies in the problem of accessing the Internet as a result of high access fees as well as the difficulties of logging in due to poor network and connectivity. Social and democratic divide are also limiting the democratic potentials of globalisation and its intrinsic technologies in Nigeria. To address these problems, government’s efforts should be directed at the following:

(i) Invest in information and communication technologies. The language of the globalised society is technology, he who talks about globalisation talks about technology, and consequently, Nigeria cannot be talking about the payoff of globalisation without paying adequate attention to the development of science and technology. The availability of technologies would serve no purpose if the technologies are not fully utilised. In this context, there is need to focus on investment on human development. A knowledge driven society is anchored on the availability of skilled workers who know how to apply technology for productive purposes. Moreover, emphasis should be placed on proper funding of education as well as the intensification of science and technology education. Apart from enabling Universities and Research institutions through proper funding to channel productive energy towards enhancing the development of technology, policies that have the capacity of promoting collaborative efforts between institutions in Nigeria and institutions in the technologically developed countries should be designed and fully implemented. Not
only this, the Nigerian State can follow the example of Malaysia which introduced ICT policies in the 1960s. A policy that centres on ICT for all schools, the use of ICT in teaching and learning as well as the application of ICT in the field of production should be formulated. Today, Malaysia has an economy that is growing at an impressive pace. Though the Nigerian state has a policy on technology, it should be implemented with determined aggressiveness so that ICT can become part of life in the Nigerian State.

(ii) One major challenge of globalisation for democratic consolidation in Nigeria is in the realm of inadequate support facilities such as electricity. The potential gains of the new forms of technologies cannot be harnessed in the absence of stable power supply. Various organisations and many households no longer rely on the public supply of electricity and have resorted to the use of personal plants and generators which, over the years, has been identified as one of the causes of high cost of business operation in Nigeria. Under the Obasanjo administration, efforts were made to improve power supply to the extent that about $16 billion was said to have been expended on the energy sector, yet power supply remains erratic. While commending the initiatives of the Nigerian State in improving the state of power supply through the establishment of new power stations and about nine private power stations to supplement the existing ones, there is the need for these projects to be executed and commissioned within the stipulated time frame and regular maintenance of the facilities should be put into consideration.

(iii) The challenges which the new forms of technologies has created must be addressed in order to reap the benefits of e-commerce and other online activities which in the long run have a potential for deepening democracy. Some of the crimes perpetuated by criminals in the cyber space could be avoided if the members of the public are security conscious. Public enlightenment to address the proper use of the Internet and other related activities is therefore necessary.

(iv) For any meaningful e-government and e-governance to take place, the various government websites must move beyond the level of cataloguing to horizontal and vertical integration that have the capacity of generating a two-way communication between the state and citizens. Not only this, websites must be upgraded and updated regularly so that information required by citizens would easily be accessed without difficulties.
(b) Managing the Processes of Economic liberalisation

It has been established in this study that economic liberalisation spawned contradictions that vitiated welfare policies of the citizens. This, as already noted, has the capacity of weakening the Nigerian State. To harness the spin-off of economic liberalisation for good governance, there is the need for the proper management of privatisation and commercialisation so as to maximize its potential gains and minimize their devastating effects. The management should entail the following

(i) There is need to have a clear and transparent procedure for the sale of public enterprises. This can be achieved by having clear selection criteria for evaluating bids, clearly defined competitive bidding procedures, disclosure of purchase price and buyer, well-defined institutional responsibilities and adequate monitoring and supervision of the programme. Similarly, the bidding process must be managed in such a way that potential investors, contractors or participants would understand it and the general public would perceive it as fair and open. Unless this is done, the privatisation process will continue to be a subject of corruption, favouritism or unfairness.

(ii) The implementation of privatisation in Nigeria must entail mechanisms for protecting the employees of the privatised enterprises. The absence of this procedure was visible in the case of NITEL.

(iii) The implementation of privatisation should not be carried out in such a way that the only a particular group of people acquired the enterprises or a situation where private monopoly replace state monopoly.

(iv) Privatisation implies a transition from a government-controlled economy to a market economy. This requires a redefinition of the role of government and the scope of public administration. This essentially requires strong state institutions that can regulate the emerging private sector driven economy. This is necessary to guide the citizens against exploitation. Essentially, strong and effective regulatory agencies must be created to carry out the regulatory functions of the state in the realm of product quality, safety measures and protecting the vulnerable consumers from exploitation. In essence, managing privatisation means the reorientation of the role of government in the economy which implies a restructuring of its activities and procedures. A market economy cannot function effectively in the context of a hierarchical command system. Rather, its advantages are maximised when there is the assurance of competitive environment, adequate procedures for promoting cost reduction and service quality as well as the capacity to perform its regulatory role which minimises corruption,
inequity, ensures standard and adherence to safety methods as well as protect the individual citizen against exploitation.

(c) **Habituating Democratic Ethos**

We have noted that in spite of the prevailing global norms in which democracy is accepted as the best form of government worldwide, the prevailing democratic ethos in the Nigerian State is still very poor. This has manifested in the perversion of the electoral system and human right abuse. The reports of independent foreign election observers on the 2003 and 2007 elections smacked mockery of democracy. Because of the prevailing nature of electoral contest, governance has not improved significantly. Accountability of elected officer is virtually non-existent as most political office holders emerged under questionable electoral process. Consequently, the current efforts aimed at reforming the electoral process must be pursued with all intent and commitment.

(d) **Commitment to Anti-Corruption Crusade**

(i) We have observed that the Immunity Clause in the 1999 Constitution has been a major obstacle in the anti-graft campaign. Actually, the interpretation of Section 108 has outlived its usefulness. It should not be used to shield public office holders from prosecution. Consequently, that section should be expunged from the Constitution.

(ii) Second, the anti-corruption agencies, that is the ICPC, EFCC, the Code of Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal need to be strengthened and their operational autonomy enhanced. One way to do this is to empower the various anti-corruption agencies and equally insulate them from the paternalistic control of the executive arm of government, especially at the federal level. The appointment of members of the ICPC, EFCC, the Code of Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal should not be in the hands of the President but the National Assembly. Also, the tenure office of members should also be guaranteed.

Globalisation, as this study has shown, is an inevitable process which the Nigerian State adapted to suit its realities. The adaptation to these realities has however had contradictory consequences for governance and prospects for democratic consolidation in the Nigerian State. It is hoped that if these recommendations are pursued with all intents, the political backlashes being spawned by the processes of globalisation in Nigeria could be tamed so that the spin-offs of the processes can be fully harnessed. This means that with proper management of the processes of globalisation, the contradictions generated can be ameliorated and democratic
potentials strengthened. This portends optimism for the future of governance and democratic consolidation in the Nigerian state.