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Managing Security *in a* **Globalised World**

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Managing Security in a Globalised World

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The State and the Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria

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INTRODUCTION

A plural and heterogeneous society is characterised by religious fragmentation and ethnic cleavages. In a fragmented society, the crisis of identity (especially religious and ethnic identities and schisms) is an important source of conflict and insecurity (Haynes, 2009, 2007b; Lane and Ersson, 1994: 134–135). In such society, the state is responsible for governing and running the affairs of the society whose purpose also include the insurance of peace and unity, security, protecting the weak against the strong and maintaining social order which fosters nation-building, without which there cannot be development and without which there cannot be security (Hobbes, in DiRenzo, 1987:8). In the view of these, the purpose of this paper is on the state of insecurity in Nigeria. Rather than focussing on nation-building and development, Nigeria is faced and still battling with the challenges of religious pluralism, multi-ethnicism and high rates of insecurity, which are inimical to national development. Therefore, being a theoretical paper, it would examine an

overview of the state, security, nation-building and national development, insecurity in Nigeria, and state's management of conflicts and insecurity in Nigeria. Four theories would be used to explain and buttress our understanding of the subject of discourse. They are: Sub-culture of violence theory, Power-exchange relation theory, Inter-generational conflict theory, and pluralist model of elite theory.

In a modernizing society, security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it, security is not a military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activities, though it may encompass it, security is development and without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop, simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizens cannot shed its human nature (McNamara, cited in Ochoche, 1997:27).

THE STATE: AN OVERVIEW

The sociological concern of what and how the society is, and how was society made possible, is also concerned with the relationship of individual within the society and the forces/social bond holding the society together (DiRenzo, 1987). Therefore, the subject matter of political thought according to Strauss (1969:48-49) and Ebenstein (1969:1-2) has principally remained, the state and its origin, the evolution of the state, the organisation of the state and the purpose of the state. *In describing the state and its origin*, Hobbes (1651) in his "social contract theory of the origin of society" stresses that the central duty and major justification/purpose of the state is to ensure peace, security, protect the weak against the strong and maintain social order (DiRenzo, 1987:8). While Plato (427-347) says that the state was established in order to cooperate and provide for the various needs of individual in the society (Enemuo, 2000). Aristotle (348-322 BC) in his *Politics* describes the state as a natural community and the highest of all communities, which embraces all the highest good. The state is the natural and final stage in the growth of human relations having evolved from the family through the village. It is only in the state according to Aristotle that man realises his entire self, particularly, the highest part of himself. He therefore declared that, man is by nature a political animal and that, it is only 'a beast or a god' that can exist without the state. The

unity required by the state is that which arises out of the proper relations among individuals as rulers and the ruled (Sabine, 1973:96-97; Enemuo, 2000). Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) holds that, the state arose out of man's social nature and that the promotion of the good life is its purpose. He said that, government is needed as the organ to look after the common good of the people (Enemuo, 2000; Ebenstein, 1969:38-39; and Land, 1964).

Rousseau's (1762) conception of the state and its origin holds that, when at a point in time men could no longer live in isolated savages, they started coming together which resulted into the formation of family, and several families leading to the formation of societies, evolving to the institutionalisation of private properties, leading to inequality, leading to violence, crime, and insecurity follows. This led to the establishment and formation of government/state, thus, state serves as a mediator, intermediary between several pressure groups, individuals to maintain peace, ensure order and security (Enemuo, 2000:73, and Ebenstein, 1969:430-433). While Lenin (1984:10-11) in his *The State and Revolution* emphasises and stresses the Marxian conception of the state, by saying that, "the state is a product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonism". Therefore, the state arose where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonism is irreconcilable. Kautsky (1912) says that the state arose from the need to hold class antagonism in check, at the time or in the midst of conflicts of these classes (Lenin, 1984:16).

According to Robert (1994:14), the state is an organised political society, with the law as an instrument of its policy. Yet, the law is nothing and weak without the state's machinery capable of enforcing observance of rules of law. Stewart (1961:7) describes the origin of the state as the seizure of power by a group, and the group keeps power as long as it can govern efficiently enough to prevent or suppress revolt. And that the state is the permanent organisation of law and order, while the government is the particular people to whom, for a time, the task of carrying out the law and the activities of the state has been entrusted (Stewart (1961:5). Cohen, Brown, and Organski (1981) emphasise that the notion of statehood and sovereignty emerged as a response to perceived threats of anarchic violence in post-medieval Europe. The state is that entity that enjoys a

monopoly of both legitimate force (violence) and legitimate coercion in the social space. It could designate lawful and unlawful behaviour, prescribe incentives or sanctions for different forms of conduct as it deemed befitting, and in this way, engineer the evolution of civic ethics embodied in the law and backed by the instruments of coercion such as the courts and the police (Odinkalu, 2004; Nozick, 1974). Ero (2004:51) stresses that the state (government) is vested with political powers to regulate matters of security, welfare and morality because, the society requires both structure and order if it is to be effective in meeting the safety, economic and social needs of its members.

SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW

Security means safety or freedom from danger and protection from external attack or infiltration, whether with reference to individual or state. This conception flows from the militarist point of view. Security does not just mean defence or end up only with the activities of the military. It also involves the activities and roles of security agencies such as the police, customs, immigration, intelligent organisations, the prison service, as well as the entire citizenry (NISER, 2005). Mroz (in Buzan, 1991:16-17) describes security as relative freedom from harmful threats, while Bellamy describes it as relative freedom from war, coupled with a relative high expectations that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that may occur. Security has for long been attached to the military. Scholars like Buzan (1983:2-3) regards the military involvement in internal security as underdeveloped and needed to be rehabilitated. He argued also that, the concept of security have been dominated by the Military factor. The West preaches peace and security through the amazement of **military weapons and personnel** (Buzan, 1991:6). Imobighe (1984) refers to this as *Pax-Atomnica* or *Pax-Amamenta*. However, he is of the view that, peace and security is better pursued through *Pax-Mundi* (i.e. the satisfaction of human needs). He further says that only a strong military system could effectively deter force (attacks) and threats of force (Imobighe, 1984).

Booth (1991:8) condemns the militaristic conception of security in terms of armaments. He stressed further that, security policy should have political accommodation as a primary and persistent aim. The adverse

effect of identifying security almost exclusively with military strength was evident throughout the Cold War, as it elevated security and its dependence on arms to the level of another ideology. This approach can be described as *strategic reductionism*. That is, conceiving security in a technical and mechanistic military way, as manifested in an obsession with military balance, state of the art technology, order of battle, etc. (Booth 1991:8; and Imobighe, 1998:4).

Nation-building and National Development

National development refers to the process of progressively transforming the economic indices of a nation through human and technological advancement for the production of higher per capita income, better infrastructure, communication facilities, high-rise buildings, better living conditions for the people as well as great improvement in literacy rate, high expectancy and others (NISER, 2005). Nation-building involves those policies, programmes and activities which among others increases the national consciousness of the people, makes the citizens of a state give their love and loyalty to the state (its central authority), encourage members of the diverse identity groups (ethnic, religious, etc.) to accept one another as citizens and equal members of the state, to work for the various groups, to drop elements of hate, discrimination, suspicion and division against one another, and instead lean to live with love and trust for one another, and make all identity groups to accept the central government as the symbol of the state, among others (NISER, 2005). The world religions share a broadly similar set of theological and spiritual values and views and this potentially underpins their ability to provide positive contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Thus, religion's role in conflict resolution and build peace is a crucial component in helping to achieve human development (Appleby, 2006: 1-2).

The task for nation building according to Mukherji (1992;23), is to set in motion a process by which the internal contradictions are resolved to the point where overall general consensus is established on the kinds of national institutions that should cover the polity, economic and society and their modus operandi in the problem-solving matrix, as well as a general effort at achieving socio-political and socio-economic development of all citizens of a nation state. The process proceeds in the context of existing calls structure, internal power distribution and external linkages

of the nation (Ahmad, 1992). When a nation is well built, the citizens will manifest high degree of patriotism and national consciousness, manifest high respect for national symbols and accept one another as members of one nation. Therefore, efforts at growth and national development should be directed towards nation-building through an upward movement towards greater political sophistication for problem solving, using the state as “a problem-solving device” (Roberts and Azubuike, 2004; Ahmad, 1992).

Nwolise (1985) states that there is no doubt that there is a relationship/correlation between national security and nation-building. Security is part of the essential ingredients for nation-building and development. Other ingredients include justice, citizens having a sense of belonging, good governance, good leadership, reasonable level of education, healthy politics and strong economy. Therefore, the importance of security as the driving engine for socio-economic and political development cannot be over-emphasised. Peace and security are the building-blocks for political order and the protection of life, liberty and estate, while it is a necessary precondition for economic investment and growth (NISER, 2005). Therefore, the absence of development that is beneficial to the populace may leads to the growth of criminality and exposes the nation to internal rift and aggression. No country ever recorded progression in it economy in an environment of civil strife and insecurity (PA-NET, 2000).

Security and National Development

By the end of the 1970s, the concept of security had been found insufficient and was redefined. This led to the more embracing concept of “comprehensive security” which broadened the concept to include resources, demographic, ecological, and environmental issues among others (Matthews, 1989). Contemporary national security concerns now embrace new realities, not including only militarism, terrorism, public safety from crime and violence, but also threats to the quality of life of vulnerable segments of the population, food insecurity, resource conflicts, resurgence micro-nationalist agitations, boundary disputes, environmental insecurity, agitations for social and environmental justice, religious fanaticism, labour militancy and students’ vanguardism, anxiety and fear over marginalisation, etc. (NISER, 2005).

Also, national security as described by contemporary scholars has

gone beyond the confinement of the military, to incorporate non-military factors like development. According to McNamara (1968:149), any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of production and per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and insufficient public utilities, and chronic problem of unemployment, has a false sense of security. He warned against the problem of poverty, and went further saying that, poverty is the harbinger of unrest, internal upheavals, violence and extremism. McNamara's view was supported by Aristotle's statement that, "poverty is the parent of violence and crime . . ." With strong emphasis on developing nations, such as Nigeria, McNamara (1968) urges political leaders to be mindful of the fact that, without development, there can be no National security. He, therefore, asserts that:

In a modernizing society, security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it, security is not a military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activities, though it may encompass it, security is development and without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop, simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizens cannot shed its human nature (McNamara, cited in Ochoche, 1997:27).

McNamara (1968) also asserts that the threats to a country's national security might not necessarily be military in nature. Stemming from this fact, Ochoche (1997:27) says that National security is about the protection and enhancement of values against those that seeks to limit or destroy their realisation. Contrary to the position of conventional security doctrine, those threats need not necessarily be military in nature. Nwolise asserts that:

A country may have the best armed forces in terms of training and equipment, the most efficient police force, the most efficient custom men, the most active secret service agents, and best quality prisons, yet be the most insecure nation in the world, as a result of defence and security problems from within — bad government, alienated and suffering masses, ignorance, hunger, unemployment, or even activities of foreign residents or companies (Nwolise, 1985:68).

The need for any nation seeking security beyond the coercive or military strategy and accommodate non-military variables (social and economic) informed the Palme's Commission of 1982 report that, a secured nation is one that is free from both the fact and threat of military attack and occupation that preserves the health and safety of its citizens, and generally advances their economic well being. Therefore, the concern for security in a country covers the protection of diverse interests in and out of the country, whether such interests are located inside or outside its borders. It also embraces the protection provided by the state for its citizens, and its endowments and asserts. National security is supposed to offer a nation protection from anxiety over national and or individual survival and well being (PA-NET, 2000).

THE STATE OF INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

In the words of Craib (1984), "the society is like a confused battleground. If you watch from the high, you would see a variety of groups or individuals fighting and conflicting with each other, constantly forming and reforming, making and breaking alliances". Otite stresses that the Nigerian society is prone to conflict and confrontations because of her ethnic pluralism or heterogeneity, and each ethnic group struggles to control state or government's policies and or have dominant access to the limited social and politico-economic resources (Otite, 2000:177).

Political Insecurity in Nigeria

The political conflicts and violence in present-day Nigeria traceable to the political history of the country (Baker, 2002), such as Aba women riot in 1928, May 1953 Kano riots; 1962 census crisis; 1962 Western regional election crisis; 1964 general election crisis; 1983 general election crisis in the south-west; the annulment of 12 June, 1993 general election and every other crisis relating to the issue of June 12, 1993 general election in subsequent years (i.e. the assassination of Kudirat Abiola on 8 July 1998); the 14 and 21 February, 2003 general election crisis; the several other Local governments election crises all over the country, etc. The political terrain in Nigeria since independence has been made unsecured, resulting from the activities of groups of people referred to as "armed-politician" (Nwolise, in *Nigerian Tribune*, 06/09/04:8 and 07/09/04:7).

These are senior citizens (political actors) in various leadership positions, who have private militias, carry out armed politics, using guns and other dangerous weapons to maim and assassinate political opponents, chase voters away from polling booths in order to rig election and in the process, rob people of their power, disenfranchise them, and illegally appropriate their resources. These armed politicians kill people, burn their houses, and ruin the nation's economy (either before/pre, during and after elections), especially when the result of the election does not favour them (Abati, in *The Guardian*, 23/05/04:53). Politicians and individual set up personal armed militias who later become greater threats to the security of lives and properties and threatens democracy. An extract:

It is widely believed that top politicians raise private armies during elections. Sometimes they use them to eliminate political opponents. 20 guns and more than 100 live Ammunition were recovered by the police from politicians in Delta state during the March Local Government polls. The weapons recovered included AK-47 rifles and pistols. Most of the weapons given out to thugs to intimidate political opponents during last year's elections, according to the police were never recovered. They were used for criminal activities (*ThisDay*, 5 May, 2004:7).

Power, according to Otite (2000:158), has a socio-cultural context in Nigeria. By its nature, it is segmentary, conflictual and confrontational as contests and their supportive group outdo each other in their attempt to control and exercise it in the multiethnic setting. Also, political positions are generally interpreted not only in terms of power but also in term of economic resources. Economic resources are also resources of power and privileges, and there is rightly or wrongly an easy conversion of a political position to economic resources. The locations of industries, the development of ethno-territories or ethnic homelands, etc. are some of the economic benefits of the manipulations of political power. And such ethnic-specific development of territories is capable of generating inter- or intra-ethnic conflict, or conflict between the marginalised group and the government (Otite, 2000:158). The corruption among political leaders and government officials, leading to unemployment and poverty, socio-political and economic discriminations and deprivations, shrinking access to social services and basic necessities of life, election rigging and election violence, all these obviously resulted into the polarisation and mobilisation of ethnic identities, as well as the emergence of militant groups with

various socio-politics and economic demands (Alemika, 2003a; 2003b). This corroborated with the words of the great ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, who said that, *"poverty is the parent of revolution and crime, and where there is no middle class, the state will soon come to an end . . ."*

Ethno-Religious Insecurity in Nigeria

Ethnic encompasses distinctive cultural characteristics which are derived from the Greek word *ethnos*, meaning people or nation. It refers to people who are identified with one another on the basis of common ancestry and cultural heritage (Henslin, 2007:328). Otite (1975) and Cohen (1969) defines ethnicity as the contextual discrimination by members of one group against others on the basis of differentiated system of socio-cultural symbols. Therefore Otite (2000:11) says that ethnic groups have an element of core territoriality, which implies identification with a particular spatial location within a state. Naroll (1964:285) further stresses that language is one of the major problems associated with ethnic group identification, as people of the same dialect/tribe are commonly classified as members of distinct cultural units if they differ markedly and obviously in their ecological patterns and occupy distinct and fairly large continuous territories. Yinger (in Humiliation, 1995) says religion is a system of beliefs and practices. While traditional religion may be locally specific, religions such as Islam and Christianity are universalistic. Although religion is part of the specific cultures, universal religions are sometimes holding to reinforce ethnicity. Ethnicity hardly occurs in a vacuum or in a pure form rather, it interacts with or incorporates other variables such as religion, political, juridical and social class (Otite, 2000:159-160; Nnoli, 1978:8). It is fundamental to note that there is an intertwined and mutually reinforcing character between ethnic and religious violence.

Most inter-religious crises in Nigeria for example, have turned into inter-ethnic crises, even when they initially operated to be mainly religious disagreements. Conversely, some socio-ethnic conflicts were fought under the guise of inter-religious conflicts. This is because, there is a strong correlation or overlap between ethnic and religious boundaries in Nigeria's federal arrangement. Thus, ethnic and religious violence are the extreme manifestation of conflicts rooted in the crisis of identity (NISER, 2005: 16). Kamrava (1993: 164) avers that identity is often created by past interactions and that, 'people's sense of identity largely determine how they behave

politically and in turn view their own political environment'. When ideologies polarise groups the result can be conflict between them. For example, an ethnocentric religious group would regard others as essentially inferior. This usually gives birth to domination, discrimination and intolerance, which trigger up violent conflict amongst them. The result of fear, threat and counter-threat can be a self-perpetuating destructive struggle, i.e. Israel and Palestinians, Muslims-Hindus in India, Muslims-Christians in Nigeria, etc. Such a situation can be exacerbated by the actions of political leaders and elites, who may seek to benefit personally from construction of exclusivist identities, and gain power as a result of arousing the emotions and enmity of members of their group against others (Rosen, 2005; Malek, 2004; Gopin, 2000). Contemporary religious conflicts involve 3 forms: religious fundamentalism, religious terrorism, and controversies surrounding 'the clash of civilisations thesis' (i.e. the case of imposing Sharia law and Boko-Haram activities in some states in northern Nigeria) (Haynes, 2007b; Juergensmeyer, 2005; Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000; Huntington, 1996).

Ethno-religious conflicts/violence poses serious threats to peace, stability and corporate existence of the Nigerian federation politically, economically and socially (NISER, 2005). In Nigeria for example, the fact remains that, individual or group being an Hausa and Muslim, may become part of the recipe for ethnic conflicts when a relationship involving contest, competitions or struggle ensue with another individual or group who is an Igbo or Yoruba and a Christian. Also, the Yoruba- or Igbo-Muslim is separated and identified, and does not have the same Muslim status as their Hausa neighbour or local community members. A Hausa-Christian will experience the same discrimination, as he/she may be saved by their Hausa people but not by an Igbo or Yoruba Christian (Oite, 2000:160). Also, an Igbo or Yoruba-Muslim may not be saved simply by their religious affiliation. A good example of this situation was the ethno-religions conflicts in Kano and Kaduna state. The conflict was fought under the guise of religious conflicts (Sharia), but Muslims from places like Ilorin in Kwara state, Kogi state and Ogbomoso in Oyo state, etc. were not spared but massacred. In this case, ethnic component may become more paramount. Also, there are various acceptable degrees of being a Hausa, Igbo or Yoruba and being a Christian or Muslim. Thus, there is an intertwine, strong correlation and interaction between ethnicity and

religious boundaries, between ethnic and religious conflicts — which is an important feature of Nigerian's federal and social structure (NISER, 2005: Otite, 2000). To this end, Otite (1986) describes the interlink between ethnicity, religion (ethno-religion) and politics as the “ethnicisation of religion, and politicisation of religion”.

Socio-economic and Political Insecurity in Nigeria

It is a known fact that most of the ethno-religious conflicts in the past in Nigeria are rooted in political differences or disagreements, or have a political undertone among key political actors in the country. There is a correlation between political position or power and economic resources. Political position/power is either used to gain economic resources or economic resources is used to gain political position/power. The location of industries and the development of ethno-territories, etc. are some of the economic benefits resulting from the manipulations of political powers/position. Such ethnic specific development of territories is capable of generating inter or intra-ethnic conflicts or between an unfavoured/ignored group and the government (Otite, 2000:158). Tishkov and Rupensighe (1996:8) argues that the moves to solve inter-ethnic clashes through reservation of political officers on an ethnic basis can foster intra-ethnic conflicts. In other words, intra-ethnic conflicts can arise when sub-groups of an ethnic group compete for political and economic resources that have been allocated to the ethnic group at national or regional levels.

Ethnicism had been conceptualised and operationalised not only as a theoretical ideology, but as a weapon for the furtherance of ethnically-structured political objectives to the detriment of national integration (Adebisi, 1998, in Igun and Mordi (ed.), 1998). While Osaghae (1991) says that ethnicity will not acquire political relevance or violent expression except people are subjected to structural inequalities and perceived political and economic gains as rewards for political mobilisation along ethnic lines. Therefore, using the inter-elite competition thesis of ethnicity, ethnicity gather political salience and produces conflicts when it is manipulated by the elites-in which the main aspirants and competitors for political and economic resources use ethnicity to further their personal interests. Otite (2000:161) adds that since resources are limited and scarce, the contests between socio-cultural segments under various leaders are inevitable, as conflicts are generated over access to these limited politico-

economic and other resources. This was what Otite (1986) describes as the "ethnicisation of politics or regionalisation of politics, and the politicisation of ethnicity".

The political boundary of Nigeria has been described as artificial, being the outcome of complex transactions with economic, commercial and other motives expressed and pursued by European powers at the 1885 Berlin conference and the subsequent legal statutes (Otite, 2000:2; Ola-Balogun, 1980:12). Prior to the coming of the British, the present-day socio-political structure of Nigeria was already divided into and governed along three dominant/major ethno-regional groups, i.e. Yoruba in the south-west; Igbo in the south-east and Hausa-Fulani in the north (Adebisi, 1998). Meanwhile, Ayida (1987:54-55) traces the genesis of the socio-political problems of Nigeria to the British colonial policy. According to him, the British had wrongly assumed that, for any political arrangement to succeed in Nigeria, it must satisfy the aspirations of the three major ethno-regional groups (Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa-Fulani). This formed the basis of the "Tripod theory of power structure in Nigeria". This theory ignored the wishes, aspirations, and stabilising roles that the minorities (who constitute about 45 percent of the country's population) could play in ensuring and promoting a healthy socio-political stability of Nigeria (Adebisi, 1998).

The contemporary Nigeria socio-political structure just like before and during colonialism is not divorced from ethno-regional arrangement. The present structure has 6 regions, 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), and 774 local government councils. According to Otite (2000:30), some scholars and writers get satisfied with the given number of 250 groups in Nigeria. Murdock (1975:43-47) gave a figure of 62 ethnic groups. Awolowo (1968:236-238) gave 51 nations excluding minor and less viable groups. Gandonu (1978:270) gave 161 ethnic groups. Otedola (1978:165-168) gave a figure of 143 ethnic groups. Hoffman (1974) said there are about 359 ethnic-linguistic groups in Nigeria. Wentelukas (1985) analysis gave between 550 and 619 ethnic groups. Moreover, Otite's (2000:370-9) fieldwork gave a 389 ethnic groups in Nigeria, and about 2000 tribes. The creation of states and local government councils with their administrative headquarters cited in a particular place have created or generated several conflicts between local governments, states and inter or intra-ethnic crises in Nigeria. Such inter or intra-ethnic

conflicts are generated from division of territorial boundaries, location and relocation of council headquarters, inclusion or exclusion from jurisdiction of certain local government councils, political positions, location or relocation of markets, hospitals, motor parks, schools, etc. (Otite, 2000: 162-163).

The structure of Nigeria's society characterised by multi-ethnicism and pluralism gives room for mutual distrust, bigotry, fear of domination, marginalisation, and ethnic cynicism, which are pre-requisites or fertile ground for conflicts to grow (Adebisi, 1998). This gave birth to the establishment and development of various ethnic militias, i.e. Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), The Anambra Vigilante Service (BAKASSI Boys), The Arewa People's Congress (APC), Ijaw Youth Movement (IJM), The Egbesu Boys, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), The Bokko Haram (an Islamic sect), etc. and the various terrorist activities in the country. Thus, Otite (2000:2) describes the socio-political boundaries and arrangement of Nigeria as artificial. While Awolowo (1947:47) remarks that Nigeria is a mixed bag of original nations with different languages and exclusive loyalties, wrapped together as Nigeria. He, therefore, described Nigeria as "a mere geographical expression" and that "a common Nigeria nationality is a complete misnomer" (Otite, 2000:3; 1971:299-300; Adebisi, 1998; Ola-Balogun, 1980; Dudley, 1973; and Awolowo, 1968:237).

Traditional Chieftaincy Disputes

This is another source of political insecurity in Nigeria. The politicisation of traditional chieftaincy title and the subjection of traditional rulers under the state governors and local council authorities have led to several crises in the country. Few among these are — the violence that accompanied the dispute between the *Ooni* of Ife and the *Alaafin* of Oyo, over the chairmanship title in the then old Oyo state council of traditional rulers. This dispute was put to an end following the creation of Osun state. Also, the differences between the traditional rulers of Modakeke and the *Ooni* of Ife, which was part of the factors that led to the Ife-Modakeke war in 1999/2000. The Urhobo and Itsekiri disputes over the traditional rulership tussle of Warri; the Zongon-Kataf crisis was also partly a product of traditional rulership tussle; the imposition of Alhaji

Datsuki as the Sultan of Sokoto by the Babangida administration in the early 1990s led to the operation *Ba-mu-so* (we don't want) riot in Sokoto (NISER, 2005).

STATE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

Having described the state as an organised political society, government is a group of people either elected or selected among the people and charged with the responsibility of governing or running the affairs of the society/state. Yet, the state cannot function or carry out its responsibilities without the law, which is the state's instrument of policy and machinery used in ensuring and enforcing compliance or observance of the rules of law (Roberts, 1994). Chirkin, et al. (1979:25) says that law is a legal order which constitutes a balance of conflicts between different interests (groups) and is aimed at satisfying the maximum requirements of the people with minimum clashes between them. That is, law is the state instrument for reconciling the different interests (groups) in the society. One of the major functions of the state is security, i.e. to ensure the safety of lives and properties of its citizens. The emergence of the state led to the creation of specialised agencies (the police) for controlling the use of violence by individual or groups and to maintain peace and order in the society (Weber, 1968). Government is a vital organ of conflict regulation, resolution and mediation in any state (Cohen, et al., 1981).

However, state relationship with the citizens and how its resources are articulated and mobilised in conflict regulation and resolution is dependent on her experiences. Nigeria's conflict resolution policy could be traced to her colonial experience. Post-colonial government inherited and adopted the colonial philosophy of conflict management approach to its repertoire of conflict management strategies. By confronting violence with greater violence was the hallmark and philosophy of colonial patterns of conflict management (Ake, 1985). Ake goes further to state that:

Although political independence brought some changes to the composition of the state managers, the character of the state remained much as it was in the colonial era . . . it presented itself as an apparatus of violence . . . and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority (Ake, 2001:3).

The colonial state and government relied on brutal force and extensive violence in relating with its subjects (Ake, 2001; 1985). It had to resort to force, violence, absolutism and arbitrariness in managing state affairs, because it was perceived by its subjects as an external imposition or alien force which lacked legitimacy and absolute support by the local habitants. They matched force with force and exchanged violence for violence. And once violent crises were arrested often with greater violence, colonial authorities were never interested and bothered in achieving peace through negotiation, mediation and consultation with the people. Rather, they dispatched policemen (anti-riot/mobile policemen), sometimes complemented by soldiers with instructions to “shoot-at-sight” to quell the situation. This method for example was used to quell the 1964 general election crisis (Ake, 2001).

Conflicts are natural and real in Nigeria. Therefore, the most important issue is not the conflict itself but how it is handle, managed and resolved, as conflicts may be resolved, transformed or managed. Cultural determinants (i.e. language, other communication symbols, information processing, and strategic use of appropriate metaphor) are essential ingredients for negotiation, bargaining and debating activities, during conflict resolution (Otite, 2000:176). In Nigeria, conflicts have been tackled through one or a combination of ways: mediation or intervention, dialogue, government enquires, intercession by government delegations and visits of very important traditional ruler and other noble personalities, etc. (Otite, 2000:177). Lewis (1965:68) argues that to suppress ethnic or religious loyalties as a means of moulding people into one nation, is a non-starter, and that nationalism cannot be imposed, but built on the pluralism of states. Cartwright (1978:165) identifies three basic strategies in dealing with ethnicity, but which depend on the extent and nature of pluralism and the intensity of ethnic identification. These are:

- (i) **Balancing Approach:** Used where there is no dominant group, but where overriding identities are already strongly established and maintained.
- (ii) **Assimilative Approach:** A situation where the values of the dominant ethnic groups are imposed as suitable for all other groups who are weaker and are indoctrinated.
- (iii) **The overarching Approach:** A situation where every ethnic groups are made to accept and be committed to a common set of

values, which may be ideological or religious in nature, but which overrides all other different interest based on ethnicity.

Nigeria adopts the balancing approach, and had so far been at war with herself in trying to discourage, but thus implicitly encouraging ethnicity in the country. But the problems of ethnicity and ethnic conflict have been unsolved denying and defying all the instruments, strategic policies, methods, etc. formulated and implemented by government to solve the problems. Meanwhile, over the years, various measures and strategies have been adopted in Nigeria to combat the security and conflict problems in Nigeria. Such strategies have ranged from the formal (state) and informal (civil society initiatives).

Formal Strategies of State's Response/Management of Conflicts

Force and Violence (Legitimate Violence)

The use of force and violence (legitimate violence) to quell crises or conflicts among rival or conflict groups/parties. That is, confronting violence with greater violence. Once there is an outbreak of violence, truck load of anti-riot policemen (Mobile police) and most times complemented by the Nigerian Army and with the instruction to "shoot at sight", are dispatched to the scene of the incident to arrest and quell the situation. Once normalcy and calmness are restored, the team of policemen and soldiers are withdrawn. No attempt is made to set up structures for building and foster peace among the warring people. This type of conflict management approach was inherited and adopted from the colonial pattern of conflict management (Ake, 2001:3). This method was applied in handling the 1962 Western regional crisis in the south-west of Nigeria; the 1964 general election crisis, etc.

Judicial litigations in managing conflicts

The policy or approach demonstrates implicit confidence of the citizenry in the ability of the courts to effectively manage conflicts without biasness or favouritism. This approach was adopted for the Umuleri-Aguleri inter-ethnic conflicts, etc. The judicial approach of conflict resolution and management, however, has its own limitations and weaknesses on the level of its effectiveness in dispensing justice. Based on the bottlenecks and judicial miscarriages in the judicial processes, they have

been accused and alleged for delays through postponement and adjournment — and therefore corroborating the popular slogan of “justice delay is justice denied”. Also, owing to the political problems of Nigeria, the judicial processes have been alleged of being politicised and several cases of violation of judicial order. All these affect the dispensation of justice and thereby making some citizens (groups) to lose their confidence in any judicial litigations and processes.

Various governments in Nigeria have applied and adopted different approaches aimed to solve various conflicts and making a truce among warring groups in the country. Yet, the problems of ethnicity and various conflicts persist. As one conflict is being quelled another springs up, thereby defying all the strategies and instruments formulated to solving them and making a permanent peace. Thus, other approaches of government aimed at finding permanent peace in Nigeria are discussed under informal strategy:

Informal Strategies of State’s Response/Management of Conflicts

Another approach/method of conflict resolution and management employed by the Nigerian government is the establishment or setting up of committees on mediation, reconciliation and judicial panel or commission of inquiry, to investigate the causes of such conflicts and come up with a communiqué recommending solutions to finding final solution and lasting peace among the warring parties/groups. This approach was adopted for the Umuleri-Aguleri, the Ife-Modakeke and the Zongon-Kataf conflicts, etc.

The informal or traditional approach to conflict resolution and management was also adopted by government. This approach involves the use of dialogue, negotiations and or bargaining. Government seeks the services of civil society organisations (CSO), traditional rulers, opinion leaders, notables and influential individuals in the society, religious organisations and religious leaders, women organisations, etc. Examples of places where this approach was adopted are: The Umuleri-Aguleri conflicts, the Niger Delta crises, the Jos conflicts, the Kaduna riots, Kano ethno-religious conflicts, etc.

Ethnic balancing, the state-ethnic quota systems in employment and admission into government schools (i.e. tertiary institutions and unity schools), the establishment of Unity Schools and Federal Medical Centres

in all states of the federation, etc.

State and local government creation: The issue of state creation could be traced to: division of the country from 4 regions to 12 states in 1967 by the Major-General Aguyi-Ironsi government. This was necessitated to stop or prevent the imminent secession by the Igbo dominated eastern region, yet it failed to prevent the civil war. As the states were being created, local governments were also created and there were adjustments of boundaries. These states and local governments were created to meet the needs and aspirations of some ethnic-groups for independent, and freedom from internal colonialism and self-determination. Rather than solving ethnic rivalry or other conflicts in the country, state and local government creations have resulted into neo-ethnicity and the emergence of new minority group assertions and the agitation for more states and local governments, and even have led to new boundary or land conflicts between and within states and local governments. State creation in Nigeria's federal arrangement is no more than what Mazrui (1971:338) describes as "an institutionalisation of compromise relationships".

General Ibrahim Babangida administration as the head of state and government between 1985 and 1993 took a holistic approach to solving or finding solution to most of the causes of ethnic conflicts in the country. Some of these were conceptualised in terms of development. They are: the establishment of the Directorate of Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) in 1986; the Directorate of Social Mobilization in 1987, which focused on mass mobilisation for self-reliance, social justice and economic recovery (MAMSER); Better Life for Rural Women in September 1987, a programme initiated by the First Lady, Mrs Maryam Babangida; the establishment of People's Bank of Nigeria in October 1989 to provide loans without tears and bureaucracy to the poor and common Nigerians; the establishment of a grassroots democratic two party system, i.e. the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) in October 1989. This was done to end the politicisation of ethnic cleavages and monetised politics and reduce the ethnic bound political clientelism, etc.

Another method introduced by the federal government to foster ethnic unity and reduce ethnic-religious conflicts in the country was the establishment of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in 1973 by Decree No. 24 by the government of General Yakubu Gowon. It is a programme

in which graduates of the universities and polytechnics both in Nigeria and outside are posted to serve the country for the period of 12 months outside their state of origin and communities. These graduates live with other graduates from different parts and ethnic background in the country and also live and learn the culture of their host communities. The aim of the scheme was that these graduates would understand each other's culture and differences, make inter-ethnic friends, and become better citizens devoid of ethnic discriminations and prejudice with the aim of fostering national unity, and encourage inter-state labour-flow throughout the country.

Based on the heterogeneity and plurality of ethno-tribal groups and ethno-religious differences in the country, the federal government initiated a body called the council of traditional rulers in Nigeria. This body consists of traditional rulers from different states and major tribes in the country, to meet regularly, with the aim of preventing, quelling and resolving any ethnic rivalry or conflicts in the country. Also an inter-religious body was set up called "Inter-religious Council of Nigeria". Membership of this body is from the 2 major rival and conflicting religion (Christianity and Islam), and members of different Islamic and Christian groups or movement. The aim of government for setting up this group is to prevent, quell and resolve any inter-religious rivalry and conflicts. Much of the successes of these two bodies, the inter-religious council and council of traditional rulers, have been achieved and recorded on conflict resolution. Although they have made some considerable impact in preventing some conflicts in the country, it is noteworthy that, most of the conflicts in Nigeria are politically instigated and motivated, but fought under the umbrella of inter-religious or ethno-tribal differences. Therefore, most of the failures of these bodies (inter-religious council and council of traditional rulers) in preventing, quelling and resolving conflicts in the country could be attributed to those conflicts that were politically instigated and motivated.

THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

Four theories are adopted. The sub-culture of violence theory explains the existence sub-culture and the use of violent armed gangs/groups of young people in settling interpersonal disputes. Power-exchange relation theory explains the notion of super-ordination and subordination drawn/

achieved from the social exchange theory. Inter-generational conflict theory explains conflict being generational and historical in a heterogeneous/multiethnic society. The Pluralist model of elite theory explains how elites monopolise/manipulates and sustain power by promoting communal sentiments and activating inter-ethnic conflicts/rivalry.

Sub-culture of Violence Theory

The theory was advanced in the 1960s by two American sociologists, Franco Ferracuti (1927-1992) and Marvin Wolfgang (1924-1998), with a focus on murder and assault. The theory maintains that, at least within the United States, some sub-cultures exist that encourage the use of violence in settling interpersonal disputes. Studying crime indifferent regions of America, they described the existence of sub-cultures consisting of young, lower-class and inner-city males in which violence is considered the normal way to settle disputes. They found out from their study that, violent crimes were unusually high in southern states of America, which consist of Africa-American race. They theorised that, there might be sub-cultural values and attitudes that are much more prevalent in certain regions, ethnic groups and even social classes that promote the use of violence, including criminal violence (Erlanger, 1974:83). Wolfgang and Ferracuti also characterised features of sub-cultures conducive to violence as those in which settling disputes thorough the use of force (Staples, 1986:139).

The theory explains the use of armed gangs, groups or young people, equipped with arms ranging from guns, cutlasses, axe, etc. to maim and or assassinate political opponents, cause mayhem or violence and or to settle their political differences. Also, these political actors hired or paid some of these armed gangs or youths to cause political upheaval or violence, as a way of expressing or revolting their disapproval of any political arrangement that disfavour them.

Power-exchange Relations Theory

The power-relations theory between individuals and groups are universal phenomena. Power-relations in any social relationship entail the ability of a person or group to make others follow his/her/their wish as against their own will (Lukes, 1978). It creates a notion of superordination and subordination. For as long as the dominant group may ensure compliance, the dominated group/individual may exercise some

levels of power to make the dominating group or individual conform to his/her/their wish, provided they have greater punishment power to exercise (Molm, 1989). It may suffice to say therefore that, no individual or group has monopoly of power. The exercise of power is dependent on the situation at hand. Since nobody has monopoly of power, then how domination and compliance is achieved was drawn from the social exchange theory of Homans, (1961), Blau (1964), Emerson (1962; 1972).

The social exchange theory premises that, human beings interact with one another for the exchange of valued resources, based on the *principle of reciprocity*. Reciprocal relationship is mutual, and failure to reciprocate may attract negative sanctions from the aggrieved party (Turner, 1998). Homans (1961) explained social exchange from the principles of behavioural psychology and opined that, just like animals humans will emit those behaviours that attract rewards rather than punishment. Therefore, social exchange is based on the consequences of reward and punishment (Abraham, 1982), which determines the exercise of power, and thus, domination and subordination. Peter Blau (1964) drew his emphasis on social exchange from the view that, reciprocity stands as the anchor of social interaction (Turner, 1998). Once relationships are formed, they are maintained by the exchange of rewards, which may be material (i.e. material wealth, political appointments etc.), or non-material (i.e. love, affection and support, etc.) (Ritzer, 1996).

However, due to the fact that, there may be an unequal exchange of rewards, power inequality evolves or come to play, and it is in favour of the party with greater reward. It is necessary also to note that, the less privileged party may seek to balance up the power inequality by all means or by other alternatives. Abraham (1982) describes those exercising power as legitimate holders by the virtue of the positions and offices they hold. Explaining the relations between A and B, Emerson (1962, 1972) says that power of each party is determined by the nature of relationship that exist between them based on valued resources. No party has absolute power. The power of A on B is tantamount to the dependence of B on A. Therefore, the power-relation as explained from the social exchange relations above is found in all socio-political groupings or arrangement in Nigeria. In the country, power-relations favour those who control the means of survival or who owns or have the economic or material resources of the country. The social structure of the country places the economic

control or resources in the hands of few elites and who by their economic power want to gain political power or positions, and by all means. Therefore, the political elite or power-brokers with their economic wealth give money and promise political offices for people in exchange or in expectation of their support in violent protest against any political arrangement that does not favour them, or to cause political upheaval in their own favour.

INTER-GENERATIONAL CONFLICT THEORY: PLURALIST MODEL OF ELITE THEORY

Kingsley Davies developed the theory from conflict theory in 1945. Conflict theory focuses on the elements of change and revolution. It has its main roots in Marx and Engel's *The Communist Manifesto*. Conflict theory posits that, in every society there are different group, strata, or classes with fundamental differences of interest between them. Also, conflicts, disagreement, coercion, dynamism of interests and ideology, competition are common and inherent in all society and are the basic features of all society. The basic conditions of human life are dissension and competitions rather than consensus and integration as advocated by structural functionalism. Conflict is a continuous and inevitable aspect of human social life. Conflict theorists are of the view that, the stratification or arrangement of the social structure of the social system will tend to favour and benefit some group to the disfavour and disadvantage of other groups. Conflicts among these different groups are predicated on the organisation, mobilisation, and allocations of economic and political resources — which are scarce, limited and are therefore unevenly allocated, with an unequal access to them among the various groups. Resulting from this, the society continuously experience an inevitable competition, coercion, conflicts, and struggles for limited and scarce resources. Weber (1921, 1968) attributes the causes and sources of these conflict and struggles to three basic factors, power (political), wealth (economic) and status or prestige (social), while Marx (1845, 1848) attributes the cause and sources of conflicts and struggle to economic factors (property, wealth) alone which exist between the upper class and the lower class. Therefore, conflict theorists stress the existence of conflicts coercion, struggles, disagreement, and social change by violence and revolution among the

different competing groups for these scarce and limited resources in the society. Ian Craib supported the conflict view by saying that:

The society is more or less like a confused battleground. If we watch from the high, we would see a variety of groups or individual fighting or conflicting with one another constant fly forming and reforming making and breaking alliances (Craib, 1984).

There is an inter play or later link between conflict theory and the pluralist model of elite theory. Elite theory has been popularly applied to the study of ethnic politics and conflicts in the society. Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca describe elite as those individuals who measure high on any social value or commodity such as power (politics), riches (wealth) and knowledge, and are always less numerous, performs all political function monopolists power and enjoys the advantages that the exercise of such power brings (Pareto and Mosca, cited in Osaghae, 1991:14). While the pluralist model of elite perspectives on conflicts conceives the elite as a diverse organised minority pursuing diverse competitive and conflicting interests or aspects of inter-elite or inter-ethnic relations. This pluralist model contends that, the elite activates ethnic, sub-ethnic and communal sentiments in order to build a support base mask its struggle and competition for valued societal resources with other contending elite (Osaghae, 1995).

According to the inter-elite competition thesis of ethnic conflict, Osaghae (1991) says that ethnicity gather political salience and produces conflict when it is manipulated by the elite to further their interests. The task and struggle of these elite is further facilitated by the scarce and limited resource, unequal distribution and allocation of these resources, and unequal access among the groups to gain access to or achieve these resources and opportunity for development. Pretending to lead the groups fight against marginalisation unequal distribution, allocation and access to society's developmental resources, the elite build up primordial sentiments, mobilises mass support (projecting elite interest as common/group interest) against the benefiting elites, groups and or government. Osaghae (1991, 1995) goes further to say that ethnicity will not acquire political relevance or violent expression, except people or groups are subjected to structural inequalities and perceived political and economic gains as reward for political mobilisation along ethnic lines.

There is the need to narrow the conflict theory and pluralist model of elite theory down to Intergenerational conflict theory. The Intergenerational conflict theory was developed by Kingsley Davies in 1945. The issue of conflict in Nigeria have been generational or historical, i.e. conflicts have been passed down from older generation to younger generations. The culture of militancy is also critical to the intergenerational conflict (Oni, 1996, Ajibade, 1993). Conflicts in Nigeria could be traced back to the pre-colonial epoch, when stronger communities and ethnic tried to gain more land and expand their empires through a violent capturing of smaller and weaker communities or ethnic groups, for example; the Hausa-Fulani in the north and Oyo Empire in the south-west. During the colonial period, most of the conflicts were political and some inherited ethnic conflicts, which were transferred into the post-colonial era with an added religious conflicts. Thus, the causes and nature of conflicts in present-day Nigeria could be attributed to those inherited from the colonial and post-colonial era (i.e. political, ethnic, and social factors).

Meanwhile, present-day Nigeria is experiencing a plurality of elites, where almost every communities or ethnic group has several elite. Using the pluralist model of elite theory, conflicts in present-day Nigeria could not be divorced from the influence and role of the elite, who instigate and fuel crises in pretence of community or ethnic patriotism and loyalty, under the guise of religious, social and economic marginalisation to pursue and achieve their own political and economic interest and benefits. These elites instigate the youths against other elites, groups or community or against the government, and sponsor them with firearms and weapons that are more dangerous. The culture of militancy among the younger generation as explained by Oni (1991) and Ajibade (1993) have now been developed into various ethnic militias. For example: The Odua People Congress (OPC), The Egbesu Boys, Ijaw Youth Movement (IJM), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), The Arewa Youth Congress (AYC), etc.

CONCLUSION: NATION-BUILDING AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Despite considerable disagreement over the causes of development and underdevelopment, there is a growing consensus that state institutions

have profound effects on developmental processes. So strong is the consensus that a diverse group of scholars claim that the major goal of development policy must be the construction of effective state institutions (Bates, 1989; Evans, 2005; Fukuyama, 2004; Wolf, 2004). Unfortunately, building an effective and ideal state is not an easy task. The organisation and coordination of thousands of state officials within dozens of departments and the construction of effective lines of communication and exchange between state and society require tremendous monetary, organisational and normative resources. In addition, rapid population growth, extreme poverty, ethnic diversity, environmental degradation and domestic conflict create social environments that complicate state-building efforts. Such daunting logistical and social impediments cause some experts to question the very possibility of constructing an effective state in many regions of the world (Herbst, 2000; Kaplan, 1994; Reno, 1998).

Examples from Botswana, Singapore, Malaysia, etc. show that extensive state-building followed periods of political crisis. A crisis is a period of intense opposition during which institutional elite experience a heightened risk of losing their positions and authority. Based on this particular definition, an economic crisis occurs when the dominant economic actors are attacked by subordinate classes, political elites or foreign powers. Similarly, a political crisis threatens the authority of state elites and thereby destabilises the political order. Gramsci's discussion of crisis is shaped by his desire to establish a socialist order and is an important component of his theory of hegemony. His work points to crises as political in nature and suggests they occur when dominant elites lose legitimacy — the crisis of authority or hegemony — and are forced to resort to open coercion in order to maintain their positions (Carnoy, 1984; Gramsci, 1971; Martin, 1997). Most obviously, crises can severely impede the functioning of state institutions and thereby the ability of individuals to pursue their well being. As such, crises can be very destructive and hardly desirable. In addition, crises can as well promote constructive periods of radical institutional change. For example, he believes the post-World War I Italian crisis of authority weakened the hegemonic powers of the bourgeoisie and the state, thereby creating an opening for revolutionary change and the construction of a socialist order (Krasner, 1988).

State or nation-building is dependent on three general mechanisms: rational choice, consensus and power. Finding that crises heighten the risk of state collapse, threaten the positions of state elite, and therefore increase elite incentives to implement reforms. Wade (1990) and Woo-Cumings (1998), for example, claim that crises of national security provided state elites with the impetus to implement radical state reforms (i.e. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). These crises threatened the very existence of the states, thereby creating a political will for more effective states that could fend off external aggressors. Tilly (1992) analysis of war-making and state-making in early modern Europe stressed that constant warfare forced political elites to build large states that were capable of collecting revenue and organising a large army. Besides transforming incentives, crises can also promote major institutional transformation by increasing political consensus. Indeed, crises have the potential to make past rivals to form an alliance against a new and common threat (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1982: 167-168; Lowe, 1990).

Crisis potentially promote institutional change through their effects on the distribution of societal power. According to the definition used in this article, crises are inherently conflictual, and conflict can result in winners and losers and thereby the transformation of relative power. And when a crisis empowers actors in favour of reform, weakens actors opposed to reform, or both, crisis can facilitate institutional change. In an extreme example, Becker and Goldstone find that revolutionary crises create opportunities to vanquish foes and that the removal of opposition facilitates state reforms. 'Since the biggest obstacle to building new regimes (or making substantial changes in old ones) is opposition from entrenched autonomous elites', they write, 'revolutions can utilise popular mobilisation to either eliminate those elites, or their autonomy' (Becker and Goldstone, 2005: 209). Thus, crises might promote relatively rapid and extensive state institutional change by creating incentives, forging a consensus and transforming power relations. At the same time, as Gramsci (1971) and Rueschemeyer (2005: 161) avers, crises need not spark constructive institutional reforms, they only create an opening for them. Crises commonly heighten disagreement and resentment, it can strengthen groups opposed to change, and need not create incentives for institutional reforms. The construction of states with the capacity to provide collective goods is a common developmental goal. Crises can promote reforms by

transforming incentives, readjusting power relations, and forging a political consensus. Much of the world is facing development crises, a concept referring to the widespread inability of people to meet their basic needs. Specifically, states are vital to broad-based development and that extensive nation-building frequently follows severe political crises. Crises have the potential to have positive and long-term effects on development (Lange, 2009). Crises potentially promote punctuated and extensive state-building by adjusting costs, transforming power relations, and forging a political consensus (e.g., conflict perspective of social order and the Chinese conception of conflict).

Finally, it is, therefore, worthy of note that rather than focusing on nation-building and the high rates of insecurity, Nigeria is faced and still battling with the challenges of pluralism of religion and multiethnicism, which are inimical to national development. The failure of several approaches adopted by past governments to solving these conflicts, diversities, pluralism and multiethnicism in the past is not in the approaches themselves, but in the:

- (i) insincerity of government in the proper implementation of such approaches and recommendations that came from them.
- (ii) appointment of wrong personnel (most of whom are politicians) in conflict resolution, mediation and reconciliation and policy implementation committee.
- (iii) politicisation of the conflict situation and resolution.

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