

# The Faces of Muslim/Christian Peaceful Co-existence and *Shari'ah* Application in Nigeria by Dr. Ibrahim O. Uthman and Dr. Lateef O. Abbas<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

This paper focuses on the complexity of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria and how this affects their understanding of the place of the *Shari'ah* in modern Nigeria. This paper questions the popular reading of the origin and development of the *Shari'ah* imbroglio in Nigeria and locates this in the desires of both Muslims and Christians to claim their portions of the "national cake" or the nation's resources. Though the paper agrees that there are indeed elements of what can be termed 'political Islam and Christianity' in Muslim/Christian relations in Nigeria, it explains how the prevailing *Boko Haram* quagmire can be traced to the dangerous play with politics in Nigerian recent history. It finally shows how this menace can be curbed through the application of some principles that intersect with Muslim/non-Muslim peaceful coexistence, pluralism and religious dialogue as being realized in Malaysia today. It also explains how this Malaysian example can help in re-directing the future relations of Muslims and Christians in Nigeria towards a sustainable, peaceful, multicultural, religious and equitable Nigerian society.

Key words: *Shari'ah* Muslim/Christian relations, Inter religious conflicts, Dialogue and *Boko Haram*.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibrahim O. Uthman holds a PhD in Usul al-Din and Comparative Religion from the International Islamic University, Malaysia. He is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Ibadan and is currently the Business Manager of Al-Fikr, journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies of the department. He is the immediate past Departmental PG Coordinator and 2013 Visiting Scholar of the United States of America Institute of Religious Pluralism and Public Presence, University of California, Santa, Barbara. He has taught at the universities in Nigeria and Malaysia. He Spent his 2010 annual leave as a visiting lecturer at USIM, Malaysia. He has also published in numerous journals including American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (2010), Islamic Studies (2010), Journal of African and oriental studies (2009) IKIM Journal of Islam and International Affairs (2006), Journal of Islam in Asia (2005) and the Journal of Religion and Culture, (2000 and 2001). He was a Consultant of the Mapping the Global Muslim Population by Pew Research Centre, 2009.

Lateef O. Abbas is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He obtained his BA (Hons) in Arabic Language and Literature, MA in Arabic and Islamic studies and PhD in Islamic Studies all from the University of Ibadan specializing in Imamship Islamic Institutions. He worked briefly, after his first degree, as a Producer at a state television and thereafter joined the teaching profession at the higher institutions. He teaches Islamic Law (*Shari'ah*) and jurisprudence.

## Introduction

Nigeria, a colonial creation, is today having a large Muslim population in the majority and is made up of 36 federating units as seen in Figure 1. Pew Forum in a recent demographical survey puts the Muslim population at 78,056,000, which was 50.4% of the entire population,<sup>2</sup> estimated to be 154,500,000.<sup>3</sup> Christians are estimated to be 50%, 40% while Traditional and other Religionists constitute the remaining 10%.

The national political system according to the Nigerian constitution is multicultural and religious in nature and it has a multiple multicultural and religious constitutionally-based legal system.<sup>4</sup> In fact, the Nigerian constitution not only recognizes the rights of the citizens to freedom of belief and worship, it also permits them the rights to propagate their religious beliefs such as the implementation of the *Sharī'ah* and Common Law. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria succinctly highlights these rights as fundamental human rights to which all citizens, including women are entitled. It also provides that nobody shall be made subject to any religious law by force in Nigeria that is not with the person's accord.<sup>5</sup> Hence, Muslim scholars in Nigeria generally uphold that the country is constitutionally a multi-religious and not a secular society.<sup>6</sup>

However the history of the implementation of the *Sharī'ah* in Nigeria has always been characterized with many flaws leading to interreligious conflicts since the advent of

---

<sup>2</sup> Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life *Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population* (Washington D. C.: Pew Research Centre, 2009), pp. 5 and 30.

<sup>3</sup> *CO2 Emissions From Fuel Combustion Highlights* (France, International Energy agency, 2012), p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman, "Roles of Arabic and Islamic studies in a Secular Society" *Journal of for Nigerian Teachers of Arabic and Islamic Studies*, (2002), 80-88

<sup>5</sup> Federal Republic of Nigeria, *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, (Lagos: A Daily Times Publications, 1979), Section 35, paragraph 2.

<sup>6</sup> Rashid, Syed Khalid ed. *Islamic law in Nigeria* (Lagos: Islamic Publications Bureau, 1986 cited in Uthman, Ibrahim Olatunde (2002) "Roles of Arabic and Islamic studies in a Secular Society."

colonialism in Nigeria. While many Christians opine that the political nature of Islam is responsible for continual Muslims' agitation and its attendant Christian's opposition for the implementation of the *Sharī'ah* which the Nigerian constitution recognizes, it is argued here that the *Sharī'ah* imbroglio was created by the direct frictions of the mutual and contending struggles for state power in order to garner the wealth of the country. This study proceeds to explore a brief history of the early Muslim/Christian encounter in Nigeria and how the struggle for state power and the national wealth contributed mainly to the rise of socio-cultural and religious conflicts in the country and the prevailing *Boko Haram* quagmire. It then shows the need for Nigerians to adopt some policies that will engender Muslim/non-Muslim peaceful coexistence, multiculturalism and human rights among others and how some *Sharī'ah* principles can be useful and desirable in re-directing the future relations of Muslims and Christians in Nigeria towards a sustainable, peaceful, multicultural, religious and a gender friendly and equitable united Nigerian society.

### **Islam in Nigeria and Early Muslim/Christian Encounter**

The history of Islam is very long and rich in the areas now known as Nigeria. While the chronology of the advent of Islam in Nigeria remains debatable, according to Babatunde Aliu Fafunwa, a foremost Nigerian professor and historian of education, Islam came into Nigeria 300 years before the coming of Christianity.<sup>7</sup> Though Wright puts the advent of Islam in Nigeria as far back as the Seventh century,<sup>8</sup> this is debatable as the advent of Islam in the Kanuri Kingdoms of Kanem and Bornu took place around the 11<sup>th</sup> century. The presence of Islam in Kanem-Bornu Empire has been documented in many reports

---

<sup>7</sup> Aliu. B. Fafunwa, *History of Education in Nigeria* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> R. Wright, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation" *Journal of Democracy* (1996), vol. 7: 2, p. 66.

when Muhammad Mani introduced Islam into Kanem during the reign of Mai Bulu.<sup>9</sup> Muhammad Mani and other traders from Fezzan introduced Islam into the Empire through the trade routes between Tripoli and the Lake Chad Basin.<sup>10</sup> However, Islam came to many other areas of what is known as Nigeria today around the fourteenth century. This is because of the very important role played by scholars from the old Mali Empire in the entrenchment of Islam in these areas. At the time of the decline of the Mali Empire, it was in Nigeria especially the Northern part, such as Kano, Katsina and Zaria, that many of its scholars went to settle. Even the Yoruba in South-western Nigeria still refer to Islam as “*esin Imale*” meaning the religion of Mali (Abdul, 1982:121). It is also supported by the “Kano Chronicle” that documents the presence of Muslims in Kano by the middle of the 14<sup>th</sup> century<sup>11</sup>

Contrary to the view that Islam was not strong in Yoruba land (Southwest Nigeria) before the coming of colonialist and Christianity, Islam can be said to have gained a strong foothold as far back as the 1550s in Yoruba land according to S. Johnson when a Muslim cleric, Baba-kewu reprimanded the *Alaafin* of Oyo for killing some of his subjects due to the death of his son. The King was then compelled to apologize before the people. The action taken by the cleric must have been the result of a strong Muslim presence and influence, hence, J. O. Awolalu (1979) established that by 1840, Islam was fully entrenched in Yoruba land and some Muslim communities were already flourishing. A key factor that brought about this influence was the conversions to Islam by many kings

---

<sup>9</sup> S. A. Balogun, “History of Islam up to 1800” in Obaro Ikime (ed.) *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), p. 211.

<sup>10</sup> Christopher Steed, “The Islamic Heritage of Nigeria” in Christopher Steed and David Westerlund *The Triple Religious Heritage of Nigeria: The Essays* (Uppsala: Teologiska Institutionen-Uppsala Universitet, 1995), p. 67.

<sup>11</sup> H. A. R. Palmer, “Kano Chronicle” *Sudanese Memoirs* (1928), Vol. 3, pp. 104-105.

in Western Sudan. Another factor was the services rendered by Muslim clerics generally to the Kings and warlords in Yoruba land. For instance, Bashorun Ga of Ibadan had a Muslim spiritual mentor who came from Iwo, *Aare* Latosa also had *Shaykh* Bello as spiritual mentor, while Alfa Ishaq was the spiritual adviser of *Balogun Akere* of Ibadan. These Muslim clerics rendered prayers for spiritual fortification especially during wars (AbdulRahmon, 1989: 23-24).

By the time Lagos state became a British Colony, the influence of Islam had gained momentum considerably among the Yoruba. It is on record that the Muslims in Lagos actually petitioned the British Colonial Government in 1899, demanding for the establishment of the Islamic legal system and Muib Opeloye, the former Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Lagos State University and a professor of Islamic Studies explains that the strong presence of Islam in Yoruba land resulted in the establishment of Islamic courts by some Yoruba Muslim traditional rulers in their domains (Muib, 2001).

Nonetheless, Christianity preceded Islam in other areas of what is known as Nigeria. For instance the growth of Islam in the mid-western region during the colonial area was largely the result of the efforts of migrant Muslim traders from northern and western Nigeria. In 1890, it was reported that the establishment of a military base in Calabar, an important Efik town facilitated the arrival of Muslim traders and the building of a mosque. The natives were reportedly impressed by the dress and devotions of these Muslims that Goldie of the Primitive Methodist Society in Calabar, concluded that in

time, the natives could begin to imitate them.<sup>12</sup> From 1896 there were also reports of Muslim elephant hunters from Kano in Elele, Port Harcourt.<sup>13</sup>

In 1903, Muslims in eastern Nigeria were also reported to have been mainly traders, some of whom did settle there before indigenous leaders such as Alhaji Sufiyan Agwasim, a Roman catholic converted to Islam.<sup>14</sup> Yet, despite the presence of migrant Hausa Muslims in Igboland, from that time, Islam was mostly seen as the religion of the Hausas, a belief that was deepened by the Nigerian civil war.<sup>15</sup> By 1984, therefore, Abdurrahman Doi, the Bangladesh Islamic scholar who was based in Nigeria at the time collected the statistics of Igbo Muslims and put their figures at 3,450 persons.<sup>16</sup> In addition, in 1991 the figures were estimated at 10, 000 persons.<sup>17</sup> Using a conversion rate of 1 Muslim for every 1000 Christians, the figures can today be put at 16, 000 from an Igbo population of over sixteen Million.<sup>18</sup>

### **The origin of Muslim/Christian Conflicts and the *Shar'ah* Imbroglia**

That Islam was therefore very strong in Nigeria Northern and Southwestern Nigeria before the advent of Christianity in Nigeria created a great misunderstanding when Christian missionaries started using Western education to Christianize non-Christians or as an instrument of conversion. Through this educational evangelism, Christian missionaries, indeed the Christian Church, succeeded beautifully in Yoruba land. Many

---

<sup>12</sup> Hugh Goldie, *Calabar and its Mission* (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier, 1901), pp. 352-354.

<sup>13</sup> Abdulrazaq Kilani, *Minaret in the Delta: Islam in Port Harcourt and its Environs 1896-2007* (Lagos: Global Dawah Communications, 2008), pp. 42-43.

<sup>14</sup> Peter B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1982), pp. 224-226 and 228-229.

<sup>15</sup> Onwuka Njoku, "A synoptic Overview" in Toyin Falola (ed.) *Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo* (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2005), p. 37.

<sup>16</sup> Abdurrahman Doi, *Islam in Nigeria* (Zaria: Gaskiya Press, 1984), p. 181.

<sup>17</sup> M. Akoshile and I. Umunna, "Igbo Muslims: Their Trials and triumphs" *Citizen* (1993) 4, p. 181.

<sup>18</sup> Egodi Uchendu, *Dawn for Islam in Eastern Nigeria: A History of the Arrival of Islam in Igboland* (Berlin: Studies on Modern Orient, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2012), pp. 37-38.

Muslims in order to go to school had to be converted to Christianity and became Christians as Yusuf became Joseph, Lawal Lawalson and Ibrahim Abraham among others (Adekilekun, 1989: 1-83). The conversion of Muslims to Christianity through the Schools led to the first religious conflict and indeed retarded Muslim education in Nigeria. However as shown by Akintola (2008: 47),<sup>19</sup> the colonialists lay the blame for this retarded Muslim education “squarely on the Muslim doorsteps as reflected in Henry Carr’s” depiction of Muslims as clogs in the progress of colonial administration. This depiction of the Muslims by the Colonial masters was in turn rejected by the Muslims as reflected in Fafunwa’s analysis that Muslim education was retarded because missionary cum colonial education was irretrievably tied to Christianization.<sup>20</sup> This view is also supported by a Christian and historian of the Ibadan school, Ayandele, who explained how the Christian Church used education for conversion in Southern Nigeria, in particular.<sup>21</sup>

As a result of their revolt Muslim education along Western lines was retarded in the North. For instance, according to Peter B. Clarke because the Emirs opposed the introduction of English as the medium of instruction in schools, “one of the consequences was that in places like Bauchi Emirate there were by 1952 only 18,000 people literate in English out of a population of over one million, and in Kano the figure was 23,000 out of a population of almost three and half million.”<sup>22</sup> The rejection of colonial education by Muslims is not restricted to Nigeria as Muslims all over Africa tend to boycott colonial

---

<sup>19</sup> Is-haq Akintola, “Islam in Africa” in Hussein Solomon, Akeem Fadare and Firoza Butler (eds.), *Political Islam and the State in Africa* (South Africa: The Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 47.

<sup>20</sup> Fafunwa, *History of Education*, p. 72.

<sup>21</sup> E. A. Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842-1914: A Political and Social Analysis* (London: Longman, 1966), p. 129.

<sup>22</sup> Clarke, *West Africa and Islam*, pp. 192-193.

schools because of discrimination against them and the attendant conversion to Christianity. In fact, it was the case in Kenya where Muslim education was retarded for many years because of the fear of conversion to Christianity.<sup>23</sup> This is also the case in Ethiopia where Muslims were converted to Christianity in missionary schools, leading to a long and turbulent history in the country.<sup>24</sup> Some scholars have contrasted this retardation of Muslim education with the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Sokoto Jihād of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio and the defunct Sokoto Caliphate in pre-colonial Northern Nigeria which have been linked to the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam in the north and other West African Countries such as Gambia.

According to historical reports, non-Muslims, some of whom were targeted by the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Sokoto Jihād suffered bitterly during both the Jihād and Sokoto caliphate that followed it. This included forced conscription into Islam, the raging army and feudal emirate system under the caliphate. The fourth Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Sokoto, a versatile scholar, Bishop Dr. Fr. Matthew Hassan Kukah and the founder and General Coordinator of the Interfaith Council of Muslim and Christian Women's Associations in Kaduna, Sr. Kathleen McGarvey describe the Sokoto Caliphate founded after the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Sokoto Jihād by Usman Dan Fodio as follows:

By far the most relevant source of conflict between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria today lies in the historical narratives about relationships between the various ethnic groups in the northern part of the country after the emergence of the Sokoto caliphate in 1804. This caliphate had come into being after the bitter wars led by Usman Dan Fodio, a Fulani scholar in the palace of one of the Hausa

---

<sup>23</sup> A. H. S. El-Busaidy, "Islam in Kenya" in Hussein Solomon and Firoza Butler (eds.) *Islam in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 47.

<sup>24</sup> C. N. Ubah, *Islam in African History* (Kaduna: Baraka Press and Publishers Ltd., 2001), 45-73.

rulers, who mobilized other Muslims and overran the Hausa city states through a Jihad. Many Hausas who until then had practiced African Traditional Religions became Muslims during the period.<sup>25</sup>

Hence, the British conquest of caliphate in 1903 was seen as “liberation by both a section of the Hausas and the overwhelming non-Muslims who had lived under the oppression of the caliphate.”<sup>26</sup> Consequently, it follows as earlier shown by Kukah that this and other experiences still account for some of the tensions generally in the relations between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Since the caliphate came into being through wars coupled with the above deprivations suffered by non-Muslims, Islam came to be seen and judged through this lens, especially by the less-privileged Nigerians.<sup>27</sup>

However, some scholars have attempted to rebut the above allegations. According to Peter B. Clarke, the British scholar of religion and founding editor journal of contemporary religion, quoting Murray last the Hausa rulers who mixed Islam with indigenous traditional practices such as the use of talisman and collection of un-Islamic taxes coupled with venal Islamic scholars were the main target of the Sokoto Jihād. According to him, the Maguzawa or non-Muslim people who resided in the emirates and their boundaries “were not really the targets for jihad in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.” Rather, it was primarily a reform movement, reforming lax Muslims, not converting pagans.<sup>28</sup> It may therefore be concluded that the Sokoto Jihād was not out to force people to become Muslims at the point of the sword. In fact, it was prepared to win the people through

---

<sup>25</sup> Matthew Hassan Kukah and Kathleen McGarvey, “Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Nigeria: Social, Political and Theological Dimensions” in Akintunde E. Akinade (ed.) *Fractured Spectrum*,. 14.

<sup>26</sup> Kukah and McGarvey, “Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Nigeria, 14.

<sup>27</sup> See Matthew Hassan Kukah, *Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1993).

<sup>28</sup> Peter B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1982), 218-222.

preaching, teaching and persuasion rather than force and not bent on outlawing Muslims because of certain reprehensible and condemnable beliefs and practices of indigenous traditions mixed with Islam.<sup>29</sup>

It must however be observed that the introduction of the “Indirect rule” administration by the British High Commissioner in Nigeria as an administrative instrument to garner the support of the elites and aristocracy for British rule contributed in no small measure to the exacerbation of the relations between the emirs, the custodian of the legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate and the people generally, including non-Muslims. This is because the indirect rule policy gave the British colonialists legitimacy and divided the opposition against its unpopular policies by using traditional rulers as “political messengers” to do the British government’s dirty work and at the same time leaving real powers in the hands of the British colonial administrators. Thus, while the policy served the colonial interests, it alienated the traditional rulers from the people in areas of taxation, culture and religion. Not unsurprisingly, the designation of many areas as emirates and the use of emirs in Northern Nigeria as administrators, even in regions where they hitherto had no powers were interpreted by many as maintaining and expanding the Islamic Caliphate structures.<sup>30</sup>

It is also noteworthy that today, Muslims all over the world are making giant strides to address the anomaly of Muslim educational retardation through the Islamization project.<sup>31</sup> As a matter of fact, as explained by Clarke above, the Muslims in Southwestern

---

<sup>30</sup> Klaus Hock, “The Omnipresence of the Religious: Religiosity in Nigeria,” in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), *What the World Believes: Analysis and Commentary on the Religion Monitor 2008* (Gutersloh: Verl, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 272.

<sup>31</sup> For details on the Islamization project and the proponents, see Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman, “Muslim and Science: Contributions of Islamic Universities to Professional Ethics” *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* (AJISS), USA, 2010, vol. 27:1,54-73.

could be said to have began this Islamization project in Nigeria, following the manner they responded to the challenges of Western-style education through the establishment of schools that provided modern education with a firm grounding in Islamic sciences.<sup>32</sup> In addition to the Egbe Killa in Lagos mentioned by Clarke, other Islamic organizations that pioneered this Islamization project are the Ahmadiyyah Movement in Islam, Ansar-ud-Deen Society of Nigeria, Nawar-udd-Deen Society of Nigeria and Anwarul-Islam Society in Nigeria etc. that took up the challenge of what I have termed Educational Jihād in the face of Christian educational evangelism by founding Islamic schools that provided the Western-style education with Islamic grounding.<sup>33</sup>

### **The Evolution and Metamorphosis of *Boko Haram* (BH)**

Beyond the problem of retarding Muslim education, the use of education to convert Muslims by the Christian Church and the subsequent boycott of education by the Muslim North is one explanation of the phenomenon of BH in Nigeria. As Andrew Walker, a freelance journalist who has conducted research on the group has written, “a range of conflicting narratives has grown up around BH when one looks deeper, however, one finds that politics—more precisely, control of government patronage—is the primary cause of many of these conflicts.”<sup>34</sup> For example, one of such narratives, which have not been employed before is why the term, BH has stuck with the infamous Islamic movement implicated in various terrorist activities in Nigeria. While the real name of this infamous Islamic movement is Jamā ‘atu Ahl al-Sunnah Lī al-Da‘awah wa al- Jihād (Movement of the people of the Prophetic Tradition for propagation and Jihad), it is

---

<sup>32</sup> Clarke, *West Africa and Islam*, 224-226 and 228-229.

<sup>33</sup> Uthman, “Muslim/Christian Encounter in Nigeria,” 89-91.

<sup>34</sup> Andrew Walker, “What is Boko Haram,” in *Special Report* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), May 30, 2012), 1-15. Available online at <http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram>

commonly known as BĤ, mainly by the Media and even some of the people in the Northeast. Though members of the movement denounce the name BĤ, the name has been given prominence by the government and Media. B or boko has both etymological and historical roots. Boko which, in classical Hausa language literally means deception or deceit is used in Hausa to describe a “fake bride” or “bride of deception” known “amaryar boko.” This has historically been a feature of the Hausa wedding, where a grandmother usually dresses up like the bride as part of a practical joke played on the groom. Ĥ or Ĥaram is the Sharī‘ah word for forbidden, prohibited or unacceptable. Hence, while the term, BĤ may mean that secular education is in Islam prohibited, it could also mean as was originally used during the Fulani/Hausa Muslim north contact with Christian education to mean that evangelism deceptively camouflaged as secular education is prohibited and unacceptable in Islam.<sup>35</sup>

This definition of boko is confirmed by no less authority than the well-known historian and author of *The Hausa Factor in the History of West Africa*, Mahdi Adamu, who writes that in Hausa, the word simply means fake and was often used to connote the “fake bride”, amaryar boko, who rode the horse in place of the real bride as the convoy of celebrants escorted her to her new home. The real bride would secretly be carried earlier by two or three women to her home. But when the missionary brought education to the Hausa speaking people, the people generally rejected it and labelled it, ilimin boko or fake education. According to him, since that period, the name ilimin boko or very rarely ilimin zamani has remained the standard translation of education among the Hausas.<sup>36</sup> Thus BĤ has only appropriated the Hausa historical pride in the hitherto educational

---

<sup>35</sup> Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, *The Boko Haram Tragedy: Frequently Asked Questions* (Niger: Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, 1430/2009), 1-2.

<sup>36</sup> See Mahdi Adamu, *The Hausa Factor in West African History* (London: Oxford University Press 1978).

system that culminated in the rejection of *ilimin boko* in its preaching as could be gleaned from the answer given by the late founder and leader, Muhammad Yusuf during one of his numerous lectures recorded in an audio-tape when he was asked why the group was against Western education and he replied that the movement was against education in schools established by the missionaries or that use modern curriculum whether at the elementary, secondary or tertiary levels. Another point that is obvious from the answer of Yusuf is that the BH use of the historical *ilimin boko* is not restricted to western education but rather encompasses any form of education that is taught in a modern setting using modern curriculum classrooms and an organized school structure, including *Makarantun ilmi* where the so-called Islamic education is taught.<sup>37</sup>

The BH has also been known for a long time by the people in Borno and Yobe states as *Yusufiyun* (*Yusufis*), an ascription to the late founder and leader, Yusuf. The movement is also referred to as *Yusufiyyah* due to the largely cult-like following and uncritical acceptance of the views of the founder.<sup>38</sup> The BH began as an Islamic movement, organizing religious preaching, lectures and sermons in different centres, mosques and open spaces. It is noteworthy that between the period of its formation in 2002 and 2009, the BH was not involved in any violent or terrorist act. It rather conducted itself peacefully in its religious public preaching and dialogical engagements with different Muslim scholars in Northern Nigeria. The series of events that changed the face of the BH began in 2002 when according to popular narrative, Yusuf was co-opted by the then

---

<sup>37</sup> See Ahmad Murtaḍā, "Boko Haram in Nigeria: Beginnings, Principles and Activities," AbdulHaq al-Ashanti (translator) (Kano: salafimanhaj, 2013), 4 also available at <http://www.salafimanhaj.com/> accessed on April 14, 2015. See also Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, *the Boko Haram Tragedy: Frequently Asked Questions* (Niger: Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, 1430/2009) and Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, *the Boko Haram Tragedy and the Boko Haram Tragedy: Responses to the Ideology of the Boko Haram Group* (Niger: Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, 1430/2009).

<sup>38</sup> Murtaḍā, "Boko Haram in Nigeria," 4.

Borno state gubernatorial candidate, Ali Modu Sheriff, for the support of his large youth movement, in exchange for full implementation of Sharī'ah and promises of senior state government positions for his followers in the event of an electoral victory. Sheriff denies any such arrangement or involvement with the sect. After the electoral victory and the government failed to implement full Sharī'ah as promised, Yusuf became increasingly critical of the government and official corruption. In short, "after the politicians created the monster," "they lost control of it".<sup>39</sup> Then came 2009 when BH suffered police brutality over the implementation of a directive on the use of helmets on motorcycles. Its members on funeral procession were brutally attacked by the police because of the failure to use helmets on motorcycles or perhaps because of their refusal to bribe the police. Yusuf then wrote an open letter to Federal Government, calling for a redress of the harm done to his movement in 40 days, otherwise the government should prepare for "Jihād operations which only Allah will be able to stop." Unfortunately security agents stormed the stronghold of the movement leading to the brutal killing of its member. Thus began a protracted massacre of members of the movement and extra judicial killing of its leader, Yusuf in police custody. With the assassination of Yusuf, Abubakr Shekau who had served as the deputy to Yusuf emerged the new leader of the movement and its complete metamorphosis into a terrorist movement in alliance with al-Qaida became complete. The period between 2009 and 2010 was a terrifying nightmare for the BH members. In describing this nightmare, Mohammad Haruna, the well-known and seasoned Nigerian journalist writes that in crushing the BH, between 800 and 1000 lives, mostly innocent civilians, were reportedly killed, including the founder of the group, Muhammed Yusuf,

---

<sup>39</sup> International Crisis Group, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency" in *Africa Report* (3 April 2014).

his father in law, Ba'a Fugu Mohammed, and the sect's chief financier, Buji Foi, a former commissioner of religious affairs in Governor Ali Modu Sherrif's Borno State Government, who were victims of extra-judicial killings by the security forces. Despite the promise of President Yar'adua to order an investigation into the alleged extra-judicial killings, nothing was heard until six months later when in February 2010, al-Jazeera, the English channel global television station, aired a shocking footage in its news bulletin which showed the security services going on an arbitrary house-to-house search-and-arrest of presumably BH followers and then lining them up and shooting them in the back. In the words of Haruna, "it was a mark of the impunity with which the security forces indulged in the killings that the officers who appeared to be in charge of the operation did not bother to hide their name tags on their chests."<sup>40</sup> Since then, the BH has metamorphosed into a monster, "targeting not only security forces, government officials and politicians, but also Christians, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, the UN presence, bars and schools." Later it "evolved into pure terrorism, with targeting of students attending secular state schools, health workers involved in polio vaccination campaigns and villages supporting the government."<sup>41</sup>

The key discovery in the case of BH is that government has been playing a dangerous politics. Granted that the government of Sheriff at the state level started this politics and late President Yar'adua mismanaged the BH with the extrajudicial killing of its founder, his successor and immediate past President, Jonathan's administration appears for a long time seemingly hell-bent on playing this dangerous politics with BH terror. It appears BH

---

<sup>40</sup> Mohammad Haruna, "On Boko Haram: Two Years On" in his *People and Politics Column* available at Gamji.com.

<sup>41</sup> International Crisis Group, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency" in *Africa Report* (3 April 2014).

was hijacked by his presidency to destroy the Muslim north, in preparation for their agenda of “do or die” in the just concluded 2015 general elections in Nigeria. Evidence in this direction includes the apparent ties of some members of President Jonathan administration with the B.H. This claim is given credence when the first bomb blast in the country occurred during the 50<sup>th</sup> Independence Day Anniversary celebrations at Eagle Square, venue of the celebrations on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2010. President Jonathan reacted by making his famous declaration that he knew those behind it and their sponsor. However, his declaration was rejected by the militant group in his hometown, MEND which claimed responsibility for the bomb blast. In fact, a leader of the group in South Africa, Henry Emomotimi Okah who has since been tried, found guilty and jailed over his role in the fatal bombing during the Golden Jubilee of Nigeria’s Independence on October 1, 2010 by the South African Courts claimed in court affidavit sworn to during his trial that he received a call from Mr. Moses Jituboh, the Head of Personal Security to President Jonathan on the day of the bombing of 1 October 2010 who solicited his cooperation with former President Jonathan towards shifting blame for the Independence Day bombings to some Northern politicians, notably General Ibrahim Babangida, former military president who was initially in the running for the 2011 presidential election with former President Jonathan. He also claimed to have received two SMS'es on 2 October 2010 from Mr. Tony Uranta asking him to tell J.G (Jomo Gbomo the spokesperson for MEND) to withdraw the statement because the government seeks to blame the bombing on Northern elements. To Okah, his refusal to co-operate with the presidency was why the Federal Government under former President Jonathan instigated the South African Police to arrest and prosecute him.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Abuja Bomb Blast: Henry Okar implicates Goodluck Jonathan, <http://saharareporters.com/news->

This claim of former President Jonathan administration's involvement with the BH is further strengthened by the failure or unwillingness of the government to prosecute and convict alleged members of the BH who have been apprehended and are still in custody. Yet these members of the BH have been implicated in terrorist acts such as the bombing of churches and mosques and killing of prominent individuals and Islamic scholars.<sup>43</sup> Prominent among such members of the BH is Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, the alleged mastermind of the Nyanya Motor Park bombing in Abuja. Since the case was discharged by the Federal High Court in Abuja on November 24 for "lack of diligent prosecution, the Nigerian Police and the SSS have engaged each other in an embarrassing blame game over the bungling. In addition, in January 2012, shortly before the New Year gift of increases in fuel price which President Jonathan gave Nigerians, he made another of his famous declarations that members of the BH had infiltrated the highest levels of his government and the military. Perhaps as noted by Walker, this new declaration by the president might have had more to do with distracting Nigerians away from the new painful fuel price increases he was about to make than with the actual truth.<sup>44</sup> The role of politics with religious conflicts in Nigeria did not however start with BH. It started with the application of the *Sharī'ah*.

### ***Sharī'ah* and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria**

Furthermore, the manner the colonial masters in Nigeria undermined the operation of the *Sharī'ah* or the Islamic law also contributed in no small measure to the rise of religious conflicts in Nigeria. Though Lord Lugard, the then Governor-General promised not to undermine the practice of the *Sharī'ah* or intrude into the lives of Muslims in Nigeria, the

---

[page/abuja-bomb-blast-henry-okah-implicates-goodluck-jonathan-al-jazeera](http://page/abuja-bomb-blast-henry-okah-implicates-goodluck-jonathan-al-jazeera) accessed on July 11, 2013

<sup>43</sup> Idowu Sowunmi, "History of Sectarian Bloodbaths" *This Day Newspaper* (1 August 2009), 65.

<sup>44</sup> Walker, "What is Boko," 1-15.

British government led by him later abolished penalties they considered repugnant to natural justice such as amputation, death penalty non-inheritance of an heir that differs from the religion of the deceased. In 1943, for example, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of an alkali court that Mary, a Christian could not inherit from her Muslim father. Again in 1948, the West African court of appeal set a death sentence passed on a murderer aside because it was contrary to the British common law (Karbi-Whyte, 1993). This led to many violent demonstrations by Muslims in Northern Nigeria in the colonial era and since that time; there has been a train of killing, burning and destruction of lives, properties, Mosques, Churches and houses particularly in the middle Belt region. Since then Christians have perceived the implementation of the *Sharī'ah* in Nigeria as symbol of Muslim domination. For instance, the demand by Muslims during the 1975 Constitution Drafting Committee work for a federal *Sharī'ah* court to sit over appeals from state *Sharī'ah* courts was totally rejected by the Christian members of the 1977/78 constituent Assembly. Its deliberation resulted in a total stalemate with Muslims from the North walking out of the conference until the Yoruba Muslims served as mediators that diffused the tension. Led by Chief M. K. O. Abiola, the Yoruba Muslims became the vanguards of a compromise acceptable to both Muslims and Christians over the *Sharī'ah* stalemate. That compromise is the provision of a special committee of the Supreme Court in place of a federal *Sharī'ah* court to sit over appeals from state *Sharī'ah* courts (Laitin, 1986:418).

It is therefore necessary to note here before proceeding further, that the *Sharī'ah* imbroglio in Nigeria predated the Nigerian nation state, if it can be called that and is therefore not a product of power struggle between Muslims and Christians like the former

president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo who term it “political the *Sharī’ah*. The agitation for full implementation of the *Sharī’ah* is not about Muslim’s frustration with Christian rule or fear of the Christian gaining political power in Nigeria; it is about Muslims’ right to practice their religion in a multicultural and pluralistic Nigeria.<sup>45</sup>

However the most violent crises in Nigeria over the *Sharī’ah* were to occur in Kaduna. This happened over the re-introduction of the criminal aspects of the *Sharī’ah* following the democratic dispensation that ushered in a new republic in 1999. Though the *Sharī’ah* initiative came from Zamfara state, no conflict has taken place over there till today. The assumption by many Christians was that some Northern states such as Zamfara concluded that their state is an overwhelming Muslim state and therefore passed the *Sharī’ah* as the law governing everyone in the State and consequently the Christian in Kaduna state which a major Christian belt in the North gathered to protest against the re-introduction of the criminal aspects of the *Sharī’ah* which eventually turned into violent riots and demonstrations.

The above assumption to us does not reveal the whole picture. On the one hand, there are many institutions in Nigeria that Muslims perceive as symbols of Christian domination, though in the name of secularity. These symbols include the common Law which has a Christian antecedent, work-free Saturdays and Sundays, the official recognition of two Christian bodies, the Catholics and Protestants in the army, Air force, Navy and all other similar national sectors while only one Muslim body is recognized. We there argue that there is a more serious factor to explain Muslim/Christian conflicts in Nigeria; especially over the *Sharī’ah* and this is socio-economic factor. It is this factor that is responsible for

---

<sup>45</sup> Joseph Kenny OP, “The Challenge of Islam in Nigeria” accessed on August 07, 2012 at <http://www.josephkenny.joyeurs.com/Challenge.htm>

“political” Islam and Christianity as would be seen in the next section where we argue that virtually all religious crises in Nigeria have economic undertones and are informed by perceived grievances of social injustice.

### ***Sharī'ah* imbroglio and the Socio-economic Dimensions of Religious Conflicts**

It can be argued that though Zamfara state is a predominantly Muslim state with pockets of Christians, this does not explain the Christians' support for the introduction of the *Sharī'ah* by the people. They must have supported the move because they were economically and politically well off. In fact the state was the first in the country to approve a then new minimum wage of 5,000 naira. This amount was far higher than what even the Federal government was paying then (The Nigerian Tribune, January 27 2000).

This economic dimension in religious uprising in Nigeria has been argued to have started with the emergence of a radical group known as Maitatsine in Kano led by one Malam Muhammadu Marwa in 1980, which attacked and killed other Muslims who did not belong to the group. According to Lewis (2002) this group had its primary constituency among the Northern Muslim talakawa (commoners) and it took the combined operations of both the Police and Armed forces of Nigeria to quell the attacks of the group.<sup>46</sup>

Similarly, the Major Gideon Orkar led coup of 1990 reflected this economic dimension. Its religious dimension could be seen when the leader of the coup mentioned the excision of the five core Muslim states in the north. Interestingly, the leader of the coup comes from the middle belt area that may be regarded as Bible belt region of Nigeria. He also accused those states that were to be excised of domination over the other parts of the

---

<sup>46</sup> Lewis Peter M. (December 2002) “Islam, Protest and Conflicts in Nigeria”, *African Notes*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Number 10.

country. More so, it came on the heels of many allegations against the Babaginda regime first over the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) issue.

Though the regime's attempt to join the OIC was purely to obtain economic assistance from the Islamic Development Bank, it was however accused by the Christian Association of Nigeria in open letter of being a principal agency of Islamization in Nigeria barely two months before the above coup. The open letter of the Christian Association of Nigeria also shows that its grouse was mainly over perceived lopsided political appointments (African Concord, February 5 1990: 36-37).

Therefore the contention here is that there is indeed both "political" Islam and political Christianity in Nigeria which arises as a result of the fight for the so-called Nigerian 'national cake' as seen when people begin to identify with Islam or Christianity for political ends like getting government's sponsorship for pilgrimages either to Mecca/Medina or to Jerusalem/Rome. What is sadly very clear is that these pilgrimages are not sponsored for religious but political motives. This has led to the occurrence of some state governors in Southwestern Nigeria, paying for Christians and their concubines to go on pilgrimages to Mecca.

### ***Sharī'ah* and Peaceful Coexistence in Nigeria: The Malaysian Example**

Malaysia, which can today be regarded as the best model for peaceful coexistence and multiculturalism and the entrenchment of Islamic cultural shares a lot in common with Nigeria. A Muslim mosque, Chinese temple, Indian temple and Christian Church are located at a distance of a few hundred meters from each other in Malaysia just as Muslim mosques, Christian churches and African Traditional temples exist together in many places, especially Southwest Nigeria. Secondly, there are many in Malaysia, both

Muslims and non-Muslims who consider the idea of the *Sharī'ah* as antithetical to the ideals of secularism and plural society which the country represents just as we have them in Nigeria. In fact, this is the position of the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS).

However, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia like the Nigerian Constitution make provision for what has been termed "legal pluralism" that is "the provision to establish native court systems in addition to the existing common law and *Sharī'ah* law."<sup>47</sup> In recognition of the two countries' plurality, the *Sharī'ah* does not have any status of superiority and neither is it an independent law in the two constitutions. However unlike Nigeria, which is divided along religious and ethnic lines, Malaysia, while upholding the *Sharī'ah* law is today able to unite its multi-religious and multicultural people and develop its society. One way this has been achieved and which can be of immense benefit to Nigeria is the active involvement of the Malaysian government in the organization, registration and activities of religious bodies, including mosques and churches. This has helped the government to nip in the bud any religious activity, preaching or doctrine that could engender religious conflict or terrorism. There is therefore the need for Nigeria to emulate this Malaysian example though the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) founded by the government of Olusegun Obasanjo in its apparent determination to promote the ideals of peaceful coexistence, especially among the various religions in Nigeria.<sup>48</sup> For NIREC to succeed in addressing serious religious and socio economic issues, which divide the Muslims and Christians of Nigeria, including the menace of , it must be constitutionally empowered to organize, register and monitor religious

---

<sup>47</sup> Abdul Rashid Moten, "Malaysia as an Islamic State: A Political Analysis" *IKIM Journal of Islam and International Affairs*, (2003), vol. 1, no. 1 pp. 1-69.

<sup>48</sup> Olusegun Obasanjo, *Address to the Nation on the Sharia Crisis*, Wednesday March 1, 2000.

organizations and their activities. The contention here is that must be given constitutional and legal strength to check religious excesses in the country. The current dialogical exchange among scholars which NIREC is focusing on is not what is necessary in Nigeria today. The gathering of scholars 'to compare and discuss the finer points of their intellectual traditions,'<sup>49</sup> has always been going on in Nigeria, especially at the behest of the Catholic Church. It is not the dialogue between eminent scholars of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in Nigeria and the Christian Association of Nigeria as currently occurring that can provide the religious impetus for Muslims and Christians in Nigeria to collaborate and work together for the development projects of the country. To borrow from Kenny 'in interreligious relations we need two eyes': one to see the failure of governance in Nigeria, the other to see the hungry and angry Nigerian Muslim and Christian masses.<sup>50</sup> Perhaps the greatest area where a constitutionally strengthened NIREC can help is in recommending policies on contentious issues like Islamic Banking, Friday prayers and wearing of hijāb in schools.

### Conclusion

The analysis of Nigerian engagement with peaceful coexistence and pluralism in this paper shows that the country can learn from countries such as Malaysia <sup>in</sup> it is inspiring its people towards progress and development. This will undoubtedly be of great benefit in resolving the crises of religious politics playing out in Nigeria. Consequently, the paper recommends the adoption of the Malaysian multicultural model for use in Nigeria because Malaysia is today similar to Nigeria in composition as well as a modern state that

---

<sup>49</sup> Charles B. Jones, *The View from Mars Hill: Christianity in the Landscape of World Religions* (Cambridge: Cowley Publications, 2005), 168.

<sup>50</sup> Joseph Kenny. "Interreligious Dialogue in Nigeria: Personal Reminiscences of 40 Years", in, Anthony A. Akinwale (ed.), *All that they had to live on. Essays in honor of Archbishop John Onaiyekan and Msgr. John Aniagwu*, (Ibadan: The Michael J. Dempsey Center for Religious and Social Research, 2004), 191.

has adequately conjoined modernity and Islam, especially as far as plural legal systems, democracy, the leadership roles of Muslim women and balancing Muslim/Christian relations for economic development projects are concerned.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY

## REFERENCES

Abuja Bomb Blast: Henry Okar implicates Goodluck Jonathan,

<http://saharareporters.com/news-page/abuja-bomb-blast-henry-okar-implicates-goodluck-jonathan-al-jazeera> accessed on July 1, 2013

Adamu Mahdi, *The Hausa Factor in West African History* (London: Oxford University Press 1978).

Akinade, Akintunde E. "The Precarious Agenda; Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Nigeria, Public Lecture, 2002.

Akintola Is-haq, "Islam in Africa" in Hussein Solomon, Akeem Fadare and Firoza Butler (eds.), *Political Islam and the State in Africa* (South Africa: The Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2008).

Akoshile M. and I. Umunna, "Igbo Muslims: Their Trials and triumphs" *Citizen* (1993) 4, p. 181.

Ayandele E. A. *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842-1914: A Political and Social Analysis* (London: Longman, 1966), p. 129.

Fafunwa Aliu. B. *History of Education in Nigeria* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).

Badawi, D. S. A.A. *Islam Hadhari Approach: towards a Progressive Civilization/Selected Speeches, by Dato Seri Ahmad Abdullah Prime Minister of Malaysia* (Malaysia, Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, 2007).

Bakar, O. "Islamic and Political Legitimacy in Malaysia" in S. Akbarzadeh and A. Saeed (eds.), *Islam and Political Legitimacy* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

Balogun, S. A. "History of Islam up to 1800" in Obaro Ikime (ed.) *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), p. 211.

A. H. S. El-Busaidy, "Islam in Kenya" in Hussein Solomon and Firoza Butler (eds.) *Islam in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 47.

Camroux, D. "State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia: Accommodation, Co-optation, and Confrontation, *Asian Survey* (1996), 36/9: 852-868.

Clarke, Peter B. *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1982).

CO2 Emissions From Fuel Combustion Highlights (France, International Energy agency, 2012).

Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, *the Boko Haram Tragedy: Frequently Asked Questions* (Niger: Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, 1430/2009).

Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, *the Boko Haram Tragedy and the Boko Haram Tragedy: Responses to the Ideology of the Boko Haram Group* (Niger: Da'wah Coordination of Nigeria, 1430/2009).

Doi Abdurrahman, *Islam in Nigeria* (Zaria: Gaskiya Press, 1984).

Federal Republic of Nigeria, *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, (Lagos: A Daily Times Publications, 1979), Section 35, paragraph 2.

Goldie Hugh, *Calabar and its Mission* (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier, 1901), pp. 352-354.

Haneef, M. A. "The Development and Impact of Islamic Economic Institutions: the Malaysian Experience in K. S. Nathan and M. H. Kamali (eds.), *Islam in Southeast Asia:*

*Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).

Haruna Mohammad, "On Boko Haram: Two Years On" in his *People and Politics Column* available at Gamji.com.

Hock Klaus, "The Omnipresence of the Religious: Religiosity in Nigeria," in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), *What the World Believes: Analysis and Commentary on the Religion Monitor 2008* (Gutersloh: Verl, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

Hourani, A. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1939-1978* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).

Ibrahim, I. "The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia" in A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique and Y. Hussain (eds.), *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, 1985).

International Crisis Group, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency" in *Africa Report* (3 April 2014), 2013

Jones, Charles B. *The View from Mars Hill: Christianity in the Landscape of World Religions* (Cambridge: Cowley Publications, 2005).

Kenny, J. "Interreligious Dialogue in Nigeria: Personal Reminiscences of 40 Years", in, Anthony A. Akinwale (ed.), *All that they had to live on. Essays in honor of Archbishop John Onaiyekan and Msgr. John Aniagwu*, (Ibadan: The Michael J. Dempsey Center for Religious and Social Research, 2004).

Kenny Joseph OP, "The Challenge of Islam in Nigeria" accessed on August 07, 2012 at <http://www.josephkenny.joyeurs.com/Challenge.htm>.

Khairi Mahyuddin, 'Muslims and non-Muslim relations: Bridging the gap and Building respect', in Ab Rahman, A. et al. (Eds.): *The World Today: Current Global Issues*, (Malaysia: Universiti Sains Islam, Malaysia, 2007), 5.

Kilani Abdulrazaq, *Minaret in the Delta: Islam in Port Harcourt and its Environs 1896-2007* (Lagos: Global Dawah Communications, 2008).

Kukah Matthew Hassan, *Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1993).

Kukah Matthew Hassan and Kathleen McGarvey, "Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Nigeria: Social, Political and Theological Dimensions" in Akintunde E. Akinade (ed.) *Fractured Spectrum: Perspectives on Christian-Muslim Encounters in Nigeria* (New York: Peter Lang, 2013).

Mohamad, M. "Malaysian Democracy and the End of Ethnic Politics? *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, (2008), 62/4: 441-459.

Moten Abdul Rashid, "Malaysia as an Islamic State: A Political Analysis" *IKIM Journal of Islam and International Affairs*, (2003), vol. 1, no. 1 pp. 1-69.

Murtadā Aḥmad, "Boko Haram in Nigeria: Beginnings, Principles and Activities," AbdulHaq al-Ashanti (translator) (Kano: salafimanhaj, 2013), 4 also available at <http://www.salafimanhaj.com/> accessed on April 14, 2015.

Muzaffar, C. *Islamic Resurgences in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1987).

Njoku Onwuka, "A synoptic Overview" in Toyin Falola (ed.) *Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo* (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2005).

Obasanjo, O. *Address to the Nation on the Sharia Crisis*, Wednesday March 1, 2000.

Palmer H. A. R., "Kano Chronicle" *Sudanese Memoirs* (1928), Vol. 3, pp. 104-105.

Peter Lewis M. (December 2002) "Islam, Protest and Conflicts in Nigeria", *African Notes*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Number 10.

Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life *Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population* (Washington D. C.: Pew Research Centre, 2009).

Sowunmi Idowu, "History of Sectarian Bloodbaths" *This Day Newspaper* (1 August 2009), 65.

Steed Christopher, "The Islamic Heritage of Nigeria" in Christopher Steed and David Westerlund *The Triple Religious Heritage of Nigeria: The Essays* (Uppsala: Teologiska Institutionen-Uppsala Universitet, 1995).

Ubah C. N., *Islam in African History* (Kaduna: Baraka Press and Publishers Ltd., 2001), 45-73.

Uchendu Egodi, *Dawn for Islam in Eastern Nigeria: A History of the Arrival of Islam in Igboland* (Berlin: Studies on Modern Orient, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2012).

Uthman Ibrahim Olatunde, "Roles of Arabic and Islamic studies in a Secular Society" *Journal of for Nigerian Teachers of Arabic and Islamic Studies*, (2002), 80-88.

Uthman Ibrahim Olatunde, "Muslim and Science: Contributions of Islamic Universities to Professional Ethics" *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* (AJISS), USA, 2010, vol. 27:1, 54-73.

Walker Andrew, "What is Boko Haram," in *Special Report* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), May 30, 2012), 1-15. Available online at <http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram>

Wright R. "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation" *Journal of Democracy* (1996), vol. 7: 2, p. 66.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY