# Nigeria at 50

Politics, Society and Development

Edited by

Babatunde Sofela
Victor O. Edo
Rasheed O. Olaniyi

Nigeria at 50
Politics, Society and Development

Edited by

Babatunde Sofela
Victor O. Edo
Rasheed O. Olaniyi

ISBN 978–978–52024–0–3

Editors' Acknowledgement

Contents

Contributors

Dr. Remi A. **ADEDOKUN**, Department of Theatre Arts, University of Ibadan.

K.A. **ADEKUNBI**, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.

Dr. Akin **ADEMUYIWA**, Department of European Studies, University of Ibadan.

Oluwasegun T. **ADENIYI**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Crawford University, Igbesa, Ogun State, Nigeria.

Olusegun **ADEYERI**, Department of History & International Studies, Lagos State University.

Dr. Adedayo Emmanuel **AFE**, Department of History & International Studies, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State.

Dr. Aderemi S. **AJALA**, Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of Ibadan.

Abiodun **AJAYI**, Department of History, Adeyemi College of Education, Ondo.

Dr. Kayode **AKINBI**, Department of History, Adeyemi College of Education, Ondo.

Dr. R.I. **AKO-NAI** (Mrs), Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

Dr. Lere **AMUSAN**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Osun State University, Osogbo.

Aisha Balarabe **BAWA**, Department of History, Usmanu Dan Fodiyo University, Sokoto.

Arisukwu O. **CHUKWUBUEZE**, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.

Dr. Bola **DAUDA**, The Early Years' Education Foundation and Academy, Ibadan.

I.D. **DAVID**, Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

Dr. Victor Osaro **EDO**, Department of History, University of Ibadan.

O.S. **EHIABHI**, Department of History and International Studies, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State.

Dr. O.M. **EHINMORE**, Department of History and International Studies, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State.

Dr. Olumide Victor **EKANADE**, Department of History and International Relations, Redeemers University, Mowe.

Emma-Lawson **HASSAN**, Department of History, College of Education, Jalingo.

Dr. Benson O. **IGBOIN**, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State.

D.O. **IGWE**, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.

A.D. **IKUOMALA**, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.

Agbo U. **JOHNSON**, Department of Political Science, Taraba State University, Jalingo.

Monsuru **MURITALA**, Department of History, University of Ibadan.

Olisa G. **MUOJAMA**, Department of History, University of Ibadan.

Professor O.B.C. **NWOLISE**, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.

Dr. Solomon Tai **OKAJARE**, Department of History & International Studies, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State.

Dr. R.A. **OKUNOLA**, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.

Mutiat T. **OLADEJO**, Department of History, Emmanuel Alayande College of Education, Oyo State.

Hezekiah D. **OLANIRAN**, Department of Geography, University of Ibadan.

Dr. Rasheed O. **OLANIYI**, Department of History, University of Ibadan.

D.Z. **OLUPAYIMO**, Department of History, Adeyemi College of Education, Ondo.

Mr. Ajishola Victor **OMOJEJE**, Department of History, Adeyemi College of Education, Ondo.

Dr. Kayode **OMOTADE**, Department of European Studies, University of Ibadan.

Ozy B. **ORLUWENE**, Department of Political Science, Rivers State University of Education, Port Harcourt.

Felix **OSARHIEMEN**, Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin.

Tolulope **OSAYOMI**, Department of Geography, University of Ibadan.

Akubor E. **OSEWE**, Department of History, Gombe State University, Gombe.

Dr. Babatunde **SOFELA**, Department of History, University of Ibadan.

Dr. P.K.N. **UGBOAJAH**, Department of History, University of Ibadan.

Dr. Dhikru A. **YAGBOYAJU**, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.

Introduction

B. SOFELA, V.O. EDO and R.O. OLANIYI

1

NIGERIA AT 50: POLITICS, SOCIETY AND DEVELOPMENT

The Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan held a two-day International Conference, in commemoration of the 50-year anniversary of Nigeria's Independence. The conference which took place on 9 and 10 August, 2010 at the Conference Centre, University of Ibadan was entitled "Nigeria at 50: Politics, Society and Development". It featured such themes as 'Challenges of Nation-building', 'Military in Politics', 'Chieftaincy', 'Religion and Society', 'Social Movements and Democratisation', 'Inter-Group Relations', 'Civil Rule and Party Politics'. It also discussed 'Gender Issues', 'Federalism and Resource Control,' 'Corruption and Governance', 'Leadership and Values', 'Policing', 'World Politics' and 'Challenges of Development'.

The conference attracted scholars from Nigeria and abroad who presented papers from a broad spectrum of academic disciplines. The conference identified

various challenges confronting Nigeria, 50 years after independence. Causes and effects of these challenges were also identified as well as the solutions.

On 1 October, 2010, Nigeria as an independent nation was 50 years. Nigeria emerged from over 60 years of British colonial rule, the largest country in Africa with enormous resources capable of transforming the entire continent. Nevertheless, the colonial past continues to haunt Nigeria. In the history of colonialism, no European power ever granted independence to her colony without pressure. This was because colonial powers depended on their colonies as sources of raw materials and markets for their industries.

From resistance movements in the 19th century to the nationalist struggles in the 20th century, Nigerian leaders envisioned a nation free from colonial domination. They enjoyed the support of the peasants, the working class and the intelligentsia. Contrary to the expectations of the British colonialists that independence should be granted at a much later data, Nigerian nationalists hastened the entire process. The Nigerian Independence Bill published in London in June 1960 made provision for the Federation of Nigeria to achieve independence within the Commonwealth on1 October, 1960. The Bill has five clauses and two schedules. The first clause provides that from 1 October, 1960, "The Colony and Protectorate, as respectively defined by the Nigerian (Constitution) Orders-in-Council 1954 to 1960, shall together constitute part of Her Majesty's dominions under the name of Nigeria." It further stressed that no UK Act of Parliament passed after 1 October shall extend to Nigeria or any part thereof, and that from that day, "Her Majesty's Government in the UK shall have no responsibility for the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof." But the echoes of independence celebration became transient as the nation encountered one crisis after the other. Therefore, the daunting task of making independence and nationhood a reality has been a hallucination.

Nigeria has been described in the worst forms of epithets by the political leaders and the educated élite as a mere geographical expression; an artificial creation; the mistake of 1914; forged nation; union of incompatibles; unholy amalgamation; nation space; and an afterthought. All these created identity crisis and significantly influenced the attitude of Nigerians towards nation-building processes. The politicians argue that disintegration is not good for Nigeria because they are still sharing the so-called national cake. Political power has been used to loot the treasury and liquidate national institutions.

The corruption that pregnated the colonial state spilled over into the postcolonial era and impaired democratic governance. Corruption has become a clog in the wheel of the country's development when compared with other African countries such as South Africa, Botswana as well as the emerging economies of the Asian Tigers. Corruption has led to the collapse of the country's industrial sector and inefficiency of infrastructure as multinational

companies in Nigeria relocate to neighbouring countries. To ameliorate this plight, there is need for the re-orientation of national values, reform of government agencies and punitive measures meted to those guilty of corruption. The anti-graft agencies should not be selective in discharging their functions and should not be used as an instrument for witch-hunting perceived enemies of government in power.

From the 1990s to the 2000s, corruption became more widespread despite the proliferation of anti-corruption agencies such as the EFCC, ICPC and the Code of Conduct Bureau. Indeed, corruption has been promoted through immunity clauses incorporated in s. 308 of the 1999 Constitution, state pardons and plea bargain. In Chapter 17 of this book, Muritala Monsuru is of the view that corruption in Nigeria has been part of public and private establishment before independence, and nurtured in the indigenous Nigerian context. According to J.O. Akinbi in Chapter 18, the issue of corruption among government officials is a recurrent phenomenon in Nigeria's political history. Despite the attempts that have been made by past Nigerian leaders to combat this malaise, corruption continues to soar.

Felix Osarhiemen in Chapter 10 argues that the economic interest of the politicians has been a decisive factor in the structure of Nigerian federalism. The nature of Nigerian federalism is so skewed that it has created so many problems in the body politic such as crises of resource control and militancy (which have tarnished the image of the country abroad), minority agitations and corruption. The local governments are rendered malfunctioned, which affects grassroots participation in governance. It is, therefore, suggested that the country should adhere to the principle of true federalism and system of resource allocation should be reviewed. Local government administration should be restructured either as a creation of the state, or be totally independent of the state rather than the semblance of concurrent nature, which operates in the time being. In Chapter 11, Olusegun Adeyeri discusses the defective federal structure that has promoted bitter struggles between interest groups to capture the state and its resources.

The state creation exercises have not addressed the problems of inequality, the minority question and underdevelopment. It is more often than not the project of the power élite as the masses are not carried along in the process. It weakens the federating units, confers more power to the centre and reinforces unitary system rather than federalism. There is need for principles of state creation and boundary adjustment that takes cognisance of the landmass, needs of the people, population, equality and history that should be upheld in the process. The bulk of the population of the states involved must be carried along through a referendum.

In his view, D.A. Yagboyaju in Chapter 19 argues that the most daunting challenge in Nigeria's five decades of independence is the crisis of governance,

which has persistently confronted the state and its key institutions. For O.B. Orluwene in Chapter 20, the federal experience has been characterised by poor and ineffective intergovernmental networks. Orluwene continues the debate by suggesting that Nigerian federalism still maintains its embryonic stage in evolution not because the ingredients for growth and development are not available, but because the political operators seem to benefit from its stunted growth. One aspect of the problem is the seemingly intractable nature of corruption in the local government system, despite the lofty measures put in place by government to tackle corruption at that level.

Ajishola Omojeje's paper in Chapter 22 dwells on an analysis of democracy and development since the creation of Ondo local government in 1976. In Chapter 23, Oluwasegun Adeniyi notes that one of the major factors for inadequate strategic planning for effective delivery of democratic dividends and good governance is the unwillingness of Nigerian leaders (military and civilian) to plan and execute good policies. In Chapter 24, Adedayo Emmanuel Afe and Solomon Tai Okajare argue that godfatherism has assumed a more critical dimension in the Nigerian politics. Political godfathers build cleavages and empires within which they control people's destinies and throw themselves up as gods to be worshipped.

Olumide V. Ekanade in Chapter 9 examines the history of state creation in Nigeria, suggesting that agitation for the creation of more states has become a recurring decimal and the clamour is not about to abate. Bola Dauda's paper in Chapter 32 draws attention to the full implications of the use of Federal Character in Nigeria. It argues that religious and ethnic identities in post-independence Nigeria are more than issues of faith and cultural affinity. They are about access to power and resources.

In the post-independence era, there appears to be a disconnection between the civil society and the power élite. With the exception of the First Republic (1960-1966), there is no formidable political opposition. This gave rise to secessionist bids and cries of marginalisation in various parts of the country. Since the 1960s, politics in Nigeria has been characterised by corruption and electoral violence that led to a weak civil society. The brand of politics and governance in Nigeria has not only underdeveloped the country, but has dehumanised the populace. Governance has been privatised and patrimonised, thus defeating the essence of politics. Moreover, we operate a system of government and economy that the people hardly understand. To address this problem, there is need for purposeful leadership. The right people must be elected into political offices through free and fair electoral processes. In this way, electoral laws must be amended; election must be based on the best democratic principles. INEC should be totally independent; civil servants should not be made to resign their appointments before participation in politics. It was suggested that democracy cannot function without economic/financial

security of the masses. Ehinmore and Ehiabi in Chapter 21 discuss the peculiar nature of political participation as well as the attendant violence that characterised it in post-independent Nigeria. Central to the discussion is the identification of the various factors, which influenced electoral violence and the extent to which it has inhibited national cohesion and democratic values.

The Nigerian spirit is vibrant, assertive, resourceful, flamboyant, proud and enterprising, but it appears less passionate about the country. Peaceful co-existence amongst the diverse groups remains an arduous task of nation-building. A popular official phrase during the Civil War of 1967-70 was, "To keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done", but at 50, the will and aspiration to "keep Nigeria one" is threatened by routine outbreaks of ethno-religious violence, discriminations, nepotism and wanton looting of the treasury.

Olusegun Adeyeri in Chapter 2 points out that there is a general consensus that since independence, Nigeria is yet to resolve the problem of nation-building. The difficulty in forging a united nation has provoked doubts and debates as to the viability of the Nigerian project. In Chapter 3, O.B.C. Nwolise adds that Nigeria is not only excessively blessed by nature in human and natural resources, but also very rich financially. Nigerians are all over the world contributing to the development of other nations in various sectors including space research, computers, engineering, medicine, and so on. However, Nigeria's politics and government have been dominated by negativities since 1959 when the election rigging virus infested the country.

At 50, Nigeria encounters the chronic problem of national insecurity as militant groups and religious fundamentalists routinely destroy lives and property. It appears that militant groups and religious fundamentalists have overpowered the state security measures. R.A. Okunola, A.D. Ikuomola and K.A. Adekunbi in Chapter 26 point out that recent community-based violent crimes have shown the ineffectiveness of the Nigeria police in security and intelligence gathering to nip criminal and deviant activities in the bud. They reveal that despite modern and community policing strategies, changes are still being described as combative and reactive rather than proactive. In Chapter 27 Ogadimma Arisukwu discusses the character and functions of the various policing strategies within the Nigerian society. It suggests the need to retrain and re-orientate the Nigerian police to be people-oriented and service-driven, reflecting the security aspirations and socio-cultural realities in the country. Agbo Johnson in Chapter 28 offers explanations to the political economy of policing and insecurity in Nigeria. The Nigerian police is underdeveloped and cannot deliver or give what it does not have. Emmanuel Akubor in Chapter 34 argues that the growing insecurity around Nigeria's borders and other related issues such as smuggling are a result of poor attention placed on human security. He concludes that the vastness of Nigeria's border, its porous nature as well as the inability to effectively monitor it has become

problematic for both the people and government of Nigeria.

The crisis in the Niger Delta is not only fuelled by the skewed nature of Nigerian federalism, but also the corruption on the part of the leadership from the region. Although there is need to review the revenue allocation formula, the leadership of the Niger Delta should be allowed to use the 13 percent derivation funds being allocated to them judiciously in a manner that would bring about development in the region.

Some of Nigeria's problems of underdevelopment are endogenous and exogenous. Since 1956, the Bretton Woods institutions have been involved in Nigerian development plans, financing and execution. More often than not, these institutions work at cross-purposes with the Nigerian state. For example, the general policy changes of the World Bank in its global operations dictate the shifts in lending operations in Nigeria. These shifts are incongruous and incompatible with the development needs of the Nigerian state. The result has been the stultification of the development process in Nigeria. There is need for the Nigerian government to prioritise domestic needs in development policy prescriptions and balance globalisation with localisation.

Nigeria equally experiences the problem of underdevelopment due to over-dependency on foreign goods and ideas. Apparently, the Nigerian state has been turned into the private empires of its rulers. Indeed, the "Nigerian factor" which implies the perversion of state institutions and due process has led to deterioration of public services. Mutiat Oladejo in Chapter 30 discusses the various factors accounting for instability in the Nigerian railways. The inefficiency hindering the railway system prompted the federal military government in 1979 to seek the assistance of foreign experts for technical and managerial functions. The paper examines the activities and impact of foreign experts in the Nigerian railways. In Chapter 31, Hezekiah Olaniran examines the urbanisation phenomenon in Nigeria and its contributions to economic development since independence. Muojama in Chapter 35 further argues that the stagnation or dwindling of economic development in Nigeria, as is the case with various African countries, in spite of the aid, financial and technical coming from these Bretton Woods institutions, is partly due to this incongruity and incompatibility of some of the policies of the institutions with the sociology and cosmology of the country.

Nigerians are yet to be fully aware of who they are and why they need the collaboration of other ethnic groups to achieve national development. No cultural group is too distinct from others on the question of ethnicity and nepotism. Incessant ethnic violence, ethno-religious uprisings and rebellions bear eloquent testimony to how deeply divided and polarised Nigeria has been since independence. According to A.S. Ajala in Chapter 5, since independence in 1960, nearly all the ethnic groups in Nigeria have complained of marginalisation from the state or the other ethnic groups. This has promoted

locally-conceived nationalisms among various groupings in Nigeria.

Since the Beijing Conference of 1995, there has been a flurry of interests in gender issues, which has culminated in gender mainstreaming programmes. There has also been changing political images of women all over the world. Effort should be made to foster gender mainstreaming through equity in the distribution of national resources as well as political positions. Women should be properly educated to enable them participate actively in politics and decision-making processes. In Chapter 15, Aisha B. Bawa discusses women's participation in Nigerian politics, arguing that prior to 1999 the number of women occupying leadership positions was insignificant. But with the opening up of the political space since 1999 the images of women in politics started changing as women increasingly attain elective and appointment into leadership positions. Yet, according to Ako-Nai and David in Chapter 16, gender inequality is such that while the men arrogate to themselves a larger chunk of the benefits of globalisation, the women are made to bear the brunt of the enormous challenges it creates.

According to Emma-Lawson Hassan in Chapter 12, religion is gradually losing its essence as all other considerations, especially modern politics and its spoils, have turned religion into an instrument of manipulation. Religion continues to constitute a major threat to democratic governance in Nigeria. Benson Igboin in Chapter 13 argues further that religious conflicts in Nigeria have gone beyond religious factor as causal, but as an inherent strong totalistic politico-ethnic force. In Chapter 14, Abiodun Ajayi attempts a re-assessment of Nigerian politics, showcasing the perversity of 'human sacrifice' in it. The paper wonders that in spite of the onslaught of Christianity and Islam on the act, such a practice still enjoys the current level of acceptance.

Nigeria has moved from tribalism to cabalism in the affairs of the state. Gradually, many qualified citizens were excluded from gainful employment and other opportunities. The citizens would say, "We can neither arrest nor prosecute our government. We beseech God to take over control". Truly, Nigerians have besieged religious spheres with greater security risks. Some Nigerians are ready to die for their religion, not country.

For Kayode Omotade in Chapter 7, unity and nation-building is impossible without addressing the perennial problems of ethno-national conflicts. In Chapter 25, D.Z. Olupayimo demonstrates how after 50 years of independence, the traditional rulers have remained relevant, playing mediating roles between political opponents and powerful individuals capable of bringing an end to Nigeria. The traditional rulers, too, have paradoxically found themselves at a crossroads where the political class was comp*elled to resolve grievances for the royal fathers. Dickson Igwe's paper in Chapter 8 explores the impact of ethnicity on governance and sustainable development as conditions that can be made favourable by strengthening institutional capacity.

The paper emphasises the importance of reconfiguring development to be inclusive and not exclusive.

Since independence, Nigeria has lacked proper education for national development. Why do we continue to use made-in-China "Yellow Ruler" to teach arithmetic at the elementary level? This further perpetrates dependency and underdevelopment. There is no scientific innovation to transform development. The undue emphasis on science and technology continues to undermine development in the country. Science and technology are over-funded to the detriment of the humanities which inculcates moral, indigenous knowledge and civic values. No innovation is coming out to improve the level of supply of electricity and revitalise import substitution industries. In recent years, education has been liberalised. This has given rise to the proliferation of private universities and schools. Due to the profit-making nature of these private universities and schools, quality is not often emphasised and many genuine candidates are excluded from educational opportunities as a result of outrageous fees. These universities are without requisite equipment and manpower to operate a university system. However, they are accredited by the National University Commission. What this has created is a situation in which the Nigerian populace is becoming more illiterate. In the past, we were more literate with fewer universities. The universities and other tertiary institutions should strive to maintain standard. Tolulope Osayomi in Chapter 33 examines the patterns and trends of private universities in Nigeria. He offers a historical overview of private universities in Nigeria and explanations for their geographical and temporal variations.

In terms of industrialisation, Nigeria was far better in 1960 than 2010 when it imports nearly everything from Asia, Europe, the Americas, and other parts of the world. Nigerians have developed fantastic taste for foreign goods and values. This tendency produced a new generation of young Nigerian international businessmen and women importing foreign commodities.

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria had four national development plans: 1962-1967; 1970-1974; 1975-1980; and 1981-1985. The foreign-driven Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), adopted in 1986 deteriorated the economic situation of Nigeria. The financial market that was underdeveloped and unorganised was liberalised. Under General Sani Abacha, SAP was reversed in 1994 and a regime of economic regulations of the pre-SAP era was temporarily experimented. Subsequently, a new policy of guided deregulation was introduced which involved a combination of controls and liberalisation. Also, Vision 2010 programme was launched to shape the country's economic direction. In 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo adopted a 4-year ad hoc plan (1999-2003) and designed a policy called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) for poverty

reduction, employment generation, wealth creation, and a new value system. However, due to lack of patriotism, both SAP and post-SAP economic reform programmes induced more waste, corruption and underdevelopment. Dependency on foreign goods, policies and ideas inadvertently eroded our independence and deepened the crisis of underdevelopment.

Nigerian leaders since independence were fully aware of complex challenges facing the nation, but over the years, they became part of the problem. In 1986, President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida summarised in a speech at the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru some of the challenges facing Nigeria:

(a) the lack of patriotic commitment to the concept of nation-hood;

(b) the emergence of a class structure in which there is a wide gulf between the rich and the poor, with the former flaunting their ill-gotten wealth unabashedly;

(c) a faulty economic system which has created hardship for millions of Nigerians and which has made the nation's economy susceptible to exploitation by foreign . . . nations;

(d) an educational system which is not conducive to national integration since there are wide gaps among states, and even within states, in educational development; and

(e) problems arising from the existence of various religions in the country, the nation's political culture generally, and bad rulership in the past.

Nevertheless, after eight years in government, President Babangida left Nigeria more divided along ethno-religious lines. As a result of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) many Nigerians became poor and unemployed as it alleviated the poverty of the power élite. The annulment of the June 12 presidential elections led to a political uproar and deepened the divide between the North and the South. Corruption was widespread to the extent that the economic crises faced by the nation defied logic. Babangida's successors have continued to encourage economic dependency, cabalism, corruption, nepotism, politicisation of religion and ethnicity in governance. There are challenges of poor corporate governance, depleting foreign reserves and growing international and domestic debt. In Chapter 4, Paul Ugboajah suggests that mobilisation efforts in Nigeria have been directed towards ensuring support for the political system, or the legitimisation of government's priorities. In a sense, all forms of social mobilisation in Nigerian military regimes could be said to directly aim at strengthening the weak legitimacy structure of the state.

Unemployment and underemployment have become national crises. In the past, secondary school graduates were offered decent jobs. Nigeria of

today offers despicable jobs to university graduates and professionals. In 1980, the unemployment rate soared at about 15 percent. By 2010, it increased to about 25 percent. Out of this, youth unemployment accounts for about 40 percent. In fact, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, about 50 percent of Nigerians between ages 15 and 24 in the urban areas were unemployed in 2009. After two decades of embargo on employment, government agencies embarked on employment scam, extorting money from unemployed university graduates. Many of the unemployed youths gravitated towards crime, violence, terrorism, illegal migration, prostitution, and other social vices. Globally, since the 1990s, Nigeria has earned bad reputation as a nation exporting the so-called "419" financial and business fraudsters. Indeed, criminals have overrun Nigeria.

From 1958 to 2006, Nigeria produced about 23.2 billion barrels of crude oil valued at about ₦30 trillion. There is nothing to show for the huge revenue accruals. Many nations, even in the third world countries have by-passed Nigeria in terms of development. Poor infrastructure has killed the industrial base of Nigeria. Many manufacturing industries relocated to neighbouring countries as result of unbearable overhead costs expended on security, electricity, and so on.

Nigeria has recorded tremendous success in her foreign relations. The country played active roles in the activities of regional, continental and global institutions. Nigeria actively participated in the decolonisation of southern Africa, anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and peacekeeping missions in Africa and the other parts of the world. Nigeria produced exceptional individuals contributing to global development. But the greatest shortcoming has been the weakness to forge individual talents into a collective resource for development. That is why it has been difficult to turn brain drain of the Nigerians in the Diaspora into brain gain. Akin Ademuyiwa in Chapter 29 investigates the history of Russo-Nigerian relations in the post-Soviet era. He concludes that though differences still exist between Russia and Nigeria in the area of ideology and socio-economic programmes, economic considerations rather than political calculations dictate relations between them.

Young Nigerian creative artists transformed the national challenges into entertainment by establishing what is globally renowned as Nollywood. From the 1990s, Nollywood became the second largest film industry in the world, competing with Bollywood in India and Hollywood in the US. Nollywood worth is estimated at $250 million, creating about 200 videos for the home video market every month. Nollywood has promoted Nigerian culture and has brought to global attention the dynamism of progress in the country. In Chapter 6, R.A. Adedokun suggests that the impact of the theatre on Nigerian society since independence has been most conspicuous, vigorous and transforming.

The neglect of History as an academic field of study has obliterated the memory of Nigerians, so to say. It has robbed the people and those in governance of the guiding principle in their actions as well as national consciousness. This neglect is exemplified in the removal of history from both primary and secondary schools curricula, the non-invitation of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN) to the National Conference of 2005, non-inclusion of HSN in the preparations for the 50th anniversary of Nigeria's independence, non-inclusion of HSN in the compilation of the on-going compendium of Nigerian history, which according to a former Minister of Information, Professor Dora Akunyili, would cost ₦250 million. We resolve, therefore, that as a matter of urgency History should be reinstated in the curricula of both primary and secondary schools and made compulsory. And as the case in the advanced societies of the world, the history of Nigeria should be studied by all undergraduates in their first year to give the youths a sense of belonging. History and historians should be given their pride of place in the scheme of things for the purpose of national development.

In the final analysis, the Nigerian government should build lasting institutions, and structures that endure.

SECTION A

Challenges of Nation-building

Nigerian Federalism and the Challenges of Nation-building: Issues, Problems and Prospects

OLUSEGUN ADEYERI

2

INTRODUCTION

There is a general consensus that almost half a century after independence, Nigeria is yet to resolve the problem of nation-building. Indeed, it seems that over the years centrifugal forces are on the ascendancy. The difficulty in forging a united nation after independence has often provoked doubts and debates as to the viability of the Nigerian project. Federalism is widely regarded as the appropriate governmental principle for countries with huge ethno-cultural diversities. Nigeria, with over 250 ethnic groups inherited a federal system from Britain in 1960. Ever since, successive governments have attempted, with varying degrees of commitment and success, to operate federal institutions that can accommodate the country's ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversities and nurture a sense of national unity. However, these governments at all levels have failed to fulfil their obligations of good governance anchored on equitable political arrangements, transparent administrative practices and

accountable public conduct. In fact, failure to encourage genuine power sharing has triggered dangerous rivalries between the central government and the thirty-six state governments over revenues from the country's oil and other natural resources. The defective federal structure has also promoted bitter struggles between interest groups to capture the state and its attendant wealth; and facilitated the emergence of violent ethnic militias, while the politicians exploit and exacerbate inter-communal tensions for selfish reasons. Thus, communities throughout the country increasingly feel marginalised and alienated from the Nigerian state. This author contends that the deeply flawed federal system in Nigeria constitutes a grave threat to national integration, stability and development, and that unless the government properly engages the underlying issues of resource control, power sharing, equal rights and accountability, the country will continue to face an internal crisis of increasing and dangerous proportions. This paper, therefore, seeks to examine the contentious issues in Nigeria's federal arrangement, and the challenges they pose for nation-building, national stability and development.

OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF
NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

That the origin of Nigerian federalism is traceable to British colonial rule is no longer new. However, opinion differs on the basic reason for its introduction. Some scholars opine that federalism was introduced in Nigeria by the British for administrative convenience. Some are of the view that Britain imposed federalism on Nigeria in order to maintain some control on the country after independence. Yet, others believe that the British colonialists adopted federalism in Nigeria to solve the problem of how to keep the large and ethnically diverse groups of people together. Regardless of the status of each of these arguments, all the viewpoints are useful in tracing the origin of federalism in Nigeria.

The origin of the federal system in Nigeria can be traced to the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914. The federal structure began to form in 1939 under Sir Bernard Bourdillon who divided the Southern Protectorate into two. The Richards and Macpherson Constitutions of 1946 and 1951 respectively only created a decentralised unitary system. The practice of federalism in Nigeria was officially adopted through the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 as it was the first genuine federal constitution of the country. The constitution was introduced due to the crises generated by the Macpherson Constitution, especially the motion for self-government, and the Kano riots of 1953. These events convinced the colonial administration that considerable regional autonomy must be granted to the regional governments and that only federalism could hold Nigerian peoples together (Oloyede, 1999:58).

Nigerian federalism became consolidated at independence, and since then, it has been operating in both political and fiscal contexts, although not in full consonance with the basic principles of federal practice. Historically, Nigeria's federal system has oscillated between the excessive regionalism that marked the First Republic (1960-1966) and the excessive centralisation of the military, and relatively, the post-military era. Nigerian federalism over time has also undergone structural changes by which the federation moved from its initial three-region structure at independence to a 4-region structure by 1964, and to its current thirty-six states structure, including 774 local governments. These changes have been necessitated by the need for a balanced federation that would give all nationalities self-actualisation and fulfilment. However, these changes have increased imbalances in the Nigerian federation as exemplified in continued centralisation and concentration of power at the centre with its attendant consequences. True, state and local government creation exercises have helped to spread development across the country to some extent; it is equally true that in spite of the structural changes, the Northern region remains dominant over the others to the extent that it is the decider on matters of joint deliberation (Muhammed, 2008:43).

The dominant and domineering posture of the Northern region over other sections of the country is traceable to the advent of the federal system in Nigeria. Extant sources show that the North's 281,782 sq. miles constitute three quarters of the country's total land mass (Gofwen, 2004). Due to this uneven structure, even when new states are created, the North continues to occupy over 50 percent of states in the country. Thus, the Northern geopolitical zone enjoys certain advantages in terms of resource allocation and federal appointments, particularly in cases where state representation is adopted as criterion. This arrangement is a clear violation of one of the core principles of federalism – that of relative equality of component units in a federation. The arrangement is also a fulfilment of Mill's Law of Federal Instability, which states that no federation can be stable when one part of it constitutes a permanent majority in joint deliberations (Oyedele, 1999:60). Nigerian federalism has thus not been able to adequately promote national integration and development as the country continues to face various protestations and agitations by groups against the current federal structure.

Concerning fiscal federalism, access to political power at the centre is perhaps the most crucial factor in resource distribution and revenue allocation. In such situation, the 'group' that controls political power at the centre ultimately controls revenue allocation and thus has the opportunity to expropriate a larger share to its own advantage to the detriment of the wealth producers. This scenario is exemplified by the consistent and systematic relegation of derivation as the principle of revenue allocation since 1951 (Ofeimun, 2005). Expropriation of the larger percentage of national wealth

by the various Nigerian governments, particularly since the advent of military rule, is a clear violation of the federal principle that requires the availability of adequate resources to support both the central government and federating units. According to Wheare, if the Central government is able to finance itself while the Regional governments are unable to do so, true federalism will not be possible, no matter how much the latter desire a federal union or enact a federal constitution because the units would soon find it impossible to discharge their functions, or can only do so by depending on the Central government (Wheare, 1963). This viewpoint illustrates one of the grave contradictions in Nigerian federalism, whereby the states rely heavily on the federal government that claims the greatest portion of national resources. The recent face-off between the Lagos State Government and the Obasanjo-led federal government over the latter's witholding of the former's local government statutory allocations is an eloquent testimony on the evils of excessive concentration and centralisation of fiscal and political powers in the federal government.

In all, serious contradictions in Nigeria's federal system such as the colonial factor, military rule, structural imbalance, over-centralisation of power in the Central government have over time perpetuated various thorny issues and challenges within the Nigerian federation.

CONTENDING ISSUES IN NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

Since independence in 1960, a number of national issues have generated heated debates and crises, sometimes threatening the entire fabric of the Nigerian state. These include:

(i)   State Creation and the Minority Question,
(ii)   Military Intervention in Governance,
(iii)   Oil and Minority Agitations,
(iv)   Ethno-religious Conflicts,
(v)   Federal Character Dilemma,
(vi)   Corruption, and
(vii)   Leadership crisis.

State Creation and the Minority Question

The issues surrounding state creation worldwide revolve around general socio-economic development, particularly in developing countries where the quest for rapid development is often anchored on ethnic affiliations. The twin issue of state creation and minority question is as old as Nigeria. In fact, since the colonial era the Minority Question has been a recurrent decimal and has been responsible for many crises of nation-building in the country. Various Nigerian nationalities have always hinged their development

aspirations on ethnic identities, with the majority ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) recording much greater success in development in relation to their minority counterparts.

As early as 1957, the minority groups in the three regions (North, West and East) demanded the creation of more states for an effective federal structure, and these agitations led to the establishment of numerous political parties such as the Benin and Delta Peoples Party, formed in 1953, Midwest State Movement (1956), Calabar-Ogoja River States Movement (1954), United Middle Belt Congress, and the Borno Youth Movement (Ali, 2003:78). However, the 1957 Constitutional Conference did not resolve the problem of the minorities. Instead, it passed it on to the Willinks Minorities Commission which although accepted that there were bases for minority fears, but nonetheless opposed the idea of the creation of new states at the time. On 27 March, 1967, in the face of imminent secession by the East, the Federal Military Government disbanded the old regions and in their place created twelve states, six each in the North and South. The states were ostensibly created to promote political stability and to establish a convenient administrative system. The new federal system, with its smaller and more sub-national units, was designed to correct the structural and administrative imbalance of the country and minimise future political friction. Within the framework of smaller units, it seemed impossible for any state to consider itself adequately self-sufficient and almost entirely independent. As Gowon puts it:

> The main obstacle to the future stability of this country is the present structural imbalance in the Nigerian Federalism. Even Decree No. 8 or Confederation or loose association will never survive if any one section of the country is in a position to hold others to ransom (Adejumobi, 1992:225).

There is need to point out that the state creation exercise was flawed in many respects. First, the exercise was decided and implemented in haste, involving many compromises. A number of principles were enunciated, such that no state should be able to dominate the federation. Each should form a compact geographical area, and boundaries should reflect administrative convenience, the facts of history and the wishes of the people. Yet, some strange bedfellows were grouped into the same state, and the Boundary Adjustment Committee that was set up could not find any enduring solution to the problem. As one study has put it, "some states, such as the North Eastern, were administratively unwieldy and ethnically incompatible" (Panther-Brick and Dawwon, 1970:131). Not surprising, therefore, the creation of states created new minority groups and this strained inter-ethnic relationship. Above all, the North-South polarisation remained.

In its primary objective (political stability), the state creation venture was

an immediate failure as it was this decision that sparked off the secession of the Eastern region. The division of the region into three states left the Igbo of the new East-Central State cut off from direct access to the sea and without the out-fields of the Niger Delta, which were within the territory of the proposed Rivers State. The Igbo 'nation' was left with only one-sixth of the oil, as Port-Harcourt with its harbours, refineries and manufacturing industry, was now in Rivers State. The Igbo political leadership, therefore, saw this move as a deliberate attempt to severe the Igbo heartland from the oil and from the sea. Biafran secession followed, with the Eastern region hoping to influence the West into doing the same, thereby land-locking the North. However, the twelve-state creation policy in the long-run was not a mistake for the Federal Military Government. It gained the support of the non-Igbo minority groups because it gave them greater autonomy. So, some two-fifths of the population of the seceding territory supported federation. Elsewhere, other minorities were also re-assured. The new form of federation created enough vested interests in national unity to give the federal authorities the power they needed to crush the secession (Yahaya, 1970).

However, pressure from minorities did not cease with the defeat of Biafra. The case for a further sub-division of the country was actively canvassed by ethnic groups fearing or experiencing discrimination or domination and hoping for greater rewards from a measure of self-government. As an illustration, the Yoruba of Oyo and Ibadan who had formed the bulwark of the political opposition in the Western region up to 1966 feared discrimination after the return to civil rule scheduled for the late 1970s. Similarly, the people of Minna and Abuja in Northwestern state complained of unfavourable discrimination in appointments to government posts and the provision of public services in favour of the Sokoto Emirate. The Igala sought separation from Kwara state, the Lere from Northeastern, the people of southern Zaria from Northcentral, the Urhobo, Isoko and Itshekiri peoples from the Midwest, the Ijebu from the West, and so on. In a nutshell, wherever there was a group different from the dominant political force of the area, there was pressure for the creation of more states. Thus, there were subsequent state creation exercises in 1976, 1987, 1991 and 1995 resulting in the present thirty-six state federation, emerging primarily from separatist agitations. The overall consequence of the continuous balkanisation of the Nigerian federation is that political and fiscal power have become over-centralised in the federal government which continues to distribute resources, favours and sanctions as it wishes, while most of the thirty-six states are mere appendages of the Centre that cannot survive for weeks without federal allocations (Alabi, 2006: 52). Yet, agitations by minority elements of all kinds for the creation of additional states have continued unabated.

Military Intervention in Governance

Military intervention in politics, until recently, was rampant in many Third World countries, including Nigeria. This is because the military saw itself as the only national institution capable of resolving the social, political and economic problems of the country under civilian rule. During Nigeria's fifty years of existence as an independent state, civilian rule has existed for only twenty years, while the military had held sway for thirty years. Evidently, the nature and impact of military rule on the Nigerian state over time has continued to generate serious concern as to the justification of the involvement of the military in governance. The military have in the past recorded modest progress in promoting national integration. But as it stands now, there seems to be a general concensus in Nigeria that the incessant military interventions in the country's administration since 15 January, 1966 constitute serious contradictions and distractions in the nation-building process.

In view of observable and objective evidence, military rule in Nigeria is both an aberration and a retrogressive phenomenon. As an illustration, the military institution represented by its leadership is a sub-class of the national controlling élite. Based on the interrelationship within the class, military intervention in politics is a stop-gap on latent public outcry against government. Each time there is the possibility of a mass revolt by the people against oppressive and scandalous leadership, and each time the masses became restless and ready to effect a change in leadership due to the inability of the ruling class to respond adequately and effectively to popular demands, the military would intervene (Alao, 1990:120). The military leadership, having toppled the previous government, use state power to restore normalcy, maintain an uneasy calm, law and order and return the country to *status quo ante*. The usual abortion of the imminent mass revolts via military coups make the military organisation an obstacle to revolutionary progress, though coupists often promise an overhaul of the system in their maiden broadcast to the nation after seizing power. Experience has also shown that the leaders of successful coups d'etat may even execute some hastily conceived and cosmetic populist policies to legitimise their illegal seizure of power and, therefore, win public approval to their cause. But in spite of all the justifications that the military might cite for seizing power from a former government, there is usually the continued use of the old, decadent, corrupt and bankrupt socio-economic and political strategies with some nominal modifications and amendments (Alao, 1990: 120).

Specifically, the greatest damage done by the military to Nigeria's political system is the over-centralisation of power, coupled with the erosion of democratic values in the Nigerian federation. It is a well-known fact that, given the nature and command structure of the military institution, military rule is antithetical to both federalism and democracy. There is, indeed, an enormous weight of scholarly evidence supporting the view that thirty years

of military rule consistently altered federal-state relations in favour of the former to the extent that Nigeria ultimately became more of a unitary state than a federal one. Worse still, subsequent civilian administrations have not been able to muster the necessary political will to return the country to true federalism.

Oil and Minority Agitations

Agitations by ethnic minority groups, particularly in the Niger Delta, over the allocation and control of oil revenue, compensation for environmental degradation arising from oil exploration, and political marginalisation, appear to be the greatest challenge to nation-building and national stability in Nigeria, in recent times. Oil, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, has been a source of persistent discontent and turmoil since the colonial era.

The immediate post-independence era witnessed an attempt by Isaac Adaka Boro to establish the Republic of the Niger Delta, following the failure of the 1957 Constitutional Conference to resolve the problem of the minorities. From this period up to the early 1990s, minority agitations over resource distribution and control were characterised by peaceful demonstrations and externalisation of demands. Many peaceful protests and demands for justice and equity were registered without success. Similarly, the oil producing communities often resorted to litigation, which usually ended in unfavourable verdicts (Jimoh, 2008:15). Letters were also written to the various post-independence administrations on the Niger Delta problem. Due to the failure of these efforts, the agitators moved further by making representation to government at all levels to make their letters effective. However, in most cases, apart from the usual warm reception and empty promises no tangible achievement was recorded (Saliu, 2008: 348). During the period also, demonstrations were staged in the Niger Delta and other places during which pamphlets and banners were displayed to further draw attention to the increasing crisis in the region. Letters were delivered in the affected state capitals, Abuja and Lagos in order to gain government attention.

Externalisation of agitations by the oil minorities soon emerged mainly as a result of increasing centralisation of the ownership and control of oil, and the politicisation of the revenue allocation system by the federal government to the detriment of the oil producing minority states. In flagrant violation of the principles of fiscal federalism, Decree 51 of 1969 gave the federal government complete ownership of all petroleum resources in Nigeria. The Offshore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9 gave the federal government total control of the entire revenue accruable from offshore oil wells in the coastal waters adjoining the oil minorities, thereby cutting them off finally from direct oil revenue, and deepening their dependence on the majority groups for a share of the oil wealth. The oil producing minorities thus became

alienated from their own resources, and this intensified the struggle between them and the Nigerian state, which, through its over-centralisation of political and fiscal power sought to exploit and dominate them alongside their strategic resource. Furthermore, the federal government abandoned derivation as the principle of revenue allocation in favour of the principles of equality and population of states, in response to the shift of the country's source of wealth from agriculture to petroleum, and the desire of the major ethnic groups to continuously control national revenues (Obi, 2000: 83-84).

Oil minority agitations assumed a very militant and violent character from the early 1990s which ushered in the emergence of ethnic militias and the attendant violent protestations against economic and political marginalisation by the federal government. The new wave of violence is traceable to General Babangida and General Abacha administrations' chronic intolerance for unfavourable public opinion; and the Odi massacre carried out by the Obasanjo civilian government. It must be emphasised that the character of the administrations, particularly those of Babangida and Abacha, deepened the contradictions and crisis of the Nigerian federation, culminating in the rise of ethnic militias such as the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilantés (NDV), Egbesu, Ijaw National Congress (INC), Urhobo National Union, Martyrs Brigade, Niger Delta Liberation Army (NDLA), Chikoko Movement, Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA) and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Peaceful protests of the previous decades consequently gave way to violent militancy. In recent years, the agitations have become increasingly militant and radical, including calls for self-determination and outright secession, all of which have had negative socio-political and economic effects on the country's nation-building process. First, the violent confrontations constitute a serious threat to personal freedom and the security of lives and property. This is because the activities of ethnic militias often caused widespread killings and destruction of property, while government's responses to the crisis through military operations led to civilian deaths and the destruction of many communities with its attendant socio-economic consequences. Second, violent agitations have also resulted in huge loss of national revenues due to large-scale vandalisation of oil facilities, disruption of oil exploration, and widespread oil bunkering. Third, increased violence in the Niger Delta has undermined Nigeria's international image, as many outsiders hold the general view that security has broken down in the country as a whole, and not in the Delta region alone. National insecurity and instability is by far the greatest threat posed to Nigeria by violent agitations for resource distribution and control by the oil minorities. Escalating violence and attacks by ethnic militias in the area during this Fourth Republic constitute serious threats to the country's democracy, security and nation building.

Ethno-Religious Conflicts

Whereas, federalism is widely acclaimed as the appropriate governmental principle for societies with vast ethnic, religious and cultural diversities, the Nigerian federation has been bedevilled by bitter ethno-religious crises since independence. Even in this Fourth Republic where democratic processes were initially thought to be more disposed to mediating the country's diversities peacefully, violent ethnic conflicts have been more rampant, thereby slowing down national progress and threatening national unity and stability.

Poverty is a dominant factor in the rising trend of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. Poverty, which is manifested in both unemployment and deterioration of social infrastructure, provides the bedrock for ethnic conflicts. Many people are unemployed. Many functional factories are not working to full capacity, leading to retrenchment of workers and an increase in the unemployment rates. Those who escape retrenchment and are still in employment find it increasingly difficult to collect their salaries, as some employers sometimes owe their workers salaries amounting to many months or atimes years (Adeogun, 2006: 94-95). Most families, therefore, find it difficult to feed themselves or cater for other essential needs like shelter, clothing and healthcare. Due to this pathetic situation, family norms and values have collapsed across the country, as most parents can no longer adequately control their children, kith and kin. This situation provides ample opportunities for ethno-religious conflicts because the jobless youths and hungry children become ready tools of selfish leaders in fomenting trouble and causing conflicts across the country. The promise of a meager amount of money with little enjoyment makes the youths ever willing to undertake such a venture. They are overwhelmed by the available goodies and booties without serious consideration for the consequences of their actions.

Furthermore, prolonged military rule manifested in the forceful suppression of the ethnic aspirations of many minority groups, while the monopolisation of power by the majority groups stimulated violent conflicts afterwards. In addition, the shift of presidential powers to the south led to some agitations, which were given religious colouration, and these agitations also elicited reactions from some elements in the south who continuously clamoured for a favourable system of revenue distribution and resource control.

Ethno-religious conflicts in this era have been further heightened by the citizen-indigene syndrome. Land ownership and the indigene-settler debacle have always generated security concern in the country, particularly in the Fourth Republic. Even within the same ethnic group, the problem of who owns the land, who is an indigene and who is a settler, are sources of violent disputes. For example, the Ife and Modakeke are Yoruba, while the Aguleri and Umuleri are Igbo, yet land disputes among these sub-ethnic groups were

intense and devastating in terms of large-scale destruction of lives and property. In addition to intra-group conflicts, inter-ethnic conflicts have been on the rise in recent times, especially between the Urhobo and Itsekiri in Delta state, the Tiv and Jukun in Benue state, Ijaw and Ilaje in Ondo state, Jukun and Kuteb in Taraba state and the Hausa-Fulani against northern minorities in most of the northern states (Alabi, 2006: 66).

The wave of religious violence across the country, particularly in the north, is due to the politicisation of religion by the selfish ruling élite who manipulate religious emotions of the masses for selfish personal and elitist objectives. But Nigeria as an heterogeneous and multi-religious society must promote its secularity at all cost. Moreover, the less the government involves itself in religious matters, the better for national development, nation building and peaceful coexistence.

The Federal Character Dilemma

Federal Character which was a key provision in the 1979 Republic Constitution, has been a major source of tension in Nigerian federalism. According to its enabling law:

> The composition of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies (Smith, 1981: 372, 373).

Put simply, Federal Character is a euphemism for ethnic balancing. It is a tool designed to ensure unity in diversity by balancing official appointments between groups and within the officer corps of the armed forces (1979 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria). There is need to emphasise that the controversial idea of Federal Character, which has become an integral part of Nigeria's federal system, is not peculiar to Nigeria. For example, the United States too applies it in the form of "Affirmative Action" and India too as "Quota System" in several areas (Ayau, 1994: 45). However, what has happened in practice in Nigeria since 1979 is that the conflicting interpretation and faulty implementation of the Federal Character principle elicited results that were almost completely opposed to the aims of promoting national unity and loyalty. Clearly, these problems contributed immensely to the contradictions and disharmony that have since marred inter-governmental and inter-group relations in the country.

Corruption

Corruption is a global phenomenon but it is more prevalent and destructive

in the Third World countries. That corruption in Nigeria has become an endemic problem threatening the country's socio-economic and political development is common knowledge. While acknowledging the threat of corruption to the Nigerian state, Ghali Umar Na'Abba, a former Speaker of Nigeria's House of Representatives declared in 2003 that:

> While we cannot rule out the incidence of corruption and bribery in almost every facet of our society, it is particularly resident in the infrastructure areas in ministries or monopolistic parastals saddled with the task of making infrastructure available to the public – water, telecommunications, electricity (NEPA), roads and railways (NRC) (Na'Abba, 2003:4-10).

In that year, a Central Bank of Nigeria director stated that "the avalanche of frauds and unprofessional/unethical practices in the industry in recent years is eroding public confidence in the system"(Dukor, 2006:61). In 2004, Transparency International (TI) ranked Nigeria as the third most corrupt country in the world, after Haiti and Bangladesh. It also stated that billions of dollars are lost to bribery in public purchasing, particularly in the oil sector of the economy. Furthermore, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) declared that Nigeria maintained a 70 percent rise in poverty in spite of an income of over 200 billion dollars in oil revenues since 1970, and her per capita income had hardly improved ever since (*The Guardian*, 3 April, 2005).

Corruption in Nigeria is primarily a political problem. The incidence of corruption in a nation is as a result of the lack of political will of the leadership and the inability of the state to maintain law and order. Thus, business corruption is a fallout of the failure to tackle political corruption, which casts doubts upon the moral uprightness of the state as a whole and on the political will of the leadership to manage the affairs of the nation. It follows that where there is absence of political corruption is where the state operates under a high ethical order and upholds, protects and enforces the rule of law on itself and on its citizens. Under the rule of law and justice, the state machinery works for the good of all and there is no stealing of public funds, inflation of contracts, forgeries, and mismanagement of money in banks, industries and government bureaucracies. In a nutshell, as it has played out in Nigeria, political corruption and business corruption are two sides of the same coin. In this regard, it is important to note that the seedy financial scandals exposed in the Fourth Republic involved several financial institutions. For example, a former Inspector-General of Police (IGP) was involved in the laundering of billions of Naira under different names in different banks. A similar method was also employed by government officials involved in "Ikoyigate", a reference to the shameful fraud involving the sale of government properties in Ikoyi, Lagos, and other financial scandals that rocked the Fourth Republic across

the local, state and federal government units, including the Presidency itself (Dukor, 2003: 62).

Electoral fraud is another dimension of the corruption syndrome in Nigeria. The massively rigged general elections of 2003 and 2007 were undoubtedly the most fraudulent in Nigeria's political history. By the conduct, nature and outcome of the polls, the Nigerian state clearly demonstrated its expertise and will to be corrupt, the will to corrupt the polity and the business society, coupled with the lack of will to enforce the relevant legislations against electoral and financial crimes. The electoral frauds perpetuated by the state and some political parties in 2003 was acknowledged by many international observers. The EU Election Monitoring Mission stated that the elections were marred by serious irregularities and fraud in many states. According to the United States-based International Republican Institute (IRI), the 19 April presidential and governorship elections suffered in some parts of Nigeria as a result of numerous uncorrected administrative and procedural errors, combined with many observed instances of obvious premeditated electoral manipulations (Dukor, 2003: 64). The Commonwealth Observer Group also observed that:

> In parts of Enugu and Rivers State, proper electoral processes appear to have broken down and there was intimidation. In Rivers State in particular, our observers reported widespread and serious irregularities and vote rigging. The official results which emerged from Rivers State bore little relation to the evidence gathered by our observers on the ground (Dukor, 2003: 64).

These statements are, indeed, bullet holes in the corruption-ridden political history of Nigeria. The scenario is even more pathetic when one considers the debilitating impact of fraudulent elections and the resultant governments on national development and nation building. Corruption begets corruption. A corrupt and unethical politician who emerges from a corrupt election cannot govern well.

Leadership Crisis

The various challenges of nation building, some of which have been detailed upon earlier on in this paper, have been compounded by leadership crisis. Though leadership challenge, like the Sword of Damocles, hangs above all nations, the issue has, however, assumed a crisis dimension of monumental consequences particularly in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). Nigeria is a nation born in hope and optimism but has lived in anxiety for most of its 50-year history, due to the country's failure to produce a nationally acceptable leadership that transcends ethnic, regional and religious boundaries, and that can unite its diverse peoples for mobilisation towards national development. In the light of this, it is valid to support the argument that the

basic problem with the Nigerian federation is the failure of leadership. All other factors of disunity, instability and underdevelopment have been nurtured and given momentum by leadership failure. Criticisms against Nigerian leaders across local, state and federal government levels are many and are justified. These include corruption, unpatriotism, selfishness, despotism, tribalism, and religious bigotry.

Nigeria's political history since independence has shown clearly through her various conflicts, coups and counter-coups, as well as a civil war, that the Nigerian ruling élite (both civilian and military) are divided along many lines, particularly along tribal, ethnic, religious and regional lines. This has led to inter-élite rivalries, mutual suspicion and status conflicts among the ruling élite. Thus, government and politics in Nigeria have been characterised by deadly competitions and conflicts of hostile subcultures arising from various danger signals that occasionally threatened the continued existence of the country. Under successive Nigerian leaderships, almost every issue has been politicised and interpreted to serve as a weapon of political domination or intimidation. As a consequence, various issues like elections, census, state creation, religion, political appointments, revenue sharing and, lately, resource control have ignited serious socio-political crises. This tragic situation has compelled some observers to conclude that for Nigeria to resolve her leadership debacle she needs heroes in the form of men with extraordinary talents (Obiozor, 1994: 89). But this raises further problems: who are these heroes? Where, how and when shall they be found? This, in my opinion, is the crux of the Nigerian dilemma.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion shows that the operation of Nigerian federalism since 1960 has not yielded meaningful socioeconomic and political development. Instead, half-hearted practice of federalism has resulted in over-centralisation of fiscal and political power, creation of unviable and federally dependent state and local governments, military intervention in governance increased corruption, ethnicity, and intense minority agitations over oil revenue. This paper acknowledges that these problems of nation building all have their roots in the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria and colonial rule as a whole. However, while it is fruitless to resist the argument that the imperialistic motive behind the amalgamation made it more of a liability than an asset, it is also far-fetched to hold colonial rule solely responsible for the near-failure of the Nigerian project. To lay all the difficulties of nation building in contemporary Nigeria on British imperialism is to suggest that inter-group relations among precolonial and postcolonial Nigerian peoples were completely cordial and harmonious. The point we are making is that the British colonisers left Nigeria fifty years ago, enough time for the Nigerian

state to institute a concrete national agenda and strategy to remedy the defective federation she inherited from the British towards achieving genuine national integration and development.

Therefore, we contend that the failure by the various post-independence Nigerian leaderships to evolve an equitable mechanism for the distribution of political power and economic resources is at the root of the Nigerian problem. We maintain that there is an immutable nexus between the desire of Nigerian peoples for equitable access to power and resources on one hand, and the plethora of obstacles to nation building, on the other. Thus, the prospects of genuine nationhood and development in Nigeria lies in a swift adoption of true federalism, not the type that superimposes unitary tendencies and contradictions on the practice of federalism. The problems of nation building in Nigeria would start to receive proper attention only under a truly federal system of government and the great potentials of the country would be best realised within the framework of true federalism. Some parts of the Nigerian federation are genuinely afraid of a return to true federalism as they view it as a prelude to the breakup of the country. But on the contrary, we believe that a true federal structure will consolidate Nigerian unity. It will give each nationality a breathing space and sense of belonging, allow for healthy competition and an opportunity to develop according to the ability and resources of each federating unit. A lopsided and unjust federal arrangement does no one any good ultimately, as the bitter experiences of Ethiopia and the defunct Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have shown. Those who are currently opposing a return to true federalism in Nigeria should know that they are laying landmines for future generations. Well-meaning Nigerians must collectively resist this.

In conclusion, since the National Assembly and the Presidency have continually displayed lack of political will to effect fundamental structural and institutional reforms in the federation, convening a Sovereign National Conference will be a good starting point.

REFERENCES

Adejumobi, S. (1992). "The Impact of the Civil War on the Nigerian State", in Oyeweso, S. *Perspectives on the Nigerian Civil War.* Lagos: OAP.

Adeogun, A. (2006). "Ethnic Conflicts and Nigeria's Democracy and Development, 1999-2004", in Saliu H. *Democracy and Development in Nigeria: Social Issues and External Relations.* Ilorin: Concept Publications, pp. 94-95.

Alabi, D.O. (2006). "Federalism and the Quest for National Development", in Saliu, H. op. cit., pp. 46-72.

Alao, A. (1990). "Military Rule and National Integration", in Falola T. *Modern Nigeria: A Tribute to G.O. Olusanya.* Lagos: Modelor.

Ali, W.O. (2003). "The Development of Federalism in Nigeria: A Historical

Perspective", in Gana A. and Egwu, S. *Federalism in Africa: Framing the National Question*. New Jersey, Africa World Press, pp. 71-78.

Ayua, I.A. (1994). "Nigeria: A Case Study in Federalism." *ECPER: Journal for Political and Economic Studies*, Vol II, No 1.

Dukor, M. (2006). "Corruption in Nigeria: The Moral Question of Statehood in Africa", in Saliu H. op. cit.

Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution, 1979.

Gofwen, R. (2004). *Religious Conflicts and Nation-Building in Northern Nigeria: The Throes of Two Decades*. Kaduna, Human Rights Monitor.

Jimoh, I. (2008). "National Resources for Sustainable Development: The Attendant Crisis and Control", in Saliu, H. op. cit.

Muhammed, A. (2008). "Some Comments on Five Decades of Nigerian Federalism", in Saliu H. op. cit.

Na'Abba, G.U. (2003). 'The Nigeria Problem and the Legislative Solution via the Legislative Agenda for Nigeria" *The Glitterati*, 4-10 May.

Obi, C.I. (2000). "Oil Minority Rights and the Question of Democratic Stability in Nigeria." *Journal of Cultural Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 75-95.

Obiozor, G.A. (1994). "The Politics of Precarious Balancing: An Analysis of Contending Issues in Nigerian Domestic and Foreign Policy. Lagos: NIIA.

Oyedele, S. (1999). "Federalism in Nigeria", in Hassan Saliu (ed) *Issues in Contemporary Political Economy of Nigeria*. Ilorin, Sally and Associates.

Panter0Brick and Dawson (1970). "Nigerian Politics and Military Rule", in Panter-Brick, S. *Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to Civil War*. London, Athlone.

Saliu, H. (2008). "The New Wave of Violence in the Niger Delta and its Implications for Nigerian Foreign Policy", in Saliu H. op. cit.

Smith, B. (1981). "Federal-State Relations in Nigeria" African Affairs: *Journal of the Royal African Society*.

The Guardian, 17 July, 2005.

The Guardian, 3 April, 2005

Wheare, K. (1963). *Federal Government*. New York, OUP.

Yahaya, A. (1978). "The Creation of States in Panter-Brick S. Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria. Frank Cass.

How Politics Underdeveloped Nigeria: Learning From History that Nigeria May Survive the Doomsday Predictions and Kick-start Locomotion for National Greatness

O.B.C. NWOLISE

3

PREAMBLE

Nigeria, we all know is not only excessively blessed by nature in human and natural resources, but also very rich financially. Nigerians are all over the world contributing to the development of other nations in various sectors including space research, computers, engineering, medicine and others. A recent economic intelligence report holds that between 1999 and 2009, Nigeria earned from oil and non-oil resources a staggering ₦34 trillion.[1] The report emphatically stated:

> Nigeria is not poor. It is a very rich oil producing country, earning trillions of naira in revenue from oil and non-oil sectors.[2]

If a census of educated people with first degrees, Masters degrees. Ph.D degrees, and professor rank are counted in each of the nations of the world, Nigeria no doubt would be amongst the first ten nations. Yet, Nigeria's politics

and government have been dominated by negativities since 1959 when the election rigging virus infested the country. Millions of our citizens have run away, and hundreds are daily running away from their fatherland because of the disastrous impact of our brand of politics and leadership.

Our government and politics have been privatised, cornered by godfathers who have no respect for knowledge, but prefer mediocrity and incompetence. The educated who possess the knowledge, expertise and competence to generate national development and greatness have long ago been excluded as they must resign their jobs to participate in politics.

This country has been run mainly by its Second and Third Eleven teams with symbolic presence of a few First Eleven often easily neutralised by the greedy, selfish, unpatriotic and incompetent elements. At this period,

(i)   Nigeria is preparing for a watershed general elections, which must not fail to uphold the voice of the people, produce popular leader, and enthrone Nigeria's First Eleven leadership team.

(ii) The new INEC chairman, Professor A. Jega was a former ASUU president. He needs support and encouragement to succeed. We must not allow godfathers, and do-or-die politicians to cage and destroy him or his integrity.

(iii) Nigerians, especially its leadership need to learn a lot, and seriously too, from our nation's history, for this country to survive the next five years. Between 2011 and 2015 are critical for this country because the events of the period shall determine whether Nigeria shall survive and remain a nation or not, and because something is telling me that the country is being programmed by internal quislings and external forces for disintegration.

(iv) Nigeria claims to be a democracy, a federation, and a republic, but we are none of the three.

We are not a democracy because there is no **demo** in our practise of democracy. The people are totally excluded in the process of choosing who governs, and what policies are to be pursued by those who govern. Those who govern since 1959 (except 1993) have been imposed by godfathers, election riggers, assassins, political thugs, and armed politicians. In a democracy, elections which constitute the soul of democracy are organised based on the best democratic practices and standards.

We are not a federation because if we are the injustices, crises, and destructions in the Niger Delta would never have arisen. In practice, we run a unitary state, in which a president sitting in Abuja removes a supposedly elected governor in Anambra, Bayelsa, Oyo, or Plateau state.

We are not a republic, because power is not inherited in republics. The public decides the great issues of the day in a republic, including who rules

or leads, and where necessary, through national referendum. These key negativities must be transformed to positivities from 2011.

Nigerians have gone to keep the peace in over 50 countries of the world since 1960, under the United Nations, African Union, ECOWAS, and bilateral arragements. We must keep away peace-keepers from our own nation.

For this country to start the march for real national development and national greatness, and to offer the leadership and protection desired of it in Africa, from 2011, the First Eleven leadership team (the best in knowledge, expertise, competence, patriotism, etc.) must take over leadership at all strata of the nation.

Our leaders have never learnt from history about the devastating consequences of religious bigotry and ethnic cleavage manipulations in Nigeria; about the nationally disastrous effects of election rigging; about the effects of the poor national image they hoist on the country from corruption, fraudulent elections, and violence; about foreign investors and tourists – the insecurity they hoist on the nation frightens them away from the country; about the evils of godfatherism – harbinger of electoral violence, electoral fraud, political assassination; about the dangers to democracy of persistent alienation of the people from the politics and government of Nigeria – loss of confidence in democracy.

THE DOOMSDAY PREDICTIONS ABOUT NIGERIA

Predictions, prophecies, and divinations have one thing in common, and that is the future, but their roots may be from diverse sources. Predictions can be scientific (including electronic predictions), statistics (through regression analysis, for example), or spiritual.

Nostradamus of France predicted or prophesied about the 11 September, 2001 attack against the United States several centuries before it occurred.

Oba Ewuare the Great of Bini Kingdom predicted through divination that a Bini Oba would be sacked by strangers, and the Kingdom ruled through Chiefs. This happened in 1897, when Oba Overamwen was dethroned by rampaging British Forces, and sent into exile.

There have been predictions about Nigeria that our leaders swept aside, despite the fact that numerous indices and even utterances and actions of some of our citizens and groups tend to support these predictions.

Before independence, the North and West threatened to break away from Nigeria. After independence, the East threatened and actualised the threat to break away from Nigeria. We lost 3,000,000 people in an avoidable civil war "to keep Nigeria one". From 1994 Ogoni uprisings, 12 June, 1993 struggles, and the Niger Delta crisis set the spirals of separatist feelings in the country, based on the injustices, and wastages in the land.

As far back as 2000, Karl Maier, a Briton, wrote a book, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis*.[3] From his analysis, Nigeria has already collapsed. We may not agree with him, but we all know that the foundations and walls of "This House" are badly shaken.

A U.S. Intelligence Agency screamed in 2005 that by 2015. Nigeria would be either a totally failed state or a disintegrated state. We expected our leaders to call our relevant citizens to check if there was something the Americans saw that they did not see, to enable remedial action. But our leaders did not. They referred to the Americans as prophets of doom, and continued to behave as if all was well.

Recently, Colonel Muammar Ghadafi called for the break up of Nigeria.[4] There are also talks about the United States plans for Nigeria's break-up through military strategy. There is a Untied States AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM), which has now been transformed into Operational Command which was not the original intention; and to be established on African soil.

Lord Lugard marched through India, the Sudan, and Nigeria, vast territories each. India has been split long ago. Sudan is on the line for dismemberment next year. Nigeria must be vigilant!

Thus, as our leaders are seeing nothing, we must talk, shout, and bang the table, so that they hear and know that we are seeing something.

We are seeing acidic political and socio-economic injustices in the land, prompting some citizens and groups to want to secede from Nigeria.

We see millions of angry, hungry and unemployed youths in the country, from whose pool recruitment is made for violent crimes such as kidnapping, armed robbery, assassination, cross-border banditry, etc. We see provocative looting of our commonwealth. We see our youths being wasted daily by the bullets of defence and security agents, in the deserts of Morocco. We see a nation with all the attributes of greatness, yet lies humiliated and crippled by incompetence, corruption, and mediocrity.

HOW POLITICS HAS UNDERDEVELOPED NIGERIA

Our brand of politics is destructive. We experience politics of election rigging since 1959; politics of godfatherism; politics of do-or-die; politics of moneybags; politics of thugs and assassins; politics that has no room for the people's participation. Thus, voice of the people (votes) is not respected.

Politics in which those that are supposed to be servants are masters; politics that have no respect for knowledge, educated people, research and development. Indeed, it is a crime to be educated in Nigeria.

Politics of public treasury looting and corruption; politics that neglect our youths, women and children, sentencing thousands of them to slave labour, sexual slavery and prostitution abroad; politics that export our capital

abroad, discouraging foreign investors, and generating multiplier effects in other nations while killing our own people at home; politics that imposes lawlessness and indiscipline.

Politics that enthrones and worships incompetence, mediocrity, greed, and money; politics of winner-takes-all (zero-sum game), that is totally unAfrican. Politics that imposes unwilling rulers on the country while those who planned to rule are kept away; politics in which candidates win elections through courtocracy (decision of the courts), instead of democracy (the people's verdict).

Politics that protect big criminals and hunt small criminals to their early grave; politics in which looters of the commonwealth are king-makers and heroes; politics that neglect the development of vital sectors of the economy, especially education, human resource development, technology, electricity, military might, diplomacy, and leadership.

ESSENCE OF POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP

The common man sees politics as the struggle for power. Politics is conceptualised as the authoritative allocation of values (David Easton); the process of determining who gets what, when, and how (Laswell); and the struggle for the minds and resources of men and nations (Nwolise).

But what is the essence of politics? To most of our politicians, politics enables them grab power for personal aggrandisement. Whereas, the real essence of politics is to throw up the best candidates to join the leadership team of a group or nation.

The essence of leadership is pursuit of the security, peace, development, welfare and happiness of the people. Leadership, therefore, is not mere occupancy of a post, but the active performance of roles that catalyse the progressive locomotion of the people.

Nigeria's brand of politics has negated the essence of politics and leadership, underdeveloped the nation, dehumanised the people, and humiliated a once proud people.

STRATEGISING LOCOMOTION TO NATIONAL GREATNESS

A philosopher once said that scientists have interpreted the world: it remains to change the world. What is the way forward? Educated people must come out of their cocoon to effect the necessary progressively transformatory change in the chemistry of Nigerian government and politics. Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT), Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) should pursue this urgent patriotic emergency.

To achieve this, the electoral law which has for decades privatised

government and politics in Nigeria by requiring public servants wishing top join politics to resign permanently has to be changed. Public servants (teachers, lecturers, etc.) who wish to participate in politics should be granted 3-6 months leave without pay. If they win their elections, their names will be struck off the register; and if they lose, they purge themselves and return to their jobs. This will enable people of knowledge, expertise, and competence to participate in law-making, policy formulation and implementation.

Election from 2011 must be based on the best democratic practices and standards:

(1) Transparent, internal party democracy – the godfathers, do-or-die politicians, assassins, money bags, and armed politicians must be run out of town.

(2) Peaceful political rallies and campaigns.

(3) Public debate by contesting candidates at all levels (local, state, federal).

(4) Indicted persons and corrupt persons to be banned from participation in politics and government.

(5) Free and fair elections.

(6) Prevalence of the verdict (voice) of the people in determining winners of electoral contests.

(7) INEC should start now to educate, enlighten the people on these through NYSC members.

(8) Enthronement of the nation's First Eleven leadership team at all levels to terminate the era of the locusts, mediocrity, incompetence, religious bigotry, ethnic manipulation, criminal looting and exportation of the commonwealth. To achieve this, there must be requiem mass for the godfather – who, correctly understood, is a criminal (gang) kingpin.

The Nigerian state must take its primary obligation of providing quality security service seriously. This requires the establishment of a Ministry of Domestic Security, It baffles me, that the government has no Ministry to cater for domestic security, which is its primary responsibility alongside external security (defence) which has its own Ministry. The new Ministry of Domestic Security will, among others, transform our present concept and practise of national security which have become obsolete, and dry up the existing pool of hungry and angry unemployed youths, mobilising their energies and talents and channelling them into national productivity.

The state must combat poverty with all the resources of the nation, including the effective use of micro-credit; payment of living wage, pension and gratuity as and when due. The state must combat political corruption with all the might of the nation. This includes recovery of all stolen wealth,

and prosecution of the thieves.

Part of the recovered funds should be used to raise anti-corruption monuments in all state capitals. We need to commence evolving of a political system at all levels that is in congruence with our culture and social values. The country needs to establish a Political Leadership Academy, to reorientate elected leaders, infuse attitudinal change, inculcate leadership values and tune them up for quality leadership.

Provision of electricity through solar energy, bio-gas, wind and coal, all of which the nation has in abundance in addition to the existing hydro, natural gas and petrol fired systems. Rapid human resource development through establishment of relevant short courses, and professional trainings. Rapid infrastructural development – especially roads, railway, and waterways. Rapid development of the nation's tourists industry. Transparent and effective enforcement of the rule of law and due process. The law is blind to the truth and justice in Nigeria. Perhaps it is time to free the effigy of our symbol of law from its blindfold.

CONCLUSION

While I respect and appreciate the architects of vision 20:2020 (even though none of the original 7-Point Agenda meant to midwife this vision had any blueprint), I am of the view that our real goal now should be transforming Nigeria into a **first world** nation before the first half of the 21st century. We have the human and natural resources to achieve this.

What is required is the leadership with vision and mission imbued with the **Political will.** The contents of political will are:

(a) Excellent strategising or planning.

(b) Mobilisation of the necessary expertise and stakeholders.

(c) Release of adequate financial and material resources required to pursue and achieve the vision and mission.

(d) Exertion of effective and efficient supervision; monitoring, evaluation of the entire process including the checkmating of quislings.

(e) Continuous motivation of the human elements involved.

It is in this way that visions and missions can be achieved through excellent planning and implementation.

I am sure many Nigerians are glad that for the first time in our history, a Ph.D holder is the power holder. We expect the dethronement of mediocrity, incompetence, trial and erorr, and the enthronement of knowledge expertise, research and development as well as patriotism in national governance. This implies the dethronement of the Second and Third Eleven leadership elements that had dominated the leadership space since independence, and inauguration

of the nation's First Eleven team in all spheres of national life, to commence the ascendance of Nigeria to real national development and national greatness.

REFERENCES

1.   For details of the Economic Confidential Report, see *Nigerian Tribune*, 3 August, 2010, p. 53.
2.   Ibid.
3.   Karl Maier (2000). *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis.* London: Penguin Books.
4.   For details, see *Nigerian Tribune*, 30 March 2010, pp. 1 and 4.

Military Rule and the Failure of Legitimacy Mobilisation Strategies in Nigeria, 1966-1998

PAUL K.N. UGBOAJAH

4

INTRODUCTION

In view of the fact that no government or political system has long survived without engaging the resources of popular support in some form through mobilisation, it is not politically strange to see successive governments in Nigeria, especially the military, embarking on powerful tactics or mechanisms or consciously designed policies of inculcating support, otherwise known as social mobilisation in general or mobilisation for legitimacy in particular, for the political system to survive.

These powerful tactics is what Kenneth M. Dolbear and Murray Edelman refer to as symbolism.[1] Symbolism, according to them, is "the process of creating images in people's minds that call for the approval or revulsion in part by fulfilling inherent needs in people; it then involves such reactions to build support or acquiescence".[2] Dolbear and Edelman further point out that much use of symbolism surrounds the legitimacy of government

institutions and policies and converts natural fears or unserved needs into forms of assurance.

Indeed, it is significant to note that most, if not all, mobilisation efforts in Nigeria have been directed towards ensuring support for the political system or the legitimation of government's priorities. In a sense, all forms of social mobilisation in Nigerian military administrations could be said to directly aim at strengthening the weak legitimacy structure of the state.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Before we proceed to look at these strategies in a brief survey of the efforts made by the military administrations in Nigeria to mobilise for legitimacy, it would be appropriate to briefly examine, for analytical and terminological clarity, the concept of mobilisation for legitimacy within the larger framework of social mobilisation.

The term mobilisation, in a social context, refers to the process whereby a concerted effort is made to engage the full attention of the members of society and channel their energies in a systematic manner for the achievement of certain set-objectives which are thought to be both desirable and necessary.[3]

Most scholars who have written extensively on mobilisation have usually treated it as a social mobilisation, presumably to emphasise the fact that mobilisation is an all-embracing concept, which often touches on all spheres of man's existence. In other words, while some authors recognise the fact that mobilisation could take different forms, i.e. it could be long- or short-term, could be economic, political, religious, military or ethnic mobilisation, social mobilisation has generally been preferred as a mere blanket and all-embracing concept.[4]

Mobilisation has also been classified by some scholars into two forms, namely, institutional and non-institutional mobilisation.[5] Non-institutional, otherwise called non-governmental mobilisation, refers to mobilisation which emanates from non-state institutions and is characteristically a threat to the integrity and stability of an existing political system and the established interests or classes which benefit from that system. According to Suberu, it is a form of mobilisation which transforms the people or group of them into 'deviant' and vociferous mobs seeking reform or revolution through riots, rampage, strikes, protests, etc.[6]

Non-institutional mobilisation can also be referred to as de-legitimation mobilisation. Close examples of de-legitimation mobilisation in Nigeria include the protest movements and political agitations which followed the 1983 elections and the prolonged violence which erupted after the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 presidential election.[7]

Institutional or governmental mobilisation (otherwise referred to as

mobilisation for legitimacy in this work) is inspired and sanctioned from the top, i.e. by the ruling élite, and is characteristically a means of authority legitimation. It is designed to create a receptive and supportive constituency among the people for the programmes of the rulers and to check popular antipathy or even hostility to the government or its priorities.[8] All except few mobilisation programmes in Nigeria especially those engineered by military administrations fall within this category because most state policies were designed by the military administrations to break the cycle of legitimacy crisis. This crisis has historical roots and has taken various forms and dimensions since independence.

In addition to these forms of mobilisation, Osaghae,[9] in his analysis of the state and its relation with society in Africa, prudently distinguished between two major forms of mobilisation, namely: development mobilisation and legitimation mobilisation. According to him, the dependent character of the state and the low level of material well-being of the vast majority of the people necessitates mobilisation for development, while the legitimacy crisis necessitates legitimation mobilisation. Quite elaborate as it is, Osaghae's typology for mobilisation drive in Africa is not exhaustive.

Perhaps because of the peculiarity of the Nigerian state and its composition (ethnic) in particular or the nature or pattern of state formation in Africa in general, a third form of mobilisation could be added, namely, cohesive or integrative mobilisation. The plural nature of the Nigerian state and its fragility demands a conscious policy that will unite the 'ever-tearing' masses. This 'process of assimilation' has been directed towards dismantling social images such as ethnicity, religious bigotry and other obtrusive images that divide the country. Such policies include the introduction of Federal Government Colleges, the Unity Schools, the NYSC scheme, etc.

It is important to note that the three forms of mobilisations highlighted above are not mutually exclusive not only because the success of one will aid that of the other, but because most state policies in Africa are always designed to 'polish' the image of the state and short-circuit the cycle of authority or legitimacy crisis.

It is, therefore, on this basis that mobilisation for legitimacy will be seen as the process that is routinely or un-routinely deployed in order to attain the goal of loyalty and conformity to the state, state policies, the incumbent political head and the state institutions. In broad terms, it refers to the process by which the state in any context tries to invoke loyalty from the people and thereby reproduce the dominant status quo. Conceived in this way, the drive towards mobilisation for legitimacy may exist at two primary levels. First, legal rational legitimation, where the rulership maintains its domination almost exclusively as a function of the enactment or decrees or legislations once the political class gets to power either through popular mandate or coercive means.[10]

The second level is related to what Ninalowo describes as socio-political legitimation, which emanates as a function of the extent to which the aspirations, needs and values of the masses are fulfilled or enhanced by virtue of particular state administrative policies that may be geared towards the practical amelioration of the human condition; in which case there would be widespread and equitable opportunities and access to adequate nutrition, housing, formal basic education, transportation, communication, civil and political liberties that would enhance and promote human centred development.[11]

THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF LEGITIMACY MOBILISATION

Be that as it may, contemporary Nigerian history is replete with attempts by the state to mobilise the citizenry. However, these mobilisation efforts otherwise conceived as mobilisation for legitimacy in this work have been against the background of the numerous crises of legitimacy which have confronted various military administrations in Nigeria. The depth of these crises is underscored not only by the unending cycles of military coups and the apathy, turbulence, violence and cynicism that pervaded the Nigerian socio-political landscape, but also by the failure of the military administrations to live up to expectations. One interesting but problematic thing about military rule is that it is a 'single-legged government' whose legitimacy relied heavily on performance, and the basic problem of administrations whose legitimacy rests on 'one leg' and depends on performance alone is that they are highly vulnerable in the event of policy failure. Therefore, failure of performance removes the only justification of their rule since they lack any valid source of authority.

Interestingly enough, in view of the fact just mentioned above that military rule is a 'single-legged government' whose legitimacy rests on performance alone, mobilisation for legitimacy usually commences immediately a new military administration comes to power. In other words, in their maiden broadcast they usually portrayed themselves as being on a corrective mission, to right the mistakes committed by their predecessors.

However, with regard to their justification for coming to power, it is instructive to observe that the reasons given for the overthrow of government of the First Republic may as well be given for all subsequent coups whether successful or abortive. Indeed, if one were to record in different voices the broadcast of Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, who first announced the assumption of power by the military in January 1966 and broadcast the same on 29 July, 1966, 29 July, 1975, 31 December, 1983, 27 August, 1985, and on other fateful coup days, one would find that there is very little, if any,

difference in the *raison d'être* of the undemocratic changes. Moreover, it could be observed that the same broadcast would be appropriate in several other African and developing countries. For this reason, it may be said without fear of contradiction that Nigeria's rulers, military and civilian, have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. Truly, a leopard cannot change its spots! The usual reasons are accusatory: corruption, graft, embezzlement of public funds, nepotism, tribalism, mismanagement of the economy, maladministration, incarceration of political opponents, denial of fundamental human rights, breakdown of law and order, political assassination of opponents, fraudulent elections, self-perpetuation in office, etc. Also, because of the fact that most, if not all, of these reasons are true, the coupists use these accusations to justify their coming into power and to garner political support from the masses, a necessary step towards the building of a strong legitimacy.

Having given reasons to justify the coup, the so-called new messiahs who regard themselves as being on a corrective mission promise a paradise here on earth. But the question is: do they ever perform? The fact that they too, have to be, more often than not, overthrown signifies stark failure. This is not to say that there are no redeeming features in military administrations. Rather, it is to say that the vision they so loudly proclaim and publicise is not regarded by the beneficiaries as having been realised, or at least the achievements are considered so meager and so insignificant that they are not making the people to be better off. There is every good reason for seeking the termination of an incompetent or insensitive government. For instance, the rulers arrogating to themselves omnipotence and omniscience, as their predecessors did, refuse to quit. They tilt at the windmills, imprisoning real and imaginary enemies and rattling sabers against unnamed foreign instigators and collaborators of internal saboteurs, subversives, styled 'extremists' by the Babangida administration.

It is this 'other side' of military rule that steers up non-institutional or non-governmental mobilisation earlier discussed above, a form of mobilisation which transforms the people or a group of them into deviant and vociferous mobs seeking reform or revolution through riots, rampage, strikes, protests, etc. which erodes the legitimacy of the administration, thus leading to a crisis of legitimacy.

The First Military Coup d'État and the Rhetoric of Mobilising for Legitimacy

The first military coup in Nigeria truly exemplifies the use of radio broadcast to mobilise for mass support and legitimacy. Speaking in a broadcast on Friday, 28 January, 1966, the coup leader of the first military coup, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, vowed to put an end to regionalism and tribalism. "All Nigerians", he declared, "want an end to regionalism. Tribal loyalties and

activities which promote tribal consciousness and sectional interests must give way to the urgent task of national reconstruction".[12] He said further:

> Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent, those that seek to keep the country divided so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotistic, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles; those that have corrupted our society and put the political calendar back by their words and deeds.[13]

He promised that "the Federal Military Government will preserve Nigeria as one strong nation. We shall give firm, honest and disciplined leadership."[14] On corruption and embezzlement, he declared:

> The federal military government will stamp out corruption and dishonesty in our public life with ruthless efficiency, and restore integrity and self-respect in our public affairs . . . The Government will study very carefully the questions posed by those who recklessly abuse their public offices through the acquisition of state lands and financial deals.[15]

Major Nzeogwu's justification for seizing power could not have been said to be wrong after all. This is because, as a commentator graphically puts the civilian legacy:

> By the time Nzeogwu stormed the scene in 1966, enough abnormalities had been taken and government wanted to cause a ferment of social discontent and political disaffection amongst the citizenry. Daylight electoral frauds, rigging, polls juggling and malevolent politicking unabashedly conducted by die-hard rivals and fanatical supporters had opened the floodgates of violence, arson, looting and mayhem in the Western Region – the Wild, Wild West of 1965 – following the regional elections of that year. But the civilian leaders appeared incapable of leading. Their importance to act decisively or even to pretend to be firmly in the saddle and in control of the reins of power immensely weakened confidence in them and paved the way for the dawn broadcast.[16]

However, one of the ironies of the coup d'etat was that those who actually led it and whose actions led to the usurpation of political power by the military, did not themselves hold any position in the administration they helped to bring about. Having all been arrested and detained, they were not even in a position to serve as the power behind the throne. Hence, it is impossible to determine what they would have done had they succeeded. However, if the statements they made and those attributed to them give any indication of their aims and objectives, one conclusion that could be drawn from them was their attempt to justify their intervention and secure the support of Nigerians for their new administration.

In other words, whatever the estimate one puts on Nzeogwu's sincerity, and many, in fact, regarded him as sincere but idealistic, it seems reasonable to presume from his broadcast that the objective of his 'Supreme Council' was to justify their seizure of power while at the same time mobilising for mass support and legitimacy.

GENERAL IRONSI AND INDECISIVENESS

The January Majors were, however, out-maneuvred by Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi to whom the rump of the civilian government was compelled to hand over political power. The new ruler, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, who assumed the titles of Head of the Federal Military Government (later changed to Head of the National Military Government) and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in his radio broadcast to the nation also identified the causes of the demise of the first democratic experiment as: "Tribalism and regionalism, nepotism, corruption in public life, embezzlement of public funds, fraudulent election and breakdown of law and order arising from the contested elections in the Western Region and resulting in arson".[17] He went further to promise 'no room' for anyone peddling these evils in the 'new society' the military was about to inaugurate. Everything was to be managed in the national interest and even 'workers' organisations must from now on work as a team in the national interest.[18]

In order to show itself as a corrective administration and to mobilise for mass support and legitimacy, therefore, the Ironsi administration probed the financial scandals of public officials and unearthed gross abuse of office, fraud and misappropriation of public funds. Unjust enrichment and ill-gotten gains did not go unpunished.

However, no sooner had Ironsi's administration begun than its seemingly weak legitimacy began to suffer, not only because of a number of problems Ironsi inherited from the civilians, but also and mainly because of the way these problems were handled.

Among such problems was the nature of federal-state relations in the context of the aggressive centrifugal pulls from the regions. Second, the administration had to grapple with the issue of establishing itself in power and providing able leadership. In addition, the nature of the coup had created problems of confidence among Nigerian groups and among members of the armed forces.[19] General Ironsi had to cope with these issues. These problems required sagacity and subtlety, patience and compromise. They required the skills of a reconciliation leader and yet the speed of a mobilisation leader. In this regard, a reconciliation leader relies for his effectiveness on qualities of tactical accommodation and a capacity to discover areas of compromise between antagonistic viewpoints. He remains in control as long as he is

successful in politics of compromise and synthesis.[20] The reconciliation here was between antagonistic regional interest groups.

History, however, shows that General Ironsi fell short of the qualities required of a reconciliation and mobilisation leader at a critical period. The mode of his coming to power, according to B.J. Dudley[21] was such that he could hardly have been expected to have any clear-cut ideas of reform and reconciliation. Dudley even doubts the capability of Ironsi to conceive what forms of reforms were needed, a fact which his 7-month tenure demonstrated. A genial, convivial man, he was never regarded as very intelligent and he owed his position as GOC more to his seniority than to any innate ability he may be said to have possessed.[22] Relying on the popular reception accorded to the military on their seizing control of government, Ironsi believed that things left alone would 'right themselves'.[23] All that was needed was a little initiative taken here and there at the 'right time'. Unfortunately for Ironsi, things just do not have a way of sorting themselves out. Decisions have to be taken and this he seemed incapable of doing. A great deal of imagination and initiative was demanded which he was incapable of providing and when he decided to act, he was to find that time had gone against him. What might have been the 'right' decisions at the 'right' time, turned out the 'wrong' decisions at the 'wrong' time.

Admittedly, the new administration had immediate problems to face and the first reaction from General Ironsi was to create institutions for an effective military administration. By Decree No.1, 1966,[24] the legislative and executive bodies in the regions and at the centre were suspended. Under this decree the Federal Military Government (FMG) had "power to make law for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof respect to any matter whatsoever".[25]

After this, Ironsi turned to the political problem of finding the appropriate model of government for Nigeria. This included finding adequate formula for federal-region relations which had pestered the civilians. The nature of these relations was such that a Nigerian head of state once remarked that:

> . . . the regions were so large and powerful as to consider themselves self-sufficient and almost entirely independent. The federal government which ought to give lead to the whole country was relegated to the background. The people were not made to realise that the federal government was the real government of Nigeria.[26]

In fact, at various times, the regions had threatened the authority of the central government. Threats of secessions had come from the Northern Region (1950), the Western Region (1953), the Northern Region (1953), and the Eastern region (1964). Each region had used the threat of secession as a political capital extraction mechanism in their relations with the centre. Many

observers had wondered whether the 'regional tails' were wagging the 'federal dog'.

This was the situation which Ironsi inherited. He could have immediately taken action to centralise political power or create additional sub-national regions before the dust which followed the coup had settled down. He did not act quickly partly because of the circumstances in which he found himself – the Nigerian socio-political context which often immobilised its leader. According to Isawa Elaigwu, Nigeria's ethnic perceptual prism often stigmatised leaders before they were given the opportunity to perform as individuals.[27] In part, Ironsi's hesitation was a result of his lack of capability to comprehend political situations fast enough and to respond accordingly.

He waited for five months before taking a decisive action. Although he had set up the Constitutional Review Study Group to study the constitutional problems of Nigeria and submit report to a Constituent Assembly, Ironsi moved to set up a Unitary government on 24 May, 1966. By Decree No. 34, 1966 (which was essentially Ironsi's broadcast to the nation), Nigeria became a Unitary state; it ceased to be a federation and was now to be called the Republic of Nigeria.[28] All the former regions were abolished and were now to be referred to as 'groups of provinces', each under a military governor. The FMG was renamed the National Military Government, and all the civil services of the country were to be unified. According to Ironsi, the decree was intended to remove "the last vestiges of intense regionalism of the recent past, and to produce that cohesion in government structure which is so necessary in achieving and maintaining the paramount objective of the National military Government, . . . national unity".[29]

While this decree existed more on pages of government files than on the ground it challenged the security of the Northern Region. Northerners especially regarded the unification of the civil service as an attempt to swamp Northern civil service by the Igbo. On 27 May, 1966 the North reacted violently and indigenes of the Eastern region became victims in bloody communal riots in most cities in the North. The nature of the January coup in which the North had lost many of its political and military leaders had generated intense suspicions. Ironsi's ideas were, therefore, not given the opportunity to take off. Even within the military, Ironsi had virtually lost his constituency among Northern officers and men. Hence, in July 1966, in a bloody vengeful rising, Northern soldiers staged a coup in which Ironsi was killed.

Ironsi had made an attempt at introducing a new form of government. He failed in his bid at mobilisation for legitimacy. Not only were his actions slow, he lacked effective communication channels to sensitise him to the political temperature. His action was ill-timed, coming after his credibility and legitimacy had started to erode amidst suspicions and fears. His failure to take prompt disciplinary action against the January mutineers also sealed

his fate among Northern soldiers.

To Ironsi and his advisers, the solution to the Nigerian political quest for an appropriate model of government lay in greater centripetal pull, greater centralisation in Lagos. For a country of great diversity in language, culture and development, Ironsi was sowing the seeds of discord and political violence: he probably forgot that if the military had to rule, he could not play apolitical politics. Mobilisation for legitimacy consist of the ability to know the environment well, to feel the political temperature of the system and to know the limits to which decisions can be taken without threatening the basic consensual values that bind the society together.

Besides, the Ironsi administration had another problem to contend with – that of dealing with those who led the coup that brought Ironsi to power. He was the beneficiary of what had started out as a 'mutiny' but had ended as a military coup. As this was a mutiny, he had to punish the mutineers in order to restore discipline in the army and appease the North for the death of its military and political leaders. In other words, were they to be regarded as rebellious troops who had murdered their superiors, then they would be liable to a court-martial before a military tribunal. Alternatively, they could be court-martialled and tried for treason. In either case, they would face a sentence which carried the death penalty. To a large number of people, however, they were heroes whose trial and possible execution would have alienated much of the support, goodwill and legitimacy on which the administration relied. Even more important than the attitude of the civil populace was that of the military whose sentiments were divided between those, perhaps the larger proportion, who felt that the plotters should be made to stand trial, not only because they thought military laws demanded this, but also to maintain the discipline on which the hierarchy of command – and, therefore, the army itself – depended. Against this group, which included what was left of the top command, were those who thought the leaders of the coup should be released from detention and, if not reinstated into their respective offices, should, at the worst, be dismissed from the army. Ironsi, however, preferred to leave matters as they were. The leaders of the coup were kept in detention and continued to receive their full salaries and other entitlements.[30]

In May, the case of these men was brought before the newly created Supreme Military Council where it was decided that they should be brought to trial. But rather than implementing that decision, Ironsi suggested that the trial be postponed till July. In July, there was another postponement to September.[31] This was to be overtaken by events. One could, however, notice that Ironsi found it difficult to punish the executors of the coup, a coup which had brought him to power, because punishing them would have alienated southerners who saw it as a revolutionary act. He tried to remain

impartial, but was subjected to the strains of diverse centrifugal pulls of the Nigerian society.

Moreover, during his brief tenure, appointments to the boards of directors of federal parastatals as well as promotions within the army were lifted in favour of the Igbo. Understandably, the Igbo were in the majority in the officer corps of the Nigerian Army at the time, yet grave suspicion and doubt were aroused in the minds of other major ethnic groups as to the true intention of government. The federal Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Mr. Gabriel Onyuike, was an Igbo. He replaced a Yorubaman, Dr. T.O. Elias. A little wisdom would have advised against such imbalanced appointment. It seemed merit was held up as the only criterion for appointments. Critics thought this was so done because it favoured the Igbo and they argued that there was no demerit or lack of merit in the continuation in office of a Yoruba national's Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.[32] Appointment and promotion thus reflected Igbo character rather than federal character. Though there was some objection to the retention of Dr. Elias (he was seen as a link with the past), his replacement by Onyuike was taken as an indication – perhaps unfairly – that Ironsi wanted to surround himself with men of his ethnic group.

This impression gathered some force when he made Dr. Okigbo, who had been special ambassador in Belgium negotiating Nigeria's associate status with the Common Market, both permanent secretary of the Ministry of Finance and economic adviser to the Federal Military Government, the only man to hold two strategic roles under the military. The offices held by these men and their personal relationship with General Ironsi inevitably led to their being regarded as a special group on whom the General relied, and as such, they came to be credited with originating the policies subsequently to be followed by the military government.[33]

This may have been an exaggeration of the facts, though they did exercise considerable influence. But perhaps their main contribution was to make Ironsi accessible to a number of people, especially the academics and intellectuals. As those who succeeded in gaining this access to Ironsi were mainly Igbo, it became easy to insinuate that they were advancing their own personal interests and those of their ethnic group, an attitude which the unwise dismissal on 'educational grounds' of some air force cadets of Northern origin – even though they had completed about one and a half to two years' service – did little to discourage. At about the same period (in April), the General also promoted some twenty-one officers from the rank of Major to Lieutenant-Colonel. Eighteen of these were Igbo-speaking but would have been due for promotion by the accepted criteria of the Nigeria Army. What was significant about their case, however, was the fact that the Supreme Military Council had earlier decided that there was to be a one-year

moratorium on promotions within the army. The moratorium was thought advisable since, with the murder of the top command, any promotion then, besides necessarily favouring the Igbo, might be misconstrued. In going against that decision Ironsi unwittingly lent more weight to the argument of those who saw his administration as one that was out to advance the interests of the Igbo. Also, the fact that military men appointed to serve as chairmen of the boards of certain public corporations, such as the Railways, the Airways and the National Sports Council were Igbo did not pass unnoticed.[34]

As might have been expected, therefore, this only served to heighten the sense of uncertainty which was already developing in the absence of any direct political move by the military, and under conditions of uncertainty, solidarity groups based on differentiated social identities take on a new significance and prominence. The 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy becomes sharper, increasing and intensifying thereby the possibilities of conflict.[35]

General Ironsi failed in another respect. He did not assuage the bitter feelings of the Yoruba who wanted Chief Awolowo released unconditionally. The Yoruba decided to distance themselves from Ironsi government, which they increasingly saw as the realisation of Igbo hegemony over the country. His failure to prosecute and punish the coup plotters estranged him further from the Hausa too.[36]

His constituency or base of support was only the Igbo. His Union Government had no use for traditional rulers – a further assault upon regional foundation especially in the north. This was evident in May 1966 when the Emirs and other traditional leaders advised Ironsi and the Governor of Northern Nigeria Group of Provinces against Unitary Government.[37] Their advice was rejected.

Thus, repercussions were not long in coming. In the same month of May, disturbances broke out in various parts of the north. And towards the end of July, mutiny broke out in units of the army at Abeokuta. It soon spread to the unit at Ikeja. Around the same time, General Aguiyi-Ironsi was on a visit to Western Nigeria. Troops from the unit in Ibadan entered Government House and captured the head of state and his host, Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi. Both were killed.[38]

GOWON'S FAILURE TO RETURN NIGERIA TO DEMOCRATIC RULE

Amidst the uncertainty and gloom which followed the July 1966 coup, Nigeria experienced a 3-day political interregnum at the end of which General (then Lt. Col.) Yakubu Gowon emerged as head of state. He ascended to power in circumstances of great difficulty and in the contexts of secessionist bids by the Northern hawks in the Nigerian Army. But the July coup, like the

January coup, was only partially successful. Northern soldiers in the Eastern Region had not taken up arms. They were, it seems, insulated from this coup by distance and the ad hoc nature of the coup execution.

With the situation at this period so tense, the new ruler, General Yakubu Gowon was forthright and straightforward in asserting that 'the basis for unity is not there'. This was the greatest challenge to his administration. In his first broadcast on 1 August, 1966, General Gowon confirmed the grave threat to the continued existence of the country as one unit. In his words:

As a result of the recent events and the other previous, similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time. I have already remarked on the issues in question. Suffice it to say that, putting all considerations to test – political, economic, as well as social – the base for unity is not there or is so badly rocked, not only once but several times. I therefore feel that we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country from drifting away into utter destruction.[39]

However, unlike Ironsi, Gowon was not only quick in mobilising for legitimacy, he also adopted a different approach to the problem of legitimation. In line with the suggestion of the *Daily Times* editorial of 1 August, 1966 that the military should seek the assistance of civilians to govern so as to maintain a stable government, General Gowon pledged to return the country to civil rule as soon as arrangement for it could be completed.[40] He also announced that he intended to pursue most vigorously the question of the release of political detainees.[41] He did so swiftly.

Twenty-four hours later (on 2 August), the doors of Calabar Prisons were thrown open and Obafemi Awolowo walked into freedom and was flown to Lagos to the warm embrace of the new head of the National Military Government. With this, Gowon obtained the goodwill support of the masses of the Yoruba, a support which was not only to strengthen the legitimacy of his administration, but was also to prove valuable in the national encounters still to come. General Gowon next proceeded to repeal the Unification Decree and thus re-established federalism, thereby winning the hearts of the Emirs in the north.

In spite of this, however, the military Governor of Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu, did not recognise General Gowon as head of the National Military government. He felt that the most senior military officer ought to have assumed the reins of office according to military tradition. However, the circumstances of the rebellion made this impossible, a fact which Ojukwu was very much aware of.

Nigeria continued to drift apart. Lt. Col. Ojukwu refused to attend meetings of the Supreme Military Council anywhere in Nigeria on grounds of personal safety. Conferences within the country were held with the objective of redefining the form of association acceptable to all sections of the country.[42] The regions took different positions, with the Eastern Region opting for confederation. At the end, it became obvious that Lt. Col. Ojukwu was planning the secession of the East from the federation. In search of a place agreeable to Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the military leaders met at Aburi, Ghana. General Gowon promulgated the famous Decree No. 8 of 1967 in implementation of the agreement reached at Aburi. But Ojukwu rejected this. He averred that the decree did not correctly reflect what was agreed upon.

Almost on the eve of the declaration of the "Sovereign and Independent Republic of Biafra", Gowon carved Nigeria into 12 states. The move very cleverly denied Ojukwu support of the minority groups of the East and by granting the age-long desires of the minority groups, the Gowon military administration earned tremendous support of the minorities as a whole and, *ipso facto*, further strengthened the legitimacy of his administration.

By the time the crisis snowballed into civil war, Ojukwu could only rely on the support of the Igbo. It was said that he based his hope on breaking up of the federation with the thinking that the West could be cajoled to follow suit, especially with the much misunderstood statement of Chief Obafemi Awolowo that "if the East was allowed to secede, the West would follow". Eventually, the East seceded, but it 'was not allowed' to do so, a condition that meant the West would not follow.[43]

Another deft move by Gowon was the appointment of popular former politicians as ministers. The move further cemented the romance between the civilian populace and the administration – a strong basis for accumulation of legitimacy. With Chief Awolowo and others openly identifying themselves with the objectives of the military, the government was rest assured of support on the expected civil war that was soon to follow.[44] Table 1 shows the list of notable civilians who featured in Gowon's administration as ministers.

To a large extent the conclusion of the civil war (in favour of the federal army) not only legitimised the Nigerian state, but also Gowon's administration.[45] The horror of the civil war called for immediate action and a lot of radical changes, cross-national exposure and the establishment of a national culture which would erode parochial identities. Part of these radical changes were the establishment of the National Youth Service Corps by Gowon and the policy of 3Rs (Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation), which was focused on reunification, and reconciliation of Nigerians estranged by the war, reconstruction of the war-torn areas and rehabilitation of Nigerians displaced or injured by activities of war.

Table 1: Gowon's Executive Council

No	Ministers	Portfolio
1.	Chief Obafemi Awolowo	Finance Commissioner, Vice-Chairman of Executive Council
2.	Chief Anthony Enahoro	Information and Labour
3.	Dr. Okoi Arikpo	Trade
4.	Alhaji Aminu Kano	Communications
5.	Wenike Briggs	Education
6.	Joseph S. Tarka	Transport
7.	Alhaji Femi Okunnu	Works and Housing
8.	Alhaji Shettima Ali Monguno	Industry
9.	Yahaya Gusau	Economic Development, Agriculture and National Resources
10.	Commodor J.E.A. Wey	Establishments
11.	Dr. J. E. Adetoro	Minister without Portfolio
12.	Dr. Russel A.B. Dikko	Minister without Portfolio

Source: Lai Joseph, *Nigeria: Shadow of a Great Nation*, p. 74.

According to Tade Aina and Adeniyi Sambo, "the philosophy of the 'New Nigeria' as embodied in the decree establishing the NYSC scheme was one that allowed for the proper encouragement and development of common ties among the youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity.[46] Far above this philosophy was the promotion of undivided loyalty necessary for the corporate existence of the Nigerian state on the one hand and the authority legitimation of the ruling class, on the other. In fact, the latter was inherent in the well-stated objectives of the NYSC:[47]

(a) to inculcate discipline in Nigerian Youths by instilling in them a tradition of industry at work, and of patriotic and loyal service to the nation in any situation they may find themselves;

(b) to raise their moral tone by giving them the opportunity to learn about higher ideals of national achievement and social and cultural improvements;

(c) to develop in them attitudes of mind, acquired through shared experience and suitable training which will make them more amenable to mobilisation in the national interest; and

(d) to develop common ties among them and promote national unity.

However, it seemed the respite ushered in by the end of the war so unchained the government that some ministers and governors embarked upon large-scale and bare-faced corruption. Governors became arrogant and

uncontrollable. One Godwin Daboh against Tarka, a federal minister, levied allegation of corruption and wrongdoings. Daboh sought to authenticate his allegations by swearing to affidavits. Mounting public pressure for investigation into the allegations met with deaf ears of General Gowon. Tarka himself boasted that any attempt to probe him would unleash a chain of events the end of which no one could tell. Nigerians took this threat to imply that other top members of the government were steeped in corruption and that rather than being a sacrificial lamb, Tarka would expose them. Failure to probe Tarka dented Gowon's image and more allegations of corruption were levelled against the government. This was the beginning of the erosion of his legitimacy.

Worse still, Nigerians were upset and disappointed when on 1 October, 1973, General Gowon broke his promise to return power to democratically elected representatives of the people in 1976. Then, he promised to reshuffle the cabinet and later deferred in doing so to the point that people wondered if this country was short of capable men. People got fed up with the administration of the state military governors and demanded their removal.

When this popular demand was backed up by senior armed forces officers, who held a meeting with General Gowon the previous year and had the courage to say so in the very presence of these governors, General Gowon announced that he would change the governors on the introduction of the new Development Plan. But there was no change. Rather, he sent his retired Army Chief of Staff to inform senior officers that he had decided to defer the change of governors till after they had shaken hands with the Queen in October. In fact, on the question of the governors, General Gowon gave the impression that he was their slave and not their master. Those discredited governors contributed immeasurably to the fall of General Gowon.

General Gowon's administration lost the moral authority to continue to govern. Also, as politicians and non-politicians clamoured, failure to return the country to civil rule, reneging on his promise, was most critical in determining his pitiable inglorious end. On this, a newspaper commented thus:

> The lack of a political programme for the return to democratic rule has been by far the most disappointing feature of Gowon's government. The new government should make it is primary objective to set machinery in motion to return this country to democratic rule within the shortest possible time.[48]

MURTALA'S SHORT-LIVED ADMINISTRATION

It was in Kampala, Uganda, where the reluctant Gowon heard the shocking news that his administration had been overthrown in a bloodless coup, led by General Murtala Mohammed. The big failure in the administration of

General Gowon was the brazen graft and corruption of some of his ministers and military governors and failure to adhere to 1976 as a realistic moment of handling over to a civilian government as a result of which his popularity was frittered away for lack of performance. So, Murtala Mohammed who overthrew him in a military coup enjoyed tumultuous welcome in July 1975.

Following in the footsteps of his predecessors, Mohammed wasted no time in pointing accusing fingers on the immediate past ruler in his maiden radio broadcast, in order to convince the citizens that his administration had come to correct the mistakes of the past administration. In what could be regarded as a post-mortem examination of the misdoings and wrong doings of the governors, General Mohammed, the new head of state was instructive:

> I am sure that you will be aware of the widespread dissatisfaction of the general public with the personal conduct of our predecessors. This led to vociferous demands for their removal which, as we all know, was never met. All over the country, there were allegations of graft and misuse of public funds. There were complaints, too, of ostentatious living, flagrant abuse of office and deprivation of people's rights and property, pervasion of time honoured government procedures and norms for reasons other than enhancing the public good, nepotism and favouritism, desecration of traditional institution and public humiliation of highly-respected natural rulers, all of which gave the impression that the states were being run as private estates.[49]

Also commenting in similar vein in a press statement, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, showing his support for the new administration, urged the new ruler to seize all ill-gotten properties. In his words: "Fortunately for our present rulers, during the past four years or so, corruption had been indulged in with such openness and undisguised shamelessness that the perpetrators as well as their loot can be easily identified".[50]

With all these accusations levelled against the Gowon administration, therefore, General Murtala's administration was highly accepted. However, General Murtala did not rest on the feeble legitimacy acquired by virtue of the nationwide acceptance of his administration. He was determined to build a solid legitimacy, a legitimacy based on performance. He appeared resolute and dynamic and took decisive actions swiftly. His administration was not dithering, not foot-dragging and not irresolute like Gowon's lack-luster government. Critics later dubbed the administration's tenure the era of "with immediate effect", for the policies and decisions of the new government were always ordered to be implemented "with immediate effect".

The government commenced with tremendous public goodwill which, as a strong basis of legitimacy, it retained throughout, a unique phenomenon in Nigerian politics. Government's urgent tasks were defined for it by the previous government. Cleaning of the Augean Stables; sacking of the former

Governors and their replacement by a dynamic team; creation of states; resolution of the question of the duality of Lagos state capital and federal capital; a programme of return to civil rule; action on the 1973 census; infusion of a sense of direction into government and proper management of public affairs.[51] This is to say that all that Murtala had to do to mobilise for legitimacy for his administration was to do those things which Nigerians had been yearning for, but which Gowon was unable or unwilling to do in flagrant defiance of enlightened public opinions and which led to a crisis of legitimacy for his administration, the consequence of which was his inglorious exit.

For a short period under Murtala administration, according to Ogba,[52] Nigerians had found a central figure whose personal commitment to the dreams of the nation turned a rallying point for mobilising them. Immediately they seized power, the new administration, with Brigadier Obasanjo as second-in-command, set about reversing the Gowon's legacy in a process of legitimation which James Oluleye pertinently described as a de-Gowonisation exercise.[53] De-Gowonisation was extended to cover all crucial national issues on which Gowon had been indecisive. Some of these national issues have been highlighted above.

Using radical clean-up and legitimising techniques of a new administration, Mohammed took action on all these issues which nine years of political leadership had mollified Gowon from taking. The new break with an on-going drift gave the impression of radicalism. No doubt, Mohammed was a man of action and did give the country a new sense of direction.

In his broadcast of 1 October, 1975, General Muritala Mohammed announced a five-stage programme designed to ensure a smooth transition to civil rule by those elected by the people of this country. In the first stage a committee on creation of additional states was to be set up and to submit its report in December 1975. Preliminary steps towards establishing the new states were to be completed by April 1976. During this stage, also a constitution drafting committee was to be appointed and was expected to complete drafting a constitution in September 1976.[54]

The second stage included the establishment of new states, the reorganisation of local governments throughout the country and the conduct of local government elections without party politics; and the establishment of a constituent assembly (partly elected and partly nominated) based on the local government council. This second stage which was to last two years was expected to be completed by October 1978.[55]

The lift of the ban on political activities to enable the formation of political parties, constituted the third stage. The ban was to be lifted in October 1978. The fourth stage comprised elections into legislatures at the state level as prescribed by the nation. And the fifth and final stage was election to legislatures

and offices at the federal level. These two last stages were to be completed by 1 October, 1979.[56] General Mohammed emphasised that his administration 'did not intend to stay in office a day longer than necessary, and certainly not beyond this date'.

In line with his promise, Murtala set up a panel on creation of states in August 1975. A report on this was submitted to him in December 1975 and he took decisive action by creating seven more states in February 1976. In reaction to widespread corruption, he purged the public service, giving it a real shock therapy. The implementation of the exercise could have been better handled, but in principle it was laudable. In essence, Murtala's administration could have been a reformist one, but he never lived to demonstrate it. The state creation exercise was certainly reformist. During his early days in office, he was preoccupied with clearing legacies he had inherited.

In addition, Murtala's government moved rapidly and decisively to purge the public sector of 'deadwoods', persons of 'doubtful loyalty', officials showing 'divided loyalties', and so on. These were retired 'with immediate effect'. Many heard of their retirement on the radio; some read of it in the newspapers. Among those retired, whether justifiably or otherwise, were Dr. Teslim Elias (Chief Justice of the Federation), and four other judges, namely, Justice George B.A. Coker, Justice Sigismund and Olanrewaju Lambo (Pesident of the Federal Revenue Court). Others were 94 top police officers, all military officers above the rank of brigadier and hundreds of public servants.[57]

To ensure sanity in the management of public funds and to prepare the ground for punishing corrupt officials, all governors and ministers were given forms on which to declare their assets before their appointments and after they were relieved of their offices.

Unfortunately, however, the revolutionary zeal of General Murtala was prematurely quenched in an abortive coup d'état in the morning of 13 February, 1976. General Mohammed was on his way to work when his car was ambushed by men acting on the orders of one Colonel Dimka. He was gunned down within seconds. Also, in faraway Ilorin, the state Governor Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo was assassinated. It was a black Friday. The plot was an unpopular one. University students voiced instant opposition to the coup attempt and vouched resistance. The possible chaos to which the nation could have been plunged was averted when the coup was aborted. Loyal forces rallied round the government to crush the rebellion.

OBASANJO ADMINISTRATION

General Olusegun Obasanjo, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, took up from where General Murtala stopped. He carried out to the letter the programmes of his predecessor and handed power to the elected civilian

ruler on 1 October, 1979. In addition to this, he embarked on two major identifiable mobilisation strategies to alter the value orientation of Nigerians in view of the persistent and endemic nature of the authority crisis bedevilling his administration after the demise of General Murtala Mohammed. These were Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) programme and the popular Jaji Declaration.

While the OFN was designed to arrest the deplorable food situation in the country and mobilise the citizens against hunger and starvation (which many people believed were products of bad policies and official corruption), the Jaji Declaration was introduced to arrest ethical problems in the society. The two policies were introduced to generate a receptive and supportive constituency among the people for Obasanjo administration and to curb popular revolt or hostility to political élite and government.[58] For instance, Obasanjo in his Jaji pronouncement cautioned the ruling class:

> . . . it is unethical and immoral on the part of any individual to brandish his riches in conspicuous consumption and ostentatious living to make the less fortunate citizens feel impoverished and cheated to the point of being bitter against society.[59]

It logically follows, therefore, that the two programmes were interrelated and, as well, designed to ward off the bitterness of the citizens against the state. As Ejembi Unobe notes, "Obviously the concern of government was not so much the opprobrium of materialism itself . . . but its consequences for the legitimation of the system. At stake, therefore, is neither ownership nor accumulation *per se*, but the manner of consumption and the implication for legitimacy".[60]

It can, therefore, be reasonably argued that the OFN programme and the Jaji Declaration, like others before them, were not only sectorally directed, but called on the élite to ensure that the masses were not brought into awareness of their property, hunger, starvation and its source. In fact, the sort of consciousness Obasanjo wanted to eliminate, according to Unobe, has the capacity for mobilising hatred that will fire revolutionary violence.[61]

It is important to note that the only programme which guaranteed Obasanjo's military government a seemingly strong legitimacy and public confidence was the consistency with which the political liberalisation programme was implemented and the fulfilment of the hand over date to a democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari on 1 October, 1979.

BUHARI ADMINISTRATION

If one takes a look again at the general reasons adduced for military intervention in politics and examines carefully the reasons why the military booted out the first civilian administration on 15 January, 1966, one would

have an insight into the causes of the sacking of the civilian administration on 31 December, 1983. This is why it was stated earlier in this work that Nigerian rulers have learnt nothing and have forgotten nothing. In other words, they do not learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. Also, the politicians in particular have failed to learn from past experiences that the legitimacy of a civil, elected administration is a procedural legitimacy. In other words, it rests on the popular preference for that government through elections that were not only free but also seen to be fair. Open, competitive party politics and free and fair elections are a *sine qua non* of true democracy.[62]

Where these conditions are vitiated by whatever means and policies, government can no longer lay claim to being accredited representatives of the people. A crisis of legitimacy, therefore, sets in. The First Republic collapsed on this score. The Second Republic capsised on precisely the same ground; another evidence of the inability of the politicians to learn from the past.

Put succinctly, the prevailing circumstance of a bitter repeat of the past sordid history of corruption, mismanagement of the economy, misappropriation of public funds, election rigging, electoral violence in form of arson, looting and killings, inter-party acrimony and bickering, barbaric politicking, politicising of the police for use against political opponents, etc. provided justification for another foray of the military into politics. So, it was on 31 December, 1983 that the usual martial music and announcement of the termination of another corrupt and inept civilian administration was heard.

The fact that the new military administration of General Muhammadu Buhari was warmly embraced by Nigerians became visible as Nigerians chanted and danced in happiness. In other words, the intervention of the military at the end of 1983 was welcomed by the nation with unprecedented enthusiasm. Nigerians were unified in accepting the intervention and looked forward hopefully to progressive change for the better. The general acceptance of this new administration, therefore, became a source of legitimacy for it.

The new administration was, however, excessively radical as it wasted no time in portraying its true colour as a corrective one. The new administration herded the perpetrators of electoral fraud into detention and appointed military governors and ministers to administer the country. The new administration established commissions of inquiry into allegations of corruption and receipt of kick-backs levelled against state governors. Some, like Professor Ambrose Ali and Alhaji Lateef Jakande, were held in detention. General Buhari promised much, injected new life into the economy, brought inflation under control and waged a relentless battle against indiscipline and abuse of office.

The legitimacy acquired by this administration did not, however, last long. As the new administration rolled out radical policies Nigerian cheered.

Within a short time, however, the applause fizzled out. This was because the administration went to the extreme in its attempt to correct societal ills.

His government showed an unparalleled disregard for public opinion, rule of threat and terror rather than persuasion and the cultivation of cooperation. The straight-jacket discipline of the barracks intruded into the civilian sphere. Government would not tolerate the expression of different and opposing opinions. All it wanted was slavish obedience to orders. Against those who would not be regimented, government armed itself with draconian laws, and clamped them into detention without trial. The military thus introduced a new dimension of intolerance that would only make the people murmur. The new masters asked for time to better the lot of the slaves but they dissipated their energies in an endless war against their critics. The press was cowed and some journalists languished in jail; among them, Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor of *The Guardian*, became victims of the infamous Decree No. 4.

As Lai Joseph puts it, the stentorian voices of military governors struck terror and fear into the minds of citizens.[63] Not being accustomed to such methods of governance, Nigerians prayed for a messiah. He was not long in coming. Excerpts from comments by *The Guardian* of 29 August, 1985 adequately summarises, in what it calls "The Arrogance of Power", the factors that led to the crisis of legitimacy of Buhari administration:

> It did not take long before the Buhari administration, so openly and so warmly received by Nigerians when it came to power, began to show its true and frightful face. Soon enough, it became clear that his administration had a conception of government in which the governed were regarded as a hostile adversary force and in which government was virtually an end in itself. Laws were made, as much through decree as by administrative fiat, without any evident regard for the interests of the people, let alone their views. Regulations were casually put out, as more operative devices than as measures designed to ameliorate the citizens' condition. Practically every segment of society, except perhaps the uniform forces, was antagonised, sometimes humiliated.[64]

The crisis of legitimacy thus engendered by the excessive radicalism of the Buhari administration eventually snowballed into a counter-coup on 27 August, 1985 signalling the end of a short, but tough rule.

BABANGIDA'S STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL AND NON-PERFORMANCE

Nigerians woke up in the early hours of 27 August, 1985 to hear Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro announce that a military coup had taken place in the country to replace Buhari administration. However, unlike the 1983 military coup d'état, there was no jubilation as the case was on 31 December, 1983.

People waited to get a clear picture of events. In fact, people were indifferent to the events. As a result and coupled with the fact that a dusk to dawn curfew was limited only to Lagos, the day in many parts of the country was like any other. People went about their business unhindered. Moreover, most people did not care a bit about the change of guards, having been betrayed by successive military administration.

General Ibrahim Babangida, the new military leader, therefore, realised in no time that, given the nature and the circumstances of the coup, the use of coercion as an effective tool for legitimacy would not be a very viable option but rather the recruit of talented individuals to help his administration either in policymaking or in developing political support.

To start with, taking a cue from his predecessors, Babangida, through his maiden broadcast as well as in subsequent messages and proclamations, laboured arduously to justify his ascension to power and to build his legitimacy on the castigations of his predecessor:

> When the former military leadership headed by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari assumed the reins of government, his ascension was heralded by the most popular enthusiasm accorded any new government in the history of this country. With the nation then at the mercy of political misdirection and on the brink of economic collapse, a new sense of hope was created in the minds of every Nigerian. Since January 1984, however, we have witnessed a systematic degeneration of that hope. It was stated then that the mismanagement of the economy, lack of public accountability, insensitivity of political leadership and a general deterioration in the standard of living which had subjected common man to intolerable suffering were the reasons for the intervention.[65]

Babangida was Nigeria's sixth military ruler. Compared with Buhari, Babangida was somewhat a more methodical ruler, and his style was different. Whereas, Buhari was stern and resolute, Babangida was deft and tactical. Babangida came to power as a champion of human rights. The reason for this is not far-fetched. Like his predecessors, he wanted to build a legitimacy to rule. Moreover, Nigerians themselves were already tired of the high-handedness of General Buhari's rule. When Babangida, therefore, seized the reins of power with a classical palace coup on 27 August, 1985, there was a general relief amongst Nigerians. The 'celebration', as in the past, was not to welcome the arrival of a new military junta but to celebrate the demise of the *ancien regime*, so to say. This is a politico-psychological behaviour of Nigerians. The departure of a government is often seen, rightly or wrongly, as a decisive opportunity for a new beginning towards nation-building and development.

However, General Babangida's ascendancy to the *magistrature suprême* brought something additional in its trail. In contradistinction to the grim-

faced, unsmiling General Buhari and his deputy General Tunde Idiagbon, Babangida brought smiles as well as a personal aura and warmth to the Nigerian political landscape. There was something seemingly arresting about him which was transmitted to the nation and the people by the media, in particular the press, namely, no matter how bad the Nigerian economic crisis, people could still afford a smile whilst tackling it.

Moreover, Babangida proceeded to ingratiate himself into the people's sympathy by pushing a liberal human rights agenda in the early days of his administration: he released most of the Second Republic politicians incarcerated by Buhari-Idiagbon, set up two judicial panels to review the cases of the detainees, both tried and yet to be tried, abrogated the notorious anti-press freedom Decree No. 4 of 1984, and threw open the National Security Organisation's detention centres, styled 'Rafindadi's Chambers of Horror', after its director, Alhaji Rafindadi.[66] By opening the prison gates for many of the political detainees; unchaining the press through a repeal of Decree 4 of 1984 as well as promising respect of fundamental human rights, Babangida rapidly concluded his initial strategy of mobilisation for political legitimacy and support. Before the end of that year, virtually all of civil society, non-state groups and interests had, either explicitly or implicitly, indicated their willingness to give the administration the benefit of the doubt. Thus, behind this smokescreen of promoting the people's human rights and the rule of law, Babangida succeeded in recruiting the best brains among the civil society drawn from all sectors of the Nigerian élite (civil service, academia, the professions, the business community, etc.).

It would appear that the widespread and systematic use of corrupt means by Babangida to 'settle' many actual and potential critics among civil society groups rested on the impeccable presupposition that if he corrupted enough Nigerians there would be nobody to speak out on the issue of corruption or public accountability and so the matter would disappear conveniently from the national agenda. To some extent, the strategy worked as many university professors and other academics, leaders of the main professions, leading trade unionists, top clerics and evangelists and the shakers and movers of the 'organised private sector' of the national economy scrambled to jump on the Babangida gravvy train. Babangida established innumerable commissions, directorates, centres, bureaux, task forces, committees, etc. with open-ended budgets, woolly and indeterminate agenda and arbitrary powers to accommodate his multitudinous army of cronies, lackeys and opportunists.[67]

The alleged Vasta coup – even though apparently only at the intention stage – of December 1985 further knitted the people to 'their' General. The latter had everything going for him. By the end of 1986, the administration had a favourable end-of-the-year review from two American Africanists. "Under Babangida", observed L. Diamond and D. Galvan,[68] "Nigeria has

permitted domestic human rights groups (such as the Human Rights Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association) and international ones (such as Amnesty International) to operate freely". Even though at the next page, the authors averred that ". . . as Nigeria made democratic progress in 1986, it also showed signs of deepening authoritarianism"; the warning could easily have been ignored.

Similarly, in the Political Bureau and general political orientation debate in the country in 1986, a sizeable pocket of informed Nigerians, in re-echoing Dr. Azikiwe's diarchy thesis, may have been persuaded that the Babangida junta had some inherent qualities that could facilitate civil polity and an 'enduring democracy' – a term the administration would use very often later. This is an educated guess from a highly charismatic and euphoric early period of the administration.

The debates of 1985 on whether or not to take the IMF loans provided an occasion for the civil society to flourish, as numerous associations including labour, religious, student, women's, artisan and professional associations emerged to proffer and canvass positions.[69]

Once wooed, civil society assumed a momentum that almost became irreversible. Numerous civic associations proliferated in various sectors to project and protect substantive interests. These associations became organised, conscious, active, radicalised, bold, undaunted and resilient in the struggle with the state. The media also proliferated and became more virile.[70]

Thereafter, a Political Bureau consulted Nigerians before making recommendations about their political future; a Constitution Review Committee criticised the 1979 Constitution which had guided the defunct Second Republic and the Directorate for Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure; the Directorate for Mass Mobilisation, Social Justice, and Economic Recovery; and the Centre for Democratic Studies appeared to have been successfully established. A National Orientation Movement was inaugurated, as well as other structures aimed at ensuring lasting democracy, and a population census was carried out in 1992.

The crisis of non-performance began to surface over time as Babangida's record deteriorated due to his inability to fulfil his promise of reviving the Nigerian economy and lack of perfomance. At the time he seized power from Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon in August 1985, the Nigerian economy, was in a shambles. Three years of civilian rule in the Second Republic had bled Nigeria dry, mismanaged huge oil 'rents', more than doubled the foreign debt profile, destroyed the manufacturing and productive base, and accentuated social tension and conflict to unprecedented proportions.[71]

Unfortunately, the Babangida administration made things worse by gross incompetence and unbridled corruption, waste and mismanagement, the

privatisation of public office and public resources, the neglect of non-oil sectors, and misplaced priorities. The adoption of a World Bank-supervised structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986 made the situation worse, because this was pathologically fixated on the exchange rate of the Naira rather than on building investor confidence, strengthening the local bourgeoisie, integrating the sectors of the economy, and promoting growth and development.[72] The pain, poverty, uncertainty, frustrations, and hunger which accompanied Nigeria's economic decline, and the implementation of an adjustment programme without any protection for vulnerable groups, created an environment which directly challenged possibilities for stability and sustainable democracy.[73] With over 45 percent of foreign exchange earnings going into debt servicing, with runaway inflation, and with increasing bankruptcies among indigenous investors, the economy sank deeper into crisis, and the social fabric of the nation deteriorated to unprecedented levels. Crime, child abuse, marital violence, disease, institutional decay, urban dislocation, and frustration characterised the society.[74]

One year after seizing power, Babangida declared a National Economic Emergency. The options open to the country, Babangida said, were either to accept an IMF loan and the conditions attached or to embark on more austere economic measures that would require great sacrifices. Although the people favoured a non-IMF option, they soon discovered the hardships eventually imposed differed little from the IMF conditions. The economic recovery programme recommended by the World Bank was instituted as a self-imposed structural adjustment programme (SAP) that involved a drastic restructuring of the country's economy. Under SAP, unemployment rates soared, food prices increased significantly, and numerous user-fees for education and health services were imposed. These hardships did not dissuade the government from SAP, which it believed to be the only approach to the country's social and economic problems. The benefits of SAP, such as longer inflation and more balanced budget, began to be seen but SAP was adhered to less stringently in the late 1980s.

Apart from these economic reforms leading to a market system, important changes were made in the basic structures of military federalism. For the first time, a military leader was called president, presumably to emphasise the executive power he wielded. The name of the supreme lawmaking body was changed from Supreme Military Council to Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). There was also a new Armed Forces Consultative Assembly, formed in 1989, which functioned as an intermediate legislative chamber between the AFRC and the rest of the military. In spite of these elaborate structural changes, Babangida adroitly increased the powers of his office. He changed his ministers and state governors frequently. Even supposedly powerful members of the government were not spared, as was demonstrated in 1986 when he

dropped his second-in-command, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe. In his place, he appointed Rear-Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, the former chief of the naval staff. The most dramatic of these changes were made at the end of 1989, when Babangida reassigned several ministers, including General Domkat Bali, the powerful minister of defence and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The changes were perceived by southerners and Christians as resulting in an AFRC that consisted mainly of northern Muslims. The service chiefs of the army, navy, and police were Muslims; only the chief of the air staff was a southerner. The ministries of external affairs, petroleum resources, internal affairs, and defence, considered the most powerful cabinet posts, were held by northern Muslims (the minister of defence being the president himself). These changes generated heated controversy and anti-government demonstrations by Christians in some northern cities. Babangida emerged from the changes more powerful than before.

Moreover, certain actions of his government exacerbated the religious tensions. The religious cleavage in the country had become increasingly politicised, beginning in the debates in 1977 when Muslims began pressing for the extension of sharia law (Muslim's religious law) from state courts in the north to the federal courts. In the Second Republic, activist Islamic groups emerged in the north, demanding the Islamisation of the country. After coming to power in 1985, Babangida adopted several measures that were considered to favour Muslims and to threaten the secular nature of the Nigerian state. In 1986, Nigeria became a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an international association of Islamic states in which Nigeria had long held observer status; this action was very controversial. In apparent contradiction, Babangida survived several religious crises by reiterating that the federation remained secular. At one point, he set up a religious advisory panel to mediate religious crises.

On 22 April, 1990, a coup attempt led by Major Gideon Orkar almost toppled Babangida. The presidential residence in Dodan Barracks was extensively damaged by the mutinous soldiers, but the head of state escaped. A unique feature of this coup attempt was the level of involvement of Nigerian civilians, who allegedly helped finance the operation. During the hours when the rebels controlled the radio station in Lagos, they broadcast a critique of the administration that combined attacks on its dictatorial nature and pervasive corruption, and announced the excision of five northern states from the federation. The survival of Babangida and all senior members of the administration enabled the government to continue its policies, especially the planned transition to civilian rule in 1992.

The crisis that ensued was made worse by the political stalemate, which accompanied the 12 June, 1993 presidential election. The transition to democracy was the major project to which Babangida had committed himself

in 1986. Concurrently, the military administration scuttled independent efforts at party formation following the lifting of the ban on politics. It barred a category of politicians from re-entering the new political arena, and constantly blamed the rich for the country's crisis. It created the National Republican Convention (NRC), described as a 'little to the right', and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which was supposed to be a 'little to the left'. It then proceeded to build offices for these two organisations in the federal and state capitals, and in local government areas throughout the country, and to fund all their activities, including deciding and publicising ideological platforms. It intimidated the political class, branded pro-democracy leaders as 'extremists', banned and unbanned social activists at will, tinkered with the transition programme, postponed the hand-over date three times, and poured thousands of millions of Naira into promoting the emergence of a so-called 'new breed' of politicians who would lead the move to the Third Republic.[75] When the civil society began to criticise his unwholesome policies, Babangida began to hound opposition interest groups, especially those of labour and students, and detained many radical and anti-establishment persons for various offences. The infamous Decree Number 2 remained in force in 1990 to facilitate these oppressive acts. The detention of several journalists and other critics of the military administration and the temporary closure of some newspapers, however, indicated the government's awareness that it had overstayed its welcome and would have to govern with even stricter controls than before. The state congresses of the two government-sponsored political parties, the only legal parties, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), were held in the summer of 1990 and campaigning began in earnest thereafter.

One reason why the military has always found it easy to hijack popular contestations for political power, aside from its legal control over the means of coercion, is the weakness and fragmentation of civil society.[76] Although labour and student unions voiced grievances and pursued popular agendas, most self-help and community-based associations were largely individualistic and narrow in focus. There were few points of convergence at which to articulate a national project. Though they often sponsored candidates for office, the vast majority of associations had no political agenda whatsoever. In fact, many were set up in the context of state failures to meet the basic needs of the people and their communities. There was not a single human rights group in Nigeria until October 1987, when the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) was founded by a number of young lawyers led by Olisa Agbakoba.[77] Nigerians abroad were more concerned with their ethnic and regional organisations than with any national movement, as had been the case in the 1950s.

However, the political miscalculation of Babangida in annulling the

presidential election results changed all this. The political transition programme beginning from 1986, with its numerous weaknesses, inconsistencies and impure motives, catalysed and generated a considerable upsurge in the formation and activities of civil society. In particular, the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 presidential elections radicalised the groups. The Campaign for Democracy (CD) compiled the results of the election based on data from the NEC, the various voting and counting centres, and showed that Abiola of the SDP had won an overwhelming victory over Tofa of the NRC. It decided to mobilise all Nigerians through its numerous affiliates to make the country ungovernable, and to force the administration out of power by the previously agreed date of 27 August, 1993. Massive protests were organised across the country, especially in those southwestern areas where support for Abiola was greatest, and where the popular groups led by the CD had more activists.[78]

Hundreds of thousands of leaflets were printed by the CD, as well as by the CLO, the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, and the Constitutional Rights Project, all exposing corruption, lawlessness, and abuse of power by the administration, and urging Nigerians to take a final stand against military dictatorship and against the subversion of the popular will. The National Association of Nigerian Students, the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Union of Journalists, Women-in-Nigeria, and the powerful Nigerian Labour Congress, all came out in opposition to Babangida and his new agenda. The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers called out its members on strike to protest against the annulment of the elections. SDP state governors were reported as being in favour of popular action; traditional leaders in the Southwest condemned the military and declared their support for Abiola and the SDP. Several prominent politicians in the East and North, including Abubakar Rimi, Balarabe Musa, Mallam Lawan Dambazau, and Sam Mbakwe, openly backed demonstrations and the need to uphold the 'June 12 mandate' given by the people to the SDP.

The CD capitalised on the presence of over 80,000 soccer fans at the World Cup qualifying match at the National Stadium, Surulere, on 3 July, 1993 to distribute leaflets calling on all Nigerians to embark on 'one week of national protest to force Babangida to go and to enforce the result of the June 12 election'.[79] Nigerians were urged to take part in 'rallies, demonstrations and other actions': workers were to stay away from work, market women were asked to close their shops, and taxi/lorry drivers were advised to keep their vehicles off the roads. Participants were instructed to block roads with barricades and burn tyres on the roads and streets. The CD leaflets pointed out that the national protest was not for Abiola as an individual, though at that moment he represented the democratic desires of those Nigerians who

have given him a popular mandate. People were warned not to loot or set fire to public or private properties. The struggle was 'not between "North or South", or between ethnic or religious groups or political parties', and 'Nigerians should not attack fellow Nigerians from other parts of the country'.[80] The CD also urged that the military's plans to hold new presidential elections should be shunned. Other organisations likewise issued statements and leaflets, including the CLO, as well as holding demonstrations across the country.

For the first time in Nigeria's post-civil war history, the military dictators were openly challenged by millions who took a stand for democracy in urban and rural settings, across ethnic, regional, religious, class, and gender lines. The five-day non-violent protests held during 5-9 July, 1993 were a huge success. The CD had done its homework by having meetings with special interest groups – meat-sellers, market women, shop-keepers, students, trade unions, and road transport workers – and by enlisting their co-operation and support. The country became paralysed as banks, markets, schools, and government offices were closed, while many streets in the major cities were deserted. Perhaps inevitably, given the high rate of unemployment, thugs and other criminals infiltrated the protests and unleashed a range of crimes on their victims.[81] The boycott of courts by the Bar Association in Lagos and Ikeja, Ibadan, Ijebu Ode, Ondo, and Edo State led to a serious pile-up of cases in these centres of legal adjudication. Even the National Association of Sea Dogs (the Pirates Confraternity) called on Nigerians to resort to 'civil disobedience if the decision is not reversed'.[82]

The action promoted and co-ordinated by the CD received unprecedented encouragement from abroad, notably from Nigerians in Europe and the Americas, who issued statements condemning the annulment, and calling for more sanctions on Nigeria by the international community. The Organisation of Nigerian Nationals (ONN) and the Organisation of Nigerians in the Americas (ONA), both in Texas, are merely two examples of concerned groups which worked hard to mobilise support for the CD.[83] The protests held in the United States and in Britain outside Nigerian missions were backed by non-Nigerian organisations. For instance, the New York-based Campaign for Peace and Democracy (CPD) issued a statement in which it called on the US Government:

(i)   to recall its ambassador to Nigeria,
(ii)   to ask Nigeria to recall its ambassador to America,
(iii) to cancel all previously issued visas to military and political leaders,
(iv)   to impose trade sanctions and stop the importation of Nigerian oil, and
(v)   to cancel all foreign (not just military) aid to Nigeria.

In addition, the CPD called

(i)   for the release of detained activists and the reopening of closed media houses and academic institutions, and
(ii)   for "the United Nations and governments around the world to support the pro-democracy struggles in Nigeria through adopting steps along the lines listed above."[84]

In response to this new awakening of the civil society, the military junta arrested the most vocal leaders of the pro-democracy movements, shut down the universities and media houses, tightened security around the country, and expanded its co-optation network. It also tried to bribe factions of the two political parties, as well as a number of national assemblymen and women, journalists, and social critics.[85] These measures failed to stem the tide of opposition, and Babangida finally realised that he had to step down. He held negotiations with certain members of the NRC and the SDP on the possibility of setting up an Interim National Government (ING) with some participation from both parties. The SDP by this time had split into two factions: (i) those who believed that Abiola was Nigeria's President-elect; and (ii) those who were against the June 12 mandate, mainly because they had been 'settled' and/or belonged to the Shehu Yar'Adua group. The latter agreed with Babangida's proposal since this would terminate the ongoing struggle and provide an opportunity to make another bid for president. In his valedictory address to the nation on 26 August, 1993, in which the General made several claims as to his contributions to peace, stability, democracy, development, and progress in Nigeria, he also announced the inauguration of a 32-member ING led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, the former head of the Transitional Council.[86]

ABACHA'S COUP D'ETAT, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE AND POLITICAL REPRESSION

The level of the instability in the state over which Shonekan presided was unprecedented. Corruption in government circles got a new boost. The crisis was aided by a series of strikes that was to cost the economy an estimated #52 billion.[87] They were also fuelled by a massive population dislocation as many Nigerians, especially the main victims of the 1967-1970 Civil War, the Igbo, moved away from their places of ordinary abode and engagement to their home states, obviously in anticipation of another war.

Under these circumstances, General Abacha, who was Babangida's *de facto* second-in-command for eight years and the most senior military officer in the ING, took over as head of state and announced the "resignation" of Shonekan on 17 November, 1993. It was soon to dawn on Nigerians, however,

that another coup d'etat had taken place. On 18 November, the General tersely announced the dissolution of the ING and the elected civilian governments at the state level. He disbanded the political parties and the National Electoral Commission, and pronounced his desire to convene a Constitutional Conference in January of the following year. Among other things, the Conference was to provide a forum for the discussion of the nation's problems, determine the tenure of the new military government, draw up a new democratisation timetable for the country, and negotiate a new constitution. The Conference was not inaugurated until June 1994.

No doubt, the agitation for a Sovereign National Conference had been a major issue in Nigeria even before the 12 June, 1993 election and the annulment. The central issue that has always faced Nigeria is the national question. This has been conceptualised in its simplest form as the problems created by the inclusion under the jurisdiction of a state of more than one nation of nationality.[88] In Nigeria, the national question has manifested itself in form of the disagreement, sometimes violently, over the proper and equitable formula for power and revenue sharing. It also includes problems relating to the national census, location of industries and other infrastructural facilities, organisation and staffing of the military, and the whole issue of the most appropriate political, economic, and administrative system for a plural nation like Nigeria. Thus, for General Abacha, the issue of holding a national conference was an all important issue that could be used to mobilise for legitimacy.

It is, however, not surprising that the National Constitutional Conference that the Abacha government called between 27 June, 1994, and 27 June, 1995, was a complete inversion of the idea of a Sovereign National Conference. First, the government appointed 96 out of the total 356 members to a Conference that ordinarily should be free in all its processes. Even the quality of these nominated delegates and the members of the Conference-organising body, the National Constitutional Conference Commission (NCCC), was such that it gave only the most conservative segment of the Nigerian élite any cheer.[89] While some of the members of NCCC were vociferous advocates of perpetuation of northern control over power in the country, many others were unabashed southern allies of the northern oligarchy. Others were thoroughly discredited former public officers. Only an infinitesimal number of the membership had any progressive credentials to their names. It is also instructive to note that no prominent member of the fledging prodemocracy and human rights movement was represented.[90] Virtually all the members of the NCCC and the nominated delegates started off, before their appointment, as anti-Conference activists. Equally important, only about 300,000 voters participated in the election of delegates to the Conference. This raises a major legitimacy question when such a ridiculously low figure

is considered against the backdrop of a total population of about 100 million.

Worse still, the military government quickly reneged on its promise that the Conference would be allowed to exercise "full constituent powers." Human rights and pro-democracy groups had always advocated a Sovereign National Conference whose powers and legitimacy would supersede those of the government in place when it takes off.[91] The highest ruling body, the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) had been empowered by decree to vet the Report of the National Conference and the new constitution it submitted to the head of state on 27 June, 1994. In this light, it was widely believed especially by southerners that the nominal gain of the Conference, the rotational presidency formula, would be expunged by the northern-dominated PRC.

Perhaps of greatest importance in this respect was the government's dramatic reversal of its well-stated position that its tenure would be determined by the Conference. Apparently jittery about the possibility of the Conference assuming sovereign powers as soon as it convened, as happened in Benin Republic in 1990, the government through its Secretary Aminu Saleh provided "clarifications" about its "true position" on this and the place of the Conference itself. According to him, the government would now, at its convenience, draw up a democratisation programme using the report of the Conference as one input out of many. Rather than a spirited discussion of the entire gamut of the national question as initially conceived, the Conference was now merely to collate the views of Nigerians expressed in an informal way across the country. This is another critical departure from and a repudiation of the terms of reference of the Conference made available by the 19- member NCCC constituted on 14 January, 1994. According to its chairman, Justice Seidu Kawu (1994: 2), participants were to focus on: the structure and government of Nigeria; the relationship between the centre and the component parts; and any other matters or opinions relating to the establishment of a lasting framework for a more equitable and just society.[92]

In spite of the government's definitive "clarifications," the Conference went ahead to pass a motion requesting the Abacha junta to hand over power to an elected government by 1 January, 1996. The government did not waste time in subverting this popularly acclaimed resolution. First, it teleguided the Conference through its government-appointed leaders to pull through a three-month adjournment period, during which the government lobbied vigorously to expunge the "offensive" resolution.[93] Second, as soon as the Conference resumed sitting in March 1995, General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, the leader of the opposition Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM) and undoubtedly the foremost organiser among members of the civil political class, was swiftly arrested and clamped into detention, accused of, tried for, and found guilty of partaking in an alleged plot to overthrow the Abacha junta through a coup d'etat. Yar'Adua had been at the forefront of the lobby

for retaining the 1 January,1996, exit date for General Abacha.

With Yar'Adua out of the way and the huge amount of money thrown into the campaign by the government, most Nigerians and international observers were not surprised when the Conference reversed its earlier decision. It quickly provided the junta with what amounted to a *carte blanche* regarding the terminal date.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that whatever the outcome of the Conference, it must be irrelevant and unacceptable to most Nigerians. The conclusion becomes compelling given that the Abacha junta itself flew the kite of the Conference in the first instance with a view to providing Nigerians an outlet for pent-up anger and frustration. It was also meant to give the government a measure of legitimacy and guarantee its survival. The extent to which it has achieved these objectives is debatable.

This was just the beginning of sorrows. The true colour of the Abacha administration began to unfold as Abacha realised that Nigerians could not be fooled by his phony constitutional conference. The country witnessed unprecedented suppression of political activities and fundamental rights. Consequently, political activists and critics were arbitrarily arrested, detained, jailed, tortured or murdered by members of the late dictator's assassination squad. Abacha's reign of political repression also led to the exile of scores of political critics and pro-democracy activists.

Political repression under Abacha progressed in two stages. The first was the administration's drafting of military decrees, the institutional measures that it utilised in its political repression. The first decree was Decree No. 17 of 1993. The decree suspended and modified some sections of the 1989 Constitution. Section 5 of the decree ousted the courts from adjudicating the law's validity. Thus, Decree No. 17 of 1993 became one of the most potent institutional measures the administration utilised in its political repression.

The second decree was the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 11 of 1994. Enacted on 18 August, 1994, this decree empowered the Chief of General Staff of the Army and the Inspector-General of Police to arrest and detain any citizen for up to three months in the interest of state security. Section 2 of the decree provided that:

> The Chief of General Staff or the Inspector-General of Police, as the case may be, shall not later than three months after the date of an order made by him under this Decree and every three months thereafter, review the case of every person, detained pursuant to the order and, if satisfied that the circumstances no longer require the continued detention of the person affected, may revoke the order.[94]

When invoked, the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree suspended a detainee's civil liberties and precluded judicial review of the detention order.

The law was the most obnoxious and dreaded of Abacha's decrees. It was the institutional instrument utilised to detain scores of critics, pro-democracy activists and socio-political commentators.

The second stage consisted of the enforcement of those decrees, arbitrary detention, incarceration, torture, brutality, assassination of political activists, and derailing of the democratic process. On 24 June, 1994, General Abacha ordered the arrest and detention of M.K.O. Abiola, the winner of the annulled 23 June, 1993 presidential election, on charges of treason. Abiola remained in detention until his death on 7 July, 1998.

Another prominent political critic who died in Abacha's detention camp was Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, a retired army general. He was arrested for an alleged involvement in the abortive coup of March 1995. Yar'Adua was sentenced to death in July 1995 by a military tribunal headed by Maj. Gen. Patrick Aziza. The death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Lt. Col. O. Akinyode was yet another political detainee who died in Abacha's detention camp. Obasanjo was more fortunate. He was jailed for alleged involvement in the March 1995 abortive coup. The military tribunal sentenced him to life imprisonment, a punishment the junta commuted to a fifteen-year jail term. Obasanjo remained in jail until 24 June, 1998 when Abacha's successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, released him.

The tactics used in Abacha's political repression included the assassination of critics. Among the victims of the state-sponsored political assassinations was Alfred Rewane, an elderstatesman. Felix Ibru, publisher of Guardian newspapers, the country's widest circulating daily, escaped assassination on 2 February, 1996 as gunmen opened fire on his car. It was for that assassination attempt that four persons are currently standing trial in an Ikeja Magistrate's Court in Lagos.[95]

The list of the political detainees include Alani Akinrinade (former minister of industry); Cornelius Adebayo (former governor of Kwara state); Balarabe Musa (former governor of Kaduna state); Abubakar Umar (a retired army colonel); Yusuf Bala Usman (a lecturer at Ahmadu Bello University) and James Magaji (former deputy governor of Kaduna State). Others were Michael Ajasin (former governor of Ondo State and leader of "Egbe Afenifere", the mainstream Yoruba political movement); Beko Ransome-Kuti (chairman of Campaign for Democracy, a human rights and pro-democracy organisation); Bola Ige (former governor of Oyo State); Tola Otulaja (former Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice in Ogun State); Olusegun Osoba (former governor of Ogun State); C.C. Onoh (former governor of Anambra State); Yahaya Abdulkarim (former governor of Sokoto State) and Jonah David Jang (former Benue State governor).[96]

Another repressive measure utilised by the junta was the banning of civil organisations and academic institutions. This was because during military

rule, political activism was engineered from university campuses. For example, in May 1996, the military junta banned university unions at the national level. The proscribed academic unions included the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). Others were the Non-Academic Staff Union of Universities (NASU) and the Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities (SSANU).[97] Other civil organisations that were banned included the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP).[98]

The junta's political repression can be understood in the context of its overall suppression of criticisms of the colossal level of financial impropriety and fraud among members of the ruling faction of the military oligarchy. General Abacha and members of the ruling military bourgeoisie corruptly enriched themselves with public money so much so that the junta took to repression of the political élite, the class with the clout, who criticised their illegal private capital accumulation. Prior to his death Abacha built a vast multi-million dollar business empire with money looted from the nation's treasury. The federal government of Nigeria estimated that Abacha looted $4 billion from the nation's treasury. It is in a bid to recover some of the stolen money that the federal government of Nigeria has sued the Abacha family in some European countries.[99]

Machinery set up by Abacha's successor recovered some of the stolen money in 1998 and 1999. For example, on 8 November, 1998, the federal government announced the recovery of over $600 million from the former head of state's family. The government recovered another £75,306,884 from his family that month. In September 1999, the government seized and placed eighteen of Abacha's choice property valued at ₦2.356 billion (over $200m) on sale to the public.[100]

General Sani Abacha's political repression can further be understood when one critically examines the late dictator's dubious and hidden political agenda to succeed himself as civilian president. After consolidating power as the de facto ruler of the country, Abacha embarked on a systematic but ruthless programme to succeed himself as president. He was ruthless with those he perceived as opponents of his presidential ambition. They included M.K.O. Abiola and Shehu Yar'Adua – among others – who made bids for the presidency, the post Abacha also wanted. Abiola and Yar'Adua died in Abacha's detention camps. Abiola's widow, Kudirat, and Alfred Rewane were among many other political opponents the rulers assassinated. It is for those assassinations that Major Hamza Al-Mustapha and Sgt.Rogers Mshelia, Abacha's chief security officer and bodyguard respectively as well as

Mohammed Abacha, the late dictator's son, were prosecuted in a Lagos High Court. Another prominent Nigerian Abacha sought to murder was Alex Ibru, owner of the Guardian publications.[101]

By and large, Abacha's administration perpetrated the most extreme forms of human rights abuses ever witnessed in Nigeria's history. Similarly, the Abacha transition earned more condemnation due to its singular diabolism.[102] The many contradictions of the Abacha transition can be reduced to three broad statements: It was mounted in a constitutional void; its ultimate object could be discerned ab initio; and it excluded critical elements of both civil and political societies. Even though it organised a so-called constitutional conference in 1994, the Abacha junta never promulgated the draft the assembly submitted (even though the administration handpicked the assembly). The transition programme unfolded in a legal vacuum, robbing it of one critical element that would have afforded it some form of credibility.

The transition's ultimate aim was obvious: the transmutation of head of state Sani Abacha to a civilian president. That being the case, it was only natural that the programme exuded an exclusionist temper. Of 23 political associations that applied for registration as parties, only five "trusted" ones were registered by the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON), the electoral umpire. Clearly marked for non-certification were associations like the All Nigerian Congress (ANC) and the Progressive People's Party (PPP), which included seasoned politicians who could not be relied on to support Abacha's self-succession plan. These factors created a serious legitimacy crisis from which the programme never recovered, the legitimacy mobilisation efforts of several government sponsored organisations notwithstanding.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this paper has been able to examine the efforts of successive military administration between 1966 and 1998 in acquiring legitimacy for their rule. However, we have also seen in this paper the importance of performance as the only means of acquiring strong political support and legitimacy, the absence of which resulted in the crisis of legitimacy and overthrow of government.

In view of this, it could be posited that most military administrations in Nigeria, in a bid to acquire legitimacy left enduring legacies by which they are remembered. For instance, the Gowon administration, among other achievements, successfully prosecuted the civil war to sustain national unity. General Murtala Mohammed tried to de-institutionalise corruption which had been an integral part of national political and bureaucratic leadership, while General Olusegun Obasanjo husbanded the second experiment in civil rule. General Buhari put the state apparatus, including its coercive arm, to

maximum use and in that connection broke the dialogue between the ruler and the ruled. Babangida succeeded in getting people's sympathy by pushing a liberal human rights agenda in the early days of his administration: he released most of the Second Republic politicians incarcerated by Buhari-Idiagbon, set up two judicial panels to review the cases of the detainees, both tried and yet to be tried, abrogated the notorious anti-press freedom Decree No. 4 of 1984 and threw open the prison gates for many of the political detainees. Unchaining the press through a repeal of Decree No. 4 of 1984 as well as promising respect of fundamental human rights, Babangida rapidly concluded his initial strategy of mobilisation for political legitimacy and support. Over time, however, Babangida's record deteriorated due to his inability to fulfill his promise of reviving the Nigerian economy, and lack of performance. The last straw that broke the camel's back was the political miscalculation of Babangida in annulling the presidential election results in 1993. The annulment of the 12 June, 1993 residential elections radicalised civil society groups as a result of which they decided to mobilise all Nigerians to make the country ungovernable, and to force the regime out of power by the previously agreed date of 27 August, 1993. Finally, the administration of General Sani Abacha was mounted in a constitutional void while it also excluded critical elements of both civil and political societies. Even though it organised a constitutional conference in 1994, the Abacha junta never promulgated the draft the assembly submitted (even though the administration handpicked the assembly). The transition programme unfolded in a legal vacuum, robbing it of one critical element that would have afforded it a veneer of credibility. These factors created a serious legitimacy crisis from which the programme never recovered.

ENDNOTES

1. See Kenneth M. Dolbear and Murray J. Edelman, American Politics: Policies, Power and Change (Lexington: D.C. Health and Com. 1985), p. 182 cited in Ogundiya, I.S., "The Legitimacy Crisis in Nigeria: A Two-Regime Analysis" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan), p. 192.
2. Ibid, p. 192.
3. I.S. Ogundiya, op. cit., p. 193.
4. For further elaboration of this concept, see Karle Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", APSR, Vol. LV, No. 1, p. 494.
5. R.T. Suberu, "Constraints on the Process of Social Mobilization in Nigeria", in 15th Proceedings of the NPSA Conference, pp. 1177-1178.
6. Suberu, op. cit., p. 1178.
7. Ogundiya, op. cit., p. 193.
8. Ogundiya, op. cit., p. 195.
9. E.E. Osaghae, "The Character of the State: Legitimacy Crisis and Social

Mobilization in Africa: An Explanation of Form and Character", Africa Development, vol. XLV, No. 21, pp. 27-47.
10. See Adebayo Ninalowo, "The State Legitimation and Human Centered Development", African Development, Vol. XXI, no. 4, 1996, p. 56.
11. Adebayo Ninalowo, op. cit., p. 56.
12. Cited in Lai Joseph, Nigeria: Shadow of a Great Nation. Lagos: Dabeo Press Ltd., 1993.
13. Broadcast over Radio Kaduna at Midday, 15 January, 1966 cited in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 125-126.
14. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, p. 125.
15. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 126.
16. Lai Joseph, Nigeria: Shadow of a Great Nation, p. 66.
17. West Africa, 23rd July, 1966.
18. West Africa 12th February, 1966.
19. Of the senior officers killed in the January coup, Lt. Col. and above, the North lost four out of five officers (Gowon being the only survivor); the West lost two of its six officers; the East lost none of its seven officers; and the Mid-west lost one of its four officers. In addition, the North lost its Premier and a Prime minister while the West lost a premier and the Midwest lost a Federal Ministers.
20. J.I. Elaigwu, "The Military and Political Engineering in Nigeria (1966-79): An Overview" in J.F.A. Ajayi and Bashir Ikara (eds.) Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria, (Ibadan: University Press Ltd., 1985), p. 189.
21. B.J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 113.
22. Dudley, op. cit., p. 114.
23. An example of this attitude was Ironsi's statement that all that was required to deal with the problem of 'tribalism' was an interchange between the regions of primary school students.
24. "The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 'Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree' (1966, No. I)", cited in Elaigwu, J. I., "The Military and Political Engineering in Nigeria..." p. 175; see also Kirk-Green, A.H.M. op. cit., pp.130-138.
25. Elaigwu, op. cit., p. 175.
26. Yakubu Gowon, Faith in Unity (Lagos: Government Printer), p. 108.
27. Elaigwu, op. cit., p. 190.
28. Decree No. 34, 1966; cited in Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., op. cit., pp. 169-173.
29. Republic of Nigeria, Broadcast to the Nation, by H.E. General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi (Lagos: Ministry of Information, 1966), p. 3.
30. B.J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 115.
31. Dudley, op. cit., p. 115.
32. Lai Joseph, Nigeria, op. cit., p. 70.
33. Dudley, op. cit., p. 119.

34. Dudley, op. cit., p. 120.
35. See Gamson, W.A. *Power and Discontent* (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1988).
36. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 71.
37. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 72.
38. See Dudley, op. cit., pp. 134-143 for a detailed narration of the July coup.
39. General Yakubu Gowon's Maiden Broadcast on the morning of 1 August, 1966; cited in Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., op. cit., pp. 196-197.
40. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 203.
41. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 201.
42. For a detailed analysis of this so-called Ad Hoc Conference, see Dudley, *Instability and Political Order*, pp. 151-170.
43. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 74.
44. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 74.
45. I.S. Zwingina, *Capitalist Development in an African Economy*, (Ibadan: University Press Plc. 1992), p. 72.
46. Tade Aina and Adeshina Sambo, "Riding on the Back of the Poor: issues and Problems in Nigeria's Experience of Mobilizing for Development" in *15th Proceedings of NPSA Conference*. 1998, p. 367.
47. Ogundiya, op. cit., p. 203.
48. *Daily Times*, Newspaper, August 2, 1976.
49. Brigadier Mohammed on the occasion of the swearing in of 10 of the new governors in Lagos on July 31st 1975; *Daily Times*, 1 August, 1975.
50. Press Statement by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, *Daily Times*, 3 August, 1976.
51. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 81.
52. Leo Ogba, "Authentic Strategies and Mechanisms for Democratic Mobilization in Nigeria", in 15th Proceedings of NPSA Conference. 1998, p. 951.
53. James Oluleye, *Military Leadership in Nigeria, 1966-1979* (Ibadan: University Press Ltd., 1985), p. 169.
54. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *A Programme For Political Action* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1975); also cited in Elaigwu, pp. 186-187.
55. Elaigwu, op. cit., p. 187.
56. Elaigwu, op. cit., p. 187.
57. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 84.
58. Ogundiya, op. cit., p. 205.
59. Olusegun Obasanjo, *Discipline, Equality and Humanity* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information 1977), p. 8.
60. Ejombi Unobe, "Democratic Mobilization and Political Participation in Nigeria: Implications for the Political System". *15th NPSA Proceedings*, p. 138.
61. Unobe, op. cit., p. 939.
62. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 86.
63. Lai Joseph, op. cit., p. 99.
64. *The Guardian*, 29 August, 1985.
65. Excerpts from Major-General Ibrahim Babangida's broadcast of 27 August,

1985; cited in Lai Joseph, op. cit., pp. 93-95.
66. Osoba, 1996, 381-82.
67. Osoba, 1996, 382.
68. L. Diamond and D. Galvan (1987: 75).
69. T. Olukoshi, "Associational Life". In L. Diamond, A.H.M. Kirk-Greene and O. Oyediran (eds.). *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida*. (Ibadan: Vantage Press, 1996).
70. Olukoshi, T. op. cit., p. 451.
71. R. Joseph, Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. 21, 3 (1983), pp. 21-38.
72. A. Olukoshi, A. (ed). *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*. London, 1993.
73. F.N. Ndubuisi, "Wreckage of a Nation". *National Concord*. 9 December, 1993.
74. J.O. Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 34, (2) (1996), 197.
75. J.O. Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratization in Nigeria". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 34, (2) (1996), 197.
76. Ihonvbere, op. cit., p. 201.
77. Ihonvbere, op. cit., p. 201.
78. Akin-Aina, W. "Days of Rage". *Newswatch*, 19 July, 1993.
79. Ihonvbere, op. cit., p. 202
80. Ihonvbere, ibid, p. 202.
81. Enahoro, Anthony "No Case for Fresh Elections", *TELL*, 19 July, 1993.
82. Ihonvbere, ibid, p. 202.
83. Ihonvbere, op. cit., p. 203.
84. Ihonvbere, op. cit., p. 202.
85. P. Adams, "Nigeria's Government Proscribes Newspapers". *Financial Times*, 17 August, 1993.
86. I.B. Babangida, "Valedictory Address to the Nation". State House, Abuja *The Guardian*, 27 August, 1993.
87. *Nigerian Tribune*, 1993: 3.
88. N.O. Mimiko, op. cit., pp. 134.
89. Mimiko, op. cit., p. 138.
90. Mimiko, ibid, p. 138.
91. Campaign for Democracy, "The Struggle So Far: The Challenges Ahead." *Tempo*, Lagos (24 March, 1994).
92. Seidu Kawu *The Guardian* (21 January, 1994).
93. Mimiko, op. cit., p. 139.
94. Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 24 August, 1994:159.
95. Chris W. Ogbondah, "Political Repression in Nigeria, 1993-1998: A Critical Examination of One Aspect of the Perils of Military Dictatorship", *Africa*

Spectrum, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2000), p. 234.
96. *The Guardian,* 20 June, 1998, p. 40.
97. Ogbondah, op. cit., p. 235.
98. *The Guardian,* 12 August, 1998, p. 1.
99. Ogbondah, op. cit., p. 235.
100. Ogbondah, op. cit., p. 236.
101. Ogbondah, op. cit., p. 240.
102. Ebenezer Obadare, "The Press and Democratic Transition in Nigeria: Comparative Notes on the Abacha and Abubakar Transition Programmes", *Issue: A Journal of Opinion,* Vol. 27, No. 1, Transition in Nigeria? (1999), p. 39.

REFERENCES

Adams, P. "Nigeria's Government Proscribes Newspapers". *Financial Times,* 17 August, 1993.

Aguiyi-Ironsi, J.T.U. *Broadcast to the Nation,* (Lagos: Ministry of Information, 1966).

Aina, T. and Sambo, A. "Riding on the Back of the Poor: Issues and Problems in Nigeria's Experience of Mobilizing for Development" in *15th Proceedings of NPSA Conference.* 1998.

Deutsch, K. "Social Mobilization and Political Development", *APSR,* Vol. LV, No.1, p. 494.

Dolbear, K. M. and Murray J. Edelman, *American Politics: Policies, Power and Change* (Lexington: D.C. Health and Com. 1985)

Dudley, B. J. *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria,* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973).

Elaigwu, J.I. "The Military and Political Engineering in Nigeria (1966-79): An Overview" in J.F.A. Ajayi and Bashir Ikara (eds.) *Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria,* (Ibadan: University Press Ltd., 1985).

Enahoro, A. "No Case for Fresh Elections", *TELL,* 19 July, 1993.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, *A Programme For Political Action* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1975)

Gamson, W. A. *Power and Discontent.* (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1988).

Gowon, Y. *Faith in Unity* (Lagos: Government Printer)

Ihonvbere, J. O. "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria". *The Journal of Modern African Studies.* 34, (2) (1996).

Joseph, L. Nigeria: *Shadow of a Great Nation,* (Lagos: IDabeo Press Ltd., 1993)

Joseph, R. "Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria". *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics.* 21, 3 (1983), pp. 21-38.

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, Vol. I,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Mimiko, N.O. "Between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia: The Abacha Coup, the National Conference, and Prospects for Peace and Democracy in Nigeria", *Social Justice,* Vol. 22, No. 3 (61), Racial and Political Justice (Fall 1995).

Ndubuisi, F. N. "Wreckage of a Nation". *National Concord.* 9 December, 1993. *Newswatch.*19 July, 1993.

Ninalowo, A. "The State Legitimation and Human Centered Development", *African Development,* Vol. XXI, no. 4, 1996, p. 56.

Obadare, Ebenezer "The Press and Democratic Transition in Nigeria: Comparative Notes on the Abacha and Abubakar Transition Programs", *Issue: A Journal of Opinion,* Vol. 27, No. 1, Transition in Nigeria? (1999).

Obasanjo, O. *Discipline, Equality and Humanity* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information 1977)

Ogba, L. "Authentic Strategies and Mechanisms for Democratic Mobilization in Nigeria", in *15th Proceedings of NPSA Conference.* 1998.

Ogbondah, Chris W. "Political Repression in Nigeria, 1993-1998: A Critical Examination of One Aspect of the Perils of Military Dictatorship", Africa *Spectrum,* Vol. 35, No. 2 (2000).

Ogundiya, I. S., "The Legitimacy Crisis in Nigeria: A Two-Regime Analysis" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan)

Olukoshi, A. (ed). *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria.* (London, 1993).

Olukoshi, T. "Associational Life". In Diamond, L., Kirk-Greene, A. and Oyediran, O. (Eds.). *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida* (Ibadan: Vantage Press, 1996).

Oluleye, J. *Military Leadership in Nigeria, 1966-1979* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1985).

Osaghae, E.E. "The Character of the State: Legitimacy Crisis and Social Mobilization in Africa: An Explanation of Form and Character", *Africa Development,* Vol. XLV, No. 21, pp. 27-47.

Suberu, R. T. "Constraints on the Process of Social Mobilization in Nigeria", in *15th Proceedings of the NPSA Conference.*

Unobe, E. "Democratic Mobilization and Political Participation in Nigeria: Implications for the Political System". *15th NPSA Proceedings.*

Zwingina, I.S. *Capitalist Development in an African Economy* (Ibadan: University Press Plc. 1992).

Newspapers

Daily Times, 1 August, 1975.
Daily Times, 3 August, 1976.
Daily Times, Newspaper, 2 August, 1976.
Tempo, Lagos, 24 March, 1994.
The Guardian, 29 August, 1985.
The Guardian, 27 August, 1993.
The Guardian, 12 August, 1998.
West Africa 12 February, 1966.
West Africa, 23 July, 1966.

Yoruba Nationalism and the Rhetoric of Marginalisation in South-Western Nigeria, 1960-2009[1]

ADEREMI SULEIMAN AJALA

5

INTRODUCTION

Since independence in 1960, almost all the ethnic groups in Nigeria have complained of marginalisation from the state or other ethnic groups. This has aggravated locally conceived nationalisms among various groupings in Nigeria. The agitation often takes a violent form. Aggrieved groupings normally accused Nigerian governments of economic and political marginalisation as socio-economic hardships in Nigeria increased. The Yoruba in south-western Nigeria particularly identified the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group as the perpetrators of their political and economic marginalisation. Thus, relying on qualitative ethnography, the use of marginalisation for grassroots mobilisation in ethnic nationalism among the Yoruba is examined. The study establishes that the expression of marginalisation and the people's use of nationalist movement dominate Yoruba politics. Being a constructive agenda, the Yoruba political élite find favour in the political expression of

marginalisation to appeal to many Yoruba. Thus, across all the classes, both educated and non-educated, Yoruba consciousness of being a nation and the struggle for self-determination only serve as political tool of accessing national political power.

Since 1960, the Yoruba people had radicalised its nationalism from a co-fraternal relationship with other Nigerian ethnic groups to violent agitation against the people's perceived marginalisation in Nigeria. The nationalist actors continued to use the rhetoric of marginalisation to draw grassroots support and to legitimise political violence that occurred in 1964, 1983, 1993, 2007 and 2009; and ethnic violence between 1995 and 2002 in south-western Nigeria. A number of socio-cultural agencies such as the cult of Awolowo (Adebanwi, 2009), socio-cultural associations (Nolte, 2009), media agencies and Yoruba migrants in other Nigerian cities were engaged in the expression of marginalisation. While the Yoruba sense of marginalisation was expressed against the Nigerian state and Hausa-Fulani political élite, the objects of attack in Yoruba nationalism are Nigerian government institutions mostly located in south-western Nigeria, like the Nigerian Police Force and Hausa-Fulani residents in the region. Between 1960 and 2009, the expression of marginalisation in support of Yoruba nationalism is also fussy. It usually draws large support and engages in violence during civilian regimes as experienced in 1960-1966; 1979-1983; 1993; 1999-2003 and 2007-2009. Marginalisation bears the concern that the Yoruba lack equitable access to federal political power under the military and certain civilian administrations. While under the military administration of 1966-1979 and 1983-1993, the expression of marginalisation in Yoruba nationalism was dormant and less violent, but emphasised more on perceived economic deprivation of the Yoruba people in Nigeria, the civilian administrations have witnessed more radical and violent expression of marginalisation. Mostly during the civilian administrations, certain Yoruba politicians drum political violence over their failures in federal elections. They rely on Yoruba marginalisation to woo grassroots sentiments.

Many extant literatures on nationalism have used the term nationalism loosely and created varied terms that are often used interchangeably. Such varied terms include cultural nationalism (Doortmont, 1989), civic nationalism (Berman, 1990), political tribalism (Lonsdale, 1994), provincial nationalism (Kraxberger, 2005), and ethnic nationalism (Duruji, 2008), among others. This development emanates from the very nature of the use of concepts in the social sciences, where many terms and concepts do not usually have an agreed uniform sense of application and sometimes lack precise definitions and clear understanding. Applicable to many concepts in the social sciences, this conceptual confusion in nationalism creates the problem of matching many conceptual discussions with the reality of empirical data on

nationalism. In some cases it also makes nationalism to be a fuzzy concept to the extent that it is often used in tandem with other terms such as ethnicity. While one accepts that both ethnicity and nationalism are related, the two are, nonetheless, not the same. As I employed in this paper, nationalism implies the imagination of a group of people believing that they share certain characteristics that bind them together as a people, and using such imagination to build an independent nation.

The concept nationalism emerged from nation. Nation is an "imagined political community" (Anderson, 1983), "a daily plebiscite" (Renan, 1990), and "a contested community" (Yewah, 2001) that is sustained not only by any actual judicial affiliation or constitutional patriotism, but by other imaginations (both cultural and civic) of its citizens (Young, 2004). Nation is, therefore, an expression of a common nationality. Whether a nation is imagined, constructed or invented, it is an imagination that is based on some materiality that are real enough to bind a particular group of people together in an expression of certain common cultural and civic contents. Such contents include imagined space, spiritual link, history, ethnicity, ancestry, language, and political system and, above all, marginalisation and deprivation experienced by a group of people. All these contents bind a group or sub-groups of people together to affirm nationhood.

Because nationalism is defined as loyalty and attachment to the nation (Virtanen, 2005), it is important that such loyalty and attachment be expressed above and beyond individual differences. It must also be a projection of group identity aimed at declaring group autonomy either in full or in part. Thus, nationalism is often expressed in the contexts of history of political development, patrimonial or matrimonial descent, and cultural ethnocentrism commonly shared by a group of people seeing itself as different from others, mostly within which it jointly exists as a political state. The idea of nationalism is often created by a limited number of people (nationalist actors) who often propagate their ideas to their members in the same society. While this suggests that nationalism is a form of social movement, it also implies that mobilisation is an important ingredient of nationalism. Hence, nationalist actors require a strong mobilisation for a large number of people to support their agenda.

Globally, mobilisation for nationalism does not take the same form. For instance, while Irish nationalism draws mainly on cultural renaissance, both the Quebec and Turkish nationalisms in Canada and Cyprus respectively draws on both cultural renaissance and political marginalisation (Colak, 2008). The nationalism that brought the Republic of Eritrea into being relied mostly on political marginalisation, which the Eritreans claimed that they experienced under Ethiopia.

Of course, mobilisation for nationalism may have more than one focus. In other words, it may involve the combination of both cultural renaissances,

economic and political marginalisation, which is often the case in many nationalist movements across the globe between the 19th and 21st centuries. Hence, it is often difficult to have a straight-jacket classification of the focus of nationalist mobilisation. Nonetheless, because nationalism often grows in phases, a critical analysis of the sentiments, aspirations, and goals attached to each phase may provide insights into the identification of the most popular focus of nationalism. The above suggests that perspective of mobilisation especially when the expression of marginalisation is involved is very significant to the understanding of nationalism. It is particularly so, if the particular purpose of nationalism and nationalist actors are to be underscored. Hence, the social and political formation of a state that is creating nationalism; social and cultural agencies engaged in grassroots mobilisation for nationalists support; and the justifications for whatever reasons given for the supports are important elements in the analysis of the nationalistic expression of marginalisation.

Against this background, this paper examines how marginalisation is used as a political rhetoric by the Yoruba political élite to draw closer to federal power in Nigerian socio-politics. From a theoretical discussion that immediately follows this introduction; the paper examines the creation of Yoruba nationalism starting from its cultural project in 1900 to its political and violent form in the 21st century. The paper concludes that there is no remarkable difference between an ordinary Yoruba person and other ordinary Nigerians irrespective of ethnic backgrounds. And since Yoruba nationalism has not yielded to creation of a Yoruba state, marginalisation is an instrumental force mostly used by the postcolonial Yoruba political élite to get more inclusion in federal government in Nigeria. Data for the paper draws on ethnography with the use of key informant interviews and survey study conducted in many Yoruba cities. The choice of respondents for the survey study and key informant interviews cut across a number of socio-demographic characteristics such as religion, age, occupation, sex, political leanings and sub-groupings of the Yoruba people in south-western Nigeria.

BACKGROUND TO YORUBA NATIONALISM

The Yoruba people are located in south-western Nigeria. Numbering about 39 million, to a certain extent the Yoruba people are not homogenous and the local history confirms that the idea of nationalism among the people was a creation of the early 19th century (Peel, 1989; Matory, 2005; Adebanwi, 2009; Nolte, 2009). Between the 19th and 21st centuries Yoruba nationalism is expressed in three phases. The first was in form of pre-colonial group consciousness based on the expression of Yoruba cultural pride and the creation of an "imagined" national unity among diverse Yoruba sub-groups that existed like the Greek city-states. Appearing as the second phase, which

started from the 1880s, the new Yoruba European missionaries cum colonial-made clergies and intelligentsia created cultural nationalism to establish a common myth of origin, language, ideology, religion and belief, craft and popular cultures to establish a pan-Yoruba pride and cultural superiority in colonial Nigeria (Barber, 1989; Matory, 2005). At that time and until the 1940s, the early Yoruba intellectuals and members of the clergy that were involved in cultural nationalism were not interested in the creation of a politically autonomous Yoruba state. Rather, they wanted European missionaries and the British colonial administration to recognise their ideational culture, mostly the Yoruba language and the unity of the Yoruba people, as superior in colonial Nigeria.

Both the first and second phases of Yoruba nationalism significantly drew on cultural renaissance and revaluation. The third phase was the translation of the Yoruba re-valued cultural pride such as the creation of a common history of origin and a common form of Yoruba language into a political project by some of the Yoruba colonial political élite. The third phase was the political import of Yoruba nationalism begun in the 1940s in colonial Nigeria. This third phase involved an appropriation of the legacies of cultural nationalism to negotiate inclusion in colonial government. It was also used to gain political superiority in colonial Nigeria and in the subsequent postcolonial Nigeria that started to emerge beginning from the late 1940s. The Yoruba myth of origin was re-invented to bind all Yoruba groups together as a political consti-tuency (Doortmont, 1989), with a feeling of collective consciousness of being Yoruba (as a pride group) through which a set of "perceived" qualities of being better than other ethnic groups in Nigeria was constructed (Ajala, 2009). All these were translated to political actions such as the formation of political parties and socio-cultural groups, used in accessing political power and negotiation for political domination in Nigeria.

The third phase of Yoruba nationalism was similarly characterised by a series of socio-political movements in form of civic nationalism initially resting on fraternal relationships with other ethnic groups that constituted colonial Nigeria between 1900 and 1960. Rather than the use of cultural renaissance employed in its earlier cultural nationalism project, the third phase of Yoruba nationalism used economic and political marginalisation as instrument for mobilising supports from the grassroots. The Yoruba claim to political marginalisation was specifically traced to the British colonial government and subsequent political suppression, which the people perceived they faced in the Nigeria both at the colonial and postcolonial eras. Many agencies were put at work by the nationalist actors to mobilise supports from the grassroots. Among these agencies included the cult of Awolowo and Abiola, ethnic and political violence and socio-cultural and political associations,

among others. With strong attachment to its mythological and "actual"[2] power and perceived enlightenment based on the people's literacy capacity, the Yoruba re-created its nationalism with the use of the rhetoric of marginalisation and violence from 1960 until 2009. Supported by increasing economic declines, perverse use of ethnicity in Nigerian politics, over-centralisation of the government, general breakdown of social infrastructure and irregularities in Nigerian transition to democratic rule between 1960 and 2009, rhetoric of marginalisation, becomes the most popular focus of the Yoruba nationalist actors in drawing grassroots support in south-western Nigeria.

YORUBA NATIONALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF MARGINALISATION, 1960-2009

The postcolonial period represents the mainstream of Yoruba nationalism, which is partly ideological and partly functional in the context of its focus on political and economic marginalisation in Nigeria. As from the 1960s, the definition of nationalism is both in political and economic terms, resting on the legitimisation of the Yoruba cultural renaissance that mostly characterised colonial Yoruba nationalism. Postcolonial expression of nationalism, therefore, goes beyond how the Yoruba people are different from the other Nigerian ethnic groups in cultural terms. Rather, the emphasis rests significantly on the Yoruba perceived cultural superiority to regain the control of regional political power as was granted between 1954 and 1960 when regional autonomy was granted. It should be noted that the British colonial government granted the colonial Nigeria a quasi-federalism in 1954. The federalism provided both fiscal and political autonomy for each of the three (Northern, Western and Eastern) regions that formed the Nigerian colonial state. Against the developmental principle of federalism, the fiscal and political autonomy that was granted the federating units of federal colonial Nigeria ended up in strengthening the pre-colonial political hegemonies of the dominant ethnic groups in each of the federating units. Sometime during the pre-colonial era, the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group were recognised as the dominant ethnic group in Northern Nigeria following the success of the 1804 Fulani jihad. Similarly, through the Oyo Empire's imperial rule, the Yoruba in south-western Nigeria had established its political superiority that extended to Edo, Itsekiri and Urhobo, among others, in Western Nigeria. The Igbo of Eastern Nigeria were also of enormous political influence among many other ethnic groups located in eastern Nigeria. The British designed federalism but still conceded much of the pre-colonial power and influence to these three dominant Nigerian ethnic groups (Arifalo, 2001). In the absence of strong minority rights to protect the smaller ethnic groups in each of the regions, the use of ethnicity became prominent in power relations among the

three dominant ethnic groups in colonial Nigeria. Used to edge out the smaller ethnic groups in power play, ethnicity was also used in political formations such as political parties and political patronage in colonial Nigeria (Joseph, 1981, Osaghae, 2001). Right from the colonial period, the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria had been set against one another to fulfil the workings of the British colonial administrative style of divide and rule policy in Nigeria (Ukeje and Adebanwi, 2008). At independence in 1960, there was little change in the colonial political formation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, except for the creation of Mid-western region in 1962, that excised mainly the Edo, Ijaw, Urhobo,and Itsekri from western Nigeria, a region that was earlier dominated by the Yoruba.

As the political setting at Nigerian independence was based on ethnic politics (Mackintosh, 1963), the government was construed from ethnic sentiments. The political arrangement that provoked ethnic sentiment reflected the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) winning the election in 1959. The NPC was a political party mostly dominated by the Hausa-Fulani political élite from northern Nigeria (Peel, 1989). The government was pro-Hausa-Fulani as the most strategic government positions were filled by the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo who formed a political alliance with the Hausa-Fulani in the NPC. An NPC leader (Hausa-Fulani) was the prime minister, while the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) leader (Igbo) was the President and the Action Group (AG) leader (Yoruba) became the Leader of Opposition. The NCNC was mainly dominated by the Igbo political élite from eastern Nigeria and AG was mainly dominated by the Yoruba political élite from south-western Nigeria. Hence, all the political parties had ethnic affiliation.

The situation became more intense as colonial Nigeria was advancing towards independence in 1960 (Joseph, 1981). Struggles for central political power amongst the Nigerian political élite were, therefore, coloured with ethnic sentiments, and nearly all policies and programmes of the Nigerian early independent government headed by NPC/Hausa-Fulani political élite were read through the spectacles of ethnic sentiment. Even when opposition to government policies and programmes was objective and critical to the need to redirect Nigerian economy and politics to avoid wreckage of Nigerian early economic and political development, the NPC government and its Hausa-Fulani political élite often understood the Leader of Opposition – Awolowo – from the language of ethnic sentiment. The Hausa-Fulani political élite mostly took Awolowo's political ideas as representing the entire Yoruba political constituency. The opposition leader posed a stiff opposition against the government to the extent that he was a Yoruba man was accused of plotting to overthrow the government. Obafemi Awolowo was tried, found guilty and jailed for treason (Nolte, 2009). Coupled with the political tension in the western Region caused by intra-party squabbles within the AG

(Mackintosh, 1963), as the Hausa-Fulani party (NPC) wanted to continue in power, the 1964 general election was massively rigged and the Yoruba resented the move with open violence. In its dramatic turn, the crisis led to the collapse of the first Republic in January 1966, when the military government seized power.

The aftermath of the 1964-1966 crises was the Agbekoya[3] crisis of 1968, where the lowering of cocoa price by the federal military government of Nigeria was resented with violence by the Yoruba. Cocoa was the economic resource of the Yoruba just as groundnuts and the palm oil were to the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo respectively. The "Yorubas could not understand why the purchasing price of cocoa should be slashed without been extended to groundnut and palm oil".[4] The Yoruba way of explaining the situation was that since the funding for developmental projects in the Yoruba western Region accrued from the proceeds of cocoa exports, the federal military government of Nigeria intended to cripple the development of the Yoruba nation, thus a violent resistance in form of nationalist movement was staged.

While the violent Yoruba nationalist struggle went underground under the first military administration in Nigeria, the grumblings of the Yoruba for lack of economic power was added to their plight of political marginalisation under the military administration that lasted between 1966 and 1979 in Nigeria. Although this did not lead to violent crises, the expression of both economic and political marginalisation was intensified due to the Yoruba lack of enough access to national political power in Nigeria during the military administrations. On economic terms, the Yoruba complained of more fiscal resources allocated to northern Nigeria and the crippling of western regional economic resources. Specifically, there was also a complaint against the establishment of Nigerian petroleum refinery in Kaduna in northern Nigeria. The 1970s marked the era of crude oil boom in Nigeria. Since 1956 when crude oil was discovered in commercial quantity in the Niger Delta area of Nigerian former eastern, mid-western and western Regions. The northern Region had no oil. With the oil boom, the Nigerian government embarked on building petroleum refineries in Nigeria. Five refineries were built and located in northern (Kaduna), mid-western (Warri) and eastern Regions (Port Harcourt). Kaduna (northern Region) was about 1000 km distance to the locations of Nigerian crude oil and some Yoruba communities (western Region) that could host oil refineries were between 100 and 500 km distance from many of Nigeria's crude oil locations. Yet, Nigerian military governments failed to establish at least an oil refinery in western Region, even with the discovery of crude oil in its Ilaje community (Gennova, 2006). The Yoruba also complained against the nationalisation and indigenisation policy of the Nigerian federal military government that was executed in the 1970s. Through the nationalisation policy, most of the economic ventures

and institutions that were established and exclusively managed by each of the former regional governments were taken over by the federal military government without compensation. Affected by this policy was the western Region-owned bank that was nationalised to become National Bank of Nigeria (NBN). To the federal military government, all these were economic reforms towards Nigerian development, but the Yoruba in particular read ethnic sentiments into the policies. The people felt that the military government was out to weaken both the Yoruba nationalist interests and the people's economic power; and appropriate such for the interests and development of the Hausa-Fulani in northern Nigeria.

Politically, the military government was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani political élite who formed the bulk of Nigerian military leadership between 1967 and 1979. The Yoruba complained of low Yoruba access into the Nigerian army as the recruitment policy favoured more of the Hausa-Fulani than the Yoruba. Again, the Hausa-Fulani had more access to rapid promotions than their Yoruba counterparts. As the Yoruba believed that all these efforts were directed toward hegemonisation of Nigerian political power by the Hausa-Fulani political élite, the rhetoric of marginalisation became prevalent as Yoruba nationalist's form of mobilisation for grassroots support.

Mostly during the military era (1967-1979), the Yoruba people always contrived both economic and political marginalisation, often blamed on the centralisation of state power that characterised the military governments.[5] The people held the belief that the centralisation project of state consolidation in Nigeria under the military in the 1970s (and later in the 1990s) subjected the Yoruba to cultural devaluation, political repression, and economic deprivation in the Nigerian political space. They believed that by virtue of the Hausa-Fulani people who had ruled Nigeria for the longest time, the Hausa-Fulani have created strong institutions to perpetually control both Nigerian politics and economy and thus subject the Yoruba to both economic and political marginalisation. According to a key informant who is a national leader of the OPC:

> ... the periods by which the Yoruba have presented the leaders for Nigeria are too small to balance the gap. It is obvious that Yoruba people are marginalised. Thus, there is need for the Yoruba to be radical in their approach towards redress.[6]

Another Yoruba septuagenarian and a politician who was also one of the leaders of the Yoruba Council of Elders (a Yoruba socio-cultural group) maintained that:

> Yoruba were excluded from top positions in government at that period, and many of the government corporations established in western Region were headed by Hausa-Fulani even when there were more qualified Yoruba to head them.[7]

He also maintained that the Yoruba in the Nigerian army were not regularly promoted unlike their Hausa-Fulani counterparts. To him, that was why many of the successful coups d'etat in Nigeria were headed by Hausa-Fulani in the army.

The Yoruba historical consciousness and the invented pan-cultural identity (Doortmont, 1989) attached to a common ancestry – Oduduwa[8] – were commonly emphasised in Yoruba nationalism. These agencies were also redirected to the desire to protect the Yoruba economic resources and correct the perceived sense of marginalisation. Yoruba nationalism thereby relied on these agencies to persuade and appeal for grassroots support and to belief that perceived strict senses of economic and political marginalisation under the Nigerian military government were real. This eventually characterised the Yoruba postcolonial nationalism under the military. From the desire to have access to regional and national economic control to the establishment of an independent Yoruba nation, Yoruba nationalism continuously grow into a radical demand for the restructuring of the Nigerian politics and economy.

The late 20th century thereby marked the shifting of the Yoruba form of mass mobilisation for nationalism. Initially, it relied on cultural renaissance or cultural revaluation, it changed to self-determination to the sense of Yoruba's control of Nigeria. Another important focus for Yoruba nationalism which was equally driven by its sense of economic and political marginalisation was the Yoruba creation of a Yoruba nation which was constructed in two senses. The first was the building of the newly independent Nigeria together with the other ethnic groups in Nigeria through political restructuring that would guarantee regional self-autonomy. The second sense was, of course, the possibility of evolving a sovereign Yoruba nation should the newly independent Nigeria fails (Falola, 2006) to provide equitable opportunities to both political and economic resources in Nigeria. Thus, the nationalist's interest became manifold. It was vested in controlling huge resources and committing such to building the Yoruba region as a self sufficient Yoruba community that would guarantee good living and economic prosperity for its people. It was also focussed on engaging in a healthy competition with the other ethnic groups in Nigeria inasmuch as equitable access to national political power that would benefit the Yoruba level of development, would be guaranteed. The Yoruba level of development was its literacy and enlightened capacity which is higher than any other ethnic groups in Nigeria between the 1960 and the late 1980s. The Yoruba nationalists then argued that the principle of sharing the Nigerian national resources among its ethnic groups should be equitable, based on the contribution from each ethnic group to the national wealth.

The late 1970s marked the termination of military rule. With the civilian

administration still headed by a Hausa-Fulani political élite between 1979 and 1983, the Yoruba quickly developed its rhetoric of marginalisation. While elections that were held in 1979 and 1983 were marred by a lot of irregularities that favoured Hausa-Fulani political élite, the Yoruba political élite drummed its marginalisation swan song into the Yoruba public. In 1983, amidst open political violence in south-western Nigeria, the 1983 presidential election victory was awarded to the Hausa-Fulani against the Yoruba. As was the case in 1966, the 1983 violent political crises in the south-western region attracted the Nigerian military to stage another coup. In what seemed to have justified the rhetoric of marginalisation in Yoruba nationalism, the presidential election of 1993 was annulled by a military head of state, who was from the Gwari ethnic group of central Nigeria, but was linked with Hausa-Fulani political group. The election was claimed to have been won by a Yorubaman, M.K.O Abiola, hence its annulment was counted by many Yoruba as the highest level of Hausa-Fulani political élite depriving Yoruba access to national political power. Thus, the annulment produced national political crises, which quickly died down in other ethnic groups in Nigeria, but the crises lasted till 1998 in south-western Nigeria. During the period, reinventing its weapon of nationalism, the Yoruba engaged in formation of socio-cultural agencies in its nationalist demands. Such agencies like Afenifere and O'odua People's Congress (OPC) and the rhetoric of marginalisation among others commanded popular appeals and became widespread, having practically shown that the Hausa-Fulani political group did not want the Yoruba to head a Nigerian national government. Abiola's arrest and his imprisonment, the political assassination of his wife Kudirat, and the imprisonments of many Yoruba military élite such as Oladipo Diya, Olusegun Obasanjo, among others, and the eventual death of Abiola in detention raised more support for Yoruba claims of marginalisation between 1993 and 1998.

While 1999 marked another return to civil rule in Nigeria, the government that was headed by a Yorubaman (Olusegun Obasanjo), did not douse Yoruba violent nationalism. While it was expected that Obasanjo's assumption of office as the first Nigerian civilian President, elected and sworn in as Nigerian president from Yoruba ethnic group would put a stop to Yoruba ethnic sentiments against Nigeria and the Hausa-Fulani political élite, the activities of Yoruba nationalist movement such as OPC defied that logical conclusion. Between 1999 and 2003, a number of ethnic violence that claimed many lives in Lagos, Sagamu and Ibadan, among others, was staged. Resting on rhetoric of marginalisation, the violence affected many people among whom the common Hausa-Fulani population in south-western Nigeria were the majority. While Olusegun Obasanjo was president between 1999 and 2003, his political antecedents denied him popular Yoruba support. Obasanjo was considered as a conservative politician, a political ideology and camp

dominated by Hausa-Fulani political élite. He was also a member of People's Democratic Party (PDP) – a party that was also bulked up by Hausa-Fulani political élite. Many Yoruba political élite in the progressive political camp were opposed to Obasanjo. Instead, he was seen as pro-Hausa-Fulani, and thus the expression of marginalisation among the Yoruba was popularly salient. The Yoruba expression of marginalisation continued from 1999 and 2003, despite the fact that a number of key appointments in Nigerian federal government were made from amongst the Yoruba.

Obasanjo's political tactics of building new political alliances in south-western Nigeria, his divisive politics in western Nigeria, and his diplomatic handling of OPC crises provided the opportunity to break the ranks of the Yoruba progressive political élite who were the main actors of Yoruba nationalism. All these efforts culminated into Obasanjo and his party-PDP's success to massively win elections in many south-western Nigerian states in the 2003 governorship election. Having the political control of the south-western Nigeria he was also able to reduce ethnic tensions usually created by Yoruba in Nigeria against Nigeria and Hausa-Fulani political élite. Thus, between 2003 and 2007, when Obasanjo ran the office of Nigerian presidency for a second term, the Yoruba expression of political marginalisation tentatively went underground. While the 2007 election caused a lot of contestations about Nigerian democracy, the conclusion saw a Hausa-Fulani becoming Nigerian president since 2007. Amidst a pile of electoral irregularities, political violence (mainly in south-western Nigeria), that affected all Nigerians irrespective of ethnic background, the Yoruba again read ethnic sentiments into the constitution of Nigeria. Between 2007 and 2009, nearly every step made by the federal government against Yoruba interests was interpreted through the rhetoric of marginalisation. Such included the appointment of ministers in the federal cabinet in 2007; the appointment of the Governor of the Central Bank in August 2009, and the appointment of Nigerian police boss in September 2009.

However, as at 2009, Yoruba popular opinions about the political competition with – and perceived oppression by – the Hausa-Fulani, which was popularly expressed in the opinion of many of the key informants mainly members of Yoruba political élite, are not supported by the Yoruba grassroots people as shown in the randomised survey opinion in the table on Page 96. The table establishes that 80.4 percent of the 591 interviewed Yoruba respondents thought that the Yoruba have access to political power, while 70.7 percent and 88.0 percent of the same category of respondents believed that the Yoruba equally have access to both economic resources and social prestige respectively in Nigeria. This perhaps reflects the different perceptions of Yoruba marginalisation between the political élite who are more interested in political power as against the Yoruba who are only interested in their

livelihoods. It is, therefore, clear that only the Yoruba political élite, mostly from the progressive political camp, believed that the Yoruba people are politically marginalised. Supported by inferences drawn from key informants, many Yoruba mostly of the conservative political camp who supported the Hausa-Fulani political élite, do not share the same sense of Yoruba political marginalisation in Nigeria. Rather, they held the opinion that it is the Yoruba who as progressive political élite that refused to work with the Hausa-Fulani political élite. To the ordinary Yoruba, as the opinion of some key informants further illustrated, there is no difference in the living standards among the ordinary Yoruba and other ethnic groups in Nigeria. Thus, the expression of political marginalisation was that of the élite mainly in the progressive political camp between the 1950s and the early 2000s. These political élite were mainly Awolowo's followers. These crops of politicians continue to use the rhetoric of political marginalisation as the political instrument to negotiate more access to political and economic power in Nigeria.

Principally, in a diverse cultural society like Nigeria, inter-group power relationship exerts an emotional, psychological, symbolic or conflicting actions (Campbell, 1999:115), requiring redress for equity, justice and fairness. The absence of redress leads to evocation of politics of marginalisation and sometimes political violence. As inequity in resource distribution and widespread poverty acquires greater salience and attraction among the Yoruba of south-western Nigeria, the people find it increasingly prudent to mobilise against their perceived historic and contemporary inequities and injustices in Nigeria. Hence, nationalist movements among the Yoruba in the '90s operated on the channel of economic and political deprivation which poor governance also made many Nigerians to suffer. As the socio-economic problem had no ethnic limitation, rhetorics of marginalisation became more popularly accepted among the people despite the fact that many Yoruba were aware that the perceived marginalisation was not an exclusive problem against the Yoruba. Thus, nationalism and politics continued to remain as constructive device among the people, at least, to resent the constructed marginalisation. To attain this, mobilisation for nationalistic struggles engaged a number of social and cultural agencies within which grassroots support for the expression of marginalisation became achievable.

SOCIO-CULTURAL AGENCIES FOR THE EXPRESSION OF MARGINALISATION IN YORUBA NATIONALISM

The rise of Obafemi Awolowo not only as a prominent Yoruba politician but as the neo-Yoruba progenitor (Adebanwi, 2009), created a rallying point and voice for the Yoruba between the 1950s and the 2000s. With Awolowo, a unification of the Yoruba people, seemingly having a united political destiny,

vision and voice from the disunited Yoruba people in the pre-colonial and colonial eras (Ukeje and Adebanwi, 2008) became possible. His administrative success as the premier of Western region in Nigeria further created much respect for Awolowo's political opinion. Having transformed the Yoruba people within three years (1954-1957) from an agrarian and mostly uneducated people to cottage industrialists and massively educated people, Awolowo was highly revered and respected as the foremost Nigerian administrator. Following the big political crisis that started between Awolowo and his deputy premier, Awolowo was eventually jailed for treason. Granted a political amnesty, and invited to participate in Nigeria's first military government, he was also able to manage the Nigerian economy as finance minister from 1966 to 1971, when Nigeria was under the threat of Biafran secession. Throughout his lifetime, first in the First Republic (1960-1966) and then in the Second Republic (1979-1983), Awolowo sought to lead Nigeria, but failed in the attempt. For many of his Yoruba compatriots, Awolowo was not just the most competent administrator among his peers, but also the 'best president Nigeria never had,' as many Nigerians attested at Awolowo's passage in 1987.

All his political travails were interpreted by the Yoruba as a conspiracy against the Yoruba. It is instructive, however, that, by the time Awolowo died, he had become the benchmark for describing how to be a 'proper' Yoruba. These old faultlines still largely determine the direction and tempo of Yoruba politics, despite interesting reconfigurations. However, events in the late 1980s and 1990s in Nigeria were to strengthen the nationalist impulse of the Yoruba, while projecting their struggles for political control with renewed vigour onto the national platform. This nationalistic impulse soon translated into the dramatisation of violence as a legitimate weapon for drawing attention to and defending the collective interests of the Yoruba. The cult of Awolowo in Adebanwi's opinion (Adebanwi, 2009) remains the foci and justification of Yoruba expression of marginalisation in Nigeria.

So, in 1993, when similar circumstances occurred to another Yoruba – Abiola, whose election victory as Nigerian president was annulled – the Yoruba summed up their ethnic sentiments and further propagated the expression of political marginalisation. The reactions of the Yoruba to the annulment of the federal elections won by Abiola was related to the background of previous suspicions that those who, they believed, wielded power in Nigeria (the Hausa-Fulani) were unwilling to allow the Yoruba a chance to produce a president. Abiola's arrest, detention, the assassination of one of his wives, Kudirat, and his death in detention in 1998, assumed a widespread misgiving that further gave credence to Yoruba justification for the expression of marginalisation.

The Yoruba in the 19th century were very fond of socio-cultural associations that transcend kinship and lineage boundaries (Falola, 2006).

The Perceived Marginalisation of the Yoruba People in Nigeria

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yoruba Access to Political Power in Nigeria		
No Response	35	5.9
No	81	13.7
Yes	475	80.4
Total	591	100.0
Yoruba Access to Economic Resources in Nigeria		
No Response	34	5.8
No	139	23.5
Yes	418	70.7
Total	591	100.0
Yoruba Access to Social Prestige in Nigeria		
No Response	29	4.9
No	42	7.1
Yes	520	88.0
Total	591	100.0

Source: Ethnographic survey on Yoruba politics in Nigeria, 2009.

As many of these associations incorporate many interests such as inter-religious and inter-community (Trager, 2001), they acted as broad-based social movements for the expression of various Yoruba social and political interests. From the People's Union founded in Lagos in 1908 by John Randle and Orisadipe Obasa[9] to Egbe Omo Oduduwa founded by Obafemi Awolowo in 1948 (Arifalo, 2001; Nolte, 2009 and Adebanwi, 2009), such associations acted as organs of reaching the grassroots Yoruba for political and nationalist mobilisation. By 1949, Egbe Omo Oduduwa had transformed to a political party, the Action Group, that embraced many Yoruba irrespective of their lineage and community affiliations. The political élite under the leadership of Obafemi Awolowo recreated Yoruba nationalism (Adebanwi, 2009) from its initial cultural project into civic nationalism that radicalised its expression political marginalisation against the Yoruba. Up till the 1951 when Egbe Omo Oduduwa was transformed to a political party called AG in 1951, Awolowo significantly used Egbe Omo Oduduwa to sell his ideas of Yoruba

cultural and political prides among the grassroots. Relying on multiple cultural institutions such as kingship (Vaughan, 2006), local community-based meetings (Nolte, 2009), Christianity and enlightenment (Peel, 1989), Awolowo did not only establish his political interests, but he was able to recreate a vision of a new Yoruba nation (Adebanwi, 2009). He also used this platform to prepare the Yoruba into meeting the challenges – political marginalisation ahead of Nigerian independence. The official launch of the Action Group (AG) in 1951 did not only confirm the success of mass mobilisation through Egbe Omo Oduduwa, but also demonstrated Awolowo's skill in arousing Yoruba sentiments against the colonial political contrivances that formed the basis of the people's expression of political marginalisation. Representatives came from all the Yoruba communities, and all the notable kings were in attendance at the inauguration. Along the line of the Yoruba characteristic of using local genres to express political and social feelings, many renditions of political songs in form of local genres further confirmed that had succeeded in sensitising Yoruba grassroots against political marginalisation. For instance, one of the popular political songs at the launch ran thus:

> *Bi won o lo, kan ma a lo,*
> *Bi won o lo, kan ma a lo;*
> *A ti l'Awolowo, A l'edajoba se*
> *Bi won o lo, kan ma lo.*[10]

> If they want to go, let them go,
> If they want to go, let them go;
> We have Awolowo, we can run our government
> If they want to go, let them go.

The above rendition also explained the strong force of association in mobilisation for nationalism, which Awolowo recognised and maximally put into function. Having been relatively unknown up till the 1940s (Nolte, 2009), his acceptance as a Yoruba political leader as inferred from the above rendition by the Yoruba demonstrated that associations are powerful forces of political mobilisation and nationalistic expression of political marginalisation in south-western Nigeria.

However, the Yoruba politics of the mid-20th century clearly featured division of Yoruba political interests into two main ideological groups – the progressive and the conservative groups. Awolowo and all his supporters constituted the progressives. Although very marginal and located in many Muslim dominated Yoruba communities (Peel, 1989; Adebanwi, 2009) non-supporters of Awolowo belonged to the conservative groups. Up till 1966, when it was proscribed, AG remained the political organ of Yoruba nationalism. Like Egbe Omo Oduduwa, AG was used as the platform for mobilisation for Yoruba nationalism. It controlled the regional government

of the Western region between 1954 and 1963, when the party introduced monumental development projects. Such projects included free universal primary education in 1955, establishing the first television station – Western Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (WNBC)[11] in Ibadan, Western region in 1955, and massive building of infrastructures such as roads and industries in western Nigeria.

Despite the political crises that ruptured the party between 1957 and 1962 (Mackintosh, 1963), like Egbe Omo Oduduwa, AG similarly enjoyed grassroots support until its proscription in 1966. During its crises, the party was ably used to express political marginalisation against the Yoruba, across many Yoruba communities. Between 1957 and 1962 many members of AG in many of its stronghold communities among the Ijesa, Igbomina, Ofa, Ekiti (Peel, 1989) and Ijebu (Nolte, 2009) faced political intimidation and harassments of its members by the rival party (Sklar, 1963). Yet, AG members were still holding political meetings, rallies and campaigns where the expression of Yoruba political marginalisation was forcefully preached.

Despite the contestations that surrounded the formation of Afenifere (Osun, 2005, Adebanwi, 2009), as another Yoruba socio-political association, it was similar to Egbe Omo Oduduwa, both in structure and functions. The contestations on Afenifere included the controversies on its date of foundation and who founded the association. While Adebanwi (2008) was of the opinion that Afenifere was founded after Awolowo's death in 1987 as an idea muted by Chief Bola Ige (Osun 2005) could not take a concrete decision. Osun maintains that a less formal organisation of Awoists (the Awolowo supporters and former members of AG) were in existence prior 1978. However, while it is difficult to establish the actual date of its formation, some of my informants claimed that Afenifere was a political slogan that was unconsciously generated at a meeting of AG held in Owo in 1951, when Awolowo read the laudable programmes of the party to participants.[12] Although not as popular as Awo-another AG slogan, the slogan *Afenifere* meaning *those who want others to live well* was used between 1951 and 1966 as another AG's slogan. And following the proscription of AG in 1966, all the Awoists bonded themselves in "cult" and call themselves as Afenifere.[13] It was this platform which Awolowo used in 1978 and which made it possible for him to declare the establishment of his new political party – Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) – barely 24 hours after the lifting of ban on formation of political parties. Whichever was the reality, it is very obvious that *Afenifere* became an active political organ of Yoruba nationalism in the 1990s.

Like AG in the '50s and '60s, UPN founded by Obafemi Awolowo in 1978; and Alliance for Democracy (AD) founded mostly by Awoists in Afenifere in 1998, were both political organs of Yoruba nationalism. Between 1979 and 1983, when UPN was in control of government in south-western

Nigeria, it was used as an agent of mobilisation for the expression of political and economic marginalisation of the Yoruba in Nigeria. Similarly, between 1999 and 2003 AD assumed a similar position.

The establishment of O'odua People's Congress (OPC) in 1995 re-invented another pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organisation that resembled Egbe Omo Oduduwa in drawing Yoruba grassroots support. Unlike Egbe Omo Oduduwa, OPC did not have open partisan political interests. It was probably this feature that made it to be supported by the generality of Yoruba people. Founded by Fredrick Faseun (a medical doctor), the group was bulked up by many Yoruba artisans and craftsmen who had strong rural connections including Gani Adams – a former carpenter (Adebanwi, 2005) from a local community in Akoko, Ondo state. Founded at the time when the political devaluation of the Yoruba people reached its apex, in what looked like a revalidation of pan-Yoruba interests, OPC also drew its membership from many successful Yoruba intellectuals of different professional leanings; religious background, sex and political groupings. The association's claim of restoring the degenerating Yoruba political glory; its pursuit of Yoruba self-determination struggle; and fights against the annulment of the general election held in 1993 endeared OPC as an organisation that is really committed to end Yoruba political marginalisation in Nigeria. With close to 20 million[14] out of 39 million of the Yoruba population in south-western Nigeria who were OPC members, the association fulfilled the associational features of the Yoruba people.

Since 1964, when political violence erupted in south-western Nigeria up till 2009, both political and ethnic violence were acted as cultural agencies for the expression of Yoruba marginalisation. In what was identified as symbolic expression of Yoruba nationalism, during this violence, attacks were often directed to federal government institutions such as the police and federal electoral offices located in south-western Nigeria. Attacks on the Nigerian police force in south- western Nigeria since 1964 suggests that the Yoruba were unhappy with the centralisation of power which the Nigerian police force symbolised. Similarly, the attacks on federal electoral commission offices in 1964, 1983, 2007 and 2009 in many Yoruba communities signalled the Yoruba sentiment against the use of the electoral commission to marginalise the Yoruba.

Between 1964 and 1993, expression of marginalisation through violent attacks was limited to political violence in south-western Nigeria. During this period, Nigerian electoral systems were characterised by series of malpractices usually against Yoruba political interests. On every occasion when election frauds were against the Yoruba dominated political parties, the Yoruba in such parties often resorted to political violence. However, between 1995 and 2003, expression of marginalisation drew more on ethnic violence

mostly against the Hausa-Fulani people resident in south-western Nigeria. For instance, between 2001 and 2002, many ethnic violence were caused mostly in many parts of south-western Nigeria (Adebanwi, 2005) as the Yoruba means of expressing the people's economic marginalisation in Nigeria.

Relying on trade, the federal civil service, schools, the security forces and many other federal institutions, many Yoruba people moved beyond their homeland in south-western Nigeria. These migrants mostly in many northern Nigerian cities often founded Yoruba socio-cultural associations such as Egbe Omo Yoruba and O'odua Peoples' Congress (OPC). Through these agencies they acted as Yoruba organs for the expression of their perceived sense of Yoruba marginalisation. Apart from expressing the Yoruba marginalisation through their associations, they also carried information about northern Nigeria having better infrastructure than south-western Nigeria to their homeland. Among others, many of them often expressed that northern Nigeria had better roads and give more bursaries and scholarships to their students than the states of south-western Nigeria. These claims often aggravated tension and built-up support for the political claim that the Yoruba were marginalised in Nigeria and thus making the rhetoric of marginalisation to be more popular in south-western Nigeria.

In the context of the mobilisation for popular support of the Yoruba perceived marginalisation, both the institutional and native media based in south-western Nigeria proved potent. The institutional media included mostly the print media that are owned and controlled by Yoruba media professionals. Native media were in form of mass communication that involved an exclusive use of the local language in the production of folk music, poetry, symbolic messages and drumbeats.

The Yoruba region in south-western Nigeria has a good number of radicalised institutional and native media professionals who constitute its repertoire of local intellectuals that continue to use their knowledge of oration, music and poetry in protest epistemology (Jeyifo, 1984; Olukotun, 2002). The production of protest rendition cuts across ages and governments. From the colonial era, the likes of Hubert Ogunde (Clark, 1979) and I.K Dairo (Ajala, 2009) featured prominently in the use of locally produced music protest against the colonial policies and programmes that were regarded as offshoots of Yoruba marginalisation in the colonial Nigeria. In the '50s both I.K Dairo and Ogunde (Nolte, 2009) produced musical records that had great impact on Yoruba sensitisation for impending marginalisation in postcolonial Nigeria. Specifically, Ogunde pointed out certain political contrivances that were directed towards reducing Yoruba political influence in Nigeria. He also noted that there were many Yoruba politicians who acted as sell-outs to the Hausa-Fulani political class in the bid to perpetually marginalise the Yoruba. As the records became popular through its rendition,

many Yoruba created the perception that the British colonial government had designed a platform for Yoruba marginalisation in Nigeria.

Similarly, during the military administrations that lasted in two phases (1966-1979; 1983-1999), the Yoruba media in more than any other period had involved the use of its skills to engage the military authoritarianism. In the process, the media gained popular support by indicating a number of lopsidedness in Nigerian postcolonial structures that were against equitable ethnic representation in governance. Most of the print media involved had a good number of their volumes discussing the allocation of both economic and political resources, such as top-government offices that were mostly occupied by the Hausa-Fulani. Specifically, local weekly magazines such as *Newswatch* (1986); *TheNews* (1990), *Alaroye* and *TELL* (1996) covered stories that accused the Hausa-Fulani of dominating Nigerian federal government (Olukotun, 2002). Also, during the struggles to bring the military governments to grips with the effect of administrative recklessness native musical intellectuals in Yorubaland such as Ayanyemi Ayinla, Lanrewaju Adepoju, Olatubosun Oladapo, Opeyemi Fajemilehin, Gbenga Adewusi, Ayinde Barrister, Salawa Abeni and Wasiu Ayinde, among others, rendered their intellectual productions to inform the Yoruba masses of their political marginalisation in Nigeria. Specifically, Ayanyemi relied on the use of the Yoruba effective talking drum as an instrument of secret communication. Lanrewaju Adepoju, Olatubosun Oladapo and Gbenga Adewusi used their poetic skills to make them as exceptional personalities behind the use of native media to draw popular support for Yoruba marginalisation. Between 1984 and 1996, Lanrewaju Adepoju was stoic against inequitable representation in Nigeria and became a mouth-piece for the airing of Yoruba mass grievances and popular discontents rooted in Yoruba political marginalisation. In one of his productions, Lanrewaju rendered:

Awa gannan la nke t'aye n gbariwo wa wipe Oyinbo nre dudu je ni gusu
Ile eniyan dudu.
Ohun awa fi n sera wa lorile ede yi nko? Se a gbodo palawo funfun lo fi n seni?
Ka fi korin ewi s'eti soja ko tete gbo, o le je pe won ko tii mo.[15]

We once complained that British colonial masters cheated the Black people
What of this cheating that we now render against ourselves? Can we still accuse the British colonial masters?
Let's express in poem for the military to hear, maybe the military is yet to know.

The above rendition is a direct indictment of the military's contrivances in Nigerian government arising from over-centralisation of postcolonial

Nigerian federal structures. Paradoxically, it also linked such contrivances with colonialism and projected the Yoruba air of disappointment that arose from a background of an earlier mood of marginalisation which Ogunde had earlier emphasised.

THE YORUBA JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXPRESSION OF MARGINALISATION IN YORUBA NATIONALISM

The Yoruba expression of marginalisation has some bases for justification. The first is the repeated failure of Obafemi Awolowo to win Nigerian presidency. Between 1959 and 1987, Awolowo repeatedly contested for Nigerian presidency on three occasions and failed. While it was constitutionally justified that Awolowo did not have enough popular votes that could have earned him Nigerian presidency, politically it was regarded as Yoruba political marginalisation by the Yoruba masses. The fact that in all the occasions it was either that the elections were massively rigged against Awolowo's political parties (1959, 1964 and 1983) or the election results was stalemated (1979) justified the Yoruba claims that the Hausa-Fulani political class did not want any Yoruba to be a Nigerian president. Similarly, the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 presidential election against the acclaimed Yoruba success in that election was interpreted as another instance of political marginalisation of the Yoruba people.

Similarly, the Yoruba in the progressive political camp often claimed that the federal governments which have mostly been led by Northern Nigerian political élite have intentionally failed to show interest in developing natural resources located in south-western Nigeria. They claimed that the federal government feared empowering the south-western Nigeria by neglecting the development of bitumen and gold deposits that are in commercial quantities in Okitipupa (Ondo state) and Ilesa (Osun state). As noted by one of our interviewees in Ilaje, Ondo state:

> There is crude oil here in Yoruba region of Ilaje, bitumen in Okitipupa and gold in Ilesa, but Nigerian federal government failed to tap them because the government felt that if those resources were tapped, it might result to what is presently happening in the Niger delta. It is simple, marginalisation against the Yoruba! Is it not? I want you to convince me.[16]

CONCLUSION: YORUBA NATIONALISM AND THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA

The dynamics of Yoruba nationalist movements from the cultural and intellectual project in early 19th century Nigeria suggests the continued expression of ethnic sentiments which is a dangerous socio-political problem.

Although expressions of ethno-nationalist movement still draw on Yoruba ethnic sentiments, the use of these sentiments has assumed more Yoruba consciousness in the negotiation for political power and the Yoruba desires to have more access to economic resources and social prestige in Nigeria. Among these ethnic sentiments is the divisive opinion about Yoruba marginalisation in Nigeria. Many non-politicians among the Yoruba believed that the Yoruba expression of political marginalisation is not peculiar to the people, as many other ethnic groups in Nigeria have also demonstrated the creation of their own nationalisms within the last ten years (Ukeje and Adebanwi, 2008).

Among the Yoruba, ethnic nationalism enjoyed strong grassroots' support based on the expression of marginalisation by the Yoruba élite, who draw more on the general poor living conditions in Nigeria. As these poor living conditions remain lingering as at 2009 and perhaps growing worse now, with many Nigerians creating a sense that each new day is worse than the previous ones in Nigeria. Even after nine years of democratic governance headed by a Yorubaman for eight years,[17] expectation of violent nationalisms and ethnic politics is still very strong, as many agencies of nationalist movement such as OPC, Ijaw Youth Movement, MEND and MASSOB, among others, continue to enjoy grassroots support. This situation is best explained in the opinion of Akwetey (1996: 40), who argues that relative deprivation, rising expectation, frustration, and failure of the state to address the people's needs often provoke social tensions. This thesis further states that aggression and marginalisation always result from anger and conflict over resources, especially when there is a feeling of inability to get what one wants. In such a situation, the most satisfying inherent response is to strike at the source of frustration. The expression of marginalisation and use of violent socio-cultural movements in Yorubaland are linked to mass misgivings over political deprivations, poverty and unemployment, collapse of social infrastructures and state welfare programmes, and inefficient and corrupt government institutions, all of which have remained the features of Nigerian politics. Hence, if all these problems are not tackled nationalist groups will still continue to enjoy mass supports through the expression of marginalisation in Nigeria.

The use of marginalisation in drawing support for violent nationalist movement is not limited to the Yoruba people of south-western Nigeria. Many other ethnic groups in Nigeria are still engaged in violent ethnic nationalist movements motivated by either political or economic deprivation. Typical examples include a number of ethnic groups in Nigerian Niger-delta regions who as at June 2009 engaged Nigeria in militia conflict over deprivations arising from crude oil exploration in the region. Similarly, in February 2009, some ethnic groups in the Plateau region of Nigeria engaged in bloody clashes that claimed over 2,000 lives due to the allegation of political

marginalisation against one another. While many other ethnic groups that live close to one another such as the Idoma and the Tiv in central Nigeria; the Igbo and the Ibibio of eastern Nigeria; the Zango-Kataf and Hausa in Northern Nigeria are expected naturally to forge a stronger political and economic ties among others; the reality is that of suscipicion in political relationship that threatens the fragility and weakness of Nigeria as a state.

ENDNOTES

1. This is presently a working paper and remains a draft. Kindly do not quote yet. The author appreciates the kindness of Oduntan Oluwatoyin Babatunde and Dr. Niyi Okunoye who read the first drafts. Nonetheless, the opinions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author who absolutely bears the responsibility for any likely error in the paper.

2. "Actual power" here refers to the Yoruba belief that it has more success in introducing welfare programmes that are real aspects of human development in Nigeria. As part of its cultural pride, the Yoruba often refer to the introduction of free primary education, a free healthcare system, the establishment of the first television station in Africa, the unprecedented urbanisation and industrialisation in western Nigeria (between the 1950s and 1970s), which spread to other parts of Nigeria due to the Yoruba ingenuity in governance.

3. *Nigerian Tribune*, Ibadan, 29 November, 1969. *Agbekoya* literally means farmers refuse cheating.

4. *Daily Times*, Lagos, 25 September, 1972.

5   *TELL*, Lagos, 15 November, 1999.

6. Gani Adams is the leader and national coordinator of the more radical faction of OPC, with headquarters in Lagos. He was interviewed on 17/05/2004 at the OPC Office, Mushin, Lagos, Nigeria.

7. Anonymous X3. He is an OPC local leader in Ilobu, and was interviewed in Ilobu at OPC Local office on 13/03/2005.

8. The Yoruba progenitor is either pronounced Oduduwa or O'odua.

9. *African Mail*, 26 February, 1909; *African Messenger,* 12 June, 1926.

10. Personal interview with Chief Lamidi Adedibu in Ibadan, 2006. Chief Adedibu claimed to have attended the inauguration. He said that as at then he was in his early 20s. Although he later broke away from Awolowo's political group, Adedibu was one of the prominent Yoruba political élite until his death in 2008.

11. WNBC was later changed to Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), which is the Nigerian national television.

12. In one of my interviews with Lamidi Adedibu in 2006, he stressed that he was present at the Owo meeting together with his political boss (Lanlehin), when the chorus was echoed. Some of my other respondents who are Awoists affirmed this position, while some others rejected the claim.

13. One of my respondents in Ibadan referred to the group as a cult. While he could not explain what he meant by cult and why he referred to the association as a cult, I inferred from him that his reference to cult in respect of Afenifere is that its members were highly committed to the political principles and ideologies of Chief Obafemi Awolowo with which they were closely bonded.

14. Information collated from OPC membership registers – national (both the Adams and Faseun factions) between 1995 and 2007.

15. Adepoju, Lanrewaju, 1986. *Eto Omoniyan*. Ibadan, Lanrad Records.

16. Personal interview held with an anonymous KII in Ilaje, November 2006.

17. As at 2009, when this paper was written, Nigeria had experienced ten years of uninterrupted civil rule, the longest civilian interregnum in Nigerian political history. The government was headed by President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yorubaman, for eight years.

REFERENCES

Adebanwi, W. (2009). The Cultural Agency of Elites: Awolowo and Remaking of the Yoruba. *Journal of Historical Sociology, 22* (2): 207-233.

_____ (2008). "Structure and Agency in a Cult of Power: A Study of the Yoruba Power Elites". A Ph.D dissertation in the Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, United Kingdom.

_____ (2005). "The Carpenter's Revolt: Youth Violence and the Reinvention of Culture in Nigeria". *Journal of Modern African Studies, 43* (3): 339-365.

Agbu, Osita (2004). *Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria*. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Ajayi, J.F.A and Smith, R. (1971). *Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century*. Ibadan, Ibadan University Press.

Ake, C. (1981). *The Political-Economy of Africa*. London, Macmillan.

Akwetey, E. (1996). "Violent Ethno-political Conflicts and the Democratic Challenge", in, Olukoshi, A and L. Laakso Liisa, *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa* (eds), Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 23-42.

Arifalo, S.O. (2005). *The Egbe Omo Oduduwa: A Study in Ethnic and Cultural Nationalism*. Akure, Stebak Books.

Arifalo, S.O. (2001). *The Egbe Omo Oduduwa: A Study in Ethnic and Cultural Nationalism 1945-1965*. Ondo, Nigeria, Stebak Books and Publishers.

Awolowo, Obafemi (1947). *Path to Nigerian Freedom*. London, Faber Publishers.

Barber, K. (1989). "Discursive Strategies in the Text of Ifa and in the Holy Book of Odu of the African Church of Orunmila", in de Moraes Farias, P. and K. Barber (eds.) *Self-Assertion and Brokerage: Early Cultural Nationalism in West Africa*, Birmingham: CWAS at University of Birmingham, 196-240.

Barrister, S.A. (1984). *Military*. Lagos, Siky Oluyole Records.

Berman, B and J. Lonsdale (eds.) (1992). *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Book Two: Violence and Ethnicity*. London, James Curry.

Campbell, J. (1999)."Nationalism, Ethnicity and Religion: Fundamental Conflicts

and the Politics of Identity in Tanzania". *Nations and Nationalism* 5(1): 105-125.

Clark, E. (1979). *Hubert Ogunde: The Making of Nigerian Theatre*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Conteh-Morgan, E. (1997). *Democratization in Africa: The Theory and Dynamics of Political Transitions*. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Colak, Y. (2008). "Nationalism and the Political Use of History in Cyprus: Recent Developments". *Kasarinlan Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, 23(2): 20-45.

Cormier, J.J. (2002). "Nationalism, Activism amd Canandian Sociology" *The American Sociologist*, 33(1): 132-153.

Doortmont, M.R. (1989). "The Invention of the Yorubas: Regional and Pan-nationalism Versus Ethnic Provincialism", in *Self-assertion and Brokerage: Early Nationalism in West Africa*. K. Barber and P.F de Moraes Farias (eds.), Birmingham, CWAS, 101-108.

Falola, T. and A. Genova (eds.) (2006). *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*. Rochester, University of Rochester Press.

Falola, T. (2002). "Early Inter-ethnic Relationship in Africa", in Falola, T (eds.) *Africa* 2. California, California University Press. pp. 112-135.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Gurr, T.R. (2000). *People versus State: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. New York, United States Institute of Peace Studies.

Harneit-Sievers, A. (2006). *Construction of Belonging: Igbo Communities and the Nigerian State in the Twentieth Century*. Rochester: Rochseter University Press.

Hutchinson, J.J. (1987). *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation-State*. London, Allen & Unwin.

Iliffe, J. (1979). *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Jeyifo, B. (1984). *The Yoruba Popular Travelling Theatre of Nigeria*. Lagos, Emaco Print.

Johnson, S. (1921). *The History of Yorubas*. Lagos, CMS Publishers.

Joseph, R.A. (1981). *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Kraxberger, B. (2005). "The Geography of Regime Survival: Abacha's Regime". *African Affairs* 103/412, 413-430.

Kreuzer, P. (2006). "Violent Civic Nationalism versus Civil Ethnic Nationalism: Contrasting Indonesia and Malay(si)a". *National Identities* 8(1): 41-59.

Lentz, C. (2006). *Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana*. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.

Leroy, V. (1989) (ed.). *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*. London, James Curry.

Nugent, P. (2008). 'Putting History Back into Ethnicity: Enslavement, Religion, and Cultural Brokerage in the Construction of Madinka/Jola and Ewe/Agotime Identities in West Africa, C. 1650-1930'. *Comparative Studies in*

Society and History, 50(4): 920-948.

Nolte, I. (2009). *Obafemi Awolowo and the Making of Remo: The Local Politics of a Nigerian Nationalist*. London. Edinburgh, International African Institute, London.

_____ (2004). "Identity and Violence: The Politics of Youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria". *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(1): 61-89.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2001). "The Democracy Project in Africa: The Journey So Far". *The Nigerian Social Scientist* 2(1), 124-151.

Olukotun, A. (2002). *State Repression, Crisis of Democratization and Media Resistance in Nigeria (1988-1999)*. Lagos, College Press.

Olukoshi, A. and Laakso, L. (1996). (eds.) *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa*. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Olukosi, A. (2005). "Regional Political-economy: Retrospect and Prospect". In, Clin-Cole, R. and E.Robinson (Eds.), *West African Worlds: Paths through Socio-economic Change, Livelihood and Development* (London, Pearson Education), pp. 41-64.

Omu, Fred I.A. (1978). *Press and the Politics in Nigeria: 1880-1937*. London: Longman.

Osaghae, E. (2004). Federalism and the Management of Diversity in Africa. *Identity, Culture and Politics*, 5(1 and 2): 162-178.

Osun, W. (2005). *The Kiss of Death: Afenifere and the Infidels*. UK, Josel Publication.

Priah, K. (2004). Local Culture, Local Autonomy and Globalization: The Trajectory of Ethnic Relation in sub-Saharan Africa. A paper presented as a Keynote Address at the 2004 Pan-African Anthropologists Association Conference held at the University of Legon, Ghana.

Peel, J.D.Y. (1989). "The Cultural Work of Yoruba Ethnogenesis", in E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman (eds.) *History and Ethnicity*, London: Routledge, 198-215.

_____ (2000). *Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Renan, E. (1990). "What is a Nation?", in Martin, T.T and K.B Homi(eds.) *Nation and Narration*. London, Routledge: 8-22.

Sandbrook, R. (2000). *Closing the Circle: Democratization and Development in Africa*. Toronto: Between the Lines.

Shedadi, K.S. (1993). *Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States*. ADELPHI Papers 283, 1151, December.

Trager, L. (2001). *Yoruba Hometowns: Community, Identity, and Development in Nigeria*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Ugoh, S.C. (2008). "Ethno-politics: Conceptions and Theoretical Perspectives". *UNILAG Journal of Politics*, 4 (Rainy): 133-163.

Ukeje, C. and W. Adebanwi (2008). Ethno-nationalist Claims in Southern Nigeria: Insights from Yoruba and Ijaw Nationalisms Since the 1990s. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(3): 563-591.

Usman, A.A. (2004). "On the Frontier of Empire: Understanding the Enclosed Walls in Northern Yoruba, Nigeria". *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology*,

23(1): 119-132.

Vaughan, O. (2006). Chieftaincy Structures, Communal Identity and Decolonization in Yorubaland,' in T. Falola, and A. Gennova (eds.) *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*. Rochester, Rochester University Press, pp. 177-228.

Vickers, Michael (2000). *Ethnicity and Sub-Nationalism in Nigeria: Movement for a Mid-West State*. Oxford: Worldview Publisher.

Waterman, C.A. (1990). *Juju: A Social History and Ethnography of an African Popular Music*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Watson, R. (2003). *Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan: Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City*. Oxford: James Curry.

Woppman, David (1998). *International Law and Ethnic Conflict*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Wright, D. (1999). 'What do you mean? There were no Tribes in Africa: Thoughts on Boundaries and Related Matters in Pre-colonial Africa'. *History in Africa*, 26: 409-426.

Theatre and Nation-building in Nigeria Since Independence

6

REMI ADEMOLA ADEDOKUN

INTRODUCTION

The impact of theatre on Nigerian society since independence these fifty years has been most conspicuous, vigorous and transforming. The works of Hubert Ogunde Music Party of the 1940s introduced Nigerians to the significance of theatre in nation building. The utilisation of theatre in creating awareness for the nascent nationalism by Herbert Macauley made theatre a prominent instrument of change in the 1940s and 1950s.

Theatre practice came in two categories. i.e. the Yoruba professional Travelling Theatre and the English Literary Theatre. The early plays of Hubert Ogunde like, "Bread and Bullet", "Tigher's Empire" and "Yoruba Ronu" were revolutionary plays that sensitised and prepared Nigerians for positive change. Such plays escalated the agitation for independence. The theatre of English expression as exponented by Wole Soyinka, J.P Clark Bekeredemo, Femi Osofisan, and other writers played significant roles in shaping cultural

socio-political focus of government these fifty years.

In a culture which has no traditional respect for the theatre, one expects nothing short of shoddy and negligent treatment of such a trifling profession. This pessimism is valid and founded on the nondescript attitude of the Nigerian majority to the arts. Surprisingly, this sardonic view has recently proved incongruous. Like in any democratic cultures where all facets of human endeavour have been given the chance to compete and thrive on the principle of survival for the fittest, theatre has flourished satisfactorily in Nigeria since independence.

Its impact is monumental in the proliferation of theatre troupes and theatre departments in Nigerian universities. Government's demonstrated recognition of theatre and the massive support by the mass media and the people whose mode of life it has tremendously transformed are sure signs of its success. Though the road has not been very smooth, it has not been as worse as anticipated either. Before we analyse the impact of the theatre, we shall review the growth of this phenomenon since independence.

THEATRE DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Beginning from 1960, when Wole Soyinka returned to Nigeria with a Farfield Research Fellowship grant to explore, groom and evolve a true Nigerian dramatic form, theatre took off with a bang and in very long strides too in a few succeeding years. Serious search for a theatre that could be truly called 'Nigerian' was launched with his play *A Dance of the Forest* performed by his newly auspicated troupe – the 1960 Masks.

Long before Soyinka and the 1960 Masks appeared, the Concert Theatres otherwise appelated Travelling Theatre had been carrying on a flourishing trade in the theatre. Typified by such theatrical gems as Hubert Ogunde Theatre, Kola Ogunmola Theatre, Duro Ladipo, Oyin Adejobi, and a crop of other talented artists, these Yoruba operatic theatres had fallowed the theatrical ground for the Nigerian theatres of English expression to explore and exploit. They were professional troupes with commercial orientation. They enjoyed neither government subsidy nor foreign aid as the new arrival (Theatre of English Expression), but depended on their management skill and business acumenism to remain solvent.

Rivalry between both categories of theatre was at this moment set in motion. Each had plodded the rough road with much unease, hardship and constraints. Without gainsaying, it is evident that the commercial theatre has emerged successfully – being more persistent and better understood.

A coterie of writers like J.P. Clark and Wole Soyinka found solace and support at the Mbari Club – a truly indigenous cultural centre founded in Ibadan in 1961, Osogbo in 1962 and Enugu in 1963. Many plays, poems,

paintings, etc. came out of this experimental cultural workshop. The present writer joined this organisation in 1969. The inspiration derived from the Mbari Club had been instrumental in our founding the Osogbo City Theatre Centre and the Osogbo City Theatre Company in 1974.

There was a major theatrical breakthrough in 1963. The School of Drama of the University of Ibadan was established with a $200,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation of New York. The same year Ogunmola Travelling Theatre was taken into residence by the school for six months – an overt recognition of the Travelling Theatre by the University. Ogunmola Theatre thus replaced the defunct University Travelling Theatre. Wole Soyinka's Orisun Repertory Theatre, made possible in 1964 with funds from Farfield Foundation of New York was another milestone in Nigerian theatre history. In the following year, Duro Ladipo National Theatre and his *Oba Koso* represented Nigeria in the First Commonwealth Arts Festival in Britain. And with his play *The Gods Are Not to Blame*, Ola Rotimi emerged as a full-fledged playwright from the Ori Olokun Cultural Centre established by the University of Ife in 1968.

The first decade of independent Nigeria was very productive theatrically. Political instability, national craze for prestigious projects and a buoyant economy were some of the factors that contributed to the precocious maturity of the theatre in the 1970s. Yearly national and state festivals of the arts and culture during the second decade was another stimulant to the theatrical jobbery. The building of the multi-million Naira National Theatre in Lagos and hosting of the 2nd World Black and African Festival of the Arts and Culture in 1977 (FESTAC '77) culminated in the creative aspirations of the Nigerian artistes.

Impact on Nigerian Society

The growth of theatre has been astronomic and precocious. This is neither due to the maturity of the Nigerian artistes nor the preparedness of the Nigerian society, but is consequent upon the benevolence giving of the American philanthropic foundations. The home government had not been too much awake to its responsibilities and the people had no thorough vision about the arts. A rich harvest of talents nurtured by these foreign aids in their assiduity bludgeoned the arts (theatre in particular) to the present awareness and prestige. The Travelling Theatres also succeeded in establishing the sociological values and the economic viability of this chequered and uncertain trade.

In order to fully appreciate the impact of theatre on society and the depth of the labour of pioneer artists we have to bring the following into focus:

(i)   Sociological theories of the arts.
(ii)   Social implications of the theatre.

(iii)   Functions and meanings of performing art in society.
(iv)   Performing arts audience.
(v)   Relationship between the government and the performing arts.
(vi)   The social position of the performing artist.
(vii)   The amount of information and research facilities available on the arts.

To achieve these we have to determine the extent, type and quality of the interaction between art and society. Since most of the above items have been previously touched upon in this essay we can now safely glide into the critical appreciation of this art medium.

Whatever barometer or criteria we employ in judging the theatre since independence – the impact remains patent, conspicuous and overwhelming. It has helped in reshaping and achieving national socio-political and cultural objectives. Theatrical dynamism has been applied to evoke a new sense of direction and instill new moral values. The instance will be divided into two:

(1)   The Commercial Travelling Theatre
(2)   The non-profit Educational Theatre

The Travelling Theatre

The impact of Travelling Theatre is well catalogued in the literary and performance output of the Nigerian theatrical agencies. This commercial theatre has for the past fifty-nine (since 1946) years been the mainstay of the theatre profession. Its gradational evolution from 'concert' to 'dramatic' theatre is well manifested in our theatrical history. Proliferation of this genre of theatre had tripled since independence and over three hundred unionised troupes can now be listed as belonging to that group. The immutable commercial attributes that questioned its artistic significance has in fact been the pith of its continued existence. Because it uses the people's language it has been tagged the 'people's theatre'. This has given it a measure of popularity over its rival educational theatre of English expression. Martin Banham in his *African Theatre Today* (pp. 21-22) has this to say:

> For the Yoruba Opera communicates through so many facets and different languages, with the acting, dancing and music all making statements of importance and precision, so that the visual communication often breaks through the language barrier – a fact, it must be remembered, as vital within Nigeria, where Yoruba is only one of many languages, as it is outside.[1]

Language, no doubt, plays a prominent role in theatrical life of a people for it is through their own language and idioms that ideas and information could be well received. Jean-Paul Satre airing his views on "People's Theatre"

said many interesting things which I crave indulgence to quote because of their relevance to this essay. Some of them are:

> For a people's audience the first thing you have to do is to produce its own plays – plays written for it and speaking to it.

This people's theatre does not make for segregation in any way:

> Our subjects must be social subjects, the major subjects in the world we live in, those we have become aware of.

> . . . the action in the theatre must be very plain, very specific, and above all we must change the audience.[2]

All these characterised the travelling theatre. If it is the responsibility of the theatre to depict man in his everyday relationship with others, his conflicts and solutions, his actions – be they progressive or regressive, of tragic or comic consequences, which work for the total elevation or degradation of the society - then its onerous duty is to change the mind of humanity and form of matter for good or for evil. The theatre must have an impact, therefore, on the society that supplies its raw materials and on which it thrives. The Nigerian Travelling Theatre seems to be more adequately equipped to meet Jean-Paul Satre's prerequisites for an active people's theatre that is capable of effecting a social change. As if in realisation of this essence, the universities had established repertory companies of their own several times without success. If finally they succeed, language and not management skill may be the bane of their ventures. J.P. Clark says:

> But it can be safely said that each traditional piece does pride to the language of its people at all levels of meanings such as T.S. Eliot outlined for poetry in the theatre. So we believe does the Folk theatre at present mainly in Yoruba.[3]

The major exponents of the Travelling Theatre are Hubert Ogunde, Kola Ogunmola, Oyin Adejobi, Duro Ladipo, Moses Olaiya, etc. Their modes of dramatic productions are as variegated as their theatrical styles. Whatever be their individual approach to theatre, they have all made various impact on the society. Let us examine some of their works.

Ogunde exploited the cultural pastimes, domestic, social and political situations in his 'operatic' enactments. He is the only dramatist who has openly satirised serious political and social issues. In such plays as *Yoruba Ronu, Aiye, Mama Eko, Ologbo Dudu*, Ogunde utilised socio-political and cultural materials which had immediate impact on the society. *Yoruba Ronu*, a highly explosive political drama satirising the political situation in the former Western Region incurred the displeasure of the Premier, Chief Ladoke Akintola. As a result, Ogunde theatre was banned from performing in the Western Region in 1964. In her own record of events, Ebun Clark says:

Ogunde's aim in composing *Yoruba Ronu* was to ask Yoruba people to unite once again to become one of the most powerful and prosperous groups in Nigeria. Given the political atmosphere of that period, the song became immensely popular.[4]

This play is a call to action. People's choice of leadership was influenced and whether or not this aggravated the prevailing chaotic situation or mitigated the political hostility is a case for political scientists to determine. According to Banham:

> Many of Ogunde's plays combine simple moral stories with a real understanding of the' grievances of ordinary people. More than any other Nigerian playwright, Ogunde has captured and projected the feelings of the masses.[5]

However, Ogunde's plays lack cultural depth and tragic intensity which distinguish Duro Ladipo from any other artiste of the same calibre.

Duro Ladipo and his National Theatre has four outstanding historical plays to his credit. They are *Oba Koso, Moremi, Oba Moro* and *Oba Waja*. These plays explore, highlight and extol the Yoruba royal heroism. *Oba Koso* (The King did not Hang) – a posthumous nick-name for King Sango of Oyo who hanged himself to scorn his formidable adversary, Gbonka. *Moremi* is about an Ife heroine (Queen) of the same name who having achieved victory for her people over the villainous Igbo marauders immolated her only son, Oluorogbo, o propitiate the beneficent goddess of Esinmirin River who had granted her the victory. Lere Paimo who graduated from Duro Ladipo's school of tragic cultural heroism follows his master's footsteps in his plays – *Ogbori Elemeso, Ajagun Nla*, etc.

Kola Ogunmola's *Palm Wine Drinkard* and *Aditu Olodumare* glorify Yoruba folklore, myths and mythology. Oyin Adejobi's plays *Kuye, Orogun Adedigba* and *Ekuro Oloja* spotlighted socio-cultural issues. Isola Ogunsola's *Efunsetan* and *Basorun Gaa* fall in line with Duro Ladipo's historical plays.

The extent of the popularity of the farcical theatres of Moses Olaiya (Alawada), Ola Omonitan (Ajimajasan), Ojo Ladipo (Baba Mero) is better imagined than explained. There is much resemblance to the Charlie Chaplin technique of acting. Their themes are drawn from everyday social misnomers, corruption and vices. Obscenity, ribaldry and sheer vulgarity provide the verve of this highly extemporaneous theatrical species. As Charlie Chaplin once said:

> Comedy must be real and true to life, my comedy is actual life with the slightest twist or exaggeration to bring out what it might be under certain circumstances.[6]

These set of comedians hold individuals, social institutions and vices up

to ridicule in order to effect a positive change. Some of these plays include – *De Director, Taxi Driver, Ah Baba Sala*.

The impact of these various Yoruba travelling theatres are manifold. They have rekindled people's interest in their own cultural history. They have been so educative, and corrective, so great is their influence on the society that national policies, social norms and morals have been affected directly or indirectly. Banham concludes his observation on this theatre by saying:

> We mentioned above that the Yoruba operas, in addition to being rich entertainment, were vehicles for information, and ideas. This is an important point to stress, for through the work of the leading practitioners, Yoruba history has been explored and popularised and the lore playwrights of the people has been given new life and vigour. The cultural contribution of the companies, and of such actor/playwrights as Ladipo and Ogunmola has been and remains considerable.[7]

The travelling theatres have been able to achieve these onerous impact due to the following reasons:

(i)   They are accessible to the vast majority of people due to their ubiquity and the flexibility in their production techniques.

(ii) They use indigenous language and themes which are familiar to their audience.

(iii) Their message is not evasive as that of theatre in English.

(iv) There is no rigid adherence to the Western mode of production and aesthetic criteria.

(v)   They are fearless and independent.

(vi) And above all they are on going business concerns owned by individuals who personally administer them.

Today the Yoruba Travelling Theatre has abandoned the stage (live theatre) for the screen, producing video films massively. The film business has become so captivating and economically secure that their foreign language counterparts have also found succour in film-making. The international film market has been invaded and by the present estimation, Nigeria has become the number 3 film-producing nation after America and India. The works of great Yoruba writers like Professor Akinwumi Isola and Chief Adebayo Faleti have tremendously improved theatre influences on the Nigerian society more than ever before. Their works have been transferred to the screen by Tunde Kelani the talented film producer.

The Educational Theatre

The educational theatre, otherwise labelled literary theatre of English expression, took a definite shape in 1960 with the rise of the Nigerian drama

in English. The emergence of playwrights like Soyinka, Clark, and Rotimi from Mbari Club and Ori Olokun cultural experiments accelerated the growth of the literary theatre. Unlike the Yoruba operatic theatre which was improvisational, the Nigerian drama in English was scripted. Wole Soyinka's plays *A Dance of the Forest, Kongi's Harvest, The Lion and the Jewel* are among his earliest creative works.

J.P. Clark has a number of published works such as *Song of A Goat, Masquerade* and *The Raft.* Among Ola Rotimi's widely read works are *The Gods Are Not to Blame, Kurumi* and *Ovonramwen Nogbaisi.* The second generation Nigerian playwrights whose works now fill the bookshelves are Wale Ogunyemi, Zulu Sofola, Femi Osofisan, Egbuna, Bode Sowande, Bode Osanyin, Stella Oyedepo, etc.

University Theatre Companies, High School Dramatic Societies and Amateur Theatre groups have been the sole producers of drama in English. The universities have constantly attempted to raise professional companies that would be durable and viable as the Yoruba Travelling theatres. The University of Ibadan alone has tried this many times. Beginning with the Arts Theatre Production Group (ATPG) (1957-1961), other theatre companies include the University Traveling Theatre (1961-1966), School of Drama Acting Company (1967-1970), University Theatre Art Company (UTAC) (1970/1971), The Masques (1974-1980), Unibadan Performing Company (UPC) (1980-1986) and the University of Ibadan Theatre Arts Troupe (UITAT) (1987-1998) whose Artistic Director is the present writer. The Vice Chancellor, however, promised to fund UITAT in 1996, but subsequent heads of department have not considered its revival as of utmost importance due to lack of proper funding. The purpose is simply to take drama to the people just like the Yoruba travelling theatres, most especially during long vacations. Whether or not they succeeded or failed is not the immediate concern of this paper, but rather the impact they have on the society which was tremendous in national outlook and attitudinal change.

What impact has the drama or theatre in English? The strength and potency of this theatre lies in its scripted form – which endows it with personality and permanence. The plays could be bought in shops and read at one's leisure and also performed on stage or filmed. Theatre in English has increased the volume of written texts on drama and dramatic literature. It has focused Nigerian readers' attention on the beauty of African culture and oral literature that was exclusive to the illiterate custodians. It has also succeeded in placing the beauty of African literature on the international arena which in part has helped in promoting international understanding through various international cultural exchange programmes.

The English medium of expression has impeded wider home consumption of these dramatic works due to mass illiteracy. This language dilemma has

on several occasions been subject of heated arguments among writers. Some writers have fiddled with pidgin in their frantic bid to forge a commonly acceptable literary lingua franca without success.

Although the sources of materials of this theatre are same as Yoruba Travelling Theatre, the tragedy of an uneducated masses make their work less impressive. Making a contribution on drama in the *Living Culture of Nigeria,* edited by Saburi Biobaku (p. 137). Ola Rotimi says:

> A salient feature in the works of these dramatists is their probe into resources of Nigerian history – not simply in fulfilment of a nationalistic impulse to re-create a people's past but rather to unfold that past for the better understanding of a people's identity in order to direct their future.

A critical analysis of the literary works of these English and Yoruba playwrights/dramatists reveals great similarity in their source of raw materials. Both works of art succeed in:

(1) instilling a new sense of direction into Nigerian Culture;
(2) establishing new moral and social values;
(3) creating venues for profitable utilisation of leisure hours;
(3) establishing a literary tradition in the theatre and placing Nigerian drama on international perspective;
(4) awakening people's interest in the performing arts;
(5) expanding the vocational possibilities of the theatre.

These definitely form part of the impact of the theatre on Nigerian society since independence. The rate at which theatrical activities are censored affirms the reality that theatre is the custodian of the people's conscience and a very powerful instrument of social change.

Radio and television, two giants of the mass media, have through media drama, dramatised jingles and advertisements made the impact of theatre more purposeful and widespread. With the advent of film and video recording, the Nigerian theatre is assured of a richer and promising future. The establishment of the National Theatre Troupe certainly marks the attainment of a theatrical millennium which we have all been anticipating and itching for.

The effective power of the theatre to change circumstances for development can be further examined in the agitprop guerrilla theatre of Soyinka at Ife about which Professor Tunde Adeniran has written extensively in his *The Politics of Wole Soyinka.* Through these short, radical political plays the functions Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), has been externalised and popularised. His *The Road* exposes the idiocycracies of drivers, spare-parts sellers, touts, conductors, road users to address the issues of carnage on Nigerian roads and allied road users.

Although the modern theatre is characteristically wearing diverse masks of operation, its common ultimate goal is human happiness and development. Martin Esslin, a renowned theatre critic and writer has proclaimed its political relevance and social prowess by saying:

> A great deal has been spoken and written in the last decades about politically committed art, and especially about political theatre, drama as an instrument of social and political change. And there can be no doubt that the theatre – and drama in its wider connotation, which extends to the cinema and the electronic mass media – is a powerful political weapon. The use made of theatre in totalitarian society of all types is widely noticed and discussed phenomenon of our times.

A good appreciation of the theatre must begin from the cognition that theatre is an art through which man seeks to understand the world in which he lives, influence it and change it through drama, dance, music, literature, painting, architecture, lighting, mime and sculpture. In drama, man is seen in his infinite interactions with other people and his environment. John Hodgson and Ernest Richards observe that "Drama is the only form in which we can fully use man in the exploration of himself in living situation". Theatre is, therefore, very wide, and vibrant: consequently, a powerful institution in world development. It has powerfully influenced all aspects of Nigerian society. Although live theatre is almost choked to extinction, the electronic reproduction of dramatic arts has made theatre available to everybody through Nollywood films.

REFERENCES

Reiss, Alvin H. (1976). *The Arts Management Handbook*, Law, Arts Pub. N.Y.

Biobaku, Saburi, *The Living Culture of Nigeria*.

Clark, Ebun (1970). *Hubert Ogunde: The Making of Nigerian Theatre*.

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1977). *Sartre on Theatre*, Quarter Book, Lon.

Hodgson, John and Barnes Richard (1978). "Drama as Synthesis" from *The Uses of Drama: An Anthology* (London: Methuen) p. 215.

Banham, M. and C. Wake (1971). *African Theatre Today*, Pitman Publ.

Esslin , Martin (1977). *An Anatomy of Drama* (N.Y. Hill and Wang) p. 95.

Ogunba, Oyin and A. Irele (ed.) (1978). *Theatre in Africa*, IUP.

Greyser, S.A. (ed.(1973). *Cultural Policy and Arts Administration*

Kennedy, Scott (1977). *In Search of African Theatre*, Scribler N.Y.

Killam, G.D. (ed.) (1997) *African Writers on African Writing*, Heinemann.

Adeniran, Tunde (1994). *The Politics of Wole Soyinka*, Ibadan: Fountain Publications, pp. 53-79.

Cahn, W., *The Laugh Makers: A Pictorial History of American Comedians*. Bramball House N.Y.

Interplay of Ethnic Politics in Russia and Nigeria

KAYODE OMOTADE

7

INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity, ethnic nationalism and ethnic politics are some of the most recent, but highly complex and contentious issues in contemporary international politics that have led to the fragmentation of many plural societies. The conflict situations in the DR Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Iraq and Palestine, former Yugoslavia, and Nigeria; new state formations in the Balkans; and the re-interpretation and re-assertion of historical memories and myths in the defunct USSR and modern Russia especially exemplify the salience of ethnicity as a critical factor and challenge to nation building.

The USSR exemplified a society in which multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity and multilingualism catalysed disintegration. Research has shown that the greatest challenges to Russia and Nigeria's stability and unity are internal problems of persistent nationalism and internecine ethnic politics.

Nigeria's unity has been threatened several times by various internecine

conflicts: Muslims versus Christians, northerners versus southerners, the Ijaw versus Itsekiri, Ijaw versus Ilaje, Zango-Kataf, Ife versus Modakeke, her direct neighbour. The Ogoni case and the recurring Niger Delta crises adumbrate these ethnic crises.

The national question both in Russia and Nigeria borders on ethnic pluralism and has more serious implications for the future of Nigeria especially. Unity and nation building is, therefore, impossible without addressing the perennial problems of ethno-national conflicts. This paper seeks to answer the perennial and enduring questions of ethnic nationalism as a bane of nation-building in Nigeria using the Soviet and the Russian example. It is believed that Nigeria would draw lessons from the Soviet and the Russian experience.

In this paper, I argue that language was an integral aspect of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism (ethno-nationalism) that led to the collapse of the defunct Soviet Union. This has widespread implications for modern Russia and it also provides lessons for Nigeria as a means of nation building and stability. I will pay special attention to linguistic issues, which along with debates over political status of modern Russia played an important role in shaping the current state of inter-ethnic interplay. Here, some conceptual analysis would help shed light on this study.

The terms 'Russia' and 'Soviet Union', for many, including journalists, teachers, students, academics and politicians are synonyms of each other. On the other hand, a lot of bias still exists when these terms are mentioned arising from the foreign language, Russian, that is indeed foreign, and the age-old ideology of socialism which has since metamorphosed through Mikhail Gorbachev's 4-point policies of *glasnost, perestroika*, democratisation and acceleration.

Russia, otherwise officially known as the Russian Federation as well as other former Soviet republics has for a long period been associated with linguistic diversity and ethnic conflicts which proved to be less amenable to accommodation than class or ideological conflicts. Six full-scale wars have occurred in the defunct Soviet Union, including conflicts in Nargono-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester, South-Ossetia (Georgia), Tajikistan, and Chechnya. It has also been observed that 'strained ethnic relations mostly between the Russian-speaking population and titular groups may become conflictual in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Baltics' (Drobizheva Leokadia, 1996). Potential for ethnic conflicts also exists in other Russian republics. According to Mart Rannut (1995: 195), "Due to the political changes, economic disaster, and the consequent redivision of the status of languages, there will continue to be tensions and conflicts in the territories of the former Soviet Union".

What proportion of the Soviet Union population is composed of Russians?

What is the nationalities question which the Soviet Union inherited from the Russian Empire but still plagues it to this day? What is the politics of language in the Soviet Union? These are the enduring questions this paper hopes to provide answers to.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

It is imperative that to obtain a thorough understanding of the characteristics of Russia as a federal state, it is essential to take into account the historic Russian Empire and the processes that took place therein. These processes are linked with each other in profound dialectical unit of Russia as a federal state.

The historical origins of the Russian state pre-Revolution are chiefly those of the East Slavs, i.e. the ethnic group that metamorphosed into the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples. Each of Russia's 100 nationalities has a separate but distinct history and complex origins. The major pre-Soviet states of the East Slavs were medieval Kievan Rus', Muscovy and the Russian Empire. Kievan Rus' ultimately disintegrated as a state due to armed struggles among members of the princely family that collectively possessed it. The Mongols in the 13th century eventually conquered Kievan Rus' and was subsequently claimed by a number of states to be heirs to the civilisation and dominant position of Kievan Rus'. One of those states, Muscovy was predominantly a Russian territory, thus forming the basis for the future Russian empire, the erstwhile multinational Soviet Union and the present Russian Federation.

The Russians as an ethnic group sprang up from the East Slavs, one of the three groups into which the original Slavic people divided sometime before the 7th century A.D. The West Slavs eventually became differentiated as the Poles, Czechs and Serbs and Slovenes. The East Slavs became more politically united in the 10th century when they adopted Christianity as the state religion of Kievan Rus'. However, tribal and regional differences were exacerbated in subsequent centuries as the state expanded, thus bringing the East Slavs into contact with other ethnic groups on their borders. Thus, Baltic and Finno-Ugric tribes mixed with the East Slavs, to the northwest and the northeast respectively.

Another salient characteristic of Russian history which one should note, and which formed part of her eventual break-up was her territorial expansion, which ultimately culminated into a rather enormous geographical territory covering one-eighth of the world's land surface. This expansion started with Muscovy and efforts to consolidate Russian territory as Tatar control waned in the 15th century, expansion thus went beyond areas that were ethnically Russian, and by the early 18th century, the principality of Muscovy

metamorphosed into the expansive Russian empire, stretching from Poland eastward to the Pacific Ocean. Russia's intimidating geographical size and military might catapulted her into a major European power economically, politically, and militarily, while the acquisition of large territories inhabited by non-Russians peoples began a simply enduring pattern of nationality problems that exists up till today.

An important epoch of Russian history which one must not fail to mention is that of Peter the Great, for the history of Russia would never be complete without his name. Russian history has been brilliantly described by Lionel Kochan in his *The Making of Modern Russia* (1973). Peter, born in the Kremlin in 1672, was certainly the most venturesome and vigorous of all Tsars in his efforts to create a Russia (as Muskovy was renamed in his reign) able to rank with the West. Peter's efforts had been described thus by Stalin, the man whose own historical role is most clearly analogous:

> When Peter the Great was confronted with the more advanced countries of the west, and feverishly went about building factories and mills to supply his army and improve the defense of the country, it was a peculiar attempt to jump out of the framework of backwardness.

Peter's foreign policy barely differed from those of the 16th and 17th century Tsars. However, it was a fight for outlets to the seas, thus by the end of the 17th century the struggle for the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea, and the shores of the Caspian was added to the traditional and perennial Baltic struggle. Dziewanowski (1997) contributing to the vast literature of Russian territorial expansion, avers that besides the quick consolidation of Tsarist absolutism and the enserfment of the peasants, another characteristic feature of Muscovite – Russian development was the phenomenal territorial expansion of Muscovy in all directions with the annexation of the Tatar city-states Kazan and Astrakhan during the 16th century, Muskovy acquired its first major non-Slavic territory . . . from the Volga bases, a rapid largely spontaneous movement developed; it proceeded eastward beyond the Urals and toward the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and the Pacific Ocean: Siberia, a sub-continent larger than the United States, was conquered in a short sixty-two years . . . Muscovy's territorial expansion was unprecedented in history, as early as 1600 it was as large as the rest of the Europe, and by the middle of the 17th century – even before the conquests of Peter the Great, Muscovy was the largest country in the world. Thus, the Russians managed to build a huge empire before they became a nation in the modern sense of the term. This priority of foreign, colonial expansion over domestic problems has been one of the striking features of Russia's historic evolution.

There are many valid reasons for Muscovy's expansion and "urge to the sea":

(1) was the perpetual hunger for fresh resources, especially agricultural; in a primitive, extensive economy, more and more land was needed,

(2) colonisation, especially from lands seized from the partition of Poland – Lithuania. These expensive and centralistic tendencies were paralleled by the desire to proselytise and spread the Russian language and culture to the Greek orthodox faith to the farthest Tsarist domains,

(3) the most striking representative of the new dynasty as it were then, that ascended the Muscovite throne in 1613 – the Romanovs – was Peter I (1682-1725).

Peter's burning desire was to obtain access to the sea, to open "a window to the West" as a continuation of his imperial expansion. From the 18th century, through the efforts of Peter and Catherine the Great, Muscovy was transformed from a static, almost isolated traditional state into the more *dynamic,* partially westernised and secularised Russian empire. Catherine the Great's reign was also notable for imperial expansion which brought the empire huge new territories in the south and west, and for internal consolidation. Pokshishevsky (1974:60), commented equivocally on the origin of the Russian Empire thus:

> The Russian empire was frequently referred to as a "living ethnological museum" . . . it presented a motley picture of its races, languages, national dress, traditions, and religions.

Other credible historians have also underlined the distinction of Russia's intimidating geographical size and ethnic composition.

The great Russian historian, Vasily Khuchevsky, in Dziewasnosky (1997:23) observes that "colonisation is the essence of Russian history". Thus, from this foregoing, one can submit that the establishment of the Great Russian Empire was a consequence of a variety of methods of practice, purchase, outright conquests, acquisition by diplomatic means and the conclusion of treaties and finally, in agreement with Khuchevsky, **colonisation**.

Thus, the foreseen collapse of the huge Russian Empire in 1917 had raised the hopes of many of its disparate subject peoples; at last, it seemed, their national rights would be respected. They limited their aspiration, therefore, to the hope that the destruction of tsarist autocracy would pave the way for some sort of federal arrangement in a democratised multinational state (Nahaylo and Swoboda 1989).

THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

The history of Russia between 1922 and 1991 is essentially the history of the Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]). The Soviet Union, an ideology-based empire, was roughly coterminous with the Russian

Empire. The Soviet Union was established in December 1922 by the leaders of the Russian Communist Party, popularly called the Bolsheviks. At that time, the new nation formed from the ruins of the Russian empire included Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and the Trans-Caucasian republics.

A number of historians have shown that any study on the Soviet Union must start with the size and shape, and among them is M.K. Dziewanoskwi (1997) in her contention:

> The Soviet Union represented the largest national landmass on the face of the earth. The enormity of the former Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation is perhaps the most striking feature of Russia's geographical personality.

Although one does not disagree with Dziewanoskwi's analysis, one important aspect that was not reflected in her study is the ethnic composition and huge population that existed in the Soviet Union which has been a bane of integration. Pokshishevsky (1974:07) working from a similar perspective also traces the fundamental character of the Soviet Union as:

> A vast country with a great diversity of natural and economic conditions and inhabited by scores of people, speaking a multitude of languages, attracts widespread interest in all parts of the world. On the land, the USSR borders 12 states – six in Europe and six in Asia. More than any other country the USSR borders on countries with diverse socio-economic systems, socialist (in Europe and Asia), highly developed capitalist states and finally young developing countries sharing borders with the former USSR are Norway, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia (now Czech and Slovak republics), Hungary and Romania. In Asia, we have Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, China, and North Korea (Czech and Slovak republic, my inclusion).

From Pokshishevsky's view, the Soviet Union had greatly been influenced both by European and Asiatic cultures by virtue of border-sharing and geography. Another salient point to be deduced is that the Soviet Union had been host to scores of people, multiple languages, varying cultures, and an influence of diverse socio-economic systems; socialism and capitalism.

A vanguard of scholars and authors have also commented on the complexity of the Soviet Union. One of them is J. Hill Ronald (1989:01), who avers that:

> the size of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is by far the largest territorial state in the World, lying in the Northern hemisphere and covering one sixth of the land surface of the globe, as large as the face of the Moon, the country sprawls across Europe and Asia, from Poland to the Pacific and beyond.

It is, indeed, a truism that the Soviet Union was the largest territory in the world as Hill metaphorically states. This interesting statement also echoes

the observations of various scholars on Soviet history.

Valliant and Richard (1995) buttress further the literature on the Soviet Union by maintaining that to better understand the history of this country; one should first examine the land it occupies. They stress that the Soviet Union was immense; it was the world's only country to occupy a sizeable portion of two continents (Asia and Europe). This peculiar location has posed a dilemma for the Russian and Soviet leaders.

As Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda (1989:04), contributing to the vast literature on the Soviet Union, observes:

> The Soviet Union is the world's largest multinational state. It is structured as a federation of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs); these are also referred to as Union republics, understanding the fact that they are the constituent entities forming the Soviet Union. Each Union republic has the right to free secession from the USSR, a guarantee that is enshrined both in the USSR Constitution and in those of each Union republic. Two of them, the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian SSRs, are members of the United Nations both in their own right, and as constituent parts of the USSR. The Soviet republics are constituted along ethnic lines. Ethnic differences among the major nations comprising the Soviet Union are considerable. At one end of the scale, there are the three members of the East Slavonic group, Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, whose languages originate from Common Slavonic and are related in much the same way as the three Romance languages of the Iberian Peninsula, Castilian Spanish, Portuguese and Catalan.

It has also been argued that the Soviet Union was the last of the empires of the 20th century, and that like all empires in the past, it had no merits of holding itself, therefore it was destined to crumble and eventually vanish. As historian Yuri Afanasyev opines in Valery Tiskov (1997:24), "the USSR was neither a country nor a state. The Eurasian territory thus mapped is a world of worlds comprising different cultures and civilisations . . . and the USSR as a country had no future". Afanasyevs opinion is one of various interpretations that have been given on the history of inter-ethnic relations and causes of ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was an empire that was constructed on serious arguments, territorial expansion, colonial methods of rule, forced cultural assimilation of ethnic groups, and use of a dominant language that was not theirs.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union, following the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940, contained fifteen constituent republics, namely: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, (now Belarus), Georgia, (now republic of Georgia), Kazakhstan,

Kirgiziya (now Kyrgyzstan), Moldavia (now Moldova) Russia (now the Russian Federation) Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. It also contained 20 autonomous Soviet Socialist republics, 16 republics within Russia, 2 within Georgia, 1 each in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. Russia is a multinational state that has inherited many of the nationality problems that plagued the former Soviet Union.

Valery Tishkov (1997:27) while commenting on the ethnic composition of the former Soviet Union enthuses that the multi-ethnic composition of the state's population had evolved over the course of centuries of territorial expansion in the form of military conquests, colonisation and the development of new lands carried out by the state, first in the form of the Moscow Principality and later the so-called Russian Centralised State.

The last official census of 1989 listed more than 100 nationalities inhabiting the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation, the chief inheritor of the Soviet Union, still is home to more than 100 national minorities, whose members co-exist uneasily with the numerically and politically predominant Russians.

The ethnic composition of the Soviet Union is aptly summarised by Curtis Glenn (1996) when he submits that according to the 1989 Soviet census, Russia constituted 81.5 percent of the population of what is now the Russian Federation.

The next largest group were the Tatars (3.8%), Ukrainians (3.0%), Chuvash (1.2%) Bashkirs (0.9%), Byelorussians (0.8%) and Moldavians, (0.7%), other groups totalling more than 0.5 percent of the population each were, Armenians, Avars, Chechens, Germans, Jews, Kazaks, Mari, and Udmurts. In 1922, estimated 7.8 million people natives to the other fourteen former Soviet republics were living in Russia.

From the existing literature on Russia's ethnic composition, the formation of the federal state of the former Soviet Union was a consequence of a compromised political and ideological debate during the revolutionary period.

Thus, the Soviet Union existed as a truly multinational federal state where ethnic and national rights were enshrined and institutionalised under the form of Union republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous regions. Consequently, this ethnic mosaic resulted into the encapsulation of the national question into the multi-layered structure of the Soviet state, through incorporation, forced absorption and annexation.

Ideology apart, it is my contention that the territorial principle of the Soviet Union federalism was the dispensation of a geopolitical strategy aimed at spreading communism throughout the world. This position aptly explains the 1924 Soviet constitution where the rights of the republics were not only to join the Union, but also to secede from it. The right to secede, as stipulated in the 1924 Constitution was probably a clause Josef Stalin had failed to

realise would be the bane of holding the artificial Union together.

Looking at the composition of the former Soviet Union, one can conclude that Russia has indeed metamorphosed from "one perestroika to another", the ethnically mixed peoples of the Soviet Union were allowed self-definition based on their primary, national, and ethnic identity, the ideological void eventually created by the failure of Marxism-Leninism led to subdued cynicism and rediscovered nationalism which eventually led to disintegration in December 1991.

What is Language?

When we talk about language, what do we have in mind? Which out of the various definitions of language do we find most appropriate, especially for this study? Language has thus been subjected to a multitude of valid definitions by various authors and scholars, but we shall not engage in the various arguments about which definition is valid, and that which is not but for the sake of clarity, we shall mention some accepted definitions. Starting on this basis, Odunuga (1995:02) alluding to language as a property of an ethnic group confirms that:

> The members of such a group cannot restrict the use of the language which they regard as their own to themselves. It becomes a property to others, in an attempt to facilitate communication . . .

Language, therefore, serves not only as a means of communication, but mainly as an important means of expression (verbal and tacit), conceptualisation and symbolisation. These attributes of language as mentioned above are inextricably linked to culture, history, economy, religion, social life, ethnic identity and the political expression of every society. Within this context, language is a complex issue mainly because it is heavily tied to identity.

For an example of how strong a political variable language is, one is compelled to take on board the postulation of Eamon de Valera who had been actively involved in Ireland's fight for independence from British rule, especially the revival of Irish language. He argues in Montefiore (2005) that:

> Language is a chief characteristic of nationhood – the embodiment, as it were, of the nation's personality and the closest bond between its people. No nation with a language of its own would willingly abandon it.

Healy (1967:19), however, avers that "language, whether one's own or one acquired later is a gateway to a culture, as well as a means of communication." In sum, language is everything; it embodies and contains all other issues. Adumbrating this assertion is Whorf, as cited in West (1975:187): "Language is the "best show" and most remarkable accomplishment of man".

Isayev (1997), however, posits that "Language is an important, stable, and the most obvious indicator of a nation". Thus, with the foregoing, and to pursue our analysis, the fact that has frequently been noted is that language is a strong human variable. Thus, for the purpose of this study, we shall align with Isayev's definition as stated *inter alia*, language is an important, stable and the most obvious indicator of a nation.

The long history of Russian colonisation and the attendant penetration of the Russian language in all the national and territorial areas of the Soviet Union led to a complex interplay of linguistic diversity and ethnic conflicts. Thus, as a means of assimilating new territories and nationalities into its fold, factors such as religion, culture, politics and most importantly education were used to facilitate the linguistic shifts to Russian.

A brief, but succinct historical excursion into the politics of language in the former Soviet Union is pertinent to this study. According to Lewis (1981:46),

> The linguistic and ethnic composition of the populations of the Soviet Union . . . is the product of the conquest of some territories, the more or less pacific acquisition of others, as well as colonisation and massive migration, all acting on primordial native groups and interacting with each other . . .

> In the Soviet Union, two types of colonisation have produced language contact: the first is the traditional European process associated with the conquest of stable nations and nationalities . . . The story of the colonising of the Russian empire belongs to this aforementioned European method, which has been exemplified by the Russian empire moving against small numbers of very primitive peoples in a vast and comparatively empty space.

It was based on this premise that the Soviet empire metamorphosed into a Union, although this did not suggest a *tabula rasa* on which to subsume their "co-unionists" linguistically. This interesting statement echoes the observations of those scholars that have delved into Soviet and Russian ethnic politics. Within this context also, a valid argument was raised by Lewis; culture is historically and socially created. Hence, Russia's ethnic minorities are tied to their geographical culture but are made to adopt a language which is not directly linked to their culture and ancestral homes. Scholars have also recently challenged the politics of language rights in the former Soviet Union, claiming that it "had considerable significance for attitude". One of such scholars is Lewis (1981), who states polemically that the massive redistribution of so many different national groups has entailed the acknowledgement of a single lingua franca, Russian.

Constitutionally, such a situation need not, but should not have occurred. The titular language of a Union Republic such as Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Tadzhikistan, and so forth could well suffice as a

lingua franca within its own territory. The needs of the federation could be met by a limited diffusion of Russian or by a network of international bilingualism as in the case of Switzerland.

The status of Russian as a lingua franca derived almost entirely from the centralising character of the Soviet Union. Language apart, other nationalities and ethnic minorities were integrated into the collective social, cultural, economic and political dispensation of their host nation – the Russians, through the process of assimilation. Assimilation is a process with multiple meanings, but in the aggregate sense, it can be referred to as a change of ethnic identity, usually from a minority or subordinate group to a majority or dominant group, resulting in the "blending into one of formerly distinguishable sociocultural groups" (Elklit and Tonsgaard 1984:96). Linguistic assimilation refers to the change of language from one's traditional national language to that of a different ethnic group. Linguistic assimilation does not always indicate a change of ethnic identity (Connor 1972). In the Soviet Union, this situation became a real threat to loss of native languages, cultures, self-confidence more importantly identity, and of course, completed the assimilation of the non-Russian peoples into the Soviet rubric.

As recognised by Isayev (1977:192) "language is a nation's most obvious and important attribute". Providing a more profound insight, Joireman (2003:05), also rightly observes that "in countries that experience similar linguistic divides like Belgium, language becomes the key identifying characteristics of distinct ethnic groups". The Soviet Union best portrays this example of language bilingualism. The USSR had supported unidirectional bilingualism: non-Russians learned Russian, but Russians remained monolingual. The assimilationist character of Soviet leaders towards making Russian the language of the Soviet Union was well articulated by Roman Solchanyk in *Russian Language and Soviet Politics* (1982) when he maintains that Soviet experts on nationality relations often maintain that Russian had become the accepted "language of inter-nationality discourse" in the USSR because it is the native language of the Soviet Union's major nationality.

Keep (1996:151-152), while commenting on the importance of language, argues that "since the most important 'marker' of an individual's ethnicity was the language he spoke, they naturally gave such matters a great deal of attention". On a more specific level, commenting on the politics of the Russian Empire, Keep argues that ". . . every empire needs a lingua franca, and no one doubted that in the USSR, this language should be Russian". The kernel of Keep's argument is that language is a key component of ethnic identity in the Soviet Union. The central authorities (p. 152) "no longer so brazenly exalted its merits, but made no secret of their desire to maximise its role". In practice, this meant encouraging minority peoples to become bilingual, as the necessary preliminary to any "language shift", which clearly would require

several generations. Official statements invariably endorsed the principle of linguistic equality. The principle of linguistic equality implied an acceptance of reciprocity, yet no one spoke of the enrichment of Russian by external influences, only of the reverse. Works by minority writers might be translated into Russian, but not into other minority languages. In areas not Russian, there were usually two types of general school distinguished by the language in which instruction was given. Balts, Armenians, and Georgians put up stout resistance to the penetration of Russian as the medium of tuition to counter the resulting physical segregation of Russian and native peoples, bilingual schools with parallel classes were set up in some places, but this did not prosper. To this end, nationalists' had contended that Russian-language schools were favoured in the provision of funds, and so were larger and better equipped. There was valid argument to complaints that no native – language schooling was provided for minority nationals who lived in Russia (or other) cities that had large concentration of non-Russians. The reason for this was not just a practical one, but reflected the central authorities' view that children of such migrants were prime candidates for assimilation into the multi-ethnic Soviet culture and so did not need separate schools It is, therefore, deducible that linguistic assimilation and reidentification in the Soviet Union were promoted by bi-functional factors such as urbanisation and the reduction of native languages. To this end, Ayo Bamgbose, in his inaugural lecture, titled "Linguistics in a Developing Country" (1973:10), asserts that:

> Whether or not a local language is eventually agreed upon as the lingua franca for the country, it is important to be clear about the role of a lingua franca vis a vis the other languages in the country. There can be no question of any group being compelled to give up their own language. Rather, the use of each mother tongue should be encouraged, unless the native speakers willingly decide to give up their language in favour of another. The different languages may have different roles even in the educational system. In this connection, it is interesting to note that even in a technologically highly developed country such as the USSR, there is a deliberate policy of utilising the languages of the different nationalities in addition to Russian. Some languages such as Ukrainian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Uzbek are used up to secondary school only, and some are used only for the eradication of illiteracy and in primary education (see Desheriev [1971]). This sort of policy should serve as an eye-opener to those who may not appear to see the value in retaining and encouraging our indigenous languages.

Glyn Lewis (1981) in *Bilingualism and Bilingual Education* provides us with an intellectual circumstance that may help give direction on the language issue in the former Soviet Union, he maintains that another important point of difference is that the national minorities in the Soviet Union have a very

strong territorial bases for their language – they are in fact conquered people who have been drawn into an empire, but not removed from their ancestral homes. Several smaller linguistic groups within the small state of early Russia had to be forged into a single nation before the state could begin its imperial progress; this was another process of known in Soviet discourse as Russification.

Meanwhile, Russification policy, according to Tolz (1998:1000), continued in the Soviet Union with non-Russians, whose first language was Russian (especially Ukrainians and Byelorussians), often identifying themselves as Russians in internal passports and censuses. Moreover millions of Russians had been encouraged to settle outside the borders of the Russian Federation. The implication of this was that when the Soviet Union eventually collapsed, approximately 25 million Russians and another 5 million Russian speakers found themselves outside the borders of the Russian Federation, they were proclaimed by some intellectuals to be part of the now divided (*razdelennaya*) Russian nation. For instance, Russian journalist, V. Galenko (2001:56) suggests in *Nezavisimaya gazeta* that, "the Russian government should immediately issue a declaration on the Russian speaking Diaspora as an inseparable part of the Russian nation".

THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET UNION

Why Russian and Not Our Indegenous Languages?

> If you call yourself a son of your motherland, don't give away your language to others (Smith, 1991: 320).

In each realm of Russian history, it has been observed that language conflict has been a persistent and recurring decimal that continues to be politicised due to either the inconsistencies between the ethnic republics, laws on language and federal legislation or the bitter controversy among ethnic groups seeking to redress the perceived or actual linguistic discrimination within the republics themselves (Ilishev Ildus, 2003). The USSR thus exemplified a society in which multiculturalism, multiethnicity and multilingualism catalysed disintegration .The collapse of the USSR was a consequence of total collapse of central power, which is one of the results of its multi-ethnic composition, diverse nationality, language disparity and inchoate ethnic consciousness. Historical and cultural substrata in the former Soviet Union predictably reasserted themselves after a hiatus of 75 years of communist rule. As correctly noted by Tishkov (1997: 84),

> By the mid-1980's a complex situation had developed in the sphere of social functions of languages and cultures of Soviet nationalities. Along with developing and supporting non-Russian languages and cultures, the Russian

language received further dissemination into daily urban culture, becoming the language of work and of governance and services throughout the country. In homes all over the Soviet Union, the mass media – especially television – broadcast predominantly in Russian.

On a more specific level, Smith (1991: 301) argues that after seven decades of Soviet rule and previous decades of domination by czarist Russia, the long-obedient, subservient Uzbeks are finally rebelling against Russification – Russian on their television screens, Russian in their schools, Russian in their newspapers, Russian in their government and commerce, Russian on their street signs – even in small villages where many people speak only Uzbek-Russian as the language of science or necessary in making a career, the teaching of great Russian writers of the nineteenth century at the expense of writers from the Uzbeks' on past. Linguistic discrimination was a tender issue in Uzbekistan and many other republics.

Smith (ibid) further argues that Uzbek intellectuals have a long list of language grievances:

A writer named Nuraly Kabul told me angrily that Uzbekistan has fewer children's books in its native language than do other major Soviet nationalities. Shukhrat Makhmudov, the Uzbek cameraman whom we saw filming the Birlik rally, revealed that film scripts for Uzbek movies must be submitted in Russian, in part to accommodate Russian censors. Uzbek medical students complained that their studies are all in Russian, even though many go to work in villages where peasants speak only Uzbek. So much advanced education in Uzbekistan is taught in Russian that its rural students are handicapped in the competition for admission, because training in Russian is weaker than in the countryside than in the cities .Mohammed Salikh, an Uzbek poet told me Uzbek graduate students doing doctoral work on Uzbek language and culture must submit their theses in Russian and defend their theses before a panel of Uzbek scholars – in Russian! From many people I heard that it was impossible to buy a typewriter in the Uzbek language; Uzbeks have to buy Russian typewriters and then spend 50 to 60 roubles to have the keys modified for Uzbek.

Singer (1998), while commenting on the strong influence of language, argues that whether the motivation is emotional or pragmatic, ardent nationalism or the desire to get along, any language people choose for themselves and their children is a function of the perception of that language's standing in the world and of the relative importance of the nation or nations that use it.

Language and Education

The debate on the Russian language as the lingua franca in the former Soviet Union has generated a central point in Russia's intellectual fluidity; however,

Russia remains an intrinsic part of Europe while Russia's search for self-identification continues.

To pursue our analysis, the fact has frequently been noted that many countries experience difficulties in reconciling certain conflicting demands that education is required to meet, especially in multiethnic societies such as the disintegrated Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, linguistically bi-lingual Belgium, Nigeria and modern Russia which is still home to diverse ethnic groups.

A question that comes into focus is Why is Russia important to contemporary society? The answers are legion, but a simplistic reason is given below. Vladimir Baranovsky (2000), encapsulates the importance of Russia in these words:

The interaction of Russia and Europe is considerably affected by the changes currently way in the international political landscape on the continent, the enlargement of NATO . . . and the new agenda of the EU. Geographically, Europe and Russia are overlapping entities. Half of Europe is Russia; half of Russia is in Europe. However, politics, in contrast to geography, does not necessarily take this as axiomatic-either in Europe or in Russia.

Taking the European Union into cognisance, in its fifty years historical transformation and five "admission exercises", the most recent on 1 May, 2004 with a membership of 25 democratic states of Europe, which included mainly eight countries of the former Eastern bloc namely; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The EU is regarded as being the most powerful economic partner and important political actor in Europe, thus Russo-EU relations are developing with positive prospects arising from the post Cold War conflicts.

History, they say, has a way of repeating itself: three former Soviet Union republics, the Baltic republics have since become EU members, having escaped the Russian language domination under Communist rule that ended in 1991 when the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a legal and geopolitical entity on the world map. What kind of Europe would the former Baltic republics exist in? The core belief is that what they are likely to get from the EU might not worth the compromise. According to the European Union fact sheet: 4.16.3 language policy (2007), in the EU, there exist 23 official and working languages, of which the Baltic languages are all represented, but language policy is the responsibility of member states, but EU institutions promote the learning of other languages.

Thus, commenting on language nationalism, Valery Tishkov (1997), observes that:

Most Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians have used Russian in the past and will probably continue using it in the future, as a second official language in

intra-Baltic communications and in contacts with people in Russia and Belarus and in other post-soviet states. Even the heads of state during the Baltic assemblies and other top politicians in their regional or bilateral contacts have had to use the Russian language in times of less public but more precise communication.

In June 2005 the federal legislation on *o gosudarstvennom iazyke* (on the national language) was signed into law by Vladimir Putin, despite several renaming and controversies after its initial introduction in the Duma (Russian state assembly) in 2001. The Union republics, followed by the former autonomous republics, granted titular languages legal status starting from the advent of Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Thus, one can aver that *on the national languages* law was a quick response to the political and linguistic changes that have affected the Russian language since the splinter of the Soviet empire. The Communist government had given absolute priority to the study of Russian language in all the republics regardless of their own national languages. The argument here is not to delimit the Russian language, and its usefulness, Russians constituted majority (83%) of the population of the Soviet Union. An argument can be proposed that this should not have been done at the expense of reasonably viable and modern non-Russian languages that were the native languages of millions of people that inhabited the Soviet Union.

In an article written by Ian Traylor, in The Guardian(2000), Ukraine wages war on Russian language: Death of a folk singer fuels anger, Igor Bilozir, a popular Ukrainian folk-singer, (in Ukraine) sat at a café playing Ukrainian songs, during his free time, culturally this is a period cherished and observed religiously by the Russians and called *Svobodnoe vremya* (Free time, leisure period). At the next table, a group of young Russians were singing songs in Russian. A fight in the street followed the Russians' demand that Bilozir stop singing in Ukrainian (in his own territory, and mother tongue!).

One of the clearest examples of the strength of the mother tongue is that cited in *UNESCO and Education Throughout the World* (1985: 48):

> The mother tongue is the most natural and effective key to education and determines its success. It enables each individual to become rooted in his own culture and, by shaping his identity in it, to go forth later to meet other cultures. These universally held ideas have emerged forcefully from the many symposia and meetings on language teaching.

Bilozir died three weeks later as a result of injuries sustained in the fight. According to *The Guardian*, "more than 100,000 people in Lviv [Lvov to the Russians] turned out for Bilozir's funeral" and the next day the Patriots of Ukraine went on the rampage. Two ethnic Russian youths were arrested on

suspicion of murder. One was released on bail and left the country [and] the other is the son of the local deputy police chief. Expectations of a fair trial are low. A black cross, flowers and a picture of the songwriter mark the spot where he died. *'Igor Bilozir. Murdered Here by Russian-speaking Thugs'*, reads the inscription" (ibid, p. 7).

Xenophant Sanukov(2009) in his article, "Human Rights Problems In Russia: The Situation of Non-Russian Peoples," reminds us of the populist quip of Boris Yeltsin during his visit to Tatarstan in the spring of 1991: "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow", but as soon as the leaders and the national public movements began to implement the idea of maximum sovereignty, the Russia's leadership initially developed signs of the same disease as the former Soviet leadership with regard to the Baltic states: intimidation, threats, attempts at pressure. Speaking from both sides of the mouth, Yeltsin had several times adumbrated the slogan, "An only one and undivided Russia," one is then tempted to ask rhetorically which Russia Yeltsin was referring to the Russian empire or the modern Russian that was to emerge in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union?

The thesis of this paper is that the minority republics (have lost), and continue to lose their cultures and languages due to the historical and political domination of the Russians and the Russian language under whatever premise. Despite the fact that Soviet literature ascertained that Leninist national policy was a *fait accompli* in solving the nationality problems in the Soviet empire, the manifestation of interethnic tensions and arising conflicts were subsumed under Communist indoctrination and equality of all languages. It is, therefore, deducible that the Soviet Union's marriage of convenience which had hitherto existed for 74 years collapsed under linguistic agitations.

Another case in point is one put forward by Sunakov (2009) of a scholar from Turkey who had visited Yoshkar-Ola to consolidate his knowledge of Mari. He naively thought that knowledge of Mari is enough to live in the capital of the Mari republic. But he could not solve his problems in the hotel or post office using Mari; when he addressed somebody in this language *he was looked at as if he was a lunatic* (emphasis mine). How then does the equality of languages come to play if one cannot communicate in his own national language within the confines of his titular nation or geographical homeland?

It, therefore, becomes pertinent to also take on board the experience and lamentation of a woman in Luba, Tofalar, Slackman, cited in Freda Corsey (2002), "we are Russified; we do not even know our own language . . . we want to sing traditional songs, but we don't even know how" (the Tofalar were a nomadic people of Siberia, said to have fought in the armies of Ghenghis Khan). From the foregoing, one realises that language is a highly sentimental and volatile issue mainly because it is heavily tied to identity. The nations that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 are

trying to promote their own spirits of nationalism and of national identity, and language is a big part of individual country identity, as well as of the patriotism such emerging countries hope to foster among their people. One backlash, however, of the overthrow of decades of Russification in the ex-Soviet republics is an increase in ethnic intolerance. As postulated by Odunuga, (1998):

> By the 1980s, nationalism had become one of the fundamental problems the Kremlin had to contend with .It was at this stage that a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, emerged with his policy of Glasnost and Perestroika. Gorbachev's realisation that each of these East European countries had its national language (s), a culture and political attitude(s) must have helped his conviction that the future of the East European countries lay in the recognition of those problems that the Kremlin had to contend with.

> Russian nationalism to a large extent helped to hold together the Soviet Union for a considerable length of time as Russian experts and workers spread across the country to help in the task of building a new Socialist Society. As they scattered all over, the Russians were able to make efforts to induce non-Russians to learn the Russian language and this they did with a considerable degree of success. But the situation has changed. Many Russians have turned minorities in the newly established republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In Estonia, for instance, the knowledge of the local language plus residence since1938 are two of the requirements for citizenship, though most of the Russians there have been resident since 1940.The Russians who constitute one-third of the population suddenly became disenfranchised. Thus, since the collapse of the former Soviet Union the cultural and linguistic landscape of the region has changed considerably.

Back to the Ukraine, some of the young people quoted in *The Guardian* article were referred to as "skinheads" and Ukrainian nationalists were referred to as "Nazis preaching a gospel of ethnic intolerance" In Lvov, the city council had been trying to ban Russian-language pop music in bars and cafes and to close down a Russian-language radio station, and linguistic vigilantés have been cruising shops and kiosks, bullying retailers into dumping Russian literature, newspapers and CDs. Russian-language newspapers still outnumber Ukrainian 10 to one across the country.

Corsey (ibid), argues that essentially, for the emerging post-Soviet world, "language" is everything; it embodies or contains all other issues. A culture shapes its language, and a language shapes its culture. Time, politics, and circumstances have shaped the Russian (and his collateral) world in such a fashion that his very identity is often in question, and this causes the Russian (and Russia's other ex-Soviet citizens) to cling to language in an especially intense way – language is the primary part of what such a person has that he

feels that he knows that he owns for himself; everything else was owned by the collective, and before that, by the tsars, or the khans. Though property in the post-Soviet world is now to be privatised, in fact, privatisation is often happening either slowly or not at all. For the common man, this usually still means that someone else – someone big, with money, power, and authority, influence, political clout – owns everything. Language can be owned by anyone.

CONCLUSION

The national question which borders on ethnic pluralism with language as a mobilising agent has more serious implications for the future of Russia. Unity in a multinational state like the Russian Federation and Nigeria is impossible without addressing the perennial problems of ethno-national conflicts. The greatest challenges to Nigeria and Russia's stability and unity are internal problems of persistent nationalism and internecine ethnic politics. The demand for self-determination by constituent republics and minority ethnic groups also came in the context of incessant armed struggle. Thus, the speedy deterioration of both countries hegemony is evident in its deepening economic crisis, devastation of the country's industrial and agricultural power, increasing foreign and domestic debts, rapidly diminishing human potential, wage arrears, demoralised army, the total collapse of central power and ethnic unrest. Threat to the peace and sovereignty of modern Russia as a multi-ethnic state comes from secessionism on the part of its own ethnic minorities, such as the Bashkirs, Tatars, Yakuts, Chenchens and Kalmyks. Currently, the ascendancy of ethno-nationalism especially in modern Russia has emerged as a critical factor as reflected in the USSR-Russian case.

The survival of modern Russia lies in a secured statehood based on the principles of asymmetrical federalism which encourages self-governing national entities within a larger State. Thus the most challenging problem for political and ethnic as well as regions is to find a viable form of federation that would enable ethnic minorities to peacefully pursue their goal of self-determination within the framework of a single multinational state. In order to create a viable federative structure, it is necessary to decentralise state power through ethno-territorial federalism that will help incorporate various ethnic groups into a single state by granting them broad autonomy and full participation in decision-making on the local and federative levels through the adoption of legislation affirming their group rights.

Within the context of Nigeria's foreign policymakers, efforts should be made to understand the politics of linguistic policies, it is indeed shameful that over the years, it has become noticeable that our diplomats and ambassador to the Russian Federation (may be other countries also) do not speak the language our their host community while we have experts on the language.

That is an anomaly developed countries would never commit.

Nigeria is a plural society and should borrow a leaf from Russia's experience, The Nigerian government as a matter of urgency and foreign policy should recommend experts on languages to countries where our diplomats are posted. This would enable us understand different cultures, policies and educational facilities that would help in nation building and stability.

In a paper delivered at the University of Ibadan in 2009, His Excellency Mr Polyakov the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation states that Nigeria and Russia have a a lot in common; Nigeria is the giant of sub-Saharan Africa, while Russia is the greatest state on the Eurasian continent, both countries have approximately similar population figures, with its peoples being diverse ethnically, religiously and culturally. He goes on to say that both countries have set-goals of social and economic development, while Nigeria has the 7-point agenda, Russia also has set-tasks. Both countries even have 2020 programmes with a difference in goal: Nigeria aims to become one of twenty most developed countries in the world, while Russia is determined to become one of the worlds five largest.

Thus, from the foregoing, Nigeria and Russia are societies in transition, having in the past 10 years been subjected to similar crises characterised by ethnic nationalism with language disparity as a focal point for discussion. The case of Nigeria has only been better because of her use of language of her colonial master, Britain. If Nigeria were to collapse, or disintegrate along ethnic lines, the worst would have to be feared for.

Russia and Nigeria thus have a lot of mutual areas of interest to explore and exploit such as the sustenance of their new democracy and positive transformation of their industrial capacities and emancipation from diseases, bad governance, poverty, etc.

REFERENCES

Bamgbose, Ayo (1973). Linguistics in a Developing Country. Inaugural lecture, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

Baranovsky, Vladimir (200). Apart of Europe or Apart from Europe? International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Vol. 76, No. 3. Blackwell Publishing, England.

Corsey, F.F. (2002). The Relationship of Language, Culture and Identity in the Post-Soviet World Center for Regional and Transboundary Studies at Volgograd State University.

Dziewanowski, M.K. (1997). *A History of Soviet Russia, and Its Aftermath.* Prentice-Hall, Inc. USA.

Fishman, Joshua (1967). "Language, Modernization and Planning in Comparison with Other Types of National Modernization and Planning", Advances in

Language Planning, Fishman J. (ed.), The Hague: Mouton.

Healy, F.G. (1967). Foreign Language Teaching in the Universities Manchester University Press, Barnes & Noble Inc. New York.

Isayev, M.I. (1977). National Languages in the USSR: Problems and Solutions. Progress Publishers.

Joireman, Sandra (2003). Nationalism and Political Identity. Continuum, The Tower Building, London.

John, Keep (1996). Last of the Empires. A History of the Soviet Union.1945-1991. Oxford University Press, New York.

Ian, Traynor (2000). Ukraine Wages War on Russian Language: Death of Folksinger Fuels Anger. *The Guardian*, L., 7 November.

Lewis, E Glyn. (1981). Bilingualism and Bilingual Education Pergamon Press Ltd, Headinton Hill   Hall, Oxford OX3 OBW, England.

Michael Slackman. (2000). Bitter Lands: Displaced Peoples of the Former Soviet Union: The Last of the Tofalar: A people's identity lost to Soviet rule. *Newsday*, 22 July.

Montefiore, F. (2004). Speeches that changed the World. Quercus Publishing Ltd. Bloombsbury Square, London.

Odunuga, Segun (1994). Nationalism and the Death of East European Federations. Wemilore Press, Nigeria.

_____ (1998). East European Revolution and Nigeria's Diplomacy. Ibadan. Stirling-Holden Publishers, Nigeria Ltd.

_____ (1994). Language Politics and Nationalism, Inaugural Lecture, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

Pokshishevsky, (1974). Geography of the Soviet Union. Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Rossiyskaya gazetta, 25, February, 1994.

Sanakov, Xenophont. Human Rights Problems in Russia:The Situation of Non-Russian Peoples http://www.suri.ee/kongress/sanukov.html.6/9/2009.

Smith, H. (1997). *The New Russians.* Avon Books, Random House. New York USA.

Time (1992). "Can Russia Escape its Past? 7 December.

Tishkov, Valeri (1997). Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame. Sage Publications Ltd, London.

Tolz, Vera (1998). "*Making Russia Work*" Journal of Europe Asia Studies, Vol, 50, No. 6.

Unesco and Education Throughout the World, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orgaization, Paris, 1983.

West, F. (1975). The Way of Language. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Sustainable Development and the Paradox of Ethnicity in Social Movement in Nigeria

DICKSON OGBONNAYA IGWE

8

INTRODUCTION

The paradox of ethnicity in social movement in Nigeria discusses the issues of ethnicity in Nigeria, which has beyond doubt raised a lot of dust to the efforts and sacrifices of our heroes at entrenching sustainable development. This paper did not stop at X-raying the problem of Nigeria's ethnicity, but also went further to proffer possible solutions and Remedy to the problem of ethnicity in Nigeria. Ethnicity, a pedigree of the British imperialist pernicious policy of divide and exploit, has become a virulent scourge that has not only facilitated a widespread subversion of the essence of social movement as a vibrant platform to press for social change, it has also thwarted the practice of the democratic ethos as conduit for the realisation of sustainable development in Nigeria. The flagrant display of ethnic chauvinism by the political élite in their bid to usurp powers for their selfish ends orchestrates divisive social movements infiltrated with cleavages in the polity. This article

explores the theoretical perspectives on ethnicity and highlights the nature and importance of social movements in facilitating Nigeria's effort at sustainable development. The key argument is that sustainable develop-ment will remain an imaginary exercise unless attention is given to building human and institutional capacity free from ethnic cleavages and subjective consideration in national and institutional decision-making processes. The article argues further that the pervasiveness and ubiquity of ethnicity has profoundly disenabled social movement as a proactive force in enforcing change that facilitates the achievement of the ideals of democracy needed for sustainable development in Nigeria at 50. Panaceas were advanced as the curative for ethnicity.

Be it "the women's movement", "the peace movement", "the environ-mental movement", "the labour movement", add your favourite here – giving them a unity of purpose and intention that they never really have. Movements are not themselves actors – they are things that people create to press for social change. They are spaces that are made by people to allow relationships between them that can challenge power.

The strength of social movements to advance and engage sustainable development in Nigeria is weakened by the prevalence of ethnicity. Therefore, if sustainable development is to be realised, the issue of ethnicity must be taken into consideration especially as regards it capacity in Nigeria and Africa at large to polarise social movements in their social advocacy effort. But what is ethnicity? It refers to a shared cultural identity, involving similar practices; initiations, beliefs and linguistic features passed over from one generation to another. If we follow this definition it would be correct to say that Rwanda has one group of people with one language and similar culture hence one ethnicity. So is Somalia? Many countries in Africa have numerous ethnicities; for example, Nigeria has over 250 'tribes', Kenya over 40 and Tanzania over 60. Africa today has the highest number of 'tribes' and hence the highest number of conflicts and instability. To a great extent there would be nothing wrong to have all these ethnic groups since they are primordial, i.e. we found them there when we were born. It becomes bad only when politicians and other leaders invoke "ethnic action and nationalism", for ulterior motives, to achieve political and economic objectives; and that is when conflict begins in a vicious circle with no end in sight as exemplified in Liberia.

In ordinary English usage, the term "ethnic group" is typically used to refer to groups larger than a family in which membership is reckoned primarily by a descent rule (Fearon, 2003). That is, one is or can be a member of an ethnic group if one's parents were also judged members (conventions and circumstance decide cases of mixed parentage). There are some groups that meet this criterion but that intuition may reject as "ethnic," such as clans, classical Indian castes, or European nobility. But even in these cases analysts

often recognise a "family resemblance" to ethnic groups based on the use of descent as the basis for membership (Horowitz, 1985).

Members of the *prototypical* ethnic group share a common language, religion, customs, sense of a homeland, and relatively dense social networks. However, any or all of these may be missing and a group might still be described as "ethnic" if the descent rule for membership is satisfied. For instance, Roma and other nomadic groups have no real sense of homeland; Germans profess multiple religions; Jews speak multiple first languages; and Somali clans are not distinguished from each other by any notable cultural features. Each of these groups might or might not be considered an "ethnic group" by some, but they are all at least candidates so considered by others. In other words, while shared cultural features often distinguish ethnic groups, these are contingent rather than constitutive aspects of the idea of an "ethnic group." Becoming fluent in the language, manners, and customs of Armenia will not make me "ethnically Armenian". The key constitutive feature is membership reckoned by descent.

In many parts of Africa where there are political conflicts, ethnicity cannot be ruled out, except in Algeria where there is religious extremism. Ethnicity has been used in many parts of the African continent in terms of mobilisation by political failures lacking tangible agenda for their countries, and for seeking economic power. When a politician fails to 'eat' he or she will probably run to his "tribe" claiming that they are being finished and this works on their psychology causing conflicts. Unpatriotic leaders use ethnicity to organise people for political action pretentiously to 'defend' ethnic interests. Ethnic consciousness is a product of contradictions embodied in political relations of structured inequality common in many African nations. A good example of this happened in the Nigerian civil war.

Accordingly, it is argued here that the level of sensitivity to conflict patterns on the part of the authorities designing new institutions is critical to a peace process. Ethnic divisions must be addressed to entrench sustainable development that widens socio-political and economic space for social movements to thrive. This may be achieved through the creation of institutions that, while providing for proportional ethnic representation in the event of postconflict setting for instance, do not fixate the accentuation on ethnicity in the politics or counteract achievements towards a de-ethnicisation in other sectors of society. Moreover, each institution should ideally contribute towards a long term de-ethnicisation of politics, by encouraging contacts and trust-building across ethnic boundaries.

THE ETHNICITY DIMENSION IN NIGERIA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The ethno-linguistic fragmentation of Nigeria is extreme, even in comparison

to neighbouring countries, and there is strong evidence that the picture today still represents a falling off from the diversity in pre-colonial times. The 20th century saw both the assimilation many minority groups, a process that can be expected to continue, but also a demographic expansion of many very small groups to substantial populations (Osaghae, 1991). A key element in the ethnic differentiation sharpened by the colonial ideology was the division of the country into North and South and 'Indirect rule' system in the North. Southern Nigeria was by and large colonised without substantial military effort, gradually overcome by missionaries and trading the British companies.

The North, however, was conquered in a strictly military sense from 1900 onwards, and the two halves of Nigeria only united in 1914. Indirect Rule meant effectively running the country through local rulers, the only strategy possible in a country with such a large population and a relatively small military presence (Coleman, 1986). This in turn implied establishing the ambit of authority of existing rulers, and frankly developing hierarchical structures in confused or unstructured areas. This in turn became a key channel for the collection of taxes. This required ethnicity to be defined rather more closely than had previously been the case. Colonial policy was very much influenced by India, where officials compiled extensive catalogues of tribes and castes. From the 1920s onwards, the government was at various times, exercised by the accumulation of ethnographic information, which was intended to be a tool of policy (Gunn, 1956). From the 1950s onwards this was accompanied by a programme to extend literacy in various regions of the North. One unintended effect of this was the evolution of 'Ethnic unions', institutionalised bodies promoted the interests of particular ethnic groups. These began as early as 1916 and grew in size and importance until Independence in 1960 (Ahanotu, 1982).

A policy of cataloguing division ran very much counter to the ideology of independent Nigeria, and for this reason, linguistic and ethnic surveys were discontinued by the state and not encouraged in the universities. Indeed, policy has remained divided on this issue; the rise of a notion of 'indigenousness' effectively recognising such divisions, but with government-controlled media and documents emphasising unity. Ethnicity is thus tacit in accounts of political divisions; although it is well known which ethnic bloc politicians represent, this is rarely openly discussed in the media (Nnoli, 1995).

Political and Social Cleavages

Although ethnicity and language represent very primary cleavages, they are strongly linked to the adoption of specific world religions and thereby have significant implications for culture change. Although in principle, individuals are free to adopt what religion they like, in reality, particular ethnic groups for instance, tend to either adopt Islam or Christianity. In Nigeria, ethnic

conflicts are taken to be religious conflicts. Religion has become a highly salient dividing feature in recent years. Except in Yorubaland, Christianity only began to make a serious impact on inland populations during the colonial era, and Islam, although probably crossing the desert in the early Middle Ages, only extended its reach to most minority populations at the same time (Otite and Albert, 1999).

Traditional religion remains strong in many regions, albeit combined with a light dusting of Islam or Christianity. There is also little doubt that Islamic/Christian cleavages have been reinforced by external interests and that these have been seized on by internal elements to further essentially political rather than religious ends. For example, the conflicts in Zangon Kataf in 1992 were essentially between the indigenous people, the Tyap, and the Hausa traders who had been resident in the town since the 19th century. Old resentments about unequal access to resources and the relative wealth of the migrants came to a head in violent riots with loss of lives and property. However, this was soon interpreted as a religious conflict and in Kaduna there were further riots which had a Christian/Muslim character.

A declining respect for the older generation as well as the emergence of radical youth organisations in many ethnic groups is also changing the balance of political and economic power. All across Nigeria's North Central states, South-southern states as well as Southeastern states, 'youth organisations' have been formed with the aim of challenging the old order within their own society using kidnapping and violent attacks on wealth and privilege as strategies to address their perceived interest marginalisation by the state operators and their agents from the developmental agenda of the state. This situation tends to justify government's restrictions and close monitoring of the activities of social movements in Nigeria. Many of the kidnappings in the oil-bearing areas of the Niger delta for example, are lead by organisations such as Egbesu Youths, ethnically-based organisations. Although these activities are most often addressed by the state using political solution, they are cynically interpreted as unemployed youth trying to seize money and power bypassing the usual channels. It is also true that the attitude of elders and the elite class from these areas to agitation for justice gives youth much to be skeptical about; the disappearance of funds allocated to Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) as it is called today, intended for social development in the Niger Delta has been the source of considerable resentment (Osaghae, 1991).

Ethnicity and Governance

Ethnicity has been a major factor in the path of Nigerian political development, with power almost exclusively in the hands of a few dominant groups (Mohammed, 2009). If minorities were to be empowered, this would

inevitably create demand for greater transparency and more far-reaching changes in the political process. Civilian rule in Nigeria has a lot of promises, but for these to be realised the political class needs to redefine their objectives within the context of proper dividends of democracy which is to emphasis binding factors instead of divisive ones in socio-political relations. There is an overall tension, therefore, between the new urban-based élite whose rise to power is underlain by access to financial resources but whose networks are strongly ethnically-based. This has paved way for authoritarianism, political exclusion and intolerance which together do not proffer solution of any kind to the quest for sustainable development. The choice of development direction made by the state as policy cannot be without ethnic colouration especially in a plural setting like Nigeria. This is a possible reason why Nigeria may present the finest policy on paper but at the point of implementation there will emerge fundamental disconnect between the policy target and the interest it will eventually be serving.

Policy choices by powerful governments and international organisations and their concomitant advice have benefited only a small portion of the world's population (Hague, 2002). In many cases, nations are not facing simple development challenges, but fundamental crises in relation to war, famine, poverty and human survival (Munslow, 2003). Building quality governance for sustainable development in these conditions is a daunting challenge, especially when large portions of national revenue in developing countries are aid dependent. Worthy of note is the critical place of ethnicity in the emergent philosophies of governance and administration furthering the recognition of social capital as a critical element in the context of developing countries.

One of the key structural elements of rural and some urban communities in Nigeria is the 'traditional ruler'. Many groups had some system of authority in the pre-colonial era, but the power of such chiefs was often weak (Blench, 2003). A classic ethnography of the Igbo is entitled 'The king in every man', a phrase emphasising the equal status of households in traditional society. In much of the southeastern and north central, authority was vested in chief priests or earth-priests. The British required a structured system of chieftaincy and this was often created in contradiction to the existing system (Mukangara, 1999). Thus, the *Sarki, Hakimi, Mai Unguwar* titles common throughout much of the North have little historical depth and may run counter to the 'spiritual' authorities.

Despite this, traditional rulers remain important in popular affection, assuming they are seen to deal fairly. Government has increasingly attempted to interfere in the appointment process, but when, for example, in 1989, the then military government tried to put in place a highly unpopular businessman as Sultan of Sokoto there were mass popular protests. An *Etsu* of Nupe, a

traditional high chief at Bida in Niger state in Nigeria was driven from his palace in the early 1990s as a result of perceived bad behaviour. Studies of 'traditional rulers' in Plateau state (most of who are not really traditional at all) showed that most work extremely hard to prevent intergroup conflict during a period of increased civic stress (Blench, 2003).

Ethnicity and Employment

Nigeria has traditionally had a 'blind' attitude to ethnicity as far as federal structures are concerned (Hague, 2002). Federal officers were supposed to be posted anywhere in the country and to be impartial in their work. University vice-chancellors were often from areas very remote from the location of the university. Curiously, the larger churches have taken a similar view; that pastors are men of God and can work with any community. As a consequence the churches operated in *linguae francae* such as Hausa and English, somewhat to the dissatisfaction of congregations. The unlooked-for consequence of this is the creation of many smaller, independent churches with a specific ethnic and linguistic base. This scenario constitutes threat to sustainable development because talent and proficiency are not recognised.

The reverse, however, is true at state and local government level, where employment is strongly linked to ethnicity. A perception that the federal system had reinforced major inequities in, for example, employment, is now being addressed by a concept of indigeneity, which is itself discriminatory. However, the informal economy of Nigeria is driven by ethnicity, with particular trades and jobs dominated by specific ethnic groups and access to credit being consequently restricted. Such anti-merit procedures must be weighed against the positive social capital that ensures trust in, for example, long-distance trade (Coser, 1956).

One of the most characteristic features of the Nigerian scene is ethnic or regionally based associations formed principally to advance regional or ethnic empowerment. The federal constitution provides for quota system and federal character commission was establish to ensure equity and justice across the federating units in public service employment or federal political appointment. In the larger ethnic groups, such as the Yoruba and the Igbo, and the Hausa, the concept of marginalisation is popular as an expression of contention for perceived power imbalance arising from federal employment especially when new government is constituted (Honey and Okafor, 1998).

This situation of highly subjective criteria for the choice of manpower or skill labour to manage state affairs or public organisation has actually rubbed Nigerian nation state of the input of her best hands and egg heads and made mess the principle and usefulness of merit, accountability and productivity in Nigeria. Worst still is that these best hands and egg heads the likes of Professor Philip Emeagwali and the others are lost to braindrain leaving behind

charlatans and opportunists to jostle for plumb jobs in Nigeria. Incredible it is to find people in their fatherland with the right skills and qualification without job whereas, people with inferior or no skill at all have more than enough that they even contract out to the capable but less privileged.

Nigerian State and Social Movement

Sociological definitions of movements stress qualities like collective and innovative behaviour, extra-institutionality, their network character and multicenteredness, the shifting and fluid boundaries of movement membership, and the willingness of members to disrupt order a little or a lot (Gerlach and Hine, 1970). Social movements are generally seen as phenomena of the modern era and industrialised society, whether located in the "First" world or not (Tilly, 1986). Historically, the attitude of the Nigerian state towards civil associations in the country has always verged on jealousy. This observation applies to both the pre- and post-independence state (IDEA, 2000). The state in both the pre- and post-independence era has demonstrated a strong tendency to intervene in the regulation and activities of civil associations in the modern sphere in particular. Observing that trade unions were particularly targeted, the report goes on to catalogue some of the tactics used by the state:

> Using legal and administrative mechanisms, unions are constantly under pressure to manage and institutionalise conflict. From corporatist laws to the use of the police, the state has become a player, even if an unsuccessful one, in the internal governance of trade unions. Direct state takeover of union offices and appointment of an interim administrator from the government bureaucracy is not uncommon. In other civil organisations state intervention is through proxies. Consequently the state response to civil society varies from active support or an attitude of peaceful coexistence to ignoring some and attempting to control and constrain others (IDEA, 2000: 124).

A certain strain courses through the above excerpts – that of a hegemonic Nigerian state which imposes its will on civil associations that are by and large helpless. While this impression might be largely correct, it is nonetheless an invitation to further understand the basis for ethnic advocacy and solidarity that has amplified clamour for ethnic identity and expression as which the concept of marginalisation patens threats.

Expectedly, the state did not take kindly to this perceived interroga-tion of the reasonableness or otherwise of its economic policies by some social movement some of which have ethnic connotation signalling divisive tendencies. At this point the state's move to nip in the bud the emergence of such challenge to its policy is usually made for the interest of national unity and security. The de-tribalised posture of the state is usually interpreted by ethnic biased stakeholders whose kinsmen are not at the centre of power at

that point in time as marginalisation. For instance, the policy of deregulation of Nigerian downstream economy had receive greater condemnation than acceptance from the people most of whom are not dominant players in that sector because of the fear that the removal of subsidy from oil for instance will trigger off cut-throat exploitation by marketers, majority of whom are perceived to be from the non oil producing areas of Nigeria.

Consequently, Olukosi (1997) observes that the state, in seeking to force through its programme, made efforts to weaken and destroy the organised power of the popular social movements and other social forces opposed to market reforms, forces which are central to the vibrancy of civil society and the struggle for democracy. What resulted from these efforts was a particular social dialectic in which, as the state became increasingly resentful, it tried simultaneously to pacify and co-opt the phalanx of social forces that were ranged against it.

This scenario is that as the particular project of economic liberalisation became subsumed into ethnic rivalry, the larger struggle to democratise politics and encode some form of popular participation in it is compromised to ethnicity. Thenceforth, all means became well-nigh legitimate in the struggle by ethnic card carrying politicians who remember their ethnic groups when not in power and remember only their personal pockets while in power. These political entrepreneurs find the control of the public space to ensure its domination by their self fanning interest as the only reason to come together into social movement. It is against this backdrop that the public space had taken form as the platform on which the desire of the people for economic empowerment and political freedom could be forged. Over three decades from Nigeria independence, the military was not only invited into politics by this intense tribal struggle for political space, but also the need to ensure that Nigeria remain one indivisible country. To this end, the military in power was determined to reconfigure this unconstitutional manner of struggle for power by Nigerians.

As a result, while it generally essayed to refine the public space by expelling some associations perceived to be without national interests at heart, for example, the Association of Senior Staff of Universities and National Association of Nigerian Students were then seen as one by the military government, and where this failed, it tried to infiltrate identified associations with a view to compromising them and setting agenda for them by censoring their activities. A good example of an organisation under the latter group is the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA). In many cases, the project of infiltration of these social movements was made possible by the prevailing economic situation of wide gap between the rich and the poor in this organisation (Amuwo, 1995).

Explanations for Sustainable Development

The Brundtland Commission's brief definition of sustainable development as the "ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987) is surely the standard definition when judged by its widespread use and frequency of citation. The use of this definition has led many to see sustainable development as having a major focus on intergenerational equity.

The divisive tendency of ethnicity is anti-equity, progress and development especially as regards the allocation of resources for the satisfaction of human needs. In corroboration, development report states that human needs are basic and essential, but also equity to share resources with the poor is required to sustain economic growth; and that equity is encouraged by effective citizen participation and not exclusion as supported by ethnicity.

Increasingly, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries are now beginning to focus attention on the assumptions and strategies of current development philosophies and to 'study up' their societies (Eyong et al, 2005). Millar et al (2006) detail the need to examine African knowledge systems and to seek to allow these to underpin development philosophy and policy. Indeed, it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the issue of culture became highlighted in international development discussions. African cultures had been seen as development barriers (Crewe and Harrison, 1998), and as antithetical to sustainable development (Amuwo, 2005). The duality of governance in Africa is a reality: the modern form of governance co-exists with the traditional forms and both essentially do influence perceptions and actions regarding development programmes.

Sub-Saharan Africa countries are endowed with so much cultural and natural resources. Yet, in 2003, over 81 percent of the countries in the low human development rank, as measured by UNDP, were in SSA. African academics should be concerned, therefore, with the issue of sustainable development (SD) because of the growing and deepening poverty, the enormous natural base notwithstanding. Control over natural resources has not, in the main, been in the hands of African peoples due to divisive cleavages such as ethnicity holding sustainable development to ransom. The creation of supra-national bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) threaten to eliminate any lingering hopes that local people and the SSA governments would decide on the rate of exploitation of their natural resources and this greatly affects both the definition and actualisation of sustainable development.

Countries in SSA in the 1980s specifically adopted structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) as prescribed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The programmes stressed "getting the prices right".

Governments tightened controls on public expenditure and removed subsidies on essential services. There is currently a vast literature on the socio-economic and environmental outcomes of SAPs (*see* Kendie, 1995; Boon, 2005, for review). Generally, SAPs stalled in the 1990s, exacerbating poverty and increasing social tensions. In Cameroon, for instance, it was reported that poverty rose sharply between 1986 and 1994 (Sikod, 2005). Cameron adopted a SAP in 1988. Par capita consumption was 10 percent lower between 1986 and 1994 than it had been 30 years previously. Sikod concludes that:

> Due to the changing economic and socio-political environment, poverty has manifested itself in so many ways – unemployment of university and high school graduates – creating a new set of poor, inequality in regional development, investment by the state, gender and sex discrimination, cultural inequalities, political repression, human rights' abuses, etc.

From the foregoing, there is a sharp contrast between the features of sustainable development and the development realities in Africa particularly Nigeria which further are in contrast with the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (UN-MDGs) such as poverty eradication, universal primary education, gender equality, reduced child mortality, maternal health, combat epidemics like HIV/AIDs and other diseases, environmental sustainability and partnership for development.

Sustainable Development as Social Movement

Sustainable development can be viewed as a social movement "a group of people with a common ideology who try together to achieve certain general goals." (*WordNet*, 2003). In an effort to encourage the creation of a broadly based social movement in support of sustainable development, United Nation Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was the first international, intergovernmental conference to provide full access to a wide range of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and to encourage an independent Earth, Summit at a nearby venue. These groups organised themselves into approximately 40 geographical and issue-based caucuses (Amalric, 2004).

But underlying this participation in formal international sustainable development events are a host of social movements struggling to identify what sustainable development means in the context of specific places and peoples. One such movement is the effort of many communities, states, provinces, or regions to engage in community exercises to define a desirable sustainable future and the actions needed to attain it. In many developing countries are attempting to deal with these challenges through the choices they make about governance and development (UNCED, 1992). Africa, for example, through the African Union (AU), has adopted the New Partnership

for Africa's Development (NEPAD), in an attempt to build sustainable development through effective governance (African Union, 2001). The NEPAD founding document acknowledges that many African countries continue to be dogged by dependency, conflict and poverty. The roots of these problems are complex and related to a history of colonialism, economic dependency and political upheaval. The new response to this crisis is to define an African development strategy that emphasises good governance practice, effective development management, and institutional and human resource capacity development (African Union, 2001).

The movement for sustainable livelihoods consists of local initiatives that seek to create opportunities for work and sustenance that offer sustainable and credible alternatives to current processes of development and modernisation. Consisting primarily of initiatives in developing countries, the movement has counterparts in the developed world, as seen, for example, in local efforts in the United States to mandate payment of a "living wage" rather than a minimum wage (Haas, Levy, and Parson, 1992).

The global solidarity movement seeks to support poor people in developing countries in ways that go beyond the altruistic support for development funding. Their campaigns are expressed as anti-exclusionary practices by most governments (Brecher, Costello, and Smith, 2000). This campaign is aimed at ensuring that the proceeds from the movement for the cancellation of debt do not end in private pockets. It is further a platform used in the critique of the policies of the developed world such as agricultural subsidies that significantly impact developing countries and especially poor people (Wanjohi, 2003).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper explored the impacts of ethnicity on governance and sustainable development as conditions that can be made favourable by strengthening institutional capacity. Sustainable development as a social movement has grown in size and functions but still facing the challenge of external manipulation mostly from the state restriction against its activities. Making policy a social process and not a prescription, will definitely resolve this contradiction. It is argued that unless there is attention given to developing institutional capacity, sustainable development will remain an imaginary exercise. The paper emphasises the importance of reconfiguring the development playing field to be inclusive and not exclusive. We suggest that attention be given to empowerment. It is our view that empowered individuals and institutions are more likely to challenge local patterns and practices of inequality using the platform of ethnicity. This may evolve to broaden access and participation in governance and sustainable development. This paper

has argued for recognition and treatment on merit, social capital and social movement capacities as means to ensure inclusiveness and competitiveness. In these way, all shades of opinion as regard solution to bring about quality governance and sustainable development challenges will have been accommodated.

REFERENCES

African Union (2001). The new partnership for Africa's development. Policy document, Abuja, Nigeria, October.

Ahanotu, A.M. (1982). The role of ethnic unions in the development of southern Nigeria, 1916-1966. In *Studies in Southern Nigerian History*. B.I. Obishere (ed.). London: Frank Casss.

Amalric, F. (2004). "The Relevance of Selected Social Movements for the Great Transition Initiative," October 2004, University of Zurich (mimeo), and forthcoming as a Great Transition Initiative report, http://www.gtinitiative.org. (Accessed on June, 25/2010).

Amuwo, K. (1995). General Babangida Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria: Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project. Travauk et Documents, Centre d'etude d' Afrique Bordeaux.

Blench, R.M. (2003). The dimensions of ethnicity, language and culture in Nigeria; Nigeria: Drivers of Change. Cambridge CB1 2AL United Kingdom.

Brecher, J., Costello, T. and Smith, B. (2000). *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity* Boston: South End Press.

Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Head Counts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chichilinisky, G. (1997). "What is Sustainable Development?" *Land Economics* 73, No. 4: 467-91.

Coleman, J. S. (1986). Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Broburg and Wistrom, Benin City, p. 142.

Coser, L. (1956). *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Crewe, E. and Harrison E. (1998). Whose Development? Ethnography of Aid. London: Zed Books.

Eyong, C.T., Mufuya M., Foy, I.I. (2005). Literature and Culture: The Sustainability Connection from an African Perspective, Regional Sustainable Development Review, EOLSS Publishers. Oxford (http://www.eolss.net).

Eisenhofer, S. (1998). Lokalhistorien in Südnigeria und die Schriften Jacob Egharevbas über die Geschichte des Reiches Benin (Nigeria). In: *Afrikaner schreiben zurück*. Heike Behrend and Thomas Geider (eds.) 105-128. Köln: Rudiger Köppe.

Fearon, J.D. (2003). "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity By Country." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8:195-   222.

Gerlach, L. P. and Virginia H. H. (1970). *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Gunn, H.D. (1956). *Pagan Peoples of the Central Area of Northern Nigeria*. London: International African Institute.

Haque, M.S. (2002). Recent transition in governance in South Asia: contexts, dimensions, and implications. International Journal of Public Administration 24(12), 1405-36.

Honey, R. and Okafor, S. (eds.) (1998). *Hometown associations: indigenous knowledge and development in Nigeria*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Horowitz, D.L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kendie S.B. (1995). The Environmental Dimensions of Structural Adjustment Programmes: Missing Links to Sustaining Development, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 16,1:42-57.

IDEA (2000). Democracy in Nigeria continuing dialogue(s) for nation-building International Capacity Building Series 10.

Miller, D; Kendie S.B. and Apusiga A. (2006). African Knowledge and Sciences: A Potential for Endogenous Development, COMPASS ETC Publishers.

Mukangara, D.R. (1999). *The Roles and Functions and Performance of Political Parties in Multiparty Tanzania*, in African Review, vol. 26, n.1-2, 1999:25-51.

Olukosi, B. (1997). Associational Life in Larry Diamond et al, Eds. Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, p. 450-476.

Nnoli, O. (1995). *Ethnicity and development in Nigeria*. Aldershot: Avebury.

Osaghae, E.E. (1991). Ethnic minorities and federalism in Nigeria. *African affairs*, 90:237-258.

Otite, O. and I.A. Albert (eds.) (1999). *Community Conflicts in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Sikod F. (2005). Poverty and Environmental Degradation in Cameron, Regional Sustainable Development Review, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford (http://www.eolss.net).

Tilly, C. (1986). *The Contentious French*. Cambridge, M.A.: Belknap Press.

UNCED, (1992). Sustainable Development; Conference proceeding; United Nation Conference on Environment and Development held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (June 3-14).

Wanjohi N.G. (2003). *Sustainability of Political Parties in Kenya*, in M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.), *African Political Parties. Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance*, Pluto Press, London , pp. 239-258.

WordNet 2.0 (2003). Princeton University, 2003). http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/~wn/ Accessed on June, 25/2010.

World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), (1987) *Our Common Future;* New York: Oxford University Press, p. 8.

SECTION B

Federalism and Resource Control

Nigerian Leaders, Proliferation of States and Federal Finance in Nigeria: 1955-1996

OLUMIDE VICTOR EKANADE

9

> The first element that strikes any observer of Nigerian political history and present-day political demands is a vigorous demand and continuous campaign for subdivision of units. Nigeria could almost be compared to a biological cell which sub-divides and sub-divides again, creating more and more replicas of itself[1] (Martin Dent).

INTRODUCTION

Agitation for the creation of more states in Nigeria has become a recurring decimal and the clamour is not about to abate with the renewed campaign in the National Assembly. This paper looks at the history of states' creation in Nigeria. It interrogates the reasons and motives for the restructuring exercises and its variegated impact on revenue allocation among federating units. It also examines if these exercises are consistent with the principles of balanced federalism which has viability as a cardinal condition for states' restructuring exercises.

The paper affirms that viability of sub-units has not been at the epicentre of the various states' restructuring exercises. Rather, self-serving interests of the rulers and politicised principles such as equality, population and landmass (which favoured the Northern region) have taken precedence and these have acted as severe disincentives for internal revenue generation effort, fiscal efficiency and self-reliance among the states.

The cumulative impact of the restructuring exercises is that is has increased the Centre's power *vis-a-vis* the federating units and also reinforced northern hegemony continuously as the proliferation exercises were carried out only under the influence of rulers of Northern extraction.

The paper maintains that the clamour will not abate because state creation activities are tools for ethnic competition and political strategy. Much more importantly, it offers a formidable platform for opportunism as the elite use it as an avenue to acquire and maximise material and political patronage for personal aggrandisement at the expense of the masses.

The paper concludes that agitation for proliferation of states will continue unabated until the Centre dilutes the dominance of horizontal sharing principles such as, population, equality and landmass in the distribution of federal revenues and elevate those of internal revenue generation effort and absorptive capacity of states.

Fiscal federalism is the allocation of tax powers and expenditure responsibilities in such a way that each layer of government has enough resources to carry out its constitutional functions and obligations to the citizenry within its jurisdiction. The crisis of fiscal federalism in Nigeria has been engendered by the state building approach of Nigeria's erstwhile ruling class which centred on the creation of states again and again. This paper looks at the history of state creation in the Nigerian federation. It also analyses the reasons and motives of the various re-structuring efforts, and examines if these exercises are consistent with the principle of balanced federalism which has viability of state as a cardinal condition for state creation[2]. What also has been the impact of revenue allocation on the various state creation exercises? In an ideal federalism composite states are supposed to have enough resources to carry out assigned constitutional functions and should contribute meaningfully to the federal purse in terms of tax for reallocation to component units.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The notion of creation of states started in Nigeria on the 14 June, 1955 when a government motion for the creation of Benin-Delta state was unanimously passed in the Action Group (AG) controlled Western House of Assembly. The reason was that the AG saw the Benin-Delta area as an electoral liability

rather than an asset to the party.[3] Moreover the movement for the creation of the state had started in 1952 with the formation of the Benin Delta Peoples Party (BDPP) under the leadership of *Oba* Akenzua II.[4] Similarly, in the Eastern Region, the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) Movement surfaced in their quest for a separate region in 1953 with the United National Independence Party whose leaders were Professor Eyo Ita and Udo Udoma.[5] In addition, on the 6 March, 1956, Mallam Ibrahim Imam tabled a motion asking that the issue of creation of a Middle Belt state be placed by the Northern House of Assembly on the agenda of the 1956 constitutional conference.[6] One common reason for these agitations for new regions was the allegation of domination of the minorities in the three regions.[7] Interestingly, none of these movements achieved their aims before independence in 1960. The reason was that the colonial government believed that conceding to the creation of any state in the decolonisation era would lead to an avalanche of demands. Thus, it was expedient to discourage the creation of more states[8] given the decolonisation project which was in progress. As a follow up to these minorities' demands and consequent upon the decisions of the 1953 constitutional conference, the colonial government in September 1957 set up the Sir Henry Willink's minorities commission amid fears that the movements would delay, abort or mar Nigeria's march towards independence.[9] The commission toured the country to hear and collate the grievances of the affected peoples. In its report, the commission objected very strongly to the creation of new states affirming that it lacked a reasonable historical claim, was economically unviable and would create unnecessary new minorities.[10] In addition, carving out new states would create more problems as great as it sought to cure.[11] Thus, Nigeria still entered independence with a federal structure of three regions.

State Reorganisation in post-Independence Nigeria (1960-1966)

With the institution of the first post-independence government in 1960, the various regional governments got enmeshed in a battle of wits to retain their strangle hold over their respective regions. However, in the midst of managing these challenges, the coalition party in the centre, Northern People's Congress (NPC) and National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) allied together against the Action Group (A.G) which was officially the opposition party. Subsequently in 1963 the Midwest region was carved out of the Western region as a fourth region. Its creation was the result of the politics of struggle for supremacy and the creation of hegemonic spheres of influence among the three dominant ethnic groups and parties and was not a genuine response to the demands of the minorities for their own region.

Two self-serving reasons motivated the creation of the Midwest Region. The first was the desire by the coalition partners NPC and NCNC to emasculate

the influence of AG in the Western region and reduce its national reach. The second was to create simultaneously inroads into the area for political incursion by other parties particularly the NCNC[12] while keeping the North and East intact. Buttressing this claim, Rotimi Suberu observes that the creation of the MidWest region was part of a vindictive campaign by the ruling coalition against the federal opposition party, AG.[13] The four region structure subsisted as the major administrative units in Nigeria until the demise of the First Republic on 15 January, 1966 when the military seized political power.[14]

Military Administrations and State Restructuring Exercises from 1966

The new government headed by Major General Aguyi-Ironsi, imposed a unitary system of government on the Nigerian federation. This and his other unpopular "policies were to culminate in his violent over throw in July 1966 when General Yakubu Gowon became the head of state.

On assumption of office Gowon constituted a national conference on 7 September, 1966 to discuss Nigeria's future. One important outcome of the conference was that the delegates from different regions were not unanimous on the issue of creation of states. On 3 October, 1966 the Midwest, Western and Northern delegates subscribed to the idea of creation of states.[15] However, the delegates of Eastern region objected to the idea, claiming that ". . . it does not believe splitting up the country into more states at this stage was what we needed . . . believing that creation of states should be left to the regions".[16]

Following on this, Gowon in his broadcast to the nation on the 30 November, 1966 outlined the principles that would guide his programme of creation of states. These were that, no one state should be in a position to dominate or control the central government. Each state should form one compact geographical area, while administrative convenience should not be compromised. Furthermore, the facts of history and the wishes of the people concerned must be taken into account, and each state should be in a position to discharge effectively, the functions allocated to the regional governments. In addition it was also essential for the new-states to be created simultaneously.[17]

Thus, on 27 May, 1967, General Gowon in a 9.00 pm broadcast declared a state of emergency throughout Nigerian federation and also announced a decree dividing the Nigerian nation into twelve states, as a basis for stability. The new states were Lagos, western, Midwestern, Southeastern, Eastcentral and Rivers States. Others were Kwara, Benue-Plateau, Northeastern, Northwestern, Kano and Northcentral State. Gowon affirmed that the creation of more states was done so as to remove the fear of domination. Gowon's action however was necessitated by the need to checkmate the breaking away of the Eastern region.[18] The nationwide broadcast was actually a response to an earlier declaration on the same day, by the Eastern Region

Consultative Assembly which mandated the military governor of Eastern region (Lt-Colonel Odumegwu-Ojukwu) to "at a early practical date declare Eastern Nigeria a free sovereign and independent state".[19] Decree No. 14 of 1967 backed the creation of states and provided that they inherit powers of their former regions. In addition Decree No. 27 limited their powers to residual matters. Thus, the new states had to depend on the Federal military government (FMG) for funds to run their states[20] and this enabled the federal government to gather more initiatives and powers at the expense of the new states.[21] Consequently no state could relegate the Federal government to the background as none was financially strong enough to do so.[22] Illustrative of this is the financial statement of the Federal government in 1968/69 where states budgeted to receive the following proportion of their revenue from the Federal government channels; Benue-Plateau – 75 percent, Kano 66 percent, Kwara 68 percent. In an ideal federal state, this is an aberration as P.J. Proudhon observes that states in a federation must have internal sources compatible with their states as coordinate with the central government. Thus the central government's grant to the component unit must not exceed 50 percent of a state budget, thereby reflecting the proportion in which functions are shared between the centre and the state.[23]

Allison A. Ayida, a notable figure in the General Gowon administration, observes that equalising the number of states in the north, with that of the south "was an important consideration which could not be made explicit in the days of the gathering storm" early in 1967.[24] This also meant that viability of states was not a consideration in the creation of states. Evidently a new state like Kwara which took off in 1968/69 (with 53% budgeting deficit) depended heavily on Federal statutory allocation up till 1970 and even, increased federal financial allocation to the states did not translate to improved finances for her as she was not producing any cash crop which could earn her foreign exchange.[25] Samuel Oyovbaire corroborates this by observing that the newly created states found themselves with insufficient revenue with which to meet their constitutional responsibilities as their revenue yielding base was small compared to those of the old regions.[26] One other serious challenge of the 1967 creation of states' exercise was that the structural imbalance was somewhat maintained. For in terms of landmass the north eastern state alone accounted for about one third of the total land area of Nigeria.[27]

In view of these obvious defects and the clamour for more states, General Gowon in his independence broadcast on 1 October, 1970 asserted that settling the creation of states issue was part of his nine point programme that would usher in the new civil government.[28] Oddly enough, General Gowon did not create any new state before his overthrow in July 1975 and his replacement with Murtala Mohammed as head of state. Despite some semblance of parity

Gowon's solution reinforced the problem by restoring nominal federalism and northern pre-eminence.

Upturning of Pre-existing Equality and Reinstatement of Northern Hegemony

General Muritala in his broadcast of 5 August, 1975 barely three weeks after assuming office, acknowledged the spate of demands for creation of new states by many communities in the country. He thus promised to set up a panel that would look into the matter and make detailed submissions to it.[29] As a follow up, the FMG on the 1 October, 1975 announced a 5-stage transition programme with the creation of states to be settled in the first stage and fully established[30] Murtala stated that creation of new states would enhance Nigeria's future political stability. The basic motivation according to the head of state was to bring government nearer to the people while at the same time ensuring even development within a federal structure of government".[31] Quite obviously, the ability of proposed states to be individually self sustaining was not a strong factor here again judging from Murtala's speech. It is possible to argue that the prompt attention Murtala accorded these agitations was one of his ways of seeking for popular support and legitimacy for his administration at the period.

On 7 August, 1975 the creation of states' panel was appointed with five members and Justice Ayo Irikefe as chairman. The panel was asked to examine the question of the creation of more states in the federation and, should the committee find the creation of more states necessary and desirable, it should advise on the delimitation of such states, and advise on the economic viability of the proposed states. It was the panel's job to advise on the location of the administrative capitals of the proposed states, and to examine and advice on all other factors that might appear to the committee to be relevant so as to enable government take a decision which would ensure a balanced federation.[32]

The government included viability of states as a factor to be considered in the creation of states. However, events later showed that this was not a strong factor in the 1976 creation of states exercise. On 23 December, 1975 the panel submitted its report[33] and it gave most weight to political factors in – creation of states which would be acceptable to the people. Their criteria for recommending the new states were, the need to bring government closer to the people, ensure even development, preserve the federal structure of government, maintain peace and harmony within the federation and minimise minority tensions.[34] Considerations such as the economic and administrative viability were not entirely discarded but these were subordinated to what the panel called "the need to redress deep-seated grievances".[35] This criterion is vague as it gives the impression that virtually any area can qualify for a state in Nigeria. More so, the government reinforced this vagueness with its views

on the report when it affirmed that ". . . states were to be created only where demand had been long, strong and widely articulated and where the population of the area justified such an action and where administrative convenience and security were assured".[36] This statement also obviously did not give any serious thought to financial viability of proposed states. A plausible reason was that the expansion in oil revenue accruing to the government at this period made her feel she could sustain the newly created states through oil money deposited in the Distributable Pool Account (DPA)[37] This she eventually did with horizontal sharing principles of equality and population – a derivative of the Decree No. 13 of 1970 and the revenue allocation arrangement which took effect from 1 April, 1975.[38]

Thus, on 3 February, 1976 General Murtala Mohammed announced in a dawn broadcast that he was creating seven new states (so that the total number of states in the federation would be (19) and the Federal capital territory would be moved to a site in the centre of the country.[39] The new states were Imo, Ondo, Ogun, Benue, Gongola, Niger and Bauchi.[40] The old states were Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Plateau, Sokoto, Borno, Oyo, Lagos, Anambra, Bendel, Rivers and Cross River all amounting to 19. The Murtala regime did not pay attention to the parity that existed up till the eve of the 1976 exercise. The north-south balance tilted in favour of the north in ratio 10:9. Thus, the 37-year old parity which existed between the north and south was removed. Also eliminated was the Yourba-Igbo parity as three states were created out of the Yoruba area and two out of East-Central state. The East had four states in the new configuration and the West, five states.

Implications for Revenue distribution

This new arrangement constituted a threat to meaningful dialogue among Nigerians on the basis of equality of states, where states were supposed to be taken as the units of representation in the federation.[41] In fiscal terms, the 10:9 ratio translated to mean that the lion share of the nation's national resources would be (and in actual fact were) apportioned to the Northern region.[42] Thus, on equality basis the north was entitled to 52.6 percent of the total statutory allocation to states for the country against the previous 25.0 percent for the old Northern region.[43] Be that as it may, the 1976 creation of state effort marked a final departure from a federal system where states had relatively autonomous roles as centres of development to one in which they became peripheries of the centre and functioned as administrative agents and distribution outlets for federal finance (courtesy of oil boom). This diluted the viability criterion which hitherto had kept down the number of states. The demonstrable impact of this new scenario was the phenomenal rise in the demand for new states (since there were no clear cut criteria) as different groups struggled to maximise their shares of the federation account.[44] In

Nwabueze's view, the 1976 exercises did not have the same clear objectives as that of 1967. Inspite of this however, the 1976 creation of state affair had Nigerian unity as one of its main underlying purposes.[45] And unlike the Gowon administration which used the creation of state issue to buy time, the Murtala government viewed the exercise as essential to his image and legitimacy as a corrective administrator.

Effects of Revenue Allocation Principles on the new 19-State Structure

The introduction of the equality of states principle in 1970 as one of the two principles for sharing the DPA marked a water shed in the history of federal finance in Nigeria and the agitation for the creation of more states. In real sense, the equality principle seriously undermined the minimum capacity of the government of the Western region (states) as well as continuity of its services when its relative share of the DPA fell from 18 percent to 12.7 percent.

It was clear that the only way to restore the status quo was to agitate for more states in the Western region.[46] What the Irikefe panel did in this regard was to recommend that the Western state be broken up because of its large population, land area and high level of expenditure for maintenance of social services. The panel argued further that "if more states were not created in the West, the resources open to the government would be too thinly spread on the ground and would constitute in effect a relative holding back of development within the state". This was why Oyo, Ondo, and Ogun were carved out of the Western State.[47] The undivided states were hard hit in terms of the 50 percent equality factor in sharing of the DPA. For example, the relative share of Kano State fell from 1/12 (or 8.33%) to 1/19 (or 5.26%). The same applied to Bendel, Rivers, Cross River, Lagos, Kaduna, and Kwara states which were not split in 1976. A state like Northeast or Western State from which three states were created in 1976, had its share of the DPA increased on the basis of equality from 1/12 (or 8.33%) to 3/19 (or 15.19%)[48] The distribution of statutory revenue allocation among states between 1976/77 and 1979/80 reinforce this view.

By 1982, the total number of demands for new states reached an unprecedented 58[49] since (judging from Irikefe's report) the only condition to be fulfilled by areas demanding new states was the persistence of making the demands.[50] Essentially the 1976 exercise increased the influence of the northern region vis-a-vis the 1966 situation. Table 5.6 show cases the demands for new states from 1958-1983.

The issue of creation of states (new) did resurface as a prominent and volatile issue in the Second Republic (1979-83). However, attempts to create new states during this period was checkmated by constitutional complexities, partisan acrimony, parochialism, economic uncertainty, suspicion and unchecked sectional recrimination.[51]

RESTRUCTURING NIGERIA: THE BABANGIDA YEARS

A part of the structural reforms embarked upon by General Ibrahim Babangida military administration was the institution of a Political Bureau in 1986 headed by Dr. Samuel J. Cookey. It was to review comprehensively among other things, the history of agitations for state creation in Nigeria and make recommendations to the Federal government. The Bureau in its report recommended the creation of six additional states in the interest of fairplay and justice. The recommended states were Katsina, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Wawa, Kogi, Benue and Sardauna[52]. These recommendations were referred to another committee by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) the highest legislative body in the country during Babangida administration. It was on the strength of the new committee's advice that two new states, Katsina (in the North) and Akwa Ibom (in the south) were created[53] as the 20th and 21st state of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and were given ₦33m each as takeoff grants.[54]

In an important sense, the 1987 creation of states exercise completed the unfinished project of the 1976 exercise as the Irikefe panel had explicitly recommended the creation of Akwa Ibom, while the Zaria-Katsina crisis in Kaduna state and the concomitant demand for the separation of the two communities had become extremely strident before the exit of the military in[55] 1979. It follows, therefore, that these new states were created in the interest of peace, stability and justice which could not be taken for granted at the period.

With the 1987 creation accomplished, Babangida affirmed that no further comments or petition would be tolerated on states' creation during the transition period.[56] However, by August 1991, the government back-pedalled on its earlier declaration and created nine new states. This increased the number of states to thirty. The official reason advanced by the government was that it was under pressure to revisit the recommendations of the Political Bureau whose rationale for proposal of creation of additional states, with the benefit of hindsight were unassailable, cogent and still relevant to the recent demands.[57] The states created in 1991 were Abia from Imo state with head quarters at Umuahia, Anambra state, with headquarters in Awka, Kebbi, State from Sokoto with headquarters in Birnin Kebbi, Kogi from Benue and Kwara states with headquarters in Lokoja, Delta out of Bendel state with capital at Asaba and Osun out of Oyo with state capital at Osogbo. Others were Taraba, carved out from Gongola, with headquarters at Jalingo, Jigawa from Kano, headquartered at Dutse, Yobe created out of Borno with administrative headquarters established in Damaturu.

Justification for Distorted Formations

The government justified the creation of the new states on the following

grounds; that it would aid social justice, national development and the evolution of the balanced federation. It would also help in decentralising the currencies of power, diffuse undue political tensions which bred instability and frustration in some sections of the federation. In addition, the creation of new states would spread major development centres equitably, bring government's political and social activities closer to the people and ultimately help the development of a wholesome Nigerian citizenship. The final ground was that the creation was better undertaken by the military administration rather than a civilian government because the military administration is not subject to undue polarisation of social forces and mutual recriminations.[58]

Though these justifications were laudable, the implementation was fraught with flaws. This is evident from the anomalies and ambiguities in the composition of some of the new states. For example, the shape of the new Delta state was different from what its protagonists clamoured for. Not only did the new state have the former Bende east (which had consistently demanded for Anioma state) joined to it, but its capital was Asaba (the hometown of President Babangida's wife) in Bende east. Jigawa was created out of Kano instead of Hadeija state, for which agitation had been more strident and pronounced. A similar thing happened in Sokoto with the creation of Kebbi rather than Zamfara state.[59]

The 1991 exercise practically followed the old pattern in relation to balance of power between the North and the South. With the persuasive strength of the Igbo, predicated on economic and political marginalisation, Babangida acceded to their clamour and gave them Abia and new Anambra state and located the capital of a third state, Delta, in the Igbo city of Asaba. Three of the remaining six states, Jigawa, Kebbi and Osun were created to give satisfaction to distributive pressures emanating from Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba sub-groups. The creation of the remaining three Kogi, Taraba and Yobe was in response to the need to extend political and economic decentralisation to areas which are geographically large, administratively unwieldly and culturally incompatible.[60] This arrangement heightened the challenge of regional inequality in the distribution of states with the location of five of the remaining six new states in the north. This contradicts Babangida's assertion that the quest for justice was the principal rationale for the 1991 exercise.[61] This arrangement is also questionable because the Political Bureau which predicated the creation of Akwa Ibom and Katsina states on the need for justice had also recommended the creation of Delta, Wawa or Enugu, Kogi and Kaduna states. Even though they were unable to unanimously agree on this, common sense and justice dictated that only these four outstanding potential states ought to get the status of states at the next possible reorganisation. On the contrary, Babangida picked Delta, Enugu, and Kogi states and added Abia, Osun, Jigawa, Kebbi Taraba and Yobe.[62] This proliferation of states was at

variance with the philosophy of the period which had Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as a cardinal ideology of the administration since the government also had to advance each state ₦30 million as takeoff grants.[63]

On the whole Babangida's creation of states was by fiat in spite of all pretences of consultation and the submission of memoranda.[64] This gives credence to Professor Omoruyi's claim that Babangida negated the terms of agreement he had with *Olu* of Warri, himself and the Vice Chancellor of University of Benin in 1987 on the 1991 states re-structuring exercise.[65] On the whole, in 1987 Babangida maintained the *status quo* of the North's one state advantage over the south that is ratio 11:10 while the East-West ratio was 5:5. Babangida being a northerner and head of government used the reorganisation exercise of 1991 to carefully increase the gap to two, i.e. north 16 states and south 14 states, while maintaining the East-West balance of 7:7.[66] In fiscal terms again, the north was at an advantage. Illustrative of this is the case of states like Lagos in the south and Kano in the north. On revenue sharing from the central government, both states took 40 percent on equality and 30 percent on population with landmass and terrain taking a chunk of the remaining proportion. With Jigawa now carved out of Kano, both Kano and Jigawa now took double of Lagos' share on equality basis and nearly double share on terrain and a greater combined share on other criterias.[67] In another sense, opportunism has also been another motivating factor for the creation of states in Nigeria. Creation of states has been an avenue for the elite to acquire and maximise material and political benefits for personal aggrandisement at the expense of the masses who seem to be content with relative comfort they derive from government infrastructure. This is so because the elite see appropriation of contracts for the provision of infrastructure in the nascent states as just reward for their struggle for the creation of the states. Moreso they were the only one that possessed the financial means to execute such capital intensive contracts.

Fiscal Dependency and Imbalance Among the Federating Units: A Reflection of the 1987 and 1991 State Restructuring Project

Fiscal dependence of component units on a federation is an aberration to the effectiveness of fiscal federalism which denotes decentralisation and liberty that borders on self-determination and self-reliance.[68] The creation of states exercises of the Babangida administration exhibited this aberration. The viability clause was missing in the justification for creation of states and this impacted heavily on inter governmental fiscal relations in the federation. Table 5.8 lumps all the states together from 1988 to 1991 and shows that states were generally dependent on the centre for funds to discharge their constitutional obligation. The extent of dependence was 80.3 percent in 1988, (after the 1987 exercise) it came down marginally to 79.6 in 1989, but the

proportion went up to 85.4 percent in 1990 and virtually notched up a percentage point in 1991 to 86.1 percent.[69]

In terms of the ability of the states to individually generate a sizeable proportion of their revenues internally (which is defined as the ability to obtain up to 50 percent and above of the independent revenue accruing to states) only Lagos was able to do this consistently from 1992 to 1996.[70] The allocation from the federal government constituted about 70-90 percent of the other state governments' revenues. The other eleven states which cut across the geopolitical zones of the country (to reflect the general nature of dependence) depended on the federal government for about 50-95 percent of their funds. An important thing to note in the sample states (eleven states) is that they had been in existence for over seven years, hence they ought to have graduated and become less dependent on the federal allocation.[71] The irony, however, is that their dependence had continued unabated because the revenue allocation formulae (of equality and landmass and terrain amongst others) adopted by the federal government did not give incentive to internal revenue generation efficiency and self reliance among states in fiscal matters.[72]

This development whereby proliferation of states made them remain correspondingly poor did undermine the basis of Nigeria's fiscal federalism. However using the internal revenue generation capability and other indexes, states in the southern part of Nigeria were relatively more self reliant than their northern counterparts.[73] This can be explained in terms of access to some economic and development advantages such as being an industrialised, commercial or political administrative area. Evidently proliferation of states in the north under Babangida was political, it was not based on equity (as claimed) and at the same time did not make economic sense given the exigencies of the period. In Osaghae's words the 1991 exercise was largely intended to galvanise support for the regime whose strength was ebbing and to compensate its close allies.[74]

POLITICS OF STATES' CREATION: THE 1996 EXPERIENCE

In 1993, the Sani Abacha government which had just come into power was confronted with a lot of economic and political challenges. Thus, ordinarily the issue of creation of states was the last thing on the regime's agenda since some Nigerians considered creation of additional states to be a wasteful venture. The negative implications of any further creation of states were effectively captured in a speech by Alhaji Shehu Shagari in January 1996:

... It is hard to see what contribution the creation of yet more states will make to our recovery and progress ... Civil servants will earn rapid promotion and businessmen and women, a fresh wave of contracts for more prestigious buildings and projects. That will be it.. no new revenue resources are likely to

be generated either from taxes, production or services. Dependent on federal handouts and ill equipped to perform their functions, the new states will simply be a drain on already limited resources ... that is not development ... it is absurdity.[75]

Elsewhere, Abacha himself argued along this line that the consideration of the issue of new states could only be done against the background of their economic and other wider implications, and that only economically viable states could be created by his administration.[76] With this assertion it would appear that the issue of creation of states was a settled matter. However, in 1994 Abacha instituted the National Constitutional Conference to chart a new path of political development for the country. The various communities whose dreams of statehood had not been actualised saw the conference a platform to renew their demands. Concomitantly, the Abacha administration, given the peculiar nature of its emergence was shopping for legitimacy and saw in the clamour for more states, an opportunity for it to enlist the support of state agitators in exchange for new states.

The issue of creation of states thus featured prominently on the agenda of the conference with Dr. Peter Odili chairing the conference committee on state creation. The conference could not create states as it had no power to do so but made several recommendations which were adopted. Moreover, in Abacha's pursuit of his promise to ensure equity in the federation, he in December 1995 set up the committee on states, local governments and boundary adjustments headed by Chief Arthur Mbanefo. In his inaugural address to the committee, General Abacha tasked the committee to consider such criteria as common historical experience, cultural affinity, economic viability, (which is an essential ingredient in a federal state) contiguity, minimum and maximum population size in a state and local government area, and consensus to live or stay together. In addition, the committee was to study the recommendations of the constitutional conference on the creation of states and local governments, obtain memoranda on demands for new states, visit areas of demand, determine and recommend to the Federal Military Government the number of states and local governments to be created. The committee was also mandated to delineate boundaries of the recommended states and local governments and determine the appropriate names and suggest capitals for proposed states and councils.

The head of state re-emphasised viability of state as a strong precondition for creation of new states. Nevertheless the committee submitted its report in the third quarter of 1996 after it had received over 80 requests for new states all of which were scrutinised.[77] Quite unlike earlier commissions of Samuel Cookey and Ayo Irikefe, General Abacha's government collected the Mbanefo report and neither publicised nor published the recommendations. In addition it did not release any white paper as it was all shrouded in secrecy. The criteria

and various factors that informed committee's recommendations were concealed.[78]

However, on the occasion of Nigeria's 36th independence anniver-sary, General Abacha announced the creation of six new states as follows – Bayelsa, with headquarters in Yenogoa (out of Rivers), Ebonyi, with capital at Abakaliki (excised from Abia and Enugu states). Ekiti with capital at Ado-Ekiti (excised from Ondo state), Gombe with administrative headquarters in Gombe (excised from Bauchi), Nassarawa with headquarters in Lafia (from Plateau state), and Zamfara with capital at Gusau (excised from Sokoto).[79]

Justification for New States

The government based the creation of the six new states on four major grounds. First, though economically and politically disruptive, creation of states had become a familiar and inevitable feature of Nigeria's postcolonial government and politics. Second, the government could not ignore the obviously popular request for additional states. Third, Abacha made allusion to the broad support for creation of more states at the conference as well as the conference's decision to entrust responsibility for the issue to his government. Finally, according to Abacha, it was necessary for the government to address all genuine demands for new states and localities in order to minimise the volume of unresolved issues that could impede the stability of a democratically elected government.[80]

In an apparent manner, the administration carefully carved out a state each from the informal geopolitical division the country had been balkanised into. With a studious perusal of Abacha's inaugural address, admonition, terms of reference given to the Mbanefo committee and its juxtaposition with Abacha's justification for the creation of additional states, it appeared that the whole exercise was fraught with inconsistencies. Illustrative of this point is the viability clause which the regime cited twice as an essential component and strong parameter for judging the appropriateness of creation of states in 1996. However, government rationale for creation of states excluded this clause. Thus the newly created states found themselves unable to stand on their feet after creation. They faced enormous economic and infrastructural constraints. Bayelsa, Ebonyi and Ekiti are good examples. They were basically unviable as their internally generated revenue were low and they had to cope with high wage bills which accounted for over 60 percent of their states' budgets.[81] Payment of workers' salaries too was an herculean task for the new states as they could not meet up with this obligation completely.[82]

One inference that can be drawn from Abacha's creation of state project was that he embarked on the enterprise in his ploy to legitimise his government, win popular support and acceptance for his self succession bid.[83] This possibly accounts for why Ibrahim Baba Gana had submitted that creation of states

in Nigeria is a child of ethnic competition and a political strategy.[84] The concern with equal number of states between the two geographical entities that make up the Nigerian state historically, had been long drawn and intense. Between 1939 and 1962 the north witnessed relative disadvantage of its one region against the two in the south. This was accentuated in 1963 with the south having three regions against the north's one. The 1967 exercise established parity for the first time since 1939. By 1976 and thereafter the North's initial relative disadvantage had turned full cycle to monumental advantage with 19 states in the north and 18 states in the south presently.

Postscript: Uneven Devolution of Federal Statutory Funds in Some Selected States

Another dimension to the creation of states project is the impact of created states on resource distribution. A careful perusal of table 5.11 below reveals that between 1980 and 1986 federal statutory revenue that devolved to Kaduna and Cross River states fluctuated between 5.4–6.0 percent and 5.0-5.4 percent respectively, however this declined after 1987. The excision of Katsina and Akwa Ibom from Kaduna and Cross River states respectively, accounts for this obvious outcome.

With the 1991 creation of state exercise, Kebbi was excised from Sokoto, Delta and Edo from Bendel, Osun from Oyo, etc. Furthermore Kaduna between 1980 and 1986 got 5.7 percent of federal allocation to states. However, merging Kaduna with Katsina's federal allocation, their combined percentage rose to 7.8 percent between 1992 and 1995.

The creation of Delta and Edo reduced the revenue that devolved to the MidWest states, as their combined percentage averaged 5.9 percent, a serious drop from their figures of the 1980s. The joint percentage of Osun and Oyo states did not also witness any increase over the period when it was only Oyo state. Placed side by side with this picture is the increasing statutory allocation to Sokoto and Kebbi states when compared to the single state (Sokoto) before 1991. Again in October 1996 Sokoto state was further divided into Sokoto and Zamfara states. The implication is that Sokoto state has been divided into 3 states within a spate of 6 years (unprecedented in history of creation of states in Nigeria).

The impact of creation of states on federally allocated revenue is easily understood when the figures are compartmentalised into four regions which obtained before 1966. The shares of the Northern region (all northern states) have tended to increase progressively from 48.4 percent in 1982-84 period to 49 percent in 1987/89 and 51.7 percent for 1992/95 period. On the contrary, allocation to the Western region (states) which hovered between 17.5 percent and 19 percent fell to an average of 15.4 percent between 1993 and 1995. Since 1982 statutory allocation to the Eastern region only changed in 1993-

94 when it recorded about 21.4 percent while the MidWestern states (Edo and Delta states) declined in 1992/94 period.[85]

The application of the landmass and terrain, and equality of states criteria which carry 10 percent and 40 percent respectively are factors that explain this identified pattern of revenue allocation. On the basis of the principle of equality of states, the region that is balkanised into more states received more from the Federation Account.[86] Quite obviously, landmass favoured the northern states more than states in other parts of the federation. Given the heavy weights attached to the equality and landmass factor, it follows that they are potent instruments of expropriating revenues from regions which generate them to poor regions. This is to be expected given the pedigree of creation of states in Nigeria. All creation of states exercises were carried out only under the influence of rulers of northern extraction both military and civil. Thus, the inevitable advantage of the exercises, in economic terms, have also accrued to the Northern region at the expense of other regions in the federation.

CONCLUSION

Quite unlike other federal systems the world over, including Germany, and Australia whose component units have not for once being sub-divided,[87] tinkering with existing states has been a major preoccupation and recurring theme in Nigeria's political history between 1960 and 1996.

Agitation for creation of states in Nigeria began as a result of the fears expressed by the minorities about domination by their more populous neighbours. Even though this did not lead to the creation of more regions (states) before independence, it set the tone and tenor for further agitation in the post-independence era as the people had become conscious of the potential benefits their own autonomous political space would confer on them.[88] Thus, the agitation paid off in 1963 with the creation of the MidWest region as a result of the bitter rivalry and politics which had ensued between the coalition partners and the Action Group. The aim of the coalition was basically to diminish and emasculate the status, influence and power of the AG in the west and concomitantly create political inroads for the coalition, in the Western region which they accomplished. The exigency of an imminent civil war in 1967 provided a platform for the 1967 creation of states. Though rationalised variously (by politicians, scholars and the principal actor, General Gowon) the inference to be drawn from the exercise was that it was initially to curtail the influence of the secessionist Biafra, win the loyalty of the minorities in the Eastern Region for the federal war effort, create autonomous political space for minorities of Middle Belt, create a more balanced federation and subordinate the component units to the authority of the central

government in legislative and fiscal terms. It is instructive to note that it was only General Gowon that adhered to the earlier provision of the 1951 Ibadan Constitutional Conference which gave half the number of seats in the Nigerian legislature to the Northern region.[89] Subsequent military rulers (incidentally northerners) gave more advantages to the north in terms of states creation against the dictates of the 1951 Ibadan conference. General Murtala Mohammed pioneered it with north-south ratio 10:9 in 1976, Babangida with ratio 16:14 and Abacha 19:17.

It is important to note that this outcome is the logic of a historical process. The northerners have always been in charge of the geometry of the federation and with this had come the unstated principle of imposing northern hegemony through the proliferation of states and insertion of favourable revenue sharing principles and policies to accompany the proliferation. Unless the present trend is reversed, the north will perpetually enjoy the dividends of creation of states in political and fiscal terms at the expense of the southern states.

Creation of states has often impacted seriously on the Nigerian state in a number of ways. It has increased the powers of the central government and weakened the states such that unlike what obtained in the pre-civil war era, none is now strong enough to challenge the central government. Proliferation has affected the viability clause such that among the ten political systems which are generally classified as federal, Nigeria is the only nation where states depend on federal government for more than 90 percent of their finances.[90] The heavy dependence is most apparent in the north.

Furthermore, the proliferation which is very dangerous for fiscal federalism has discouraged self-reliance, ingenuity and vibrancy among the states given the revenue allocation principles in place. The states are no more than glorified local governments acting as administrative units for the disbursement of federal funds. The result is that the docility and complacency of the states have stunted economic growth and development in the Nigeria federation. States which could be engine rooms of economic growth and development of the whole federation have become serious economic burden on the federation and have impacted negatively on the nation's overall development.

Much more fundamentally the rationale for creation of states after the 1967 exercise changed from extending political and economic autonomy to minorities, to using the exercise as a means to apportion federal funds (largely derived from minority areas) to predominantly ethnic majority populations. It followed, therefore, that since the minorities were now disadvantaged in the various state creation exercises, after Gowon's 6:6 ratio[91] (with majority/minority ratio standing at 12:7 during Murtala regime[92] 18:12 during Babangida's regime[93] and 12:14 for Abacha's regime)[94] it was natural that the minorities should demand for the control of their resources, a cardinal requirement of fiscal federalism.[95]

There is the need to revisit the realignment of the various states along the stratum of the six informal geopolitical divisions of the country as the balkanisation of the federation along these divides holds much promise of renewal for the country's warped federalism. It has the ardent potential of not just regenerating the federal project but also making it robust and efficient while it will also become an envy for other federations in transition.

ENDNOTES

1. Martin Dent, "Ethnicity and Territorial Politics in Nigeria", in Graham Smith (ed.), *Federalism-The Multi-Ethnic Challenge.* (London: Longman, 1985), p. 129.

2. Omolade Adejuyibe, "Problems in the determination of the viability of political units," *The Quarterly Journal of Administration vol.* Xiv vol. 1 October, 1979, University of Ife, 1979, pp. 81-82.

3. Ezera Kalu, *Constitutional Development in Nigeria* (London: Cambridge University Press 1960), p. 246.

4. *The Nigeria Delta Question: Background to Constitutional Reform.* Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, Ibadan: (PEFS) Monograph, No. 8 2004, p. 15.

5. Smart Ofugara, "Creation of states, 1977-1981, A Measure of Nation Building in Nigeria", a B.A Long Essay, submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan, 1994 p. 4.

6. Ezera Kalu, op. cit., p. 246.

7. Michael Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria* (London: Faber and Faber Publishers 1978), pp. 241-242.

8. Olakunle Abdul-Rasheed Lawal "Britain and Decolonization of Nigeria 1945-1960", Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 1991, pp. 246-247.

9. Claude Ake, *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa* (London: CODESRIA publication, 2000), p. 110.

10. Oyeleye Oyediran, "Background to Military Rule", in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed) *Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979,* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1979).

11. *The Niger Delta Question: Background to Constitutional Reform.* Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, p. 16.

12. S.G. Toyden "The Minorities Factor in Nigerian Federalism", in J. Isawa Eliagwu and R.A. Akindele (eds) *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1960-1995* (Jos: Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR), Publisher, Nigeria 2001), p. 249.

13. Rotimi Suberu, "States Creation and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism", in Kunle Amuwo, Rotimi Suberu, Adigun Agbaje, George Herault (eds.). *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria* (Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 2003), p. 281.

14. Dauda Abubakar, "The North and the Nigeria Civil War", in Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi Suberu (eds), *The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath* (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers, 2002), p. 253.

15. James O. Ojiakor, *13 Years of Military Rule 1966-1979* (Lagos: Daily Times Publication, 1979), pp. 42-44.

16. NAI, CWC 2/1/3. The Ad. Hoc Conference on the Nigerian Constitution: Nigerian Crisis 1966, vol 4. Enugu: Government Printer, 1966, p. xi.

17. General Gowon's Broadcast. "Towards a New Nigeria", in *Faith in Unity.* General Gowon's Collective Speeches, Federal Ministry of Information Lagos, 1975, p. 5.

18. C.C. Agbodike, "Federal Character Principle and National Integration", in Kunle Amuwo et al (eds) *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*, p. 180.

19. James O. Ojiakor, *"13 Years of Military Rule, 1966-1979,* p. 47.

20. Asisi Asobie, "Centralizing Trends in Nigerian Federalism", in J. Isawa Eliagwu et.al (eds) op. cit., pp. 149-150.

21. Rotimi Suberu, "Traditionalism., Federalism and Conflict in Nigeria", in John A.A. Ayoade and A.B. Agbaje (eds)., *Traditonal Political Thought and Institutions* CBAAC Lagos, 1989. p. 322.

22. J. Isawa Eliagwu, "The Military and State Building: Federal State Relations in Nigeria's Military Federalism, 1967-1976", in A.B. Akinyemi et. al (eds) *Readings on Federalism* (Lagos: NIIA, 1979).

23. F.J. Ellah, *Nigeria and States Creation: Based on the Unfinished Motion* (Porthacourt: J.W. Ellah and Sons Publishers; 1983), p. 107.

24. Allison A. Ayida, *Reflections on Nigerian Development* (Ibadan: Malthouse Press Ltd., Heinemann Books, 1987), p. 7.

25. C.O.O. Agboola, "Constraints to Development in Newly Created States. The Kwara Phenomenon 1967-1979", in *Nigeria Journal of Economic History,* vol. 2.

26. S. Egite Oyovbaire, "The Politics of Revenue Allocation", in Panter Brick (ed). *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transfromation of Nigeria* (London: Frank Cass. 1978), p. 226.

27. G.N. Hembe, "The Logic of More States and the Nature of Nigerian Federalism", in *African Journal of Economy and Society,* vol. 2. No. 2, January-December 2000, p. 106.

28. Gavin Williams, "Nigeria: The Neo-Colonial Political Economy", in Dennis L. Cohen and John Daniel (eds), *Political Economy of Africa – Selected Readings* (Essex, U.K Longman Ltd., 1982), p. 57.

29. NAI, SD/M6 "A Time for Action". *Urgent Issues of National Importance,* pp. 16-17.

30. General Murtala's Broadcast to the Nation on the 15th Anniversary of Independence on October, 1, 1975.

31. NAI, SD/M General Murtala Mohammed, "Consideration for Justice, Peace and Harmony", 3 February, 1976, p. 55.

32. James O. Ojiakor, *"13 Years of Military Rule, 1966-1979*, p. 129.
33. Ibid.
34. G.N. Hembe, op. cit., p. 107.
35. Ali. D. Yahaya, "The Creation of States", in Panter Brick (ed), op. cit., p. 216.
36. NAI, CE/12 "Federal Military Government: Views on the Report of the Panel on Creation of States" (Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1976), p. 15.
37. S. Egite Oyovbaire, op. cit., p. 233.
38. J.O Osakwe, "Fiscal Relations Among the Three Tiers of government in Nigeria", in *Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development.* Ibadan, Nigerian Economic Society Annual Conference (NES) Ibadan, 1999, pp. 527-528.
39. James O. Ojiakor, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
40. Ibid, p. 132.
41. J.A.A. Ayoade, "The Federal Character Principle and the Search for National Integration", in Kunle Amuwo et. al (eds). *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria,* p. 104.
42. R.T. Akinyele, "The Ibrahim Babangida Administration and the National Question: Issues and Agenda in Retrosepct", in Isaba Yunus Muhammed and Chidi Amuta (eds), *Ibrahim Babangida, A Heritage of Reforms: Perspective and Interpretations* (Vol. 1, Zaria: Open Press Ltd., 2002), p. 404.
43. Omolade Adejuyigbe, "Creation of States in 1967 and 1976", in Peter E. Ekeh, Patrick Dele Cole, Gabriel O. Olusanya, (eds), *Nigeria Since Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years, Politics and Constitution,* Vol 5 (Ibadan: Heinemann Books 1989), pp. 214-215.
44. Eghosa E. Osaghae, *Crippled Giant, Nigeria Since Independence* (London: Hurst and Company, 1998). p. 86.
45. B.O. Nwabueze, *Military Rule and Constitutionalism* (Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 1992), pp. 111-112.
46. P. Ada Omogoriuwa, "Nigeria: The Effect of State Creation on Revenue Allocation and Economic Development". Paper presented at the National Conference on the Creation of States in Nigeria, Social Science Faculty, University of Ife, Etete Essay Series, No. 1, 1981, p. 9.
47. Omolade Adejuyigbe, "Creation of states in 1967 and 1976", in Peter E. Ekeh, Patrick Dele Cole, Gaburiel O. Olusanya, (eds). op. cit., pp. 214-215.
48. P. Ada Omogoriuwa, op. cit., p. 9.
49. Eghosa E. Osaghae, op. cit., p. 86.
50. Omolade Adejuyigbe, "Creation of states in 1967 and 1976" p. 229.
51. Rotimi Suberu, op. cit., p. 284.
52. Nuhu I. Yaqub, "State Creation in Nigeria: A Centralizing Outcome in a Devolution Strategy", Tunde Babawale and Bash Olasupo (eds), *Devolution of Powers in a Federal State* (Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2000), p. 87.
53. *Daily Times* (Lagos), 24 Septermber, 1987, p. 11.

54. Sam Oyovbaire and Tunji Olagunju, *Crisis of Democratization in Nigeria – Selected Speeches of IBB* (Lagos: Malthouse Press, Vol. III, 1996), pp. 28-29.
55. Rotimi Suberu, op. cit., p. 284. *See also* R.T. Akinyele, "The Ibrahim Babangida Administration and the National Question: Issues and Agenda in Retrospect", p. 407.
56. *Daily Times* (Lagos), 24 September, 1987, p. 11.
57. Sam Oyovbaire and Tunji Olagunju, op. cit., p. 29. *See also* Eghosa E. Osaghae's op. cit., p. 229. Rotimi Suberu argues here that the FMG was under pressure from Constituent Assembly members who strongly advocated for creation of at least four new states.
58. Sam Oyovbaire and Tunji, Olagunju, op. cit., p. 29.
59. Eghosa E. Osaghae's op. cit., p. 228.
60. Rotimi T. Suberu, op. cit., p.285.
61. Sam Oyovbaire and Tunji, Olagunju, op. cit., p. 29.
62. Nuhu I. Yaqub, op. cit., p. 87.
63. Sam Oyovbaire and Tunji, Olagunju, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
64. Ogban Iyan, "Federalism in Nigeria: Past, Present and Future", in Tunde Babawale et.al (eds), op. cit. (Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd., Friedrich Ebert Foundation 1998), p. 64.
65. Omo Omoruyi, "The Itshekiri in Old Bendel State Belong to Edo State. Reviewing the Edo State of IBB's Dreams. Paper presented at National Conference in Edo State, Benin, 2000, p. 3.
66. J.A.A. Ayoade, op. cit., p. 106.
67. I.O. Agbede, "Economic Self-Determination: Resources Generation, Allocation and Federalism" in *Constitutional Reform and Federalism in Nigeria.* Ajasin Foundation, Annual Colloquium, Monograph 1.2003 p. 53.
68. Godwin, E. Akpan, "State Fiscal Dependency and Imbalance in Nigeria". *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies,* Ibadan: Vol 41, No. 2, July 1999, p. 219.
69. Nuhu. O. Yaqub, op. cit., p. 104.
70. Akin Fadahunsi, "Labour compensation and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria", in *Constitutional Reform and Federalism in Nigeria.* Ajasin Foundation Colloquium Mongraph, 2003 p. 100.
71. Sheriffdeen Tella, "Promoting States' Economic Independence", in *Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development,* NES Annual Conference, Ibadan, 1999, p. 176.
72. Godwin E. Akpan, op. cit., p. 215.
73. Gowin E. Akpan, "Fiscal Potentials and Dependence in Nigeria," in *Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development."* in NES Annual Conference, Ibadan, 1999, p. 83.
74. Eghosa E. Osaghae, op. cit., p. 228.
75. Rotimi Suberu, op. cit., p. 286.
76. Ibid.
77. *Daily Times* (Lagos), Monday, 7 October, 1996, p. 16.

78.   Olumuyiwa Omotosho, "Administrtive Problems of State Creation in Nigeria. The Case of Ekiti and Osun State". Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, December 2003.

79.   Eghosa E. Osaghae, op. cit., p. 294.

80.   *Daily Times* (Lagos) October, 2, 1996 pp. 1-2.

81.   Rotimi Suberu, op. cit., p. 289.

82.   *Daily Times* (Lagos), 7 October, 1996, p. 16.

83.   Francis Emenuo, "Power Devolution in a Federal State. Implications for Inter-governmental Relations", in Tunde Babawale et al (eds), *Devolution of Powers in a Federal State* (Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2000), p. 75.

84.   Ibrahim Baba Gana, "The National Question and the Politicization of Ethnicity in Yobe State", in Abubakar Momoh and Said Adejumobi (eds), *The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives* (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2002), p. 141.

85.   Gini F. Mbanefoh and Festus O. Egwakhide, "Revenue Allocation in Nigeria. Derivation principle revisited", in Kunle Amuwo et al (eds), *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*, pp. 219-229.

86.   This has been amply demonstrated in the body of the work.

87.   Martin Dent, "Ethnicity and Territorial Politics in Nigeria", in Graham Smith (ed.), *Federalism. The Multi-Ethnic Challenge*, pp. 130-131.

88.   Larry Diamond, "Class, Ethnicity and the Democratic State: Nigeria 1950-1966". *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* Vol. 25, No. 3, July, 1983. Cambridge University Press, 2004 p. 475.

89.   Interview with Professor Bunmi Ayoade of Department of Political, University of Ibadan, on Thursday, 8 December, 2005.

90.   F.J. Ellah, op. cit., p. 108.

91.   Rotimi Suberu, op. cit., p. 283.

92.   Ibid, p. 285.

93.   Ibid.

94.   Ibid, p. 291.

95   O.B.C. Nwolise "How the Military Ruined Nigeria's Federalism," in Ebere Onwudiwe, and Rotimi T. Suberu (eds)., op. cit. (Ibadan, Archers Ltd., 2005). p. 116.

Nigerian Federalism and the Political Economy of Resource Control

FELIX OSARHIEMEN

10

INTRODUCTION

Federalism, which has been described as the "territorial allocation of authority secured by constitutional guarantees", is simultaneously an idea and a structure. In its operationalisation, it is commonplace to find that most people treat it as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself, the reason for this is that the core issues that bother citizens and groups within a state is not which government (federal, state or local) proposes to act, but what action such government (federal, state or local) proposes to take.[1] In simple terms, federalism is more or less an attempt to share power in order to balance multifaceted and variegated interests in a nation-state. It is built on dual sovereignty, in the view of Kunle Amuwo. This conviction rests on the assumption that only when power is divided and shared – as well as susceptible to being divided or parcelled out – is individual liberty best guaranteed. [2] Thus, it has can be inferred from the above expression that "the central interest

of true federalism in its entire species is liberty".[3]

An insight into Nigerian federalism in its complex and contradictory history reveals a lot of interesting perspectives on the phenomenon. In certain quarters, the development is seen as one in which "the various tiers of government are designed as related parts of a Nigerian governmental system, to be characterised more by co-operation and shared functions than by unnecessary conflict and unhealthy competition".[4] However, on account of the practical conceptualisation and practice of federalism in Nigeria, which can best be explained as a turbulent and complicated exercise, the phenomenon has been described by Ayoade as "a forced brotherhood and sisterhood that has been the subject of continual tinkering, panel-beating and even attempted dissolution".[5]

The economic interest of Nigerian politicians has been a decisive factor in the structure of Nigerian federalism, especially against the backdrop of the fact that the acquisition and control of economic resources by the political leaders is a strong determinant of political decisions.[6] This is complementary to the point made by Claude Ake when he explained that "the socio-political and belief system in any society is a reflection of the economic factor".[7] The question of resource control in the political economy of the Nigerian federal structure is the best demonstration of the place of the elitist economic interests in the resolution of political problems.

This issue of the political economy that coloured the crisis of resource control in the Nigerian federalism is the focal point of this paper. The first section undertakes a historical analysis of the resource control conflict as a background to the assessment of some of the most pivotal factors that led to the exacerbation of the crisis, such as the continuous neglect of the people and their demands despite the exploitation of their natural resources, the destruction of the ecosystem and the peoples' sources of livelihood by the multinational corporations in the process of oil exploration and the alteration of Nigeria's fiscal federalism by military administrations.

The paper maintains that these grievances, demands and struggles for the control and allocation of the benefits of such resources have caused instability and security problems in Nigeria, and that they have become obvious threats as well as constituted severe limitations to the overall gains that result from the nation's dependence on the oil economy.[8] Consequently, it concludes that the question of resource control in the political economy of the Nigerian federal structure demands a constitutional response and pragmatic reforms that will emanate from open dialogue and mass participation for permanent resolution and the consolidation of peace in the troubled oil-producing region in particular and the Nigerian polity in general.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RESOURCE CONTROL QUESTION

The question of resource control in Nigerian federalism can be conceptualised as the inability of the federating units to concur on the sharing of revenues accruing to the Distributable Pool Account (DPA); the fiscal source of the revenue that should be credited into the DPA;[9] the principles that should guide the vertical allocation of resources from the DPA among the three tiers of government; and, the criteria as well as statistical formulae for the distribution of such resources among the constituent units in the polity.[10]

The issue has at its core minority grievances and "demands for equitable accommodation, as well as the distribution of power and resources"[11] which stem from the prolonged deprivation of the people of access to proper representation at the national level, articulation of their individual community and collective sub-regional desire to pursue their sustained economic development within the Nigerian federation, the unfeeling arrogance of the ruling élite towards the general interest of the majority of the populace and other such associated distortions in the socio-political engineering of the national psyche.

This dilemma is traceable to the very foundation of the country, when in 1914 the eastern part of the country provided a larger proportion of the revenue for administering the emergent nation through the export of the various agricultural products in that region.[12] By 1922, the three regions became self-sufficient with groundnuts, cotton and tin being the major export items from the Northern region; rubber, cocoa and timber came from the Western region while the Eastern region exported palm produce and coal. Afolabi opines that this was in the disadvantage of the Eastern region "since no reparations were considered in respect of its palm produce when it has sustained the whole of Nigeria".[13]

The manner in which revenue allocation was formally introduced when the Richards Constitution – that was promulgated in 1946 but, which came into effect in January 1947 – created the forcefulness with which it later became a struggle for power and resources, as the creation of regional governments raised the question of allocating derivable revenues among the central government, the three regional governments and the constituting native authorities in the polity.[14] Though, this problem of revenue allocation was mild at this early stage, it tailored minority agitations and its associated issue of state creation as well as the financial relations of the federating units in the constitutional debates of the period.[15]

In an attempt to remedy this problem, the Sir Sidney Phillipson Commission constituted in 1946 recommended the principle of derivation for revenue allocation by which a region will profit from the greater proportion of its contribution to the central revenue. To satiate the chaotic struggle for

fiscal allocation, this recommendation was enshrined in the constitution. The arrangement raised fresh agitation that "was debated by the delegates in the Constitutional Conference in Ibadan in 1950, during which the North seriously questioned the derivation principle because of its poor revenue base".[16] Despite these protests, the derivation principle remained enshrined in the constitution and the dominant regional élite sought access to power as a basis for resource control in the respective regions.

The federal framework of 1954 introduced under the auspices of the Colonial Secretary, Sir Oliver Lyttleton, from 1 October of that year, to address the imperfections of the earlier constitution of 1951 promulgated under Governor-General John MacPherson further intensified this struggle for power and resources in the regional level as it increased fiscal autonomy in the direction of true federalism while at the national level the Northern region continued to articulate its discontent with the fiscal system due mainly to its poor resource base. Consequently, after independence, revenue allocation became "not only a contentious issue of struggle and conflict but a determinant of the fiscal relations within the tiers of government".[17]

Chibuike Uche and Ogbonnanya Uche, in their seminal work on the issue of oil and the politics surrounding revenue allocation in Nigeria succinctly point out that it was the discovery of crude oil in some parts of Eastern Nigeria and the potential it had for growth that altered the thinking about the place of minerals in the revenue allocation formulae. They explain that up till then, royalties from minerals fully belonged to the region of origin and that however, the discovery of oil in commercial quantities from 1958 in the Niger delta area of Nigeria – which happened to be situated in the Eastern region – coincided with the need to review the existing revenue allocation scheme, an incident that was a fallout of the 1957/58 Constitutional Conference and the imminence of political independence.[18]

The British colonial authorities subsequently appointed Sir Jeremy Raisman and Professor Ronald Tress to review the federal fiscal structure, and they recommended that the regions should have authority over produce sales tax and sales tax on motor vehicle fuel. The committee equally proposed the establishment of a DPA for the purposes of sharing federally collectible revenues.

Perhaps the most significant recommendation of the Commission was that the practice of returning mining rents and royalties to the regions should be discontinued, to be replaced with a new mode whereby revenues was now to be shared through the DPA with the regions of origin getting 50 percent, the federal government 20 percent and all the other regions to share 30 percent. Although oil was a new discovery in the colony, and the revenue from it at the time (1958/59) was estimated to be only 65,000 pounds, it however had great prospects of being a major revenue earner in the future. On the strength

of this development, the Raisman Report significantly reduced the use of derivation as a principle for sharing the DPA and substituted four new variables: continuity, minimum responsibility, population and balanced development of the federation.

Mention must be made of the fact that crude oil was not the first natural resource to be exploited in Nigeria. The West had been the wealthiest of the three regions before then due mainly to the benefits of its cocoa boom, while the Northern region appropriated to itself the proceeds from the tin and bauxite that were exploited in the area. The Eastern region fared badly under the principle of derivation as it had very little natural or agricultural resources, a situation that compelled it to devise other additional sources of income so as to meet its expectations.

From the above, Chibuike and Ogbonnanya surmise that "at the time that the derivation principle reigned supreme in the distribution of revenue in Nigeria, the less endowed regions tended to be more innovative in their bid to improve their finances".[19] Thus, each of the regions necessarily had to explore the opportunities, endowments and peculiar circumstances of their respective territories in their quest to generate additional revenues. All these changed with the discovery of crude oil in the Niger Delta area of Eastern Nigeria. This de-emphasis of derivation principle as a basis for sharing revenues and the adoption of factors such as population and balanced national development led the Raisman Commission to recommend the unification of some aspects of the Nigerian tax system. The implication of this in the view of Chibuike and Ogbonnanya, was that

> . . . the flexibility of regions with respect to adapting to their unique circumstances for generating revenues was greatly reduced. This marked a fundamental shift of focus from revenue generation to revenue allocation. As will be seen later, most regions subsequently used various overt and covert ways in their attempt to increase the revenues derived from the DPA.[20]

The first post-independence Revenue Allocation Review Commission adopted the derivation principle for allocating revenue from the proceeds of independents, royalties and customs duties as provided for in the 1963 Republican Constitution[21] while the Kenneth Johnstone Binns Commission of 1964 upheld the principle of derivation at 50 percent to the region of production, 30 percent to DPA and 20 percent to the federal or central government.

This revenue sharing formula of commendable fiscal federalism in Nigeria was in existence until the military incursion into governance in 1966 led to the imposition of a unitary system of government on the country, which was short-lived as its originator, Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, was overthrown. These and other associated events culminating in the attempted

secession of the Eastern region under Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu and which resulted in a 30-month long civil war that ended in 1970 when the fortuitous oil boom that the country experienced at the termination of the hostilities created new and more vicious basis of struggle for power and revenue allocation. The odious coalition formed by the ruling élite in the North and Western sections of the country "introduced the politics of dominant ethnic hegemony in the struggle and conflict over the so-called 'national cake' – a concept that has come to represent the plundering of national resources".[22]

This fiscal federalism eventually came to an end with the emergence of the 1979 Constitution which empowered the federal government "to control resources under or upon any land in Nigeria".[23] Through this medium, the military dictatorship of General Olusegun Obasanjo – which was mid-wifing the transition programme to hand over power to a civilian administration in October 1979 – upturned the existing fiscal arrangements that had hitherto been in operation in the country.

Without meaning to digress far from the main theme of this study, it is instructive to point out at this juncture that a major legal instrument that formed the plank on which the junta projected its nefarious intentions in the area of centralising power – as well as the control of resources in the country – was the earlier promulgation of the Land Use Decree of 1978. In simple terms, the decree vested the ownership of all lands, all that is on it and beneath it exclusively in the domain of the government of the day.

The section of the 1979 constitution that arrogated control over resources to the government was influenced by the report of the Aboyade Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation, which had recommended that the principle of derivation should be de-emphasised. Soon after the 1979 Constitution came into effect, the Pius Okigbo Report of the Presidential Commission on Revenue Allocation (1980) recommended that the principle of derivation should not be used again as a formula for revenue allocation.

This distortion of the original federal structure that laid emphasis on regional autonomy, power-sharing and revenue allocation based on derivation has since then come under increasing attack as its logic clearly had the objective of over-centralising the federal system of government and further enhancing the control of state power by the dominant ethnic groups. It is also condemned for bringing about the neglect of the Niger Delta region, which produces over 90 percent of the revenue that sustains the entire Nigerian polity.[24]

The Niger Delta environment which served as the source of livelihood for nearly all of its peoples, has been degraded and devastated as a consequence of widespread oil mining, exploration and extraction activities. In the midst of prolonged official neglect, arrogant oppression by unfeeling ruling élite of majority ethnic group extraction as well as sustained, mindless environmental

degradation, what the peoples of the area canvassed for but were consistently denied over the years was a more equitable revenue sharing formular.

Their desire was for an all-embracing policy reflecting true fiscal federalism, with recognition of the scenario that informed the formulae adopted from the time of Governor Arthur Richards' Constitution of 1946 – that created three regions in the country – up till the time of the Binns Commission of 1964, which upheld the retention of the derivation principle as the revenue allocation formular to the constituent units of the Nigerian federation.

It is an incontrovertible fact that the failure of the ruling class to rise above ethnic and regional chauvinism to become true statesmen, occasioned by their inordinate ambitions to use access to power and therefore public resources to satisfy personal greed and clannish interests transformed politics into a zero-sum game and a Machiavellian contest to the detriment of the minority groups in the country on one hand and the mass of the populace on the other, which led in the immediate time, to socio-political and economic crisis in the country with the futuristic implication of national stagnation and retrogression.

While the political gladiators were locked in a battle to the death over access to and control of power in the country, the military struck from the flanks and displaced the civilians ostensibly with claims that they were out to set things right. By its very composition, the military was rigidly regimented and it would have been wishful thinking to expect that the putschists will not only acknowledge but equally manage the country in a truly federal manner. The implication of this was that the aberration called military rule, with all their pretensions to national interest and bumbling inadequacies, eventually sounded the death knell for many things truly national and federal in perception and operation among which, unfortunately, was the revenue allocation formular based on the derivation principle.

The struggle became internationalised in the 1990s as some of the Niger Delta movements gained international recognition in confronting the problems and fundamental issues affecting them and their communities. In that year, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in concert with the traditional rulers of Ogoniland formally proclaimed the Ogoni Bill of Rights to assert their autonomy and their right to self determination.[25] In the bill, after lamenting the sufferings of the Ogoni peoples on account of oil exploration activities, the neglect of their area by successive federal and Rivers state governments and the consequent lack of amenities and social services, as well as their political marginalisation in the country and defining themselves as a separate and distinct ethnic nationality, the Ogoni demanded "political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit."[26]

The Ogoni Bill of Rights further asserted that this autonomy should guarantee the right to control their political affairs, and right to the control and use of a fair share of the economic resources derived from Ogoniland. Further, they demanded the protection, use and development of Ogoni local languages, as well as the protection of their oil-producing environment from further degradation. In the bill, the people explicitly stated that they could no longer seek restitution in the courts of law in Nigeria, as the acts of expropriation of their rights and resources were institutionalised in the 1979 and 1989 constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.[27]

Issues that Deepened the Crisis

At this point in time, the central issue in the agitation of the Niger Delta people experienced a dramatic paradigm shift from the earlier requests for an increase in the revenue allocated to the area to assume a new, ominous tone of an outright demand for resource control. Due principally to its explosive nature, the question of resource control soon led to further problems when the restive youths in different locations in the Niger Delta took up arms against the government of the day, to which the military violently responded in their characteristic manner.

Armed with sophisticated, modern weapons and adopting the strategy of *divide et impera* the military sustained their campaigns of terror in Ogoniland in particular and the Niger Delta area in general. Though successful in suppressing the rebellion, the victory of the government over the impoverished, brutalised and oppressed peoples of the Niger Delta was a short-lived one in that the onslaught of the government only served to further infuriate and inflame the separatist tendencies that have been spawned in the minds of the indigenes. In fact, after the government openly adopted repression as its official response to the restiveness in the Niger Delta, the problem assumed hydra-headed proportions as it magnified in complexity.

Many factors combined to fan the ember that made the issue to degenerate further as the situation grew more chaotic. One such reason that was quite fatal was the commercial use of political parties by the ruling élite. These parties developed as instruments to attain a number of given economic and social ends. Balogun points out that a majority of the party leadership in the First Republic were businessmen and traders as well as traditional rulers, and "the open and continued use of party patronage to secure contracts and economic benefits for these leadership groups and their clients illustrate the functions of these parties".[28] Government patronage became a major conduit for economic gain and various leadership groups in the country settled down to share the national cake among themselves.

Accordingly, the issue of resource control in the federal structure was aggravated by the tussle for political power, since the latter was "primarily a

contest for economic survival as a group and the struggle developed into a naked confrontation, in which rival groups were less willing to respect the outward form of restraint and conventional chivalry associated with the western European capitalist practice of democracy".[29] The Action Group crisis of 1962 was part of the consequences of the political élite's struggle for the 'national cake' between two antagonistic groups of politicians who were desperate for political power:

> The first, led by S.L. Akintola, wanted the Action Group to join the Federal Government of Tafawa Balewa in order that the Yoruba chiefs and businessmen might share in the federal 'chop-chop'. Why should that Federal chop–chop or the 'national cake' – as the capitalists call it – be enjoyed only by the Ibos and the Hausas and Fulanis . . . the second group, led by Awolowo, wanted to . . . build up its power among the people, use this power to unseat the NPC-NCNC coalition government and grab the whole of the federal 'chop' . . .[30]

In the fight to seize bigger share of the national cake, each of the competing political groups demonstrated that there were practically no limits to the methods it will utilise to gain power.

This economic motive in political affairs became compounded by corruption, which ". . . thrives in such a field of despair and disappointment. It becomes a situation of every man for himself"[31] and the social fabric of the society suffered severe abuse in the hands of greedy politicians. Corruption in the political system became apparent in bribery, kick-backs from contractors and contract inflation, advance fee fraud, adulteration of products, extortion, electoral malpractices, stealing, hooliganism, falsification of figures and documents, nepotism, money laundering, tax evasion, smuggling, and perversion of justice.

The ills of these vices far transcend resource control conflict and underdevelopment. It brings about social dislocations that can result in anarchy as corrupt public officers will not enjoy the confidence of the people and consequently not be able to lead them. This accountability of public officers, particularly with regard to project implementation, is a major requirement for social harmony and a vital component to infrastructure development through resource allocation.

State creation exercises were also used to pursue selfish economic interests among the ruling ethnic groups as the state unit became another scheme for federal economic and political benefits rather than instruments of development. The competition for the distribution of resources by the federating groups is a persistent factor in the demand for state creation. "The unrelenting pressure for territorial changes in Nigeria reflects the insatiable pressures by territorial communities for easy access to central revenues".[32] The people tend to have a common belief that the creation of more states will be the solution to their

economic problems, an opportunity to have their own share of the 'national cake'. Thus, they contend that "only the creation of their own state will guarantee them equal access to the national largesse"[33] but instead of pacifying the agitations, the state creation exercises escalated it.

From the outset at the creation of the regions, which was done in such a manner that the Northern region was bigger than the West and the East put together and thereby "created a tripod with one long leg and two short ones,"[34] the process of instability was set in motion particularly in the area of allocating the national cake. The imbalance created by the lopsided regions had serious negative consequences for the nation. Obafemi Awolowo saw this clearly and opined that "the evils which afflicted Nigeria and brought about the ruin of the First Republic may be put in a nutshell as follows: the abnormal imbalance in the constituents of the federation".[35]

Ailoje Jimoh explains the economic significance of this structural imbalance: "Assuming the revenue allocation was to be based on equality of states where the North would [had] 25 percent in the era of 4 regions, it would have about 53.33 percent using the same derivation principle in the era of thirty states".[36] This means that rather than removing the domination to enhance unity, the creation of more states has actually exacerbated the centrifugal forces of disunity by fueling the agitations for more states. Another consequence of the structural imbalance spawned by the state creation process is that the aggrieved sections came to believe that "the military junta split the major ethnic groups into smaller units to enable them rob the minority ethnic groups of their oil resources".[37] Therefore, rather than pacify the agitations for resource control, the state creation exercises exacerbated it in the oil producing areas.

Poverty and gross inadequacy of infrastructures in the Niger Delta also combined to add momentum to the resource control conflict and demand for the return to the original federal structure. There is evidence of continuing and massive poverty among the people of the Niger Delta. The sources of data include reports and publications on children, health, human development education, and population from various agencies including the World Bank. The main obstacle to the eradication of poverty in the area is not because the area is not naturally endowed but that the nature of the state structure is such that the federal government has become an instrument of oppression in the hands of the majority.

The issues of continuing and massive poverty are challenges to the state as it relates to the grievances of the people who are struggling to survive the insufficiency of the basic necessities of life[38] in contrast to the wealth derived from oil exploitation in the area. In a word, the lack of basic infrastructure and necessary social facilities such as portable water, electricity, good roads, functional hospitals among others, in spite of the huge revenue derived from

its bowels has fanned the flames of resource control conflicts between the indigenes of the area and the federal government of Nigeria, with the former maintaining that federal government oil related activities in the Niger Delta is the most significant factor in the region's poverty rate.

Another important factor in the exacerbation of the crisis is the reckless use of resources. In the 1970s, Nigeria earned so much from oil that a top government official was quoted as saying that "money was not Nigeria's problem but how to spend it".[39] Also, during the EEC-ACP negotiations for the First Lomé Convention in the 1970s, buoyed by its oil-based wealth, Nigeria even contemplated contributing to the European Development Fund (EDF), instead of being a recipient. The oil which brought so much wealth to the nation and to those in power, brought much poverty, disease, loss of livelihood and death to the peoples of the oil producing areas.

In spite of this high cost of hosting the oil industry, the oil producing communities are developmentally an eyesore, denied basic amenities and their indigenes are denied employment in the industry. Furthermore, their demands for compensation for damage to their farmlands, crops, economic trees, fishing lakes and equipment were generally treated with levity and even dismissed as irritants as the government embarked on several projects, especially highways and road and many worthless projects as well, all of which benefited and made millionaires out of the military bureaucratic élite and their merchant and contractor friends.[40]

In fact, Nigeria went to the ridiculous extent of paying the salaries of civil servants in far away Grenada on one occasion in the 1970s. And the billions of dollars spent in the 1990s on the ECOMOG adventure and the millions and billions in different currencies reported stolen by people in power, especially during the Babangida and Abacha administrations, came largely from the oil rich Niger Delta, where people are so poor that they lack access to clean drinking water.[41] This on its own is a sufficient causal condition for the insurgency against the state.

According to a World Bank Report in 1995, despite their vast resources, the Niger Delta region remains poor; GNP per capita is below the national average. The rural population commonly fish or practice subsistence agriculture, and supplement their diet and income with a wide variety of forest products. Educational levels are below the national average and are particularly low for women. While it is estimated that about 76 percent of Nigerian children attend primary school, this level drops to 30-40 percent in most parts of the Niger Delta.

The poverty level in the Niger Delta is again exacerbated by the high cost of living. In the urban areas of Rivers State for example, the cost of living index is the highest in Nigeria.[42] The poverty indicators are manifestations of the existence of a compelling low level of development that has also resulted

in high degree of discontent. But the dazzling nature of poverty is not so controversial as is the demand for a proper understanding of the situation in the Niger Delta in the context of the question of appropriation of revenues and the distribution of the resources under true federalism.[43]

In 1991, the World Bank issued a report on public expenditure management in Nigeria and pointed out that it was characterised by inflation of project costs, inadequate project evaluation on the basis of cost benefit analysis, and negligent project supervision after takeoff. According to the report, public expenditure is generally perceived by those who control power and authority as a means of distributing political patronage rather than a genuine means of stimulating and achieving development. There is evidence, for instance, as contained in the report of Dr. Pius Okigbo who headed a panel to investigate the oil revenues which accrued to Nigeria during the Gulf War of 1991, that "some $21 billion dollars in oil income could not be accounted for".[44]

Such a situation where resources taken from the Niger Delta are not used the for the development of the host communities but frittered away irresponsibly, cannot in any way be expected to engender peace in the region, especially when the communities watch their environment and sources of livelihood being continuously degraded and see themselves sinking deeper into unrelenting poverty.

The fierce activities of the foreign oil companies have also fueled the anger of the agitating oil producing communities. The multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, particularly Shell BP, are accused of involvement in hideous crimes against their host communities, which has led to deterioration of the relations between the tripartite participants in the situation and escalated the crises accordingly. Shell BP, for instance, maintains its own covert armed force that it uses in intimidating the host communities. "It maintains its own private police force, imports it own arms and ammunition, and has – at least in two instances – admitted payments to the Nigerian military".[45] Human Rights activists have also drawn attention to the existence of three separate Shell BP armouries in Bonny, Warri and Port Harcourt were there are pump-actions rifles, shotguns, automatic rifles and revolvers. Shell BP maintains that the weapons stored in these armouries are for police officers assigned to the company by the Nigerian government.

On 15 December, 1993, one Mr. V. Oteri, who was Shell's Security Adviser in Nigeria and the head of Shell Police at the time, requested an audience with the Inspector-General of Police to discuss "crucial matters relating to disruption of our operations".[46] The 'matter' was permission to import a million dollars worth of weapons to arm the company's supplementary police guards. He warned that "the importance of our organisation on the nation's economy cannot be overemphasised"; the Inspector-General buckled and in

July 1994 gave approval for Shell BP to buy weapons manufactured abroad via a third party, in spite of the Nigerian law that explicitly forbid commercial firms operating in the country from importing arms for their own use.[47]

The Observer of London, which obtained a copy of a materials requisition form submitted by Shell BP to the Inspector-General, revealed that "the London firm, XM Federal, was the proposed supplier of the weapons, among which were 130 Beretta 9mm caliber submachine guns, 30 pump-action shotguns and 200,000 rounds of live ammunition".[48]

The Nigerian police officers who are assigned to Shell BP are paid directly by the company instead of the Nigerian government, which results in a situation where they take their instructions from Shell officials. Shell police is something of an elite force. The officers,

> . . . unlike their counterparts in the regular force, receive free accommo-
> dation, transport, meals, medical services and regular lump sum payments,
> which in the least tripled the government rate. Most times, they are engaged in
> undercover operations on behalf of the oil company, and move about in plain
> clothes.[49]

Shell BP police has four units: Operations (OPS), whose primary duty is to provide security at company installations; Administration, which provides administrative support for the operations of the force; Intelligence and Investigations, whose members investigate community compensation claims in case of oil spills and usually operate clandestinely; and Dogs and Arms Section, which supervises the armouries and the specially trained dogs that Shell police officers use in their work.

While Shell BP officials insist that its policemen are assigned for the sole purpose of carrying out such guard duties, the local communities have accused them of brutally suppressing peaceful protests and using financial inducements to divide the community whenever there is an oil spill so that they cannot present a common front and successfully press claims for compensation.

Four former members of Shell police who spoke with Project Underground in April 1997 testified that Shell officials would give them service money in this regard.[50] The informants also spoke about a Special Strike Force, which they claimed was deployed to suppress community protests armed with automatic weapons and tear gas canisters. Owens Wiwa and other MOSOP activists have also claimed that members of Shell police, accompanied by military troops, were ferried by the oil company's helicopters and boats to attack Ogoni villages. Other communities in the Delta area have also recounted similar experiences.

This alarming trend has been described by Claude Ake as the privatisation of the Nigerian state by Shell officials. According to him, "the privatisation of the state is evident in the swarm of police men and women in Shell, the

presence of armed troops in the operational bases of the company, and in the prerogative of Shell and other oil companies to call on the police and the military for their security".[51]

A classic case of this situation is the Umuechem Massacre. Contingents of mobile policemen, armed to the teeth and chanting war songs, descended on Umuechem community in Rivers State on 30 October, 1990; they were acting on the strength of an accusation by Shell BP that the villagers were 'planning' a violent protest. They did not ask questions; instead, they opened fired on whomever they saw. By mid-afternoon, several villagers lay dead or bleeding to death from bullet wounds. Hundreds fled into the nearby bush out of fear for their lives. After chasing them for hours, the marauders went back to their base. But it was a trick.

They returned just before dawn on 1 November, catching most of the villagers who had returned from the bush where they earlier sought refuge unawares. What amounted to a slaughter ensued. An estimated eighty people were murdered in cold blood, some of them as they slept. Over 500 houses were set ablaze and for several hours, possibly intoxicated by the sadistic orgy of unbridled bloodletting, the policemen chased after domestic livestock killing goats and chicken just for the fun of it, when there were no villagers left to kill or molest.

The judicial commission of inquiry, which was later set up by the government to investigate the cause of the Umuechem Massacre did not find a single thread of evidence of violence or threat of violence on the part of the villagers.[52] What sealed the bitter cup of injustice in respect of this matter was that at the end of the findings, neither Shell BP nor its police was sanctioned; rather, the commission of inquiry only 'condemned' the dastardly act verbally.

Thus, instead of alleviating the agitations for resource control, the federal government's response to it actually propelled it. The iron fist approach adopted by the federal government to deal with the successive waves of struggle in the Niger Delta area, became bloody and murderous through the repressive actions of the police and the military or through the instrument of judicial murder. The initial issue of revenue allocation and its offshoot, more contentious problem of resource control in Nigerian federalism, therefore, remains unresolved.

The lack of respect for fundamental human rights has resulted in torture, arbitrary killings and massacre of civilians by the security forces of the Nigerian state. Examples are the Umnechem Massacre, the Ogoni genocide, the Kaiama killings, the attacks on Uzere, Ekeremor-Zion, Iko, Ubeji and Odi and most recently, the Gbaramatu kingdom, by soldiers and anti-riot mobile policemen. In all cases, the police or soldiers saw themselves as coming to fight a war, as attested to by the nature of the weapons used in each operation, such as heavy artillery, FN rifles, AK-47s, general-purpose machine guns, bazookas,

grenade launchers, mortar bombs, etc.[53] As C.B.N. Ogbogbo points out, "the various verbal protests and agitations have elicited little or no attention from those in the corridor of power, while protests – whether peaceful or violent – are crushed with extreme brutality".[54]

According to Ogbogbo, where such protesters were not killed, maimed or raped, they were hunted into exile. All this has resulted in human rights abuses against the peoples of the Niger Delta, which escalates the crisis. Thus, the response of the government in conjunction with the multinational oil corporations fell far short of the people's expectations. The "nonchalant attitude fostered the impressions of collaboration between the transnational oil companies – to merely exploit for its economic benefit without ploughing back to the host communities – for the undeserved benefit of the dominant Nigerian groups that has captured power at the centre".[55]

This intolerable situation has, therefore, bred considerable dissatisfaction in the Niger Delta area in particular and in the minds of the other minority ethnic groups in Nigeria and worsened the negative perception as well as trenchant opposition to the lopsided fiscal arrangement on that is in operation in the improperly structured federation.

CONCLUSION

The federal structure in Nigeria has continued to intensify the process of centralisation in spite of the bloody resistance from the masses of the populace. A comparative analysis of power sharing between the federal and regional governments in the Independence and the 1999 Constitutions revealed that sixteen of the matters that were conceded to the regions under the Residual Legislative List in the former has now been transferred to the federal government under the Exclusive List of the latter.[56] This is the most significant issue that has led to citizenship contestations that have persisted in the Niger Delta.

There is, therefore, need to find answers to the burning question of fair revenue allocation as well as resource ownership and control by returning to the original federal arrangement through the process of constitutional reforms and political restructuring.

For most observers, the neglect and poverty in the Niger Delta is not merely a sticky oil problem but lack of access to resources. In contemporary times, the Niger Delta struggle has graduated from an accommodating request for equitable revenue allocation system in the federation to an aggressive demand for resource control that has separatist undertones and has the potential of dismembering the polity if not properly handled.

Thus, the logic of the Niger Delta question in terms of the proper management and resolution of the core issues within the framework of

federalism corresponds with the logic of constitutional reforms that required dialogue and transparent engagement of structures and the formulation of an action plan for continuous and sustainable interventions as well as lasting peace in the region.

As the above expression proposes a realistic solution to the peculiar problems of the Niger Delta area, which is subsumed in the larger contradiction of failure to practice true fiscal federalism in the polity, it is expected that this study contribute meaningfully to the on-going discourse in advocating pragmatic responses to core issues that threaten the very survival of the Nigerian state project. The way out of this dilemma is to adopt constitutionalism, which is a theory and practice of true federalism in which there is a twin conception of authority and of purpose.

While the former engenders democratic institutions and structures, the latter focuses on the dispersion or non-centralisation of power. Constitutionalism, therefore, provides a theory of federalism, which in the words of Samuel Beer "is about the division of authority between the federal and the state governments and about the purposes which this distribution of power is expected to serve. It is a theory in the sense that it is a coherent body of thought, describing and justifying the federal system in the light of certain fundamental principles".[57]

The key to Nigeria's recurrent malaise is to find the nexus between this theory and the practical application of the principle of true fiscal federalism; if this is done, the contradictions that exist in the body politic would have been addressed, eliminated and the highway to sustainable, all-round development will be opened for the nation to transverse.

ENDNOTES

1. Timothy Conlan, *New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform from Nixon to Reagan*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988; p. xii- xix.

2. Kunle Amuwo, "Federal Systems, A Theoretical Perspective", in Tunde Babawale, Kola Olufemi and Funmi Adewumi, *Re-inventing Federalism In Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives*. Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1998, p. 2.

3. Meehan, E.M. "European Integration and Citizens' Rights: A Comparative Perspective", *Publius 26*, 4, Fall 1996; pp. 99-121.

4. Augustus Aikhomu, "Federal-State Relations Under Military Government, 1985-1992" in J.I. Elaigwu *et al* (eds.), *Federalism and Nation-Building in Nigeria: The Challenges of the 21st Century* Abuja: NCIR, 1994; p. 43-56.

5. Ayoade, J.A., "The Federal Character Principle and the Search for National Integration" in Amuwo *et al, Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books and IFRA; p. 101.

6. Jimoh Ailoje, "The Politics of State Creation: A Critique", in *Ekpoma Political*

    Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Administration, Vol. II and III, 1 and 2, 1993; p. 46.

7. Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa* Ibadan: Longman, 1981, p. 5.

8. Samuel Ugo, "Resource Control and Its Challenges to the Nigerian Federalism", in *The Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development*, Vol. 4, 4, December 2004; p. 65.

9. Mary Aderonke Afolabi, "Inter-Group Relations in the 20th Century Nigeria: A Historical Survey," in Olayemi Akinwunmi, Okpeh Ochayi Okpeh and Gwamna Je'adeyibe (eds.), *Inter-Group Relations in Nigeria During the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Ibadan: Aboki Publishers, 2006, p. 156.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Osarhiemen Benson Osadolor, *The Niger Delta Question: Background to Constitutional Reform*. Ibadan: Programme for Ethnic and Federal Studies, 2004, p. 4.

12. Afolabi, "Inter-Group Relations in the 20th Century Nigeria", p. 157.

13. *Ibid.*

14. C.B.N. Ogbogbo, "Citizenship and Resource Control Issues in the American Constitution: Lesson for Nigeria", in Shamsudeen Amali, *et al* (eds.), *Ethnicity, Citizenship and Democracy in the United States of America*. Ibadan: Humanities Publishers, 2003, p. 247.

15. O.B. Osadolor, *The Niger Delta Question*, p. 31.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

18. Chibuike U. Uche and Ogbonnaya C. Uche, *Oil and the Politics of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria*. Leiden: ASC Working Paper 54/2004; pp. 17-21.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. C.B.N. Ogbogbo, "*Citizenship and Resource Control Issues in the American Constitution*", p. 248.

22. Osarhiemen B. Osadolor, *The Niger Delta Question*, p. 32.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

24. Uche Onyegucha, "Environmental Rights and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999", in *The Emperor Has No Clothes: Report of the Conference on The Peoples of The Niger Delta And The 1999 Constitution,* Port Harcourt 2-4 November, 1999. Benin City: Environmental Rights Action/ Friends of the Earth, 2000, pp. 87-95.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

26. Ken B. Saro-Wiwa, *Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy*. London: Saros International Publishers, 1992, pp. 94.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

28. Ola Balogun, *The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis, 1966-1970*. Benin City: Ethiope Publishers, 1973, p. 14.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Zimako O. Zimako, *Face of A Nation: Democracy In Nigeria, Foreign Relations and National Image*. Idia: Modern Approach, 2009, p. 42.

32. Rotimi Suberu, "States' Creation and the Political Economy of the Nigerian Federalism", in Kunle Amuwo *et al* (eds.), *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1998, p. 278.

33. Jimoh Ailoje, "The Politics of State Creation: A Critique", in *Ekpoma Political Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Administration, Vol. II and III, 1 and 2,* 1993, p. 45.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

35. Obafemi Awolowo, *Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution*. Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 61.

36. Jimoh Ailoje, "The Politics of State Creation", p. 45.

37. Ken Saro WiWa, "Creation of States", in *The Guardian Newspapers*, Lagos, 26 July 1991, p. 15.

38. For a more detailed analysis of poverty and its effects, see Felix Osarhiemen, "Poverty and Its Impacts on Families in Nigeria", in *BIUDISCOURSE: A Multidisciplinary Journal of Faculty of Arts and Education*, Vol. 1, 2, 2006, pp. 240-261.

39. Lemmy Owugah, "Political Economy of Resistance in the Niger Delta", in *The Emperor Has No Clothes*, p. 106.

40. Nick Ashton Jones and Oronto Douglas, *The Human Ecosystem of the Niger Delta: An ERA Handbook*. Benin City: Environmental Rights Action, 1998, p. 146.

41. Lemmy Owugah, "Political Economy of Resistance in the Niger Delta", p. 107.

42. World Bank Report quoted in C.B.N. Ogbogbo, "Citizenship and Resource Control Issues in the American Constitution", p. 249.

43. Osarhiemen B. Osadolor, *The Niger Delta Question*, p. 18.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, *Where Vultures Feast: 40 Years of Shell in the Niger Delta*. Benin City: Environmental Rights Action, 2001, p. 80.

46. Polly Ghazi and Camaron Daudu, "How Shell Tried to Buy Berettas for Nigeria" in *Observer*, London: February 11, 1996, p. 18. This was cited in Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, *Where Vultures Feast*, p. 172.

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

49. Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, *Where Vultures Feast*, p. 80.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

51. Jones and Douglas, *The Human Ecosystem of the Niger Delta: An ERA Handbook*, p. 45.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

53. Osarhiemen B. Osadolor, *The Niger Delta Question*, p. 29.

54. C.B.N. Ogbogbo, "Human Rights Issues and the Niger Delta Crisis", *Ibadan Bar Journal*, Vol. 2, 1, August 2003, p. 83.

55. C.B.N. Ogbogbo, "Nigeria-Niger Delta Relations", in Olayemi Akinwunmi, Okpeh Ochayi Okpeh and Gwamna Je'adeyibe (eds.) *Inter-Group Relations in Nigeria During the 19th and 20th Centuries* Ibadan: Aboki Publishers, 2006, p. 563.

56. Shola J. Omotalo, "Sustaining Nigeria's Federal Democracy: Constitutional Imperatives", in *The Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development*, Vol. 6, 2, June 2006, p. 29.

57. Samuel H. Beer, *To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1993, p. 20.

The Nigerian Federal Experiment and Resource Control: Principle, Contradictions and Crises

OLUSEGUN ADEYERI

11

INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in various parts of Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta where there has been a resurgence of ethnic nationalism, shows that there is need for a critical look at the structure and process of Nigeria's federal system. The origin and foundation of Nigerian federalism has received more than adequate scholarly attention overtime, so, that need not delay us here. However, it is germane to re-state that Nigerian federalism can be traced to the period of British colonial rule during which certain factors which were to influence Nigeria's federal system were already manifest. These factors such as tribalism, regionalism and structural imbalance merely acquired new strength and momentum after independence.

The aspirations of the founding fathers of Nigeria at independence to build a stable and virile country were hinged upon the perceived efficacy of the federal principle. But, within a few years of independence these aspirations

and great expectations dissipitated into national confusion, and ultimately crisis. The various crises of nation building (the 1967-1970 civil war being the gravest) experienced by Nigeria since 1960, coupled with current demands for a general redefinition of the Nigerian federation via a sovereign national conference all go to show that federalism has not worked successfully in the country. Clearly, the clamour for resource control by the federating units has been a dominant aspect of the problematic federal system in Nigeria. Significantly, in the Niger Delta, agitation for resource control has given rise to another phenomenon, namely, militant nationalism. We argue in this paper that the failure by successive Nigerian governments to abide by the core principles of federalism, especially those that concern the control of resources by federating units in which such resources are domiciled, has been responsible for the various crises of nation building, particularly the armed struggle in the Niger Delta. This essay, therefore, seeks to examine the origin of the resource control struggle and the attendant militant nationalism in the Niger Delta with a view to determining its impact on political, economic and social developments in Nigeria.

FEDERALISM: A REVIEW

The notion of federalism which originated with the concept of intergovernmental relations dates back to the Greek civilisation during which efforts were made to describe the legal relationships between the leagues and the city-states.[1] But the leagues differed from modern federations in that while the various governments freely interacted, no direct contact between the citizens of the various governments was allowed.[2] Jean Bodin takes credit for being the first proponent of modern federalism and was emulated by scholars like Hugo Grotus, Otto Cosmanus and Pufenderf who viewed federalism as a voluntary type of political union (which may be temporary or permanent) of independent authorities, for special common objectives such as defence against external forces, trade and communications, etc.[3]

A new perception of federalism emerged in 1787 following the establishment of the United States constitution.[4] Since then, the tendency among scholars has been to conceptualise federalism from the viewpoint of contact at two levels (dual federalism), i.e. at the governmental level between participating units and among the citizens of these different units. Subsequently, various conceptual positions on federalism became popular. Such include the classic or orthodox school (coordinate federalism) represented by Kenneth Wheare, the sociological and process school epitomised by William Livingstone and Carl Friedrich and the cooperative federalism school by which scholars have, presently, focused more attention on how to make federalism work through cooperation between the various levels of government.

In spite of the different conceptions of federalism (i.e. the classical model, the sociological school, cooperative federalism, etc.), some basic characteristics and operational principles common to all truly federal systems can be identified,[5] to aid our understanding of the federal principle. First, the federal relationship must be established or confirmed through a perpetual covenant of union, embodied in a written constitution that outlines, among other things, the terms by which power is divided or shared in the political system and which can be altered only by extraordinary procedures. Second, the political system must ensure non-centralisation, that is, diffusion of power among the constituent polities established by the federal covenant. A third element of any true federal system is the internal division of authority and power on an areal basis, known in the US as "territorial democracy".[6] Another basic requirement of federalism is that the constituent polities in a federation must be fairly equal in population and wealth or at least balanced geographically or numerically in their inequalities, if non-centralisation is to be maintained.[7] Permanence of the boundaries of constituent units is another characteristic of successful federal systems. Boundary changes may occur, but such changes are made only with the consent of the polities involved and as a matter of political policy are avoided except in the most extreme situations.[8] Also, in a truly federal system, the constituent polities must have substantial influence over the formal or informal constitutional amending process.[9] Finally, a basic requirement of true federalism is a particular kind of environment that is conducive to popular government and has the required traditions of political cooperation and self-restraint. Indeed, most scholars of federalism conceive it as basically incompatible with authoritarianism or military rule.[10] They contend that where there are no liberal democratic institutions and structures such as elected parliament, an open competitive party system and free periodic elections, there can be no federalism.

ORIGIN OF RESOURCE CONTROL STRUGGLE IN NIGERIA

Natural resources connote any material within the natural environment that can be harnessed for the benefit of man.[11] Unfortunately, oil, the mainstay of Nigeria's monocultural economy has increasingly been a source of deep-seated acrimony, contradictions and crises since its discovery at Oloibiri, Bayelsa state in 1956. The issue of resource control in Nigeria has a chequered history. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, it was a struggle by the Niger Delta peoples to participate actively in trade especially palm oil and self-government in the region. This tendency toward self-assertion and a desire not to be dominated by any "foreign" group or government is best illustrated by the resistance put up by king William Koko of Nembe, Nana Olomu of

Itsekiriland and King Jaja of Opobo.[12] The struggle for participation and control in the palm oil trade eventually failed due to a number of developments including British Indirect Rule, revocation of the Charter of the Royal Niger company and military conquests; as well as Christianity, and western education which led to the emergence of a new traditional élite.[13]

During the colonial era, concern for resource control were exemplified by fears of ethnic minorities particularly in the Niger Delta of domination by the majority ethnic groups. These majority groups demanded the creation of more states, and their agitations led to the formation of numerous political parties such as the Benin and Delta Peoples Party formed in 1953, Midwest State Movement (1956), Calabar-Ogoja-River (COR) State Movement (1954), United Middle Belt Congress and the Borno Youth Movement among others.[14] It must be noted that although the ethnic minorities cited concern for an effective federal structure as justification for their demand for more states, their actual reason was the need to have direct control over revenue accruable from resources within their domain which would be made possible within the context of their own states.

The immediate post-independence era witnessed an attempt by Isaac Adaka Boro, a former student union leader and ex-policeman to establish the Republic of Niger Delta.[15] This followed the failure of the 1957 Constitutional Conference to resolve the problem of the minorities. Rather than resolve the problems the conference passed it on to the Minorities Commission headed by Sir Henry Willinks. The commission, while acknowledge the bases for Minority fears, opposed the idea of creating new states at the time. Instead, it recommended special councils for the Calabar and Midwest areas to supervise the activities of regional governments, while for the North it proposed a plebiscite on the fate of Ilorin and Kabba Provinces.[16] Although the Adaka Boro-led rebellion of 1966 was short lived having been crushed by federal forces within days, it foreshadowed the dangerous dimension which minority agitations were to assume in subsequent decades.

In 1990, via the Ogoni Bill of Rights, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa demanded resource control and self-determination for the Ogoni people. The Ogbia charter of demand of the Ogbia people of the central Niger Delta followed two years later. However, the Kaiama Declaration of 11 December, 1998 represents the sharpest articulation and presentation of resource control. By that declaration, the Ijaw people proclaimed, sharpened and popularised the term resource control and therefore prepared the grounds for the current debate on the issue.[17] The Kaima Declaration has since been trailed by many proclamations, bills of rights, resolutions and charters of demands from various Niger Delta ethnic nationalities like the Itsekiri, Ibiobio, Egi, Oron, Ikwere and Urhobo. Generally, Niger Delta agitations for resource control and self-determination

can be categorised into two broad phases, namely (i) era of peaceful demonstrations and externalisation of demands, and (ii) emergence of armed struggle.

ERA OF PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS AND EXTERNALISATION OF NIGER DELTA AGITATIONS

Minority agitations for resource control and self-determination during this period were characterised by immense confidence and reliance on peaceful means of seeking redress even under colonial rule. As noted earlier, in 1957 testimonies were presented before the Willinks Commission of Enquiry into the problem of minority fears in the emergent Nigeria state. Afterwards, many protests and demands for justice and equity were registered without success. Similarly, the people of the resource bearing areas often resorted to litigations, which usually ended in unfavourable verdicts.[18]

They also wrote letters to the colonial government as well as the post-independence Nigerian administrations on the Niger Delta problem. Following the failure of this approach, the agitators moved further by making representations to government at all levels to make their letters effective. But in most cases, aside the warm reception and empty promises no meaningful achievement was recorded.[19] During this period also, demonstrations were staged in the Niger Delta and other places during which pamphlets and banners were displayed to further draw attention to the increasing crisis in the region. Letters were delivered in the affected state capitals, Abuja and Lagos in order to inspire government interest.

Externalisation of Niger Delta agitations soon evolved largely due to increasing centralisation of the ownership and control of oil, and the politicisation of the revenue allocation system by the federal government to the detriment of the oil producing minority states. As Cyril Obi aptly puts it:

> In seeking to fund the war and sourcing money for running the economy, the federal government (still dominated by the now transformed Northern and Western factions of the ruling class) legislated, via decrees, the collection and sharing of oil revenues to itself. Since Nigeria came to rely totally on oil revenues the hegemonic factions of the majority nationalities now had control over the fiscal basis of the state, to the exclusion of the oil minorities.[20]

In utter contradiction of the principles of fiscal federalism, Decree 51 of 1969 vested upon the federal government the complete ownership of all petroleum resources in Nigeria. In addition, the Offshore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9 gave the federal government total control over the entire revenue accruable from offshore oil wells in the coastal waters adjoining the oil minorities, an action that finally cut them off from direct oil revenue, and deepened their dependence on the majority groups for a share of the oil

wealth. Thus, the oil minorities became alienated from their own products, and this intensified the struggle between them and the Nigerian state which through its over-centralisation of political and fiscal power sought to exploit and dominate them alongside their strategic resources.[21]

Furthermore, the federal government jettisoned derivation as the principle of revenue allocation (which benefited the major ethnic groups during the days of cash crop exports) in favour of the principles of equality and population of states, obviously in response to the change of the country's source of wealth from agriculture to petroleum, and the desire of the majority nationalities to continuously dominate national revenue.[22] Odia Ofeimun's observation on the fluctuating and diminishing fortunes of the derivation principle in Nigeria's revenue allocation system is quite revealing. According to him, from 100 percent in 1946, it dropped to 50 percent between 1951 and 1960. By 1970, it dropped further to 45 percent during the Gowon administration while under the Murtala-Obasanjo government it wavered between 20 and 25 percent. Shehu Shagari's government cut it drastically to 5 percent while the Buhari-Idiagbon administration brought it down to its lowest ebb of 1.5 percent, while the present 13 percent emerged only after extensive agitations.[23]

The net effect of the federal takeover of the control of oil, and the stifling of the Derivation principle was that the oil minorities increased their opposition to domination by the major nationalities, and devised new strategies aimed at externalising their claims and grievances against the Nigerian state. Agitation movements like MOSOP, Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), Ethnic Minority Rights Organisation of Africa (EMIROAF) and Chikoko developed a clear national agenda and solid organisation at the popular level. Above all, Mosop, IYC and Chikoko through the avenue of various global bodies and conferences successfully pushed the Niger Delta case to the front burner of global discourse[24] by raising awareness about the environmental hazards caused by oil mining companies and highlighting the lack of representation of the Niger Delta peoples. The arrest and subsequent execution of Saro-Wiwa alongside eight of his Ogoni compatriots by the Abacha government in 1995 drew public outrage and brought substantial international attention to the pathetic condition of the people.[25]

EMERGENCE OF ARMED STRUGGLE

The Adaka Boro rebellion of 1966 represents the first significant use of arms in Niger Delta agitations,[26] and nothing of sort occurred again until the 1990s that witnessed the emergence of ethnic militias and the attendant violent protestations against economic and political marginalisation by the federal government. The new wave of violence is traceable to two developments:

General Babangida and Abacha administrations' chronic intolerance for public discourse and the Odi massacre executed by the Obasanjo civilian administration. The character of the administrations, particularly those of Babangida and Abacha deepened the contradictions and crises of the Nigerian state, resulting in the rise of ethnic militias. The Niger Delta people reacted by increasing the tempo of militancy, and adopting armed struggle in their demands for justice from both the government and the oil companies. There is need to emphasise here that ethnic militia is the extreme form of ethnic agitation for self-determination, in that the agitation groups adopt a militant character and eventually metamorphose into militia groups, each with its own ethnic identity and agenda to act as the medium for the actualisation of its people's desires. These ethnic movements are characterised by ethnic identity affiliations, the use of violence, predominant youth membership, and the nature of being popular movements seeking fundamental change in the status quo.[27] Prominent ethnic militias in the Niger Delta include the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV), Greenlanders, Egbesu, Ijaw National Congress, Urhobo National Union, Martyrs Brigade, Niger Delta Liberation Army(NDLA), Chikoko Movement, Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), Joint Revolutionary Council and, of course, the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Although the origin of the Niger Delta armed groups vary across the various Niger Delta states, certain generalisations are possible. Recent studies have shown that many of these groups were established on university campuses, veered into street gangs, entered illegal activities like oil bunkering and illicit drug dealing, and from time to time served as political thugs. As Asuni notes:

> One of the most notorious and feared figures to emerge from the Niger Delta, Ateke Tom, cut his teeth in the bunkering trade, amassing a fortune in the process. Formerly an impoverished mud-brick salesman, he transformed his fortunes in the oil business, initially by providing protection for an oil servicing company before turning to bunkering. As the enterprise developed, so did its capacity to attract violence, as rival groups battled for control of the market; aided by an influx of firearms purchased with bunkering profits. Street gangs such as the Icelandos and Bermuda Boys engaged in bloody feuds in their attempt to dominate the market in the Okrika region of Rivers state. One of Ateke's main rival was Mujahid Asari Dokubo, who later went on to found the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force. Dokubo was quite open about his involvement in bunkering, claiming he had a legitimate right to lay his hands on the resources of the Niger Delta, on the grounds that they belong to the local people rather than the Federal Government. Most of his profits, however, were spent on funding his own-armed group and buying weapons. Ateke

> responded to this threat to his business empire by forming his own-armed group, the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV). On Ateke's side were Vikings, Icelandos, and some captured Greenlanders (another armed group) to form Niger Delta vigilantes. Full war broke out between these warlords and their followers. The state was hot for six months 'till . . . people were brought before the President for peace talks on 1 October, 2004.[28]

The lengthy quote above exemplifies the complexities that surround the origin, nature, motives and membership of the Niger Delta armed groups as well as the knotty challenges their activities pose to the Nigerian federation.

It is difficult to determine the number of people involved in ethnic militancy in the Niger Delta, but a research carried out recently shows that there are at least 48 groups in Delta State alone, having over 25,000 members with a military arsenal of about 10,000 weapons. All the groups enjoy the tacit support of local communities in solidarity against the exploitation of their region by oil companies and federal and state governments. In addition, several groups rely on patronage from politicians who use them to attack and intimidate their opponents, while many others are engaged by military officers and politicians to prop their criminal activities such as arms importation and oil bunkering. It is further suggested that there about sixty thousand armed militants in the Niger Delta altogether.[29] These figures speak volume about the magnitude of the problems and challenges facing the federal government and the Niger Delta states governments in terms of disarmament, demobilisation and eventual reintegration.

Ethnic militancy in the Niger Delta is continually fuelled by various issues and grievances against the government and oil companies. Perhaps the strongest grouse of the oil minorities is that the federal government, dominated by the majority ethnic groups is using Nigeria's oil wealth to develop other areas at the expense of the oil producing minorities. The huge oil revenue from the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta has continuously being deployed by the federal government towards the development of states, towns and villages of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo majority ethnic groups to the neglect and consternation of the oil communities. This lopsided developmental approach is evidenced by huge federal funding of extensive dam and irrigation projects, as well as heavily subsidised agricultural and social development programmes in northern Nigeria. in addition to these are the geo-politically motivated state-owned socio-economic projects like the Kaduna Refinery and many educational, administrative and military institutions with their headquarters in the territories of the major ethnic groups.[30]

Consequently, the oil minorities continue to live in abysmal poverty amidst abundant oil wealth. As an illustration, Ogoniland, considered to be the "luckiest" of the oil-producing communities in Rivers state, is reported to

have provided Nigeria with a total oil revenue of about 40 billion dollars between 1958 ad 1992.[31] In addition, between 1999 and 2004, Nigeria made a whopping $96 billion from oil.[32] Despite this massive contribution to the country's revenue base, Ogoniland, presently can only boast of seven oil fields, a large petrochemical plant, several oil servicing companies that are closely located, Nigeria's only major fertiliser plant and fourth largest ocean port.[33] The case of Urhoboland in Delta state is even worse. In 41 years of the petroleum industry in Nigeria, Shell, Pan-Ocean and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) have gained up to 2.2. trillion naira, an average of 56 billion Naira yearly.[34] The whole budget of Delta state is about 4 billion Naira per annum, whereas the state accounts for at least, 36 percent of Gross National Product (GNP). Moreover, everyday of the year, Urhobo natural gas worth about 68 million Naira is wasted through wanton flaring.[35] Yet, Urhoboland does not have any significant federal industry apart from the epileptic Warri Refinery and the inactive Aladja Steel Complex. In addition, Delta state as a whole has no federal higher institution except the Petroleum Training Institute (PTI), established to train skilled manpower for effective oil extraction, whereas almost all the ethnic majority states have one form of federal institution or the other.[36]

The Niger Delta people are also aggrieved by environmental degradation and the attendant disruption of farming and fishing which are their major occupations. Due to oil exploration, oil spillages unto land, swamps and offshore areas over the decades have had serious adverse effects on the economic welfare and health of the inhabitants. Oil explorational activities often results in the destruction of the environment, erosion, destruction of aquatic life, extermination of some important soil organisms, promotion of malaria infestation due to the accumulation of water in the pits which serve as breeding grounds, and lastly general ecological disturbances.[37] The Jesse, Delta state, tragedy of 1998 in which about 1,200 persons were burnt to death by petrol explosion while attempting to glean a living from the gushing and wasting petrol is an illustration of the horrible situation faced by the oil minorities in their daily lives.

Political marginalisation is another source of anger among the oil minorities. This marginalisation depicted in their inadequate representation in government is most acute and evident in the appointments into oil related federal government parastatals. Ordinarily, preference ought to be accorded indigenes of the oil communities in such appointments, but in utter disregard of the federal principle that requires a federal government to serve as a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected, major appointments are often monopolised by the three ethnic groups with the Hausa-Fulani claiming the lion share.[38] It is important to recall that the replacement of Professor Eric Opia of Delta State, with AIG of Police Alhaji

Bukar Ali, a Northerner as head of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1988 was greeted by massive protestations from the Niger Delta region. That the Abubakar administration later rescinded the decision by replacing Bukar Ali with Rear Admiral Preston Omatsola of Delta state, is an eloquent testimony to the painful fact that the oil minorities cannot receive fair treatment from the Nigerian state without intense agitations.

Agitations over resource control and revenue allocation by the poor and underdeveloped oil producing communities of the Niger Delta now appear to have reached its peak, due to age long grievances. Consequently, decades of peaceful protests have now given way to violent militancy. In recent years, the agitations have become more militant and radical, including calls for self-determination and outright secession. On 8 November, 1999, the Egbesu killed a policeman in Odi, Bayelsa State, following the kidnap and killing of policemen by Egbesu youths in retaliation for the killing of their members. The government deployed soldiers who consequently, liquidated the town. On 25 April, 2003, Ijaw militiamen attacked the army and navy in Warri, Delta State leaving ten persons dead. The militants also intercepted the radio communication of the army and navy. Five days later, women were killed in a crossfire between Ijaw militants and the Nigerian security forces. The security forces intervened when the Ijaw militia attacked an Itshekiri town, killing five women. On 1 May, 2003, Ijaw militiamen attacked government forces and oil installations in Opumani, Tanke Farm, Okerenkoko, Delta State while similar same action was replicated in Effurun the next day. In early 2004, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force under Mujahid Dokubo Asari threatened dissolution of the Nigerian State and outright war against the oil companies, and the federal and state governments.[40]

Following the detention of Dokubo Asari in September 2005 on grounds of treason, other militias emerged, particularly MEND, known for its astute tactics and coherent strategies, and its contempt for the conservative local leaders it perceived as traitors of the Niger Delta cause. To drive home its demands for local control of oil wealth, compensation for environmental pollution, and the release of Asari Dokubo, MEND launched a fusillade of attacks on oil installations in February 2006 causing reduction in Nigeria's oil output by about 25 percent. It also kidnapped nine foreign oil workers, released them in March and threatened fresh violence against oil installations. On 19 April, 2006, it detonated a car bomb in a military barracks in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, killing two people and seriously wounding six. MEND, more than any other militant group has executed its operations with considerable media and technical sophistication. Its threats of attacks delivered through email pushed crude oil prices to seventy dollars per barrel. The Port Harcourt car bomb which was its first incursion into urban areas was

detonated by cell phone.[41]

Widespread unemployment among the youths, the availability of large quantity of firearms and the persistent disaffection with the federal, and state governments in the Niger Delta have all combined to provide a veritable recruiting base for MEND, and other militias in furtherance of their militant demands and activities. For example, the Martyrs Brigade attacked the Benisede Flow Station of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) on 15 January, 2006 killing five army guards and nine other persons. The Niger Delta Liberation Army in June same year threatened to kill the former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nuhu Ribadu for the continued detention of former Bayelsa State Governor, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, who was on trial for corruption and money laundering. Similarly, the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta in July terminated its alliance with the Joint Revolutionary Council on account of it being too soft and too tolerant with the leaders of Nigeria and then proceeded with a threat to resume hostage taking not only of foreigners as before, but also of local politicians and other prominent Nigerians.[42] It is instructive to note that the scale and scope of hostage taking have recently become unlimited with no one completely free from the menace as foreigners, Nigerian state officials, children and even the aged are all now possible victims.

Meanwhile, agitations for resource control in the Niger Delta have taken a new dimension with the women joining the centre stage in the protest against the serious injustices meted out against them by the oil companies and the federal government. Around 2002, women and children from Ugborodo oil community seized Chevron's tank farm and terminal in Escravos. Similarly, women from Gbaramutu kingdom invaded NNPC/Chevron flow stations. In the same period, Itsekiri women in Warri under the umbrella of Warri Women Consultative Assembly emerged to speak on behalf of the Itsekiri people, threatening to seal off all oil wells in the Niger Delta. The involvement of women in militant agitations in the Delta is significant because they and their children are the greatest victims of the economic and health effects of oil exploration and extraction.[43]

Government Response to Resource Control Agitations

Historically, government's response to oil minorities demands on revenue allocation and resource control has been an admixture of coercive and bargaining strategies. The Willinks Commission of 1957/58, commissioned by the colonial government in recognition of the peculiar developmental needs of the Niger Delta region recommended a development board for the area. The Tafawa Balewa government subsequently established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) via an Act of Parliament in 1961, but this board made little or no impact due to poor funding. In 1969, as noted

earlier, the federal government promulgated the petroleum decree which vested it with control of oil exploitation and laid the foundation for the relegation of derivation as the principle of distribution for federal revenue. Subsequent military regimes continued to de-emphasise the derivation principle in revenue allocation to the detriment of the oil producing communities. Due to increasing agitations and political mobilisation of the Niger Delta nationalities, the Babangida government created the OMPADEC in 1992 for infrastructural development of the region. But the Babangida administration also adopted arm-twisting tactics. In 1990, government repression of popular protests in Umuechem resulted in massive destruction of lives and property. In July 1993 and April 1994, government and oil companies orchestrated violence against the Ogoni, while military occupation of agitating oil communities and harassment of those protesting injustice in the areas became common from 1994.[44] Other instances of violent repression by government including the Egbena crisis (1989-91), Oburu violence (1989), Bonny Ijugba square tragedy (1992), Egi-Obaji Mayhem (1994), Tai-Biara massacre reportedly sponsored by Wilbrose, a servicing company to Shell (1994) and the Ubima tragedy of 1995.[45]

The Abacha government was outstanding for its ruthless repression of resource control agitations. The administration responded to the Niger Delta crisis by stationing an 'army of occupation' in the oil producing communities to suppress protesting youths, individuals and groups through brutal force in order to maintain the free flow of oil for the Nigerian state. Environmental, minority and human rights activists in the area were often harassed, arrested and incarcerated indefinitely without trial, or even murdered by government.[46] The Ogoni revolt that followed the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni nationalists in 1995 compelled the oil companies in the Niger Delta to establish the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES) in that year to assess the environmental conditions in the region and make suggestions for ameliorating the hardship of the oil communities. However, violent agitations continued because the issues that gave rise to them originally still remained, despite state repression and palliative measures like the OMPADEC and NDES.

The Obasanjo civilian government responded to the Niger Delta crisis through developmental and military measures. In December 2000, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was created to achieve what government described as a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the region and facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful. The NNDC claimed that it had initiated over 2,000 development projects, including roads, bridges, hospitals, classroom blocks, university hostels, jetties, canals and shore

protection facilities. It also announced the commencement of over 300 electrification projects to support local small businesses, an agricultural programme geared towards large scale production and processing of cassava and rice, and a training programme for over 6,000 youths.[47] Despite its positive changes in the region, the achievements of the NDDC have greatly fallen short of the needs and expectations of the oil communities.

In 2001, the federal government initiated the Special Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas which seemingly went beyond its terms of reference (security matters) and subsequently reported to government that the Niger Delta problem was primarily political and thus required political solutions that would ultimately mean greater oil security. The committee recommended a review of policies and laws that have fuelled discontent and agitations in the region such as the Petroleum Act and the land Use Act. It also suggested to government to increase the derivative principle to 50 percent.[48] However, the federal government did not implement these recommendations, possibly as a result of objections from political forces within the territories of the majority ethnic groups that have always rebuffed the idea that oil and gas located in the Niger Delta belong solely to its people or that the region deserves special compensation. The oil minorities thus perceived the non-implementation of the recommendations as a continuation of the policy trend by which previous administrations systematically rejected their demands. As violent agitations increased in the region, President Obasanjo inaugurated the Consolidated Council on Social and Economic Development of Coastal States of the Niger Delta (CSEDND) on 18 April, 2006 to undertake what he described as a "Marshall Plan" that would create new jobs in the military and police forces, and initiate a 1.8 billion dollar road project. However, this council from inception suffered serious legitimacy problems. It is instructive that the council consisted of the governors of the oil producing states and other local elites whom the communities have always accused of betraying them by wasting and embezzling federal allocations and money meant for infrastructural development. That leaders and representatives of credible civil society groups in the Niger Delta were not appointed to the council cast great doubts about government's sincerity of purpose. Again, militant groups and citizens in the region felt insulted and were angered by Obasanjo's offer of employment in the same military and police forces which had overtime killed Niger Delta civilians and razed down their villages.[49]

MEND particularly rejected the initiative for its failure to address the clamour for resource control, and went ahead to denounce some local Ijaw leaders whom they accused of complicity in the injustices against the oil minorities.[50] Similarly, the plan received sharp criticism from the Abia and Imo States governments, which the NDDC Act recognises as part of the Niger Delta but are excluded from the CSEDND. The two state governments

view the initiative as a design to erode solidarity among oil producing states. As government was still grappling with the widespread pessimism that greeted the plan, MEND launched its first car bomb in Port Harcourt, just a day after Obasanjo's inauguration of the council in Abuja. On 29 April, MEND announced that it was responsible for another bomb explosion that had destroyed petrol tankers and buildings in the outskirts of Warri, Delta state, and on that same day it issued a warning to China, which had secured oil contracts in Nigeria during President Hu Jintao's state visit earlier in the month. The federal government responded to violent attacks by MEND and other militias by launching Operation Restore Hope, which essentially is a deployment of a joint military task force (JTF) involving the army, navy and personnel of other security forces and agencies. The JTF has reduced inter-ethnic conflicts and oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. However, its operations and tactics in some instances have resulted in destruction and death in various villages such as the incident of 20 August, 2006, during which either as a result of over-zealosusness or mistaken identity, JTF troops patrolling the creeks killed nine Ijaw youths and a Shell Community Liason Officer who had just helped the Bayelsa state government to secure the release of a kidnapped oil worker.[51]

The Yar'Adua administration convened a technical committee in late 2008 to study all previous reports on the Niger Delta and subsequently developed strategies for the resolution of the region's crisis. It findings was later passed on to another committee for further consideration. Yar'Adua also created a ministry of the Niger Delta in December 2008 and appointed two ministers to specifically address the problems of the region. In June 2009, Yar'Adua announced an offer of unconditional amnesty to all militants in the Delta. In addition, the Presidential Committee on Amnesty and Disarmament for Militants under the Minister of the Interior, Major General Godwin Abbe, was to execute a post-amnesty programme of socio-economic development of the Niger Delta worth about 50 billion Naira.[52] Although it is still too early to asses the success of the programme, inspite of the relatively calm atmosphere in the region presently, there are clear indications that ultimate resolution of the crisis requires a more comprehensive policy beyond the Amnesty deal.

RESOURCE CONTROL AGITATIONS AND NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT

The crisis engendered by the struggle, especially violent agitations, for the control of oil resources in the Niger Delta has affected Nigeria's development in many ways. The violent confrontations constitute a serious threat to personnel freedom and the security of lives and property in Nigeria. As earlier

noted, the activities of ethnic militias have caused widespread killings and destruction of property, while government's responses to the crisis through military operations led to civilian deaths and the destruction of many communities with its attendant socio-economic consequences. The violent activities of ethnic militias are not new in Nigeria, but their frequency and intensity since the advent of the present democratic order in 1999 is, indeed, worrisome. Aside engaging state security forces in armed confrontation, killings, raids, murder and attempted murder of political figures, hostage taking has now become very rampant. The caliber and scale of hostage taking have now reached a point that no one appears to be safe. Presently, foreign and local oil workers, government officials, as well as their family members are variously being held hostage to press home the demands of ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta.

Violent agitations in the Niger Delta have also affected Nigeria's economic adversely. This point becomes more critical given the centrality of oil to the national economy. Nigeria, being an oil-based economy relies heavily on oil exports, and whatever happens to the commodity will surely affect all the other sectors of the economy. One major effect of continued violence in the Delta is the huge loss of national revenue due to large-scale vandalisation of oil installations, disruption of oil exploration and widespread oil bunkering. It is important to note that by September 2009, militant activities in the region had reduced oil production by about one million barrels daily. Such shortfalls in production have consistently diminished the income of government and the profit of oil companies. Violent agitations in the area have also reduced foreign investments in the country because credible investors require a reasonable degree of security to successfully conduct their business. Today, many prospective investors do not see Nigeria as an investment-friendly country especially in the light of satellite pictures of gun-totting youths made available to viewers worldwide. To make matters worse, only few foreigners know that the crisis is limited to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, not the whole country.[54]

Ethnic agitations for resource control also constitute a threat to energy security, not only of Nigeria but also of the entire world. This is because some of the oil resources such as petroleum, diesel and gas form the basis of power supply to some industries, and also for domestic consumption all of which are jeopardised by widespread violence and criminal activities in areas where these resources are located. The importance of Niger Delta to global energy security was underscored in a recent publication by the Council on Foreign relations:

> Insecurity in the Niger Delta is a problem not only for the Nigerian government. It is a problem for the United States and the wider world as well. It is in the United States interest to improve its energy security and reduce the

flow of arms, illicit oil, and illegal money transfer from Nigeria. A stable Niger Delta producing a steady supply of oil would also help to moderate world oil prices. It is therefore imperative that the United States and other international partners offer Nigeria all the help it needs to confront its armed groups. Because one thing is clear: allowing the problem to fester will be a recipe for further violence, instability and energy insecurity.[55]

One is not certain whether the Nigerian government itself holds a lucid perception of the Niger Delta problem as some outsiders do. Even if it does, it is yet to prove its seriousness and determination to resolve the problem in terms of sincerity of purpose and mustering the necessary political will.

Increased violence in the Niger Delta has also affected Nigeria's foreign policy in a number of ways. It is common knowledge that in the contemporary world, the international image of a country is crucial in its efforts toward achieving its foreign policy objectives. Certainly, the unfortunate scenario in the Delta which is widely publicised by the world media has greatly undermined Nigeria's image abroad. Indeed, the general view outside Nigeria is that security has broken down in the country, sometimes prompting some foreign governments to discourage their citizens from travelling to Nigeria and if they must, they should avoid the Niger Delta region.[56] Furthermore, stories of hostage taking have continued to magnify Nigeria's corruption at the global level. It is now well known that captives often times pay huge sums of money to their captors in return for their freedom, in the face of government's helplessness. It is believed that ransom money often goes into the unaudited accounts of the militants. Worse still, hostage taking appears to be compromising Nigeria's sovereignty because in recent times, foreign interests have been negotiating directly with militants over and above the Nigerian government.[57] Finally, Nigeria's foreign policy has also suffered from the Delta crisis because it appears to be undermining the laudable peacekeeping roles which the country has consistently played across the world. Many people in some quarters continue to ponder over a scenario in which Nigeria cannot solve her little problem (relatively speaking) in the Niger Delta, yet she keeps exporting conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms abroad.[58]

National insecurity and instability is by far the greatest threat posed to Nigeria by violent agitations for resource control in the Niger Delta. Escalating violence and attacks by ethnic militias in the area in this Fourth Republic pose serious threats to the country's democracy, security and stability. As one civil society leader notes "the commitments to federalism and democracy holds Nigeria together, and the lack of federalism and democracy threatens to tear Nigeria apart".[59] In particular, the source of acquisition of weapons by the ethnic militias should be a source of serious concern for national security. There is reason to believe that some of the weapons used by ethnic

militias come from government armouries, while others seem to have entered the country through her porous borders.[60] Undoubtedly, increasing violence in the Delta region undermines the integrity of Nigeria as a state and present the dangerous possibility of attempted coups and other desperate actions by those who feel that their privileges are being jeopardised. It will also be recalled that in March 2005, an independent panel of experts on sub-Saharan Africa assembled by the United States government's National Intelligence Council declared "the outright collapse of Nigeria" as a potential destabilising development in the West African sub-region within the next fifteen years. Of course, Obasanjo immediately dismissed the report describing its authors as "prophets of doom".[61] While a united, stable and viable federation should be desired by all Nigerians, President Obasanjo failed to realise or acknowledge that the threats of the Niger Delta crisis to Nigeria's stability are stark realities which require urgent and sincere government attention, rather than shying away from them under the cover of patriotism.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it is very clear that the failure of federalism in Nigeria is at the root of the chronic national crisis engendered by the struggle for resource allocation and control by the oil producing minorities in the country. Although Nigeria inherited a defective federal structure from the British, the Nigerian leadership at independence had ample opportunity to remedy the situation but failed to do so. Instead, successive Nigerian administrations adopted federalism in principle but in practice failed to constantly observe its true principles. These contradictions have given rise to various crises of nation building of which the Niger Delta problem is currently the most challenging.

As we noted earlier, various Nigerian governments have not successfully addressed the endemic crisis in the Niger Delta over the control and sharing of the region's oil revenue. Particularly, the federal takeover of complete ownership of all petroleum resources and the subsequent relegation of derivation as the principle of revenue allocation, deepened the oil minorities crisis and consistently alienated them from the Nigerian state. Subsequently, decades of fruitless peaceful demands by the Niger Delta peoples for a desirable revenue allocation system, and resource control degenerated into an armed struggle that is now the greatest threat to the fledging Nigerian nation.

To save the Nigerian federation from perennial instability and the threat of state collapse, government must eschew its age-long approach marked by half measures, and promptly resolve the Niger Delta problem based on sincerity, justice and fairplay. Thus, Nigeria urgently needs to return to true federalism as it was before independence. To remove the contradictions which have fuelled the resource control crisis, the federal government must immediately

release its stranglehold on national resources, and allow sub-national government's financial autonomy and self reliance. In this direction, we contend that the oil producing states, deserve up to 50 percent of oil revenues. This will effectively douse the tension in the Niger Delta, restore the region's confidence in the Nigerian project and prepare the grounds for swift and genuine reconciliation. Also, such measures will finally drive home the point to the federal government, non-oil producing states governments and other stakeholders that there is the urgent need for alternative means of state funding and development instead of the retrogressive attitude of continuous and complete reliance on oil for survival.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1.   Mogi, S. (1931). *The Problems of Federalism* (London), p. 21.
2.   Ibid, p. 22.
3.   Ibid, pp. 30-33.
4.   *See* Shridat Pamphal's Keynote Address to the International Conference on Federalism, cited in Akinyemi et al (eds.) (1979). *Readings on Federalism* (Lagos, NIIA) p. xiv.
5.   Elazar, D.J. "Federalism", *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vols. 5 and 6, p. 357.
6.   *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1997). vol. 4, p. 712.
7.   Ibid.
8.   Ibid.
9.   Diamond, M. (1963). "The Federalist", in L. Strauss and J. Cropsey (eds.) *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago).
10. This assertion is supported by enormous literature, and which derives inspiration from the American Federal experience and K.C.Wheare's Federal Government (1963). Other relevant works include those of M.J.C Vile (1968), W.S. Livingstone (1956), and W. H. Riker (1964).
11. Faniran, A. and Ojo, O. (1981). *Man's Physical Environment: An Intermediate Physical Geography* (London, Heinemann).
12. Douglas O. (2001). *A Community Guide to Understanding Resource Control*, a publication of Urhobo Historical Society, p. 1.
13. Ibid p. 2.
14. Ali W.O. (2003). "The Development of Federalism in Nigeria; A Historical Perspective", in Gana and Egwu (eds) *Federalism in Africa: Framing the National Question* (Trenton, New Jersey, Africa World Press) p. 78.
15. Douglas, O., op. cit., p. 2.
16. Ali, W.O., op. cit., p. 2.
17. Douglas, O., op. cit., p. 2.
18. Jimoh, I. (2008). "Natural Resources for Sustainable Development: The Attendant Crisis and Control", in Hassan Saliu et al (eds). *Perspectives on Nation Building and Development in Nigeria: Environmental and Economic Issues* (Lagos,

Concept Publication) p. 15.

19. Saliu, H. (2008). "The New Wave of Violence in the Niger Delta and its implications for Nigerian Foreign Policy", in Hassan Saliu et al (eds). op. cit., p. 348.

20. *See* C. I Obi (2000) "Oil Minority Rights and the Question of Democratic Stability in Nigeria", *Journal of Cultural Studies,* Vol. 2, No 1, p. 83.

21. Ibid, p. 83.

22. (a) Ibid, pp. 83-84, *see also* J. Onoh (1993). *The Nigerian Oil Industry* (London, Croom Helm)

23. *The Guardian,* 17 July, 2005.

24. Obi, C.I. op. cit., pp. 87-88.

25. J.B Asuni (2009). *Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta* (New York, CFR) p. 1.

26. Ibid, p. 5.

27. Agbu, O. (2002). "Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria", *News from the Nordic African Institute* (Uppsala).

28. For a detailed illustration of this trend, *see,* for example, Asuni, J.B, op. cit., p. 8.

29. Ibid.

30. Ovwasa, L. (1999) "Oil and the Minority Question in Nigeria", in Hassan Saliu (ed.) *Issues in Contemporary Political Economy of Nigeria* (Ilorin, Sally and Associates) p. 89.

31. Ogoni Bill of Rights (1992).

32. *The Guardian,* 18 April, 2006.

33. Naanen, B. (1995). "Oil-Producing Minorities and the Restructuring of Nigerian Federalism: The Case of the Ogoni People". *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* Vol. 33, No. 1.

34. Ovwasa, L. op. cit., p. 89.

35. *The Guardian,* 19 August, 1998.

36. Ovwasa, L. op. cit., p. 90.

37. Jimoh, I. (2008). op. cit., p. 11.

38. Ovwasa, L. "Oil and the Minority Question in Nigeria", p. 91; *see also* Livingston, W. L. (1952). "A Note on the Nature of Federalism", *Political Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 22.

39. Asamu, F. (2006). Ethnic Militias and National Security" in Hassan Saliu et al (eds) op. cit., pp. 128-130.

40. Crisis Group Africa Report (2006). "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment". (Dakar/Brussels) p. 6.

41. Ibid, p. 6.

42. Ibid, pp. 6-7.

43. Ugo, S. (2004) "Resource Control and Its Challenges to Nigerian Federalism", *The Constitution.* Vol. 4 No. 4 (Lagos CENCOD), p. 68.

44. Isumonah, V. (2003). "The Obasanjo Administration and the Management of Niger Delta Conflicts in Nigeria", *African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*

(Ibadan, CEPACS), pp. 213-214.

45. Ovwasa, L. op. cit., p. 94.

46. Adejumobi, S. (2005) "Ethnic Militia Groups and the National Question in Nigeria" *Social Science Research Council,* GSC Quarterly, p. 1.

47. Crisis Group Africa Report (2006) "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment, p. 7.

48. Ibid, p. 7.

49. Ibid, p. 8.

50. *The Guardian,* 20 April, 2006.

51. Crisis Group Africa Report (2006), op. cit., p. 8.

52. *The Punch,* 1 July, 2009.

53. Asuni, J.B., op. cit., p. 22

54. Saliu, H. "The New Wave of Violence in the Niger Delta and its Implications for Nigerian Foreign Policy", in Saliu, H. op. cit., p. 352.

55. Asuni, J.B. op. cit., pp. 26-27.

56. Saliu, H. op. cit., p. 351.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Crisis Group Africa Report, op. cit., p. 1.

60. Asamu, F. op. cit., p. 131.

61. Crisis Group Africa Report op. cit., p. 1.

45. Osuntala, J. op cit., p. 81.
46. Ahmadu, J. (2002) "Yoruba Militia Groups and the Survival Question in Nigeria." Social Science Research Council SSRC Quarterly, p. 1.
47. Crisis Group Africa Report (2006) "Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment," p. 9.
48. Ibid, p. 2.
49. Ibid, p. 2.
50. The Guardian, 20 April, 2006.
51. Crisis Group Africa Report (2006), op cit., p. 6.
52. The Punch, 1 July, 2005.
53. Azaiki, R. op cit., p. 22.
54. Salihi, H. "The New Waves of Violence in the Niger Delta and its Implications for Nigerian People in Future," in Salihi, H. op cit., p. 234.
55. Azaiki, S. op cit., pp. 26-40.
56. Salihi, H. op cit., p. 45.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Crisis Group Africa Report, op cit., p. 1.
60. Azaiki, S. op cit., p. 124.
61. Crisis Group Africa Report, op cit.

SECTION C

Religion and Society

12

THE MANIPULATION OF RELIGION IN NIGERIA

The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria: Implications for Democratic Governance

EMMA-LAWSON HASSAN

12

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary Nigerian situation seems to show that religion, as a way of worship and reverence to a supreme being who is variously referred to as the almighty God, the Creator of the universe and the giver of life and every good thing thereof, etc. is gradually losing its essence as all other considerations, especially modern politics and its spoils, have turned religion into an instrument of manipulation. It is almost unimaginable, for instance, that corruption which is like a cankerworm that has eaten deep into the national fabric, and which ought to have been detested because it is morally unsound and condemnable by any religious consideration; is today turning out to be a subject of hero worship and everything that is acquired through it (including primitive accumulation), are regarded as signs of blessing from God. This unfortunate mentality is also transferred into the realm of democracy where, for instance, victory at the polls is often ascribed to divine

providence even when such was clearly the result of an electoral fraud. This is what has given rise to the erroneous notion people hold nowadays that anybody holding an exalted public position is being placed there by God and any attempt to either remove him from such position or bring him to book when he errs tantamount to working against the will of God for that person or the entire society. The manipulation of religion in Nigeria, therefore, as this paper attempts to show, has serious adverse implications for the entrenchment of democracy in our country.

Today, after the reactions that followed the assassination of General Murtala Ramat Mohammed on 13 February, 1976; the politics of the Sharia Debate (1976-1977); and the occurrence of several religious disturbances in different parts of the country only the most uncritical minds will doubt the fact that religion is being manipulated in Nigeria. Most students and keen observers of the African political scene are agreed on the fact that religion, and to some extent, ethnicity are the most dangerous threats to a meaningful democratisation process in Africa. Here, we shall restrict our discussion to religion because that is the focus of the paper. It is important to note that almost all religions that are known today started in conditions of social and economic dislocation and were originally movements composed and led largely by the poor and the oppressed. This was probably why Karl Marx and other Marxist scholars refer to religion as the 'opium of the masses'; hence they sometime become so drunk in it as to forget about the fact that their poverty is the result of the merciless exploitation and oppression of the privileged class in the society. With time, however, they (religious movements) became so popular among the masses that they were captured by the very oppressors that they were meant to dislodge. Thereafter, they turn into instruments of deception and domination. This is as true of the world religions – for example, Christianity, Buddhism and Islam– as it is true of the African traditional religions. After all, religion is nothing more than what Kukah (1999:93) refers to as,

> . . . an explanation of it within the context of a set of rituals by which the human being relates with the higher being has come to be accepted while its derivation from the Latin word *religare* (to bind) has come to be understood as reflecting the effort by fallen man to re-establish contact with his creator.

The manipulation thesis seeks to draw attention to the fact that the development and progress of Nigeria has often been obstructed largely by individuals and interest groups whose stock-in-trade has been a systematic deployment of religious sentiments by which group antagonism along religious lines are constantly played out. The proponents of this thesis believe that most of the religious crises that have become recurring phenomena in many parts of northern Nigeria are the external manifestations of these hidden

hands of manipulation.

In its beginnings, Christianity was the religion of the slaves, the outcasts, the poor and oppressed. Jesus Christ himself had a poor earthly parentage as his father, Joseph, was a carpenter. He was even born in a manger. His entire ministry was devoted to fighting the cause of the poor and down-trodden. Indeed, that was why the early Christians, especially the disciples were drawn from amongst the lowly and oppressed classes, namely, the fishermen, artisans, slaves and shepherds. Christianity continued to grow in strength because of its message of social justice and its popular social base. The ruling classes of Rome and Judaea became so frightened that they had to adopt the religion in order to tame it, corrupt its leadership, and turn it into an instrument of domination. The Prophet Mohammed also was of a humble beginnings even though his clan, the Quraish, had a high social status. He was an orphan. He was poor. His message was first received by various groups oppressed by the old order. This is reflected in the values and composition of early Islam: its rejection of hereditary principles of succession to leadership, its concern for social justice and the protection of the weak and the poor, its insistence on accountability and probity in public life, and its call on all the oppressed to stand up and fight for their rights. But, as rightly pointed out by *The Analyst* (1988: 7),

> Islam also could not escape the putrefying hands of the rich and the powerful. No sooner had it conquered Arabia, and began its world-wide expansion, establishing itself as the religion of the state, than it became the victim of the rapacious greed, capricious avarice and lascivious appetite of monarchs, kings, merchants and the official clergy. The discredited hereditary principle of leadership found its way back into the Umma. Controversy riddled succession to the caliphate. The third caliph, Usman, was assassinated by hired killers. His successor, the caliph Ali, was also assassinated, this time in the mosque. Since then, the caliphate became the sole preserve of dynasties.

But the use and abuse of religion is not restricted to world religions. For centuries, African traditional religions have also lent themselves to positive, as well as negative, use. A typical example can be seen in the Arochukwu cult of the peoples of eastern Nigeria. The Aro oracle or Long Juju as it is sometimes called arose out of a communal society where the fear of the unknown was particularly strong, because of the low level of human control over the environment. The Arochukwu oracle served to assuage society's fears and to explain its misfortunes. The barren, the diseased and the distressed all sought solace from the oracle. However, the emergence of the slave trade changed all that as the Aro oracle became a snare. The Aro priests transformed themselves into slave merchants. Unsuspecting supplicants who went to consult the oracle and make offerings were lured into a labyrinth of caves

which opened up into slave ships. This is similar to what manipulators of religion do nowadays. They appear to show some concern and love for religion and its followers and can even demonstrate some level of piety openly in order to get the attention or win the support of the followers of their religion just for the sake of their ulterior motives, which are usually hidden from the people. The manipulator makes the manipulated act under the garb of religion or ethnicity or any other aspect of social life in other to achieve his (manipulator) selfish or class interests. This simply means that the act of manipulation goes directly to benefit the manipulator and not the manipulated.

Definitional Problematic

The term 'manipulation' is open to different definitions by different professionals and amateurs alike depending on the biases of their fields of specialisation and intellectual linings. Our intension here is not to go through the plethora of definitions that have been offered by various scholars but rather to align our analysis of the manipulation of religion in Nigeria to one particular definition that will facilitate a proper understanding of the picture that is painted in this paper as the focus is analytical rather than definitional. It is therefore very important that in a discussion of this nature we are precise about our terms. Nevertheless, it is only proper to acknowledge the fact that the concept of the manipulation of religion seems to have been put forward more forcefully for the first time by the great historian and erudite scholar, Dr Y.B. Usman in a public lecture which was organised by the Students Union under the same title at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria on 28 November, 1977. It appeared in the New Nigerian on 13 and 14 January, 1978, and was published together with other lectures and articles in 1979. In his definition of the term 'manipulation' Usman (1979:78) observes that:

> Manipulation means, essentially, controlling the action of a person or group without that person or group knowing the goals, purpose and method of that control and without even being aware that a form of control is being exercised on them at all.

The important point to note about this definition for the purpose of our discussion here is that the people that manipulation is targeted at are themselves ignorant of the fact that they are being manipulated. This ignorance on the part of the masses is the product of both their low level of literacy and the various attempts being made by their manipulators to keep them at that level of ignorance, which in itself is an act of manipulation. For, it is this ignorance that has given rise to certain questions bothering on whether or not we can actually talk about the manipulation of religion in Nigeria today? Or is it merely one of contestation between various religious faiths? There are people

who would say that all that is happening is a healthy development because people are becoming more conscious of their religious obligations and rejecting secularism. Reverend Fr Matthew Kukah alludes to this point in the picture he paints about the Muslim North, according to him (Kukah, 1999:25):

> ... there are many of the masses who feel so strongly about their faith that they are not ready to trade it off with any tall talk about democracy. Within Northern Nigeria, for example, and especially within the Muslim populace, there are many who will see democracy as part of a worldly pursuit which they can not engage in for fear of losing their religious kingdom.

One very important thing that we need to take note of as far as the scenario that is represented in the above quotation is concerned is the fact that it makes such people or group more vulnerable to the antics of religion manipulators. For it is on what the people honor and believe so much in that is usually exploited by their manipulators who neither love their religion nor the people whom they ostensibly arm to defend the religion. No, their interest in fanning the embers of religion or ethnicity is for them to achieve their socio-political and economic ambitions as individuals or a group.

But it is increasingly becoming clear that even some of the people who deny that religion is being manipulated in Nigeria today, are doing so because they want to satisfy certain vested interests which in itself, is a form of manipulation. What, therefore, is the evidence that religion is being manipulated in Nigeria today?

THE MANIPULATION OF RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA

Contemporary Nigeria is used here to denote the period during which the phenomenon of manipulation of religion in Nigeria today started to take its concrete form and shape. The period proper can be said to fall around the 19th century to present, and it is characterised by the 19th century jihad in Hausaland; the imposition of colonial rule; the Nigerian civil war; the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed, and the politics of the Sharia Debate. We shall proceed to discuss these factors one after the other within the context of the phenomenon under study.

Usman Dan Fodio

One of the best examples of the use and abuse of religion in Nigeria is to be found in the jihad of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. The jihadists mobilised people on the basis of concrete social and economic discontents. For example, in his *Kitab-al-farq*, the Shehu condemned the imposition of a wide variety of taxes and all kinds of levies and extortions, such as *kudin ghari* (poll tax), *Kudin salla* (festival tax) and *jangeli* (cattle tax), among others, by the rulers of

Hausaland on the peasantry. It was this concern with the well-being of the common people or *talakawa* that enabled the Shehu and other leaders of the jihad to rally support and to overthrow the old Hausa order, i.e. the *Sarauta* system of government. Soon after the success of the jihad, Shehu Usman Dan Fodio retired from active politics and concentrated his efforts on writing guidelines on the proper conduct of state affairs for his successors under the new system of government known as the Emirate system. Barely one decade after the success of the jihad, the Shehu's younger brother and one of the leading commanders of the jihad, Abdullahi Dan Fodio, had cause to write a scathing attack on the new order, in *Tazyin-al-Waraqat,* he indicted the new rulers for betraying the ideals of the jihad by reverting to some of the old practices of the erstwhile Hausa rulers which were antithetical to what the jihad stood for.

The Bible and the Sword

It is an indisputable fact that in the colonisation of Nigeria, religion was used. For the missionaries co-operated and collaborated with the European traders, and both served as advance parties or pathfinders, spies and scouts for the colonial soldiers and administrators. After all, they all came from the same European backgrounds and civilisation and were to work in the same capitalist vineyard. This way, religion was used in order to pave the way for the penetration of colonial capitalism and all that it stood for. Even after colonialism had been firmly established in the country, the colonial administrators resorted to playing off one religion against the other, manipulating different religious sentiments so as to confuse people and subvert their yearnings for independence and self-determination. This was particularly carried out in the educational institutions. While in certain schools, they would promote the virtues of Christianity and western civilisation and denigrate traditional religions and Islam; in other schools, they would extol the teachings and examples of the Sokoto jihad, which they reduced to a Fulani affair. After independence, the successors of the colonial regime were to perform this political trickery using religion.

The Civil War

The Nigerian civil war (1967-70) offered yet another platform for our political 'wizards' to continue with the deceptions and manipulation of religious sentiment and differences in furtherance of their narrow and selfish ends. *The Analyst*, in its September-October 1988 edition, seems to have captured the spirit of the time by stating that:

From Ojukwu's bunker, Radio Biafra continued to cry wolf about the Biafrans being the victims of a so-called jihad launched by the 'muslim vandals of

Northern Nigeria' against the black 'Christian Jews' of Biafra. And from Kaduna the shrill voice of Isa Abdulmumini and Lamido Muhammed Bajoga would retort: the rebels of Eastern Nigeria are but the illegitimate children of the Christian colonialists and the black servants of the Vatican (p. 9).

As the war of words between Kaduna and Enugu went on as part of war propaganda, the international community was caught up in the crossfire and the reactions from the hierarchies of the two religions (Christianity and Islam) amounted to pouring fuel onto the conflagration. On the Christian side for instance, in its September 1967 edition, the *African Monthly Review* writes:

The Arabs have tried three times to wipe out Israel from the earth ... Today a similar situation is taking place in the west coast of Africa. More than 30,000 inhabitants of what used to be Eastern Nigeria were murdered in cold-blood. Pregnant women, children, unarmed Christian worshippers, were among the victims of the pogrom in Northern Nigeria last year. But the almighty God is fighting with the innocent Biafrans.

It should be noted that at the end of the day and behind the façade of the war propaganda, neither the so-called Christian easterners nor the Muslim northerners can be said to have told the world the truth about that war of attrition that had engulfed the country. They were all engaged in a game of manipulating religion in order to win sympathy and support from the adherents of the two religions both internally and internally.

Murtala Muhammed: The Felled Hero

The assassination of this patriot brought to the fore, with absolute clarity, the full domestic and foreign dimensions of the pattern of religion manipulation in our country. The domestic religious pretenders rose in one voice to sing their normal song: 'look, the Nigerian Muslims are killing the Christians; hey, the Christian infidels are killing our Muslim brothers in Nigeria. Indeed, Murtala's assassination was interpreted variously in religious terms in order to foster communal violence and distrust. Usman (1979:79) underscores both the domestic and foreign dimensions thus,

The domestic forces were made up of two main tendencies. There were those that wanted to present Murtala as a Muslim martyr and his assassins as Christian villains. Then there were those that wanted to present Murtala as a Muslim villain and his assassins as Christian redeemers. The foreign dimension manifested itself very clearly in the dispatch from Reuters sent by their chief Nigerian Correspondent, Colin Fox, and broadcast over the British Broadcasting Corporation, which said that communal violence had broken out over Murtala's death in parts of the country.

This section of the discourse will not be complete without making reference to the inflammatory remark by Chike Obi on the occasion of the 1976 convention of the National Union of Nigerian students at Enugu where he was quoted by a journal, *New Breed*, to have charged that the backwardness of Nigeria can be directly traced to the door-steps of Islam and the Fulani.

The Politics of the So-called 'Sharia Debate'

Reference is hereby made to this debate as so-called because as Usman (1979:82) rightly observes: "there was really no debate in the sense of an articulation of basic issues and dimensions of the matter." But it was clear, however, that there were seminars and symposia organised ostensibly to debate the constitution, which was produced by the Constitution Drafting Committee in 1976 as part of the efforts by the Murtala regime to pursue the programme of the return to civil rule. According to Kukah (2003:118), these seminars and symposia afforded groups and individuals the opportunity to plan their strategies for the real debate, since for many of the members; the floor of the Assembly was already part of the political landscape for the second republic. But what is worrisome was that this so-called sharia debate appeared to have been deliberately pushed to become the most prominent issue in the discussion of the future constitution for the country. Usman (1979:82) observes that,

> This 'debate' provided an excuse for the publication of provocative and scurrilous articles purporting to oppose or support the sharia in newspapers, especially *The Punch*, the *New Nigerian* and the *Nigerian Standard* . . . as part of this campaign of provocation-reaction-counter-reaction, the main feature of this phase of the pattern of manipulation.

Kukah (2003:120-1) notes that when in a chat with a former Governor of Kaduna state, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, he sought the ex-governor's view on the interest of the northern ruling class on the Sharia Debate, Alhaji Musa replied that,

> . . . the ruling class in Northern Nigeria knew that they were threatened by the new democracy. They had no foothold or any solid base for political competition as a block with the rest of the country. In view of this political bankruptcy, it became clear that Islam would offer the only alternative for the protection of their class interests.

Kukah received the same, though broader response in another separate interview with Dr. Mahmud Tukur, former head of the department of history, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. According to the university don as quoted in Kukah (2003:121):

> . . . certain groups with political ambitions from the North and the South decided to use the sharia debate as a means of mobilising support, the advantage

being that either way, these individuals will still use the support they had earned in presenting themselves as defenders of sharia or defenders of their people from the cloak of Islamic domination.

Let us close the discussion on this section by concurring with Kukah that while most people appeared to be concerned with how they and their constituencies would be affected by the sharia, there were a good number of those who were more worried about their political fortunes.

Implications for Democratic Governance in Nigeria

Although Nigeria and Nigerians can claim to have crossed what Ibeanu (2007:1) refers to as 'the magical three elections plus one civilian-to-civilian handover threshold of democratic consolidation', the path to true democratic governance is still rough and rugged. One of the variables making for this situation is the manipulation of religion in the society. This is so because even if we put aside the fact that political science is yet to come up with a single theory of democratisation; the fact still remains that any attempt to manipulate a people, which simply means mobilising the people based on deceit and falsehood, as earlier defined in this paper; is already a big obstacle to true democracy.

Democratic governance cannot thrive under a situation where the media which is the watchdog of the society and as an important outlet for mobilising popular support and information dissemination finds itself engulfed by the burning flame of religious or/and ethnic bigotry? The statement by Dan Agbese, one of the pillars of journalism in Nigeria, with regard to the *New Nigerian* which is one of the leading newspapers in the country, as quoted in Kukah (2003:73), speaks volumes of how some sections of the Nigerian media seem to have had their hands tied long before now. According to Agbese:

> I became an editor by accident because in the history of the *New Nigerian*, editors had always been appointed, and the editorial chair was out of bounds to all non-Muslims, since the New Nigerian was the voice of the North and also the voice of Islam in the North.

A look at the political history of contemporary Nigeria shows that while all other forms of conflicts that appear on the political arena seem to point at certain things that when put in place are capable of resolving them; religious conflicts, as the Nigerian experience has shown, appear more difficult and most times, impossible to resolve. Meaning therefore that the manipulation of religion, more than all other forms of manipulation, poses more threat to the entrenchment and sustenance of democratic governance, especially in the north where the religious divide between Christianity and Islam is very glaring

and government resources seem to be lavishly used to enforce an Islamic culture. This is a project that was started by the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the *Sardauna* of Sokoto. He used position and the resources of the region, including soliciting funds from Arab nations, to set upon the agenda of expanding the frontiers of Islam in Northern Nigeria by means of an aggressive capital intensive project for building mosques and the campaigns for the conversion of non-Muslims especially in the Middle Belt area to Islam (Paden, 1986:566-68). This conclusion may not necessarily be applicable in the south where ethnicity rather than religion seems to have developed into such a wild form that ethnic and sub-ethnic loyalties threatened the survival of both the East and the West (Ekeh, 1989:6-7).

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is unfortunate to conclude that the scepter of religious manipulation in Nigeria generally, and northern Nigeria in particular, will continue to constitute a major threat to democratic governance for some time to come. In the north, for example, the intermittent religious disturbances that the region has been experiencing in recent times are indices of this pattern of manipulation. And unless the leaders of the region take a decisive stand in fighting illiteracy, poverty and all forms of deprivation, it will be "morning yet on creation day" as far as the manipulation of religion is concerned. And for as long as this trend continues, our dream of democratic governance as a nation will remain a fleeting illusion.

REFERENCES

Ekeh, P.P. (1989). "Nigeria's Emergent Political Culture", in Peter P. Ekeh, Patrick Dele-Cole and Gabriel O. Olusanya (eds) *Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 Years Vol. V Politics and Constitutions,* Government Printer, Lagos, pp. 1-9.

Ibeanu, O. (2007). "Elections and the Paroxysmal Future of Democracy in Nigeria", in Attahiru Jega and Okechukwu Ibeanu (eds), *Elections and The Future of Democracy in Nigeria,* Political Science Association of Nigeria, pp. 1-22.

Kukah, M. Hassan (2003). *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria,* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.

Kukah, M. Hassan (1999). *Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria,* Ibadan:Spectrum Books Ltd.

The Analyst, Vol.III, No. 5, September-October, 1988.

Paden, J.N. (1986). *Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria,* Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company.

Usman, Y.B. (1979). *For the Liberation of Nigeria,* New Beacon Books Ltd, London.

From Religious Conflict to Religious Nationalism: The Nigerian Experience

13

BENSON O. IGBOIN

INTRODUCTION

The inveterate nature of religious violence in Nigeria has continued to dominate the tabloid. The reason is obvious: religion has been a veritable tool in the hands of politicians as well as religious fundamentalists to foment trouble. The recent gory experiences of Jos, Plateau state, though have been variously termed religious appear in reality to be beyond religion. This paper ventured to refer to it as a case of religious nationalism, whose rise is an attack on "public space and culture on the intellectual ability to explain and think of the world" in pluralistic contours. Religious nationalism in Nigeria as in other parts of the globe is a religious nationalistic collectivity of the Islamic extraction to terrorise a common enemy in obedience to the divine. The punch of this paper is to demonstrate that religious conflicts in Nigeria have gone beyond the religious factor as causal, but an inherent strong totalistic politico-ethnic force, which mobilises adherents of particular religion to a

common goal outside the intellectual/cognitive capacity. This paper would therefore X-ray the nationalistic factors and argue that mouthing platitudes might not be the cure needed. Religious education and poverty eradication become imperative. It is strongly suggested that government must first exercise the political will and authority to implement the contents of the white papers in order to stem the tide before the divisive goal of religious nationalism is realised.

Conflicts of different kinds have been experienced in Nigeria for decades now, and there seems to be no sign of possible end to them in the national psyche. The conflicts have been tagged religious, ethnic, communal, political or social, etc. More often than not, religious appellation is identified with the conflicts. But there became a shift in the acceptance of the stark reality in the causal relationship between the conflicts and religion such that the conflicts are described with hyphenated categories such as ethno-religious, socio-religious or politico-religious conflicts. Religion has been the smokescreen for the hyphenated categories. The factors have been investigated by scholars, policymakers and governments with specific attention given to perpetuators, victims and on-lookers, with almost no premium placed on the instigator. These efforts have, as usual, proffered some solutions: embracing tolerance that probably led to the establishment of Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), dialogue, mass literacy, poverty alleviation, breaking up the country, implementation of the White Papers on the Commissions of Inquiry, etc.

Scholars have done systematic analyses of the immediate and remote causes of the various religious and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. They found out that there are similar causes in the intra- and inter-religious conflicts that have characterised the history of the country. Such causes include: fanaticism, fundamentalism, ethnicity, politics, economy, ignorance, intolerance, bigotry, poverty, etc.[1]

However, those scholars have not paid attention to the emerging religious nationalism in Nigeria and the influence of geography on religion. This paper argues that there is a psychological aspect of geography of religion that incites violence. Although geography of religion is a descriptive discipline, it will be shown that it has strong influence on how people react to religious issues, even within a particular faith group. This, with specific reference to Nigeria, also affects, or is affected, by the nature of Nigerian nationhood. The philosophical template of nationhood will be shown to impinge on the nature of religious pluralism; a denial of which is partly responsible for the emergence of religious nationalism. Since religious nationalism has a cognitive concern and a widespread economic dimension, it will be argued that education and frontal attacks on poverty are crucial just as deterrent measures are a *sine qua non* of stemming the tide of religious nationalism.

A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF NIGERIAN NATIONHOOD

Ludwig Wittgenstein says that definitions of concepts are hardly universally agreeable. This, he argues, is because contextual flavors impinge on concepts such that different contexts may define a single concept in different ways that may result in unacceptable definitions. The context of meaning of concepts makes use of languages in their robustness, fecundity or paucity. The reason, according to him, is that

> language is used and understood depending on the context in which it is used ... all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing. To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of a description, and thus, the essence of the world. The limits of my language mean the limits of my world ...[2]

This means that definitions of concepts are different from their explanations in that the former depend on the acquisition of language and its robustness and, therefore, determine the essence, the latter "require comparisons and classifications of facts . . . definitions involve elementisation and reduction."[3] What this portends is that one should foray into the world of definitions of concepts and can eventually adopt one or more that are most suitable for one's context.

What, therefore, is a nation? Hugh Seton Watson argues that it is difficult if not completely impossible to define the term. According to him, "I am driven to the conclusion that no scientific definition of a nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists".[4] Such a conclusion does not however put paid to the search for definitions. It is even more crucial for Nigeria which at her golden jubilee still gropes in search of nationhood. Is Nigeria a nation? An authority defines a nation as "a stable, historically developed community of people with a territory, economic life, distinctive culture and a language in common".[5] Another source goes ahead to state that a nation is:

> people of the same ethnicity; a community of people who share a common ethnic origin, culture, historical tradition and language, whether or not they live together in the same territory or have their own government.[6]

Certainly, Nigeria, as it is at present does not fall within the ambit of the definitions above. It is clear from the features of the definitions that Nigeria has not attained that organic commonness to warrant a nation in that category. *Thesaurus Dictionary Translations* defines a nation as "people in a land under a single government; a community of people or people living in a defined territory and organised under a single government".[7] Nadesan is apt and catchy when he says that:

A nation is not simply an ethnic group; neither is a nation simply an economic togetherness. It is a political togetherness . . . concerned both with the structure and exercise of power . . . It is a togetherness which gives expression to the shared aspirations of the people for equality and freedom and to establish, nurture and maintain the institutions necessary for that purpose.[8]

From the above definition, we can say with a modicum of confidence that Nigeria is a nation, at least, conceptually. It is a 'political nation' on the prism of geographical considerations because historically and politically, the Nigerian nation found its origin in "territorial demarcations, drawn by the European colonial powers, following geographical considerations and regardless of ethnicity of the people in the territories".[9] It is in this sense that Soyinka argues that Nigeria is a nation becoming and not a nation being. More realistically, he says that Nigeria – in addition to Awolowo's description of it as a mere geographical expression – is a state, expressing the brutish powers of statehood rather than developing into nationhood. It is also in this sense that Nigeria is described as a nation of nations, while many have deliberately refused to employ the term nation for it, preferring more conveniently to use country or state.[10] The plural nature of Nigeria, in terms of ethnic groups, religions, languages, histories, laws, politics, etc. has given vent to such realities as secular nationalism, religious nationalism, liberal nationalism, linguistic nationalism, territorial nationalism, etc.[11] This set of nationalisms as present in Nigeria is not mutually reinforcing but rather mutually exclusive and suspicious, thus becoming the womb that conceives the various conflicts the country has witnessed.

We can argue that Nigeria is not naturally a nation as it is constituted now. It is a creation of European colonialists who compressed or altered the natural affinities that bound the individuals together. This political compression, though has held the peoples together since 1914, it has not glued them together as one people, one nation, in spite of the slogans and jingos. Thus, Soyinka argues that instead of talking about Nigerian nation, it is more realistic and safe to talk about Itsekiri nation, Igbo nation, Edo nation, Yoruba nation, Hausa nation, Fulani nation, etc. It is in this sense that a true nationhood or pragmatic nationalism can be conceived, accepted and even respected.[12] The amalgam of nations conscripted by the will of the colonialists through force majeure has continued to agitate for disparate settlements, whether or not such agitations are real or imagined. However, for the sake of the present work, it is a given that Nigeria is a nation of a sort. The reason is that its present structure gives vim to its geography of religion and religious pluralism, to which we now turn.

GEOGRAPHY OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

We must posit from the outset that this subtitle "geography of religion" sounds

strange to many people. This is because it is hardly that religion is found in geography textbooks, and vice versa. And when they do occasionally, they may not attract serious scholarly attention. In spite of this, it is not the case that geography does not influence, or is influenced by, religion, rather it is the case that many scintillating discourses and phenomena about the development, spread and impact of religions on people's lives are inherently or creatively rooted in geographical factors, such that we can analyse "what happens where", which belongs to geographical perspective.[13] Even though the discipline is an emerging one and descriptive in nature, no serious scholar of Religious Studies who is acquainted with global occurrences in the intricate relationship between religion and politics can ignore the global distribution of religions without compromising intellectual integrity and responsibility. Religion and politics are crucial factors in the determination of global peace at present. And the pursuit of peace at that level is taking historical-geographical characterisation of religion into serious policy formulation account. Thus, the distribution of religions can be done globally or locally around the pertinent questions: "Which religions are strongest in different places?", and "Why might this be so?"[14]

Even if it is almost impossible to draw a map of religious distribution, an intent study of smaller scale distributions and dynamics of how religions spread across the globe and the changes that result through time constitute and interesting aspect of geography of religion. The processes accountable for observed patterns of changes through time and space stimulate scholars' interest.[15] For instance, in Nigeria the questions can be asked: why are southern Muslims not as violent as their northern counterparts even when they practice the same faith? What geographical phenomena, features and realities can be identified to have impinged on their different psychological responses to the same religious issues? Can we suspect the climatic differences or landscapes? Can these spatial patterns be held responsible for the more tolerant response of African Religion?

These questions do not prismatically command our response in this present work because not much investigation has been done to authenticate the claims. However, it is imperative to answer some in peripheral way because it will help us appreciate the locale of conflicts in Nigeria. From a geographical analysis, the distribution of religions is classified into two main categories: universal or universalising religions such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, which seek global acceptance and indulge in active membership drive; ethnic or cultural religions like Judaism, African Religion, Shinto, Taoism, Confucianism, which do not strive for membership through violence.[16]

With particular reference to Nigeria, in spite of the fact that there are Christians in the north and Muslims in the south, the country is generally described as Christian south and Muslim north. This description has been

termed to be political and mutually suspicious. The Muslims in the north regard the southerners as infidels who must be evangelised, and somehow relate with their Muslim brethren in the south as less religious than they. The Christians in the south view the Muslims in the north as illiterate and backward.[17] This is in spite of the fact that before the emergence of Christianity and Islam, the peoples practised some similar forms of African Religion, from which they basically derived their law and mode of political administration.[18]

The dynamics of geography of religion – diffusion and dispersion – have led to the articulation that there are religious ideas and values, patterns and phenomena that are spread along with religion. In other words, the processes of diffusion involve "that anything that moves must be carried in some way, and that the rate at which some things move over geographic space will be influenced by other things that get in the way".[19] This can be understood against the background of the provenances of the major world religions, which geographers have described as "religious hearths" of "religious heartlands",[20] namely: India, Palestine and Arabia. It is this force of diffusion that Christianity and Islam – rival, universal, militant, ethical monotheistic, proselytising and judgmental religions – brought along with them to places they have established their presence and influence.

The geography of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria clearly shows that the north is the hotbed of violence. And this has a long stretch of history behind it. History is replete with the fact that the Fulanisation of the Hausa kingdoms was through the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio in 1804. Before the emergence of Fodio, traditional Hausaland was owned and inhabited by the aboriginal Birom, Hausa, Anga, Nupe, etc. In a bid for settlement, Fodio veered into Hausaland and militarily subjugated the peoples. However, his expansionist ambition was stringently resisted by the Tiv, Birom (Jos), the Yoruba. The Fulani dominated the political and economic spheres of the conquered territories until the advent of the British.[21]

The introduction and adoption of Islam helped in the consolidation of Fulani hegemony. Islam provided "an overarching objective and formidable political mobilisation potential, which can only be jettisoned or neglected at the peril of a nation."[22] Islam does not distinguish politics from religion. This also has a long history behind it, dating back to the establishment of the *ummah* – the Islamic community – by Prophet Muhammad after the migration from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD. The Prophet became the political, economic, religious, diplomatic and legal head of the community. This practice continued in the development of Islamic history. Little wonder then, that the incursion of Fodio followed a similar historical pattern. The emergence of colonialism only stopped the naked exercise of power momentarily. Soon after independence, the dominant spirit was reasserted in a country that has

become thoroughly pluralistic.

It must be stated that the British, after conquering the north promised the emirs that their socio-political and religious status quo would be put into consideration on the condition that they cooperate with the colonial policy. This means that the existing northern institutions tilted towards Islamic law would be retained and strengthened. Metuh says that:

> the one fact which above others influenced the status of Islam and its relationships with other religious groups in Northern Nigeria during the colonial period and into post-independent Nigeria, was the promise made by Lord Lugard, the first British colonial governor of Nigeria, to the Sultan of Sokoto, Waziri in 1903 after the fall of the town, to the effect that even though the Sultan and the emirs were to be appointed by the Chief Commissioner (provincial administrator) the Emirs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time and take such taxes as are approved by the High Commissioner, the Alkalis and Emirs will hold the law courts as of old ... government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion.[23]

This has continued till date, in spite of the Constitution which in a way recognises the sharia law. Kukah argues that this historical factor has lent credence to the vehement rejection of secular state thesis because it will precipitate anti-religious laws that will oust religion from public life.[24] But the religiosity of Nigerians has not de-criminalised them; rather, they sin religiously, corrupt religiously, kill religiously and fight religiously.[25]

The skirmishes, bloodiness and martyrdom that saw to the end of Hausa kingdoms at the advent of Fodio started to be re-enacted in the 1980s in form of religious conflicts. This time, it was not to claim the Hausa kingdoms back, but to fully Islamise the whole of the north. This meant that non-Muslims were vulnerable, and were largely unwanted. Islamic fundamentalists started the campaign by capitalising on some flimsy excuses of desecration of the Quran, etc. The precipitation of religious violence has been argued to have other extraneous factors, such as political, economic and ethnic. This inveterate religious conflagration resulted in migration and resettlements. "Sordid development where settlements are now being defined along religious lines: Muslims tend to cluster in a particular area, while Christians are migrating to areas dominated by people with the same faith, thereby carving two sharply divided potential war zones".[26] This is for security reason, especially when it has been argued that the government has either at one time or the other taken side with a particular religion thereby unwilling to implement the White Papers that would have served as deterrence or threatened by the powerful political entities alleged to be behind the various violent combustions, thereby turning a blind eye.

The religious and ethnic crises in Jos can thus be analysed in the foregoing

perspective. It has been argued that the Jos crises are caused by a "deep-seated historical ethnic divide ravaging the country which sometimes finds expression in bitter religious conflict".[27] Omo Baba expatiates:

> This crisis is another form of resistance, not by those youths against some religious groups, but against the feudal northern system that keeps indigenous land owners as strangers and slaves in their homeland. What we see regularly is minority revolt against an unjust system that keeps us as perpetual victims of domination by the Hausa-Fulani.[28]

The political history and structure of Nigeria certainly undermine the rights of the minority. This becomes the primary cause for revolt in Jos. The acknowledgement by the Arewa Consultative Forum that the Northern region is "the problem of Nigeria"[29] is a confirmation of this thought and Obafemi Awolowo's stark observation. Lateef Jakande quotes him in the following submission:

> I believe and state as a fact that the problem of Nigeria can never be solved until the problem of the North has been solved. I hold it as a fact that the Northern Region in its present state constitutes a gradual but sure brake on the fast-moving south, a lack of incentive to the Northerners to accelerate the pace of their progress in order to catch up with their Southern colleagues, and a dead-weight on the country as a whole. I hold it as a fact that so long as the Northern Region remains a giant and monolithic unit as it is at present . . . I hold it as a fact that there is always the danger which now more manifest than ever before that the feudal and autocratic system of the North will spread to the South.[30]

Sanusi attests to this fact in his *How North Underdeveloped Nigeria*. According to him, the symbolic reference to the north as the husband and the south as the wife, playing out in political arrangement of the country has contributed to the tension it has witnessed. In this analogy, it is only when the husband is either dead or indisposed that the wife can act, at least, briefly. The northerners get to power by design while the southerners who have been lucky to rule got it either by accident or political circumstances.[31]

Apart from the political and ethnic reasons for the widespread violence in the north, it has been opined that the hostile climatic atmosphere impinges on the Muslims. The impact of heavy rainfalls on human psychology of response is an open subject for investigation, especially with regard to religious conflicts in Nigeria. While this is so for now, it appears that it has been used to mobilise towards religious nationalism.

RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA

The concept, religious nationalism is not a new one. But its resurgence has

been explained in the wake of 11 September, 2001 attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda. The argument is that bin Laden, the key instigator of the terrorist attacks used "religious nationalism to rally support for his cause".[32] According to bin Laden, America is the 'pot of Islam's corruption and her elimination is the sure way to attain purity in the world'. Therefore, the forces of good which Islam represents are against the forces of evil America represents. This dualism, although has been overly simplistically construed, the terrorist attacks on 911 definitely aroused the interest in the interrelationship between religion and politics.

Nationalism has been seen to create "an egoistic sense of in-group cohesion by emphasising the shared greatness of a people".[33] Bin Laden utilised this nationalistic concept to mobilise Muslims to see his cause as God-ordained. According to him, it is only the Muslims who are compliant with his call to violence that are worthy of God's approval because they are doing God's work. This has a vehement moral tone. Studies have shown that moral exclusion or disengagement is an important instrument for collective violence.[34] On the other hand, nationalism exacerbates feelings of threat by pointing to the nation's precarious nature and structure, and expressing angst towards those deemed responsible for the hardship. It can also spring up because of the belief that one's nation has been insulted or shown a "collective humiliation". This, as has been argued, was interpreted by bin Laden to mean the presence of American army on Islamic holy land is a collective insult on Muslims as a whole. As he puts it: "I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America".[35]

Again nationalism has a fundamental aspect of human social cognition, which is the attempt to divide humans into groups. This divide takes the form of *Us* and *Them* and tends to favour one's group to the detriment of the other. This form of nationalism uses ethnicity, race, language, ideology and religion to mobilise support for its cause.[36] This form is demonstrated in the use of language to stimulate in-group support such as "the Islamic nation or God's children" which are Muslims, and the out-group, "God's enemies" which are non-Muslims. Thus, for instance, on 23 August, 1996 in his "Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques", bin Laden called for "a guerilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it".[37] This use of language was to de-humanise the non-Muslims in calling them "infidels" or "devil's supporters".[38] This is a reminiscence of Hitler's description of the Jews as vermin, bacilli and "kikes".[39] Bin Laden felt that destroying America was a priority, Saudi Arabia which has betrayed the Islamic community by allying with America must also be cautioned, at least. This religious (Muslim) nationalism is also to promote "the cause of Islamic revolution within the Islamic world itself, in the Arab lands especially and Saudi Arabia above all".[40]

Esposito has done a considerable work on religious nationalism and specifically on the transition from Arab nationalism to Muslim nationalism. This cause, he argued, is strengthened by the new but forceful appeal to Islamic alternative, which calls for Islamisation or re-Islamisation of society. He avers:

> For almost two decades, Islam has been reasserted as a source of political development and mobilisation. The pervasive belief that nation building required a clear secular orientation has been challenged in diverse ways across the Middle East, as well as in South, Southeast, and central Asia. The role of Islam as a symbol of political legitimacy and a source of political and social activism and popular mobilisation has become global in scope as governments have appealed to Islam to enhance their legitimacy and authority, buttress nationalism, legitimate policies and programmes and increase popular support.[41]

How does the foregoing relate to Nigeria? It is pertinent to posit that Islam has been a vocal force against progressive Westernisation and secularisation of society. As Mamman puts it:

> In the process, fragile and endangered ethnic, cultural and religious identities are forced into new forms of resistance. Resisting westernisation has become indistinguishable from resisting globalisation. Southern Nigeria has been part of the vanguard of westernisation; thus, it has no qualms in positively embracing globalisation . . . This is not necessarily a northern distrust of Yoruba or Igbo culture, nor is it necessarily a resistance to southern domination. Rather, it is a resistance and protest against globalisation and its westernising consequences. In contrast, the response of politicians and intelligentsia from southern Nigeria to this northern disposition has been one of apprehension, bewilderment and hysteria, translated in practical terms to the agitation for restructuring of the country through a sovereign national conference.[42]

According to Umejesi, if these fears are not genuine, how do we interpret the *Boko Haram*, which literally means, "western education is an abomination?"[43] This group believes that Western education and values are evil and sinful, as such they should be wiped out in northern Nigeria and be replaced with full-scale sharia law and Islamic education. This crisis which began in Bauchi soon spread to Kano, Yobe and Borno States. The victims include police stations, churches, women, and children. Mohammed Yusuf, the 39-year old leader of the group said, "Democracy and the current system of education must change, otherwise this war that is yet to start will continue for long".[44]

It seems to us that there is no other way to interpret the full introduction of sharia law in 2000 by the Zamfara State Government than to locate it within the global political Islam. Soon after its introduction, other northern states followed suit. Left to be incubated, the 'political sharia' would most

probably have resulted in tension that would have taken more dastardly religious nationalistic contours. As it were, religious nationalism is an abrasive rejection of religious pluralism.

The principle of religious pluralism is that "a religious tradition is not a cathedral which contains everything, but a crossroads which is open to everything".[45] The argument is that there is the acceptance and toleration of the fact that there is religious diversity and plurality, "what is 'religiously other' within a given social context".[46] This construes complex socio-political questions, because the fundamentalists often reject the awareness and fact of the relativity of all religions. This awareness invalidates the superiority or naked particularism that is often expressed by them. In other words, religious fundamentalists reject inclusivism, pluralism and parallelism and insist on exclusivism and monopoly of the ultimate truth.[47] The grubby consequences of rejection of the positive interpretation of religious pluralism are articulated by Samartha in the following submission:

> Historically, it is true that gap between profession and practice in any religion has been almost unbridgeable and that religious fanaticism has caused untold harm to responsible human community. One needs not to go back to the crusades to prove this point. The examples in recent years are obvious.[48]

However, in a globalised world, religious pluralism is at once a reality and an ideology. Understood from this global prism, religious pluralism can result in eirenic human community rather than blatantly polemical one. But the question is, Do principles and practices tally? The acceptance of religious pluralism as an ideology has characterised the litany of speeches and responses to religious conflicts in Nigeria. Its denial in practice, it seems to us, has been more vociferous. In other words, if religious pluralism is accepted conceptually and pragmatically there will not be religious nationalism, religious conflicts and violence.

Recommendation

The foregoing analysis has shown that religious conflicts are gradually moving towards religious nationalism, not only in the global space, but also more specifically in Nigeria. The awareness of this transition is important, but to nip it in the bud is imperative. Suggestions have been proffered to stem the tide of religious, ethno-political conflicts in Nigeria; it appears that the government usually politicises it. What is involved here is not just the survival of the country beyond her golden jubilee, but more importantly the human beings who are at once innocuous and volatile. The need to eliminate various conflicts is imperative, before they take the more dastardly posture of religious nationalism.

Nwabueze suggests that the Constitution must be respected and made to work because it espouses religious neutrality of the state. As long as the challenges of constitutionalism still remain unsolved as they manifest in the lack of justice, fairness, liberty and good governance, it is doubtful that these conflicts will cease.[49] Nwabueze in this context speaks of the violation of the Constitution in respect of the introduction of sharia law. It is, however, important to point out that the secularity of Nigerian Constitution is doubtful insofar as the states can operate the sharia law without necessarily violating the Constitution.[50] As Atanda observes, "the Nigerian State, as constituted, is *de jure* a secular state, but *de facto*, she is a religious one".[51] This paradox has continued to bastardise the actual secular status of the country. In spite of that, there is generally the absence of the rule of law. According to Salisu Mohammed, a conflict management specialist, who was analysing the *Boko Haram* episode to *Al Jazeera* said: "there was not a major push to check (religious crisis) in the past" and people "are taking advantage of a broken-down structural condition in Nigeria and people take the laws into their hands without getting reprimanded".[52] To be ruled be by the rule of law is to be ruled by the law of the land. In contextual sense, government's refusal to implement the various White Papers which are believed to have indicted powerful individuals, some of whom are even members of the commission of inquiry into the recent Jos conflicts, is the precursor of inveterate conflicts in Nigeria. If the government is still unwilling to deter fomenters of conflicts in whatever coloration by punishing severely their instigators and perpetuators, we shall X-ray the cost of curbing the outbreak of religious nationalism as an alternative.

One brutal outcome of religious nationalism is clear in the action of the Muslim Brethren that almost assassinated Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 for his sympathy for secular nationalism. But his successor, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt could not escape their bullet in 1981. In Afghanistan Muslim groups overthrew the communist government in 1992 and the Taliban took over, which was only overthrown by America in the reprisal of the 911 attacks in 2001.[53] According to Moyser,

> In south Asia, religious nationalism is at the root of continuing international tension between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. In India itself, Hindu nationalism has long been a militant force confronting both the religiously accommodationist nationalism of Mohandas K. Gandhi (who was assassinated) and the once-dominant Congress Party he led.[54]

Zionism is the Jewish nationalism outfit. Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was assassinated by the follower of Rabbi Kahane (the founder of Kach Party that emphasises the Torah – the Jewish Law – as the basic law), in 1995 for being too accommodating of the Palestinians and complacent about the

Jewish heritage.[55] The violent and intractable religious nationalistic hostilities between Israel and the Arab allies had led to the 1967 Arab-Israel 6-Day War that resulted in the defeat of the combined Arab forces against Israel.[56]

> The Pakistan-Bangladesh civil war in 1971 made a sham of Muslim nationalism as a source of Islamic unity and identity for the otherwise linguistically and ethnically diverse West and East Pakistan.[57]

The point being made here is that religious nationalism can only be tackled by war. If Nigerian government refuses to deter religious conflicts by fully implementing the contents of the various White Papers, can it afford the alternative of fighting war to curtail the consequences of religious nationalism? The forces of religious diffusionism are operating at global stage. Nigeria is not an exception more especially that some fundamentalists in Nigeria react violently to religious issues that occur outside the shores of the country.

CONCLUSION

We have pointed out that religion gives people the gestalt of human relations just as it plays vital roles in understanding conflicts globally and regionally. Either it is the sole causal factor or used as the garb, its place in human community cannot be over-emphasised. This is further strengthened by the nature and structure of Nigerian nationhood that tilts towards compression of disparate ethnic nationalities. The northern part which has harsher climatic atmosphere is more prone to violence than the south with more soothing weather. Whether or not geographical features have impact on the various conflicts can be further investigated. But there is a sway towards this reality. This is because the issues of home traditions, i.e. nature of religion itself, the nature and impact of other cultural factors such as language, customs; host traditions, i.e. cultural, political, legal, religious practices of the host; the nature of migration process, that is, from the homeland or other migration context (e.g., people who are 'twice migrants') are migrants sojourners or settlers, economic migrants, exiles or refugees? And the nature of migrant groups, that is, religious and ethnic divert, size, geographical dispersion, division and cohesion, and finally the nature of host response, i.e. social attitude rather than cultural traditions constitute interesting concerns for geography of religion.[58]

The structure of Nigeria at present is indisputably pluralistic. Religious pluralism is a reality that is either acknowledged conceptually and denied pragmatically or denied on both strands. The embracive practice of religious particularism, which breeds intolerance, becomes a major factor for religious conflicts. Its denial is the womb that conceives religious nationalism. While it is observed that the features of religious nationalism are already visible in

Nigeria, we argued that that it is because of the absence of rule of law, more pointedly, the abrasive unwillingness of the government to implement the White Papers on the past conflicts that are leading to it. The punch therefore is that either the government enforces the White Papers or be prepared to engage in war to curtail religious nationalism when it takes its toll.

Since the poor are usually the recruits who perpetuate these heinous violent conflicts, it is important that the economic dimension to conflicts is tackled headlong. Mass education is a *sine qua non* of liberating the people from the veil of ignorance, which has been used to mobilise people into violent actions. Social policy to cater for the unemployed becomes imperative in the face of the intractable violent situation that has continued to recur in the country.

ENDNOTES

1.   R.I. Gofwen, *Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Nation Building: The Throes of Two Decades 1980-2000*, Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor, 2004; S. O. Odo, "A Survey of Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Implications for Sustenance of Democracy and National Integration" *Journal of the Nigerian Academic Forum*, 4/1, 2003; *Daily Champion*, Dec. 21, 1999; *Newswatch* March 2000, T*he News* May 15, 2000; *The News*, June 5, 2000; G. A. Oshitelu, "Religious Fundamentalism in Pluralistic Society" in *ORITA: Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies*, XXXI/1&2, (June and Dec. 1999); S. Awoniyi, "Conflict in Religion and Socio-ethical Demands" in J*ournal of Nigerian Academic Forum*, 4/1, (2003); S. Awoniyi, "Exploration of Religious Fanaticism: Towards Re-designing Nigerian Society" in *JAPHIL: Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 1/1 (2006); B. O. Igboin, "A Critique of the Conceptual Modes of Religious Conflicts in Nigeria" in *JAPHIL: Journal of Applied Philosophy*, (2007); T. Adamolekun, "Christian-Muslim Conflict in Nigeria, 1960-2000" in *AAU: African Studies Review*, 1/1, (2002).

2,   L. Wittgenstein, *Tracta*tus *Logico- Philosophicus,* http://www.tamilnation.org/nation.ht

3.   C.O. Isiramen, "General Introduction: The Nigerian Nation", in C.O. Isiramen, F.J. Imaekhai and B.O. Igboin, (eds) *Religion and the Nigerian Nation: Some Topical Issues*, Ibadan: 2010.

4.   Cited in Isiramen.

5.   Ibid.

6.   Ibid.

7.   Ibid.

8.   Ibid.

9.   H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and State,* Methuen, London, 1977, 2; A. K. Anya, "The Legal and Moral Basis of the Power of Amnesty in Nigeria", in O. Fatula (ed.) *Law, Politics and Development: The Challenges of an Emerging Mega-City: Essays in Honour of Babatunde Raji Fashola, SAN*, Lagos: NBA, Ikeja Branch, 2010, 35-7; O.A. Fatula, "Nigeria/US Relations and the War on

Terrorism".

10.   B.O. Igboin, "Religion, Politics and the Nigerian Nation", in C.O. Isiramen, F.J. Imaekhai and B.O. Igboin, (eds.), op. cit., Ibadan: 2010.

11.   J.L. Esposito, "Introduction", in J.L. Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?* Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997, 2.

12.   Igboin, op. cit.

13.   C. Park, "Religion and Geography", in J. R. Hinnells (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*, Oxon: Routledge, 2005, 438; See also, D. Sopher, *Geography of Religion*, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

14.   Park, ibid., 438.

15.   Park, op. cit., 438.

16.   Park, op. cit., 440.

17.   A.A. Idowu, "Law, Religion and Politics: The Nigerian Situation", in O. Oluduro, et. al. (eds.) *Trends in Nigerian Law: Essays in Honour of Oba DVF Olateru-Olagbegi III*, Ibadan: Constellation, 2007, 358.

18.   Idowu, 354.

19.   op. cit., 443.

20.   Park, ibid.

21.   A. Adeoye, "The Jihad and the Hausa-Fulani Dynasty", in *The Nation on Sunday*, January 31, 2010, 14.

22.   T. Mamman, "Inching towards Constitutionalism and Nationhood: Challenges of Pluralism and Religion in Nigeria", in N. Tobi (ed.), *A Living Judicial Legend: Essays in Honour of Honourable Justice A. G. Karibi-Whyte (CON)*, Lagos: Florence and Lambard, 2006, 36.

23.   E.I. Metuh, "Two Decades of Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: A Recipe for Peace" in *Bulletin of Ecumenical Theology*, 6/1, (1994): 69-93, especially 72-3.

24.   M. Kukah, *Human Rights in Nigeria: Hopes and Hindrances*, Aachen: Missio, 2003, 24.

25.   B.O. Igboin, "On Dopamu's 'God Loves Variety and Hates Monotony'" A Review", in A. K. Chepkwony and P. M. J. Hess (eds.), *Human Views on God, Variety not Monotony: Essays in Honour of Ade P. Dopamu*, Eldoret: Moi University Press, 2010, 10.

26.   Adeoye, op. cit., 13.

27.   Adeoye, op. cit., 14.

28.   A. Adeoye, "The Rage of the Warlords", in *The Nation on Sunday*, January 31, 2010, see also *TELL*, March 22, 2010, 29.

29.   Adeoye, op. cit., 14.

30.   Adeoye, op. cit., 46.

31.   M. Sanusi, "How North Underdeveloped Nigeria", in *The Nation*, June 25, 2010, 18.

32.   D.R. Mandel, "Evil and the Instigation of Collective Violence", in *ASAP: Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2/1, (2002): 101.

33.   Mandel, op. cit., 104.

34. E. Staub, "Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory and Extreme Destructiveness" in *Journal of Social Issues*, 46 (1990): 47-65; A. Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetuation of Inhumanities", in *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3 (1999): 193-209.

35. PBS Frontline, "Osama bin Laden v. U. S.: Edicts and Statements" available in http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who edicts.html ; D. Chirot, *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in our Age*, NY: Free, 1994; I. Berlin, "The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism", in H. Hardy (ed.), *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas*, London: Fontana Press, 1999, 238-261.

36. A.E. Azzi, "From Competitive interests, Perceived Injustice, and Identity Need to Collective Action: Psychological Mechanisms in Ethnic Nationalism", in C. Dandeker (ed.), *Nationalism and Violence*, NJ: Transaction, 1998, 73-138.

37. PBS Frontline, "Osama bin Laden v. U. S.: Edicts and Statements" available in http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/ edicts.html

38. Op. cit., 104.

39. Ibid, 104.

40. G. Moyser, "Religion and Politics", in *The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*, 435.

41. Esposito, op. cit., 3.

42. Mamman, op. cit., 37.

43. I.O. Umejesi, "Rule of Law as a Panacea to Religious Crises in Contemporary Nigeria", in *Human Views on God, Variety not Monotony*, 236.

44. Umejesi, op. cit., 237.

45. M. Barnes, "Religious Pluralism", in J. R. Hinnells (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*, Oxon: Routledge, 2005, 407; See also, J. Dupuis, *Towards a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism*, NY: Orbis, 1997; J. Dupuis, *Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue*, NY: Orbis, 2002.

46. Barnes, op. cit., 407.

47. I.O. Umejesi and B.O. Igboin, "Styles and Attitudes to the Study of Religions: An Appraisal of the Nigerian Religious Universe", in *Human Views on God, Variety not Monotony*, 121.

48. J.T. Kerker and F.L. Ikyaan, "Religious Pluralism and the Quest for Human Community", in *AAU: African Studies Review*, 8, (June 2009): 159-172, 169. *See also* S.I. Akinde, "Ethnic Pluralism and Challenges of Democratic Consolidation: The Nigerian Case" *AAU: African Studies Review*, 8, (June 2010): 121-140.

49. Mamman, op. cit., 40-1.

50. B.O. Igboin, "The Concomitance of Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Secularity, Tolerance and Dialogue", in *Human Views on God, Variety not Monotony*, 138.

51. Gofwen, op. cit., 186.

52. Umejesi, 237. Several proposals and suggestions have been proffered. Some suggest that dividends of democracy will mitigate the frequency of the bloody mayhem and sheer criminality perpetuated in the name of religion, or that sovereign national conference should be convoked to determine the nature of federation the country should operation, which they believe will be a panacea to ethno-religious recrudescence in Nigeria. For details see C. Uwazurike, "Urban Violence as Metaphor: Insecurity, Ethno-religious Fault-lines and the Crises of Democratic Legitimation" in T. Babawale (ed.), *Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, Lagos: Malthouse, 2003, 78; A. Fadahunsi, "Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Implications for the Economy", in Babawale, 152-7.

53. Moyser, op. cit., 433.

54. Ibid, 433. See also E. Sahliyeh (ed.), *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, Albany: State university of New York Press, 1990; P. Van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

55. Ibid, 433.

56. Esposito, op. cit., 2.

57. Ibid, 2.

58. S. McLoughlin, "Migration, Dispora and Transnationalism: Trans-formations of Religions and Culture in a Globalising Age", in *The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*, 539.

Human Sacrifice in Contemporary Nigerian Politics: Myth or Reality?

ABIODUN AJAYI

14

INTRODUCTION

Sacrifice is no doubt a religious act of antiquity in Africa. It constitutes one of the commonest acts of worship in African Traditional Religion. Its description by Amposah as, "the act of giving up something for the sake of something else" implies that it is premised upon the idea that nothing good can be costless. Thus, the needs of better things like, good harvest, prosperous life, and high position among others make sacrifice to be a common place in African history particularly in Nigeria. Objects of these sacrifices range from animal, bird, tree, to human being, depending on the magnitude of the endeavour or circumstances that warrant the sacrifice. However, it is surprising that, in spite of the level of modernity and civilisation attained by Nigerians, 'human sacrifice' remains an important feature of their politics. This paper, therefore, attempts a re-assessment of Nigerian politics with a view to showcasing the perversity of 'human sacrifice' in it. This makes the work

reveal that, in spite of the onslaught of Christianity and Islamic religion on the act, and the level of religiosity being claimed by the generality of Nigerians, such a practice can still be enjoying the current level of acceptance.

The fact that many scholars have shown interest in the concept of sacrifice has made it to be given diverse definitions. Its meaning has, therefore, been made to range from general (i.e. secular) to different other connotations which are based on its roles in the different contexts. In spite of all these diverse views of sacrifice, the fact remains that it is originally a religious term.[1] Indeed, sacrifice is a very important rite and it constitutes one of the commonest acts of worship in West African traditional religion. Of course, it is one of the earliest and most nearly universal of all religious activities.[2] Hence, it forms the essence of the Yoruba religion, there is no religion without some form of sacrifice, however modified or refined it may be.[3]

In general terms, sacrifice means the act of self-denial in which case the sacrificer will have to deny himself of certain benefits and advantages for a particular purpose. In other words, it means forgoing something for a particular cause that is very precious.[4] For example, education of a child will cost the parents much money. This no doubt involves self-denial, since the parents have to forgo the present comfort that the money spent on the child's education would have fetched them. This is in a view to have bigger comfort in the future in form of the betterment of the life of the child and the future condition of the parents themselves.

From the foregoing, sacrifice can be said to be the price one pays in order to have something that is more pressing. The use of comparative here emanates from the fact that the costs that one has to incur are the precious things one has to forgo in expectation of having the other more precious things.[5]

In similar vein, Nigeria's independence which most scholars have described as one attained piecemeal compared to that of Angola, South Africa among others, did not come without one sacrifice or another. It cost Nigerians both human and material resources if measured in terms of the nationalist movements, efforts of the various workers union and press activities, and a host of other important efforts.

The desire to bring forth children calls for the sacrifice of forgoing the private life of celibacy. Also, one will have to be faced with the challenges of containment which the two different individuals with different backgrounds have to face. The husband also has to provide for the need of his family, especially in the area of the basic necessity of life; food, shelter, housing and security. Rearing children as a task is equally enormous. The same thing applies to other human undertakings, which also involve sacrificing one thing or another. However, borrowing from the foregoing, sacrifice pervades all the sectors of the Yoruba economy. In the dominant agricultural sector, the need of high quantity of yam, maize and other crops at a later date makes

farmers to sacrifice a small quantity of yam that are usually cut into yam seeds at a particular period. In other words, the yams, maize and other crops that farmers would have eaten will be forgone in order to have good yield of the crops during the next harvesting season.

Moreover, in the above metaphorical or secular meaning of sacrifice is inherent, the economic concept of opportunity cost or real cost as indicated by the usage of the word forgoing.[6] This marks the economic connotation of sacrifice. Here, sacrifice can be seen as the alternative forgone or the real cost of a particular cause earlier on referred to as the more pressing. This is premised upon the fact that sacrifice in any sense is not observed for any reason, it is always purposeful. This also holds true for the economic term "alternative forgone" or "real cost" which is usually incurred after a choice has been made among the very many wants confronting an individual. The other alternatives left un-attended to because of paucity of resources to satisfy them are the real cost of the choice made or the opportunity cost or the alternative forgone. So were sacrifices not costless as asserted by Awolalu that:

> Whatever the purpose may be, it is obvious that something is renounced in order that a certain end may be achieved. What is "sacrificed", whether material or spiritual, is often costly. Sacrifice therefore, involves cost. What a man gives-whether he gives time, his cloth, his food, his money or his life is part of himself.[7]

This meaning of sacrifice is implied, implicit and indirect as it can be regarded as the extension of the core meaning of sacrifice. For the purpose of this work, emphasis needs always to be placed on the religious connotation of sacrifice as its core meaning. This religious meaning of sacrifice easily comes to mind at the mentioning of the word sacrifice.

In the religious sense of it, the word "sacrifice" originated from two words *sacer* (holy), and *facer* (to make). The two words combined to form sacrificial, which means sacrifice.[8] In *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, sacrifice is defined as, "a rite in the course of which something is forfeited or destroyed, its object being to establish relations between a source of spiritual strength and one in need of such strength for the benefit of the latter".[9] Also, *Oxford Dictionary* defines sacrifice as the, "slaughter of a victim or presenting of a gift or doing of an act to propitiate a god, the giving up of something for the sake of something else, the thing so given up".[10]

Various definitions in this regards have shown that sacrifice is primarily a means of contact or communion between man and the Deity.[11] It stands out as the best way of maintaining good relationship between a man and his object of worship.[12] Sacrifice in relation to the parties involved can be described as a gift offered by an inferior to a superior or a tribute paid by the dependent to his Lord. Hence, it involves man who is dependent upon the favour of the

deities which have the power to sustain or destroy him.[13] Man also depends upon these spiritual powers for prosperity, good health, good yield of crops, and cattle and above all procreation.[14] As a result, it becomes imperative for man to maintain good relationship with the forces through the medium of sacrifice. Sacrifice, therefore, is usually offered to effect a bond of union with the divinity to whom it is offered as a gratitude for giving good things, for expiation and other purposes as will be discussed under the types of sacrifice.[15]

The fact that sacrifice is an act of making an offering, be it of animal, vegetable, food, drink or any other objects to a deity or spiritual beings also authenticates its religiousness. In other words, it is something set apart and offered to God or a divinity[16]. Sacrifice is done religiously and is usually governed by the beliefs and ideas of particular religions. It is practised wherever the divine being is worshipped.[17] Indeed, it is inseparable from worship such that offering to a divinity of any object such as human beings, animals, food or anything else is ascribed to the very essence of religion all over the world.[18]

HUMAN SACRIFICE

This is a practice in which a human being is the subject of sacrifice. According to Farrow, it constitutes the supreme sacrifice of African societies, although it was made illegal after the establishment of British rule in the country.[19] It used to be the climax of sacrifice in the old days. In Yorubaland, for example, the occasion was more often than not a matter of national or communal importance. The examples of Oluorogbo, the only child of Moremi who was sacrificed to Esinminrin, a river in Ile-Ife which was believed to have helped the people to overcome the menace of the Igbo people,[20] the Eleguru in Ijebu-Ode, an Ifa priest who offered himself as a sacrifice in order to appease the raging flood[21] and another priest who laid down his life before Ibadan could finally be settled,[22] and many others are worthy of mention here. Divinities whose annual offerings must be human beings included Oramfe of Ile-Ife and Ondo, Ogun and some rivers among others. Thus, such sacrifices were offered whenever it was believed expedient that someone should die as a sacrifice of appeasement for the peace and safety of the community.[23]

However, in spite of the outlaw of the practice by the colonial government, it still endures. In fact, human sacrifice is becoming more rampant in modern-day Nigeria than in the past. This work, therefore, attempts to examine the various forms in which the practice exists and through this, a better understanding of human sacrifice will be enhanced.

HUMAN SACRIFICE IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

Right from independence, the systems of government attributable to Nigeria

range from parliamentary, presidential, to military. This implies that, politically, the country has not been static but, rather, it had constantly been on the ladder of progress. However, these political dispensations have not come into being without a form of sacrifice or another.

For a better understanding of the forms of human sacrifice in Nigerian politics, our knowledge of the definition of human sacrifice according to Byaruhanga-Akiiki is highly necessary. According to him, "Whoever dies, for whatever love object is a human sacrifice". The love objects can be husband, wife, children, country, religion, freedom, money, position, and so on. This makes human sacrifice a daily occurrence in the world all over today.[24] Thus, Nigerians who died in the struggle for freedom in the pre-independence era are classifiable as victims of human sacrifice. The same goes for the political martyrs of the different political dispensations in Nigerian politics.

But different categories of human sacrifice have evolved in Nigerian politics over the years. In the first instance, the secular definition of sacrifice given earlier is applicable to the costs incurred by the politicians in the pursuit of the various positions they attained, such as the prime minister, the premier, ministers and later on president and governors. These positions would have been unattainable without self-denial, such that various office holders have denied themselves of benefits and advantages their money would have fetched them. Thus, the positions have not being without cost, which also stand as the alternate forgone or the real cost of the offices. This is supported by Awolalu when he says that:

Whatever the purpose may be, it is obvious that something is renounced in order that a certain end may be achieved. What is "sacrificed", whether material or spiritual, is often costly. Sacrifice, therefore, involves cost. What a man gives-whether he gives time, his cloth, his food, his money or his life is part of himself.[25]

Considering the risks surrounding the processes of attaining different positions of prominence, especially in term of the number of deaths during elections and the number of office holders that have died from independence till date, the idea of volunteering oneself to contest for political office in Nigerian has become a matter of self-sacrifice. This is because it is a matter of life and death, akin to a war situation in which the leaders will be telling his followers to sacrifice every thing including their dear lives.[26] A considerable number of office holders have sacrificed their lives for this country through their deaths in their various offices. Examples here include the prime minister, Abubakar Tafa Balewa, J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, General Muritala Mohammed, M.K.O. Abiola, President Umar Musa Yar'Adua, just to mention a few.

A category of human sacrifice known as political martyrs[27] featured prominently in the First Republic. These included the premier of northern

Nigeria Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sadauna of Sokoto, Brigadier S. Ademulegun, and Colonel R.A. Sodeinde, Colonel Kur Mohammed, the prime minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the finance minister, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, Lt. Colonel J.Y. Pam, Lt Colonel, A.C. Unegbe, Lt Colonel Largema, the premier of Western Region, Chief S.L Akintola, and many others.[28] Hence they died in active service and by implication their lives were sacrifice for the peace and unity of the country.

Going by the assertion of Norris and Ross that by far the most costly war in terms of human life (human sacrifice) was World War II (1939-45)[29] In the case of Nigeria, the period between 1966 and 1970 witnessed the greatest fatality since independence till date.[30] Directly or indirectly, the blood of the great number of people who died was shed for the unity that the country achieved eventually. Whether we agree with Norris and Ross or not, the oneness of Nigeria at the end of the war was not costless. In other words, since the lives of both the military and civilian that were lost then in addition to the material cost were the real cost or alternatives that have to be forgone in order to ensure the unity of the nation, then they were all classifiable as human sacrifice in the history of Nigeria polity.

The above category of human sacrifice also pervaded the different political dispensations after the Biafran war. It should, however, be noted that the number of this human sacrifice in the military era, far outweigh those of the civilian dispensations. Notable examples of those who died for what they believed in were M.K.O. Abiola and his wife Kudirat, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Dele Giwa, Alfred Rewane, among others. General Abacha and President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua could also be classified as political martyrs, hence they died while in active service and for what they believed in as ideal for their fatherland.[31] Also, the military officers who lost their lives in the plane crashes during the administrations of General Ibrahim Babangida, President Olusegun Obasanjo, among others, are equally fit to be in this class of human sacrifice.

Although ritual killing is not a recent phenomenon in Nigerian politics, but the fact remains that it is increasing at an alarming rate. This is quite surprising in relation to the modern level of civilisation. Thus, in spite of the proliferation of churches and mosques, ritual killing either for money or religious purpose has regained its historical popularity. The cases of Okija shrine in Anambra, Ido-Osun shrine in Osun state, and different other ones in bushes and undergrounds as they were popularly known were important in this regard.

Of all the categories of human sacrifice attributable to Nigerian polity, kidnapping is the most recent. Although there have been cases of kidnapping in the past, the present category deserves special attention as it is giving negative popularity to Nigeria. This is because foreigners are involved. Although this

does not always result into loss of lives, the ransoms paid by implication is a sacrifice of life[32] (substitutionary sacrifice).

The above examination of the different categories of human sacrifice in Nigeria has no doubt presented a new understanding of human sacrifice, in that the matter of sacrifice, in or outside Nigeria whether human or material is not something of mere historical interest or disinterest, rather, it is a very much current cultural, social and religious practice as manifested in the daily exercise of wars, coups and counter-coups, riots, political, economic, social and all sorts of upheavals. It is still very much a reality to reckon with.[33] People die or are killed in the hope of bettering prevailing conditions. Thus, one finds abundant evidence in Nigeria for the historical and social existence of sacrifice, human or material.

CONCLUSION

The fact that man seems to have a ruthless determination to sacrifice or be sacrificed is indubitable. The reasons for this are so many that no one can presume to know them all. They include the need for consecration, expiation, purification, salvation, fortification, redirection of life forces, and expression of highest love, among others.

However, the new understanding of sacrifice which this work represents has clarified the fact that human sacrifices take place almost everyday in the world, not only as offerings in the strictly religious sense, but in order to achieve material goal valued more highly than the object being offered. But for the over-ambition of the politicians and their cohorts, and the barbarity of the ritual killers, many of the human sacrifices mentioned would have been avoidable.

The point being made here is that, human sacrifice is not uncontrollable, especially in relation to Nigerian politics. This can be done through re-orientation of Nigerians, bridging of inequality gaps, improving of living standard, and reduction of prices of goods and services. More importantly, political posts should no longer be made more attractive than civil services. As a matter of fact, corruption, robbery, and other vices that characterised Nigeria will be reduced, if not totally eradicated by the time equality is ensured through total eradication of lopsided distribution of income and other necessary resources.

REFERENCES

1. Omosade Awolalu, *Yoruba Belief and Sacrificial Rites*, UK, Longman 1979, p. 134.
2. Kwabena Amposah, *Topics on West African Traditional Religions*, Cape Coast, Mfantsiman Press Ltd., 1975, p. 39.

3. Bolaji Idowu, Olodumare, *God in Yoruba Belief*, Great Britain, Campton Press, 1975, p. 118.
4. Omosade Awolalu, *Yoruba Belief and Sacrificial Rites*. United Kingdom: Longman, p. 134.
5. Omosade Awolalu, op. cit., p. 135.
6. Omosade Awolalu, op. cit., p. 137.
7   Omosade Awolalu, ibid.
8. G.O. Abe, *History and Theology of Sacrifice in the Old Testament*, Benin City, Seevon Print, 2004, p. 1.
9. O. Awolalu, op. cit., p. 135.
10. K. Amposah, op. cit., p. 39.
11. B. Idowu, op. cit., p. 118.
12. Ibid.
13. G.O. Abe, op. cit., p. 1.
14. O. Awolalu, op. cit., p. 137.
15. O. Awolalu, op. cit., p. 136.
16. Ibid.
17. G. O. Abe, op. cit., p. 1.
18. G.O. Abe, op. cit., p. 2.
19. S.S. Farrow, *Faith, Fancy and Fetish*, London, p. 97.
20. O. Awolalu, op. cit., p. 50.
21. Ibid.
22. Chief Ifagbenusola Atanda, The Awise of Agbaye. Oral Interview on an OSBC programme titled, Lets Discuss. 11/07/2010.
23. O. Awolalu, op. cit., p. 180.
24. A.B.T. Byaruhanga-Akiiki, "Sacrifice in Africa" in J.O. Okpaku (eds), *Black Civilization and Religion*, Lagos: Third Press Intl. Vol.7. 1986, p. 12.
25. O. Awolalu, op. cit., p. 137.
26. A.B.T. Byaruhanga-Akiiki, op. cit., p. 15.
27. Ibid.
28. T. Falola, et. al. *History of Nigeria*, Lagos: Longman Nigeria Plc., p. 123.
29. Norris and Ross McWhiter (eds), *Guinness Book of World Records*, New York: 1973, p. 358.
30. T. Falola, et. al. op. cit., p. 123.
31. A.B.T. Byaruhanga-Akiiki, op. cit., p. 15.
32. Op. cit., p. 17.
33. Op. cit., p. 12.

SECTION D

Gender Issues

Engendering Democratisation: The Changing Political 'Images' of Women in Postcolonial Nigeria

AISHA BALARABE BAWA

15

INTRODUCTION

Women's participation in the political process has become a subject of major concern to protagonists of democracy the world over. Gender sensitivity is a crucial part of democratic governance. Women's representation and democracy is self-evident, since women account for over half the population of most societies and have been making tremendous contributions in all sectors of the economy. It is in realisation of this that the UN General Assembly, through its various organs and agencies, designed and recommended concrete steps to alleviate the problems facing women with the view to liberating them and integrating them into the mainstream of national development (Musa, 1992:55).

The first international instrument relating to women's rights was the convention on political rights of women which came into force on 7 July, 1954. The Convention acknowledged the rights of women to take part in

government either directly or through freely chosen representatives (Bawa, 2009:127).

It attempts to equalise the status of men and women in the enjoyment and exercise of political rights in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ojogbane, 2007:91), the United Nations adopted the "Declaration of the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women" (CEDAW) in 1967. The Third Article of that declaration stipulates that appropriate measures should be taken to educate public opinion and direct national aspirations towards the eradication of prejudice and the abolition of customary and all other practices that are based on the idea of the inferiority of women.

The pronouncement of the International Year for Women by the UN World Conference held in Mexico in 1975 spurred many governments into focusing their attention on issues affecting women. The Beijing Declaration of 1995 advocates that "government of all nations must take full measures to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structure and decision-making by creating gender balances in government and administration". It emphasises that more effort be made to "integrate women into political, parties, increase women's participation on decision-making and leadership and enhance the role played by women "in the electoral process and in political activities in general" (Iyoha, 2010: 389). This paper aims to examine in historical perspectives the changing political images of women in postcolonial Nigeria.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Democracy has been variously defined and observed as a technique through which popular participation is enjoyed among the civil masses to decide their leaders. In the classical sense, "democracy is that form of government of the people by the people and for the people" (Agaba, 2009:76).

Bullock and Stallybrass (1977:18) reflect that "democracy" as a concept originated in the classical Greek city-states. It also evokes the right of all to decide what are matters of general concern for human development and enhancement. In recent times, the size of modern nation-states has meant that "democracy is no longer direct but indirect". In other words, "democracy as a political system has to be executed through the election of representatives, hence the term representative democracy.

According to Held (1987:49), democracy implies a state where there is no half-slave and half-free society in which independence is the right of all classless men. Democracy is also characterised by principles like popular consultation, majority rule, popular sovereignty, political parties, universal adult suffrage, popular participation, separation of powers, rule of law,

protection of human rights, public accountability, responsive and responsible government, etc. It is in this perspective that Mayo (1980:17) notes that democracy offers voluntary adjustment of disputes, ensures peaceful change in changing societies, makes for orderly succession of rulers, ensures political freedoms, and recognises the need for minimum coercion in society. Lively (cited in Agaba, 2009:76) on his part argues that democracy ensures that a government pursues the general interest of the greatest number of the people, helps mould leaders who are committed to democracy, people (followers) who are committed to and ready to defend democracy with the last drop of their blood, and peaceful environment.

The culture of democratic governance, therefore, moves beyond the mere procedure of democratic institutions. Democracy as it implies in this paper refers to the governance with wide scope of political participation, embracing pluralistic system of political parties, a vibrant civil society and media, which promotes and integrates women.

Political participation, as one of the tenets of democracy is perceived according to Okolie (2004:53) as "freedom of expression, association, right to free flow of communication, right to influence decision process and the social justice, health services, better working condition and opportunity for franchise".

Political participation is one of the key ingredients of democracy in its real sense. Larry (cited in Dave and Aluko 2010: 582) stresses that democracy provides the equal opportunity platform for political participation and fairness in such competition. Thus, a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaning and extensive competition among individuals and groups, especially political parties, for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force, a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair election, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded, and a level of civil and political liberties, freedom to form and join organisations sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.

HISTORICAL TRENDS OF WOMEN IN NIGERIAN POLITICS: PRE-INDEPENDENCE

Before colonialism, the various societies that make up Nigeria women played important roles in the politics of those societies. Undoubtedly, it cannot be argued that pre-colonial Nigeria was essentially patriarchal. Women nevertheless had access to political participation (Apenda, 2007:22). There are quite a number of records of several distinguished women that played important roles in politics of pre-colonial Nigeria. In Daura, for instance,

before the 9th century AD women officials like Magajiya of Daura played important role in the political set-up (Abubakar, 1992:13). The 16th century Hausaland also witnessed the emergence of powerful female rulers. Queen Amina (the oldest child of Bakura Turuku) not only took over the throne of Zazzau (Zaria) in 1576 but she emerged as a warrior queen who built a high wall around Zaria in order to protect the city from invasion. The significant roles played by prominent women such as Moremi of Ife, Emotan of Benin, and Nana Asmau, daughter of Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo, cannot be ignored. Moremi and Emotan were great amazons who displayed tremendous bravery and strength in the politics of Ife and Benin respectively (Bawa: 2011:4).

Among the Igbo, there was the institution of Umuada, the eldest daughters of the lineage who also still have definite ritual and political roles to play in the village. What is clear is that during this period, women were not left out of the political decision-making process. This situation is further stressed by Apenda (2002:4) that: "Traditional societies attributed grater political powers, in certain contexts to women in the remote".

However, this traditional system which gave women the chance to have a say in matters that affected their lives, particularly in the political domain, was disrupted during the colonial era and the power was then lost and was yet to be regained. Colonialism as an imperialist policy had different impacts on the men and women of Africa generally. One aspect of the initial colonial state ideology was the belief that the women of India and Africa were degraded and oppressed and it was the British mission to "uplift" and "redeem" the women. This was one of the arguments used to justify and legitimise colonial conquest and rule (Agaba, 2007:79). Since the colonial ideology used the indigenous for intervention the colonisers made women central to the politics of colonialism. Ityavyav (1997:3) points out that:

> From its introduction, colonialism set men against women, in the 1929 Aba war, women faced not only the agents of colonialism, but also faced their husbands. Husbands were very afraid of the colonial administration and feared the impact on them of the consequences of their wives confrontation with the colonial government.

It is interesting to note that since the inception of the political process of the colonial rule, Nigerian women were excluded from politics. As a matter of fact, until federal elections of 1954, women were deprived voting rights. At that point in time women in the southern parts of the country enjoyed the privilege.

The colonial principle which favoured domestication of women was found in their sexual division of labour and the introduction of the monetary economy. The introduction of Western education favoured only the men who could go to school and later occupy job positions as the women wallow

at home and were held back by the long chain of children (Anshi, 2007:37). In another analysis, salary and wages empowered men over women and consequently, women were subordinated and dependent on men for the subsistence of the family.

This situation is further confirmed by Ake (cited in Moralake (2003:13) that colonial capitalism convoluted the social relations of the African extended family, and the pre-eminence of kinship and lineage within the pre-colonial African communities was warped by the privatisation of land ownership; the development of large-scale capital farms; the estrangement of land from the proletarian to the large-scale farmers, and the rise in agricultural wage labour. The worth of traditional African women's labour was altered because of colonial capitalism's separation of the workplace from the family. Women were further marginalised in the labour market, creating fresh monetary configurations between the genders (Moralake, 2003:14).

Nigerian men, therefore, gained enormously from the intrinsic gender discrimination of the colonial government. They did not have to co-rule with women as in the precolonial period. With the new system, they were empowered to make decisions for women. The outcome was the development of a politically inactive women population and prejudicial self-serving men.

However, it is imperative to emphasise that women in Nigeria strongly resisted colonial policies that directly affected their trade interest. In Igboland, where colonial administration gave the Warrant Chiefs new powers over men and women, the women resisted. According to Catherine (cited in Vitrovitch, 1997:163):

> what detonated the next round of demonstration was the inauguration of tax, which was introduced in 1927 and 1928 in far southern provinces. The prospect of a census persuaded that taxes would be imposed on everyone, although they were supposed to affect only men. The women directly attacked the warrant chiefs and native courts created by the colonial administration after some distances in 1928, the real women's war (Ogu umunwaye), called the Aba revolts exploded the next year (1997:163).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the threat of taxation was the immediate course of this revolt; the women were actually fighting against the massive erosion of their political power. The Igbo women's revolt, however, demonstrates women solidarity in defending not only their economic autonomy but also their political and cultural identity. In the Western Provinces also, the women fiercely opposed the colonial policies that were detrimental to their economic interests in the 1930s.

As the case was with the Igbo, Indirect Rule deprived Egba women some of their rights, including the right of representation in the council by the *Iyalode* (or head of the women). It was not that the British explicitly excluded

women, they simply never even imagined that women could have a public role to play (Agada, 2007:84). This led the educated women among them to take the initiative in organising political action against the British system of Indirect Rule which conferred unprecedented powers on the traditional ruler and excluded them from participation in decision-making. Mrs Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti was the leader of this movement. Convinced that women had suffered more than men under colonialism, she planned a version of "modern" political action calling for the right to vote and representation in the local courts from 1946. A campaign was launched against unjust enforcement of women's taxation and the high-handedness of the *Alake* of Abeokuta who had become the mouthpiece of the British administra-tion (Awe, 1992:32). The campaign led to his temporary abdication.

Towards the end of the colonial period, there emerged other women's pressure groups which were political in the sense that they articulated the interests of women who had not been given expression or represented in the political process. Under the leadership of Mrs. Ransome-Kuti, the National Council of Nigerian Women's Societies was formed in 1953, where the voice of all Nigerian women would be heard. Its objectives were "to encourage the womenfolk of Nigeria to take part in the political, social, cultural and economic life of Nigeria, to create facilities for female education, raise the status of women and win for them equal opportunities with the menfolk" (Awe, 1992:32).

A similar movement started in Ibadan under Elizabeth Adekogbe. She led a delegation to the Electoral College system, which she argued would continue to eliminate women even if they were elected at the primaries level. Later in 1958, the National Council of Women's Societies was formed with branches in Lagos, Enugu, and Kaduna, but it declared itself a non-political body looking after the interest of women only. This movement succeeded in making significant input into the emergence of political organisations to harness their energy for their own purpose by encouraging them to join their organisations, and many of them became politicians within these parties. For example, Madam Pelewura's market women entered into an alliance with the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), led by Herbert Macaulay (Sani, 2001:123).

There were other women like Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, Chief Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, Humani Alaga, Wuraola Esan, Margaret Ekpo, and Janet Mokelu who were a part of the political force that deliberated on Nigeria's Constitution and subsequently fought for independence.

NIGERIAN WOMEN AND POLITICS: THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD

The period after Nigeria's independence was remarkable in the history of

women's political participation. The potential political contribution of women was so valued that all the four major political parties had women's wings. Notable women like Hauwa Kulu Abata, Mrs. Oyibo Odinamadu headed those women's wings. The women fought to secure a place of prominence in the political scene of the country. It was, however, unfortunate that only few women emerged at the regional and federal levels when Nigerians became masters of their affairs after 1960 (Sani, 2001:123). This situation was further analysed by Sha (2003:64-65), who observes that:

> The involvement of women in politics in Nigeria since independence has mostly been at the level of voting even then it was only women in the southern parts of the country that voted during election. Some other parts of the country did not allow women to vote because of the restrictions in the electoral guidelines. Women are discriminated in the process of elections and this has affected their poor representation.

In the last 50 years after independence, Nigeria has had five transitions to civil rule programmes in 1979, 1991-1993, 1999-2003, 2007.

The First Republic (1979-1983)

In spite of obvious constraints, the Nigerian women made some marginal progress in the First Republic. Factors which contributed to this were the expansion of Nigerian educational system and the subsequent introduction of free primary and university education, the recognition of women organisations and the series of actions by the United Nations to improve the lot of women worldwide (Ojogbane, 2007:91).

In the First Republic, there were two female senators out of 364 – Chief (Mrs) Wuraola Esan and Mrs. Beatrice. Also, 1979 marked a new beginning for women in Northern Nigeria, when under the new constitution they were given voting rights (Awe, 1992:33).

By its very nature, a military administration was a male-dominated one. In a review of the gains of Nigerian women under the military administration, Ityavyav (2001:3) opines that "just as Nigerian women gained very little during the First Republic, the Aguiyi-Ironsi administration was a continuation of colonial policy of exclusion of women in politics and governance". The Gowon administration showed a greater concern for including women in the government of the country. His administration included women in the state cabinets, though not the federal cabinet, and that tradition of at least one woman in each state cabinet has continued (Awe, 1992:33).

The Second Republic

Second Republic records show that Nigerian women were more involved in politics. There was a marginal increase in the number of female legislators at

the federal level with the election of Princess Franca Hadiza Afegbua as the only female senator of that republic (Sani, 2001:124).

It is interesting to note that the first set of women ministers emerged during this republic. These included Mrs Adenike Ebun Oyagbola (Minister of National Planning), Mrs Janet Akinrinade (Minister of Internal Affairs), Mrs Elizabeth Iyase (Minister of State for Education), Dr Simi Johnson (Youth and Social Development) and Mrs Asinobi (Minister of State for Internal Affairs) (Sani, 2001:125).

In northern Nigeria, there was a remarkable increase in the participation of women in politics. During the 1983 elections at least three women were elected into the House of Representatives. These were Hajiya Kande Balarabe from Kano state, Mrs Sarah Dokotri and Mrs Elizabeth Wuyeb, both from Plateau state. Indeed, the national elections of 1983 showed that the number of women in the House of Representatives increased and, in fact, more than doubled, from three in 1979 to eight in 1983. This development was motivated by the events in the international scene, the 1985 Women's Conference held in Kenya, which marked the end of the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985), re-echoed the international attention focused on women.

Given the international prominence accorded the conference, and the many resolutions urging states to come to terms with the reality of ensuring the participation of women in public life, it was not surprising that the Political Bureau set up by the Babangida military government in 1986 to make recommendations on the political future of the country, recommended that 5 percent of the seats in various legislative houses in the country, be reserved for women to assuage their entrenched marginalisation (Ojogbane, 2007:94). It is significant to note that the Bureau recommended that the federal government should formulate the National Policy on Women and Development. Therefore, the decision of the Babangida administration to initiate the formulation of a national policy on women is highly commendable. It became a landmark in the country's efforts at highlighting women in all aspects of decision-making (Sani, 2001:126).

The Third Republic

During the third republic, Nigerian women's participation in politics improved greatly. The long transition period witnessed a radical change in the involvement of Nigerian women in politics from the grassroots to the apex of executive offices. According to the Nigerian country report (1995), cited in Jimoh (2010: 463), 1985 marked the beginning of women's active involvement in national development. The reasons for this were many. A decade earlier, the international women's year was celebrated throughout the world. Activities in this regard were to promote recognition of women's contribution to society and equal rights. In the same period, the first World Conference on Women was held in

Mexico City. The final plan of action called for the preparation and adoption of an international Convention against all forms of sex discrimination and recommended procedures for its implementation (Jimoh, 2010: 463).

It is, therefore, on the basis of this that the 1987 local government election on non-party basis witnessed the emergence of Mrs Titi Ajanaku as the chairperson of Abeokuta Local Government in Ogun state, despite contesting against many male aspirants. At the same time, many women emerged as chairmen and councillors in different parts of the country. In Kano state, 28-year old Mallama Yelwa Hawa'u and Ladi Gwaram became councillors in Wudil and Dutse respectively. There were also other women who actively participated in party politics. Three women were leading the National Republican Convention in Plateau, Lagos and Benue states. They were Helen Gomwalk (Plateau), Abosede Osinowo (Lagos) and Susan Adagio (Benue) (Sani, 2001:127).

Although women were actively participating in the on-going party politics, only three women emerged as governorship aspirants, Mrs Titi Ajanaku of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) came third in the governorship election in Ogun state out of ten male aspirants. Mrs. Oluremi Adiukwu of National Republican Convention came second in the governorship election in Lagos state out of six male aspirants. Mrs. Hannatu Challan also contested the gubernatorial election in Plateau state under NRC. In Cross River state, Cecilia Ekpenyong became deputy governor (Sani, 2001:127).

Table 1: Names of Female members elected into the Nigerian National Assembly, 1992-1993

Office/Position	Name	State	Number
Senate	Senator Kofo Buknor-Akerele	Lagos	1
House of	Christiana Akpan	Akwa-Ibom	1
Representatives	Ifeoma Chinwuba	Anambra	1
Rebecca Apedzam	Benue		2
	Ada Mark		
	Rabi Allamin	Borno	1
	Florence Ita-Giwa	Cross River	1
	O.E. Giwa-Osagie	Edo	1
	Mariya Abdullahi	Katsina	1
	Hajara L. Usman	Niger	1
	O.O. Abiola	Ogun	1
	Bola Sarumi	Osun	1
	Amina M. Aliyu	Plateau	1
	Dr. Bolare K. Nwokeafor	Rivers	1
	Total		14

Source: Sani, H. (2001) Women and National Development, p. 128.

The political activities of women in the Third Republic can be summarised as follows: In 1992 out of 300 gubernatorial aspirants, nine were women though none of them won. Women held 4 percent of party executive posts. In 1991, 27 (2.3%) of 1,172 legislators in the various Houses of Assembly were women. At all levels women constituted only 3.99 percent of SDP party executive of members of House of Representatives in 1992, up from less than 1 percent in 1980. However, there were fourteen elected women representative, two female deputy governors and one presidential candidate.

THE CHANGING POLITICAL IMAGES OF WOMEN, 1999-2007

The beginning of the new era of democratic government in 1999 was marked with increased women political participation. In the spirit of its expressed policy in support of 30 percent Affirmative Action for the benefit of women, the Olusegun Obasanjo administration made conscious and positive efforts at giving appropriate measures to reflect a good percentage of women in governance. During his first tenure (1999-2003) and the second tenure (2003-2007) women political representation increased 20.5 and 27.3 percent respectively, in the category of ministers and special advisers (Jimoh, 2010:466). Many female civil servants reached the peak of their careers as directors-general and permanent secretaries, many more became ambassadors or heads of foreign missions. Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide a summary of women elected in the 1999, 2003, and 2007 Nigerian election and political positions.

In Table 2 it has been shown that in the 1999 Nigerian elections there were three female senators of 109 members. Thirteen House of Representatives female members, out of 360 House members, 1 female Deputy Governor of 72 Governorship/Deputy Governor seats. Twelve female members House of Assembly of 990, 9 female local government chairmanships of 774 and 143 female councilors of 8,800 seats (Agena, 2007:135).

Table 3 shows slight increased in the number of women elected in the 2003 election. In the 2007 election the number increased from 3 senate female members in 2003 to 9, 13 House of Representatives female members to 27, 2 deputy governors to 6 and 23 state house of assembly to 52.

Collation of comprehensive number of women in both elective and appointive positions shows that without fear of contradiction there is certainly increase in the number of women in those positions during the Fourth Republic. This has demonstrated that in spite of the odds against women, a few determined, courageous, industrious, resourceful and dogged women have their roles in politics written in indelible ink for all to see.

However, despite the fact that women's participation in politics in Nigeria rose in 1999, 2003 and 2007, it was restricted maximally to the appointive positions as none of the women who contested governorship election was

elected. Observation and studies have revealed that a number of factors facilitated or contributed to the low participation of women in politics in Nigeria.

Table 2: Women contestants for political offices in the Fourth Republic 1999

Post/position	No. of available seats	No. of women contestants and percentage total	No. of women percentage of total
Presidency	2	Nil	Nil
Senate	109	5 (0%)	3 (0%)
House of Representatives	360	29 (8.05%)	13 (0.36%)
Governor and Deputy	92	2 (5.55%)	1 (2.9%)
State House of Assembly	990	39 (3.93%)	12 (1.21%)
Local Government Chairmen and Deputy	774	46 (5.94%)	9 (0.11%)
Councillorship	8,800	510 (5.79%)	143 (1.62%)
Total	11,107	631 (5.68%)	181 (1.62%)

Source: Adopted and Modified from Okpeh, O.O. (2007:191). "Patriarch, Women's Quest for Political Leadership and Democratisation Process in Nigeria," in Okpeh, O.O. and D.P. Sha, *Gender, Power and Politics in Nigeria*. Makurdi: Aboki.

Table 3: Number of women elected in the 2003 and 2007 Nigerian elections

Post/position	Positions available	No. of women in 2003	No. of women in 2007
President	2	None	None
Senate	103	3	9
House of Representatives	360	13	27
Deputy Governors	36	2	6
States Houses of Assembly	990	23	52
Total	1497	41	94

Source: Adopted and modified from Jimoh, D.I. (2010), op. cit., p. 465.

Table 4: Political Positions: 2003

Position	Women	Men	Total	% women
Minister/special advisers	12	32	44	27.3
Speakers	0	36	36	0
Governors	0	36	36	0
Deputy governors	2	34	36	5.5
Total	14	138	152	8.13

Source: Adopted and modified from Jimoh, D.I. Nigerian women since 1960: Trends in women Empowerment in Bello-Imam, *50 Years of Nigerian Project: Challenges and Prospects.* Ibadan: College Press and Publishers Limited, (2010) p. 466.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF WOMEN MARGINALISATION IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The origin of gender inequalities in Nigeria lies in the patriarchal roots of most people of the world, especially Africans. As a matter of fact, every community in Nigeria has fixed ideas about the female gender, who she is, and what she hopes to become in the future (Okpeh, 2007:184). This gender-based discrimination encapsulates two basic concepts that should be explained. First, it emphasises the superiority and importance of men compared to women. The extension of this as pointed out by Okpeh (2007:184) is "The nation that men are more 'intelligent' than women, more 'significant' and, of course, more worthwhile". Second, it underscores the complementary nature of women in relation to men. Therefore, rather than compete with men, women should take pride in fulfilling their natural feminine "functions like making the home as wife and taking care of the man and his children as mother and mistress, for which they are socially rewarded . . ." (Okpeh, 1999, cited in Okpeh, 2007: 184).

There are also traces of the history of the exclusion of women from politics and leadership found in the Western philosophical and political traditions. These traditions had produced an unending list of dualisms: particular and universal, sacred and profane, and the many transcendence and imminence, family and state, male and female and especially private and public (Anshi, 2007:40). The public realm incidentally was represented by the *polis*, state or city. An analysis of the concept of the individual and state enterprise shows that for the Greeks, one must first and foremost be a citizen of the state, and moral perfection was suppressed for state interest. Public realm thus belonged to the woman, the female subject. In this sense, the woman was (is) confined to the domestic environment with the specific duties of bringing up children and maintaining standing traditions such as keeping

the domestic altar aflame (Anshi, 2007:40).

In other words, Hegel as reiterated by Knox (1979: 26), confines women to domesticity in what he terms "family piety". He considered women as incapable of activities which demand universal faculty, such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. According to him, "When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demand of universality but by arbitrary inclination and opinion".

Furthermore, the prerequisite for any advanced political participation and culture is education. Unfortunately, the male dominated tradition has excluded women from education at the meaningful stage. This is shown in the understanding that women education ends in the kitchen. These views were stressed by Sha (2003:78), that:

> This form of education given to women therefore affects their presence in government bureaucracy and in other private sector establishments. Their number compared to those of men is lower. Though they are increasingly seen nowadays in government, many of the appointments they are offered are in areas of traditionally reserved for them such as women affairs, social welfare, health youths and the like.

From the foregoing, it is clear why women continue to remain at the circumferences of political leadership in Nigeria as it is the case with other countries of the world. Therefore, it is significant to note that since Nigeria is democratising, and it is people-driven and ultimately people-specific, there is the need to integrate women who are almost half of the total population into decision-making. The fact is that if truly democracy is adjudged the game of number, how proportionate is the number of Nigerian women involved in politics and critical decision-making processes relative to the entire women population?

Indeed, democracy is the best system of government that can address the exploitation and oppression of women and allow them to fully participate in the politics of their country.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined in historical perspective the politics of exclusion of women and that of given them a taken place in the administrations in the past fifty years. There is no gainsaying the fact that few women ever attain leadership positions at national and local levels in Nigerian governments. In spite of their constraints and marginalisation, there are equally appreciable changes towards their political participation. It is argued that the opening up of the political space through the return to democracy in 1999 it has opened new opportunities for women to participate in politics, although the reasons

for such development could be attributed to the call by the international organisations and the rise of contemporary feminism who are out to challenge and willing to fight for equal opportunities for women in all spheres. Therefore, with the recent development in the political process it indicates that the situation can change for good, more especially when the true tenets of democracy are strictly adhere to.

REFERENCES

Abubakar, J.E. (2007). "Queen Amina of Zaria" in Awe, B. *Nigerian women in historical perspective,* Ibadan: Sankore Boocraft, pp. 13-25.

Agaba, J.E. (2007). "Nigerian women and politics: The colonial experience", in Okpeh, O.O. and Sha, B.P. *Gender, power and politics in Nigeria,* Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, pp. 73-88.

Agena, T. (2007). "Economic status of women and their participation in politics", in Okpeh, O.O. and Sha, D.P. op. cit., pp. 104-143.

Anshi, M.W. (2007). "Philosophical analysis of gender in politics", in Okpeh, O.O. and Sha, D.P. op. cit., pp 37-52.

Apenda, A.Z. (2007). "Culture as a barrier to women leadership", in Okpeh, O.O. and Sha, D.P. op. cit.,, 221-233.

_____ (2002). "Empowering women for national development in Nigeria", presented at International Conference of the Institute for Benin Studies, University of Benin, Nigeria.

Awe, B. (1992). "Women and politics in historical perspective", in Ayoade, J.A.F., Elene, J.N., Sambo, A. *Women and politics in Nigeria.* Abuja: Malthouse Press itm. pp. 25-35.

Bawa, A.B. (2009). "Historical antecedent of women marginalization in Nigerian politics". *Journal of the National Association for Science, Humanities and Education Research,* Vol.7 No.2: 125-130.

_____ (2011). "Women in the corridor of power: A history of Nigeria's first ladies roles in governance: 1967-2010. Ph.D research proposal. Usmanu dan Fodiyo University, pp. 1-8.

Bullock, A. and O. Stallybrass (1997). *The Fontana dictionary of modern thought.* London: The Chaucer Press.

Dave, A. and F.S. Aluko (2010). "Women and political participation in Nigeria", *Journal of European Journal of Social Sciences,* Vol.16, No.4: 581-593.

Held, D. (1987). *Models of democracy.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ityayyar, D. (2001). "Women leadership and decision making in Nigeria: 1960 to date." Presented at a workshop on Gender, violence and family poverty organised by the office of the special adviser to the president, July.

Iyoha, F.E. and P.O. Oviasuyi (2010). "Women in national development since independence: A comparative analysis of Nigerian women and women in some selected countries", in Bello-Imam, I.B. *50 years of the Nigerian project: Challenges and Prospects.* Ibadan: College Press and Publishers Limited pp.

388-439.

Jimoh, D.I. (2010). "Nigerian women since 1960: Trends, in women empowerment", in Bello-Imam, I.B. op. cit., pp. 388-439.

Knox, T.M. (1979). *Hegel's philosophy of right.* Oxford, Oxford University.

Majo, H. (1980). *An introduction to democratic theory.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Morolake, O.M. (2003). *Gender inequality in Nigeria.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited pp. 68-73.

Musa, B. (1992). "The content of political education", in Ayoade, J.A.A., J.N. Elone, A. Sambo. *Women and politics in Nigeria.* Abuja: Malthouse Press Ltd., pp. 55-59.

Ojogbane, V.J. (2007). "Nigerian women and post-colonial politics: Issues, problems and the way forward", in Okpeh, O.O. and Sha, D.P., op. cit., pp. 90-105.

Okolie, A.M. (2004). *Political behaviour,* Enugu: Academic Publishing Company.

Okpeh, O.O. (2007). "Patriarch, women's question for political leadership and the democratization process in Nigeria", in Okpeh, O.O. and Sha D.P., op. cit., pp. 175-199.

Sani, H. (2001). *Women and national development: The way forward.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Sha, D.P. (2003). "Women and Management of the Nigerian state: A reflection on the past, present and the future", in Angya, C. *Review of Gender Studies in Nigeria.* Vol. 2, Makurdi: Black Heritage Publications, pp. 78-79.

Globalisation, Human Development and the Female Gender in Nigeria

R.I. AKO-NAI and I.D. DAVID

16

INTRODUCTION

Globalisation is a paradox in the contemporary world, with its gains and pains focusing more on development issues as they affect women. Globalisation has been described in various ways, but in all it could be said that it emphasises the removal of the barriers against free trade and ensures the closer integration of national economies. This ensures that the mode and process of interaction amongst actors in the international system have become more frequent and intense. Technology, the power driving globalisation, has turned the world into a global village. This new global deal has implications for human development, especially for the female gender. This study uses Rostow's growth theory, which sees development in terms of modernising a traditional society or a subsistence sector of a developing economy in a bid to attain self-sustained growth. Development, which implies the right to improvement and advancement of economic, social, cultural and political

conditions has become a major concept of the 21st century as the citizens, and for this study the female gender is out to ensure the improvement of their status. Using primary and secondary data, the study shall look at the impact of globalisation on human development in Nigeria with special emphasis on the female gender almost fifty years after independence.

Taking advantage of advances in science and information technology, globalisation renders traditional conception of time and distance meaningless in the contemporary international system. Based on a free trade ideology, it creates unequal exchange relations between the advanced North and the majorly underdeveloped South. This is because the technological and economic advancement of the North places it in a more advantageous position to enjoy the benefits of the globalising process, while dumping the enormous costs at the doorstep of the South. This condition ensures and sustains the perpetual dependence of the South on the North.

Apart from the international inequality created in the form of North-South dichotomy, globalisation also creates an array of local problems in developing countries of the South. One of such problems, which have become a focal point of global discourse, is the issue of gender inequality. It is not to say this problem does not exist in the northern hemisphere, rather, it is more pronounced and critical in the South. Globalisation in the South is such that it tilts the balance against the female gender in the distribution of benefits and costs of the process. This condition hinders the capacities of the female gender for human development. This injustice to the fundamental human rights of women has become a global concern.

In Nigeria although the female gender makes up roughly half of the entire population, they are unjustly under-represented at every facet of national life. In politics, the representation of women is a far cry from the 30 percent recommended by the Beijing Declaration of 1995. In addition, women also suffer socio-cultural marginalisations in Nigeria. They bear the burden of a culture that is predominantly patriarchal in orientation. Even religion offers little hope for justice, as Christianity and Islam, the two major religions, proclaim injunctions that promote the perpetual and continued domination of the womenfolk by the men. The two religions preach total submission of wives to husbands.

Economically, the story is not too different. Women have little access to credit facilities. They are majorly engaged in the informal sector of the economy, where they work under inhumane and internationally unacceptable labour conditions. This makes them vulnerable to domestic violence and abuses at the workplace. Of particular concern in this study is the fact that this injustice is being perpetrated under a democratic dispensation, where the chief concern of the nation should naturally be how to consolidate our democracy through justice and equity in the distribution of society's benefits.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Globalisation

Globalisation contains far-reaching implications for virtually every facet of human life that makes academic discourse of the phenomenon a necessity. The term "globalisation" has generated much controversy in contemporary political and academic debate. It is a multi-faceted concept that covers a wide range of distinct political, economic and cultural trends. In everyday discourse, the term may refer to one or more of the following: the pursuit of classical liberal economic policies (free trade and economic liberalisation); Westernisation of the international system; monumental advancement in science and information technology, and global integration. However, more precisely, conceptualisation of the term has been offered in the field of social science.

Although disagreements remain about the precise nature of the causal forces behind globalisation, there appears to be a consensus about the basic rudiments of the concept. Generally, conceptualisation of globalisation takes the following attributes into consideration:

(1) De-territorialisation
(2) Interconnectedness
(3) Speed or velocity
(4) Long-term process
(5) Multi-pronged

First, there are those who have identified globalisation with the concept of de-territorialisation (Ruggie, 1993; Scholte, 2000). The focal point here is increased possibilities for interaction between and among people even without physical contact. In this sense, geographical locations matter less in facilitating contacts. Globalisation, therefore, makes a growing variety of social activities possible irrespective of the geographical location of participants. Although geographical locations remain important for many of human interactions and activities, there are still so many human activities that take place irrespective of geographical locations. For example, business contacts and transactions are made today through e-business and e-commerce. All these have been made possible through advances in science and information technology. An indication of this was given by Scholte (1996, 45) who asserts that "global events can occur almost simultaneously anywhere and everywhere in the world". The main contention here is that territory in the traditional sense of a geographically identifiable location no longer constitutes the whole of "social space" in which human activity takes places. The major take here, therefore, is that the globalisation refers to the spread of new forms of non-territorial social activity (Ruggie, 1993; Scholte, 2000).

Second, there are also those who see globalisation from the point of view of increased social interconnectedness across existing geogra-phical and political boundaries (Tomlinson, 1999; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999). The point of emphasis here is the manner in which distant events and forces impact on local and regional endeavours (Tomlinson, 1999: 9). Unlike the earlier conception, this conceptualisation once again brings to the fore the importance of geographical locations to human activities. Geography cannot be entirely relegated since a larger chunk of human activities take place within a geographical confine. It can, therefore, be contended that a core concern of globalisation is the manner people are affected by distant events. Thus, it can also refer to those processes whereby geographically distant events and decisions impact to a growing degree on "local" life. Globalisation refers "to processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organisation of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents" (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999:15).

In the attempt to conceptualise globalisation, a third category of scholars lay emphasis on the speed and velocity of social activities (Eriksen 2001; Scheuerman 2004). Today, geography shrinks in the face of advances in science and information technology at a speed and velocity never before thought possible. The speed and velocity at which interconnectedness and de-territorialisation occur are unprecedented. This has been made possible by the proliferation of high-speed transportation, communication, and information technologies. High-speed technology plays a pivotal role in the velocity of human affairs, and without this it is difficult to see how distant events could possibly posses the influence they now enjoy.

Although analysts disagree about the causal forces that generate globalisation, scholars like Giddens (1990) nevertheless agree that globalisation should be conceived as a relatively long-term process. This definition of globalisation makes it an ongoing process, a journey rather than a destination. For as long as new technologies that blur and shrink geographical distances and increase interconnectedness at hitherto unknown speed and velocity continue to emerge, the process of globalisation persists. The triad of de-territorialisation, interconnectedness, and social acceleration hardly represents a sudden or recent event in contemporary social life. As noted by Giddens (1990: 27), globalisation is a constitutive feature of the modern world, and modern history includes many examples of globalisation.

Last, globalisation is conceived of as a multi-pronged process. In this view, globalisation is understood to have many faces and manifestation. In another word, it is multi-faceted since it manifests itself in many different (economic, political, and cultural) arenas of social activity. Although each facet of globalisation is linked to the core components of globalisation

described above, each consists of a complex and relatively autonomous series of empirical developments, requiring careful examination in order to disclose the causal mechanisms specific to it (*see* Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999: 15).

It should be pointed out that while all the attributes identified above collectively constitute what we call globalisation today, none can in isolation adequately explain or define the phenomenon as a whole. However, after everything has been said and done, it must also be emphasised that the different conceptualisations enumerated above revolve around the impacts of globalisation on humanity. To this extent, discourses on globalisation cannot be done in isolation without reference to its impacts on human development at both global and local levels.

Theoretical Framework

Dependency theory provides the theoretical framework for this paper. At best, we can see dependency theory as a critique of the developmentalist perspective of liberal political economy. This critique finds expression in the work of Paul Baran (1957), A.G. Frank (1967, 1969), Theotonio Dos Santos (1971), and more recently Cardoso (1977).

In summary, it expresses the idea of the unequal exchange between the global North (core) and global South (periphery) and inevitable dependency and attendant underdevelopment in the South that has come to characterise the contemporary era of globalisation. Even after political independence of the periphery from the core they still raged behind in economic development and had low living standards. This makes them to depend on the core states for economic assistance.

According to Petras (1981: 148), recently, dependency has achieved a new status in the attention given to the "unequal exchange" theses of Arghiri Emmanuel (1972), Samir Amin's discussion (1974) of the "accumulation of world capital", and Immanuel Wallerstein's historical interpretation (1974, 1976) of the rise of a "single capitalist economy".

Dependency theory developed mainly as a reaction to the growth of global inequality. The dependency theorists saw dependency as a lack of self-sustaining economic growth of the periphery and this is a result of global capitalist development which simultaneously produced massive accumulation of wealth in the core areas (Blaney, 1996: 460).

Globalisation creates a relationship of dependency between two parties, expressed as the core and the periphery in the language of dependency theorists. It widens the already existing inequality gap between these two actors. Not only that, it also directs the resources of the less developed periphery towards further development of the already developed core at the expense of development in the periphery. In this sense, globalisation creates two different

worlds within a single world; one advantaged, the other disadvantaged. One big implication of this is that the one continues to depend on the other perpetually, thereby making sustainable development of the dependent party almost impossible. A major take in this paper, therefore, is that globalisation creates a relationship of dependency between the already developed North and the largely underdeveloped South, and that dependency is an impediment to sustainable development.

Taking our point of departure from this assertion, we argue that not only does globalisation create international inequalities between state actors; it also creates local inequalities between different sections within the borders of territorial states. One of such local inequalities that has attracted and generated global interest in the contemporary international system, particularly in the southern hemisphere, is the issue of gender inequality. To this extent, the study examines the interface between globalisation and human development in Nigeria by focusing on the implications for gender development. It is in view of the perceived and well analysed overall implications of globalisation for human development in the global South that we make a case sustainable development in our conceptualisation of development. In other words, we conceive development in terms of sustainable development.

Today, the concept of development is generally seen in terms of sustainable development. This is because no development can be complete unless it is sustainable. From this view, every developmental effort and program must contain the concept of sustainability. The question then is what is sustainable development? World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) defines sustainable development as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs' (WCED, 1987: 43). Within the purview of this discourse, and to put it in a very succinct and common language, sustainable development can be interpreted to mean "meet your needs without compromising mine or my ability to meet mine". It is a development that is human-focused.

In this context the ideal of sustainable development will not accommodate certain divides that exist globally and locally. First, it will not accommodate the North-South dichotomy of the globalisation epoch. As we shall see later in this discourse, globalisation creates deep economic interdependence as never witnessed before. The idea of economic interdependence contains the free trade ideology, since it opens up hitherto inaccessible markets and economies. The weak market of less developed economies is opened to the strong economies, and vise versa. There is an inherent unequal relationship in this open market scenario, since the two economic divides come into the relationship with unequal advantages. The strong economies are able to take more advantage of the situation than the weak economies, since they have

more means to dictate the terms of the relationship at their disposal. The result is that the weak economies will come to depend more than ever on the strong and developed economies, who will continue to develop at the expense of the poor nations. Consequently, the rich will get richer, while the poor gets poorer. The North-South dichotomy is, therefore, a situation that does not give room for sustainable development.

Second, at the local level, the ideal of sustainable development will not accommodate any divides that compromise the ability of an individual or group of individuals to meet their needs. This is because, overall, the benefit of the entire humanity must be at the heart of every developmental policy. In this regard, the rich must not get richer at the expense of the poor. The poor must be given the means to meet their needs just as the rich. Similarly, the ideal will not accommodate a policy that allows or disallows people to develop based on ethnic or religious affiliations. In the same manner, and central to the focus of this discourse, sustainable development will not accommodate policies that compromise the ability of people to meet their needs because of their gender. No development policy can be complete without paying attention to gender issues, since gender development is part, albeit very important part, of the general concept of human development. This statement is particularly true in Nigeria, where developmental policies are continually plagued with deep-rooted gender marginalisation and discrimination, despite global consciousness of gender issues.

GLOBALISATION AND GENDER DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Although globalisation impacts on different aspects of human life both globally and locally, the study summarises the impacts of globalisation on human development in Nigeria into three distinct but related facets of national life, namely economic, political and socio-cultural. Analysis of these impacts is done with special interest in gender issues. Based on this categorisation attempt is made in the study to evaluate some implications of globalisation for gender development in Nigeria. A critical examination of these implications will help reveal to what extent globalisation has promoted or hindered gender development in Nigeria since independence in 1960.

Gender and Political Participation in Nigeria

One distinguishing characteristic of the era of globalisation is the global spread and acceptance of democracy as the preferred system of governance. That authoritarian and dictatorship regimes have become old-fashioned worldwide is best underpinned by the *UNDP National Human Development Report*:

The end of the Cold War provided a historic opportunity for a world-wide liberal democratic revolution. In view of the western industrialised market economies, the collapse of authoritarianism and socialist central planning has revalidated the claim of liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular democracy, as an ideology of potentially universal validity" (UNDP, National Human Development Report for Nigeria, 2000/2001:2).

Democracy is viewed as the best system of governance because of its relationship to good governance with its inherent features including the rule of law, democratic participation, probity, integrity, and transparency. On the general acceptance of democracy, Yusuf (1994: 113) observes that it is also preferred because it posits and insists that power springs from, and, therefore, belongs to the people and that those who exercise power should use it in the interest of the people or, at least, the majority of the people. This is not to overlook the fact that democracy protects the interest of the minority just as much as it does the majority.

In fact, it demands unequivocally that while the majority should rule, and even in most cases have its way, the minority must be able to have its say, and its say must be listened to while its rights must be respected and protected. In other words, democracy is against marginalisation of any kind. Preference for democracy also springs from the fact that it demands that people should be availed equal opportunities to participate in the administrative and decision making machinery of the state; and that there should exist a free, fair and independent judiciary; equality of all before the law; supremacy of the law; and fundamental human rights for the people (ibid).

After several years of uninterrupted military dictatorships, Nigeria returned to democracy again in 1999. National development had been hampered under the several years of military rule. While it could be argued that democracy is gradually taking root in the country, taking into consideration that there was a successful civilian-to-civilian transition of power following the 2007 general elections. It still remains to be seen how democracy has promoted equality and justice in the distribution of its dividends, particularly when viewed from a gender perspective. The question may then be raised, How has democracy promoted the rights and socio-economic wellbeing of the female gender, especially in relation to political participation?

Since democracy is about justice, equality and fundamental human rights, then it must provide all equal opportunity for development and political participation, without recourse to discrimination by race, ethnicity, religion, colour, or gender. The protection of human rights also entails the protection of gender right; this is because women right is an essential and inseparable aspect of human rights. Human right after all is inseparable. It is, therefore, the concern of this study to evaluate the issue of gender participation in the democratisation of Nigeria in this era of globalisation.

Politics offers little accommodation for women in Nigeria. Nwankwo (1996: 12) points o the fact that women have continued to be poorly represented in politics and public decision making. Unlike elsewhere where women have a high participation in politics, the return of democracy to Nigeria has not translated into increased participation in politics and public decision for women in the country. Nwankwo further observes that while Nigeria had a mere 5 percent women representation at parliament between 1990 and 1999, Norway and Sweden had a female representation of between 35 and 60 percent. Jean O'Barr (1984: 154) reinforces the position that women are politically marginalised in Africa generally and by extension Nigeria. He posits that after a global survey of women in politics, most African countries registered 5 percent or less of women at every level, in every sphere of government (ibid). A similar indication was given by the World Bank which states that a review of Nigeria's attempt at contemporary government and civil rule shows a 4 percent average of women involvement in power, although women constitute about 56 percent of voters (World Bank Report, 1996: 13).

This low participation of women in politics in Nigeria is a far below the 30 percent minimum representation recommended by the Beijing Declaration of 1995. For example, the Obasanjo's administration on ascension to power in 1999 allocated 15 percent of appointed public offices to women. Although an improvement from the usual, this, however, is still a far cry from the desired. Ever since 1999, no single administration has been able to meet this minimum requirement. It is instructive to note that the highest political office ever held by a woman in Nigeria was that of the Speaker of the House, Patricia Olubunmi Etteh in April 2007.

One likely implication of this political marginalisation is the continued marginalisation of women in the distribution of dividends of democracy and basic socio-welfare goods, which may result in continued impoverishment of the female gender. The poor representation of women in politics in Nigeria, as will be seen later in the study, cannot be unconnected with certain socioeconomic and cultural factors embedded in the African society on the one hand and promoted by the forces of globalisation on the other hand.

Economic Opportunities for Women in Nigeria

One consequent economic impact of globalisation is the increased international economic interdependence. Globalisation involves opening up of markets. Such opening up increases global trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flow. Bayo (2000: 36) observes that globalisation offers developing countries like Nigeria the opportunities to create wealth through the export-led growth, to expand international trade in goods and services and to gain access to new ideas, technologies and institutional designs (see also Salimono, 1999). Consequent upon globalisation of the system, domestic economics,

employment, inflation, and overall growth are heavily dependent on foreign markets, import of resources, currency exchange rates, capital flows, and other international economic factors. The implication of this economic internationalisation process according to Kwanashie (1998: 340) is the subordination of domestic economies to global market conditions. One important area in which national economic wellbeing and the international economy are connected is trade. There have been increases in world trade as a consequence of increased international economic interdependence. This is because economic interdependence promotes trade liberalisation, which leads to increased trade among nations.

One strong argument for economic globalisation is the positive impact on trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the often assumed inevitable positive impact on employment and job creation (see Lall, 2004, Matusz and Tarr, 1999). However, the theoretical issues and the empirical evidence discussed in Lee and Vivarelli (2004) lead to the conclusion that the employment impact of trade and FDI is country and sector specific. In view of this, some authors have identified the availability or lack of sufficient "national absorptive capacities" in terms of institutional setting, labour skills, technological capabilities and competitiveness of domestic firms as factors that can either amplify or severely jeopardise the potential for economic and employment growth (see Abramovitz, 1986 and 1989; Perez, 1983; Shafaeddin, 2000; Basu and Weil, 1998).

In other words, countries with sufficient local capabilities and infrastructure are best positioned for the benefits from globalisation. The implication here is that developing countries like Nigeria with weak local capacities and infrastructure can hardly hope to enjoy the employment creating benefits of globalisation. To buttress this point, Lall (2004: 73-101) observes that while there is a clear evidence that several developing countries have exhibited export and employment growth as a consequence of opening to trade and FDI (see also UNIDO, 2002), doubts can be cast about the belief that globalisation should always benefit employment growth within a developing country.

Even if it is accepted that globalisation increases world trade and FDI flow and the attendant benefits, there are still concerns about the ever-increasing gap between the haves and the haves-not, expressed in *Awake* (2002: 1-14). The net worth of the 200 richest peoples on earth now exceed the combined income of 40 percent of the people who live on the planet (2-4 billion of people) (*Awake*, 2000). It is also observed that while wages continues to rise in wealthy countries, 80 impoverished countries, including Nigeria, have actually seen a declined in average income over the past ten years (ibid). Globalisation is an uneven process with unequal distribution of its benefits and losses. Obadan (2000: 36) argues that this imbalance leads to polarisation

between the developed countries that gain, and the developing countries that lose out.

International trade in the era of globalisation is such that developing economies have been reduced to exporters of raw materials, while they continue to import finished and manufactured products from developed economies. Developing economies like Nigeria enjoy a technological disadvantage that makes it practically impossible for their manufactured goods to penetrate developed market economies. And, on the other hand, the technological advantage enjoyed by developed economies over developing economies ensures that the markets of developing economies are flooded by manufactured goods from developed economies.

This unequal exchange is further manifested in the gradual eroding of developing countries traditional source of world export, primary products, through biotechnology development of synthetic alternatives to primary commodities. This situation, Aderemi (2003:15) notes, places Africa in a peripheral position in the world economy as it has increasingly declining demand for its products in the world market. Stiglitz (2003: 56) effectively captures the lopsided exchange of the prevailing process of globalisation thus:

> Today, few – apart from those with vested interests who benefit from keeping out the goods produced by the poor countries – defend the hypocrisy of pretending to help developing countries by forcing them to open up their markets to the goods of the advanced industrial countries while keeping their own markets protected, policies that make the rich richer and the poor more impoverished – and increasingly angry.

A big consequence of the unequal trade relation created by globalisation and its free trade ideal is increased poverty in economically and technologically disadvantaged South, which is associated with job loss. The inability of manufacturing industries in the South to withstand global competition leads to the close down of factories, rise in unemployment and fall in household income (on the employment impact of globalisation, *see* Abiodu, 1997). Factory closure may also accelerate the growth of the informal sector, which ILO (1992: 51) estimates accounts for about 93 per cent of Africa urban labour force in the 1990s. This sector is characterised by small-scale, mostly family-operated or individual activities. This is a common phenomena in cities of the developing countries. In Africa, Rondinelli and Kasarda (1993: 92-119) document that this sector provide jobs for about 63 percent of total work force in urban Africa.

The participation of women in the informal sector is found to be typically higher than in the formal sector as it provides better opportunities of combining paid-work with household chores (Riham el-Lakany, 1999: 1). One big implication of this as pointed out by Lin Lean Lim (1999: 19-20) is that 'the

growth of the informal sector also means that traditional employment related benefits and mechanisms of protection are not available to those employed in that sector'. Consequently, women in the informal sector sometimes work under dehumanising labour conditions. Globalisation may also lead to casualisation of labour, as Transnational Corporations (TNCs) often find subcontracting and hiring part-time or temporary labour more cost-effective. The net result is poorer quality labour opportunities. Under these circumstances underemployment seems to be as big a problem as open unemployment (UN: Report of the Secretary General, 1999). Women are usually at the receiving end of labour casualisation, since they almost always provide ready source of cheap labor for these TNCs. Today, in Nigeria there are millions of women working under dehumanising conditions in order to make up for the falling household income resulting from globalisation.

Lim (1999: 19) points to the connection between trade liberalisation and TNCs preference for cheap labour, which is usually provided by women, in the quest to realise comparative cost advantage. John Hilary (1999: 1) testifies to this when he posits that the highest absorption of women into the labour force has been witnessed in those labour-intensive industries that have relocated to developing countries in search of cheap labor. The UNDP (1999: 1) maintains that Investors have demonstrated a preference for women in the "soft" industries such as apparel, shoe- and toy-making, data-processing and semi-conductor assembling industries that require unskilled to semi-skilled labour. Such industries are also labour intensive, service oriented and poorly paid.

Large numbers of rural women, often young and poorly educated, migrate to the metropolis in search of employment. They are often forced into the cheap labour market to augment the acute shortage in family income. The vulnerability of these women makes them easy prey for exploitation, both economically and sexually. This is often the case in Nigeria where children and young girls are trafficked to Europe and America under the guise of better income and greener pastures. Thus, according to the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) women bear the disproportionate weight of the constraints introduced under the yoke of globalisation (Riham el-Lakany, 1999: 1). Perhaps it is for this reason that a United Nations survey concludes that "it is by now considered a stylised fact that industrialisation in the context of globalisation is as much female-led as it is export-led" (United Nations, 1999: 9).

Culture, Religion and Social Subjugation of Women in Nigeria

Globalisation involves the growth of cross-cultural contacts made possible through advances in information and communication technology. This growth in cross-cultural contacts is not without implications. This cultural

import has big implications for gender development. Today, the protection and promotion of gender rights has become somewhat of a global culture. Gender rights have become a very important, albeit inseparable, aspect of human rights globally. This global recognition of and campaigns for the protection of the rights of women will pass as a positive impact of globalisation. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) provides a comprehensive framework to guide all rights-based action for gender equality, including that of UNDP. This idea became globalised with the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 1995, which got all governments to commit to the agenda on women's empowerment "a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality, development and peace (Beijing Declaration, 1995)". This conference was a landmark in the campaigns for the protection of women rights.

Unfortunately, in spite of the global campaign for the promotion and protection of women rights, women have continued to be objects of abuses, violence and marginalisation. The womenfolk suffer relegation in social stratification. In fact, in most cases, they have been regarded as inferior to men. The relegation of women in Nigeria is, to a large extent, culture-based. For example, Chafe (1977: 15-17) observes that among the Igbo the family is a hierarchy with the man as the father and the head. They believe this arrangement reflects the divine pattern, with man's role in the home similar to the role of God in the universe (ibid). Consequently, one did not have to be a puritan to subscribe to patriarchy (ibid).

In the Nigerian background, women inferiority is seen as customary, and her value, which is nurtured in her legal status, has been demoted and has continued to reduce her to the position of legal minority and forever under the sponsorship and protection of man for her entire life. This cultural subjugation is further aggravated by the globalisation of the Christian and Islamic religions, both of which demand that women relate to men in deference. Religion has long been found to be one of the factors predicting levels of female representation in politics (see Rule 1987; Reynolds, 1999). Islam and Christianity preach that women should be submissive to their husbands, the heads of the family. For this reason, the society tends to measure a woman's devotedness to God partially in terms of her loyalty and submission to her husband. Within this context, women are expected to be home keepers in all ramifications, including child rearing. This condition is a total subjugation of women in the scheme of things and a fundamental denial of their inalienable human rights that is detrimental to the overall human development of a nation.

CONCLUSION

Although globalisation comes with certain benefits, it also comes with numerous challenges that raise questions of justice and equitable distribution of costs and benefits with implications for overall human development. Questions of justice and equitable distribution of costs and benefits do not only arise within the context of North-South dichotomy, globalisation also gives birth to gender inequality and injustice within the disadvantaged South in the distribution of its costs and benefits. In Nigeria, this gender inequality is such that while the men arrogate to themselves a larger chunk of the benefits of globalisation, the women are made to bear the brunt of the enormous challenges it creates. A situation like this does not promote sustainable development of a nation. This is because development is not complete until it embraces every aspect of humanity, which the female gender is a very important and indispensable part of. An inevitable conclusion from this study is that globalisation is an uneven process that hinders the overall development of a nation, as seen in the marginalisation of the female gender in Nigeria in three important facets (political, economic and socio-cultural) of national life analysed.

Recommendations

A major problem inherent in the process of globalisation, with particular reference to the globalisation of the Nigerian society as identified in this study, is that of gender imbalance or inequality in the distribution of costs and benefits of globalisation. A combination of economic, political and socio-cultural factors, which place the female gender at a disadvantage in social stratification have been identified as causative factors of this undesirable condition. As remedy to this problem, it is, therefore, recommended that:

(1) The education of the girl-child should be made paramount in government developmental programmes. This is to ensure the acquisition of the necessary skills that put the female on the same horizon with the male in terms of consciousness of her fundamental human rights and job accessibility.

(2) In line with the Beijing Declaration of 1995, at least, 30 percent of all public offices (elective and appointable) should be reserved for women. This will ensure representativeness of the female gender in decision-making.

(3) Private sector employers should be mandated to have at least 30 percent of their workforce made up of women.

(4) The protection and promotion of gender rights should be properly enshrined in the constitution in such a way that protects these rights against obnoxious religious beliefs and practices.

REFERENCES

Abiodun, J.O. (1997). The Challenges of Growth and development in metropolitan Lagos, in C. Rakodic (ed.), *The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 192-225.

Abramovitz, M. (1986). "Catching-up, Forging Ahead and Falling Behind". *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 46, pp.385-406.

Abramovitz, M. (1989). *Thinking about Growth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aderemi, A. (2002). "*Towards an Interpretation of Africa's Development Process: NEPAD and the New Global Orthodoxy.*" Unpublished paper presented at the International Cooperation and Peace Institute, Yaounde.

Awake (2002). Globalization: Course or Cure. *Awake*, May 22, pp. 1-14.

Basu, S. and Weil, D.N. (1998). "Appropriate Technology and Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 113, pp. 1025-1054.

Bayo, A. (2000). "Globalization and Nigeria Economy". *The Economist* Vol. 4, pp. 36-37.

Chafe, W.H. (1977). "Changing Patterns in American Culture". *Women and Equality*, 15-17.

Dani, R. (1997). The New Global Economic and the Developing Countries: Making Openness Work. Baltimore: John Hopkin University Press.

Dear, A. (2000). *Investment in African Women Entrepreneurs Leverages Economic Growth* African Development Bank.

el-Lakany, R. (1999). WTO Trades-off Women's Rights for Bigger Profits, *Women's Environment and Development Organization (News and Views)*, Vol. 12, Nos. 2 and 3 (November 1999), p. 1.

Eriksen, T.H. (2001). *Tyranny of the Moment: Fast and Slow Time in the Information Age*. London: Pluto Press.

Giddens, A. (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., and Perraton, J. (1999). *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

ILO (1992). *World Labour Report*, ILO, Geneva.

John, H. (1999). *Globalization and Employment: New Opportunities, Real Threats* (Panos Briefing No. 33, May 1999), p. 1.

Kwanashie, M. (1998). "The Concept and Process of Globalization." *Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review*, Vol 36, No. 4, 340- 351.

Lall, S. (2004). "The Employment Impact of Globalization in Developing Countries", in Lee, E. and M. Vivarelli (eds.), *Understanding Globalization, Employment and Poverty Reduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 73-101.

Laurie, N. R. (1997). "The Globalization of Female Child Prostitution: A Call for Reintegration and Recovery Measures Via Article 39 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child", *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 239.

Lee, E. and Vivarelli, M. (eds.) (2000). *Understanding Globalization, Employment and Poverty* Reduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lin, L.L. (1999). *More and Better Jobs for Women: An Action Guide*. Geneva: ILO, pp. 19-20.

Matusz, S. and Tarr, D. (1999). "Adjusting to Trade Policy Reform," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2142.

McAlister, E. (2005). "Globalization and the Religious Production of Space." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 44, No 3, 249-255.

Nwankwo, N. (1996). *Gender Equality in Nigerian Politics*. Lagos: Deutchetz Publishers.

Nwoye, M.I. (1995). *Small Business Enterprise: How to Start and Succeed*. Benin: Benin Social Science Series for Africa.

Nwoye M.I. (2002). *Taking women to task in a gendered economy: the opportunity cost of neglecting the resources that African woman represents*. A paper delivered at the Women's Worlds' Conference, Kampala, Uganda.

Obadan, M.I. (1999). *International Capital Flows and the Recent Financial Crises: What have we Learned?* Presidential Address of the Nigerian Economic Society, July 21.

Obadan, M.I. (2000). "Africa and the Challenge of Globalization: How Should the Continent Respond?" *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Financial Review*, Vol 6, No. 2, 35-42.

O'Barr, J. (1984). "African Women in Politics", in Hay, M. and Stitcher, S. (eds.), *African Women: South of the Sahara*. London: Longman.

Perez, C. (1983). "Structural Change and the Assimilation of New Technologies in the Economic and Social System", *Futures*, Vol.15, pp. 357-375.

Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995. United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13, chap. I, resolution 1. Strategic Objective A. 1, pp. 40-44.

Reynolds, A. (1999). "Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling." *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 547-572.

Roudinelli, D.A. and Kasarda, J.D. (1993). "Job in *Third World Cities: Problems, Policies and Prospects*". London: Sage, pp. 92-119.

Ruggie, J.G. (1993). "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in Relations," *International Organization*, 47: 139-74.

Rule, W. (1987). 'Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunities for Parliament in 23 Democracies.' *Western Political Quarterly*, 40: 477-498.

Salimono, A. (1999). *Globalization and Challenges*. A paper presented at the International Summit on Globalization as problem of development in Havana Cuba, January 18-22.

Scheuerman, W.E. (2004). *Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Scholte, J.A. (1996). *Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization*.

New York: St. Martin's.

Scholte, J.A. (2000). *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. New York: St. Martin's.

Shafaeddin, M. (2005). *Trade Policy at the Crossroads: The Recent Experience of Developing* Countries. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stiglitz, J.E. (2000). "Development Thinking at the Millennium", in Pleskovic, B. and Stern, N. (eds.), *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics*. Washington: The World Bank, pp. 13-38.

Stiglitz, J.E (2003). "Globalization and Development" in D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (Eds.), *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 47–67.

Tomlinson, J. (1999). *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

UNDP, Human Development Report (1999) and the Havana Programme of Action. Available at: http://www.g77.org/summit/ProgrammeofAction G77Summit.htm), accessed on 21 May 2010.

UNDP, National Human Development Report for Nigeria, 2000/2001, p. 2.

United Nations (1999). *World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Globalization, Gender and Work,* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.99.IV.8), p. 9.

Gender Inequalities in Nigerian Politics, World Bank Report, 1996.

World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). *Our Common Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yusuf, A.A. (1994). "Africa : A Case for Mass Democratic Participation", in Omoruyi, Omo et al *Democratization in Africa : African Perspective*. Abuja: CDS.

SECTION E

Corruption and Governance

Cementing the Cracking Walls: The Interface of Corruption and National Economic Development in Nigeria Since 1960

MURITALA MONSURU

17

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is so pervasive and prevalent in Nigeria that almost all challenges of governance, economic woes and development predicaments are attributed to it. Although it is a global phenomenon, corruption has eaten so deep into the fabric of the society in Nigeria that even existing anti-corruption agencies are not free from it. Several definitions of corruption have been given by intellectuals, international organisations, diplomats, policymakers, anti-corruption agencies and human rights organisation. For the purpose of this paper, corruption is defined as a deviation from legal standards, acceptable moral/social norms and the absence of accountability in public and private responsibilities. This cankerworm, no doubt, has affected the economic development of Nigeria since 1960 and seems to be out of control.

This study adopts historical and interdisciplinary approaches in its analysis. Both primary and secondary sources of data are adequately interpreted and

utilised. This paper argues that corruption in Nigeria has been part of public and private establishment before independence, and nurtured in the indigenous Nigeria context. In fact, Osoba is more assertive when he argues that in Nigeria corruption became the principal means of private accumulation during decolonisation period, in the absence of other means, and came to shape political activity and competition after independence (Osoba, 1966:372). This, of course, partly explains the reason why the various National Development plans: 1962-68, 1970-74, 1975-80, 1981-85 and economic visions of both military and civilian administration have not translated to economic development.

Central to this study is the attempt to use the revenue and expenditure approach of analysis. This is done by examining the major source of foreign exchange earnings in Nigeria with emphasis on the Oil sector, which took over from agriculture in the 1970s. Also, the expenditure approach is employed to synthesise the capital projects on which several billions of dollars had been expended and still has not yielded the desired results.

NIGERIA AND CORRUPTION: A HISTORICAL SKETCH

Corruption in all manifestations is a global phenomenon, such that a universal conceptualisation, while it may be adopted needs to be adapted and situated within the circumstances of the place, nation, continent and establishment in question. Corruption in Nigeria is a kind of social virus which is a hybrid of traits of fraudulent anti-social behaviour derived from British colonial rule and those derived from, and nurtured in the indigenous Nigerian context (Osoba: 1966: 372). Buttressing this assertion by Osoba, Bolarinwa posits that corruption is as old as the African continent (nation-states), created artificially by the colonial masters (Bolarinwa, 2005:166). He premises his argument on the fact before independence, most especially in the 50s and 60s, the mode had been firmly established that access to public office was not for good of a nebulous nation, but for self-enrichment, which the colonial administration really upheld and practised (Bolarinwa, 2005:166). He concludes that they looted the treasury and made laws to protect themselves and prohibit judicial intervention through the so-called ouster clauses.

No doubt, corruption in Nigeria is deep rooted in historical antecedents. Between 1900 and the end of World War II, Nigeria was essentially governed by unrestrained autocratic and authoritarian rule of small bands of British colonial officials, aided and abetted by their compatriots among the European Christian missions and monopoly holding trading firms. The colonial authorities and their collaborators presided over a fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system; which facilitated the appropriation of huge profit surpluses for shipment to the metropolis from the Nigerian peasant farmers and other petty producers via unequal terms of trade; Nigerian workers via

meager, often below subsistence wages; all adults via primitive and exorbitant taxation; and the entire population (including unborn generations) via exclusive monopoly rights of exploitation granted to British and other European firms over Nigeria's mineral and other natural resources (Osoba, 1966:373). Besides, the period of decolonisation which saw the emergence of the educated élite that eventually took over from the British at independence further entrenched the seeds of corruption sowed by the colonial authorities. It was this period of decolonisation that the pervasive phenomenon of "ten per cent" kick-back dates, as executors of a whole array of public policies insisted on a prepayment to themselves of at least 10 percent of the value of the favour being sought by members of the public (contract, licence, scholarship, employment, etc.) before performing the duty for which they were already being paid generous salaries and allowances from the public treasury. Also, available evidence during the period under consideration revealed the problems of poor attitude to work and unethical behaviour, notably in the form of corrupt practices: embezzlement, fraud and straightforward theft (Bolarinwa, 2005:166).

Notable features of corruption that have affected economic development since independence in Nigeria had their seeds sown during the colonial period. In fact, the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry of 1956 into the African Continental Bank (ACB) and the Coker Commission of Inquiry of 1962 into certain Western public corporations found Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo guilty of corrupt practices respectively. Azikiwe according to the Foster Sutton Commission was found guilty of abusing his position as head of government to divert the huge sums of Eastern Nigeria funds into his own bank, ACB, thus solving the bank's problem of chronic shortage of operating capital and in the process substantially enriching himself. In the same way, the Coker Commisssion of Inquiry revealed several indigenous and brazen devices by which Awolowo and his colleagues in the leadership of the Action Group government of Western Nigeria enriched themselves and their party fabulously at the expense of accumulated funds of the Cocoa Marketing Board, property of the whole people of Western Nigeria.[1] Although these are just two examples of the numerous cases of corrupt practices perpetrated by the educated élite that took over power from the colonial authorities; who had bequeathed on to Nigerians legacies of corruption and primitive accumulation of wealth. Therefore, it is on this premise that an analysis and synthesis of the interface of corruption as a bane of economic development shall be examined.

National Economic Development Since 1960: An Appraisal

Until the recent emergence of the United Nations inspired concept of Human Development Index (HDI), development was seen world-wide in terms of

level of Gross National Product(GNP), level of Per Capita Income (PCI), nature of roads and bridges, presence or otherwise of overhead bridges and skyscrapers and others (Nwolise, 2010:174). Nwolise argues that even in nations with the highest levels of GNP and PCI, and beautiful roads, 5-star hotels, and skyscrapers, the majority of the people still suffered. Of course, several attempts have been made by economists, policy makers and analysts on the universally acceptable definitions of development without success. Rather, economists and policymakers increasingly started giving more emphasis to the objectives of development as a basis for redefining the concept (Osayimwese, 1983:22). Thus, development is defined in terms of attacking widespread absolute poverty, reducing inequalities and removing spectre of rising unemployment – all of these being achieved within the context of a growing economy. This rethinking led to the redefinition of economic development in terms of both 'redistribution with growth' and 'meeting the basic needs' of the masses of the population. Buttressing this assertion, Dudley Seers poses the most fundamental questions relating to the meaning of development when he writes that:

> The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: what has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 'development' even if per capital income doubled (Seers, 1972:21).

It is obvious from the foregoing definitions, that the whole concept of development transcends increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP) and Per Capita Income (PCI). Rather, it focuses on the need for development to provide the necessities for a decent livelihood to the largest majority of the population as well as enabling environment for investment, technology and industrial growth. Can this be said of Nigeria at 50 years?

Development policies objectives are synonymous with wealth creation, employment generation, poverty alleviation, capacity building, human capital development, and provision of infrastructure, among others. Several countries have utilised development planning as a means of mobilising and using their endowments of human and non-human resources to accelerate the development process.[2] In China, India, Brazil, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, development planning has become strategic – allowing both the state and market institutions to drive the development process with mutually beneficial results.[3] In Nigeria, however, systematic economic planning did not start until the end of World War II when the Secretary of State for the

Colonies called on each government of the then British colonies to formulate a 10-year plan for the economic and social development of its territories. Since then, Nigeria has prosecuted four National Development Plans: 1962-1968, 1970-1974, 1975-1980 and 1981-85 (Edward, 1988:7). The first plan (1962-1968) focused on the development of agriculture, trade and industry, power and electricity, transport and communication, water, education, health and social welfare. An appraisal of the development plan revealed that in spite of the interruption of the civil war in 1967 which meant the mobilisation of all available resources for its prosecution; many of the major projects embarked upon in the plan period were successfully completed.[4] These included the Port Harcourt Oil Refinery, the Nigerian Security and Minting Plant, the Jebba Paper Mill, the Bacita Sugar Mill, the Niger Dam, the Niger Bridge, some trunk roads and the Lagos Port extension.[5] The overall performance of the economy according to Edward was impressive because in addition to the projects that were proposed and successfully executed, the GDP also grew and the economy recorded a growth rate of about 5 percent per annum. Table 1 shows the structure of the GDP during the plan period.

Table 1: Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost (Constant Prices) 1962-1968 (₦ million)

Sector	1962-68	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68
Agriculture, livestock, Forestry and Fishery	1,609.6	1,741.6	1,733.4	1,741.8	1,739.0	1,634.6
Minning	53.6	62.6	95.0	164.8	228.8	103.0
Manufacturing and Crafts	151.8	153.6	157.6	183.4	186.2	217.8
Electricity and Water Supply	12.0	14.6	16.2	18.4	21.4	20.0
Buildng and Construction	115.0	132.0	130.0	160.0	162.6	144.6
Distribution	322.2	361.8	389.8	405.4	401.8	387.8
Transport	110.0	122.8	118.6	111.2	106.6	100.2
Communication	11.8	13.4	15.8	18.4	18.8	15.6
General Government	102.6	102.6	104.2	103.2	103.2	96.2
Education	71.4	75.6	86.0	87.4	96.4	92.6
Health	14.4	15.0	18.8	19.6	18.6	18.0
Other services	56.4	55.8	61.4	72.4	82.8	94.4
GDP At Factor Cost	2,630.8	2,851.4	2,926.8	3,086.0	3,166.2	2,9224.8

Source: Second National Development Plan 1970-74, Federal Ministry of National Planning, Lagos, p. 50.

From the above table, there is no doubt that the first national development

plan was impressive in spite of the constraints of inadequate infrastructure, savings and foreign capital inflow and most importantly the outbreak of the civil war, which reduced the 50 percent expected foreign capital needed for its implementation to just 14 percent by the World Bank, other financial institutions and private foreign capital (Osaghae, 2002:49).

Meanwhile, if the performance of the first development plan was so impressive and inspiring, at what point did the country go wrong? And what is the nexus between corruption and economic development? A brief survey of the focus and constraints that impeded the remaining economic development plans and the analysis of the leadership roles of both the successive military and civilian administrations Nigeria have had so far in the last 50 years of her independence will illuminate on why corruption has been the bane to economic development.

The Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, was launched after the end of the civil war with the aim of reconstructing a war battered economy and promoting economic and social development in the country. By 1971, oil overtook agricultural production in magnitude and scale, becoming the mainstay of the economy.[6] The price of crude oil had quadrupled with implications for foreign exchange earnings for the country. Thus, the oil sector by 1973 contributed over 80 percent of total export revenue and almost 90 percent of government revenue. In fact, it was at this point that Nigeria began to get it wrong as a nation. At the end of the plan periods, the average growth rate of the economy was about 11 percent, yet distribution remained a challenge. The Third, Fourth and subsequent development plans benefited massively from inflow of oil revenue from 1975 even up till date when it was expected that the nation would have benefited in terms of increased productive capacity of the economy, rapid industrialisation, income distribution, diversification in the economy, poverty alleviation if not eradication and robust foreign exchange earnings and reserves. Rather, Nigeria today is classified as one of the countries in the world with high level of poverty, poor health delivery systems, high maternal death rate, low production and manufacturing output, low life expectancy rate, and general poor standard of living. In fact, Transparency international in its global ranking of most corrupt 180 nations, placed Nigeria as 130th, due to the country's lack of electoral accountability, embezzlement of public funds, manifestations of bribery of government officials including the "toll gate fees" openly extorted from motorists by the police along the nation's high-ways, kickbacks on public procurement, poor implementation of anti-corruption laws, unnecessary injunctions granted by the judiciary,[7] and others.

Corruption and Economic Development

The nexus between corruption and economic development in Nigeria is such

that hardly can one be discussed without reference to the other. As earlier mentioned, Nigeria with her enormous human and material resources should occupy an enviable position in the comity of nations economically, politically and socially, but the reverse is the case. The negative trend is not unconnected with the pervasiveness of corruption that has enthroned mediocrity and incompetence, retarded economic growth, hindered good governance and accountability and most importantly mismanagement and loss of resources needed for development. The common understanding of corruption is that it is dishonest, illegal or immoral act which has the potentials for perverting social values and proceedings. Moving away from the street understanding, corruption may be viewed in three main ways: as a process, a behavioural act and a condition.[8] As a process, corruption may be seen as the process of imparting negative values, perverting (social) moral values, breaking the laws of the land or inculcating dishonest, fraudulent and debased culture in others. As an act, corruption is dishonest, illegal or immoral behaviour, especially from someone with power.[9] As a condition; corruption is a state of being corrupt.

As a corollary to the above, Hope and Chikulo on a higher intellectual plane conceptualise corruption as the use of official position or title to achieve personal gains, either on an individual or collective basis, at the expense of the public good, and in violation of established rules and ethical principles.[10] The ₦20 collected by the policeman on the road, or the ₦500 collected by the civil servant to provide job placement form is corruption. But this is petty corruption. The real devastating corruption in society is the stealing of millions or billions by chief executives in public and corporate offices, and more especially, the millions or billions stolen by political office-holders.[11] This conceptualisation and explanation of corruption vividly describes the Nigerian situation from independence such that in spite of the enormous human and material resources possessed by the country; attainment of economic development has been a mirage. Few examples of distortion in policies implementation and corrupt attitudes of Nigerians in both private and public life would improve our stock of knowledge as to why Nigeria is economically backward as far as national development is concerned.

Starting with the First Republic, following the taking over of the centre by the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), it exploited that power in crucial events: producing a highly disputed and expensive census count favourable to itself in 1962-63; manipulating the result of the federal elections, especially in the North (Richard, 1978:142) and, finally, overtly re-directing the flow of economic resources in its own favour. For example, the 1962-68 Development Plan had included plans for a steel mill to cost £30 million (Adesina, 1998:88). Rivalry ensued as to where the mill should be sited. The North wanted the mill at Lokoja, the East argued for Onitsha and the South proposed Ikare. A

feasibility study was subsequently carried out at enormous costs by Swiss consultants and in August 1965, an agreement was signed with five foreign firms to build the two mills in Onitsha and Lokoja. However, in spite of the high cost sunk on the projects the mills were never built (Adesina, 1998:88). Also within the same 1962-68 plan, another white elephant project embarked on was multi-million Naira Kainji Dam, located in the North. The dam was built at a cost of ₦136.2 million under the 1962-68 plan (more than 10 percent of the federal government's total spending for that period) to generate electricity (Adesina, 1998:88). And the economists have argued that, enough power could have been generated at less than one-fifth of the cost of the dam by using natural gas which was located in the South. During this period favouritism and nepotism was highly pronounced as exemplified in 1964 by Dr Ikejiani, an Igboman, who was the chairman of the Nigerian Railway Corporation. He used his position to make sure that out of the 431 senior posts, 270 were held by the Igbo (Bamisaiye, 1976:73). This of course, would be interpreted as favoritism, but then, incompetence was being promoted over merit. Besides, it is important to state that the period between 1970-1979 (military administration) when the revenue resources available to the military administrations in Nigeria were beyond the wildest dreams of those administrations was typified by wasteful spending on the part of the successive governments.

The period 1970-1979 was the period of oil boom for Nigeria, but paradoxically it was also a period that is synonymous with squandering of riches. Nigeria had more revenue resources than what the absorptive capacity of the economy could cope with (Ayagi, 1990:73). For instance, the Gowon administration spoke publicly that finance was not the problem of Nigeria, but how to spend it. Consequently, the country embarked on spending spree with Universal Free Primary Education, then cement armada, FESTAC '77; thus this recklessness worsened an already bad situation.[12] As if that wastage and corrupt practices were not enough, the experience of the Second Republic in terms of corruption and maladministration was frustrating and appalling that the citizenry welcomed the military back into the Nigeria political space. A few examples of the corrupt practices of the politicians will illuminate on the reasons why it was just a *fait accompli* before the nation was plunged into the murky waters of foreign debt. In fact, the depth and extent of the prevalent corrupt attitudes of the period was succinctly described by Chinua Achebe as follows:

A structure that cost say ₦200 million carries a huge hidden element of kickbacks and commission to Nigerian middlemen and, increasingly, middle women; it carries inflated prices of materials largely by corruption; theft and inefficiency on the site fostered by more corruption; contract variations

corruptly arranged midstream in execution, an inflated margin (or, more aptly, corridor) of profit. When all these factors are added to others which our corrupt ingenuity constantly invents, you will be lucky if on completion (assuming such a happy event occurs) your structure is worth as much as ₦80 million (Achebe,1983:53).

Examples of corrupt practices perpetrated during the regime were revealed by tribunals set up in May 1984 by the Buhari administration to try the corrupt former ministers, governors, and politicians. For example, between 5 and 9 July, 1983, Bisi Onabanjo, the former governor of Ogun State, together with two other governors, was found guilty for soliciting illicit side payments totaling 2.8 million Naira.[13] The other governors were acquitted, but Onabanjo was sentenced to 22 years in prison (Ikubaje, 2006:38). Also, Umaru Dikko, the then Transport and Aviation Minister who fled to Britain was alleged to have amassed a fortune of over 1 billion dollars during barely three years in office.[14] The *Nigerian Weekly Star* also reported the fraud at the Ministry of Telecommunication where the government was losing ₦50 million per month.[15] However, one bizarre experience was the importation of "*sands and mud*" in containers to Nigerian ports to access foreign exchange by Nigerian exporters from the Central Bank.[16] In fact, Justice Sampson Uwaifo's tribunal, for instance, reported that it recovered over 200 million Naira in cash, real estate, and vehicles and more than 35 million Naira from politicians, public officers, and contractors.[17] The cases are so numerous that these few examples attest to the fact that the level of corruption in the Second Republic surpassed that of the First Republic, but also meager compared to the ones perpetrated by the subsequent administra-tions (military and civilian) from 1984 to date.

The military administrations are known for the use of decrees and suspension of certain parts of the Constitution. This was usually done in order to sustain whatever policy put in place regardless of whether it is anti-people or not. Corruption under the Babangida and Abacha administrations was so pervasive that both of them were said to have had soft attitude towards corruption.[18] For example, the Babangida administration pardoned and released the Second Republic politicians that were jailed for corruption by the Buhari administration and also returned their confiscated properties to them.[19] The interpretation of this gesture and the subsequent events that followed on the part of the citizenry is that the Babangida administration officially encouraged the practice of corruption. Meanwhile, an unpublished public enquiry report that opened the can of corruption worms under Babangida administration was the Okigbo Panel report. The report revealed that Babangida established a 'Dedicated Account' into which the windfall from the Gulf War was paid. The account held the sum of $12.4 billion

dollars and at the time of enquiry only $206 million dollars was left there.[20] In fact, Okigbo referred to the handling of the revenue as "a gross abuse of public interest" He said 21.2 billion – more than one third of the country's total foreign debt – was spent in less than 6 years on "what could neither be adjudged genuine, high priority nor truly regenerative investment".[21] Thus, his administration was characterised with advanced free fraud, drug trafficking, high inflationary trend, low production, increased debt rate and general increase in poverty level.

In the case of General Abacha, he discarded all financial procedures to the advantage of himself, his family and his cronies. For instance, a former Minister of Finance, Anthony Ani, confirmed that the National Security Adviser to Abacha, Ismaila Gwarzo, withdrew about 120 billion Naira (1.3 billion dollars) from the Central Bank without the consent of the Ministry of Finance.[22] He personalised the Central Bank by issuing cheques at will for billions of Naira for personal use and his administration was synonymous with extra-budgetary spending. For instance, in 1994, the federally collected revenue stood at 201.9 billion Naira. That year, the government earmarked the sum of 110.5 billion Naira for expenditure. It ended up spending 141.6 billion Naira, showing an over-spending of 28.2 percent.[23] He was listed among the ten topmost corrupt leaders following the discoveries of his loot that ran into several billions of dollars. The consequence of all these is that, in spite of the increase in government revenue as a result of increase in international oil prices, what was more visible was the woeful performance of the public enterprises which were responsible for the supply of petroleum products, electricity, communication and obsolete infrastructures with its unfavourable environment for investment. The inefficacy of the above mentioned public enterprises coupled with: high rate of inflation, poor human capital base, poverty, high debt profile, insecurity of lives and property, poor health care delivery, high death rate etc made economic development a mirage.

CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION
INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA

Several efforts have been made by different regimes in Nigeria to tackle corruption, but so far it appears that the clean up exercise has been in futility. Although President Obasanjo in 1999 was so concerned about the devastating effects of corruption on Nigeria that he declared to Nigerians in his inaugural speech that one of his administrations priorities would be the development of a comprehensive anti-corruption programme. He described the situation he met on assumption of office as follows:

... the impacts of official corruption is so rampant and has earned Nigeria a very bad image ..., beside, it has distorted and retrogressed development. No

society can achieve anything near its full potential if it allows corruption to become full blown cancer it has become in Nigeria. One of the greatest tragedies of military rule in recent time is that corruption was allowed to grow unchallenged, and unchecked, even when it was glaring for everybody to see ... there will be no sacred cows; nobody, no matter who and where, will be allowed to get away with the breach of the law or the perpetration of corruption ...[24]

The above observation and declaration of war against corruption was followed by action when his administration adopted both legal and institutional frameworks to combat corruption which had become a bane of development. Thus, the Fourth Republic has established the following institutions primarily to investigate and prosecute corrupt practices and economic crimes: The Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).[25] Other initiatives, although not institutionalised but incorporated into the existing government institutions, include the establishment of Due Process Office in the Presidency to monitor the award and execution of contracts and to prosecute contract related offences.[26] The achievements of these institutions have impacted greatly on the society especially the EFCC. The pioneer chairman of the EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu, no doubt recorded impressive performance which culminated in the trial and imprisonment of some top shots in the political and economic circle. According to him, since its establishment in 2003, EFCC had recovered 5 billion dollars from the perpetrators of advanced free fraud (419), money laundering and other financial crimes; recovered 150 million dollars from a former Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun.[27] Also, EFCC under Ribadu, with the support of the UK Metropolitan Police and Bayelsa State House of Assembly, investigated a former governor of Bayelsa state, Diepreye Alamieysieigha in 2006. Investigation revealed that he had four properties in London valued at about 10 million pounds, plus another property in Cape Town valued at 1.2 million dollars. 1 million pounds cash was found in his bedroom at his apartment in London. 2 million pounds was restrained at the Royal Bank of Scotland in London and over 240 million dollars in Nigeria (Olakanmi, 2010:153). Another then serving governor was Joshua Dariye of Plateau state who was found by the London Metropolitan Police to operate 25 bank accounts in London alone to juggle money and evade the law.[28] This crooked means of siphoning public funds partly exposes the ways through which Nigerian officials between 1960 and 1999 had stolen or wasted more than 440 billion dollars.[29]

EFCC after Ribadu has continued to wax stronger in its anti-corruption campaign. Mrs Faridah Waziri, Ribadu's successor has successfully tried

corrupt politicians, businessmen, chief executive of banks, companies, etc. For instance, she tried and prosecuted Olabode George (a chieftain of the ruling Peoples Democractic Party) for flagrant abuse of office and corruption. Also, chief executives of ailing banks were investigated for corruption and misappropriation of depositors' money and shareholders fund. Despite these achievements, the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria is not without criticism especially under the Obasanjo administration. For instance, many Nigerians have criticised the anti-corruption initiatives for poor commitment from government leadership and that the two prominent initiatives (EFCC and ICPC) are meant as a witch-hunt on the government opposition.[30] In spite of these criticisms, larger percentage of Nigerians still welcomes the idea because today in Nigeria the fear of EFCC is the beginning of wisdom. In fact, it was Kayode Eso (a former Nigerian Supreme Court Justice) who declared, "I support Obasanjo 100 percent on his anti-corruption war because it has never happened in the history of Nigeria before and if it goes on, then Nigeria saviour has arrived".[31] Meanwhile, ministers, special advisers, governors, corporate executives and civil servants are being exposed daily of corrupt activities. Few example, illuminate on this; Halliburton bribery scandal, Siemens bribery scandal and the gross financial misappropriation by managing directors of banks have been reported by newspapers and magazines in Nigeria. The poser, therefore, is How do we cement the cracks in the wall from imminent collapse?

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined how corruption has hindered the economic development of Nigeria since independence as well as offer suggestions on how to tackle this bane of development. There is no doubt, that corruption has depleted the foreign exchange earnings of Nigeria in the last fifty years, prevented industrial growth, rendered the economy paralysed, enthroned poverty and diseases and eroded patriotism on the part of the citizenry. Although, several approaches had been adopted to tackle the menace, the results when compared with the efforts seem to have yielded low output. This paper suggests that apart from the legal and institutional framework that has been adopted, the government should also incorporate societal strategies that place emphasis on the determination of a common standard of morality against which corrupt behaviour can be measured. Also, there is the need for adaptation and review of the constitution and laws of Nigeria; especially the aspect that deals with corrupt practices such that severe punishments will be the ultimate for whoever is found guilty of corruption of greater magnitude. This becomes imperative because experience in the last 50 years has shown that people engaged in corrupt practices with impunity

because there are no severe punishments for such offence. Yet, their actions have resulted to, if not direct, but indirect deaths of innocents citizenry through road accidents, poverty and diseases, consumption of fake drugs, extra-judicial killings by the security agencies, illegal possession of fire arms, environmental degradation, electoral malpractice and political violence, to mention but a few.

Also, the existing strategies require the expansion of the judiciary for prompt and effective trial of offenders as well as the total overhauling of the police institutions for effective policing. Besides, the civil service must be restructured and the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) needs to be re-launched. It is believed that if all these are put in place with effective implementation of policies, the existing anti-corruption strategies that comprise EFCC, ICPC, the Code of Conduct Bureau, and SERVICOM will go a long way in correcting this killing plague (corruption) that has retarded the economic growth and development of Nigeria.

ENDNOTES

1. For details, *see* Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry of 1956 and G.B.A Coker Commission of Inquiry respectively.
2. H.E. Akpan, "An Economy Still Trapped at the Crossroads", in *TELL* No. 40, 11 October, 2010, p. 54.
3. Ibid.
4. Edward, J.A, Development Planning in Nigeria . . ., p. 7.
5. J.A. Edward, Development Planning in Nigeria . . ., p. 7.
6. H.E. Akpan, "An Economy Still Trapped at the Crossroads . . ., p. 54.
7. *See* Towobola Damilola, "Nigeria Still very Corrupt", *Insider Weekly,* No. 47, 7 December, 2009, p. 30.
8. O.B.C. Nwolise, Corruption and Underdevelopment . . ., p. 177.
9. For details, *see* B. Aboyade and S. Ayodele (eds.) *Fighting Corruption in Nigeria: Challenges for the Future.* Conference proceedings, May 2006.
10. *See* K. Hope and B. Chikulo, Corruption and Development in Africa, London: Macmillian Press, 2000.
11. O.B.C. Nwolise, Corruption and Underdevelopment . . ., p. 177.
12. Ibid.
13. *See* West Africa Reports, 11 June, 1984, p. 1205.
14. Ibid.
15. *See,* for details, *Nigerian Weekly Star,* 15 May, 1983.
16. *See,* for details, Nigerian *Daily Times,* 16 May, 1983.
17. *See,* for details, *West Africa Reports,* 9 June, 1986, p. 1234.
18. I.A. Ayua, Overview of Corruption in Nigeria, a paper presented at National Conference on the Problems of corruption in Nigeria (Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal Studies) from 26-29 March, Abuja, Nigeria.

19. Ibid.
20. For details, see *Newswatch*, 16 January, 1995.
21. *African News*, 14 October, 1994, p. 3.
22. *See*, for details, *Tribune*, 4 November, 1998, p. 1.
23. *The Guardian*, 4 November, 1998, p. 20.
24. O. Obasanjo (former President of Nigeria) Inaugural speech delivered in 1999 in his swearing ceremony as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
25. J. Ikubaje, Corruption and Anti-Corruption . . ., p. 50.
26. Ibid.
27. *See*, for details, *The Punch*, 30 June, 2006.
28. Ibid.
29. N. Ribadu, Capital Loss and Corruption: The Example of Nigeria. Being a testimony before the US House Financial Services Committee. 19 May, 2009.
30. *See* for details, *TELL*, 10 July 2006, *ThisDay*, 30 May, 2006 and *Sunday Independent*, 20 August, 2006.
31. See *Vanguard*, 10 April, 2005.

Corruption and Governance in Nigeria, 1999-2005: A Retrospective Examination

JOSEPH OLUKAYODE AKINBI

18

INTRODUCTION

It is an incontrovertible fact that corruption is a cankerworm which has eaten deep into the fabric of the Nigerian society. *The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* defines corruption as "dishonest, illegal, or immoral behaviour, especially from someone with power". The word "corruption" is itself defined as using your power in a dishonest or illegal way in order to get an advantage for oneself. Thus, corruption involves employing procedures that are contrary to accepted moral, legal and ethical standards to satisfy one's needs or wants, and in its elastic sense it embraces all forms of social impropriety like bribery, perversion of justice, squandermania and embezzlement of public funds, etc. (Akinbi, 2003a).

The issue of corruption among government officials is a recurrent phenomenon in Nigeria, because there is hardly any administration in the course of Nigeria's history that has not accused its predecessor of economic

corruption or financial mismanagement.

According to Akinbi (1999), emphasis in Nigeria has been on the distribution of the so-called national cake with no reciprocal emphasis on its baking; while the concept of "chop-politics" was popularised to the detriment and stagnation of national development. Certain measures that were taken to arrest this menace by Nigerian leaders before the democratic administration of Obasanjo included the dismissal of large numbers of public servants indicted of corruption by the Murtala-Obasanjo administration and its issuance of a series of decrees to this effect and the series of decrees issued by Buhari-Idiagbon administration in 1984 such as the Recovery of Public Property Decree, Banking (Freezing of Accounts) Decree (Akinbi, 2003b).

The Obasanjo administration was inaugurated on 29 May, 1999 and it embraced the anti-corruption crusade as one of its cardinal principles. For instance, it established the Independent and Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), headed by Justice Mustapha Akanbi and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) under the chairmanship of Nuhu Ribadu, geared towards curbing the menace posed by corruption in the society. Disheartening, however, is the fact that despite all the above measures tailored towards checking corruption in Nigeria, the wave of corruption rather than decreasing has been on the increase and this had dangerous implications for the future of the nation. For instance, the report of a survey on Nigerian governance and corruption commissioned by Obasanjo and financed by the International Development Community indicated that many Nigerians regard federal, state and local government office holders as dishonest (*TELL*, 15 December, 2003). Enterprises sampled in the survey also showed that government contracts are poorly executed or abandoned because public officials who are expected to monitor the progress of the jobs become accomplices of defaulting contractors by taking bribes from them to award those contracts.

This paper explores certain conspicuous cases of financial corruption during the Obasanjo administration and its implications on the nation's development. It also proffers certain suggestions geared towards curbing this malaise and is finally rounded off with the conclusion.

A SURVEY OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION UNDER THE OBASANJO GOVERNMENT

National Assembly Cases

The National Assembly during the Obasanjo administration was infested with the corruption plague. For instance, the Idris Kuta Panel indicted Senator Gbenga Aluko of corruption and asked him to refund over ₦74 million to the state coffers (*Nigerian Tribune*, 26 August, 2000). The paper on 29 July,

2000 also reported former senate president Dr. Okadigbo's looting saga and corruption of federal legislators in general. For instance, it was reported that Okadigbo received ₦22 million for Sallah and Christmas welfare and spent ₦37 million as furniture allowance for his official quarters, instead of the ₦25 million approved by the senate; while the corruption of other senators was also shown in the inflation of price of cars from ₦3.5 million to about ₦5.1 million each, which they all collected, and in their sharing ₦319 million through award of contracts to ghost firms (their cronies) in contravention of their jurisdiction rights (*Nigerian Tribune*, 27 July, 2000). It was also reported that lawmakers defrauded the National Assembly of ₦376 million. The money was collected to settle the salaries and allowances of non-existent personal aides as each member was officially entitled to 11 aides. Such was the extent of corruption among the leaders who were supposed to be custodians of the nation's patriotic values.

TELL (13 May, 2002) also reports the squandermania of public funds by a former Speaker, House of Representatives, Alhaji Ghali Na'Abba and his cohorts in the house leadership. It indicated that the House treasury was looted under all kinds of guise, particularly through the contingency vote commonly called 'The Pool'. At least, ₦700 million was dedicated to the pool for 2002 alone, while it also got handsome sums in the previous two years. The speaker disbursed the fund at his whims and caprices; through this "free fund" and other spurious sub-heads, Na'Abba pampered his supporters in the House through the huge sums of money approved to them as patronage. For instance, *TELL* investigations reveal that through payment vouchers dated 13 and 15 March, 2002 respectively, one Sani Udu, Chairman House Committee on Education drew ₦13,246,533.60 to treat a purported renal dysfunction at a London Hospital. Also, Shettima Shehu, also a Na'Abba acolyte, got a total of ₦3,542,231 as refund for the treatment in 2001 of his wife's chronic pelvic inflammatory disease through two vouchers dated 5 March, 2002.

In January 2002, Ibrahim G. Abubakar, Deputy Chairman, House Committee on Communication got ₦1,450,000 as refund for "out of-pocket expenses" for the treatment of his wife in a London Hospital months after delivering a baby girl through caesarean section in Nigeria. The payment was made through a voucher dated 10 January, 2002; while another lump sum of ₦3,128,000 was approved for him by Na'Abba for the wife to keep a 8 February, 2002 appointment with doctors in Saudi Arabia. The systematic looting of the House of Representatives by certain members exposed the sleazy side of the 'contract' which the Speaker and his cohorts signed with Nigerians.

Also, the former senate president, Adolphus Wabara, and five other members of the National Assembly were involved in a ₦55 million bribery saga. In fact, the money was recovered by the chairman of EFCC from Senator Adighiye (*The Punch*, 23 March, 2005).

Unwieldy Bureaucracy at the Three Levels of Government

This has become a serious drain pipe on the nation and its economic well-being. Obasanjo had 1,444 political appointees working for him by 2003, but many of them were performing similar functions. Also, a sizeable number of his special assistants were not appointed for any specialised skills they possessed, but on sentimental grounds either for being children of his friends or the influential politicians (*TELL*, 25 December, 2003). Of the ₦1.16 trillion the President proposed for the 2004 budget, most significantly ₦540.25 billion was allocated for recurrent expenditure and ₦310.32 billion for capital projects. Such manner of budgetary allocation and political appointment were replicated in the 36 states of the federation and the 774 constitutionally recognised local government councils. The waste pipes were by no means restricted to the executive arm of government (*TELL*, 15 December, 2003).

Instances of Corruption Contained in the 2001 Audit Report

The Acting Auditor-General of the Federation, one Mr. Azie submitted an audit report of federal government ministries and parastatals and all the three arms of government to the National Assembly within the stipulated time in January 2003. Besides the allegations of misappropriation of public funds and gross financial recklessness in all the three arms of government, several ministries and parastatals were indicted for breaching laid-down financial regulations. Cases of outright embezzlement of funds were rife, as were instances of looting of public treasury as contained in the report (*TELL*, 17 February, 2003).

Also, as far back as March and April 2002, audit queries were sent out to affected the ministries and agencies as contained in the *TELL* referred to earlier. For instance, queries were sent to the Ministry of Education about the non-supply of 6,425,548 exercise books for which ₦175 million had already being paid. Also, another query was issued to the same ministry over the payment of ₦17 million for the production of a coat of arms for the ministry. The Ministry of Information and National Orientation also received a query in April 2002, as the office of the Auditor-General queried a voucher payment of ₦275 million, which could not be substantiated. It also received a query over the use of substitute vouchers to pay ₦128 million. Disheartening, however, was the lackadaisical attitude of the agencies to the queries as "the accounting officers of the ministries and parastatals treat audit queries with disdain" either by failing to respond or responding rather very late (*TELL*, 17 February, 2003). Indeed, Azie's report is unprecedented in recent times. What had always happened was that audit reports were often inconclusive as they were killed at the level of raising queries.

Ondo State Financial Scams Involving Governor Adefarati and Three of His Commissioners

The corruption mania was by no means restricted to the federal level of government as there were many cases of corruption witnessed at the state level too. For instance, a former governor of Ondo State, Chief Adebayo Adefarati and three of his commissioners were implicated in some financial scams that rocked the state. For instance, *TELL* (15 April, 2002) reveals that using a bank account owned by Duo Ventures, the controversial company owned by his former attorney-general, Ogedengbe, Adefarati transferred millions of Naira to London and bought a property there in his brothers-in-law names, in the person of Mr. Oluwole Aofolaju (brother to Mrs. Adetutu Adefarati, nee Aofolaju). Also, Chief Adefarati approved ₦500.1 million for the purchase of property on Plot 90, Ajose Adeogun Street, Victoria Island, Lagos, which was introduced to the former governor by his attorney-general, Ogedengbe. The amount was lodged in the account of Duo Ventures Limited which acted as agent in the deal. But the inherent fraud in the transaction was exposed by *TELL* (15 April, 2002). First, *TELL* investigations revealed that Duo Ventures Limited was owned by Ogedengbe. Two, the property was purchased for ₦351 million and not ₦500 million as claimed by the attorney-general. Three, 16 months after the purchase, the property's papers still bore the name of its vendors.

Similarly, Abass Aidi, a former Commissioner for Lands and Housing deceived the government and collected ₦35 million for a property that was sold to the state at ₦12 million by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA). The property was an abandoned estate situated in Ibule, near Akure (*TELL*, 15 April, 2002).

One Segun Ojo, a former Commissioner of Finance under Adefarati was also implicated in yet another ₦435 million property scam pertaining to Plot 1385, Guarara Street, Maitama District, Abuja. He presented a memo to the state executive council on 6 August, 2001 that the property would cost ₦435,209,500 which was inclusive of all transfer charges and taxes. But in the end, the state was defrauded. While preparing the transfer papers the property's value was put at ₦391 million. Yet, while applying for consent at the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), the property value was again put at ₦119 million (*TELL*, 15 April, 2002). These cases of corruption led to the removal of the affected commissioners while they also faced trial for corruption and embezzlement of public funds by various courts in the state.

The National Identity Card Bribery Scandal

The National Identity Card scheme assumed a symbol of corruption in

Nigeria's public life spanning a period of 22 years and involving about four successive governments. It was first conceived by General Obasanjo during his first coming as military head of State, and was continued by subsequent governments in the country. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) said the contract became riddled with corruption after the federal government awarded it at a cost of ₦214 million, while SAGEM, the company it was awarded to through its agents in Nigeria, especially Niyi Adelegan, organised and executed a scheme through which bribes were distributed to government officials (*TELL*, 15 December, 2003).

The ICPC alleged that former Ministers of Internal Affairs, Sunday Afolabi, Mahmud Shata, his successor in office, Hussaini Akwanga, a former Minister of Labour and Productivity and Nwodo, a former National Secretary of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), collected huge sums of money both in local and foreign currencies as bribes from the companies executing the I.D card scheme. In fact, they were fingered by Adelegan as having received bribe from him (*TELL*, 22 December, 2003). Sunday Afolabi also defied higher authorities in breaching the terms of an earlier contract given to one of the companies, Chams Nigeria, in favour of the one he preferred – SAGEM. The two companies had got different components of the contracts from the retreating military junta of General Abubakar. This action made Chams to go to court and the sole arbitration panel headed by Justice Kayode Eso awarded over ₦1 billion costs against the federal government (*TELL*, 22 December, 2003).

Tafa Balogun's Corruption Cases

The EFCC claimed that a former Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun, during the period he held sway at Force Headquarters, Abuja was into money laundering and theft of police funds. He also allegedly invested stolen funds in blue chip firms and banks, and owned several bank accounts where huge sums of looted monies were lodged under fake names. Altogether he was accused of stealing ₦10 billion from the Nigerian Police (*The Guardian*, 5 April, 2002). The former Inspector-General faced trial on a 70-count charge of financial malpractices, all of which involved huge sums of money (*The Punch*, 5 April, 2005). An additional 92-count charge bordering on official corruption involving ₦5.7 billion was later added (*The Punch*, 24 May, 2005).

₦55 Million Bribery Saga Involving Professor Fabian Osuji, and Others

Other cases of corruption in Nigeria included the ₦55 million bribery saga involving a former Minister of Education, Professor Fabian Osuji and some top government officials. It was indicated that Osuji in concert with the acting permanent secretary, Ministry of Education, P.S. Abdu and five other

directors raised ₦55 million with the sole purpose of bribing members of the National Assembly for an increase in the ministry's 2005 budget (*The Punch*, 23 March, 2005). In fact, Osuji himself admitted giving out ₦55 million to the National Assembly which he called "welfare package" (*The Punch*, 12 April, 2005). Following Osuji's indictment by the EFCC, he was dismissed by the president to face trial.

Shoddy Sale and Allocation of 207 Federal Government Properties in Ikoyi

Other cases of corruption included the shoddy sale and allocation of 207 federal government properties in Ikoyi by the Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Mrs. Mobolaji Osomo. She was dismissed following the embarrassing handling of the sale of the property in violation of the federal executive council's decision and the clear and repeated directives from President Obasanjo that the sale should be conducted in a fair and transparent manner; and following the unsatisfactory explanation offered by the minister, according to the report of the secretary to the federal government, Ekaette, contained in *The Guardian*, 5 April, 2005.

Illegal Funding of Political Party with Government Funds

This was another area of corruption involving public funds. For instance, *The Punch* (11 May, 2005) records that the EFCC arrested the Delta State Commissioner of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, Moses Odibo, over an allegation that he was involved in the deduction of funds meant for the 25 local governments in the state, contrary to the law signed by President Obasanjo prohibiting the deduction of council funds by state governments. The commissioner agreed that the money estimated at ₦11.2 million, was being deducted on a monthly basis in compliance with the PDP's directive. This position was also supported by the state's Commissioner for Information, Magnus Onyibe, who stated that his embattled colleague deducted the council's money to fund the PDP.

It could also be stated that at the heart of the crisis between Governor Chris Ngige of Anambra state and his erstwhile political godfather, Chris Uba, lay the issue of refund of money purportedly given by the latter to sponsor Chris Ngige for governor and which was believed to be from government purse when Chris Ngige assumed office.

Closely related to the above was the allegation of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) in Ondo State that the state government under Segun Agagu crippled local governments in the state through illegal deduction of 20 percent from federal allocations which were claimed would be used to assist the local governments to execute capital projects (*The Punch*, 9 May, 2005). The AD director of publicity, Kunle Oyegoke, claimed the deduction was contrary

to the Obasanjo's anti-corruption campaign and the state government's claim on transparency and due process; while there was nothing to show on ground in all the 18 local governments to justify the deduction as regards execution of capital projects. The socio-economic effect of this anti-people act of the state government was the mass retrenchment of local government workers throughout the state (*The Punch*, 9 May, 2005).

Other General Cases

There were many other cases which affected virtually all sectors of public life. A few instances shall suffice. First, the EFCC dragged the Plateau state Governor, Joshua Dariye, to court in December 2004 for allegedly laundering money. Washington had as a result cancelled the visas granted him and his wife (*The Punch*, 11 May, 2005), while the UK Metropolitan Police stripped Dariye of his immunity and declared him a wanted person (*The Punch*, 6 May, 2005). However, his trial in Nigeria was stalled by the immunity which he enjoyed as governor. Also, the chairman of the EFCC, Ribadu disclosed on 6 May, 2005 that 20 governors had foreign accounts through which they laundered money abroad (*The Punch*, 6 May, 2005).

The judiciary was also infested with this corruption mania. For instance, *The Punch* (13 May, 2005) reports that Obasanjo approved the dismissal of two justices of the Court of Appeal, Justice O. Opene and Justice D.A. Adeniji over an alleged ₦27 million bribe received from Senator Uba to influence the decision of an election tribunal. The panel set up by the National Judicial Council (NJC) to investigate allegations of bribery and corruption against them found that the two justices corruptly enriched themselves and recommended their dismissal from service.

The newspapers, too, were replete with corruption cases of local government chairmen and other officials in the country. Other parastatals like the police and the Federal Roads Safety Commission were not excluded. Police officers routinely collect bribes at checking points from motorists despite orders banning this shameful act. *The Punch* (May 2005) also reports that four officers of the Anambra state sector command of the FRSC were sacked for allegedly extorting money from commercial vehicle drivers, instead of booking them as traffic offenders.

The foregoing survey undoubtedly lends credence to the fact that corruption is widespread in Nigeria. This development has serious implications for national development.

IMPLICATIONS OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION ON NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT

Stagnated Development

All the corruption cases identified above have contributed significantly to the

stagnation of development in Nigeria. Nigeria still remains a developing (underdeveloped) nation and one of the poorest countries of the world because her resources have been mismanaged and squandered through official corruption. Economically, indices of stagnated development could be seen in runaway inflation with its attendant high cost of living, growing rate of unemployment, declining agricultural and industrial output, etc. prevalent in the country (Akinbi, 2003b).

Nigeria's International Image

Another implication of official corruption is that it exposed the moral bankruptcy of some of our leaders and contributed significantly to denting Nigeria's image abroad, and dwindling the influence and importance of Nigeria in the international arena. Nigeria is one of the countries noted for corruption in the world due to the shady economic deals Nigerians are involved in overseas, apart from official corruption and financial mismanagement in the country.

The Future Leaders

Closely related to the above point, is another implication of leaving behind bad examples for future leaders of Nigeria. One disheartening fact is that, the prevalence of corruption vices in the country since 1960 despite attempts to root such out, points to the fact that people failed to learn from the mistakes of the past. And this constitutes a serious challenge to the future of the country. Corruption practices appear to have been accepted by the general public as a way of life and as a part of our culture. No wonder, student union leaders in the universities and colleges of education who are looked upon as future leaders of the country embezzle union funds.

Nigeria's Debt Crisis

A disturbing picture of the nation's debt crises was pointed out by a delegation of the National Assembly which visited Washington, London, Berlin and Rome in 2005. The lawmakers reported that even though the nation spent $3.4billion to service its debts in the previous two years, the interests on the debts rose by additional $4 billion from $32 billion to $36 billion (*The Guardian*, 10 May, 2005). This reveals the precarious situation of Nigeria and led to pleas for debt cancellation, but the international community normally would not take Nigeria serious considering the way and manner public funds are stolen and stashed in foreign accounts by Nigerian leaders. Even, after the debt forgiveness Nigeria managed to enjoy from the Paris Club in 2006, the debt crisis got worsened.

Democracy

Another implication of corruption among government officials is that it threatens the democratic experiment. The implication (or entanglement) of an erstwhile senate president Adophus Wabara, the former Inspector-General of Police Tafa Balogun, former Minister of Education, Osuji, and former Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Osomo, in corruption cases and their consequent removal from the offices they occupied left much to be desired and could provide a good excuse for the military to stage a come-back, if the trend continues unchecked.

General Implications

There are other general implications associated with official corruption. For instance, as regards the police officers receiving bribes at checkpoints, this has led in some cases to insecurity of lives and properties, as the police personnel most of the time are not concerned with whether vehicles are stolen or human heads are put in the boot of vehicles but are pre-occupied with collecting and storing money illegally. The action of the road marshals, too, in collecting bribes from motorists has a security risk implication. For instance, the development had reportedly led to reckless behaviour of drivers, who now overload their vehicles and drive above stipulated speed limits, believing they can always bribe the marshals (*The Punch*, 11 May, 2005). It is very devastating to read about the large number of lives that are lost in road accidents due to carelessness of drivers on the highway. Free and fair justice is also being denied in a situation where judges take bribe.

SUGGESTIONS TAILORED TOWARDS CHECKMATING OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Effective Legislative Check

The legislature has the constitutional powers to summon any member of the executive to account for whatever had happened under his watch (Otoide and Akinbi, 2004). This check mechanism should be improved upon to check the excesses of the executive.

Effective Judicial Check

This area too can be improved upon. People involved in corruption should not only be prosecuted but those found guilty should be given adequate punishment such as imprisonment to serve as deterrent to the others. In addition, all past and present leaders found guilty of corruption should be barred from contesting elective offices in the country. Nigeria should also heed the advice of a former US Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, to

initiate necessary judicial processes to recover stolen funds stashed in banks abroad (*The Punch*, 11 May, 2005). Also, those facing trial for corruption charges should have their international passports seized by the court and an interim order be granted freezing the money stashed in bank accounts until the final determination of their cases.

Regular Audit Report

Regular auditor-general's report of ministries, parastatals and the three arms of government should be done and published. This will help governance and ensure probity. Since the 1960s, the audit report has been sold to the public. The practice stopped in 1980 when no report was issued. The situation remained the same until 1986, when the audit reports began to reappear in government circles, albeit sporadically (*TELL*, 15 December, 2003). Now that we have witnessed a new dawn of democracy regular audit report which should be made public should be encouraged. Taxpayers are entitled to know how public funds are spent. Also, accounting officers in the ministries and parastatals, in the habit of treating audit queries with disdain should be given necessary disciplinary sanctions.

CONCLUSION

This paper has given a survey of some of the major cases of corruption involving government officials during the Obasanjo administration. It is clear from the survey that the phenomenon of corruption is widespread and touches virtually all sectors of public life in Nigeria. The paper has also highlighted the dangerous implications of official corruption on the nation's development and future and suggested measures geared towards checkmating official corruption in Nigeria.

REFERENCES

Akinbi, J.O. (1999). "Political Leadership and Nation building in Nigeria. The Historical Perspective", in Akinbi, J.O. *Towards A Better Nigeria: Reflections on Contemporary Issues in the Socio-Political and Economic Development of Nigeria*, Ibadan, Ben Quality Prints, 1-14.

_____ (2003a). "An Appraisal of Social Indices of Corruption Militating Against Nation Building in Nigeria", in *The Nigerian Journal of Curriculum and Instruction*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 197-203.

_____ (2003b). "Corruption in the Politics and Economy of Nigeria: Implications for National Development, in *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History*, Nos. 5 and 6, 122-136.

Mumuni, M. (2002). "A Crises of Confidence", in *TELL* (Lagos) No. 22, June 3, 28-37.

_____ (2003). "When Will the Nation Get it Right?", in *TELL* (Lagos), No. 50, December, 22, 22-24.

Mumuni, M. and I. Bakare (2003). "Caught in the Act" in *TELL* (Lagos), No. 51, December 22, 20-23. *Nigerian Tribune* (2000), July 27, 1.

Oshunkeye, S. and B. Bakare (2002). "A House that Stinks", in *TELL* (Lagos), No. 19, May 13, 24-31.

Otoide, L.E. and J.O. Akinbi (2004): "Democracy: A *Sine Qua Non* to National Development in Nigeria", in *International Journal of Social and Policy Issues*, Vol. 2, No. 1 and 2, 27-32.

Owolabi, Y. (2002). "Looting God's Own Project", in *TELL* (Lagos), No. 15, April 15, 22-28. *Saturday Tribune* (2000), 15 July, 1.

Semenitari, I. (2003): "Obasanjo's Big Headache" in *TELL* (Lagos), No. 7, February 17, 55-56.

The Guardian (2005), 5 April, pp. 1-2.

The Guardian (2005), 10 May, pp. 3-4.

The Punch (2005), 23 March, pp. 1-2.

The Punch (2005), 5 April, pp. 1-2.

The Punch (2005), 6 May, p. 9.

The Punch (2005), 9 May, p. 12.

The Punch (2005), 11 May, pp. 1-7.

The Punch (2005), 24 May, p. 8.

Running Round in Circles: Reflections on the State and Governance Crisis in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

DHIKRU ADEWALE YAGBOYAJU

19

INTRODUCTION

It may be plausible to argue that the most daunting challenge in Nigeria's 50 years of political independence is the crisis of governance, which has persistently confronted the state and its key institutions. Right from the evidently troubled First Republic, which was eventually terminated by the January 1966 military coup d'etat, up to the Fourth Republic that is yet to significantly improve in terms of the management of the governance crisis, the story of Nigeria's post-independence life has been bewildering. Given Nigeria's array of human and material resources, it may be appropriate to ask how and why the country got itself into the acute governance crisis and evident lack of capacity? Is there any link between the colonial beginning of the state in Nigeria, its multi-ethnic character and the lack of capacity or, more appropriately, misdirected capacity? What roles have such factors as crisis of legitimacy, political corruption, personal rule, insecurity and poverty played in all of

these? What are the probable consequences of Nigeria's "running round in circles" for almost fifty years, over the governance crisis? Can democracy help to resolve this crisis? If it can, will democracy ever work in Nigeria?

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

The two basic concepts that we shall operationalise in this paper are state and governance. By extension, we shall also explain good governance and governance crisis. Apparently, the required vibrant relationship between the modern state, the provision of the good things of life and the proper management of governance crisis, if it arises, also requires a critical examination and analysis as to why some states function well and others perform abysmally.

Drawing from the above, the state can simply be defined as the most important territorial association through which politics, political processes and governance can, perhaps, best be understood. In this sense, the objectives and programmes of successive governments, especially those in respect of harmonising the different aspects of society and many others, are better implemented through the more stable and permanent agencies and institutions of the state. By this, the state should be able to fulfill its expected role as contained in a "social contract".

Over time, the state has also been conceptualised based on certain qualities as either strong or weak. While such states as the US, Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Russia, France, and many others in the developed world, are classified as strong, Nigeria and several others in the less developed world are described as weak. For a better understanding we shall borrow from the views of Midgal (1988:4) on the distinctive features of a strong state. According to him, a strong state must have:

> The capacity and capability to really penetrate its society regulate its social relationships, be able to extract resources it needs from society and to appropriate or use those resources in determined ways.

Remarkably, this point of view can simply be interpreted to mean that a state primarily draws its legitimacy from the positive reciprocal exchanges between it and the society. It means that the extent of legitimacy is a function of how best the interests of the ordinary citizens in the society are pursued by the state and its officials. Thus, the state in Nigeria is classified as weak because its offices and institutions are profoundly manipulated and exploited by the officials in charge, for their own selfish purposes and at the expense of the majority of the populace (Yagboyaju, 2008:8).

In line with our assertion in a preceding part of this section, governance is being examined and explained in the context of its relationship with the state. In this sense, governance can be applied as:

> A term to describe regime types, or the nature of the relationships between state and the society; as a set of norms to appraise governmental systems and prescribe appropriate or acceptable practice of the manner in which power is utilised (Olowu et. al., 1999:3).

This delineation of the concept of governance seems to agree with the traditional notion, which essentially links the term to the activities of "specific occupants of public office who are in a position to make binding decisions at any given time" (Collier, 1982:7). Governance in this sense presupposes the totality of what public officials do or what they refuse to do is for the improvement of the generality of the people.

However, in recent times, especially since the mid-1980s when the strong wind of liberal democracy swept across eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa, governance is also used as a synonym for democracy. In this sense, it is used to denote whether a society is democratic or not. A democratic society is, for instance, one "which possesses a wide variety of state and society institutions that interact with one another to ensure that state institutions are efficient, responsive, accountable, transparent and bounded by the rule of law" (Olowu et al, op. cit.). Obviously, all of these in the opinion of the proponents of liberal democracy constitute good governance, while its absence is the direct opposite.

In the light of the opinions in the foregoing explanations, this paper conceptualises governance crisis as the persistent absence of the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people in any political community. In more concrete terms, and in line with our focus on Nigeria's present democratisation, the Fourth Republic, governance crisis is the acute shortage of such basic ingredients of democracy as periodic credible elections, openness, transparency, accountability, rule of law and, even economic empowerment for the citizens.

A CHARACTERISATION OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

What constitutes the socio-political fabric of the state in Nigeria? Why is it that one is confronted, almost everywhere one turns, by the strong feeling of alienation among the people? How do we explain the evident mindless corruption and insensitivity to social justice among the leaders, as well as the wanton vandalism and criminality by the ordinary citizens? We cannot properly address the issues raised in these questions without a historical exploration into the beginnings or formation of the Nigerian state. Most of the early scholarly explanations on the nature and character of the state in Nigeria, including the works of Lewis (1965), Sklar (1966), Dudley (1973), Ekeh (1975), and the more recent ones Oyovbaire (1984) and Osaghae (2002) emphasise the impacts of colonialism and the multi-ethnic nature of the

country. A common line of thought in the arguments and explanations of these scholars is that the colonial and postcolonial state in Nigeria encountered serious challenges, in terms of its lack of legitimating ideals, which made it more of an alien structure. For example, in his seminal essay "Two Publics" in Africa, Ekeh conceptualises one side of these publics as the primordial community, which the African relates with integrity and moral uprightness, while he relates to the second, the colonially contrived nation-state, with no moral commitment or a minimum sense of responsibility or decorum.

Remarkably, the other part of these early conceptualisations, which emphasises the ethnic factor, does not present ethnicity or its salience in a negative picture. It only criticises the politicisation of ethnicity by the political elite and bureaucrats. In essence, it draws attention to the manipulation of the ethnic factor by the political class particularly when all other factors fail to achieve a political objective. All these recurrent features are summarised by Ake (1996) in a scholarly opinion that crystallises state and politics in Nigeria as a composite problem with the following dimensions:

(a)   The prevalence of ethnic and sectional loyalties, which prevent the emergence of national identity and collective purpose;

(b)   A form of political competition in which people seek political power by all means, legal or not, with the result that politics is debased to warfare and the political system tends to break down;

(c)   A political leadership alienated from the masses, and which maintains power without mandate or accountability;

(d)   Political instability often manifested in disorderly and violent changes of the government in office.

Obviously, it is inappropriate to heap all the blames of Nigeria's predicament in terms of lack of capacity and acute governance crisis on colonialism and ethnicity. It may be more appropriate to conceptualise the state and politics in Nigeria by adopting some relatively recent perspectives that emphasise the role of the social class and the individual public official particularly with the profound debilitating effects of personal rule, which coincided with the successive military and civilian administrations from the mid-1980s up to the late 1990s when civil rule was reintroduced, and perhaps beyond. The most prominent features in these explanations are well covered in such scholarly works as the "prebendalist perspective" of Joseph (1991), the " lame leviathan" (Callaghy, 1987) and the "patrimonial state" (Ikpe, 2000). Most of the prominent features that are articulated by these scholars namely, nepotism, administrative inefficiency, political corruption, political instability and an evident erosion of the moderating and regulatory function of the state are also well captured and placed in proper perspectives in the concept of the state capture by the World Bank (2000).

The present acute governance crisis in Nigeria can partly be traced to the colonial beginnings of the state in the country, while the rapid erosion of the capacity and functionality of the state is largely attributable to the manipulation of the authoritarian nature of the colonial and postcolonial state by its officials. In this sense, the postcolonial state in Nigeria perfectly fits into such categorisation as "repressive and feeble" or "fragile and absolutist". In other words, the state is repressive because its offices and institutions are mostly personalised and possibly criminalised, while it is feeble because it is incapable of moderating the activities of its officials or even performing the most basic of its functions, the security of the lives and properties of ordinary citizens, effectively. Obviously, this marks the genesis of the governance crisis in the country.

The Fourth Republic Experience

The Electoral Process

Election is central to democracy. This is mainly because it affords the people the opportunity of participating in the selection of their representatives and leaders. Quite importantly, it is highly probable to bring competent and skilled people into politics and governance through this process. This probability is more profound when credible and transparent elections are conducted because such a process guarantees that today's winners can become tomorrow's losers, or vice-versa. However, elections alone do not constitute the electoral process. The other important aspects include the electoral laws on party registration, party funding, electioneering campaigns, voters registration and other similar activities. It is, therefore, the efficient management and effective administration of all of these that guarantee the actualisation of the Aristotlean notion of politics, which links the development and, indeed, the survival of any political system to the sanctity of its electoral system.

In the light of this, it may not be a mere coincidence that no other challenge or problem has ever brought Nigeria closer to the brink of disintegration than rigged and fraudulent elections. The stories were almost the same in 1959, 1964 and 1965. In fact, the aftermath of the 1965 elections in the Western region significantly contributed to the country's first military coup d'etat and, ultimately, the civil war. Evidently, Nigeria's electoral processes during the ill-fated Second and Third Republics did not fare better. The controversial annulment of the results of the 1993 presidential election evoked the memories of the country's civil war when the initial struggle to re-validate the results gradually took the form of an ethnic agenda that was pursued solely by the south-west.

The reintroduction of civil rule since 1999 and the conduct of three general elections are yet to restore hope in terms of an electoral process that

can help in the effective management of legitimacy and governance crisis in the country. While the 1999 exercise, in spite of its trappings of a "pacted affair" that involved "huge arrangements for power transfer negotiated by cartels of elite group interests, be they ethnic, social-class based or both" (Adekanye, 2005:11), was probably overlooked because of the need to ease out the military from the governance of the country, there was no cogent reason why the 2003 and 2007 exercises should suffer from lack of credibility as much as they did. In the case of the 2003 general elections, it is appropriate to note that the political space that was deliberately constricted to limit the number of parties that could legitimately participate in the electoral process was only brought to an end on 17 December, 2002 when the Supreme Court ordered the Independent National Electoral Commission (INCE) to register more political parties. Incidentally, the provisions of the 1999 constitution on this matter are quite clear. Another contradictory action that was most probably meant to influence the 2003 elections and the entire electoral process was the dissolution of the democratically elected local government councils throughout the country without making arrangements for elections to be conducted as clearly required by the 1999 constitution (Ogunsanwo, 2003:12). Yet, elected officers at various levels across the country supposedly derive their legitimacy from this constitution.

The election, coming after twenty years when the last of such exercise was conducted by a civilian administration, also came with a lot of apprehension in terms of the possibility of violence. In the light of this, and the fact that the police was evidently incapable of ensuring peaceful voting in 120,000 polling stations across the country, the armed forces and other agencies of government were requested to lend a hand especially in suspected flashpoints. In spite of all these, serious violence still characterised the exercise all over the country. There were also serious evidences of lack of adequate preparation on the part of INEC as many voters could not find their names on the voters register, in many parts of the south-east, just as there were multiple voting and other electoral frauds in several other places. Although Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, the ANPP presidential candidate in that election, could not sufficiently prove his case of electoral fraud against President Obasanjo's victory, the initial posting of the name of the PDP governorship candidate, on INEC's website, as the winner of the election in Lagos state meant that so many things went wrong with the process. In fact, a school of thought is of the opinion that if not for the vigilance of Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the eventual winner in Lagos state, and the mayhem his supporters were known to be capable of unleashing, that initial result on the commission's website could have stayed. In spite of the controversial election results across the country and, more importantly, the widespread criticisms that followed it from both domestic and international monitoring groups, the whole exercise was still

accepted as part of the democratic learning process.

However, the conduct of the 2007 general elections showed in many ways that the generality of Nigerian politicians and administrators have imbibed very little from democratic principles. Just like in 2003, INEC's preparation for the elections was evidently poor just as the execution of the project was utterly shoddy. While its promise on the application of advance technology in the registration of voters failed, the electoral body equally failed in such other areas as the provision of ballot boxes and papers, ink, writing materials and other essentials. A curious aspect of this abysmal performance on the part of INEC was that the shortages were more noticeable and profound in the areas controlled by the opposition or where the candidates of the ruling party were more likely to lose. In this connection, Clement Seweje (2008:14) argued that INEC's shoddy preparation was probably more deliberate than being accidental. This opinion might further be concretised when examined against the background of the Commission's unilateral banning of some estranged members of the ruling party from contesting.

It was, therefore, not surprising that the 2007 elections like the previous ones under INEC were marred by several irregularities and fraudulent practices such as multiple voting, ballot stuffing and snatching of ballot boxes. Remarkably, the collation process attracted more criticisms as results were altered frivolously in some instances, while they were outrightly falsified in others. At the end of the exercise, a coalition of Independent Observers Group in the country described the whole election as a "sham", while the European Union said the process "cannot be considered to have been credible". In addition, the EU castigated INEC for its "administrative failure on a national scale", just as it wondered how the electoral body "usurped the role of Nigerians in determining the legitimacy of the outcome of the elections". In its final report, the EU submitted that given the lack of transparency and evidence of fraud, particularly in the collation process, there can be no confidence in the result of these elections" (Nigeria Today, online, 24 August, 2007). Such reports and similar others, which helped to show that the exercise fell below minimum international standards, in so many ways contradicted INEC's own assessment and "its appropriating 80 percent success to the conduct and administration of the 2007 elections" (Okunade, 2008). Obviously, they also constituted part of the evidences that led to the upturning of the initial electoral victories of Governors Osunbor and Agagu of Edo and Ondo states respectively. While Adams Oshiomhole replaced Osunbor in 2008, Agagu was replaced by Olusegun Mimiko in 2009. Several other results were also set aside, at different levels across the country, by the numerous election petition tribunals set up in the aftermath of the 2007 exercise.

Finally, the controversial and fraudulent nature of the conduct and result of this election, more than any other factor, accounted for the classification

of Nigeria's electoral process under the same category with those conducted about the same time in Kenya and Zimbabwe in the 28 April-24 May, 2007 edition of *The Economist*.

In a similar vein, the open declaration by President Yar'Adua that the election, which brought his administration into office, was flawed and the subsequent constitution of the Muhammadu Uwais Electoral Reform panel were all evidences of a faulty electoral process. In this connection, it is appropriate to note that the faulty electoral process, in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, which consist of excessive abuse and manipulation in the registration of political parties, supervision of campaign and election funding, and the conduct and administration of elections, is at the core of the legitimacy and governance crises that successive administrations have encountered. There is obviously no doubt that electoral corruption or fraud constitutes a huge part of the governance crisis, which any serious democratic administration must address in Nigeria.

Security of Lives and Properties

If credible elections are the hallmark of a democratic system, then the security of the lives and properties of the generality of the citizens should be primary objective and function of any modern state or government. In the case of Nigeria, this function is clearly stated in section 14(2b) of the 1999 constitution as the primary concern of the state. By implication, it means that any hindrance in the actualisation of this goal should attract the greatest attention from the government. Successive administrations in the country, especially since after the first military coup, seem not to fully reckon with this fundamental purpose of the state. In fact, the government is even linked at times, with several threats to the lives and properties of the ordinary citizens, while in some other cases it is often alleged that suspected culprits are covered up because of their connection to the government. In our discussion of this aspect of governance crisis, we shall concentrate on electoral violence, political assassination, abduction and kidnapping. However, this does not mean that such other threats to life and property like road and air mishaps, drug counterfeiting, diseases, violent robberies and other dangers leading to preventable deaths are less important.

From available evidences, political and electoral violence, arson, brigandage and the assassination of key political actors seem to have phenomenally increased since the return of civil rule in 1999. Notably, the long list of unresolved assassinations that most probably had political motives include Chief Bola Ige (2001); Mr. and Mrs. Barnabas Igwe (2002); Alhaji Isyaku Mohammed (2002); Dr Harry Marshal (2003); Chief Aminaosari Dikibo (2003); Mr. Funsho Williams (2006); Dr. Ayo Daramola (2006); Mr Kehinde Fasubaa (2009); Mr. Dipo Dina (2010) and several others across the

country. In addition to this long list of important public figures that included serving ministers, prominent lawyers, political stalwarts and aspirants, the abduction of Dr. Chris Ngige, the governor of Anambra state in 2003, introduced a more dangerous dimension to the spate of insecurity that pervaded the political space. Although the government was at no point in time directly linked with any of these violent crimes, the shoddy investigation and prosecution that followed most of these cases and which have probably emboldened evil perpetrators clearly manifest the depth of governance crisis in contemporary Nigeria.

All of these are obviously different from the violent disturbances that have severally disrupted deliberations in many legislative chambers across the country since 1999. While many legislators were, for instance, badly injured during such violent disruptions in Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Ekiti, Bayelsa, Edo, and several others, at different points in time, Dr. Safana lost his life when he slumped in the House of Representatives in 2007 during one of such instances. In addition to these disturbances and distractions, there are examples of elections backlash that have manifested as multi-faceted threats to peace, stability and development in the country in the Fourth Republic. These, according to the 2008 report of Human Rights Watch, include arson, large scale vandalism, abduction and kidnapping for a ransom most probably by political gangs that were armed during the electioneering campaigns. Many of such gangs that did not surrender their ammunitions after the campaigns now engage in "more generalised forms of violent crime" (Adeyeye, 2009).

In brevity, it is bewildering that fifty years after political independence the state in Nigeria is so much incapacitated that it cannot effectively guarantee the security of the lives and properties of the generality of the citizens. In Aba, Abia state and several other parts of the South-east and in Edo and Ondo states, organised armed robberies forced economic activities to a standstill between late May and June 2010 following the closure of commercial banks for fear of attack. Shockingly, robbers reportedly write to banks in Anambra State before they struck. This was in spite of the over "350 police check points manned by 1,800 personnel" drawn from the dreaded Mobile Police Division (*The Punch*, Wednesday, 23 June, 2010, p.80). In the face of all of these, quite a large population of ordinary Nigerians now resort to self-help and such other primitive ways of life like invoking curses to scare away criminals! Obviously, this is a clear manifestation of lack of confidence in conventional security apparatus and it was in recent times, renewed when Benin traditional worshippers marched round the major streets in Benin City, Edo state, in June 2010. The net effect of all that we discussed here is that the level of insecurity in the country discourages foreign investors just as it also prevents decent people from participating in politics and, ultimately, helping to address the governance crisis.

The Economy

There is, perhaps, no other sector that manifests the effects of governance crisis as much as the economy. Remarkably, while the primacy of the function of any government in respect of the security of the citizens cannot be disputed, the link between the economic well-being of the people and their safety can also not be underestimated. This mutually reinforcing relationship between security, economy and the management of governance crisis in Nigeria can be better understood through a critical examination of the performances of such key sectors as transportation, communications, power generation and distribution, education, health, housing and several others in the country. Although almost all of these sectors of Nigeria's public bureaucracy had become atrophied due to years of mismanagement under successive military regimes, we shall concentrate more on education, health and power in our discussion. In consonance with our selection of the Fourth Republic, it should be noted that the major economic policy since the return of civil rule in 1999 is built on the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) at the federal level, the State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS) and Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (LEEDS) at the state and local government levels respectively. In view of the overbearing presence of government in the country's public life and overarching concern on the poor performances of the key institutions and agencies, the "centrepiece of NEEDS/SEEDS is the gradual disengagement of government from all business through the active participation of the private sector in socio-economic development" (Erinosho, 2008:3). In concrete terms, the actualisation of this policy framework involved the deregulation of the economy, dominated largely by the privatisation of many government enterprises and monetisation of such benefits as housing, health and transportation. Quite importantly, it also included the enactment of the laws establishing the Independent Corrupt Practices and allied Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and such other efforts that were meant to encourage probity in governance.

In the education sector, the effects of the reform programme manifested more in the higher education arm where operational licences were granted private investors. This, notably, gave access to many qualified candidates who could not be accommodated in the existing government-owned universities, with the result that nearly 1 million students were as at 2009 enrolled in the more than 100 universities that operate in the country now. The net positive effects of this policy, apart from the fact that it gave access to more students for education, included the reduction of pressure on government and its insufficient infrastructure, encouragement of the public institutions to improve their standard and finally, the breaking of the monopoly of public

universities, which hitherto, was often exploited for the incessant strikes in the public institutions in the course of seeking legitimate redress over poor and debilitating conditions of services. In another sense, the expansion of the educational space has positively affected the gender equation in the country because "available reports indicate that the private institutions are accommodating sizeable proportion of female students who are likely to be empowered to access good jobs and positions in the society" (Erinosho, ibid).

However, there are several noticeable weaknesses in the formulation and implementation of the educational policy, especially in respect of general economic development and the management of governance crisis in the country. First, the increasing licensing of private institutions right from the primary up to the tertiary levels may give a wrong impression that the government has little or no interest in this key sector of the economy. The renewed vigour of the government in its efforts at ensuring basic education, through the Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme, does not help in any significant way as funding and purposive supervision remain major problems. A critical examination of the budgetary allocations to the education sector during this period can help us to understand this problem better. Second, if the general motive of most service providers in Nigeria is to count, then it is more than likely that profit making shall be the overriding interest of most providers of private institution facilities. In this case, quality might be sacrificed particularly when the state has substantially lost its capacity as a regulator in Nigeria. In fact, there is yet to be any significant evidence that the products of the high-fee paying private institutions are better than their counterparts from the public institutions. Finally, another effect that has to be addressed in the overall interest of education and good governance in Nigeria is that good education is a key to empowerment, good jobs and social mobility, and an unequal access to it can worsen the effects of the yawning gap between social classes in the country and ultimately the governance process.

The health sector just like education has equally received some attention in the last decade in Nigeria. In specific terms, successive administrations during this period identified such key challenges as the collapse of infrastructure, dwindling budgetary allocations to the health sector and the massive flight of qualified health personnel to other countries where their practice could be more productive and rewarding. In view of these challenges, the government's health sector reforms were mainly aimed at making healthcare services accessible, equitable, cost-effective and efficient in the context of best practices in other parts of the world. Quite importantly, the reforms also shared in the views of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on the need to reduce the burden of infant and maternal mortality, the scourge of malaria, HIV/AIDS and its opportunistic diseases including other non-communicable diseases. In order to concretise its plan for reforms, the

Obasanjo administration revised the 1988 national health policy with the re-aim of strengthening primary health care in the country. In addition, it re-organised the entire public health care system, increased funding for health programmes, refurbished existing teaching hospitals across the six geographical zones in the country and generally boosted the morale of health personnel by improving their working conditions all over the country. Similarly, the government strengthened the activities of the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA), facilitated the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) as well as partnered various international agencies on the control of such diseases as malaria (The Roll Back Malaria Initiative), polio and HIV/AIDS. In a similar vein, the liberalisation of the health sector enhanced private participation in such essential services as medical laboratory, mortuary, ambulance and radiography. All these were also complemented by the over sight function of the legislative arms at different levels of government across the country.

However, in spite of all these, the health sector in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has obviously performed abysmally. Again, in line with our framework of analysis, the erosion of the moderating and regulatory function of the state in Nigeria is the first major reason that accounts for this. The Federal Ministry of Health, and the Minister of Health, Professor Adenike Grange and the Senate Committee on Health were all, in 2008, arraigned in connection with the mismanagement of the unspent ₦400 million budgetary allocation. This partly implied that in spite of the insufficient allocations to public agencies and institutions, officials still divert resources for personal use. It also meant that budget tracking was either ineffective or not in existence because the discovery of poor budget implementation should not wait till the following year. Another aspect of the poor healthcare delivery since the return of civil rule in the country is the increasing level of quackery both in the acquisition of knowledge and its practice. Obviously, this is equally traceable to the fragility of the country's education sector and the state itself. Finally, the continuous poor ranking of Nigeria in most of the international reports, in the last ten years of democratisation in the country, can also be used to evaluate the success of its health sector reforms. In the 2009 United Nations Human Development Report, for instance, Nigeria was ranked 158th out of the 182 countries that were assessed. The indices used in the survey included life expectancy, education as well as income and purchasing power. The key aspects of the HDR that are of particular relevance to our discussion include the ones, which put "life expectancy in Nigeria at 47.7 years compared to 82.7 years in Japan, Nigeria's per capita income at $1,969 against that of tiny Djibouti which was $2,061" (Sunday Punch, 30 May, 2010, p.10). The report also says that 53 percent of the citizens in Nigeria lack access to clean water. Obviously, this report and several others by UNICEF and other international

agencies show that Nigeria's health sector, in spite of the country's decade-old democratisation, increased funding and even the reforms, still performs so abysmally. Apparently, no economy can thrive when such key sectors as education and health encounter the type of huge problems they face in Nigeria.

Finally, there is a link between the performance of the power sector, economic growth and the management of governance crisis in Nigeria. Just like the other key sectors that we have discussed so far, the performance of the power sector at the dawn of Nigeria's Fourth Republic was grossly inefficient. As at 1999 the combined production of the entire power plants in Nigeria could hardly take care of the energy needs of a quarter of the country. Therefore, in line with the reform policy of the Obasanjo administration, the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was commercialised and transformed to Power Holding Company of Nigeria Plc (PHCN Plc) with a view to unbundling the sector and attracting private investors. Other arrangements in this sector included the Independent Power Projects (IPP), which such States as Lagos, Rivers and a host of others embarked upon. In a similar vein, the policy also facilitated other joint power projects like the building of the Okpai power Station in Rivers State by the NNPC and Agip Oil Company. In fact, this particular project contributed "450 megawatts (MW) to the national grid as at September 2005" (The Punch, Wednesday, 4 October, 2006, p. 14). Above all these, the Obasanjo administration in the twilight of its life partnered a conglomerate of Chinese businessmen to build power plants in Alaoji, Papalanto, Omoku, Geregu and Omotosho. In view of the spread in the distribution of these plants and the huge capital outlay that also drew loud criticisms, there were great expectations on the probability of a lasting solution to the power problem in the country. Surprisingly, more than three years after the commencement of what appeared as the boldest efforts in the power sector, the supply of electricity remains as epileptic as in the recent past, especially under the military. Alarmingly, the renewed promise of producing 6,000 megawatts, in a country that requires more than 20,000 megawatts by President Yar'Adua was unfulfilled before his death. Expectedly, President Goodluck Jonathan also promised that the country should expect a significant improvement in the sector before his term expires in 2011.

Obviously, the inefficiency in the power sector explains the continuous downturn of the economy in Nigeria. While several of the manufacturers who can still manage by supplying the energy that they require produce just to remain in business, many others have relocated to neighbouring countries with better infrastructure or folded up outrightly. Apparently, another key aspect of the economy during the period that we are discussing was that even with the modest economic growth, there was no corresponding human development. This is because the increase in national wealth and the settlement of external debts at that point in time did not, for instance, enhance a

generalised access to such good things of life as food, shelter, clothing, education, health, political, economic and personal self-esteem, which comes from an "individual's capacity to participate in meaningful and socially productive interaction with the other members of the community" (Olopoenia, 1998: 5).

The Judiciary

The judiciary is a very sensitive arm of government under any type of political system in the modern world. Even during Nigeria's long period of military rule, the independence and sanctity of the judiciary was often stated rhetorically. In view of this, the role of the judiciary in the management of governance crisis in the country cannot be underestimated. In the light of this, it was not surprising that the new civilian administration in 1999 emphasised the urgent need for reforms in the judicial arm. It should be noted that these reforms were quite noticeable in the areas of improved funding for the judicial organ of government, refurbishing of old structures and the building of new ones where necessary, computerisation of the administration of justice, salary review and, more importantly, the restructuring and reinvigoration of the National Judicial Council (NJC), the body in charge of the welfare and discipline of judges and other judicial officers.

However, in spite of what looked like a serious effort at reforming the judiciary for an effective management of governance crisis, there were several serious challenges that proved otherwise. It should, for example, be noted that there were instances of serious violations of the constitutional provisions on the principle of separation of powers. In Oyo state, for instance, Mr. Justice Isaiah Olakanmi, a former chief judge in the State, was investigated and recommended for dismissal in connection with corrupt and sundry malpractices under the Ladoja administration, while the succeeding Alao-Akala administration, under controversial circumstances, reinstated the judge in question and, thereafter, retired him without proper recourse to the NJC. Obviously, this case and other similar ones across the country manifested the disturbing elements of clientele and prebendal politics in the country as well as the meddlesomeness of the executive in the operations of the other arms of government. Similarly, the role of the chief justice or chief judge, as the case may be, in the impeachment procedure has been abused severally. Rather than comply with the constitutional provision on the establishment of an "impartial" panel to investigate the allegation of misconduct against either the President or Governor, it is amazing that the processes that led to the impeachment of Governors D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha, Joshua Dariye, Rashidi Ladoja and Ayo Fayose of Bayelsa, Plateau, Oyo and Ekiti states respectively, appeared to have served some political purposes. This is because in spite of the serious objections raised by the officers directly involved, the trials were

conducted sometimes in the absence of these officers or their legal representatives. The most recent example of this is the impeachment of Bayelsa state deputy governor in June 2010. In a related instance, President Obasanjo refused to comply with the verdict of the Supreme Court, in the case over the withheld allocations of the 20 Local Governments in Lagos state, by holding part of the allocations till the end of his tenure. In short, the performance of the judicial arm in Nigeria's Fourth Republic and the contemptuous conduct of some senior public officials against the judiciary have combined to impede the role of the judicial arm in the management of governance crisis in Nigeria.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The crisis of governance is undoubtedly an important obstacle to national unity, cohesion, democratic rule and development in Nigeria. Indeed, it constitutes one of the most prominent challenges that successive administrations encountered in the country's 50 years of political independence. In spite of various efforts at resolving the crisis, it seems that the state in Nigeria is merely running round in circles. Using the Fourth Republic that commenced in 1999 amidst great expectations of a new beginning as the point of reference, this paper discovers that rather than restore the autonomy and functionality of the state, the democratisation process seems to have worsened its fragility. In our view while the impact of the age long factors of ethnicity, colonialism and others cannot be underestimated in all of these, leadership failure and state incapacitation in the post-independence era appears to be more important causal factors. This is mainly because of the evident existence of elements of good governance during colonial rule and in the immediate postcolonial era in spite of the oppressive and autocratic nature of the colonial state. The hope of greater development was squandered and dashed with the first coming of the military in the mid-1960s, while it worsened under subsequent military administrations and civilian administrations as the state and its institutions were manifestly "captured" and personalised by their officials. The regulatory and moderating role of the state seems to be badly eroded in the Fourth Republic than ever before. The effects of this are felt in almost every aspect of the country's public life, but more profoundly in the electoral process, security of life and property, the economy and the judiciary among several others. This, therefore, explains the worsening effects of the crisis of governance in the country. In line with the general expectation that this crisis can better be resolved in a democratic setting, this paper is of the opinion that the first major step should be the discovery or identification of great leaders, preferably from the community or local levels, around whom functional public institutions can be built. In this connection, more civil society groups and different categories of professionals need to engage more in politics and public

affairs in general. In addition, a truly indigenous and representative constitution should be fashioned and effectively implemented.

REFERENCES

Adekanye, B. (2005). "Reforming the Character of Civil-Military Relations for Democratic Governance in Nigeria After 1999", Distinguished Lecture Series, No. 8. Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos.

Adeyeye, J. (2009). "Needed a State of Emergency against Abduction", *Saturday Punch,* 31 January, p. 64.

Ake, C. (1996). "The Political Question", in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.) *Governance and Development in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Billy J. Dudley,* Ibadan: Oyediran Consults International.

Callaghy, T. (1987). "The State as a Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative state", in Zaki Ergas (ed.). *The African State in Transition,* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Collier, R.(1982). *Regimes in Tropical Africa,* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dudley, B. (1973). *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria*, Ibadan, University Press.

Ekeh, P. (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17(1): 91-112.

Erinosho, L. (2008). The Social Sector under a Democratic Dispensation: 1999-2007, a paper presented at the CODESRIA/African Universities Social Sciences Faculty Seminar Series, University of Lagos, 5 March.

Ikpe, U. (2000). *Political Behaviour and Electoral Politics in Nigeria,* Uyo: Golden Educational Publishers.

Joseph, R. (1991). *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic,* Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Lewis, A. (1965). *Politics in West Africa,* Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press.

Ogunsanwo, A. (2003). Keynote Address in Anifowose and Babawale (eds.) *2003 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria,* Lagos: Frankad Publishers.

Okunade, B. (2008). "Foreword", in a paper on "The April 2007 Elections in Nigeria – What Went Right?", delivered by Professor Maurice Iwu at the Department of Political Science Public Lecture Series, University of Ibadan, 15 April.

Olopoenia, R. (1998). "A Political Economy of Corruption and Underdevelopment", Faculty of the Social Sciences Lecture Series, No. 10, University of Ibadan.

Olowu, D., Williams and Soremekun (eds) (1999). *Governance and Democratization in West Africa,* Dakar: CODESRIA.

Osaghae, E. (2002). *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence,* Ibadan: John Archers

Publishers Ltd.

Oyovbaire, S. (1984). The Nigerian State as a Conceptual Variable, *Studies in Politics and Society,* No. 2.

Seweje, C. (2008). "Lets learn from other climes", *The Punch,* Tuesday, 23 December, p. 14.

Sklar, R. (1966). "Nigerian Politics: The Ordeal of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 1960-65", in Gwendolyn Carter (ed.) *Politics in Nigeria: Seven Cases,* Harcourt, Brace and World Inc.

World Bank (2000). *Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate,* Washington, D.C., The World Bank.

Yagboyaju, D.A. (2008). Attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in a Weak State: The Nigerian Example, Journal of International Politics and Development (JIPAD), School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Kokomo, USA, Vol. 6, No.1 and 2, p. 8.

Newspapers

Nigeria Today (on line), 24 August, 2007.

Sunday Punch, 30 May, 2010, p. 10.

The Punch, Wednesday, 4 October, 2006, p. 14.

The Punch, Wednesday, 23 June, 2010, p. 80.

Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations and Corruption in Nigeria

OZY B. ORLUWENE

20

INTRODUCTION

It is an irony of history that almost 60 years after the Littleton Constitution of 1954 introduced federalism as a form of government, Nigeria is yet to conceptualise its efficacious utility as an instrument of independent co-existence of the units of a plural society. Nigerian federalism still remains in an embryonic stage not because the ingredient for growth and development are not available but because the political operators seem to benefit from its stunted growth. For a nation is recognised, respected and accepted in the comity of nations based on the holistic assessment of its development.

A close observer of the relations between the federal, state and local governments in Nigeria may conclude, and reasonably so, that the system has been characterised by the supremacy of the federal government over the state and local governments, especially during military rule. Several other factors also account for these but the most important is the oil economy that

has led to the dependence of the sub-national units on revenue from oil extracted from southern minorities of Niger Delta which is disbursed from the centre, endowing it with control over huge resources. This centrist trend in Nigeria's federalism has throw up series of debates about the structure of the federation especially as it relates to the viability and autonomy of the states and local governments and a form of sectional domination (Amuwo, et. al., 1998).

A close observation of the three post-independence constitutions of Nigeria, allocated jurisdictional power to the various tiers of government. In all cases, there are two legislative lists – Exclusive and Concurrent. The Exclusive Legislative List is for the central/federal government while the Concurrent is for both the federal and state governments. These lists constitute part one and two of the 1963 Constitution, parts one and two of the Second Schedule of both 1979 and 1999 Constitution. The allocation of item however, differs, reflecting different levels of non-centralisation. In addition, both the 1979 and 1999 Constitution contains in their Fourth Schedules the functioning of local government. Again, showing the recognition of local council as third-tier of government, thereby defining Nigeria's three-tier general principle in all federal system that adopt the dual list system, federal legislative action take precedence over legislative action of state government on the matters in the Concurrent legislative lists. But matters not found in either the Exclusive or Concurrent Legislative Lists are residual to the State government as in all federation.

The analysis of Nigerian federal constitution and experiences provides several areas of interface between and among the various tiers of government. But it has been characterised by poor and ineffective intergovernmental network. Despite the constitutional provision of various Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) institution and its operations in Nigeria for a long time, no serious attempt has been made to understand why these institution are not functioning properly. A poor intergovernmental network has led to policy and administrative failure, resulting in the collapse of many laudable development programmes by successive administrations. One aspect of the problem is the seemingly intractable nature of corruption in the local government system despite the lofty measures put in place by government to tackle corruption at that level.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

This work commences by making some pertinent comments that clarify and situate our analysis. We accept that federalism is enshrined in the division of works and responsibilities. It specifies who does and has what. But these divisions are not neat, exclusive or overlapping. As Dare (1980) notes

"governmental powers are not always clearly divisible". Further, federalism when practise rigidly is difficult and unreal. Autonomy or even sovereignty within jurisdictional areas is not real as several governments may relate to the some citizenry who are actually best served by support and consultation among constituent governments (Dare, 1980). More importantly, federalism as a system is characterised with overlaps and sharing of powers. Accordingly, Wheare, one of the greatest authorities on federalism argues that a system can only be said to be federal if there is:

> a division of powers between one general and several regional governments each of which in its own sphere is coordinate with the others; each government must act directly on the people, each must be limited to its sphere of action, and each must within that sphere, be independent of the other (*cited in* Kolawale, 2008).

Federalism as a system of governance is pragmatic, dynamic, utilitarian and evolving. It can only thrive on consultation, negotiation, compromise, bargaining and agreement between constituent governments. It grows under a system of mutuality and interdependence. Federalism seeks and is built on the need for cooperation and collaboration between governments in a sphere that is essentially characterised by shared functions and powers. Rather than compartmentalise roles and rigid adherence to constitutional stipulations that may promote isolation and solo effort, re-construct a framework and system of joint action, common purposes and harmonised effort through interaction, inter-wined influence and mutual interdependence (Stillman II, cited in Ikelegbe, 2004:427).

Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) refers to the political partnership between the national government and other tiers of governments; the states and local, is well appreciated and an "array of structures, processes, institution and mechanism for coping with the inevitable overlap and interdependence that is a feature of modern life" (Cameron, 2001:127). Generally, IGR has no standardised or universal meaning. But it can be classified in different ways. Ferguson and McHenry have identified three classifications as the most important categories. These involve:

(1) Vertical IGR – federal to state, state to local, federal to local;
(2) Horizontal – state to state or local to local unit, and
(3) Classification based on the objective of the relationship that IGR is meant to promote and establish: financial aid, information, contractual arrangement or other goals (1981:179).

Therefore, this paper focuses on the first classification. It, however, recognises the fact that IGRs are carried out mainly on matter of financial support and contract of mutual benefits between the centre and other

constituent units. However, our examination of the pattern of these relations will surely overlap and consider some pertinent issues under other categories.

Wright (1995) defines IGR as comprising all the permutations and combination of relations among the units of government in a federal system. He observes that IGR includes the activities and attitude of persons occupying position in all the units of government under consideration – federal, state, local, political, administrative, and judicial legislative or executive branches of government. Thus, IGR, which originated (in the 1930s) in the United States, encompasses several facts of governance that are different from and supplemental to federalism. Its major features distinguish it from a broader system of federal arrangement. As Walker notes, federalism is cheaply a constitutional, legal, jurisdictional, power-political and two-tier formal systemic concept. IGR are more compassing, multi-faceted, more functional, fiscal, administrative and more flexible and informal, though not lacking formal features (1995:22).

Walker (1995) like Elazer, sees IGR in broader terms involving a simple or complex network of interaction based on partnership. This involves matters of constitutional, representational, fiscal, administrative and juridical relationship between and among public officials at different level of government. These relationships are more reciprocal, mutually interactional and beneficial and could either be formal or informal, private or public. Thus, broadly defined, Ferguson and McHenry sees IGR or intergovernmental cooperation (IGC) as all forms of collaboration between units of government, more narrowly, it involves voluntary effort on the part of two or more units of government to provide services or solve mutual problems (1981:183). The major features of IGR include contract for simple sharing, interdependence activities, grant-in-aid and tax offset, etc. Indeed, IGR "is tailored to set each programme through the political process in which representatives of the federal, state and local governments and concerned private interests all participate" (Elazer *cited in* Mohammed, 2006:51).

Various scholars have conceptualised corruption in different ways. Smith cited in Musa (1991:13) defines it as "the diversion of resources from the betterment of the community to the gain of individual at the expense of the community". According to Porta and Meny (1997:4) is:

> A clandestine exchange between two markets, the political and/or administrative markets and exchange is an occult one since it violates public, legal and ethical norms and sacrifices the common good to private-personal, corporatist, partisan etc. interest. And such a transaction enables private actors to have access to public resources (contract, financing, decision making, etc.) by giving them an unfair advantage, between there is neither transparency nor competition.

The argument of Porta and Meny is that private accumulation is essentially at the root of corruption and as a form of anti-social behaviour. Corruption is inimical, unethical and anti-thetical to a nation's development.

Dunham and Alpert (2001) while discussing corruption believed that a distinction has to be made between ethical issues and corruption, even though they are related. Ethical problem for instance include accepting social gratification from clients, falsifying records, lying and other unsavoury practices. Corruption connotes the misuse of public office for personal gain. Put together, corruption and unethical conduct function to harm a system and render it moribund. The UN also has the following to say about corruption:

> Through experience, observation, information, discussion, reports, news papers, findings of commission of inquiry and of limited social-scientific studies, one can make and endless descriptive list of instances of corrupt conduct or practice. One can also give three various instances assorted label, bribery, abuse and/or misuse of office, illegal payment, kickbacks, tax, credit, and customs fraud; misappropriation and embezzlement; currency violation, forgery, false acting; real estate swindle and wind speculation; abuse of public grants, environmental damage, smuggling; violation of labour regulations, over-invoicing, over-pricing and transfer-pricing; illegal/illegitimate monopolisation and restraints of trade; hoarding; illegal flight of capital; exploitation of labour; fraudulent sales; adulterated food or hazardous drugs; act of constraints or distortion of development plans, etc. (UNO, cited in Odekunle, 1991:93).

Gboyega sees corruption as:

> Any decisions, act or conduct that subverted the integrity of the people in authority or institutions charged with promoting, defending or sustaining the democratisation process, thereby undermining its effectiveness in performing its assigned role (Gboyega, 1996:6).

Central to Gboyega's thesis is the notion that corruption tends to carpet the integrity of those in authority and weaken them in performing their official assignment, in that once their hand are soiled they become incapacitated.

The New Standard Encyclopaedia Dictionary describes corruption as "viciously immoral or deprived, capable of being bribed or improperly influenced, dishonesty altered or debased by errors and changes and rotten or putrid". Similarly, *The American People Encyclopedia* (cited in Rodda, 2006:88) view corruption "as the fraudulent appropriation of money or other property by one entrusted with it". The Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC) (2000) see corruption as immorality, deprivation, bribery, dishonesty, false practice, debase changes, gratification, rottenness, etc. According to Carter (1991) corruption and fraud are used interchangeably in daily discussion and can be said to be antithetical to transparency and

accountability; and issues like forgery, bribery, impersonation, breach of trust, graft, embezzlement, etc. entail corrupt practices, especially when internationally perpetrated.

So many public officials in Nigeria have soiled their hand at one time or the other by corruptly enriching themselves, by flagrantly embezzling public money, undue inflation of contract or over-invoicing thereby betray the public trust in them. It is safe to say that in Nigeria, because of the behaviour of many public servants, public accountability, morality and ethics are dead making the nation susceptible to all forms of atrocities perpetrated by the citizens.

In this study, corruption encompasses numerous unwholesome and sharp practices committed by government functionaries in collaboration with their associates, proxies, family members and relations both local and international. These practise include (but are not limited to) bribery and corruption, fraud, money laundering, graft, theft, embezzlement, mismanagement/ misappropriation/misapplication of resources, forgery, inflation of contract, conflict of interest, duplicity in duty, etc.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The nature of Nigeria federalism since independence has been such that the federal government sees itself as a "superior" to the states and the states on the other hand assume a "senior prefect" status to the local governments. This "big brother" mentality not only contradicts the essence, essentials and purpose of federalism, it retards its development and places the other two tiers of government at the operational mercy and benevolence of the central government (Kolawale, 2008:454). An interesting but unfortunate scenario is that the state tend to replicate to the local governments the behavioural arrogance they suffer from the central/federal government while the local government having no other tier of government below it; visit their own arrogance on the people they are expected to serve. These aforementioned scenarios not only promote but also facilitate corruption at the local government level through the instrument of intergovernmental institutions (FRN, 1999).

The constitutional provision in section 7(6) states that subject to the provision of the constitution:

(a) The National Assembly shall make provision for statutory allocation of the public revenue to the local government councils in the federation and

(b) The House of Assembly of state shall make provisions for statutory allocation of public revenue to local government council within the state.

The provisions of this section place the bulk of the financial burden of the local government on both the federal and state governments since he who pays the piper dictates the tune, it stands to reasons that both government exercises some measures of control over local governments. However, the Chairman of Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAPC) had since 2003 alleged that more than ₦35 billion of local government funds were diverted by states. The state governments have also been accused by the RMAFC of misappropriating allocations to the local government from the Federation Account and VAT (Agbabiri in Ikelegbe, 2004:148). The state governments are said to divert local government funds to other uses and to make all kinds of deductions (Ogbu and Onuwa, 2003). Sometimes, the states withhold the funds or simply delay them, thereby causing distortions in the operations of the local governments. As a consequence, actual funds released to the local governments are much less.

Moreso, chronicles of the abuses of the Joint State/Local Government Accounts (JSLGA) by the states, the funds is controlled by the states with little input and actual consent of the local governments. There are numerous deductions and consequently meagre remittance to the local governments. The list of items and projects for which funds have been deducted and consequent meagre remittance to the local governments include internal connectivity, community reorientation, committee and co-funding of provision of lunch to primary school pupils and agricultural loans. Others are Thuraya phones, computerisation of salaries, printing of almanacs, fertilisers, rural electrifications and stabilisation funds (Ogbu and Onuwa, 2003). In sum, only between 20 percent and 60 percent of allocated funds actually gets to the local governments.

The governments have particularly siphoned local governments through the transition and caretaker committees because the democratic and more specifically representative content of the local government system has been poor as the state and federal governments have preferred caretaker and transition committee to elected officials. Such committees, which were in place in most states between June 2002 and April 2004 were subjected to greater control and manipulation, being usually party men and lackeys appointed for rewards rather than competence hence accountable to patrons not the masses.

The state governments have the used the instrument of IGR to impinge on local government funds by directives or orders to contribute specific sums to state agencies, activities, joint programmes, celebrations and pet projects. For example, local government have been directed to contribute to state independent electoral commissions, state elections, and inauguration ceremonies. The local government have also contributed to the sustenance of the police, state security services, immigration, National Directorate of

Employment and other federal government agencies in their localities. Thus, local governments were compelled to buy 1000 Prado Jeeps in the Year 2001 for the police through the cost of ₦4.4 billion which has deducted from their allocation by the federal government. The local government were also made to contribute compulsorily to funding of national elections (Ikelegbe, 2004:148).

The state governments also interfere with the collection of local government taxes. There are encroachments on the taxation jurisdiction of the local governments. Sometimes, the state governments impose tax agents who collect revenue on commission for the local government. Such tax agents are difficult to control and have doubtful loyalty and responsibility.

A close personal observation reveals that the federal government has over the years encouraged corruption in the local government through a number of unconstitutional practice and directives on various seminars/workshops attendance in Abuja and other locations in the country. Seminars and workshops are lucrative avenue for siphoning money out of the local government system since 1 percent of the monthly statutory allocation is reserved as training fund. Many unemployed, retired, dismissed, educationally and professional unqualified individuals have, over the years, become consultants on local government affairs.

Many of these unqualified management consultants have milked the various local governments of millions of Naira from the training funds. These "emergency" consultants "train" local government staff at many unprofitable seminars at the local, state and federal levels. Seminars and workshop at the local level are usually for the non-unified staff, i.e. junior staff on Salary Grade Levels 01-06; while at the state level, they are for the middle-level and senior staff and sometimes the political functionaries. Those at the federal level are usually for political functionaries particularly the local government chairmen and their wives, the supervisory councillors, on some occasion, and top career officer, usually the directors of personnel management and finance respectively.

For the local governments are expected to train the non-unified staff (those on grade levels 01-06) while the State Local Government Services Commission (LGSC) is expected to train the unified staff (i.e. officers on Grade Level 7 and above). On many occasions, the LGSC in many States shirked from their responsibility in this respect and pushed the payment to the local governments. The simple question is: what do they do with their allocations on training and staff development? On some occasions, the LGSC has paid for the unified staff in this respect. Even when the commission does not pay, local government council officers find means to appropriate funds by claiming to have spent several millions of Naira annually on (worthless) seminars (Aluko, 2006:142).

The federal constitutional arrangement that did not give full autonomy to Local Government System (LGS) necessitated the need for the LGS to secure approval of expenditure above spending limit. The provision of the financial memoranda and the handbook on local government administration fixed the ceiling for spending by a local government at about ₦500,000.00 at a tune. However, because of galloping inflation in the country, the ceiling on the expenditure has been raised to ₦1 million. There is also a provision for sanction against any officer who decides to divide the sum into smaller units so as to circumvent the necessary approval at the state level.

The scenario and arrangement in itself is not a bad one, but in some states it has been said that local government systems must take care of the deputy governor, the commissioner of local government affairs and others who have hand in processing their request before approval is received. This occurs when it involves a major project, for which the total sum of execution is quite substantial, like the tarring of roads or the erection of shopping complex, among others. This practice invariably leads to contract inflation, and in some cases, to the outright abandonment of the project. This is because, the local government functionaries may also have built large some into the original quotation for the contract as their own share of the "booty". In the end, the amount left for actual execution may not be enough to complete the project (ibid).

More importantly, the constitution provides for the establishment of the Auditor-General of Local Government (AGLG). The AGLG which was created to ensure effective post expenditure audit for local government accounts has the problem of weakness in terms of the number of qualified staff, resources and other inadequacies of the office. The duties of the auditor-general are contained in section 39.1 of the Model Financial Memoranda for Local Government. However, rather than act as a watchdog for the masses against embezzlement of public funds at the local government levels, this office in many states has acted as partner-in-crime with fraudulent local government officials. Whole it does not perform its functions adequately in some state, in other, it dictates the terms on what to collect as kickback on any capital project in every local government (Orluwene, 2008:69). Moreso, its reports goes to the State House of Assembly and no provision is provided for downward accountability. Therefore, citizens have little opportunity to check the financial performance of their local governments.

In a presidential system of government such as practised in Nigeria, the local government system legislature (which is made up of councillors representing their different wards in the local government area) is expected to perform the following roles:

(1)   Consider and approve the annual budget of the council, as presented

by the chairman of the local government with or without amendments;

(2)   Monitor the execution of the various approved projects in the council; and

(3)   Make and review the bye-laws of the council.

The major problem with this body in Nigeria is that member demand bribes from the executive branch of the council before passing the appropriation bills. Furthermore, they also want regular return from executive projects from the executive arm. Where the chairman of the local government proves difficult and does not release funds to the councillors on a regular basis, they start to find fault with him and the usual line of action is to threaten him with impeachment (Aluko, 2006:157).

The foregoing has shown that political instability as well as selfishness and corruption on the part of the political class, which is made up of many groups of people, mostly unelected, has continued to grow at the grassroots level with encouragement and collusion from the superior levels of government.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The paper has examined federalism and corruption at the local government level Nigeria. It equally argues that nature of our federalism, constitutional provision and primitive capital accumulation as the reason for corruption in Nigeria. Corruption is clearly an absence of accountability, law and order and widespread corruption is a symptom of a poorly functioning state and a poorly functioning state can undermine economic growth but good governance are measured by accountability, order and capacity. From the foregoing various cases of corruption are still prevalent in our IGR and proper IGR culture is yet to be established. It is our opinion that to allow corruption to persist in our is to allow social decay which also signals an enfeeblement of a people's culture animating principle and departure from the highest ideals of collective life.

To avoid the nation sinking deeper into the mesh of political decay, the government should evolve an accountability system that will evolve from a legal and moral liability for ensuring that public funds are used for public good, end or purposes. For it ensures that the best value is obtained for money spent. Egonmwan and Ibodje (cited in Nwankwo, 2003:130) advise that to enhance accountability for the action of the local government, the citizens and resident should be enlighten to take greater interest in the way their collective resources are being utilised. Thus, the primordial sentiments in them should be constantly re-awakened so that they can realise that each act of misappropriation or embezzlement of funds by public officers retards

the progress and general well being of the area concerned.

Money should be de-emphasised in national politicking. Government should do more in the area of provision of infrastructural amenities and people's welfare. The harsh economic condition should be mitigated to give the people new lease of life.

The judiciary should also ensure that it enforces diligently the provision of the relevant laws that have been put in place to check corruption. It is important however, to point out that the fight for public accountability is a challenge to every citizen of this country, unless it is won, our quest for development may well be in danger. Additionally, structure such as special corruption bureau/courts should be set up to handle corruption cases. The normal court processes is overcrowded and therefore, slow in dispensation of corruption cases.

There should be proper constitutional recognised autonomy for local government system in Nigeria as to avoid undue and unnecessary interference in the affairs of local government in Nigeria or in alternative the idea of constitutional recognition of local governments should be discarded and local government made a creation of States.

It is our contention that for the system of local government is to serve as a veritable instrument for transforming our rural society, the debilitating effect of misallocation, misapplication or misappropriation of resources must be tackled with great vigour in order to ensure total eradication or reduction of corrupt practices.

The creation of special democratic agencies that would enable the citizens organise themselves effectively, the strengthening of such legal body will also enhance the economic, social and political empowerment of the citizens, which would be inevitable tool that can be used to curb corruption.

Finally, individual operators of IGR or public officers should change their orientation and work ethics; for not much can be achieved unless and until individuals change their perception. After all, public accountability is a by-product of disciplined behaviour and moral integrity and not the product of the legal and institutional provisions on public accountability.

REFERENCES

Books
Aluko, J.O. (2006). *Corruption in the Local Government System in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Book Builders.
Carter, D. (1991). *Police Deviance, Criminnati*. OH: Anderson Publishing Company.
Dunham, R.G. and G.P. Alpert (2001). *Critical Issues in Policing Contemporary Readings Prospect Heights*. IL: Waveland Press Inc.
Ferguson, J.H. and D.E. McHenry (1981). *The American Federal Government (14th ed)*. USA: R.R. Donneily & Sons Company.

Walker, D. (1995). *The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching Towards Washington*. Chatham and New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.

Chapters in Books
Aiyede, R.E. (2004). "Constitutional and Institutional Basis of IGR in Nigeria", in F.O. Egwaikhide, R.E. Aiyede, S.A. Benjamin, H.D. Dlakwa and Augustine Ikelegbe. *Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria*. Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Ltd.
Amuwo, K., A. Agbaje, R. Suberu, and G. Hercult (1998). *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
Cameron, D. (2004). "Intergovernmental Relations, Governance and Development in Nigeria", in F.O. Egwaikhide, R.E. Aiyede, S.A. Benjamin, H.D. Dlakwa and Augustine Ikelegbe, op. cit.
Dare, L.O. (1980). "Perspectives on Federalism", in A.B. Akinyemi, P.D. Cole and W. Ofornagoro (eds) *Readings on Nigeria Federalism*. Lagos: NIIA.
Gboyega, A. (1996). "Corruption and Democratization in Nigeria 1983-1993: An Overview", in Alex Gboyega (ed) *Corruption and Democratization in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Friedrich Elbert Foundation and Agbo Areo Publishers.
Kolawale, D. (2008). "Nigerian Federalism and Local Government System: An Anatomy of Politics of Reforms and Development", in Kunle Ajayi (ed) *Public Administration and Public Policy Analysis in Nigeria*. Nigeria: Panaf Publishing Inc.
Mohammed, H. (2006). "The Nature and Role of Intergovernmental Relations in the US' Federalism: Lesson for Nigeria's Federal System in Post-Military Rule", in C. Ikonne and S.I. Radda (eds) *Nigeria-US Relations: The Challenges of International Understanding in the New Millennium*. Port Harcourt: The University Press.
Musa, Shehu (1991). "Anatomy of Corruption and other Economic Crimes in Nigeria Public Life", in A.U. Kalu and Yemi Osinbajo (eds) *Perspectives on Corruption and other Economic Crimes in Nigeria*. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice Law Review Sereies 2. Fabog Nigeria Enterprises.
Porta, D.D. and Y. Meny (1997). "Introduction-Democracy and Corruption", in D.D. Porta and Yves Meny (eds) *Social Changes in Western Europe: Democracy and Corruption in Europe*, London.
Radda, B.I. (2006). "Corruption as Catalyst of Poverty in Nigeria", in C. Ikonne and S.I. Radda (eds) *Nigeria-US Relations: The Challenges of International Understanding in the New Millennium*. Port Harcourt: The University Press.
Wright, D.S. (1995) "Democracy and Federalism in the United States: Intergovernmental Pattern, Policies and Perspectives", in O. Aborisade and R.I. Mundt (eds) *Local Government in Nigeria and United States: Learning from Comparison*. Local Government Publication Series, Department of Local Government Studies, OAU. Ile-Ife.

Journal and Newspaper

Ogbu, C. and Onuwa, S. (2003). "Local Government Funds; Revenue Commission Accuses State of Misappropriation". Lagos: *The Punch*, 18 August.

Orluwene, O.B. (2008). "Constitutional Provisions and Challenges to Local Government Administration in Nigeria" in the *Nigerian Academic Forum* 14(3) 63-71.

SECTION F

Leadership and Values

Electoral Violence and the Crisis of Democratic Experiment in Postcolonial Nigeria

OMOLERE M. EHINMORE and ODION S. EHIABHI

21

INTRODUCTION

This study discusses the nature of political participation as well as the attendant violence that characterised it in post-independent Nigeria. Central to the discussion is the identification of the various factors, which influenced electoral violence and the extent to which it has inhibited national cohesion and democratic values. The study concludes that, Nigeria should produce selfless and visionary leaders, as well as educated operating within the frame work of true federalism so as to make appreciable improvement on her development strides. The study, therefore, recommends discouragement of use of money and material gifts during elections, reduction of remuneration of political office seekers, commensurate punishment for culprits as well as independence of the electoral commission should be truly granted.

In all discussions on democracy, one fact stands out – that democracy provides the citizens the power of choice to politically decide who governs

them and also influence governmental policies.[1] It is also correct to posit that a democratic system gives sovereignty to the citizens to take total control of forces that will determine their welfare.[2] There are various schools of thought on the positive and negative impact of democracy,[3] but what is incontrovertible in the character of post-Cold War politics is that poor nations that are not "democracy compliant" may lose relevance in the competitive nature of international aids-politics and diplomacy.[4] However, the beauty of democracy is observable when its principles are respected. The respect can lead to developmental expansion in political, social and economic activities. This takes us to the question whether there is a direct or indirect structural link between democracy and development. Shola Omotola's, *No Democracy, No Development or Vice Versa?*[5] presupposes that there is a connection between the two concepts. In the Nigerian situation, it is a paradox. There seems not to be any remarkable landmark of development to justify the positive impact of democracy on the country's developmental calendar in the past fifty years of its attainment of political independence (1960-2010).

Books and articles in academic journal and newspapers have been published on all aspects of the Nigerian affairs, reflecting on the deplorable nature of her postcolonial socio-political and economic realities. The common conclusion is that, Nigeria is a failing, if not a failed state, the second most corrupt nation in the world, a disservice to the black race and an embarrassment to Africa.[6] This position, either exaggerative or precise, it is obvious from existing facts of history that Nigeria's greatest bane of development is that of mal-governance coupled with an apathetic, disoriented and malleable masses.[7]

A careful view of Nigerian postcolonial history shows that the palpable political, social and economic crises manifest themselves in various forms such as, the collapse of physical and social infrastructure, the high incidence of vandalasation of public property, the sporadic bout of ethno-religious blood-letting, pandemic fatal and menacing combats over resource control, the suffocating reality of corruption in public offices, high level of armed robbery, political assassinations, ritual murder, kidnapping, youths restiveness, collapse of formal and informal education at all levels, high rate of unemployment, desecration of value system, intensified religiosity without marked improvement in the spiritual and social quality of individuals and the society, mad thirst for foreign commodities and culture, civil war and undue military intervention in politics, the colonial heritage and its bequest of neo-colonialism, the lopsided nature of the federation coupled with unbalanced regional development, debasement of the judiciary, the glorification of fraud such as election rigging, manipulation of electoral process and the rabid quest for power and values and the accompanying venality have added in concert though in different circumstances to diminish

the nations corporate existence.[8] Of all the myriad features of postcolonial Nigerian state, electoral violence and its associated components forms the thrust of this discussion as it affects the stability of democratic values.

The study is, therefore, an historical exploration into the nature and causes of electoral crises and the impact on Nigeria's efforts at democratisation. The study equally examines the concept of, and factors which precipitate electoral violence and how this circle of violence has crippled the practice of democracy. Some recommendations were also suggested on how best to minimise electoral violence in the postcolonial Nigerian state. To achieve our goals, the study adopted the analytical methodological approach to examine the causes and impact of electoral violence in relation to the principles of democracy. For the sake of minimising ambiguity in the classification of principles of democracy, the study limited its scope to the clarification of the American State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs.[9]

CONCEPT OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT

In pre-colonial Nigeria, there we been pervasive and recurring phenomena of violence arising from conflicting claims to natural resources, unhealthy competition among groups for greater share of available resources, identify supremacy, power possession as well as ethnic and sub-ethnic conflict over ownership of and access to values.[10] Violence in the context of this study is not limited to an action which intends directly to hurt persons. It is conceptualised as tactical, psychological and confrontational devices adopted by political actors to win elections. All activities associated with election are presumed to be part of democratic practices. In that wise, democratic experiment as applied in this discussion means the various attempts by the Nigerian state to entrench democratic governance since political independence in 1960. The first attempt lasted for six years (1960-1966), the second survived for just four years (1979-1983), the third was the botched infamous 12 June, 1993 election, while the fourth attempt is still gradually taking roots since 1999. However, the paper demonstrates that one of the major factors that have militated against Nigeria's efforts at democratisation is electoral violence. Electoral violence in Nigeria manifests itself in various ways through historical institutions such as colonial heritage, ethnicity, poverty and unemployment, corruption, election rigging and provocative campaign practices. The continued perpetuation of electoral violence over the years has bridged the principles of democracy in the aspects of decentralisation of power, presence of multi-partism, universal participation, free and fair election, respect for the rule of law, dialogue and negotiation. Some of the causes of electoral violence in Nigeria are discussed below.

CAUSES OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

The colonial heritage and its bequest of neo-colonialism to a large extent have left much to be desired in apportioning causal factors to the upsurge of electoral violence in post colonial Nigeria.[11] The formation of the Nigerian nation as a colonial package with an ambiguous foundation is like a wound that refuses to heal. The colonial state laid the foundation of the present Nigerian state from an amalgam of nationalities. In this political configuration, the politics and governance of the colonial masters was characterised by "arbitrariness" and "absolutism" which defined their relationship with their subjects.[12] This autocratic affair made the colonial state become so powerful that it was regarded as the sole centre of power. The colonial politics was so buried in intense power monopoly and pride that it could best be described as existing for itself and its mother country.[13] The same mentality was inherited and extended to the post-independent Nigerian state by the indigenous leaders who took over from the colonial rulers.[14] There is little surprise, therefore, that post-independent Nigeria produces political leaders that are uncontrollably immersed in 'do or die' rush for power at all levels. The post-independent Nigerian state reflects the already divided polity with divide and rule tactics of the colonialists, ethnic rivalry, loose amalgamation and unhealthy competition for economic and political gains.

Due to over-concentration of power at the Centre, there is, therefore, the mad rush to acquire power because it provides the holder the authority to distribute the allocation of natural and material resources. That is why electoral violence has become a defining factor in postcolonial Nigerian politics. Concentration of power negates the principles of democracy. It is dangerous when power is concentrated in an institution or individual, because such power could be abused and the holder becomes a dictator. Democracy supports decentralisation of power because it promotes development as well as prevents tyranny. A central power from its seat of office may not be directly familiar with development in other parts of its communities. To promote even development, most democratic states have decentralised powers into three tiers of government; the central, state and local government. This is done in order to make the people enjoy what is commonly regarded in Nigeria as the dividend of democracy.

Ethnicity poses serious challenges to democratic rule in post-independent Nigeria. Ethnicity is conceptualised as manipulation of ethnic identity and loyalty in the context of competition for power and other valuable resources in a given socio-political milieu to discriminate against non-ethnic groups.[15] Ethnicity is not a political feature peculiar to Nigeria, it has taken a global dimension.[16] The seed of ethnicity was sown during British colonial rule and it got fully nurtured and promoted from 1960 in the era of conflicting

ideologies of early Nigerian politicians with ethnically motivated intentions both at the central and regional levels, especially between 1960 and 1965.[17] Cases of ethnic loyalty in Nigeria during elections have generated recruitment of wrong leaders who have enjoyed the support of their kinsmen. In most cases Nigerian leadership recruitment is not based on credibility but ethnic influence and loyalty hence the problem of adequate tapping and harnessing the human and natural resources. This development has generated ethnic conflicts of various sorts as well as electoral violence, capable of crippling democratic culture.

However, the ethnicity factor in Nigerian electoral and political process seems incurable as it is a natural and intrinsic issue. Nigerian politicians deliberately promote ethnicity to score political points and create relevance. In the present composition of the Nigerian state, it is difficult to sincerely talk about the presence of patriotic multi-partism. Since democracy as a political concept provides one with choices, it becomes necessary and logical that you can only make a choice were there are more than one options. It is this reality that has manifested in bloc vote casting along ethnic line since 1960.

Poverty and unemployment have been intractable obstacles to free and fair election and democratic governance in Nigeria since independence. Unemployment as a common bane of Nigerian development engenders poverty both of knowledge and material in turn engenders ignorance, gullibility, thuggery, hooliganism and election rigging in the bid of economic survival.[18] This explains why violence, militarisation, thuggery and the use of money to influence voters usually characterise elections in Nigeria. By using thugs and money for election rigging through snatching of ballot boxes, multiple voting, assassination, maiming of life and manipulation of election results in favour of candidates who have the money to buy their ways through democratic principles and fundamental human rights are grossly trampled upon. Invariably, most people are always disenfranchised, thus negating the democratic principle of universal participation which is the involvement of men and women in the process of electioneering and actual vote cast on election days.

Election rigging in Nigerian politics is worrisome and has a negative impact on the quality of leaders produced. This development often produces leaders who cannot harness and manage the resources of the nation as well as build up a solid democratic foundation and virile governance. For instance, in 2011 elections, about 117 cases of ballot box snatching were reported in Delta State.[19] The result of these ugly trends is the myriad post-election protests in all the states of the federation in recent times. In a democracy, political public leaders must be products of a free and fair election. That is, any political contest that fails to produce electoral victory at the end of the contest cannot be said to be democratic. In other words, a democracy must produce duly

elected political public office holders.

The agencies charged with the responsibility of conducting elections in Nigeria for about fifty years are not credited with reliability, integrity and trust. In the first instance, these agencies were set up by wrong institutions such as the military and ex-military godfathers who would still want to be part of the ruling government at all cost.[20] For example, FEDECO was inaugurated by the Olusegun Obasanjo military administration to conduct the 1979 state and federal elections in the country was characterised by massive election irregularities and as such accused by other political parties of manipulating election results in favour of National Party of Nigeria (NPN).[21] During Babangida administration, there was the transformation of FEDECO to National Electoral Commission (NEC) and this was equally accused of election malpractices in 1993. The change from NEC to independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which conducted the 1999, 2003 and 2007 state and federal elections did not change the culture of election violence and irregularities as there were still a barrage of accusations from various quarters on it of supporting the People's Democratic Party (PDP) to rig elections in its favour.[22]

Apart from the institutionalisation of electoral corruption, there also have been cases of bribery among the election actors such as the polling agents and the returning officers during elections.[23] All these unethical election activities engender violence and constitute bane to democratic governance in Nigeria. In addition, there are reported cases of election officers exploiting the poor rural and difficulty riverside regions to cause delay in the distribution of election materials to such areas most especially where their favoured supporters resides. As a matter of fact, most cases of election rigging in Nigeria are reported from the remote and rural areas of the country.[24] When the electoral body assigned with the responsibility of managing elections are corrupt, the end product of the elections always end in shambles. Election must be free and fair. All political parties should be given equal opportunity to participate in all stages of election activities. In essence, all parties involved in an election should be given the opportunity to express and organise themselves. In that process, the electoral body would have been seen to be fair in its duties to all parties involved which indicate respect for the rule of law. The law should have no favourite. That is, everybody is equally protected by the law and also can equally be punished by the law. In other words, there is no person that is above the law. As long as the society is democratic, everybody is equal. But in the Nigerian situation, it seems those who aid election fraud are never purnished, and as such they are above the law.

Most Nigerian politicians adopt violent, insulting, damaging and confrontational style of campaign which is not healthy for democratic culture. The use of abusive, foul and threat languages as well as the involvement of

ritual activities and actions of vendetta are reported to have characterised election campaign in Nigeria.[25] Election campaign is also associated with thuggery, fake promises, deceit and intimidation which have been intensifying spate of violence and as a result compromise the principles of democracy in the country. In a democracy, issues or matters that can lead to national conflict and embarrassment are easily avoided in the course of campaign. In Nigeria, election periods are always trying moments for its citizens because of the use of language of war by politician during campaign. It is this method of provocative campaign that fuels pre- and post-election violence in the country. Since 1960, there has been no election held in Nigeria without fatal casualties. This has become the political scenario in the country which only the bold, wicked and violent can freely participate in active party politics.

CONCLUSION

The study examined the postcolonial Nigerian electoral violence and how it has adversely affected the practice of democratic culture since independence. It equally maintained that democracy is germane to development but in the Nigerian context, it is paradoxical that what characterise democracy has been electoral violence, thuggery, ethnicity, foul play, rigging, abuse of human rights, disregard to democratic principles and executive lawlessness at various levels. The study discovered that, causes of electoral violence could be traced to colonial legacy of dictatorship and deceitful political configuration before and during handing over of power to Nigerians. Poverty and unemployment have also been viewed as factors inducing violence in the country since 1960. Another identified factor of violence here is corrupt nature of electoral officers who usually exploit the ignorance of the masses as well as geographical disadvantage of the rural areas to perpetrate electoral fraud.

The study suggests that in order to discourage electoral violence and promote democratic culture for socio-economic and political developments, there must be reduction of the remunerations of political office holders who are recruited through elective principles as candidates would no longer find political office lucrative. There should also be strong legislations of imprisonment for election rigging and thuggery during elections. Moreover, political education should be given to the electorate to enable the voters have the political awareness as well as moral education on electoral rules and the implications of the breach of such rules. It is also recommended that sharing of money and other materials as gifts during campaign and elections are discouraged by punishment on culprits. Reducing charges for the collection of forms for those vying for elective posts would help to reduce violence as candidates can no longer claim to have invested much money which he or she would later recoup. In addition, INEC should actually be made

independent as this would at least curb the culture of influencing and bribing electoral officers at INEC offices to manipulate figures, pictures and symbols.

As a matter of fact, various suggestions and unenforced legislations have been made on related issues but unfortunately, Nigerian political participants seem to have been addicted to electoral fraud. The Nigerian people desire endurable democracy but seem not to be aware of the possibility that the country lacks the capacity to manage the gains and pains of democracy because of underdevelopment. However, if these suggestions are accepted, problems of election crisis as well as those of democratic growth would be reduced drastically if not totally solved.

REFERENCES

1. *See*, for example, T. Fotopoulus, *Towards an Inclusive Democracy*. London: Cassel, 1997, K. Janda, J.M. Barry, and J. Goldman, *The Challenge of Democracy Government in America*. Boston: Houghton Miffli Company, 1992, J.M. Blum, E.S. Morgan, et al, *The National Experience A History of the United States to 1877* Part one. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc. 1973, and the various editions of *Journal of Democracy* just to mention a few.

2. A.B. Zack-Williams, "No Democracy, No Development: Reflections on Democracy and Development in Africa", *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 28 (88), pp. 213-223, 2001, cited in S.J. Omotola, "No Democracy, No Development or Vice Versa?", in H.A. Saliu, J.F. Olorunfemi, U.Lateef and S.B. Oludoyi (eds.), *Democracy and Development in Nigeria* Vol. I.(Lagos: Concept Publications Limited, 2006), p. 27.

3. Some of the arguments have been discussed in S.J. Omotola, "No Democracy, No Development or Vice Versa?", pp. 30-32.

4. Ibid, p. 26.

5. Ibid.

6. *See* Richard Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*. Cambridge, 1991, Toyin Falola, *The History of Nigeria*. West Port CT., Green Wood Press, 1999, Eghosa Osaghae, *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence*. London: Hurst 1998, Karl Maier, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis*. London: Penguin, 2000, all cited in Ayodele Olukoju, *A Plan for the "Re-Organization" of Nigeria*, Faculty of Arts and Education Public Lecture, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria, 27 November, 2003, p. 4.

7. Ayodele Olukoju, *A Plan for the "Re-Organization" of Nigeria*, p. 5.

8. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

9. A.G., Ghiorgis www.asmarino.com>Home>Articles

10. Roberts, N, *The State Accumulation and Violence: The Politics of Environmental Security in Nigeria's Oil Producing Areas* (Ibadan: NISER, 1999), pp.42-43.

11. Ayodele Olukoju, *A Plan for the "Re-Organization" of Nigeria*, p. 5.

12. C. Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 6.

13. A. Agagu, *The Nigerian State and Development: A Theoretical and Empirical Explorations* (Ibadan: Flag Publishers, 2004), p. 6.

14. D. Olowu, "Transition to Democratic Government in Africa," in D. Olowu, K. Soremekun and A. Williams (eds.), *Government and Democratization in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 1995), p. 10.

15. S.I. Akinde, "Ethnic Pluralism and Challenge of Democratic Consolidation: The Nigerian Case," *A.A.U: Afican Studies Review*, A. Journal of the Department of History and International Studies, A.A.U., Akungba-Akoko, Vol. 9, 2010, p. 123.

16. E. Osaghae, *Ethnicity and its Management in Africa* (Oxford: Malt House Publishers, 1994).

17. B. Fayemiwa, *Tai Solarin: the Man and His Rebellion* (Nigeria: Flocel Publishers, 2001), pp. 45-46.

18. O. Omoruyi, "The Politics of Oil: Who Owns Oil: The Nigerian State or The Community?" *The Guardian*, Wednesday, January 24.

19. O.S. Ehiabhi and O.M. Ehinmore, "Nigeria and the Challenges of Credible Political Leadership Since 1960", *Canadian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 7 (4), 2011, p. 139.

20. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

21. *Newswatch*, 1999, p. 13.

22. Ibid.

23. This information was gathered from local news in Nigeria.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

13. C.C. Aka, *Diseases and Development in Africa* (Washington: The Brookings ...

14. E Olowu, "Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa", in D. Olowu, K. Soremekun and A. Williams (eds.), *Governance and Democratisation in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 1995), p. 10

15. S.I. Asein, "Ethnic Pluralism and Challenge of Democratic Consolidation: The Nigerian Case", A.I. U.P (*Ikom Studies Review*, A. Journal of the ... and International Studies, A.A. U, Akungba-Akko, Vol. 2, 2010, p. 132

16. E. Osaghan, *Politicks and its Management in Africa* (Oxford: Malt House Publishers, 1984)

17. R Pasemang, *The Edaucation and Social in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Lighthouse, 2001), pp. 63-66.

18. O Omotoye, "The Politics of Oil: Who Own Oil, The Nigerian State or The Community", *The Guardian*, Wednesday, January 24, ...

19. S. Raji, Joel and O.M. Ekanmore, "Nigeria and the Challenges of Citizle Political Leadership Since 1960", *Canadian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 7 (4), 2011, p. 136.

20. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

21. Meremikwu, 1996, p. 11

22. Ibid.

23. The information was gathered from local news in Nigeria.

24. Ibid.

Ondo Local Government Since 1976: An Analysis of Democracy and Development

AJISHOLA OMOJEJE

22

INTRODUCTION

Democracy and politics are not coterminous phenomena and as such they do not share the same ideological principles and philosophical positions. While democracy emphasises a political system of majority rule for the utmost benefit of all, politics in its entirety connotes the exposition of the complexities of man. Putting them together, therefore, democracy, as a variety of politics, could be said to be an advanced and an accepted system of politics and governmental setup in today's world. Given its right place in politics and putting it in proper political perspective, democracy breeds development in a tremendous way. The rule of law and its application must be properly followed while citizen's rights and privileges must not be trampled upon with disregard and impunity.

Thomas Jefferson, writing to Joseph C. Cabell in 1816 said, "The way to have good and safe government is not to trust it all to one, but to divide it

among many, distributing to everyone exactly the function he is competent to" (www.wikianswers.com). This short but pungent aphorism clearly define the purpose why local governments were created in Nigeria.

The aim of life is nothing but happiness, and the governments having realised this fact strive day by day in other to ensure that citizens are given their rights and privileges. Governments, therefore, would have been relevant if the graph of the yearnings and aspirations of its citizens is positively skewed towards absolute satisfaction. The third-tier government system in the country, the local government system, was created purposely to bring the government closer to the grassroots so that government would be all-inclusive and development would not only be sporadic but would also permeate the nooks and crannies of the country.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CREATION: A CONCEPTUALISATION

The term "local government" has been defined in different ways, depending on the orientation and perception of its users. Awa (1981), in his own opinion, conceptualises the local government as a political authority set up by a nation or state as a subordinate authority for the purpose of dispersing or decentralising political power. It is, therefore, a territorial non-sovereign community, possessing the legal right and the necessary organisation to regulate its own affairs. He goes further to say that local governments are not sovereign, unlike independent nation-states, but they are subordinate government which derive their existence and powers from laws enacted by a superior government (Awotokun and Adeyemo, 1999).

The local government is also defined as the act of decentralising power, which may take the form of de-concentration or devolution (Wraith 1984). De-concentration involves delegation of authority to field units of the same department, and devolution refers to a transfer of authority to local government units or special statutory bodies such as schools board. From this perceptive, one can see local government as a lesser power in the national polity. It is an administrative agency through which control and authority relate to the people at the grassroots or the periphery.

Emezi (1984) perceives local government as the system of local administration under local communities that are organised to maintain law and order, provide some limited range of social amenities, and encourage cooperation and participation of inhabitants towards the improvement of their conditions of living. It provides the community with formal organisational framework which enables them to conduct their affairs effectively for the general good. These definitions given by Awa, Wraith and Emezi have some colonial undertone. For instance, Emezi emphasises more on maintenance of law and order and the provision of limited range of

social services. In essence, the conceptual view of local government is basically a function of space and time factors. For example, in colonial times, native administration was primarily established for the maintenance of law and order. With independence, emphasis was shifted from this to the provision of social services. Whallen (1976) views local government as a given territory and population, an institutional structure for legislative, executive or administrative purposes; a separate legal identity, a range of powers and functions authorised by delegation from the appropriate central or intermediate legislative and within the ambit of such delegation, autonomy including fiscal autonomy.

Gboyega (1987) argues that there exist two basic classes of theories of local government. The first class attempts to justify the existence or need for local government on the basis of its being essential to a democratic regime or for practical administrative purposes like responsiveness, accountability and control. While the second opines that effective local government institutions are neither democratic in their internal operations nor admit a responsiveness, accountability and control. Therefore, this position can also be amplified into different schools of thought with emphasis on the functional responsibilities of local government.

In his view, Ola (1984) opines that these schools of thought include:

(a)   The Efficient-Service School
(b)   The Developmental school and
(c)   The Democratic Participatory School.

The democratic school of thought holds that local government functions to bring about democracy and to afford opportunities for political participation to the citizens as well as to educate and socialise them politically. This viewpoint has been corroborated by Keith-Lucas, Bulfer and Mackenzie. The efficiency school argues that what is central and important to local government is not the bringing about of democracy but, rather, that local government must be judged by its success in providing services up to a standard measured by a national inspectorate. Sharpe further opines that the efficient performance of these services is so compelling that, if local government did not exist, something else would be created in its place. The developmental school defers from these over its ethnocentric bias in favour of the developed Western democracies. It argues that from Alex de Tocqueville and J.S. Mill to James Bryce and to contemporary theorists such as James, Sharpe, William Mackenzie and Hugh Whalen there was the emphasis on Western Europe and America.

Undoubtedly, Anglo-American has been the chief of the democratic participatory school. Whereas, from the Western Europe side, the German School have tended to embrace the efficiency services school, particularly from Rudolf Von-Gueist to Georges Langrod. Therefore, the developmental

school really emphasises on how local government in the developing world can be categorised into two. The major functional items in the general category which sums up the ideas of the democratic participatory and the efficiency schools are, democratic ideals, political participation, protective service and infrastructural services. Under the developmental category are national integration, social and economic development, and manpower resources development. Arising from this definition, the government itself sums up the primary objectives of the local government as follows:

(a)   To make appropriate services and development activities responsive to local wishes and initiatives by devolving or delegating them to local representatives body:
(b)   To facilitate the exercise of democratic self-government close to the local government levels of our society, and to encourage initiatives and leadership potential;
(c)   To mobilise human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public in their local development;
(d)   To provide a 2-way channel of communication between local communities and government both state and federal (Adeyemo 2005).

Arising from the guidelines, the primary aim of local government is even far beyond the conceptual views of these scholars. However, in a broader scope, the functions of the local government include:

(a)   Collection of rates, radio and television licences;
(b)   Registration of births, deaths and marriages;
(c)   Collection of taxes and fees;
(d)   Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds and homes for the destitute or infirm;
(e)   Licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, wheel barrows and carts;
(f)   Establishment, maintenance and regulation of markets, motor parks and public conveniences;
(g)   Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, drains and other public highways, parks, and open spaces;
(h)   Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses;
(i)   Provision and maintenance of public transportation and refuse disposal;
(j)   Registration of births, deaths and marriages;
(k)   Assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a state; and,

(l)   Control and regulation of out-door advertising, movement and keeping of pets of all descriptions, shops and kiosks, restaurants and other places for sale of food to the public, and laundries (Arowolo, 2008).

The 1976 Local Government Reforms and the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions were enacted purposely to make local government the bedrock of national policies as implied in the second objectives above. Akpan, putting it in a much more relevant perceptive especially to present-day local government arrangement, defines it as "the breaking down of a country into smaller units or localities for the purpose of administration, in which the inhabitants of the different units or localities concerned play a direct and full part through their elected representatives, who exercise power or undertake functions under the general authority of the national government". Thus, local government exists in such a place where elections take place as at when due, to enable the people have a direct or indirect participation in the matters that concern them. It also connotes decentralisation of power or authority. The description of local government in Nigeria appears more detailed and relevant to the present circumstances, as it sees local government as a representative government which can be autonomous. It also advocates the cooperation of the people in their development projects and also stresses the need for local government to be relevant to the needs of the people.

The local government system in Nigeria is a creation of the British. It has over time experienced changes in name, structure and composition. Between 1930s and 1940s, for instance, local government was known as chief-in-council and chief-and-council, where traditional rulers were given pride of place in the scheme of things. In the 1950s, election was introduced according to the British model in the western and eastern parts of the country with some measure of autonomy in personnel, financial and general administration (Nwabueze, 1982:20-21). It was on this premise that the heightened progress, growth and development experienced in the local governments in these areas were based.

During this period, heterogeneity was the hallmark of local government as there was no uniformity in the system and the level of development was also remarkably different. The introduction of the 1976 reforms by the military administration of General Obasanjo brought about uniformity in the administrative structure of the system. The reforms introduced a multi-purpose single-tier local government system (Ajayi, 2000:70).

The reforms also introduced population criterion under which a local government could be created. Consequently, a population of within 150,000 to 800,000 was considered feasible for a local government. This was done for easy accessibility and to avoid the creation of non-viable local councils. There

was provision for elective positions having the chairman as executive head of local government with supervisory councillors constituting the cabinet. This was complemented by the bureaucrats and professionals, such as doctors, engineers, etc. who were charged with the responsibility of implementing policies as spelt out by the 1976 local government guidelines.

There was a major landmark reform in 1991 which brought into the local government system a legislative arm. In addition, the Babangida administration increased the number of the local governments from 301 in 1976 to 453 in 1989 and 589 in 1991. The Sani Abacha administration increased the number to 774 local councils and the administrative sector of the local government also underwent structural changes (Ajayi, 2000:71).

For the past decades, more euphemistic phrases have been employed to justify people's participation at the grassroots. They include: "Development from Below", "Bottom-up Approach to Development", "Popular Participation", Bringing Government Closer to the People" and other pungent catchphrase to justify the argument for people's involvement in the affairs that directly affect them (Lawal, 2000:66).

Local government was established specifically for the purpose of institutionalising an all-inclusive and participatory democratic development for the resident population. Participation by the citizens in governance is one of the underlying precepts of democracy and modern-day notion of government. Local governments, therefore, serve as avenues through which the people participate in governance. This is done through participation in the electoral processes and decision-making in the local communities.

The local governments also serve as political incubators for budding politicians. It affords future leaders the opportunity to undergo political training through participation in local elections either at party levels or in the local government as councillors, chairmen or members of the states Houses of Assembly or the House of Representatives (CFRN, section 7, 1999). Also, due to the vast nature of the country, the presence of government whether at the federal or state levels will not be felt much at the grassroots, the resultant effects being neglect and distrust of government. In a bid to bring the activities of government closer to the people, local governments were created to serve as conduits through which government policies reach the people. Furthermore, local governments were created for administrative expediency. There are many functions that will be cumbersome for the state and federal governments to perform because of the distance separating them from the people.

THE MAKING OF ONDO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

According to history, the Indirect Rule system ushered in the Ondo native authority administration with the use of traditional representative of

indigenous administrative systems to administer the people under the supervision of the British as from 1916. Then, the *Osemawe* of Ondo was the sole native authority to administer the authority under the British administrative officer. All the districts, areas and a few selected residents were not expected in any form to exercise any executive function. All orders of administration were transmitted through the traditional ruler.

There was no form of delegation of authority and no noticeable development project of any form to the community – the roads were footpaths and tracks, the staff were poorly remunerated, hence the conspicuous master-servant relationship between the super-ordinates and the subordinates.

In 1955, the nomenclature of Indirect Rule was changed to indirect administration and this pointed out the importance of local government to political education of the people. The 1955 Constitution led to the emergence of four district councils in the defunct Ondo Native Authority. These district councils were Ondo Central District Council, Ile-Oluji-Okeigbo District Council, all subsumed under the Ondo Divisional Council.

For the first time, the local government experienced democratised two-tier system of government. Election was held into the Ondo Divisional Council, which metamorphosed into Ondo Local Government. Before then, the president of the council was the *Osemawe* of Ondoland, with high Chief E.A Akinkugbe, the *Sasere* of Ondo, as chairman. The constitution of the council made it compulsory to maintain all roads in the council area and its functions included maintenance of dispensaries and maternity centres.

The Ondo Central District as it was known generated revenue which was used for some services for the community. Ondo Divisional Council was in charge of the native courts. Other obligatory functions were education and maintenance of the traditional office of the *Osemawe* of Ondo. The functions included the provision of medical services and settlement for lepers in the leprosarium along Aratudin Road.

The system was in existence until 1963 when the district councils were dissolved and management committees were appointed. The management committee system paved the way for the existing divisional officers, who were civil servants delegated to manage the council.

Between 1969 and 1972, the local government experienced another policy that was added to the existing system. Some members were hand-picked only to serve in an advisory capacity to the sole administrator.

Ondo Central District Council witnessed the 1973 Local Government Reforms, which introduced the council manager system. Similarly, councillors were hand-picked to serve the council. Furthermore, Ondo Central Council Committee, Ondo Southern District and Ondo Western District Committee came together to form the Ondo Local Government Council with headquarters in Ondo town. There were 7 area committees in the council.

This was the system in 1976 when the federal military government introduced the uniform local government system throughout Nigeria. It was not quite long that disintegration occurred among the amalgamated district councils.

Ondo Southern District Council and Ondo Western District Council were dismembered and merged with Ile-Oluji-Okeigbo District, named Ifesowapo Local Government, while Ondo Central District Council was designated Ondo Local Government which was intact in shape and substance until it was bifurcated into Ondo West and Ondo East local governments.

When Ondo state was created in 1976, it was among the states that experienced local government reforms. This brought about uniformity in the local government structure which directed all local governments to run a single-tier system throughout Nigeria (The 1976 LG Edict). However, the Ondo Local Government was divided into Ondo East and West Local Governments on 1 October, 1996 by the Sani Abacha administration. It shared boundaries with Idanre-Ifedore Local Government in the east, in the north and south by Ifesowapo Local Government area. The town covered an area of about 16 sq. km. and had the following major towns:

(1)	Ondo town	(11)	Oloruntedo
(2)	Igbindo town	(12)	Orisunbare
(3)	Igbado town	(13)	Sasere
(4)	Igunsin town	(14)	Fagbo
(5)	Ilunla town	(15)	Awoduyi
(6)	Bolorunduro	(16)	Omifunfun
(7)	Bagbe	(17)	Irewa
(8)	Losare (Sati, 2007)	(18)	Oboto
(9)	Gbagia	(19)	Oladapo
(10)	Asantan	(20)	Laje (Aderoboye, 2007).

The local government came under the control of the sole administrators and elected chairmen who directed the affairs of the local government. Moreso, the quality and quantity of services provided by the local government since 1976 could be attributed to its efficient development planning, though some of these plans were checked by shortage of funds and instability of the local government system of Nigeria.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN ONDO EAST-WEST LOCAL GOVERNMENT SINCE 1976

Ondo East and West local governments has made tremendous impact on the lives of the people of the community, although hindered by the clips of the state government, it could be said that the two local governments have since

their inception transformed the lives of the people from obscurity to limelight. However, mention could be made of some salient noticeable achievements of the local councils especially in the areas of health, agriculture basic infrastructure, and others.

Works and Road Maintenance

Since the local government came into existence. It has connected many villages to major towns and some roads within the towns are wearing a new look through good road networks. A typical example of the village road that leads to town is the Laje-Ondo Road, Bagbe-Ondo, which was said to be in a devastated state before but now motorable for motorists and many other village roads alike. So also the popular Gani Fawehinmi road which has changed its flooding story to a tarred road through the efficient plans of the local government (*Sunshine LG News*, p. 12).

In Ondo East, Fagbo-Bolorunduro Road as well as Sasere roads were made motorable in order to facilitate easy movement of farm produce from the interior to the urban city.

Agriculture and Rural Development

Agriculture in the local government is as old as the local government itself. This sector witnessed many community development projects, which has really assisted the farmers in producing more of their products, FADAMA irrigation programme, cocoa and palm kernel seedlings for farmers at subsidised rate and various workshops for farmers to educate them on new farm techniques or product. All these are efforts of the two local governments, in boosting agriculture and agricultural products in the local government.

Education and Community Development

The local government is not only saddled with the responsibilities of improving and maintaining good standard of education in the area, but had executed government plans tremendously in the total number of schools by the way of renovating, refurbishing classrooms reconstructing of some dilapidated school buildings, as well as distribution of free exercise books to public primary school and other education functions in the local government.

Agricultural Impact

Agriculture has been playing a significant role in ensuring food security for the teaming population of the country, through the introduction of modern techniques into farming activities. Apart from this, it is imperative to say that a lot of foreign exchange has been earned through this sector, thereby contributing significantly to national GDP.

Agricultural department of the local government has been contributing its quota in agriculture in the community. This department in the local government is involved in crop production, animal husbandry, agricultural extension services and agricultural credit schemes to the benefactor of the grass root in particular and the entire economy in general. To this end, some activities were embarked upon in the last few months, which few are still in progress others are still on the pipeline. Therefore, they are highlighted as follows:

Raising of Cocoa Seedlings

In order to boost revenue sources of this local government, this department has established cocoa nursery for hybrid seedlings. These seedlings are being disposed to the community at subsidised rate.

Palm Plantation

This department some years ago established about 400 stands of oil palm trees within and outside the local government secretariat. The Palm Plantations are yielding the desired oil palm fruits needed to boost internally generated revenues every year. These seedlings are being disposed to farmers in the community at a subsidised rate.

Fadama Project

During the dry season (off-season), various species of vegetables are usually planted along the river bank at the back of the secretariat. The department is saddle with the responsibilities of maintaining these vegetables and some considerable amount of money has been generated through sales of matured ones.

Maize Plantation

The department has made it as a necessity to cultivate at least 1 hectare of land for the planting of maise. Funds generated from these products are used as revolving loan.

Floral Beautification

In an effort to beautify the local government secretariat complex, some ornamental flowers were planted round the council secretariat. These flowers are being given adequate attention and maintained by the agriculture department.

Animal Husbandry

In the effort to contribute to the protein intake of the communities in particular and the economy in general, the local government established poultry farms which consist of the recurring of 4-week old cockerels and recurring and sale of broilers.

Recurring of Layers

After the proposal had been considered, layers pen were constructed and the rearing of layers has been in progress and ready to be disposed to the community at subsidised rate.

Extension Services

This is another major task being undertaken in the department. Dissemination of current agro-technological information to the local farmers in the local government. The department educators make use of the pilot farms where demonstration of the use of such information in various wards and villages were enhanced.

Apiculture Production

The department also ventured into honey production and has hives stationed within the local government premises. Efforts are still in progress to harvest for the community at subsidised rates.

Problems of Ondo East-West Local Government

Local Government system in local Nigeria is such that the powers of a third-tier government was given to them in principle but in practice, the reverse is the case. The Ondo West and East Local Governments were controlled by the state government in such a way that they operate at the behest of the state Government. Evidence of this was noticeable during the Adefarati administration between 1999-2003 when the chairman of both Ondo West and East local governments, Chief Alfred Adesida and Jimi Adepoju were impeached (A.A. Adesida) following trivial allegations.

Evidence of elements of control of by the state on local government is also noticeable by the various assertions and vituperations in forms of marching orders on the seemingly innocuous local governments, such actions by the state include the urge on ondo local council workers to call off the job boycott embarked on over perceived insecurity following the crises that trailed the dissolution of the councils (*The Nation*, p.c.).

Also, evidence of political control and encroachment was noticeable in ondo state after the declaration of Olusegun Mimiko by the election petition

tribunal. Equipped with the powers of a governor, Mimiko's first task was the dissolution of the 18 Local government council's chairmen on the political alibi that their election to office was not done according to the established constitution (*The Nation*, Tuesday, 14 April, 2009). Further still, it is obvious from the way and manner in which the state positioned it that the jugular of the local councils is in the firm grip of the state (*The Nation*, 11/3/2009).

Following the imbroglio which trailed the coming of the labour party into political power in Ondo state, the staff of Ondo East and West local councils and others in the state were cautioned against pitching tents with the local government chairmen belonging to the ousted People Democratic Party (PDP). Thus, making the local governments to be between two perilous alternatives (*The Nation*, 11/3/2009).

Also, the activities of the local government were unnecessarily clogged by the state thus preventing the ultimate benefactors from enjoying their rights and privileges in a democratised Nigeria. This is evident in Year 2009 when the court granted the Mimiko government its request to "flush out" the Ondo East and West council chairman plus other council chairmen in the state following a suit instituted against them on account of improper conduct of the local government election (*The Nation*, 9/4/2009).

This charge in baton brought the Local government face to face with the directors of personal management holding forth in the councils and the appointment of caretaker committee in place of a democratically elected council political functionaries (*The Nation*, 25/6/2009) The situation in Ondo was further exacerbated when the house of representatives split along party lines over the political debacle of the local government in Ondo (*The Nation*, 19/03/2009).

Worse still, the Ondo State house of assembly passed a resolution urging the federal government to stop allocation of funds to the councils (*The Nation*, 26/6/09). Whereas, the police, acting at the behest of the federal government directed the operators of the government in ondo to return the sacked local government chairmen (*The Nation*, 17/03/2009).

It does not necessarily follows, therefore, that the local government were created purposely to bring the dividends of democracy to the doorstep of the common man, since their activities could be chipped by the state as presented evidently above, the activities of Ondo (East and West) local government could be compared to the proverbial millipede who wishes to run at a great speed but which has too many legs.

Since 1976 when the Local government was created, the rate of development has been at a snail speed not only because of corruption and ineptitude on the part of the operators but because of unnecessary bureaucracy and protocol occasioned by incessant change of government, change of policy and gross mismanagement. Although the Ondo East and West local

governments have tried in their capacities to provide good potable water in form of borehole to the rural dwellers, also they had provided basic health centres to virtually all the rural areas including Obunkeko, Fagbo, Tekuile, Laje and Sokoto (*Sunshine LG News*) the people would gain more and life would be more worthy of living it. The local council would have performed better if they were allowed a hands free system in their affairs without unnecessary incursion from either the state or the federal government.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Despite the justification for the establishment of local government and its inevitable importance to the people at the grassroots, this tier of government seems not to have justified the reasons for which it was established. The questions that summarily come to one's mind are: Why has local government not lived up to its expectations? What are the causes of these seemingly conspicuous weaknesses? What are the challenges of the local government? And how can these weaknesses be corrected and the challenges met ? The problems of local government are multifarious in nature and it is the concern of this paper to explain them in details. These problems include finance. Despite the increase in the total amount of funds available to local government in Nigeria since early 1990s, its economic and financial profile is still very poor, relative to the development programme it is expected to carry out. This situation is not unconnected to the mismanagement and embezzlement of these funds by the local councils.

Furthermore, the local government has over the years experienced and is still experiencing dearth of skilled, technical and professional staff like qualified engineers, medical doctors, accountants, statisticians, economists, lawyers, town planners, to mention a few. The facilitating factors for this include: Low image of local government in the mind of professionals who feel and think that there is no job satisfaction sufficient to keep them at that low level of public service. Hopeless nature of the job attributable to, and arising from, low or no incentives for junior workers, no chances for creativity and innovation as well as perpetual delay in payment of salary.

Recently and more importantly, threat and fear of retrenchment of junior workers has derailed their psychological balance and affected their efficiency and output. Employment was based on favouritism, nepotism, political consideration and other primordial factors that replaced and displaced competence, qualification, experience and performance.

For the past decades, more euphemistic phrases have since been employed to justify people's participation at the grassroots. They include: "Development from Below", "Bottom-up Approach to Development", "Popular Participation", Bringing Government Closer to the People" and other

catchphrase to argue for people's involvement the affairs that directly affect them (Lawal, 2000:66). From all indications and convictions, research and physical observations have shown that there has been more hue and cry than action. Local government prepares estimates for its revenue and expenditure without proper recourse to, and due consultation with, the people for whom the exercise is being carried out to know their needs, their problems and potentials. A number of factors are responsible for non-involvement of people in their own affairs. These include:

Loss of interests in the project that will not benefit the chairmen and their cohorts. The age-long belief by the officials that people are ignorant, illiterate and unenlightened. Lack of political will by the leadership to run an open administration due a to selfish interest. Poverty of socio-political philosophy for change. Misplaced Priority Hard-earned and limited resources accrued to and raised by local government are always mismanaged. Priorities are misplaced; projects are done not according to or as demanded by the people but regrettably in tune with the selfish end and aggrandisement of the political leadership in collaboration with the senior bureaucrats at the local government level of administration. Coupled with this is the greatest bane of development in the Nigerian public service in general and local government in particular which corruption is. Reports of probe panels at the three tiers of government have revealed the culpability of civil servants. Corruption in low and high places, corruption has been rampant among the senior civil bureaucrats to whom the public funds meant for developmental purposes are entrusted.

Generally, wide-scale embezzlement by officials of the grassroots has made the needed development of the grassroots a tall dream and has rendered them financially incapable to discharge their constitutionally assigned responsibilities.

Generally, indiscipline is rampantly perceived and well pronounced among the workers in third tier of government. The senior officers who travel to their families away from their offices on Friday return very late the following Monday, or may decide to stay back until Tuesday; and the junior members of staff who directly or indirectly observe this more often than not are in the habit of playing truant with their jobs. Little or no commitment to duty has become a rule rather than an exception.

Offices have been turned to marketplaces where officers sell their goods freely. The rules that guide moral conduct and professional ethics seem to have, at worse, become cobweb that is so weak to tame the monstrous activities of the workers .Indiscriminate lustful desires are noticeable amongst the workers. The official's relationship between super ordinates and subordinates has been stained. Strict instructions handed down from top echelon to the bottom are either not followed or treated with levity as a result of the immoral relationship between the boss and subordinates. Official duties are seen as an

extension of private leisure. The *laissez-faire* attitude to work has arrested the efficiency of local government and has drastically affected its performance.

The degree of external influence and intrusion in local government affairs by the higher levels of government is worrisome and needs re-evaluation. Where the state governor unconstitutionally dissolves the entire elected council's officers without proper investigation on spurious allegations is not good for the future of local government administration in the country. Such external interference, indeed, subverts democratic process and undermines constitutional authority at the grassroots level. The crux of the matter is the 'almighty' power and misuse of it enjoyed by the state governments over local governments. Practically, and in true sense, local government in Nigeria lacks autonomous financial power. Local government is now considered as an extension of state's ministry. The inherent nature of this problem has caused subservience, a situation where local government waits for the next directives from state government before the former could think of, let alone embarking on developmental projects. This has made local government an object of control and directives. The major challenge that local government faces is the political control the respective state governor has on the local government chairmen. This is as a result of the fact that state governor sponsors election of most, if not all, of the chairmen. They are handpicked by the state governor rather than being elected. It is a clear case of who pays the piper dictates the tune. This again creates a problem of diversion of local government funds for personal use of state governor.

In Ondo State, for instance, there is this unholy alliance between state government and local councils in the State, where the state government constitutes Joint Action Committee, tagged 'JAC'. Federal allocations to local government are first deposited into a particular ad hoc account before calling for the committee meeting. This in a way paves the way for the state government to plan for the local government and release the money in instalments. The motive behind this is to divert the money to another thing entirely which does not have impact on the lives of the rural-dwellers but that will be beneficial to the state governor. Another thing is the interest that the money will generate in the bank. The implication of this is that few of the local government chairmen who have genuine intentions and are ready to perform are being discouraged. This again assigns more power and control to the state governor. The overall effect of this is the negative impact it has on the people of the grassroots as they are getting more and more alienated from developments. An illustration of this undue control of the state on the local government is the arrest and prosecution by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) of the former Enugu State Governor, Chimaroke Nnamani, on the allegation of diverting local governments' funds in the state. This shows the level of influence and control that state governors

have over local governments in their respective states.

This undue interference has incapacitated the local government from effective functioning on the one hand, and alienated grassroots people from enjoying social services delivery expected of local government on the other.

CONCLUSION

This paper has made efforts at highlighting the activities of the Ondo local government which became emanated, statutorily as from 1976, and which was bifurcated into Ondo East and West in 1996. Although, the local councils had strived in their efforts geared towards fulfilling the specific functions of the established local governments but hard as they may their efforts are still being clogged by the powers-that-be. If the local government were given the right atmosphere to operate, the so-called dividends of democracy would be thoroughly felt by all and sundry.

Recommendations

The suggestions of this paper are based purely on experience and direct observations and are, therefore, practical and problem-solving. The major purpose of creating local government is to bring development to the grassroots. In order to perform this adequately, there is need for the local councils to have strong economic base. In this connection, it is suggested that statutory allocations to them should be reviewed upward. In addition to that, the councils' shares of the federation account should be released to them directly to avoid lateness in the payment of salaries and arbitrary deductions by state government. Local government should have representation in the Revenue Allocation and Fiscal Commission, which determines and shares the federated revenue to the beneficiaries. It is not enough to have an upward review of councils' allocations, but also advisable for local councils to look inwards for improved Internally Generated Revenue (IGR). This will make them financially self-reliant. Besides, the local councils should look for ways of attracting industries to their areas as this will propel economic development and increase their revenue base. Section 7 of the 1999 constitution that places local government under state government has made the former to be a mere appendage to the latter. For instance, the Ondo State House of Assembly recently passed a bill which seeks to amend the laws establishing local councils in the state. The implication of this is that, intermittent reforms and undue interference do not make local councils stable tier of government. The fear of uncertainty could cause apathy and inconsistence in policy and ideologies. It is, however, appropriate to suggest that the National Assembly should be the creating authority of local government as this will rightly place local government as the third tier of government with full direction and control

over their respective localities.

Better welfare package for staff workers in any organisation makes things happen and as such they occupy important position in production process. This is because they put life into raw materials and change its form to satisfy human wants. In consideration of this, therefore, workers in the local councils should be adequately motivated in order to prepare them for the task of service delivery. Finally, the electorate should be educated and enlightened of the danger inherent in money politics, they should endeavour to vote for people of proven integrity rather than compromising their future and that of generation yet unborn on the altar of election.

It is the belief of this paper that strict observance to these suggestions would lift the local councils from their relegated position of tools of manipulation to the aspired status of instrument of change and development at the grassroots.

REFERENCES

Aderoboye, T. (2007). Focus on Ondo East Local Government Bolorunduro in Ondo State, *Trade Fair Bulletin*.

Adesida, A.A. and J. Adepoju were chairmen of Ondo West and East Local of Government between 1999 and 2001 when they were both impeached.

Adeyemo, D.O. (2005). Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective. *Journal of Social Sciences* 10(2) 77-87.

Ajayi, K. (2000). *Theory and Practice of Local Government*. Ado Ekiti: UNAD.

Arowolo, D. (2008). Local Government Administration and the Challenges of Rural Development in Nigeria.

Awa, E.O. (1981). The Theory of Local Government. *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol XV, No. I and II October/January.

Awotokun, A.M. and D.O. Adeyemo (1999). "Local Government in Nigeria: A critical Exploration" *Journal of Public Affair*, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Emezi, Cleus (1984). "Local Government in Historical perspective." *Nigerian Journal of Public Administration and Local Government* 2(2):50.

Gboyega, A. (1987). *Political values and local Government in Nigeria Lagos*. Malthouse Press Ltd Local Government Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provision Decree 198 9 (Decree No.15 of 1989, section 14).

Sati, B.I. (2007). Profile of Ondo West Local Government An NYSC Research Project.

Wraith, R. (1984). *Local Administration in West Africa*. London: Leonge Allen and Unwin.

Leadership and the Dilemma of Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria

OLUWASEGUN THADDAEUS ADENIYI

23

INTRODUCTION

The leadership occupies a central position in any human endeavour. It is one of the elements of effective and efficient management. The paper notes that the reason for inadequate strategic planning for effective delivery of democratic dividends and good governance is the unwillingness of Nigerian leaders, both military and civilian, to plan and execute good policies that uplift the standard of the teeming down-trodden populace. Nigerians have seen hopes dashed, reawakened and dashed again in the criss-crossing of inconsistent policies and abuse of rules and regulations. There has not been any dramatic change in the quality of average Nigerians since 1960.

Unemployment rate has continued to be high. Infrastructure and social amenities have not been provided and the available ones are in a state of decay. The change envisaged has not arrived. From the time of Tafawa Balewa to the present, the story of governance has befuddled Nigerians.

This is because the ruling élite act with impunity and show indifference to providing the so-called dividends of democracy to the masses.

This paper further examines governance as a *sine qua non* for ensuring effective development and social order, that development which has to do with both quantitative and qualitative changes in structure and performance. Good governance encompasses general values and basic freedom which include accountability, competence, enthronement of the rule of law and respect for human rights – all these are lacking in Nigeria today.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSES

The triple concepts – leadership, democracy, and good governance – have dominated international discourse for sometime now. The conceptual ambivalence and ambiguity that hover around them, however, relate to their multi-dimensional and multifarious perspectives. However, it is imperative to operationalise these concepts so as to properly situate them in the context of this discourse.

Leadership

The topic of leadership has been of interest for many hundreds of years, from the early Greek philosophers like Plato and Socrates to the plethora of management and leadership gurus, whose books fill airport bookshops. Seldom has the need for effective leadership been voiced more strongly than now. It is argued that in this changing global environment, leadership holds the answer not only to the success of individuals and organisations, but also to sectors, regions and nations. Despite recognition of the importance of leadership, however, there remains a certain mystery as to what leadership actually *is* or how to define it. In a review of leadership research, Stogdill avers that there are "almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept" – and that was more than 30 years ago! (Stogdill, 1974: 259).

Some definitions of leadership restrict it to purely non-coercive influence towards shared (and socially acceptable) objectives. Within such frameworks the likes of Hitler, Stalin and Saddam Hussein would not be seen as leaders, but rather as tyrants working solely for their own benefit and depending on threat, violence and intimidation rather than the more subtle processes of interpersonal influence more frequently associated with 'true' leadership. Such distinctions, however, are always problematic as the actions of nearly all leaders could be perceived more or less beneficially by certain individuals and groups (Bolden, 2004: 2).

The psychodynamic approach made famous by researchers at the Tavistock Institute, adds further areas for consideration: What are the

psychological factors that encourage people to become leaders or followers and what is it about groups, organisations and societies that give rise to the perception of 'leadership'? This approach emphasises the importance of understanding self and others and, through this, understanding the transactional nature of the relationship between leader and followers (Stech: 2004: 2). Thus, for example, it could be concluded that the leader fulfils a role of sense making, offering security and purpose to his/her followers and it is for this reason that they choose to remain followers.

In a recent review of leadership theory, Northouse (2004) identifies four common themes in the way leadership now tends to be conceived:

(1)   leadership is a *process*;
(2)   leadership involves *influence*;
(3)   leadership occurs in a *group context*; and
(4)   leadership involves *goal attainment*. He thus defines leadership as "a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal" (Northouse, 2004: 17).

This is a good definition, but it still locates the individual as the source of leadership. A more collective concept of leadership arises out of a review by Yukl:

> Most definitions of leadership reflect the assumption that it involves a social influence process whereby intentional influence is exerted by one person (or group) over other people (or groups) to structure the activities and relationships in a group or organization (Yukl, 2002: 2).

Even this definition obscures as much as it reveals. Just what exactly is the nature of this 'social influence'; how can it 'structure' activities and relationships; and when applied in a group setting who is the 'leader'? According to Bolden, whilst practitioners often see theory as separate from practice, within an applied field such as leadership the two are inextricably related. Traditional and contemporary theories of leadership strongly influence current practice, education and policy and offer a useful framework for the selection and development of leaders (Bolden, 2004: 2).

In this article we will identify with some of the most influential leadership theories but for time and space constraints we will not be able discuss them. They all offer a valuable context for the consideration of wider issues about defining leadership capabilities and development approaches. They are: Leadership traits, Situational leadership, Transformational Leadership, Charismatic leadership, Transformational Leadership, Servant and Team leadership, and Distributed leadership (Bolden, 2004: 3). However, we will adopt one of the types of leadership as our anchor for analysis of the subject of consideration. It is the political leadership which is peculiar to

contemporary African societies generally and Nigeria in particular. It consists of the Instrumental and Societal leadership.

Democracy

Democracy (Greek *demos,* "the people"; *kratein,* "to rule"), is a political system in which the people of a country rule through any form of government they choose to establish. In democracies, it is the people who hold sovereign power over legislator and government. In modern democracies, supreme authority is exercised for the most part by representatives elected by popular suffrage. The representatives may be supplanted by the electorate according to the legal procedures of recall and referendum, and they are, at least in principle, responsible to the electorate. In many democracies, such as the United States, both the executive head of government and the legislature are elected. In typical constitutional monarchies such as the United Kingdom and Norway, only the legislators are elected, and from their ranks a cabinet and a prime minister are chosen. In typical constitutional monarchies such as the United Kingdom and Norway, only the legislators are elected, and from their ranks a cabinet and a prime minister are chosen (Pious, 2007: 66-84).

Elections in a democracy cannot be façades behind which dictators or a single party must hide, but authentic competitions for the support of the people. In addition, democracy subjects governments to the rule of law and ensures that all citizens receive equal protection under the law and that their rights are protected by the legal system. Without any doubt, all democratic societies are committed to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise. Democracies recognise that reaching consensus requires compromise and that it may not always be attainable.

There are several varieties of democracy, some of which provide better representation and more freedoms for their citizens than others (Gaus and Kukathas, 2004: 143-145). However, if any democracy is not carefully legislated to avoid an uneven distribution of political powers with balances, such as the separation of powers, then a branch of the system of rule could accumulate power and become harmful to the democracy itself (Preuss, 1991: 353-364). "Majority rule" is often described as a characteristic feature of democracy. An essential process in representative democracies are competitive elections, that are fair both substantively and procedurally, which means equality among all citizens in all respects, i.e. equality in chances, in starting point, etc. Furthermore, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential so that citizens are informed and able to vote in their personal interests. Procedural fairness means that the rules of the elections are clear and set in advance.

Constitutional democracy as it is operated in Nigeria is predicated on the rule of law, but in a situation where those that swore on oath to uphold the constitution, are wantonly violating the constitution, then such characters on the political landscape should be tactically eased out of the system, so that the country can have a sustainable democratic culture, thereby deepening the roots of democracy in the country.

According to Robert Dahl (1965), there is no single theory of democracy; only theories. Yet however different many of them are from one another, these theories belong to a family, and they share some family resemblances. Most obviously, they reject the idea that one person or a few have any warrant to rule the rest. The reason this is so for most democrats is that they hold that persons are equal in some important ways and all deserve a voice in their governance. Democratic theories also share the view that each member of the political community carries elementary rational capacities that are sufficient to judge the conduct of government. For such judgments to have meaning democratic citizens are expected to be free in several important respects; they must be free regarding such matters as speech, assembly and conscience. For some, these sorts of freedoms are liberal rights, but for many democrats, these and allied freedoms are valued independently of our liberal inheritance as essential components of an open regime that is accountable to citizens (Dahl, 1965: 441-46).

Although all theories of democracy share a vision of government by free and equal citizens who participate in their own governance, it turns out that each of these terms has various meanings. Aristotle's view of democratic government does not mesh with most contemporary theories, such as Robert Dahl's pluralism, nor with the views of feminist writers like Anne Phillips or the postmodern orientation of William Connolly. For some, democracy is about protecting freedom from a government which favours rulers and their friends at the expense of the rest. For others, democracy should reflect the interests of citizens and remain responsive to the concerns of organised groups. Alternate democratic voices call for a more active government to address the problems of the most vulnerable citizens. Still others see obstacles to full democratic citizenship coming not only from the state but located throughout society in ways which diminish the egalitarian principle of democratic politics and which, therefore, need to be resisted.

Good Governance

The terms "governance" and "good governance" are being increasingly used in development literature (UNESCAP, 2009: 1). In other words, it is an indeterminate term used to describe how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources in order to guarantee the realisation of human rights. Governance describes the process of decision-making and the

process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented. Governance, according to Keohane and Nye (1989) "the emergence and recognition of principles, norms, rules, and procedures that both provide standards of acceptable public behaviour, and that are followed sufficiently to produce behavioural regularities". Governance can also be seen as both processes and arrangements that ensure orderliness, acceptable standard of allocation of resources (both human and material) and a legal framework within which national behaviours are shaped and controlled (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 417-427). Bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within our societies. Major donors and international financial institutions are increasingly basing their aid and loans on the condition that reforms that ensure "good governance" are undertaken (UNESCAP, 2009: 1). Thus, the term, though it seems to be something that could be objectively defined, is often very nebulous, defined in ways that are advantageous or in alignment with the agendas of aid organisations or authorities of developed countries (Poluha and Rosendahl; 2002: 276).

Good governance as a concept has steadily entrenched itself in the political and development discourse. It has permeated all sectors and become part of the common shared principles and virtues of different countries in the world. It has attained universality as an indicator of adherence to democracy and rule of law. It can be referred to as "broad reform strategy and a particular set of initiatives to strengthen the institutions of civil society with the objective of making government more accountable, more open and transparent and more democratic" (Minogue, 1997: 4).

Good governance has been closely linked to "the extent which a government is perceived and accepted as legitimate, committed to improving the public welfare and responsive to the needs of its citizens, competent to assure law and order and deliver public services, able to create an enabling policy environment for productive activities; and equitable in its conduct" (Sharma, 2007: 29-62).

There is a danger, however, that good governance has become a catchword and that few bother to consider its implications. In line with the pluralistic understanding of governance, scholars have applied a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of governance. Here, we give an overview of the approaches that have been used. They are; Argumentative theories, Cultural theory, Democratic and legal theories, Gender theory in political science, Network theory, Political economy and, Theories of system transition and transformation.

This research used the critical research method of identifying and analysing available secondary data and information to review the recurring occurrence of problems affecting the "Nigerian project" and made recommendations as to the way forward in the country's development.

NIGERIA: LEADERSHIP AND THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

At exactly 50 years of independence, the myriad of problems with Nigeria remain unabated. Nigeria's political problem started from the beginning of its independence. The result of this has been that Nigeria instead of advancing or forging ahead has remained stagnant in every sphere of her national life. This has caused a lot of damages in the Nigerian society like poverty, injustice, corruption, greed, tribal conflict, dearth of development in the agricultural, technological, medical, academic, business, and other sectors of the economy.

Various governments, both military and civilians on inauguration make pacts with the people, but these dreams hardly materialise and hopes for a brighter future are always shattered. As a result, most Nigerians have developed a cynical attitude that borders on distrust of the establishment at all levels. So, the Nigerian landscape is still littered with un-kept and broken promises.

Since the government of any nation is saddled with the responsibility of promoting the common good, it behoves common sense that it works towards its realisation. The common good is simply "the sum total of social conditions which allows people, either as groups or as individuals to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily."

As Nigerians expect much from their leaders, their hopes and aspirations become dashed when those they have hitherto expected so much from end up performing far below expectations. The situation even gets sadder when such leaders, rather than do things that could ordinarily help endear them to the hearts of the citizenry, become encapsulated in the crazy vagaries of misplaced priorities, disguised objectives, misguided maturity, and other deceptive devices that only end up doing the masses no good.

Nigerian leaders find ways to weaken or corrupt the states' institutions; they manipulate the poor and the uneducated; they play regional and sectional politics; they are masters of ethnic and religious politics; they draw no boundary between public and private interests, thereby illegally enriching themselves; they have no respect for human life and human dignity; and they rely on coercive agencies to do their biddings. And in so doing become masters of survival strategies and strategies of survival and of divide-and-rule. All of the aforesaid have caused unmitigated sorrow. Dreams are lost and hopes are diminished. There are many types of leadership and each has peculiar attributes. In this write-up, we will dwell on only two relevant types of political leadership which are peculiar to contemporary African societies generally, and Nigeria in particular. They are the Instrumental and Societal leadership.

We will touch on their attributes and how they affect changes in a society. At this juncture, we burrow from Eulau's (1963) typology of leadership, and

agree and submit that the two types of leadership common in contemporary Nigerian politics are the above stated ones (Eulau, 1963: 95).

The "Instrumental leadership" is a leader who uses power and influence primarily in the pursuit of private (personal, close family, cohorts) goals. Community objectives are secondary to an instrumental leader. The main concern of the instrumental leader is how he can use his office to achieve personal objectives. He may not be lacking in social/community commitments, but in practice more considerations are given to self over the interests of the society which he governs (Eulau, 1963: 96).

This development has been with Nigeria for sometime now because some of the leaders are mired in the pursuit of selfish and personal goals at the expense of broader national interests. Accordingly, Eulau continues that the "Instrumental" leader uses official power and influence primarily in the pursuit of private (personal, close family, cohorts) goals. Community objectives are secondary to the leader, as the main concern is how to use official position to achieve personal objectives. Such a leader, however, may not be lacking completely in social or community commitments, but overall more considerations are given to self over the interests of the society without minding the disruptive impact.

Other scholars such as Schapera (1967) and Kofele-Kale (1978) are of the opinion that there is a cluster of factors that breeds 'instrumental leadership,' including the symbols of office and ceremonies surrounding the office. In Nigeria and other African states, even the "ubiquitous walking stick" or a "staff" confers respect to the holder (Schapera, 1967: 21; Kofele-Kale, 1978: 84).

Contributing to the debate, Gardner (1978) contends that it is weak or the absence of effective institutional checks and balances are other factors that make 'instrumental leadership' possible. The availability of abundant resources to tap and steal is a good factor that breeds instrumental leadership in Nigeria. So, Nigerian leaders take undue advantage of these shortcomings and circumvent the few institutional restraints that are in place. The public treasury looting that has been on going in Nigeria is a good for the checks on power to be kept in working order (Gardner, 1978: 132-135).

On the whole, it is the combination of these factors that give the 'instrumental leadership' the elbowroom to become corrupt and acquire wealth through questionable means. Under these circumstances, the leader becomes the richest person in the community and, therefore, would bribe his/her way to remain in power forever. The instrumental leader uses official position to promote private and selfish goals, and he also likes "absolute power" and would hold on to power, as long as private objectives are achieved (Kofele-Kale, 1976: 84).

Given the above descriptions and the antecedents of Nigeria's past leaders,

it is clear that the majority of them were instrumentalists and opportunists. Virtually, all the leaders, for instance, was holding on to power, grabbing and hoarding as much money as he could possibly put their hands on without minding the effect of their behaviour and actions on the society.

On the other hand, the "Societal" leader is a public servant first and only secondarily a private person. The societal leader subordinates private narrow goals for broader community objectives. Power and influence are important only if they can be used to solve community problems. The societal leader is not 'power-drunk' and is likely to resign or make policy changes when it is convinced he/she cannot influence changes to the benefit of the general public. He is not the 'instrumental leadership' that creates more social crisis than solving them, at least in Nigerian context (Dike: 2008: 3).

ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

Some people believe that the greatest challenge confronting Nigeria as a nation for many years is that of organising free and fair elections. However, the followings are some other important national issues constituting impediments to the growth and development of the country since independence. Nevertheless, issues such as social services, industrial and infrastructural deficiencies, and style of governance, the judiciary and court judgments, non-adherence to federal character principle, election and electoral reforms debacles, oath-taking in politics, insecurity of live and property; human rights violation; Nigeria's external relations and constitutional defects, among others, cannot be discussed because of space constraints.

Lack of Will to Implement Development Vision

Nigeria is the second largest African exporter of crude petroleum and the sixth in the world, and is awash with numerous sound and captivating development visions, policies and plans; the nation's underdevelopment is associated with weak management and corruption on the part of the political leaders responsible for the development in of the country. Indeed, the country abounds with abandoned projects and policy summersaults, yet successive Nigerian leaders are found wanting. At the end of tenure, with non actualisation of the vision, and no regrets for the failure; no review, and no direction, the non-performing leader often aspires to continue in office even after his tenure has expired. If, and when, he leaves or "steps aside" or is forced out of office, the successor jettisons some of the visions of the previous leader(s), adds to the list, and repeats the circle of chanting vision slogans for inaction. He may even abandon all the programmes of the previous leaders for his 'new' ones, or panel-beat them to feign originality, ingenuity and sagacity (Eneh, 2009: 314-316).

On the long run, the negative consequences of this untoward attitude is that Nigeria has been overtaken in development by the middle 1990s by some other developing countries that were worse than the country in the 1960s. These countries include Malaysia, Indonesia, and Venezuela. Nigeria lags behind many sub-Saharan African countries, including Cameroon, Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Togo and Benin in GNP per capita. The income of the average Nigerian declined by 10 percent from 1993 to 1994, when the GNP per capita dwindled from $310 to $280. There was further decline to $260 in 1995. Anya (2008) asserts that there is poor development because Nigeria's political leadership has failed to work for social and economic transformation of the society. There is too high level of hypocrisy, insincerity and lack of integrity in the practice of our politics (Anya, 2008: 14-16).

Economy

Over the years, the Nigerian ruling class failed woefully to carry out any major economic development. Nigeria still remains a producer of raw materials for the developed countries. Agriculture, that was once the major backbone of the economy, was hurriedly abandoned for crude oil exploitation, having discovered the latter in the 1970s. The economy is now more one sided than ever before. Over 90 percent of government income comes from crude oil exportation. Manufacturing companies are producing at less than 26 percent of their capacity. Unemployment, high rates of inflation, a huge flight of capital and a valueless currency are the realities of the Nigerian economy. The mafia methods, the greed and corruption of this worthless Nigerian ruling class have plunged the country into a deeper economic crisis than when it came to power.

Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the increase in agriculture production in the preceding five years (i.e. from 1995) was sustained in 1999. During this period, the aggregate index of agricultural production rose by 3.3 percent, compared with 3.1 percent recorded in 1998 while the performance has been highly unimpressive in the later part of Year 2000. Consequently, this shoot up prices of agricultural commodities. Also, while the prices of agricultural commodities went up at home, the prices of Nigeria's major agricultural commodities in the world market declined substantially in 1999 relative to their levels in 1998. According to Central Bank of Nigeria's report, the dollar prices of all the commodities recorded declined during 1999. The decrease in prices ranged from 16.9 percent for soy beans to 30.8 per cent for cocoa (CBN Annual Report, 1999). This was attributed to increased supply and reduction in demand.

The manufacturing sector is another important sector in this analysis. Although the manufacturing sub sector recorded a moderate recovery in 1999 and 2000 from what it experienced in 1996. However, the sector still

finds it difficult to change the taste and orientation of the people for imported goods. According to a nation-wide survey conducted by the CBN which covered 560 manufacturing establishments, the weighted average capacity utilisation rate of the sub-sector rose from 30.3 percent in 1998 to 34.3 percent in 1999. The total cost of operations also increased by 14.2 percent over the level in 1999 owing mainly to high costs of raw materials, machinery and spare parts. The value of imported raw materials rose significantly by 34.7 percent and accounted for about 47.5 percent of the total value of raw materials used, while the value of locally sourced raw materials, accounting for 53.5 percent of total, increased by 5.8 percent (CBN Annual Report, 1999).

Corruption

One of the major challenges that faced the Nigerian nation over the years is the issue of corruption and its debilitating ancillaries – bribery, graft, fraud and nepotism. There are many unresolved problems in Nigeria, but the issue of the upsurge of corruption is troubling. And the damages it has done to the polity are astronomical.

As Agbase (2008) notes, Nigeria remains the most populous black nation in the world, rich in human and vast mineral, natural and agricultural resources, with great scholars and dazzling footballers, and has the most vibrant, irresponsible and iconoclastic press in Africa, nay the third world. It mints more billionaires in a year than all other African countries put together can come close to in a decade. Its democracy is a government of contracts and contractors by the few and for the few while the people wallow in poverty and misery in the midst of plenty. Abu (Abu, 2008: 13) opines that corruption is Nigeria's number one enemy. It is responsible for nearly all the pains that we now experience as a nation and as individual Nigerians. Corruption has crippled our economy, ruined our roads, health and educational institutions. It has put so much money in the pockets of a few privileged people and rendered the vast majority of the people poor. The level of impoverishment is getting more acute and the pains of the ever growing legion of the poor have become very unbearable (Agbase, 2008: 7, 13).

The menace of corruption leads to slow movement of files in offices, police extortion at toll gates and slow traffics on the highways, port congestion, queues at passport offices and gas stations, ghost workers syndrome, election irregularities, among others. Consequently, the issue keeps reoccurring in every academic and informal discussion in Nigeria. Some writers and opinion moulders say that corruption is endemic in all governments, and that it is not peculiar to any continent, region and ethnic group. It cuts across faiths, religious denominations and political systems

and affects both young and old, man and woman alike (Dike, 2008: 4).

In every society, the primary concern of reasonable, caring and competent leader should be the welfare of his followers. But in Nigeria, the case is different and so far while our leaders pay lip service to fight against corruption and poverty reduction, they wallow in self-adulation and sycophancy, and never seem to be tired of asking for more benefits for themselves. It is no wonder then that Nigerians feel no sense of patriotism, as the leaders appear insensitive to the plight of the masses. Sadly, corruption is now a high-profile issue in Nigeria; and those in political power are the main culprits.

News of corruption always oozes out from the National Assembly, but nobody has been prosecuted. And many of them often engage in frivolous oversea trips (with hordes of cronies and praise-singers) while civil servants in their states go for months without getting paid their salary. And some are known to have acquired landed properties in the United States, UAE, South Africa and Britain, among other places.

Government at the central level is the vessel that is leaking from the top and Aso Rock, states and other government parastatals and departments are the main fountain where corruption takes its source. Obasanjo commissioned a corruption commission (the EFCC); however, almost none of the senior officers or bigwigs in government offices taken to court by the commission in a country as corrupt as Nigeria have been jailed.

In its years of existence, the Independent Corrupt Practices (and Other Related Offences) Commission, ICPC, has remained a toothless bulldog, having very little to show as evidence of its success in the war against corruption. It almost watches like a spectator in the war against corruption. On the other hand, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, another anti-graft agency, faces enormous challenges from indicted former public office holders, who use their loot to buy their ways to freedom (Akintunde, 2008: 14).

Based on the fact on the ground, the country's circumstances are still so devastating for the vast majority of Nigerians in spite of the nation's enormous endowments, because the governments at various levels have no serious intention to turn things around, they lack the capacity to face the challenges or are still searching for the right strategies to tackle the core issues of true development.

Education Sector

For many years on in Nigeria, the educational sector has witnessed its own "ups and downs". It is an undeniable fact that the education sector in Nigeria had always experienced deep crises for many years. The schools, at all levels lacked teachers and basic infrastructure. They suffered from overcrowding, poor sanitation, poor conditions of service for teachers resulting in poor

quality of teaching and poor quality of products. This sub-sector has equally been burdened by frequent industrial disputes and strikes actions. It suffered from poor management, manifested in poor intra-sectional allocation, multiplicity of agencies with duplicated functions and inadequate coordination (Mudasiru and Adabonyon, 2001: 10-13).

Without any doubt in the aspect of tertiary education, Nigeria has more universities, polytechnics, technical colleges and other institutions of higher learning than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa put together yet, infrastructure underdevelopment, inadequate funding and human brain drain and sub-standard education are the bane of visible advancement in the sector.

In view of the enormous importance of education for national development, education must continue to be funded heavily by public funds through budgetary and non-budgetary provisions. A minimum of 26 percent of the annual budget of the state and federal governments ought to be allocated to the funding of education. On the other hand, the funding of education had consistently been reduced from a paltry 5 percent under Obasanjo and to mere 2 percent in the 2009 Budget, compared with the 12 percent during the short military era of Abdulsalami, which proceeded the present democratic era. It is pellucid that there is no significant improvement in university system since the 1980s (Owete, 2009: 21).

Related Social Problems

The incidence of street children, hazardous and exploitative child labour, child unemployment, poor nutrition and health, commercial sexual exploitation, girl prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, juvenile abortion and wastage/spilling of human lives/blood, teenage motherhood and child abandonment and dumping on the street, stunting and wasting (among under-five children), child begging, youth drug addiction, delinquency and crimes with the danger of the children becoming hardened criminals, and various other vicious means of livelihood, as well as various harmful traditional practices against women remain nagging symptoms of underdevelopment and deepening poverty in Nigeria. With the Nigerian population quite young (47% under-18, and 20% under-5), it is quite worrisome that about 570,000 Nigerians were infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in 1999 (FOS and UNICEF, 1999).

Despite the fact that there is an overdose of natural water in Nigeria, citizens groan daily under the weight of lack of safe domestic water. The average urban resident, who cannot afford to sink a borehole, resort to fetching water for domestic purposes from shallow wells or from streams up to 3-hour walking distances away (Njoku, 2006: 38).

At the current estimated 5.3 percent rate, urbanisation in Nigeria is among the highest in the world, occasioning overcrowding and its attendant socio-

economic problems, including environmental degradation (United Nations System in Nigeria, 2001 and Eneh, 2007: 314-316).

Out of the 130,000 graduates churned out from the Nigerian tertiary educational institutions annually, only 3,000 (10%) of them get employment, leaving 90 percent roaming the streets seeking opportunities for legitimate jobs or social vices (Gyamfi, 2006: 39). Graduate unemployment has occasioned sophisticated crimes and social vices of alarming dimensions, leading to palpable security conundrum, manifested in youth restiveness, cultism in schools, unprecedented wave of armed robbery, drug addiction and the attendant mental derangement, etc. (Eneh, 2009: 314-316). The parlous state of the economy with an ever-increasing army of the unemployed has only compounded matters. As the saying goes, "An idle hand is the devil's workshop." It is not surprising that the enemies of democracy always find a ready market to recruit those they use to perpetuate their evil deeds. Those who have carried out all the killing, looting and arson in the various ethnic/religious riots are sometimes able bodied, trained and educated people, who otherwise would have been usefully engaged in the development of the nation. Even the laws of the land are often decorative, as travesty of justice takes the scene.

Unfortunately the government had adopted an arrogant, selfish, parochial and ultimately a failed approach to ameliorate the problem. The result is huge wastage of the nation's resources with little to show for it. The greed and selfishness of those in authority from the local government level to the federal level is a further cause of frustration in the system. Those in authority today care more about themselves than those they took oath to serve. The salaries, emolument and other entitlements of those in government, particularly the executive and legislative arms, at all levels are totally out of tune with economic realities in the country. Those in government are living far above the standard of rest of society. And yet their appetite for more seems insatiable. They have become an Island of privilege and luxury, in a vast ocean of poverty and misery. The civilian inheritors of powers, it would seem wanted to enjoy the same benefits, privileges and perquisites as their military predecessors. And just as the military dictators, they too are gradually being alienated from the rest of the society.

Power Sector Problem

When Obasanjo became president in 1999, the nation's electricity output was 1300 megawatts out of a possible 6,500 megawatts. The Electricity Power Sector Reform Act 2005 was promulgated on March 5, 2005, to liberalise the energy sector and break the monopoly in the industry. The Act also established the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC). The legislation was passed in a bid to resuscitate the power sector (Quadry, 2008: 2).

The estimates of government spending in the power sector between 1999 and 2005 came to about ₦1.3 trillion (about $9 billion). Some of this money went directly to the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (formerly NEPA), while the rest went to capital spending in for different schemes. Unfortunately with so much spending the power sector has witnessed little boost in the output. Indeed, since 2005, power generation has been on a consistent decline. Government at a particular time claimed that the unrest in the Niger Delta worsened the power situation through the canalisation of pipelines and refusal of militants to allow workers repair damaged gas lines have contributed to the worsening power situation (Financial Spotlights, 2006). To date, there is no agreement on the actual figure expended in the energy sector between 1999-2007 (Quadry, 2008: 3).

Regular power supply is the prime mover of technological and social development. There is hardly any enterprise or indeed any aspect of human development that does not require energy in one form or the other – electric power, fuels, etc. Nigeria is richly endowed with various energy sources, crude oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower, solar energy, fissionable materials for nuclear energy. However, the actual power available at any given time is less that 40 percent of the total capacity due to poor maintenance; hence there is a perennial shortage. The implications of constant power supply for industrial sector in Nigeria is that power as well as the provision of other infrastructural facilities usually facilitates the industrial development of any economy. The state of the manufacturing industries in Nigeria at the end of Obasanjo administration on 29 May, 2007 can be classified as follows: 30 percent have closed down, 60 percent ailing and 10 percent operating at sustainable level (Okafor, 2008: 83-92).

According to the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria's (MAN) survey in 2005, only 10 percent of industries operated. But then, the 10 percent could, on the average, only function at 48.8 percent of their respective installed capacities. According to the survey, 60 percent of the companies were in comatose while another 30 percent had completely closed down. The following year, 2006, a survey conducted by MAN in the first quarter indicated that most of the industrial areas around the country suffered an average of 14.5 hours of power outage per day as against 9.5 hours of supply. Further the figure released by the MAN indicated that the cost of generating power supply accounts for 36 percent of production. About 1500 firms (60 percent) of the association's 2,500 members are in dire strait principally because of the additional operating cost of alternative power generation. Over 750 companies (30%) have closed shop out rightly due to the problem (Udeajah, 2006: 29; Adegbamigbe, 2007: 68-70).

As a result power supply and other related factors, industrial sector contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have continued to drop

since 1990 from 8.2 percent, got to 4.7 percent in 2003; 4.06 percent in 2004 and 4.2 in 2005 percent, the lowest figure since the country got independence in 1960 (Ajanaku, 2007:31-33). In the recent times quite a number of multinational companies operating in Nigeria generate own power through Independent Power Project (IPP) (Udeajah, 2006: 29).

Passive Attitude of Nigerians to the Leadership Problem

The argument that Nigeria's problems have been caused by inadequate leadership is true only up to a point. However, Nigerians due to their psyche already being battered by years of misrule, and their hopes dashed time and time again, they have grown a passive and cynically indifference to bad governance. Totally traumatic, Nigerians accept their lot and behave as if there is nothing they do can to free themselves from the shackles of bad governance. They ought to know better. We could learn a thing or two from events in South Africa over the past forty years. Despite being repressed by an evil system, black South Africans rose up and defied the excesses of the apartheid regime in South Africa. After an unrelenting campaign for equality, the regime they fought against has been dismantled and the black majority now control South Africa's destiny.

However, Nigerians have resorted to a sheep-like relationship with their governments. Blindly following the example (good or bad) of leading government figures seems to be a national trait. A few examples will illustrate this point. Babangida's tactic of using money and corruption to solve every problem has introduced a new dimension which eventually destroyed the moral fabric of Nigerian society. Rather than speak out against the scandalous corruption of Babangida, Nigerians simply copied him and succeeded in bringing corruption to the doorstep of each and every Nigerian.

Myriads of Constitutional Crises

It could be logically submitted that Nigeria is indeed a country that has been plagued with one constitutional crisis or another, even before her independence in 1960. For example, the demand made in 1947 by some nationalists for the extension of franchise and the holding of direct elections signaled the earliest constitutional crises in Nigeria during the pre-independence era. The demand led to the abrogation of the 1947 Constitution and the introduction of a ministerial government in 1951.

Since 1960, Nigeria has so far experimented with five constitutions. They are the 1960, 1963, 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions. The 1999 Constitution was the brain child of the Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar's government, which, through Decree No. 24 of 1999 promulgated the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which took effect from 29 May, 1999. The moment it

was promulgated and released, it attracted virulent attacks from all sections of the society. Its implementation has been rather difficult because it contains many parallel clauses that fail to clearly define spheres of authority, while it is seen as a legal document; its legitimacy has been questioned.

Nigeria faces several seemingly intractable political and constitutional problems. The experience of constitution making in Nigeria, though almost a generation and half old, still faces various problems. Among these are the controversies over the distribution of powers among the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; executive or split executive of the presidential system; operation of the party system in its new form; the role of the Independent National Electoral Commission and the limits of its powers; and the choice of a satisfactory formula for political party formation that can guarantee stability and progress in the election of a president. The National Assembly is currently reviewing the 1999 Constitution with a view to coming out with a truly people's document (Jaja, 2004: 6).

The more recent constitutional crisis had to do with President Yar'Adua's medical trip to Saudi Arabia on 23 November, 2009 and his long absence from duty thereafter opened the floodgates to tricky constitutional issues that ultimately affected the conduct of politics in the country. But in the closing days of year, some unexpected developments happened, which heightened apprehension about the political direction the country was taking.

The crux of the whole problem was President Yar'Adua's failure to transfer his power as provided by the provisions of the constitution and as such the president did not comply with the constitutional provisions of enabling the vice president to act in his stead as well as chair the Federal Executive Council. Since the vice president was not an acting president as enshrined in section 145, there are many duties he cannot perform. These include signing of the 2009 Supplementary Appropriation Bill; signing of the 2010 Appropriation Bill; authorisation of withdrawal of monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation for the purpose of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Government of the Federation for a period not exceeding six months; convening of the Council of State Meeting; approval of the list of 2009 National Awards, reconstitution of INEC, National Defence Council or the National Security Council, National Judicial Council, and the Federal Judicial Service Commission and the National Population Commission. In addition, if there was a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria, the Vice President cannot give an order to the armed forces. Thus, the Vice President Goodluck Jonathan declined to append his signature to the budget bill because he did not have the powers of president. Jonathan was not an acting president as envisaged in section 145 of the 1999 constitution.

Many Nigerians were of the opinion that such ugly scenario should not

have arisen when there was a vice president, who is empowered by the constitution to act in the absence of the president. Fears were rife then that these events may heat up the polity.

Recommendations

The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership (Achebe, 1983).[1]

The legitimacy of a government and its power to govern a people depends on their consent. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government to perform for the people, much as it is the responsibility of the people to monitor the activities of the political leaders with a view to renewing their mandate for good performance or using constitutional provisions to fire them for non-performance.

Arising from the acceptable virtue of a leader, those in public leadership positions in Nigeria should imbibe and cultivate moral character, piety, human-heartedness, self-discipline, purpose, accomplishment indispensable for quality leadership with deep convictions, responsibility, knowledge, leadership with example (Odimegwu, 2002: 5), which forms the essence of leadership. Suffice it to say that all must join hands to build a nation of high moral standard in which hard work and sweat in the service of the nation will be commended and encouraged (Ejiogu, 2000: 14). Not only this, piety which is a *sine qua non* and a household name elsewhere should be manifested in Nigeria leadership. This should be displayed in sincerity, trustworthiness, truthfulness; for pious leaders who are dependable and be counted upon to honour their duties and obligations. The 21st century leaders should be ready to serve, adopt constitutional model of leadership, resolve difficult paradoxes to create synergy, learn from experience continuously, because history is a book of lessons for the wise, while aligning organisational elements and empowering people to unlock their enormously gifted talents, ingenuity, intelligence and creativity (Odimegwu, 2002: 5).

Again, self-sacrifice should form primarily a duty which must be carried out with "fear and trembling". Self-sacrificed in the art of leadership is perhaps most powerful in attracting loyal followership. Leadership is by example and not just by tenets. Hence, human leadership is delegated responsibilities used with a high sense of humility on God's behalf. The quality is always one who is willing not only to be selfless but to die for his subordinates (Wambutda, 1991: 23-24). In summary, a leader must recognise the essence of the way of the leader and follow its meaning diligently, because leadership is not certainly for all comers as it is obvious in Nigeria. Nigerian leaders should focus more on responsibilities with full awareness of the varied qualities that are needed for a good job than devoting times on right and

benefits to be derived. For leadership is a most powerful force to be entrusted to devoted and responsible men, since it affects everyday life.

There is need for the evolution of an acceptable code of values with sanctions and punishment clearly spelt out as guidepost to our politics, before the fruits of education and that of economic development can become available to the masses of our people. Poverty continues to hold the society hostage. We need to expunge the term, 'the Nigerian factor' from our national lexicon and we need to outlaw the practice of garrison politics in the name of self-serving 'consensus politics' that takes on prisoners in the name of democracy (Anya, 2008: 14-16).

Another approach is to honestly implement many solutions that already exist in the constitution, or the legal system that governs electoral misnomer in the country. However, it cannot be implemented simply because the ruling party has already planted their surrogates in the courts to subvert and manipulate the legal system in their favour. That is the reason why the country cannot prosecute the corrupt former leaders.

The Nigerian policymakers and implementers in democratic Nigeria must of necessity pay attention to the battered, dehumanised, deprived and neglected Nigerian citizenry (Nwosu, 2008: 1-20). Democracy without improved quality of life for the generality of the citizenry is useless, nonsensical, empty, unsustainable and an unforgivable insult to the people's intelligence. It has been estimated that more than 95 percent of the 140 million Nigerians are traumatised and dying of extreme poverty and hunger, while a 5 percent privileged few have by fair or foul means "cornered" and monopolised Nigeria's economic, political, health and socio-cultural "common wealth" (FRN, 2007: 175-198). Okeleke (2008) submits that one of the problems is the federal character principle, which is applied in the employment and distribution of facilities. This has relegated meritocracy to the background and enthroned mediocrity, complacency and inefficiency in the public sector management (Eneh, 2009: 314-316).

The need for emergence of leaders through due electoral process. Since 1960, when Nigeria became independence, Nigerians have either been ruled by military coup lords or puppet regimes, who were hand-picked by the outgoing leaders, after rigging the elections. Nigerians have never had the opportunity to elect their leaders through fair and free elections. Therefore, our first step to solving the leadership problem in Nigeria is to institute an electoral system that will ensure true, free, and fair elections, to enable Nigerians elect leaders of their choice.

To win the war on corruption, adherence to ethical standards in decision-making must be the foundation of the nation's policies. Ethics is a set of moral principles or values or principles of conducts governing an individual or a group in the conduct of the affairs of the nation either public or business,

ethics is important if the apparent wars on corruption in Nigeria will be successful. In other words, without ethics, any money budgeted toward fighting corruption in Nigeria is a thing cast to the *wild cat*. Nigeria has to make laws and implement them to the letter.

In fighting corruption and other crimes in our society, the roles of The Nigerian Police and our legal system cannot be overemphasised. Selecting good leaders to head both the Police and our legal system in the country is paramount to achieving our goals in that respect. Both the Inspector-General and the Attorney-General of Nigeria must not continue to serve at the pleasure of the president.

One of the reasons for the upsurge of corrupt activities in Nigeria is that the law enforcement agencies are not properly trained to ensure that Nigerians live under the rule law, as against the period when the society was under military rule. The Nigerian police should be upgraded in status, and be well trained, well equipped and well paid (and on time too). The police should become an *elite profession,* which would be open only to those with good moral character. If the police and other security agents (for instance, customs and the military), will learn and understand their limits (not to harass and kill innocent citizens) and follow the rules, things might improve in Nigeria.

Political parties' formation and practice should be based on ideology. Presently, Nigerian politics is not about ideology but personal power and patronage. Political patronage is not unique to Nigeria alone, it is found everywhere in the world. While some people may argue that political patronage is not the same as corruption, the boundary is very thin. For example, if someone donated money to a political party and that party wins the next election and the donor was then awarded a lucrative government contract, then it is difficult to argue that is not corruption. We are identifying the hurdles to achieving political parties that are based on shared values and beliefs. What some people failed to understand is that the nature of the party political system is such that there has to be a way to encourage, enforce and reward party loyalty. This is usually done by appointing, not on their merit, these loyal party members to senior government posts. The problem with Nigeria is that square pegs are put into round holes. Worst still is the fact that when it becomes obvious that the people appointed on the basis of patronage cannot perform in their roles, the party machinery insists on them remaining in their jobs.

Nigeria needs to start a new set of political parties. We propose that the existing political parties should be dissolved and a system of two names should be approved for the Nigerians to use as their new political parties as was done in 1989. Alternative, a new sprawling political organisation would have to be developed as the competitor along with the PDP for political offices in 2011 and beyond. The formation of new parties would only lead

to a one party-dominance and would further erode the Nigerians faith in election (Omoruyi, 2001: 323-340).

The current review of the constitution (by the National and State Assemblies) should take into account the history of the country considering the errors or mistakes or frauds, the sources of the grievances and what and how the issues were resolved as a way of moving forward. It should emphasise how the need for all the ethnic groups to live under one umbrella in justice as the basis of the new structure of government, which the new Constitution is to deliver. In effect, the review of the 1999 constitution should start with a debate on the lingering problems facing the nation. The process and outcome should rekindle faith in the political order and should make all groups feel that they 'winners' and not 'losers'.

It should be noted that the 1999 constitution came after the political parties and the political class came to the political scene. The Obasanjo administration was sworn in on 29 May, 1999 under a constitution that was not an issue at the time of the election on the understanding that it would be revised with input of the people after 29 May, 1999. The constitution is fraught with many fraudulent provisions beginning with the Preamble, which associated the people of Nigerian with the origin of the constitution. Beside, the Preamble to the 1999 Constitution is uninspiring and it bears no relationship with the past, the present and the future. The framers did not know what the Preamble to a constitution was meant to serve.

Moreover, Nigerians should be free to fashion the constitutional arrangement spelling out the conditions under which the various ethnic nationalities would have to work with one another in a common or general or federal government. There is a need for a system that would provide for the common/general/federal government and other unit governments. There is no question that all these would have to emerge from amicable agreement arrived at, at a national conference. The agreement would have to be reflective of the agreed conception of the past, which would form part of the Preamble to the constitution.

Turning to one other very important subject area, peace and the amnesty. First, we want to commend the people of the Niger Delta and the government for finding a way out of the conflict. We hope the country continues to build on these efforts and the government should be encouraged further on quick movement to identify appropriate reintegration and rehabilitation programmes. Government should as a matter of fact introduce more helpful programs ranging from information technology, education, agriculture, health and maritime security.

Nigerians seem to have broad agreement on the need for electoral reforms prior to the next general elections in 2011. Although the unpublished recommendations of the Electoral Reforms Commission (ERC) were to be

a starting point, many are concerned that the reforms will not be in place in time for the upcoming elections. These reforms include a transparent voter registration, logistics planning, and better electoral administration, to name a few. Government must be bold enough to implement these necessary changes for the country to move ahead.

The power generation issue is a critical challenge to the nation. The right thing to do by the government is to put in place a comprehensive mechanism to achieve effective reform of the power generation and hydrocarbon sectors to improve transparency, administration, performance, and have reliable and affordable energy.

On the incessant ASUU-federal government face-off, we have the belief that dialogue is the best solution to every issue causing industrial actions. A closer look at institutions in the country says a lot about the agitation of the ASUU. There is the need for sustainable development in the sector. This is the type of developments that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. In essence, we advise both sides of the divide to bury the hatchet and settle through negotiation and dialogue with utmost sincerity.

Another challenge for the leadership is the need to ensure long-term food security for all Nigerians. Nigeria is a vast and rich country of nearly 150 million people. Food security reduces hunger and cannot be accomplished by short-term interventions. Key efforts toward mechanised farming and credit to farmers is vital. Government should establish several credit programs to assist farmers.

CONCLUSION

Nigerians are ready more than ever before to witness and savour committed leadership, viable democracy and good governance with its attendant characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimised, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society. Deficits in these areas give rise to conflict and set back to human development. Democracy, quality governance, true federalism, and economic transformation, are also intertwined.

Quality, democratic governance is epitomised by predictable, open and enlightened policymaking, a bureaucracy imbued with professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs. Poor governance (on the other hand) is characterised by arbitrary policymaking, unaccountable

bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespread corruption. These principles have certainly not been the defining features of governance in Nigeria whether under the military or civilians.

Recently Nigerians marked eleven years of uninterrupted civil rule; the occasion provided the opportunity to look ahead to the future. Today, the country is counted as one of the world's democracies. But, one notable dimension in this reality is the negative perception of democracy in Nigeria with its obscene cost. Nigeria's democracy is arguably the costliest on earth. While politicians revel in puzzling affluence and luxury, a shocking number of Nigerians are impoverished without end in sight. This can hardly stand the test of time. Many historical examples bear this out.

Since great evident abound that the military have stayed back in their barracks, then the possibilities are many. This is indeed time for introspection. The Jonathan administration would certainly be judged on the justice, humanity and the vision of its actions. In the future, history would surely hand down its verdicts on the successes he is able to achieve. In all, one thing can not be denied – there can be no response to history without effort. Will Jonathan in synergy with the nation's political leadership, in entering the next political decade, rise to the occasion, learn from their failures and make the imperative efforts to respond to history?

REFERENCES

Achebe, C. (1983). *The Trouble with Nigeria*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension.

Adegbamigbe, A. (2007). Obasanjo's Legacies. *TheNews*, Vol. 28, No. 21, 68-70.

Agbese, D. (2008a). "Silence of the Drums" *Newswatch*, 6 October, p. 13.

_____ (2008b). "The Right to Know" *Newswatch*, Monday, 27 October, p. 7.

Ajanaku, L. (2007). "Battling with Darkness," *TELL (Special Edition)*, 21 May, 31-33.

Akintunde, K. (2008). "A War in Chains", *Newswatch*, 3 November, p. 14.

Anya, O.A. (2008). "The Nigerian Conundrum," *Newswatch*, 6 October, pp. 14-16.

Bolden, R. (2004). *What is Leadership?* Leadership South West Research Report 1 Exeter: University of Exeter sourced at www.leadershipsouthwest.com

Central Bank of Nigerian Annual Report, 1999.

Dahl, R.A. (2003). *How Democratic Is the American Constitution?* 2nd Ed.Yale: Yale University.

Dike, V. (2008). *Leadership, Politics, and Social Change: Nigeria and the Struggle for Survival* Africa Economic Analysis Assessed from http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/20/1/Leadership-Politics-and-Social-Change-Nigeria-and-the-Struggle-for-Survival/Page1.html

Ejiogu A. (2000). Morality and National Development: A Case for National Rebirth.

Abuja: National Orientation Agency, p. 14.

Eulau, H. (1963). *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics,* New York: Random House.

Eneh C.O. (2009). Failed Development Vision, Political Leadership and Nigeria's Underdevelopment – A Critique, In Simon Sigué (ed.) *Repositioning African Business and Development for the 21st Century* Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference ©2009 IAABD http://www.iaabd.org/2009_iaabd_proceedings/track10a.pdf

Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007). Official Gazette. 94(24), B175-198, Federal Government Printer, Lagos.

Gardner, J.W. (1978). *Morale.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Gyamfi, C.C. (2006). "Minister Bemoans Youth Unemployment," The *Guardian Newspaper,* November 14, p. 39.

Gaus, G.F. and Kukathas, C. (2004). *In Handbook of Political Theory,* London: Sage Publications.

Jaja, S.O. (2004). Nigeria Political and Constitutional Development since Ind   ependence, Saturday, 24 July, 2004. OnlineNigeria.com http://www.Onlinenigeria.com/

Keohane, R.O. and Nye J.S. (1989). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.* New York. Boston: Little Brown.

Kofele-Kale, N. (1978). "The Problem of Instrumental Leadership in Contemporary African Political Systems", *Journal of Asian and African Studies,* Vol. 13, Nos.1-2, 80-94.

Minogue, M. (1997). 'The Principles and Practice of Good Governance' Law and Governance 4, *British Council Briefing,* p. 4.

Mudasiru, S. and Adabonyon, O. (2001). "The Nigerian Economy Under Obasanjo" *Development Policy Management Network Bulletin,* Vol. 8, No. 3, 10-13.

Njoku, J. (2006). "Fresh Onslaught against Water Privatization" *Vanguard Newspaper,* September 25, p. 38

Northouse, P.G. (2004). *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (3rd Edition). London: Sage Publications.

Nwosu, I.E. (2008). "Building Conducive Policy Environment for Planning and Executing Advocacy, IEC and BCC Projects/Programmes on Adolescent Reproductive Health in Nigeria" *The Nigerian Journal of Development Studies,* Vol. 6, no. 2: 1-20.

Odimegwu, F.B.O. (2002). "Leadership: Responsibilities and Imperatives," *NIBREW News,* Vol. 40, No. 1: 5

Okafor, E.E. (2008). Development Crisis of Power Supply and Implications for Industrial Sector in Nigeria. *Kamla-Raj Stud Tribes Tribal,* Vol. 6, No. 2, 83-92

Okeleke, P.A. (2008). *"Federal Character Principle: An Analysis of the Federal Character Policy of Nigeria and Its Impact on Sustainable Development."* A Seminar Paper presented at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus.

Omoruyi, O. (2001). *Parties and Politics in Nigeria,* African Studies Center, Boston University.

Owete, F. (2009). Pan-African Voices for Freedom and Justice. *Pambazuka News* Vol. 2, No. 2, 21.

Pious, R.M. (2007). Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative Politics *Presidential Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 37, No. 1, 66-84.

Poluha, E. and Rosendahl, M. (eds.) (2002). *Contesting 'Good' Governance. Crosscultural Perspectives On Representation, Accountability And Public Space.* London: Routledge Curzon.

Preuss, U.K. (1991). "Perspectives of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *Journal of Law and Society,* Vol. 18, No. 3, 353–364.

Quadry, Wasiu (2008). *Solution to Nigeria Power Outrage* May 9, 2008 Assessed from http://www.booksie.com/all/all/quadri/solution-to-nigeria-power-outrage

Ronald, J.T. and Thomas, C.C. (2001). *Theories of Democracy* Rowman: Littlefield.

Schapera, I. (1967). *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies.* New York: Schocken Books.

Sharma, S.D. (2007). "Democracy, Good Governance and Economic Development". Taiwan, *Taiwan Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 3, No. 1, 29-62.

Stech, E.L. (2004). Psychodynamic Approach. in Northouse, P.G. (eds) *Leadership: Theory and Practice,* 3rd Edition, London: Sage.

Stogdill, R.M. (1974). *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research.* New York: Free Press.

Udeajah, G. (2006). Industrial Firms Lose ₦38 billion to Power Outage. *The Guardian,* 24 August.

UNESCAP (2009). http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/projectactivities/ongoing/gg/governance.asp

Wambutda, D.N. (1991). "Leadership and Biblical Studies" *African Journal of Biblical Studies,* Vol. 6, No. 1, 23-24.

Yukl, G.A. (2002). *Leadership in Organizations: Fifth Edition,* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Godfatherism as a Factor in Nigerian Politics Since Independence

ADEDAYO EMMANUEL AFE and SOLOMON TAI OKAJARE

24

INTRODUCTION

Generally, a godfather is the person that develops or begins something (Wehmeier, 2001). The practice of godfatherism is as old as humanity. However, its origin can be traced to certain Christian traditions, wherein godparents were chosen as surrogates to assist in the upbringing of Christian children, to produce God-fearing and law-abiding adults. However, a Christian god-parent is different from a Nigerian political godfather. Godfatherism in the Nigerian political context denotes a manoeuvring of governmental system by godfathers through their godsons at the helm of affairs. Emeka Mamah has it that godfatherism was triggered off in Nigeria by her first generation leaders.

Specifically, historians and research on godfatherism have not reflected pre-1960 Nigeria. However, godfatherism had been part of Nigerian history, even before the 20th century, especially in the South-west. *Basorun* Gaa's role

in instituting and deposing kings in Oyo in 17th century can best illustrate this point (Johnson: 2001). Following the usurpation of constitutional roles by *Basorun* Gaa, Johnson notes that he raised five kings (whom he murdered later in succession) to the throne. He was himself murdered by the fifth. His display of godfatherism can be discerned from the manner at which he manoeuvred the constitutional roles of the kings to the extent at which he installed and deposed them at will.

In America, the practice assumed a critical dimension in the era of Prohibition, when mafia henchman, Allophone Capone prior to World War II was the unrivalled boss of Chicago. He was able to legalise his business with the money he derived from bootlegging (Ogabido, 2006).

Significantly, godfathers help politicians in elections by ensuring that they secure political power. As a reward, the politicians award them contracts and protect them from prosecution (Anakwenze, 2004). The practice was the same even in Europe, where the dreaded Neapolitan mafia in Italy manipulated their men into political office. This practice is consecrated in American political science literature under the euphemism of 'party machine' politics (Ibrahim, 2006).

In Nigeria, modern godfatherism began after independence in 1960, when godfathers started to sponsor politicians in elections and ensured their attainment of political power.

CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF GODFATHERISM IN NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Over the years, the concept of godfatherism has come to mean different things to different people in Nigeria. A few years after independence, it was a desirable phenomenon, while in recent years, it has come to represents the ugly face of Nigerian politics (*Daily Champion,* February, 2004).

Thesaurus has it that godfather means "male parent", a man having analogous relationship to an enterprise (Webster and Thesaurus: 2002). Also, the Chambers holds that the word "godfather" is a sponsor, one who pays the bill or the head of the criminal organisation: especially the mafia (Clay, 1983). In other words, the godfather is a sponsor who is responsible for the moral and religious development of another person's child (Uwehejevwe-Togbolo, 2005).

The application of the term godfather has shifted from the auspices of Christendom; it is now popularly used by power-brokers to refer to their relationship with subordinates or their clients. As a matter of fact, there is a world of difference between godfather in the Christian faith and godfather as in political realm. While the former provides guidance and counselling that benefits the godson, the latter conditions his favour, he only advances it out

when he feels that it promotes his personal interests and ideology, especially political and economic interests (Anakwenzwe: 2004). A popular political analyst, Kargbo affirms the Christendom definition thus:

> My dictionary tells me that a godparent is a person who promises at a Christian Baptism ceremony to be responsible for a child and to teach that child about the Christian religion (*Daily Independent*, January, 2006).

In modern politics, the godfather is simply a self-seeking individual, who sets to use the government, through his godson, to drive home his interest. The godfather remains unconcerned about the outrageous effects of his actions on the state. Therefore, the godson is compelled to sacrifice the interest of the populace for the selfish interest of his godfather.

Ogabido conceptualises godfather in two ways: the cultured and the uncultured. Cultured godfathers politically tutor their godsons to avoid any irresponsible act or confrontation. They help their godsons to secure a political post and offer them good advice on the best way to run their offices. In essence, they never allow their godsons to soil their reputation by ensuring that they perform up to the expectation of their subjects. More so, the mutual understanding both shared is not publicised. In reciprocation, the beneficiaries implement their wisdom, discretion and sense of maturity to appreciate the good gestures of their godfathers. Adimuba adds, "Much as the *Ziks*, the *Awos*, the *Aminu Kanos* and *Ahmadu Bellos* created, generations of leaders" (Ogabido, 2006).

For instance, in the Second Republic, Senate President Joseph Wayas practically installed Senator Donald Etiebet as the Governor of Cross River State, and Dr. Olusola Saraki was instrumental to the emergence of Chief Cornelius Adebayo as the Governor of Kwara State. However, none of them was reported to have claimed the credit for the new dispensation.

Uncultured godfathers are unworthy. The main drive behind their assistance to their beneficiaries is to seek personal aggrandisement and protection. In this case, unnecessary intervention with the business of their godsons is highly pronounced. Significantly, their interference renders the godsons weak and unfocused. As a result of corruption inherent in the chequered political system that does not allow for transparent electoral process, this latter type of godfathers has emerged to put the nation's political calendar backwards by their actions (Ogabido, 2006).

During the First Republic, godfathers produced politicians of good reputation and followership (Ogabido: 2006). These were godfathers in the cast of Awolowo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Ahmadu Bello, among others. In their regions, they commanded large followership. Also, they were active politicians, who led their parties and personally canvassed for votes all over Nigeria (Nkwoji: 2006). However, the evils inherent in the First Republic as a result

of power tussle among the godfathers have been identified. The Tafawa Balewa government was accused of election rigging and unholy alliances. The people's trust in the ruling party (NPC) was betrayed, since they controlled all electoral organs.

The above ills were the acclaimed primary concern of the military leaders to engage in the programme of transition to the Second Republic. They claimed to be compelled by the need to prevent the recurrence of the failure inherent in the First Republic (Nkwoji, 2006). Better still, under the political environment of the godfathers in the First Republic, it was abnormal for the leaders to appoint some of their trusted lieutenants before the electorate for elections into certain positions. Godfathers in the mould of Zik, Awo, among others, were political assets who commanded the respect of the electorate. Also, the political sons were those who could be trusted with the implementation of electoral promises.

Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, was the political godfather of a lot of young northerners (Anakwenze, 2005). He anointed Tafawa Balewa, his deputy, to become prime minister after winning the federal elections. In the same vein, Obafemi Awolowo was godfather to a large number of today's Yoruba leaders that have applied and continue to apply his teachings to the benefit of their region. Akin Omoboriowo lends credence to this (Omoboriowo, 2005). Similarly, Zik anointed Sam Mbakwe and Jim Nwobodo to be governors. Anakwenze has it that Zik was a godson to Sir Odumegwu Ojukwu, the father of Ikemba Nnewi (Anakwenze: 2004). Consequently, the earlier republic witnessed successive transitions in godfatherism of accountable people.

The practice was more pronounced in the Second Republic as the leadership of Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) led by Obafemi Awolowo, decided candidates for elective offices in virtually all states. Political godfatherism in the republic was not for personal interest. The concern of the mentors was to ensure good governance and development. As alluded to earlier, the Second Republic was characterised by political godfathers who never arrogated to themselves the victory won by their godsons. For instance, Senate President Joseph Wayas did not arrogate to himself the victory of Donald Etiebet as governor of Cross River state, while Olusola Saraki did not boast of his assistance to Cornelius Adebayo in becoming the governor of Kwara state (*Comet*, March, 2004).

This form of godfatherism was largely progressive and focused and it was not too different from what operated in other civilised climes of the world. Oyelese and Solomon account that Awolowo's style was in conformity with the practice in other lands (*TELL*, July 2003). Solomon notes that,

In other democracies, such godfathers content themselves with being

kingmakers and any time they want to peddle influence, it is to the advantage of the electorate.

It was in the same vein that Sina Awelewa, a lawyer, notes that "godfatherism is not on its own a bad thing". Similarly, there are manifestations in other parts of Africa. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela anointed Thabo Mbeki, his deputy to succeed him after only one term in office. Also, Mandela did not make South Africa ungovernable for Mbeki (*TELL*, July 2003). To crown it all, Bola Ige adduced that the electorate was at its best in choosing emergent leaders, who had earlier been anointed by their godfathers (Ige, 1995). He rightly adds that, "The 1979 election was the freest that Nigeria has ever had till today" (Ige, 1995). The aborted Third Republic marked the beginning of the end of politics based on ideals. A two-party structure, funded by government shut a spectral of ideological leanings as traps.

A critical look at the First and Second Republics would reveal the manifestation of cultured or civilised type of godfatherism. However, the practice turned sour with the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999. It became clear that politics in the country had assumed an investment status that must yield profits. The contractor this time is the godfather and the contracted, the godsons. Femi Ajayi states that "Godfathers can also be regarded as investors, in comparison with businessmen, that invest their capital for gain" (Ajayi, 2006). Prominent among such investors in Nigeria are: Senator Jim Nwobodo versus Governor Chimaroke Nnamani in Enugu state, Chief Emeka Offor versus Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju in Anambra state, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi versus Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso in Kano state, Senator Ali Modu Sheriff versus Governor Mala Kachalla in Borno and Olusola Saraki versus Governor Mohammed Lawal in Kwara state.

It is disappointing to note that since Year 2000, Nigerians have been treated to a rash of claims by all manners of people, on how they single-handedly made their godsons state governors. This kind of godfatherism is what Jemibewon tags "Group godfatherism". He adds that it reared its head in the form of regional or pan-ethnic groups, such as the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Ohanaeze N'digbo and Afenifere (*Comet*, March 2004).

In the first two dispensations of the Fourth Republic, from 1999 to 2007, it was a tug of war as citizens of the states actively involved could not reap from democracy. In Anambra state, godfatherism reared its head in the most brazen manner. It created significant alterations within the party and the polity. Shortly after the inauguration of the civilian government in 1999, crisis erupted. Emeka Offor, a godfather, sought to use the House of Assembly to impeach the governor, Chinwoke Mbadinuju. Godfatherism during this time was characterised by greed on the part of both the godfathers and the godsons.

In Edo state, the government of Lucky Igbinedion was such that shook the very cord that brought Edo people together as one people of common origin. Moreover, in his non-performing administration, he exhibited disdain for the plight and yearnings of Edo people. He was only accountable to his godfather, Tony Anenih. Igbinedion attested to this when he asserted that:

> If you ask Odion Ugbesia to draw God, because I have never seen God, by the time he finishes, you will probably find the face of Anenih, you'll find the hands of Anenih and you'll find the legs of Anenih. This is a man who has done so much for me . . . every time Anenih comes and helps me. He made me a commissioner, made me a minister, made me a minister again; helped me to build a house (Ogbomwan, 2005).

The depth of this praise depicts the magnanimity in corruption and the neglect of the people's interests in Edo state. In fact, he turned Anenih into a mini-god who he could hardly live without.

During the second dispensation of civilian administration in Anambra state, a more violent godfather emerged in the person of Chris Uba (Uwhejevwe-Togbolo, 2005). His actions and utterances revealed a high level of decadence in the state. Generally, some of the godfathers believed that they also had the power to remove people who could not meet up with their expectations, from office (*New Age*, December 2004). Adeniyi Akintola who was a member of the Presidential Committee on the Review of 1999 Constitution (PCRC), attested to Chris Uba's strength in the following words: "I was at the World Igbo Day ceremony in New Jersey USA, where Chris Uba confessed that Ngige did not win the election, but it was manipulated for him" (*New Age*, December, 2004).

This made him to demand for wholesome returns from the godson. He demanded billions of Naira from the state treasury, and he also wanted to be governor for a few months. The confirmation coming from Uba that the 2003 governorship elections in Anambra was rigged, and the Police or the Election Tribunal turning the other way, is a reflection that Nigerian laws are only meant for a certain set of people who had no godfathers. It is pathetic to note that Uba is still walking free in Nigeria after his confession of rigging the election. This among others has made scholars to refer to the crisis as Anambra 'Tsunami' (Chris, 2006). The godson's refusal to yield to the godfather's demands culminated in his illegal arrest by the Police. However, the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Tafa Balogun, denied the arrest, and submitted that the State Commissioner of Police, Raphael Ige, carried out the arrest and acted on his own (*TELL*, Febuary 2006). This illegal act, which was largely a theatre of the absurd, is a fundamental statement about the state of democracy in the country. Similarly, the 'tsunami' caused some wranglings in the internal structure of the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

It led, among other things, to the resignation of the party's Chairman, Audu Ogbeh, and the appointment of Ahmadu Ali in his place (Ibrahim, 2006).

Uba's godfatherism has been described as gluttonous, supercilious and very narcissistic (Chris, 2006). His desperate nature informed his desperate actions to achieve desperate goals. Worse still, government property built with taxpayers money were destroyed by hooligans assumed to be supporters of Uba, as a result of the unyielding attitude of Ngige to his request to quit office. Anambra, a once productive and industrial state, is now disrupted by the godfatherism syndrome, a 'tsunami' that has swept off the polity and economic situation of the state. This moved Atiku Abubakar, Vice President of the Federation (1999-2007) to remark that the godfathers were gradually taking over the Nigerian political institutions, and the relevance of the electorate is diminishing (Uwehejevwe-Togbolo, 2005). In his exact words:

> The concept of godfathers as 'owners' of political parties or sections thereof is a threat to the development of democracy Godfathers must not be allowed to substitute themselves for the members of political practices or indeed for the voting citizenry during elections by determining who gets nominated to contest for elections and who wins election.

Jim Nwobodo became an issue in Enugu politics from 1979, when he was elected governor of the state, and his group provided the key functionaries of state. Chimaroke Nnamani was one of the godsons that Nwobodo put in office. Consequently, Jim Nwobodo and his political son, Okwiesilieze Nwodo (the former PDP national secretary, now national chairman), continued to pose a threat to the state governor who, incidentally, had C.C. Onoh, the former Governor of old Anambra state on his side, thereby setting a stage for a power tussle (Ibrahim, 2006). Nnamani was a US-based gynaecologist. He left a thriving medical practice in America for governorship. However, his educational qualification informed his categorisation as one of the most educated governors in the Fourth Republic. Even at that, the unquestionable kingmaker, Nwobodo, continued to engage in strife with his godson, a situation which led to many deaths. A religious crusade organised by the Catholic Church at Adoration Grounds in Enugu manifested in the display of a show of power tussle that led to the loss of lives, thereby giving room for accusations and counter-accusations from the political camps of Nnamani and Nwobodo. In essence, the state was polarised into two ideological camps armed to the teeth for an eventual display of power. This also provoked the crisis in the Enugu state legislature, which was attributed to the underlying currents in the Enugu political sphere.

Following the inauguration of Sam Egwu as the governor of Ebonyi state, he experienced an unhealthy rivalry from the camp of former senate president, Anyim Pius Anyim. The fight between these two led to loss of

many lives. Public think-tanks suggest that Ebonyi and its sister state, Anambra, were kegs of gunpower waiting for an explosion that would consume everyone in its vicinity and even beyond (Ibrahim, 2006).

The former governor of Bayelsa state, Diepreye Alamiesegha was said to be the godfather of the state's former speaker, Heineken October Lokpobiri. The relationship started when Alamiesegha single-handedly influenced Heineken's crossover to the PDP. Similarly, Alamiesegha manoeuvred his way to win the speakership post for him. However, on getting to office, Lokpobiri wanted to assert his independence from his benefactor. Consequently, the relationship got sour, and one was instigating the impeachment of the other (*Executive Watch*, November 2004).

The northern parts of Nigeria was not left out in the political crisis. The former governor of old Kano state, Abubakar Rimi, arguably one of the most influential political figures in the state failed in his attempt to influence the emergence of governors in the state in particular. However, he became a political antagonist, condemning those who won elections (Omatseye, 2004).

Similarly, the extent of godfatherism in Oyo state was particularly alarming. Here, discretion was thrown out of the window and Lamidi Ariyibi Adedibu altered anything alterable. He posited that godfatherism could not be ruled out of Nigerian politics, because it was compulsory for aspirants to pass through him before they were elected (*TELL*, September 2007). He traced the genesis of his godfatherism to Augustus Meredith Adisa Akinloye. He submitted that Akinloye was not just a father but a mentor and astute political architect whose training made him prominent in Oyo state politics (*TheNews*, October 2007). He notes:

> . . . by the grace of God, you made it possible for me to have recognition in the political history of the country. You promoted me. You lifted me up and gave me what I can never forget in my life. You prayed for me and the prayer has shown on me. Surely, you Adisa Olayiwola Akinloye will rest in the bosom of Almighty God, because you have done very well, God will not leave you.

Trailing this, he admitted that thuggery had accompanied godfatherism in the earlier republics. In his exact words, "Thuggery is part of politics. It has to do with politics but we thank God this phenomenon called thuggery started in Western Region in 1953" (*TheNews*, October 2007). This implies that over the years, thuggery was the wheel of politics in the Western region and it found great approval in Adedibu. In fact, he noted that thuggery and godfatherism were inextricably interwoven in Nigerian politics, by stating that 'it is impossible to do politics without thuggery and the influence of a godfather, of course, we started politics with godfatherism'. However, he shunned the type of godfatherism in other states like Anambra. He notes that:

A political godfather should only seek to enthrone his or her political children not that he too will be eyeing the throne. Those ones in Anambra are also seeking political offices, that is wrong – I for one cannot even sponsor my own children, not that I do not have qualified children but it is going to be a misnomer if I do such thing . . . because if my own child is a member of a parliament, government, and there is need for me to call them to order over misrule, I might lack the moral authority to do that . . . (Ibrahim, 2006).

Worse still, the situation in Oyo state was so degrading that Adedibu confirmed the allegations of Olusegun Obasanjo, that he was responsible for pre-electoral violence, before the former Governor, Lam Adesina assumed office. He even noted that he crushed people who crossed his path, by taking the laws into his hands.

Unfortunately, the political turmoil was given a boost in Oyo state, which has made it become a stain on the banner of democracy (Ibrahim: 2006). Due to clashes between the godfather and his godson, former Governor Ladoja, a group of Oyo state legislators loyal to Adedibu and backed-up by the police proceeded to commence impeachment proceedings against the governor. Their frequent clashes took a serious toll on governance and resulted in many deaths. It is unimaginable to know that politics in a democracy could take such an unpleasant form. The state earned the notoriety of being the nation's hot-bed of violence. The situation in the state could be likened to an endless struggle. Each time disciples of the two political chieftains' clashed, blood flowed and governance was put in abeyance while democracy took a blow. Eventually, the clashes eventually led to the impeachment of Ladoja, by 18 members of the 25 legislators based on unverified corruption allegation (TELL, September 2007). Adedibu relished this event with pomp as he enthroned and dethroned governors at will. He labelled Ladoja as the disobedient godson (TELL, February 2006). Worse still, during the third term of the Fourth Republic, Adedibu categorically states:

If I say I dominate politics, I do predominantly, I dominate the political affairs of this state. All the governors that have won never did so without my contribution and influence . . . I put Ladoja in the government house and later, I took him out of the place and put another person there (TELL, February 2006).

As a matter of fact, right from the first governor in the first dispensation of the Fourth Republic, Lam Adesina to Alao-Akala, none of them secured the post without Adedibu's influence. He rightly notes:

I did not work for Ladoja, I put him there. Our former PDP chairman told him, that is the man that put you in the government house . . . who made him the senator? Working for him is another thing (TELL, February 2006).

After the inauguration of Adebayo Alao-Akala as the new governor of Oyo state, he went to pay homage to Adedibu and prostrated to Adedibu (Ibrahim, 2006). Political analysts questioned this act, and compared him to a political stooge of Adedibu.

In fact, Adedibu implied this when he asserted that, "Alao-Akala comes here everyday . . . he is always with me" (TELL, September 2007). Such was the derogatory situation in Oyo state, where a barely literate godfather dominated the politics, and not the electorate. This must have informed Professor Alex Gboyega's opinion that:

I think that it is anomalous for governmental power to be viewed by man who is not directly accountable to the public. They claimed that they manipulated the electoral process to ensure their candidates won. I do not think that it is an edifying thing for anybody to want to identify with. If you make such an admission, I think you leave room open for the rest of us to say that we do not want manipulation (Ogadido, 2006).

Adedibu asserts his importance and indispensability in Oyo politics thus:

If you want to win election, you must come here. Godfather would continue to exist, since a godfather is like an intermediary between a politician and God (TELL, September 2007).

In Taraba state, the former governor, Reverend Jolly Nyame boasted to the Nigerian Sun that "One thing in politics is that you must believe in godfatherism. If I did not believe in it, I would not be in daddy's place" (Ibrahim, 2006). In essence, the governor noted that, to be reckoned with in the society, one must pay the sacrifice of having a godfather.

Meanwhile, the situation was different in Kwara state, where godfatherism of mandate and legacy was practised. The rise of the Saraki dynasty in Kwara state depicts the case of welcomed authority and of a people's hero in the most vivid manner. During his rise to power in a most classical and uncharacteristic manner for contemporary godfathers, Olusola Saraki measured out philanthropic gestures that ranged from repair of bad roads to setting up of medical clinics, and building of schools, among others. In this way, he gained a faithful attention and affections of the people and culminated in earning him the title Turaki of Ilorin in 1974. Little wonder then that wonder the populace did not question his authority, as he single-handedly anointed and replaced the last five elected governors in Kwara state since 1979, starting from Alhaji Attah through Cornelius Adebayo, Sha'Abba Lafiagi to Mohammed Lawal and lastly, his son, Bukola Saraki. He diplomatically lay his claim to Kwara state politics like no other godfather had done in Nigeria (Ezenkwe, 2006).

The point to be emphasised here is that having satisfied most of the people's

needs, they found it worthy to reciprocate his philanthropic gestures by conceding to his demands in political elective and appointive pursuits. Such was the case when Saraki instructed the masses to vote Attah out of office in 1983 and the people heeded (Ezenkwe, 2006). This type of godfatherism by people's mandate is a sharp contrast to all types of uncultured godfatherism earlier described.

IMPACTS OF GODFATHERISM ON NIGERIAN POLITICS

Given the distinction made between the cultured and uncultured godfathers, it becomes apparent that godfatherism in the First and Second Republics was a beneficial practice that enabled the godchildren to govern in the interest of the larger society. However, from the inception of the Fourth Republic, the practice changed tremendously to a greedy and selfish act, especially in the cast of Uba, Emeka Offor, Adedibu, and the others. This leaves the electorate and the larger society powerless even in their homeland. Worse still, the present class of godfathers lack the basic understanding of the fundamental concepts of government and governance (Anakwenze, 2004). This probably informed the frequent committal of political blunders that was uncommon with the first generation of national leaders.

However, some of the godsons on getting to office want to leave some legacies worthy of emulation, and would decide to set themselves free from the apron strings of their godfathers. This explains the reason behind the protracted struggle between the parties of Ngige and Chris Uba, Adedibu and Ladoja. Ngige versus Uba crisis left Anambra State prostrate, where a lot of government property like the media station was brought to ruins (Ogabido, 2006).

Consequently, Chimaroke Nnamani concluded that the entire production process in an economy of a state under godfather politics is a very poor one (Nnamani, 2006). The self-centred godfather remains unconcerned about the masses, hence he does not support policies, which favour increased popular participation in the production process. He notes:

> His vision for the creation of job through massive investment in the real sector of the economy-that is, in the agriculture and industry is insular and narrow, for fear of power diffusion in the economy which threatens his sole proprietor-status in the state (Nnamani, 2006).

In other words, any focus in capacity building and economic empowerment is viewed with critical negative attitude. Furthermore, since the godfathers did not consider the interests of the electorate, they play them like cards. This informed Adedibu's remark when he was asked whether peace at gunpoint was peace, he said: *whatever it is, peace is peace* (*TELL*, September, 2007).

This implies that people in uncultured godfathers' states sleep with one

eye closed. Nobody knows what they would resort to in another moment. As if this was not enough, Chris Uba boasted of his illegitimate disposition of power; "I am the greatest godfather in Nigeria because this is the first time an individual single-handedly put in position every politician in the state" (Ibrahim, 2006). This declaration reveals an aspect of the intensity of unchecked power arrogation by godfathers in Nigeria.

The gulf between Awolowo, Azikiwe and Ahmadu Bello's type of godfatherism in comparison and that of Adedibu and Chris Uba, on the other hand, cannot be over-emphasised. The former stood for elections, while the latter are persons seeking for elections. Awolowo, for instance, commanded the respect of Yoruba people. He was a man of integrity and good reputation. In essence, the degrading standard of godfatherism in the nation is a reflection of the almost irredeemable political decadence that is prevalent in the country. Naked power and money politics in Nigeria and the capacity for election rigging and political violence are behind the power of the Fourth Republic godfathers. Senator Jubril Aminu, who spoke on money politics and the problems of godfatherism, observes categorically that: "A man like Chris Uba would not have become a godfather and a bank-roller if elections were held based on merit alone, without people having to spend much money" (Ibrahim, 2006).

On a critical examination, no one is an island, and a tree cannot make a forest. It is only a reasonable and healthy development, that somebody assists someone to attain a political post as it is done in other parts of the world, especially in the case of Mandela and Mbeki in South Africa.

However, it is alarming and heart-breaking looking at the perspective in which the practice has resulted into political confusion and democratic failure in Nigeria. It is the biggest challenge to the nation's political edifice and development (Ibrahim, 2006). Specifically, it has bred a violence-prone and chaotic political culture, where a political parochialist arrogates to himself the status of a god, which government must cater for (Udoma, 2006). However, some political analysts have recommended that the electorate should take the back seat as on-lookers and watch the turn of events. This is dangerous since there is a strong connecting link between the electorate's welfare and the type and quality of political office holders in place at any given time, which usually comes in through a credible, free and fair elections.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is a known fact that the practice of godfatherism is a great challenge to the growth and development of Nigerian democracy. Many scholars and critics in the Nigerian political space seem to agree that the solution to the quandary lies behind the complexities of the historical roles played by the godfathers

and its irresistible influence in contemporary politics of Nigeria (Ezenekwe, 2006). On the other hand, some intellectuals trace the cause for the practice in uncivilised manner to poverty. However, people should stop selling their God-given talents or skills for immediate pecuniary gains. In fact, it would make them retrogress.

Similarly, as a remedy to the above political evil in Nigeria's democracy, there is the urgent need to de-emphasise the influence of money. It is regrettable that due to money politics and its attendant evils, good, God-fearing and talented people with tutored political minds, have no chance to steer the ship of governance in the nation (Ogabido, 2006).

Finally, to allow the electorate perform its constitutional role, government must do something urgent to illegitimise the activities of the uncivilised or uncultured godfathers. This can be achieved through an independent judiciary by bringing the uncultured godfathers to book. This is because political godfatherism is a negative political reality. However, the culture of the practice must change for the better. This finds support in Sina Awelewa's view that "Godfatherism is not, on its own a bad thing, it is bastardised in Nigeria because of greed on the part of the benefactor and the godson" (*TELL*, July 2003). It follows therefore, that if godfatherism must remain as a feature of contemporary politics in Nigeria from now, it is expedient on both the political class and the electorate to reflect deeply on the political journey of Nigeria in the last fifty years and do everything to discourage any manifestation of uncultured or negative godfatherism.

REFERENCES

Ajayi, F. (2006). *Nigeria Political Godfatherism in the World of Baale Molete*, SOBEF650 @aol.com, pp. 1-7.

Anakwenze, N. (2004). *The Convention of Anambra State Association*, Oklahoma, USA.

Clay, Richard (1983). *The Chambers 20th Century Dictionary*, Great Britain, p. 537.

Daily Champion, 11 February, 2004, p. 38.

Daily Independent, Friday, 27 January, 2006, p. B5.

Executive Watch: Changing Tides of Enugu Politics, 16 November, 2004, p. 2.

Ibrahim, J. (2006). "The Rise of Nigeria's Godfathers", *BBC News Africa*.

Ige, Bola (1995). *People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria: 1940-1979*, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria Plc, p. 40.

Ikenna O. Ezenekwe, *Godfatherism of Mandate and of Legacy*, iezenekwe@hotmail.com

Johnson, S. (2001). *The History of the Yorubas*, Lagos: CSS Bookshop, p. 182.

Layonu, T. (2003). *Adelabuism: Politics of Adegoke Adelabu, The Legendary Leader of Ibadan People*, Ibadan: Media Report Project, p. viii, 65.

New Age, 6 December, 2004, p. 4.

Nnamani, C. Godfather phenomenon, www.ebana.org

Oduyela, S. (2006). State of the Nation: Countdown to 2007, www.dawodu.com/ articles

Ogabido (2006). *Movement for Nigerian Political Re-engineering and Better Order* (MONPORBO), Enugu, www.thetidenews.com/article.aspx

Ogbomwan, S. (2005). *3rd Annual Edo Global Organization*, Budapest, Hungary.

Omatseye, S. (2004). *Polity and the Siege of Godfathers*, USA, p. 1.

Omoboriowo, A. (2005). *Awoism: Selected Themes on the Complex Ideology of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Ibadan: Evans Brothers Nigeria Publishers Limited, p. xiii.

TELL, 20 July, 2003, pp. 39-16.

TELL, 28 July, 2003, pp. 39 and 40.

TELL, 6 February, 2006, p. 32.

TELL, 17 September, 2007, p. 30.

The Comet, 1 March, 2004, p. 14.

Uba, C. (2006). "The Anambra 'Tsunami' Epicentre of the Election Fraud", nigeriaworld. com/columnist/ajayi/01305html.

Udoma, Y. *Public Lecture: 8th Sir Udoma Symposium*, Uganda.

Uwhejevwe-Togbolo, S. (2005). *Movement for Youth Actualization International* (MYAI), mfya@yahoo.com, pp. 13-17.

Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus. (2002). Scotland: Geddes & Grosset, p. 163.

Wehmeier, S. (2001). *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 509.

Chieftaincy and Modernism: A Perspective Explanation of Politics and Society in Nigeria

DOLAPO ZACCHAEUS OLUPAYIMO

25

INTRODUCTION

The chieftaincy institution in many African societies is saddled with the management of politics and governance. It is a system that could be described as housing the age-long political structures of the Africans. It may be said that there was nowhere in the Africa of the pre-colonial era where governance was not a responsibility of the chiefs appointed in most cases through hereditary succession. The institution of chieftaincy in most African settings where it was operated carried with it multidimensional responsibilities covering executive, judicial, legislative and beyond. Indeed, no one was made a chief in most African traditional communities unless he was considered knowledgeable in the laws, customs, usages and traditions of his people.[1] The reason was because the basic essence of governance was the maintenance of law and order and the onus of this rested entirely on the monarch and his chiefs who constituted the chieftaincy institution.[2]

This function of a typical pre-colonial African traditional chieftaincy structure which is part of what this paper purports to discuss was inseparable. That is, there existed a fusion of judicial, executive and legislative duties as there was no defined line of distinction between the executive, legislative and judicial duties.[2] The early Yoruba monarchs operated very much like absolute ruler with chiefs who served merely as advisers. As the body of chiefs grew around him, important titles attracted portfolios, which tied their selection to heredity, and with time, these title-holders became identified as the council of state/town/village, as the case might be. They gradually acquired power that transcended the advisory level and also began to have stakes in the running of the government along with the *Oba*, although the prerogative of approval lay with the Oba.[3]

THE YORUBA CHIEFTAINCY STRUCTURE

This has remained despite the various shades of development which has trailed world politics. In Yorubaland, the chieftaincy structure was informally graduated along pyramidal hierarchies, ranging from empires, towns, villages, and quarters/compounds to families at the lowest rungs. The paramount rulers headed empires or states, which consisted of towns under the paramount ruler and his council. Towns were made up of units called, '*adugbo*'-quarters/ compounds with at least one chief *(Ijoye)* from each quarter/compound. Each '*adugbo*' was made up of smaller units called '*ebi*'-Kins.[4] While each town/ village was headed by an '*Oba*' or *Baale*,[5] the adugbo was headed by a titled chief (*Ijoye*) which when put together culminated in the town council and each family was under an '*Olori-ebi*' who might not be a titled chief. The basic duty of every '*Olori-ebi*'– family head was similar to that of an arbiter in civil cases when they arose among his kinsmen. The duties of an Ijoye in his quarters included deciding civil cases within his area of jurisdiction as the head in his quarters. It was only in selected civil cases, where the family heads and the quarter chiefs could not arbitrate and particularly in criminal cases, that the Oba was involved. The *Oba*'s court also served as the only court with appellate jurisdiction in all cases.[6]

Their sole duty was to arbitrate and this was buttressed by the establishment of judicial machinery in private hands, first within the family then compound/quarters and lastly the monarch – *Oba*.[7] Judicial administration was completely diffused and since the sources of law were basically customs and usages they were unwritten and their purpose was to strengthen the societal bond. The traditional judicial process adopted religious implementation of judicial decisions. This did not only promote conformity, it also sustained the sanctity of the law. According to Adewoye, the law never stood alone in the traditional society. Religion was used to foster the

potency of law and the enforcement of serious court decisions was in the hands of various cults, e.g. Oro, Ogboni, etc.[8]

The Idea of Modernism and Yoruba Chieftaincy

The word modernism takes its root from 'modern', which simply refers to a deviation from the old way of doing something – a style different in order, that is belonging to a new order.[9] The scope of what this write-up adopts as modernism could be positioned in the Yoruba country at the period the British colonisers began to pursue the occupation of the hinterland of Yorubaland that eventually became the western parts of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In other places other than Yorubaland, various agreements were signed, which gave the British administrators direct access to change or replace their traditional political structure with that of the British, or establish another one to monitor it closely. The case of the appointment of Warrant Chiefs in the southeast was a case in point. This was not exactly so in the Yoruba country, especially because the text of the agreements earlier signed with some traditional rulers had guaranteed a degree of independence.[10] Perhaps because the Yoruba chieftaincy structure is inseparable from its judicial system, the traditional judicial system did not change immediately from its original course of the traditional political arrangements, rather, it was allowed to follow the ancient path. For instance, the colonialists, in Yorubaland sustained the Native Court system.[11]

In the view of earlier scholars who examined indigenous practices (one of which is the institution of chieftaincy) vis-à-vis modernisation, they expected a complete shift in paradigm. They opined that such indigenous practices would wither away.[12] As Lloyd Faller puts it, "modernisation and traditionalism would marginalise chiefly powers in African states". One of the recent analysts of the Yoruba chieftaincy structure and modernisation, Olufemi Vaughan writes in one of his analysis [13] "that chieftaincy structures were sustained by the calculations of the controllers of the modern state power (i.e. the colonial administrators, the educated élite and the business elite) who sought to co-opt the traditional chiefs needed to legitimise their hold on power and mobilise support within the colonial and postcolonial dispensations".[14] The various studies on chieftaincy structure in Africa are described by Vaughan as having critical insights, but were limited by what he describes as the "teleological preoccupation"[15] which blocked the dialectical interaction between chieftaincy and the state structures in colonial and postcolonial Africa.

In his own work under review, Vaughan examines the Yoruba chieftaincy structures with the aid of specific case studies and underscore the fact that it was the struggle amongst *Obas*, chiefs, the educated élite and elders to control the trio of state power, privileges and status that enshrined the new meaning

of traditional authorities and communal identities in the early days of colonialism. Vaughan contends that a number of instruments invented were used to sustain the neo-traditional structures. These include reconstructed histories, myth, traditions, social memory and symbols. To him all these played critical role in the consolidation of élite interests in Yoruba towns and it was consequently used as basis for the collective Yoruba political actions of the 20th century.[16]

An examination of the colonial reforms of the decolonisation era in the light of indigenous social and political structures would show how the nationalists aligned with traditional rulers to enable them gain access to modern state power apparatuses to be relinquished by the colonial authority. Based on this analysis one may contend that the process of elite formation was not just a rapid change in social strata, but a calculated creation of a conflicting ideology during the period of decolonisation through the introduction of regionalism by the 1947 constitution.[17]

A quick look at the developments during the period of decolonisation would show the effects of communal tension on the development of the polity. One could, therefore, note that the emerging regional political class needed to marginalise the old chieftaincy order to foster their existence and at the same time needed to solicit their support for mass mobilisation of the populace, therefore, the regional politicians connived with the traditional authorities to construct a pan-Yoruba identity so as to win their region in the ethnocentric politics of the era of decolonisa-tion.[18]

Further analysis beyond the period of decolonisation, i.e. between 1960 and 1966, has been described by Vaughan as the year of 'acrimonious competition' that had a very serious impact on the chieftaincy structures. He explained the Action Group politics of this period in the southwest vis-à-vis the other political parties in the same region as essentially the pivot of intensified communal clash of ethno-regional interests. For illustration, when the various activities of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa[19] where the *Obas* played prominent roles were placed in perspective the chieftaincy policies of the Action Group in the Western Region during this period would show how anti-Action Group *Obas* were deliberately victimised. The case of Oba Adeyemi II the *Alaafin* of Oyo who was pro-NCNC and who was eventually sent into exile was a case in point. The solidification of ethno-regional power configuration during the military rule which followed the first coup d'etat may also be interpreted as an attempt to use chieftaincy structures as ideological expression for various interests and organisation. (The government of Ironsi was actually overthrown while he was attending a national conference of traditional rulers in Ibadan on 28ᵗ July, 1966 in Western state with Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi.)[20]

The chieftaincy policy of Murtala-Obasanjo military administration may

be summed up as the policy of "chieftaincy rationalisation", in the words of Vaughan. This may be argued from many fronts based on the key pursuits of that government, i.e. to hand over government at all cost based on the transition time-table made for that purpose. Only two of such key pursuits of that administration has been chosen for the purpose of this work – *The 1976 Guidelines for Local Government Reforms* and Land Use Decree 1978.

The monarchs and chiefs during this period saw the 1976 guidelines for local government reforms as an attempt to rationalise them. For instance, their territories were partitioned without their knowledge and this threatened their right to control land. In Yorubaland, the notion of *Oba lo n'ile*[21] an important Yoruba maxim was also threatened as such, *Obas* in Yorubaland vehemently opposed this.[22]

The royal fathers were just recovering from this when in 1978 the Land Use Decree was promulgated. This was such a deviation from the existing land tenure system whereby the *Obas* held land in trust for their subjects. The Modakeke-Ife war of 1981 could partly illustrate this. The Modakeke people applauded the decree because of their misinterpretation of it that payment of *Isakole*[23] had been abrogated by it. The right of ownership of Ife landowners was considered null and void since the decree had abrogated the right of the landowners. In effect, the implementation of the decree was not thorough and the landowners still had some holds on their tenants, hence the war.

The 1979 to 1983 presidential electoral politics also established a calculated link between the First and Second Republics in that the chieftaincy structure was used as an instrument by the regional politicians to reinforce the prevailing regional power configuration carried over from the First Republic. While the traditional rulers offered chieftaincy titles to fortify their political interests, the politicians used chieftaincy title-holding to secure the support of the masses. This is a symptom of modernism that greatly redefined the chieftaincy order. One Yoruba proverb says, *Bu funmi n bu fun o, l'opolo n ke*[24] may illustrate clearly this situation that ushered in a regime of ventilation into Yoruba chieftaincy. The chiefs/*Obas* began to give out chieftaincy titles to prepare the ground for potential political aspirants and élite, while the politicians and such élite were also prepared to placate their royal backbones in order to retain their hold on power.

Further examination of the significance of chieftaincy structure beyond the period after the Second Republic underscores the implications of chieftaincy structures for élite consolidation within the local, regional and national power configuration. The chieftaincy structures during the military administration of Generals Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, Abdulsalami Abubakar; Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Umaru Musa Yar'Adua may be said to have underscored a regime of social contradictions where the royal fathers were used and dumped each time they were needed. It, therefore, follows

that the indigenous political structure (chieftaincy structure inclusive) has proved its resilience not only because of their enduring normative and utilitarian qualities but also because of adaptability, integration into power centre and their roles in the processes of class formation as a reaction to modernism.

For illustration, under the Unity Party of Nigeria government in old Oyo state led by Bola Ige, a royal father, Oba Iyiola Oyewale Matanmi III, the *Ataoja* of Osogbo, was appointed a commissioner-without-portfolio,[25] and would have suffered disgrace when the military government of Buhari-Idiagbon suddenly came to power but for a quick integration into the then power centre. Another example was the support given by the *Akirun* Oba Adeyemi Lawani to the causes of the Unity Party of Nigeria during the 1983 election crisis[26] with emphasis on the impact of this on the ethno-regional politics of the Ibrahim Babangida's period and the attendant effects of the ethno-regional politics on the institution of chieftaincy.

When in August 1985 General Babangida became the military head of state, he presented a picture of a leader who understood the concept of power and its application in the Nigerian environment. This was clear when his method of legitimising his hold onto power and consolidation of his administration in total connivance with the traditional rulers are placed in perspective. This in my opinion was one reason why he ruled the nation for as long as eight years. Again, when General Sani Abacha took over from Ernest Sonekan's Interim National Government, he seemed to have played the same game. A case in point was the coup-plotters' film which he invited reputable traditional rulers to watch in preparation for the execution of the alleged coup-plotters before his sudden death.

This looks like an adverse effect of modernism on the institution of chieftaincy, but in my opinion, it is just a strategy of resilience to sustain the royal fathers' enduring normative and utilitarian qualities so as to retain adaptability procedure, integration into power centre and their roles in the processes of class formation as a reaction to modernism.

The Nigerian society has witnessed great change, the traditional and the traditional chieftaincy structure has maintained its resilience by working itself into the scheme of Nigerian politics and remaining relevant. It has, however, given way to a redefinition of the institution in various grades as a result of modernism. Many of the rules governing the appointment of chiefs has been modernised without giving due consideration to traditional procedures. A quick effect of this includes the appointment of *Obas* and chiefs based on their political affiliation. An example of this may be found in the recent *Deji* of Akure crisis where one of the defeated aspirants cried foul and alleged that his appointment was cancelled on political grounds.

In Nigeria's fifty years of independence, the chiefs have remained relevant

and on many occasions they have played mediating roles between political opponents and powerful individuals capable of bringing an end to the political entity called Nigeria. The *Oba*s have had several occasions to summon political big-wigs for peace meetings between aspirants. The Ladoja and Alao-Akala feud in Oyo state was a case in point, and the most recent struggle between Governors Alao-Akala of Oyo state and Prince Olagunsoye Oyinlola of Osun state over the ownership of Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Ogbomoso is another. This was resolved by the *Ooni* of Ife in a meeting he held with the two governors on 1 August, 2010 at his palace in Ile-Ife.

The chiefs, too, have paradoxically found themselves at a crossroads wherein the political class was compelled to resolve grievances for the royal fathers. For illustration, Colonel Adetunji Olurin summoned the royal fathers to a meeting of Oyo State Council of Obas in 1983 to settle the lingering leadership tussle between the *Ooni* of Ife, *Oba* Okunade Sijuwade II and the *Alaafin* of Oyo *Oba* Lamidi Adeyemi III. A similar tussle has continued in Oyo state between the *Alaafin* of Oyo, the *Soun* of Ogbomoso and the *Olubadan* of Ibadan of late, which the various government has had to grapple with since the carving out of Osun state. The above call to question the extent to which the royal fathers have 'fathered' the Nigerian political class since 1960.

Impact of Modernism on the Traditional Chieftaincy Structure

Again, when there is no existing chieftaincy declarations and clearly spelt out modalities or procedures for appointment; or, better still, when there existed only a clumsy modality or procedure for appointment, there is bound to be notable problems since the ruling power plays a key role in the making of chieftaincy declaration.

The influence of gratification may also be established to warrant modernism in chieftaincy claims. In some cases, the consenting authority[28] ran into the naughty problem of indecision, having been gratified either duly or unduly. The impact of this is the presence of vacancy for a very long time and the reign by regency.

The promotion of partisanship in the society is another impact of modernism. People who share the same social ideology have also been found to flock together during any named chieftaincy contest so as to facilitate the defeat of opponents. Political party affiliation is another potent reason why partisanship crept into chieftaincy claims. Apparently, as a result of the rise of region-based political parties which arose in the 1950s, the Action Group, being an offshoot of Egbe Omo Oduduwa dominated the Western Region. Membership of any other party beside the than Action Group in the west was not only seen as an act of opposition, but an affront to the Yoruba race. Partisanship crept into chieftaincy claims as a result of religious beliefs or dispositions of the contestants.

The availability of the option of litigation to chieftaincy disputants might be described as a prominent impact of modernism on chieftaincy system. For instance, prior to the acceptance of the present *Oluwo* as the rightful *Oluwo*, the *Oluwo*'s case witnessed 18 litigations.[25] The option of litigation has also been used as a show of wealth. A case in point is also the *Olotan* case where the litigants used the option of litigation available to them to prove their wealth even when the procedure appeared not to favour them.

The activities of legal practitioners, an aspect of modernisation in chieftaincy development, has also introduced artificial delay as a strategy to the legal process of hearing. In the legal enterprise, lawyers sometimes attempt to deprive the winning party the benefit accruing from the judgment of a decided case by pleading for legal relief like stay of execution.

The attitude of the emergent political class to chieftaincy succession has also impacted the system particularly as a way of encouraging partisanship, which usually follows the contest. The bid of the political class to supplant the traditional chieftaincy institution is another impact of modernism. They introduced different grades of alterations to the principles governing the selection, appointment, ethics and functions of traditional title-holders.

These various grades of impact are noticeable in many ways which include the following: the number of ruling houses eligible for the contest, the order of rotation where the order is restructured in favour of modernism, the method of nomination of *bona fide* candidate is altered in favour of modernism; the composition, number and roles of kingmakers are also relaxed to accommodate new realities, the redefinition of position and power of the consenting authority as mode of modernising the system.

ENDNOTES

1.   O. Adewoye (1977). *The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria: 1854 to 1954* (London: Longman), p. 3.

2.   Ibid, p. 1.

3.   Kola Balogun (1976). "From Sacred Kingship to Democratic gerontocracy: Impact of Change on Yoruba Traditional Political System", in I.A. Akinjogbin, and G.O. Ekemode (eds.) *Yoruba Civilization*, (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press), p. 296.

4.   For further details on the 'Ebi' concept as operated among the Yoruba people of South Western Nigeria. *See* I.A. Akinjogbin; (2001) *Milestones and Concepts in Yoruba History and Culture*, (Ibadan:Olu-Akin Publishers) pp. 104-119.

5.   In Yorubaland, a *baale* was usually the title of every ruler of a village who is not a crowned head.

6   L.K. Alo (1995). 'The Native Courts in Ibadan 1901-1960' (Unpublished M.A. Project, University of Ibadan), p. 13.

7   N.A. Fadipe (1970). *The Sociology of the Yoruba*, F.O. Okediji and O.O. Okediji

(eds.) Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, p. 209.

8.   L.K. Alo, op. cit., p. 13.
9.   Adewoye, op. cit., p. 7.
9.   *New Oxford Advanced Learner Dictionary.*
10. O. Adewoye, op. cit., p. 55.
11. A.V. Omojeje (2007). "The Administration of Native Courts in Ondo, 1915
     to 1960", an unpublished M.Phil thesis, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-
     Ife, Nigeria, pp. 30-50.
12. Levy Marion, "Pattern of Modernization and Political Developments," in
     Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 35,1965. *See also* Lloyd
     Fallers; (1956) *Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the
     Political Institution of an East African People* (Cambridge: Hefer).
13. Olufemi Vaughan (2000). *Traditional Powers in Modern Politics: 1890s- 1990s.*
14. Ibid
15. O. Vaughan (2000), op. cit., p. 13.
16. Ibid, p. 64.
17. The 1947 Constitution was Richards Constitution.
18. Olufemi Vaughan (2000). op. cit. p. 65.
19. For details about the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa, see* S.O. Arifalo, "Egbe Omo
     Oduduwa: Structure and Strategy" *Odu: A Journal of West African Studies,*
     January, 1981.
20. Olufemi Vaughan (2000). op. cit., p. 125.
21. *Oba lo nile*
22. Ibid, p. 140.
23. *Isakole means.*
24. *Bu funmi n bu fun o lopolo n ke.*
25. D.Z. Olupayimo (2006). "The Impact of Judicial Intervention in Chieftaincy
     Institution in Old Osun Division, 1946-1991", unpublished M.Phil thesis,
     Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, pp. 54-59.
26. Ibid, p. 60.

SECTION G

Policing Nigeria

Issues in Nigerian Security and Policing

R.A. OKUNOLA, A.D. IKUOMOLA and K.A. ADEKUNBI

26

INTRODUCTION

Security of life and property is a fundamental human right guaranteed in the Nigerian constitution. Efforts have been made by successive administrations, especially since 1999, to provide this. However, growing poverty, wide income disparities, high level of unemployment, social dislocation caused by massive rural-urban migration and the breakdown of societal values leading to business frauds (419, drug abuse, etc.), and community unrest account for the growing concern about the level of uncertainty and security in parts of the country. The institutions that were established to guarantee security to the ordinary citizen are incapacitated by limited manpower and skills relative to society's demand, poor funding, poor equipment and general lack of proper orientation and commitment by some operatives. A weak economy can only aggravate the situation (Rotimi, 2001, Otubu, and Coker, 2006). In its effort to improve on the situation, the Government has taken several measures among which

are the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices Court, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the implementation of the recommendations of the Justice Kayode Eso Commission of Inquiry, strengthening of institutions such as NAFDAC and substantially raising the manpower strength, equipment and mobility of the Police. However, a lot still remains to be done to attain the level of security and the administration of justice, which Nigerians deserve. There are several legislations and regulations put in place to assist the police at carrying out this duty of protection of life and properties of the citizen and the provision of internal security of the nation. One of such legislation is the Police Act. By virtue of the provision of section 4 of the Police Act:

> The police shall be employed for the *prevention* and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulation with which they are directly charged . . .[1]

Arising from the above provision and in line with the topic of this paper it can be said that there is a bit of silence on the way and manner policing should be done regarding information gathering.

Recent happenings in community based violent crimes have shown the ineffectiveness of the Nigeria police in security and intelligence-information gathering in nipping criminal and deviant activities in the bud. Contributively, capacity building and the failure of the state to qualitatively invest in modern policing strategies with regards to the socio-cultural characteristics of the nation have not helped matters. Similarly, investment in police intelligence has not been taken seriously. This paper examines the Nigerian police and policing strategies especially in relation to intelligence-information gathering since independence. Major findings revealed that despite modern and community policing strategies, changes are still being described as combative and reactive rather than proactive. Also, over the years investment in policing has dwindled and mainly responsible for the continuous breakdown in law and order. Therefore, this paper suggests among others, that the concept of true federalism should be incorporated in the Nigeria policing structure in line with the American model of policing.

POLICING IN NIGERIA AND SECURITY SERVICE REFORMS

There is no doubt that since the mid-70s, Nigeria has been experiencing what is referred to in criminological literature as a crime-problem (Odekunle, 2004). This has been highlighted in various dimensions raging from incidence and seriousness, which lingers from the usual to the unusual creating a monstrous atmosphere for the people and security agencies in fighting crime. The reportage

of assassination, armed robberies and big-time fraud only serve to undermine the required appreciation of the enormity of the burden on the average citizen regarding thefts, burglaries, and assaults. The cost and consequences of crime for the population are pointers to the inefficiency of the Nigeria police. These are realities that must be curtailed. In this regard various ethnic groups in the country had to seek for alternative means of security. For instance the Oodua people's Congress, among the Yoruba, Egbesu boys for the Igbo, and Arewa Youth Vanguard for the Hausa, among others, became involved in security business. The height of some of these alternative security measures was also embedded in the agitation and popular support for Sharia in some northern states. According to Olaniyi (2005), the outburst of the agitation for a strict implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria with reference to the (Northern Nigeria, was motivated by general disenchantment, deteriorating social conditions and ineffective policing. These have been attributed to the continuous attachment and redeployment of police officers to private individuals, top government officials and companies for security purpose to the detriment of the populace, irrespective of the low staff strength of the police force in the country. The police have been described as alien to the people because they are usually deployed to regions they know little about and sometimes to areas that are completely strange to them, a factor attributed to the militaristic behaviour of the most security agents in Nigeria (Heap, 2000; Ismail, 2008).

From an examination of police reform in the post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa it is clear that African police forces evolve, not in the sense of a linear progression towards a Western model of catching criminals and being publicly accountable but through adapting to political developments and accommodating regimes. As a result, historical inheritance, socio-political pressures, personal ambition, political contingencies, and institutional resilience have shaped them much more than any aid programme. Based on this record, Hills (2001) notes that security sector reform programmes have yet to engage with the nature of the political power inhibiting effectiveness of the police. There is no doubt that, since the mid-70s, Nigeria has been experiencing what is referred to in criminological literature as a "crime-problem" (Odekunle, 2004). A situation where crime, in terms of incidence and seriousness, passes from the normal or tolerable level to the pathological state is worth calling a social problem, which requires a multiple task on the part of the police, the community and government. The task of crime prevention is a hazardous and tedious exercise. Not only must the police officers be intelligent, brave and assiduous at duty, the organisation must provide the wherewithal with which the police officer must do the task. In carrying out crime prevention tasks, the Nigerian police have availed itself of all of the following mechanisms:

Beat Patrols

A beat is the area which a particular constable or group of constables is detailed to patrol during a single tour of duty. It may be a precinct in a city or town, as small as a couple of streets, depending on the density of the population, the known rate of crimes, the economic or administrative importance of the establishment or building in the area. In the rural areas, it may be a collection of villages or hamlets or a stretch of kilometres of our national borders. Depending on the size, nature and extent of the beat to be covered the concerned police officer may trek, go on bicycles, horsebacks, or vehicles, and where necessary with the assistance of police trained dogs (this has become rare and non-existent after independence). The primary object of the beat patrol system is to disperse policemen in a way that will possibly eliminate or reduce the opportunity for misconduct and to increase the likelihood that an offender will be apprehended while he is committing an offence or immediately thereafter. The strong likelihood of immediate apprehension, no doubt, has a strong deterrent effect on potential offenders (Ismail and Abiodun, 2007).

Going by this, most crime would have been nipped in the bud and the attendant cost of prosecution, and incarceration would be avoided. A corollary effect of the beat system was the moribund policy of posting Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) to their locality in the 70s and 80s. The situation was such that Otubu and Coker (2000) laud the policy, as well as highlighting the so-called Nigerian Factor in the body polity for its demise. The policy would have gone a long way at assisting the police in their crime prevention duties and stem the tide of official corruption in the institution. Arguably, a police officer working within his locality is more likely to know the dark spots in the area and probably the criminals and potential criminals in his neighbourhood. As an indigene he will be circumspect at collecting bribes from members of the community as victims can easily trace his roots in the community and thus become stigmatised.

Inasmuch as this system is cheap on the long run and desirable in its import, it will not work well in an environment of distrust, ethnic bias, nepotism and corruption. The system will also fail except and unless there is adequate logistic and institutional support both from the government and the private sector in the country. Since the system rests strongly on prompt, efficient and effective communication network, it may fail where there is no support system like good roads reliable communication system and efficient energy backup. Also, the initial capital outlay for the implementation of the system nationally may be outlandish. In spite of this, one may also agree that crime detection and prevention task has improved since the introduction of GSM telephony in the country.

Anti-Vice Squads

This is a surveillance squad operating in disguise and carrying out intelligent surveillance of areas that one potentially breeding grounds for various vices such as gambling, prostitution, rioting, etc. They operate at large gatherings, public places, and motor parks, etc. where theft and affray have been found to be rampant. The objective of the squad is to gather information and provide proactive measures to prevent the commission of crime and where that fails, to at least immediately apprehend the criminals at the point of commission of the offence. This measure has been used at various times, with varying degrees of success, by the police authorities to carry out raids on these breeding places of crime. Such raids have led times to arrest and prosecution of drug users and peddlers, arms dealers and robbers, etc. Through the system is good as a measure of crime prevention, its use over a long period of time is doubted. Not only is it expensive to run on a long time basis but it also imparts negatively on the public image posture of the police; for it implies a fire brigade approach to crime prevention and management. The system can also be easily abused by overzealous police officers.

Stop, Detain and Search

By virtue of the powers conferred by the provision of section 25 of the Police Act, a police officer on beat is expected to be vigilant and on his suspicion being aroused, entitled to stop, detain and search any person whom he reasonably suspects of having in his possession or conveying in, any manner anything he has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully obtained or with reference to which an offence has been committed. This mechanism, when sedulously employed in a police jurisdiction, yields tremendous results for detecting offences, as much as preventing them.

Specie Escorts

Armed policemen guarding large sum of money, valuables or explosives in transit is a service rendered free of charge to government and quasi-governmental agencies, but on payment of fees, to private organisations and individuals.

Static Guards

This was a time honoured important anti crime prevention model adopted in Europe and the US, partially in Nigeria during the colonial era and the first and second republic, through this model, police guards are provided at public sphere to check ingress and exit of customers and clients etc and prevent crimes is relation to such establishments (Laitin, 1982). It is true that this crime prevention method is gradually fading with the development, private

guards, and the use of close-circuit monitors, it is, however, been used with respect to public institutions and installations. The recent damage to oil pipelines and gas stations by militants and hoodlums readily comes to mind (Kialegee, 2005; Ahmed, 2006; Ikporupo, 2007).

National Security

The police in collaboration with the relevant state security agencies also provide surveillance network on the activities of persons considered security risks in order to prevent sabotage and subversion of the nation and its established institutions internally. Nevertheless, internal security over the years have been described as pathetic as notable as well as unknown individuals have lost their lives, and till date these a lot of these deaths have not been resolved based on either the slow pace of investigation processes in the Nigeria force notable murder cases that have not been resolved such as that of the killers of Bola Ige, former Minister of Justice in December 2001 at Ibadan; Barrister and Mrs. Igwe in September 2002 at Onitsha; Alhaji Isiaku Muhammed in September 2002 in Kano, Sir Theodore Agwatu in February 2003 in Owerri; Chief Ogbonna Uche also in February 2003 and Dr. Harry Mashall in March 2003 among other attempted cases of murders and theft cases. Situations like these have called the Nigerian police and policing strategies especially in relation to intelligence information gathering since independence to questions. Accounting for these is the dismal image of the police overtime which has also led to the non-cooperation by the public who are often reluctant to volunteer useful information to the police (Olujinmi, 2004; Bruce and Neild, 2004.). Yet, the tasks of crime prevention and detection as well as prosecution of offenders cannot be successfully performed without the cooperation of the public. It is in this regard that Odekunle (2004) highlights the challenges facing policing under four major yardsticks:

(1) Effectiveness (fewer or reduced criminal victimisation; higher proportion of crimes known to the police cleared by arrest; increased recovery of stolen property; higher rates of arrests which result in conviction; lower traffic accident rates; faster response time to reports/complaints).

(2) Responsiveness (higher citizen perception of safety from crime; higher citizen ratings of police performance in general; higher citizen ratings of specific police activities; higher citizen ratings of specific aspects of police conduct such as honesty, integrity, courtesy and fairness).

(3) Equity (with reference to egalitarian distribution of "protection" to all sections of the population).

(4) Efficiency (with reference to cost-and-benefit analysis of "protection" output relative to monetary, human and material input).

Based on the above meanings and measurement of efficient policing, there is no doubt that policing in Nigeria is not where it was after independence. Judged by the yardsticks outlined, it has long been clear to a majority of Nigerians that the police short of optimum performance especially in the area of intelligence and information gathering.

COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME PREVENTION

Public hostility and indifference are the most perplexing problems the police force is experiencing today. The Nigerian publics have come to demand so high an expectation from the police. The top hierarchy of the police does not begrudge them for doing so. No one is more sensitive to the great and urgent need for more efficient and effective law enforcement than the top brass of the force. They not only appreciate but also concede that without the full and in compromising support of the public, their efforts cannot fructify. The problem, however, is that the public do not direct their minds to the limitations placed on police capabilities by various factors not of their own making. The individual citizen fails to appreciate that he is equally responsible for law enforcement and that he has powers and obligations under the law to accomplish this task. If he was an eyewitness of a crime, he would rather decide to look the other way than perform what one may regard his civic, if not legal, duty to come forward to give the police necessary information in his possession.

Amongst the many criticisms that have been levelled against the police and quoted as responsible for the not too inspiring police/public relations are the followings:

(i) The police are too corrupt.

(ii) The police are high headed and prove too combative rather than proactive.

(iii) The police delay members of the public unnecessarily at police stations, even when they are complainants or witnesses.

(iv) The police are inefficient and hence continuous harassment of the public who ought to be partners in the investigative and crime preventive strategies.

Irrespective of these shortcomings of the police which is futile to deny, individuals and communities within the society owes the singular responsibilities, amongst others, to be conscious of their self preservative rights. This right is best exemplified when you try to anticipate and prevent yourself from being harmed by the action of others. By so doing individuals are carrying out their civil and legal duty of crime prevention in the society.[2] This task of crime prevention is not achieved through retaliatory actions or

pre-emptive violence but by promptly reporting such incident or fact to the law enforcement agency, the police or any closest agency depending on the urgency. In essence all hands must be on deck to achieve the task and we all have a responsibility and a role to play in the task of crime prevention. The situation at hand reveals the loss of interest in the police and, invariably, this has made a lot of people who hitherto knew their obligation to have either forgotten or deliberately ignore their self-preservation duty of reporting crime to the police by virtue of the provision of section 34(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which states that "every person is bound to assist a Police officer the preventive or suppression of a breach of the peace".[3]

Effective and Efficient Policing in Nigeria: Inadequacies, Problems and Obstacles

There is abundant official and research confirmation of this assertion, apart from information in the daily newspapers, and there is no need to "prove" the non-optimum performance of the police in the present contribution. Rather, what is needed is the identification of the major inadequacies, problems and obstacles that are responsible for the situation. And these may be grouped into three categories: material inadequacies; human problems; and obstacles external to the police.

Material Inadequacies

Material input in terms of funding, crime-prevention/control, detection, investigation, traffic-control and accident-prevention, communication and data-gathering research needs are not only inadequate but are unrealistic as well. The authorities of the police have always provided the technical details of these material inadequacies, even if sometimes exaggerated for obvious reasons. For example, between 1994 and 2003, the amount of funds actually released to the police relative to its request for capital vote ranged from 0 percent for 2003 to 9.5 percent in 1998; and for overhead costs, amount released ranged from 4 percent in 2003 to 5 percent in 1998 and 2002. Yet, the Force is supposed to cover a population of about 120 million Nigerians, spread over more than 926,000 sq. km. of land. Relatedly, as Okunola (2006) demonstrates, the Nigeria police is far from Nigerians whom they are supposed to police. Arising from the centre-periphery focus of development strategy in development, police stations and operational nerves are concentrated in centres and the police apparatus and operations thins off as you move father into the more remote areas. Thus, and consequently arising from this is that the police have little or no direct information about the grassroots especially. This in turn results in reactive operations rather than pro-active operations in terms of policing

Human Problems

Had the quality of the human or personnel resources of the Force been optimum, the material inadequacies might have been partially ameliorated. In other words, the police have human problems that not only aggravate its material insufficiencies, but are also of tremendous adverse import on its general performance from one day to the next. The following are the major factors responsible for this category of problems:

(1)   The colonial origin and heritage of the police which continue to influence the selection, training and orientation of a majority of policemen;

(2)   Improper, inefficient and, sometimes corrupt and nepotistic methods of recruitment (bad enough to require a re-vetting exercise for some recruited officers in 2002 and 2003 respectively);

(3)   Insufficient length of training-period and attention in training recruits for the "rank and file";

(4)   Lopsided emphasis (in training curricula) towards "drill", paramilitary work, and "mechanistic" teaching of law and police work;

(5)   Exposure of recruits to only "professional police officers" and only in exclusive police institutions;

(6)   Existence of "deviant" but durable "police sub-culture" which moulds the "working personality" of new constables;

(7)   Discourtesy, nonchalant attitude to reports of citizen complaints, dishonesty, corruption, abuse or misuse of the authority to arrest, detain or use force by a substantial number of policemen on the streets, in the station, etc;

(8)   Organisational emphasis on "episodic" raids and "temporary" successes instead of systematic beat; and the scape-goating of the so-called "bad-eggs" instead of engaging in systematic re-orientation of policemen;

(9)   Offensive aggression, potentially and actually, manifested by the reputation ("notoriety" is better word) and "macho" conduct of the Mobile Police (e.g., suppressing rather than managing riots and demonstrations);

(10)   The adverse effects of the last two factors in producing a negative public-image for the police;

(11)   The adverse effects of the last three factors in fostering poor police-community relations;

(12)   Discouraging salary, conditions of service, rank-mobility, promotion criteria and procedure for the "rank and file", recent efforts to improve the situation notwithstanding;

(13) Insufficient usage, if at all, of outside help (e.g., research) because of police traditional obsession with "security" and a "know-all-about crime" mentality.

(14) Absence of an overall crime-prevention/control policy, body and planning;

(15) Political interference and the feeling of accountability by the police to the "government of the day" rather than to the rule of law and the people (i.e. a carry-over from the colonial period and the succeeding military regimes);

(16) A materialistic, greedy, corrupt and indiscipline socio-economic environment (i.e. a society gets what police force it deserves); and

(17) The burdensome character of our inherited legal system (from the substantive and procedural law through justice administration to offender-correction) which has never been meaningfully or social-scientifically reviewed to make justice "real" rather than "technical", and speedy rather than delayed.

The Way Forward: A Systemic Approach

There are no quick fixes to the problem facing the Nigerian police. Improving training or salaries alone, or pressing criminal charges against selected individuals, will not produce more than shallow and short-term results if programs do not also correct broader institutional weaknesses that permit, enable, or encourage corruption. International experts agree that policing reforms are long-term, even generational, efforts (Uruena, 2003; Uzendo, 2006; Neild, 2007). While important results can be achieved in the short term, consolidating and sustaining those achievements over time remains a major challenge. Given constant opportunities for corruption in policing, it is important to take systemic and long-term approaches. Programmes that address police corruption as part of a larger focus on good governance across all state institutions may face less resistance than programs that make the police feel singled out. It is equally important to identify and address linkages across the criminal justice system as a whole.

At the simplest level, when police believe that judges are "bought off," they have little incentive to pursue a serious investigation and every reason to take the bribe themselves before the case reaches the courts. In reality, a series of linkages exists in efforts to increase probity and professionalism across the criminal justice system. Efforts to enhance judicial independence and improve access to justice should be aligned with policing reforms: projects addressing judicial independence could undertake parallel initiatives to improve the operational independence of the police. Both police corruption and the conduct and success rate of criminal prosecutions may be addressed by strengthened prosecutorial and judicial oversight of police investigations.

Prosecutors and courts must hold the police criminally liable for acts of corruption. Projects that aim to improve the speed of trial processes through better case management could include systems to register and track detainees in police cells and help restrict abuse. Despite their potential efficiencies, these and other synergies between police and justice reform are too little explored. Major focal concerns in restoring a better policing system should therefore be on:

(1) *Democratic Policing:* Within the police, reform strategies that emphasise accountability, transparency, and professional practices should produce overall gains in efficiency, as well as greater responsiveness to the communities they serve. Good democratic policing practices, such as improving standards, selection, training, and salaries, can contribute to improved conditions of service, capacity, professionalism, and morale. The introduction of performance indicators and well-defined job descriptions will support merit-based systems for assignments and promotions.

(2) *Build Public Support:* In settings characterised by weak political will, building public awareness of the extent and dynamics of corruption and generating pressure for change may be essential first steps toward institutional reform. Strong demand-side pressure for performance enhancement is equally as important as institutionally focused initiatives. Ongoing public concern is especially necessary in the face of allegedly competing priorities, such as rising crime, which allow police to argue for increased powers rather than increased accountability. A more informed public and policy debate would benefit from reliable data. Public perceptions of corruption tend to be very general, and police corruption is often viewed as endemic even where specific dynamics are, in fact, more limited. Widely shared misperceptions can feed accusations of corruption when police conduct legal actions such as levying fees for certain services and issuing on-the-spot fines. Research and information campaigns can provide insights into practices and problems and identify constructive solutions that reform advocates can use to keep the issue on the public agenda even when reform efforts may be stalled. Nevertheless, caution should be exercised in building external strategies that focus exclusively on police corruption, particularly criminal corruption, but also politically biased policing. Civil society groups may be subjected to reprisals and even attacks in response to public revelations and criticisms. A risk analysis and careful consultation with potential civil society partners should be undertaken as part of the assessment and development of an external strategy on police corruption.

(3) *Counter-Police Resistance:* Police have considerable capacity for resistance. Police are also keenly aware of the political impact that their action or inaction may have for a government, and can seek to temper official pressures by asserting the need for resources, powers, or political backing in order to deal effectively with social unrest, demonstrations, and other public order issues. Political pressures that challenge deeply vested police interests may compete with a government's need for effective police action, particularly in highly visible public order policing. In these settings, the clear ability of the police – through act or omission – to produce negative political outcomes can result in a softening of government support for reform.

(4) *Recognise the Limits of Community Policing:* The introduction of community policing strategies does not necessarily address police corruption neither does it enhance intelligence-information gathering all alone. The police may as easily become embroiled in local power structures as national ones, and with greater distance from accountability mechanisms that are too often located only in capitals and large cities. Local needs policing was implemented to positive effect in the context of a holistic police reform as shown in Sierra Leone (Horn, et. al., 2006). This contrasts, however, with less positive appraisals of the impact of community policing in Uganda and Kenya, where recent human rights reports argue that community policing should only be implemented once systemic problems in policing have been addressed (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006). These latter experiences suggest that clear national standards and accountability mechanisms should be in place before implementing community policing to avoid the risk of reinforcing undemocratic local authorities and power structures.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

With a total police force of about 110,000 in 1999, the number of the force has almost quadrupled in the last decade to about 410,000 in 2009 (Ismail, 2008). The challenge now is to make the police more effective. To enable the police meet the challenges of modern policing and crowd control, as well as eliminate the incidence of corrupt tendencies, a major thrust of policy will be to build capacity through training of police personnel, pursue paradigm shift in orientation of the police force and better equip the force to improve its image, responsive-ness to distress calls and adopting a more proactive approach to crime prevention and detection. Specific initiatives would include:

(1) Re-orientation to improve the quality of service;

(2) Increased use of scientific methods in policing – to enhance the quality of evidence and investigation;

(3) Introduction of appropriate equipment and development of an exclusive communication system – to improve police effectiveness; and

(4) Capacity building, training and re-training as well as involvement of communities in policing.

The police will be properly trained and equipped to enhance their effectiveness in combating crimes. The level of entry into the force will be raised to a minimum of OND, gradually rising to HND and degree level. With the advent of the GSM telephony, sophisticated gadgets and improved fleet of vehicles, the performance of the police should increase.

Lastly, inasmuch as the above mentioned initiatives are cheap, achievable on the long run and desirable in its import, it will not work well in an environment of distrust, ethnic bias, nepotism and corruption. The Nigeria police is part and parcel of the entire system; it can only get better if adequate logistic and institutional support from the government, community and the private sector are properly harnessed in the state. Since the system rests strongly on prompt, efficient and effective communication networks, it may fail where there is no support system like good roads reliable communication system and efficient energy backup. Also, the initial capital outlay for the implementation of the system nationally may be outlandish. In spite of this, however, you will also agree with me that crime detection and prevention task has improved since the introduction of GSM telephony in the country and much is still expected.

ENDNOTES

1. Section 4 Police Act Cap 359 LFN 1990.
2. Section 24 (1) Police Act.
3. Sections 201 and 200 of the Criminal Code.

REFERENCES

Ahmed, A. (2006). Pipeline Sabotage in Nigeria and Oil Pollution Damage Out of Context. Available at http://www.amanaonline.com/art_pipeline.htm (accessed 21 October 2006).

Bruce, D. and Neild, R. (2004). The Police That We Want; A Handbook for Oversight of Police in South Africa, Johannesburg and New York, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Open Society Justice Initiative and Open Society Foundation for South Africa.

Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) (2006). The Police, The People,

The Politics; Police Accountability in Kenya, Uganda, and Delhi. London.

Heap, S. (2000). 'Colonial "Area Boys": Male Juvenile Delinquents on Lagos Island'. Paper presented at the Conference 'Africa: Past, Present and Future', African Studies Association of the UK Biennial Conference, Trinity College, Cambridge, 11-13 September.

Horn, A., Olonisakin, F., and Peake, G. (2006). United Kingdom-Led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. *Civil Wars*, Vol. 8, (2), pp. 109-123.

Ikelegbe, A. (2005). The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 14(2):208–234.

Ikporupo, C.O. (2007). The Niger-Delta: the Geography of Terrorism and the Terror of Geography: A Valedictory Lecture, Department of Geography, University of Ibadan, 27 June.

Ismail, O. (2008). Youth, Political Violence and Human Security: A Case Study of Lagos, Nigeria (1999-2007), Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

Ismail, O. and Abiodun, A. (2007). Youth in the Interface of Development and Security. Journal of Conflict, Security and Development 7(1): 3-26.

Laitin, D.D. (1982). The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 411-430.

Neild, R. (2007). Anticorruption and Police Integrity. USAID Program Brief: Security Sector Reform, p. 12.

Odekunle, F. (2004). Overview of Policing in Nigeria: Problems and Suggestions in Crime and Policing in Nigeria, Challenges and Options. Alemika E.E.O. and Chukwuma, I.C. (ed) CLEEN Foundation Publication Nigeria, pp. 22-34.

Okunola, R.A. (2006). The Limits of General Criminal Law: A Study of Traditional Institutions in Crime Management in Rural Nigeria, Ph.D thesis, University of Ibadan.

Olaniyi, R.O. (2005). *Community Vigilantes in Metropolitan Kano*, Ibadan: IFRA.

Olujinmi, A. (2004). Crime and Policing in Nigeria. A Keynote Address in Crime and Policing in Nigeria, Challenges and Options. Alemika E.E.O. and Chukwuma, I.C. (ed) CLEEN Foundation Publication Nigeria, pp. 19-21.

Otubu, A.K. and Coker S.A. (2006). Police and Crime Prevention in Nigeria

Rotimi, K. 2001. *The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience*, Ibadan: College Press Ltd., p. 11.

Uruena, N. (2003). *Police Corruption: Paradigms, Models and Concept.* in Stanley Einsten and Menachem Amir (eds.), *Challenges for Developing Countries*, Office of International Criminal Justice (OICJ) Sam Houston State University.

Uzendo, M. (2006). "IGP to Officers – You Can't Take Weapons Home," *Champion Daily*, Lagos, Nigeria, 13 September.

Policing Trends in Nigeria Since Independence

OGADIMMA CHUKWUBUEZE ARISUKWU

27

INTRODUCTION

Every society deserves one form of policing style or another to maintain law and order and protect lives and property of its people. The trends in the Nigeria police show a development from the traditional to modern policing styles. In the pre-colonial era, traditional African policing methods were rooted in the community and closely linked with social and religious structures. However, as the society develops and gets more sophisticated, a corresponding policing strategy emerges to capture the prevailing social realities in the society. The role of the police in maintaining law and order in the society cannot be overemphasised, but the character and functions the police assume are influenced by the socio-political environment within the society. So, the police in any society is a reflection of the power relations and socio-political realities within that society. The Nigerian society has witnessed several policing trends reflecting various stages of its political development

since independence in 1960. Policing structure and operational focus have metamorphosed over the years since the nation gained independence. The re-emergence of democracy after several military incursions in Nigeria has placed additional demands and challenges on the operational strategies of the police.

This study unveils the character, and functions of the various policing strategies within the Nigerian society. The study brings to fore the need to retrain and re-orientate the police to be people oriented and service driven reflecting the security aspirations and socio-cultural realities within the country. For the police to continue to remain relevant in the nation it must embrace the public as partners at the design and implementation of community policing style.

An analysis of police and policing must begin with careful delineation of the two interrelated concepts and phenomena. Police refers to a socio-political and quasi-legal institution – state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. Many quasi-police agencies such as the customs and immigration organisations and economic regulatory agencies are also involved in public policing. Analytically, policing refers to measures and actions taken by a variety of institutions and groups (both formal and informal) in society to regulate social relations and practices in order to secure the safety of members of community as well as conformity to the norms and values of society. It is, therefore, a "sub-set of control processes" which involves "the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance – either immediately or in terms of the initiation of penal process or both (Reiner 2000:3). State agencies designated as police as well as community groups are involved in policing. But community policing groups who carry out activities aimed at safety and social order do not constitute police. No society can do without policing. However, historical evidence indicates that societies have existed without formal police forces.

The danger of 'police fetishism' should be avoided so that the capacity of society for evolving variety of policing organisation and strategies is not undermined. According to Reiner (2000: 2-3), modern societies are characterised by what can be termed 'police fetishism, the ideological assumption that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order so that without a police force chaos would ensure. In fact, many societies have existed without a formal police force of any kind, and certainly without the present model . . . It is important to distinguish between the ideas of 'police' and 'policing'. 'Police' refers to a particular kind of social institution, while 'policing' implies a set of processes with specific social functions. 'Police are not found in every society, and police organisations and personnel can have a variety of shifting forms. 'Policing', however, is arguably a necessity in any social order, which may be carried out by a number of different processes

and institutional arrangements. A state-organised specialist police organisation of the modern is only one example.

Pre-colonial Policing Style

In pre-colonial Nigeria society, the communal lifestyle made it possible for the people to bond easily together. In spite of this simple lifestyle, people's conduct still needed to be regulated to reinforce commitment to the norms and values and discourage misconduct among members. The policing style took the form of informal social control with the family, religion, age grades, folklores, satirical songs and ancestral spirits having a dominant influence on people's behaviour. So policing was part of the general culture and traditions of the people and not external body outside the people (Alemika, 1993). The informal means of social control were not just used to maintain order, they equally helped to reconcile offenders back with the community members (Tamuno, 1970).

Colonial Policing Style

As the British sought colonial expansion across the territories of Nigeria, they established local and decentralised police forces. The first of such force was created to police the Colony of Lagos in 1861 (Ehindero, 1976). According to Tamuno (1970), the need for state policing arose as a result of the nature of Nigerian opposition to British jurisdiction and rule. Following local resistance to the British colonial invasion, the British consul charged with the administration of the colony of Lagos sought and obtained permission from his principal in London to establish a Consular Guard comprising of 30 men in April 1816 (Sache, 2002, 2003). The Consular Guard became known as the "Hausa Guard". It was further regularised and renamed "Hausa Constabulary" in 1879 (Tamuno, 1970). The use of this Hausa ethnic group to police Lagos with a contradicting linguistic and cultural background marked the origin of "disconnected" police force from the people (Tamuno, 1970).

On 1 January, 1896, the Lagos Police Force was created and armed like the Hausa Constabulary, under the control of a Commissioner of Police, who was also a sheriff, inspector of weights and measures and the officer in charge of the prisons. The Niger Delta region was declared as oil Rivers protectorate in 1891 with headquarters in Calabar, where an armed constabulary was then formed (Sache, 2003).

In Northern Nigeria, the Royal Niger Company which was granted a Charter in 1886 by the British Government to administer the territory set up the Royal Niger Constabulary in 1888 with headquarters at Lokoja. In 1900, when the charter granted to the Royal Niger Company was revoked, the

Royal Niger Constabulary was split into the Northern Nigeria Police Force and the Northern Nigeria Regiments (Sache, 2003).

The primary purpose of the police during this time was to advance the economic and political agenda of the colonial masters. According to Tamuno (1970), in order to suppress all forms of local opposition and uprising against its hegemony, the colonial state emphasised the need for troops and police as the ready instrument of enforcing government orders when peaceful overtures failed.

In fact, in many areas, the police engaged in the brutal subjugation of communities and the suppression of resistance to colonial rule. Innocent Chukwuma (2000) argues that, "the use of violence and repression from the beginning of the colonial era, marked a dislocation in the relationship between the police and local communities, which has characterised law enforcement practices in Nigeria ever since". This position is true considering the image problem the police is still battling with till date in the society. The police is still perceived to be the instrument of coercion in the hands of the government of the day (Tamuno, 1970). Police corruption has been a major hindrance to positive image of the police in the society.

Post-Colonial Policing Style

These alienating policing structures were retained after Nigeria gained independence in 1960. However, successive post-independence administrations equally used the police to enforce authoritarian and unpopular rules. The military administration further emasculated the police and promoted the abuse of human rights and rule of law in police operations, by using the police to enforce draconian decrees. Another major impact of military rule on the police was the problem of funding. There was no constitutional provision that a certain percentage of national revenue be allocated to the police. As such, the police were subjected to crisis of underfunding. The police suffered a gross neglect from successive military administrations (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

Policing in a Democracy

The social environment plays a unique role in the nature and pattern of social problems in a society. Sociologists do not analyse social problems in isolation without relating them to the social structure and other environmental factors within the society. The police are agents of the state, established for the maintenance of order and enforcement of law. Therefore, like the state, the character, roles and priority of police forces are determined by the political and economic structures of their nations. Similarly, the form and activities of policing by state and non-state agencies are also dependent on the character

and composition of the political economy of society. The tasks of police are dictated by the contradictions and conflict of interests among groups and classes in society which if not regulated can threaten the preservation of the prevailing social order or *status quo*. In very substantive ways, the police mirror the contradictions and conflicts as well as human cooperation in society. The need for the police and policing arose out of the desire to not only maintain law and order, but also out of the need to protect life and properties within the society. Most of the predisposing factors that cause crime in a society are from the political and economic environment (Alemika, 1993). So it sometimes requires good governance for these crimenogenic situations to be resolved.

The police as agents of the state established for the maintenance of order and enforcement of law, shares same characteristics like the state. Therefore, like the state, the character, roles and priority of police forces are determined by the political and economic structures of their nation. In the same vein, the form and activities of policing by state and non-state agencies are also dependent on the character and composition of the political economy of society. According to Alemika (1999), the tasks of police are dictated by the contradictions and conflict of interests among groups and classes in society which if not regulated can threaten the preservation of the prevailing social order. In very substantive ways, the police mirror the contradictions and conflicts as well as human cooperation in society (Alemika, 1999). According to Reiner (2000:5), "while policing may originate in collective and communal processes of social control, specialised (police) forces develop hand in hand with the development of social inequality and hierarchy". The police has not met the minimum demands of democratic policing which cardinal elements are "justice, equality, accountability and efficiency" (Law Commission of Canada, 2002).

Policing usually involves enforcing laws in the society. The question then is who makes the laws that the police enforce? For what purpose are the laws made? Democracy empowers the people to determine who governs them and how he/she governs through free and fair elections, opinion polls and protests/demonstrations. Sometimes, police are used by the government to quench the exercise of these democratic rights by the people.

In Nigeria, electoral fraud has been the bane of good governance. This act must be criminalised because it makes the entire society victims of bad governance. When the votes of the people are allowed to count, the leader enjoys the support of the people and fear of crime is reduced. The introduction of community policing style in Nigeria since 2004 ought to make the police to be service driven and people centred in operations.

Community policing as the name implies, is a partnership of the people with the police in determining security need and planning together ways of resolving identified security needs in the community. This synergy between

the police and the people will enhance better police-public relations, and reduce the gap between the police and the people. It will enable the people to "own" their police and support them in crime prevention in the society.

According to Lee Brown et al (1998), the demand for community policing was as a result of police inability to prevent and control crime effectively using the traditional, reactive and militaristic policing style. So community policing strategy is a means of crime prevention and control in the society in a more selfless and humane way by both the people and the police. It recognises the human beings as a major resource in securing their environment.

POLICE REFORMS IN NIGERIA

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, the police have received huge amounts of outside technical assistance, training and support, yet it is one of the most corrupt institutions in a society that is notorious for high levels of unpredictable violence, corruption and ethnic and religious sectarianism. The police are still seen on the road collecting bribes from motorists and harassing innocent citizens on the streets. The poor and vulnerable still suffer more from police brutality while the rich and government officials enjoy more police protection in the society. Nigeria has adopted the language and organisational features of community-oriented policing and yet its police force is fundamentally the same as it was ten years ago. It remains politicised, under-resourced and inadequately trained. This suggests that the basic assumptions that underlie international police reform policies are wrong (Hills A, 2008:3). The gap between the police and the people is still very wide because the police operate as if they only exist for the government and the rich in the society. Citizens, therefore, do not feel obligated to cooperate with the police in crime prevention and control in the country.

The Emergence of Other Security Agents in Nigeria

The inability of the police to cover various aspects of security needs in the society, has led to a proliferation of different security agencies to police various aspect of the social life in the country. The customs and immigrations emerged to control the movement of goods and persons in and out of the country's borders. The upsurge of economic and financial crimes led to the creation of ICPC and EFCC. These agencies have not really lived up to the expectations of Nigerians. The challenges of piracy and importation and manufacturing of fake and substandard products have led to the emergence of NAFDAC, Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) and other regulatory agencies in the county. Despite the existence of these agencies, crime rate is still on the increase. The nature and dynamics of crime in the country, from armed robbery to kidnapping, to terrorism and human trafficking to smuggling, etc.

requires a concerted effort by all the security agencies and the government in tackling crime proactively and in collaborations with the people.

Most analyses of police reforms suggest that democratic-style reform follows a linear progression. For example, police service commissions and community-police partnerships lead to accountable forms of policing. However, reform is an interactive process that goes through phases. Rather than a linear progression there is often one step forward followed by one step sideways or backwards.

CONCLUSION

The quest for a "peaceful" society led to the metamorphosis of policing strategies to adapt to a fast changing world. The nature and structure of the society at every stage of these transformations, influences and determines the form and functions of the police also. Though the Nigeria police was a colonial creation, it has gone through a lot of transformations in the quest to sustain the unity of the nation and protect lives and property. The attempt by the police to always remain relevant in the society by preventing crime and protecting life and property of the citizens led to the emergence of different policing trends (David Weisburd and John E. Eck, 2004).

These policing trends where a reflection of the prevailing government or political arrangement of the day. The three phases of political development in Nigeria, pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial era have utilised various policing styles according to the prevailing political structure in the country.

After destabilising the informal policing style that existed before colonialisation, the colonialist created modern policing strategy that required brutal force to enforce colonial rule against the will of the people. This policing style alienated the people and created a "we" and "them" attitude between the police and the people. To further separate the people from the police, the police officers were housed in police barracks so as to remove them from socially interacting with people within their community.

Subsequent governments during the postcolonial era maintained this alienating policing style and structure. However, the emergence of democratic rule in Nigeria in may 29, 1999, brought to fore the need to have a policing strategy that will be pro-people. According to Larry J. Siegal and Josephy J. Senna (2005), "for more than 30 years, the police agencies have been trying to gain the cooperation and respect of the communities they serve".

Community policing is, therefore, another evolutionary stage in police attempt to serve their community better. This change from a militaristic and alienated policing trend, to a more friendly and public participatory policing emerged as people became dissatisfied with existing policing strategies then. Also, the respect for human rights and police adherence to the rule of law

became a serious matter in policing in a democracy.

For community policing to strive, there has to be a commensurate change in police curriculum and training to reflect the current political structure and tenets of a democratic society in Nigeria. The electoral process must be seen to be free and fair. This will make it possible for people's choice in their governance to be effective and reduce politically motivated crisis and violence in the society. The hallmark of democracy is not only freedom of expression and free and fair elections, it equally includes rule of law and justice which can be promoted through policing styles in the society.

REFERENCES

Alemika, E.O. (1993). "Criminology, Criminal Justice and Philosophy of Policing," in *Policing Nigeria Past, Present and Future*. Malthouse Press Limited (ed.), Lagos.

David Weisburd and John E. Eck (2004). What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder and Fear? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 593.

Ehindero, S.G. (1986). *Police and the Law in Nigeria*. Times Press Apapa, Lagos.

Hills, A, (2008). "The Dialectic of Police Reform in Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 215-234.

Larry, J. Siegel and Joseph J. Senna (2005). *Introduction to Criminal Justice*. Thomson Wadsworth USA.

Lee, Brown (1998). *Integrating Investigative Operations through Neighbour-hood Oriented Policing*. The Houston Police Department. Human Rights Watch, 2005.

Omotola, J.S. (2007). The Police and the Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria: Contributions and Constraints. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences* 4(4): 620-631.

Reiner, R. (1997). Policing and the Police in Maguire, M. Morgan, R. and Reiner (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 997-1049.

Sache, I. (2002). Nigeria Police, www.nigeriapolice.org.

Sache, I. (2003). History of the Nigeria Police Force www.nigeriapolce.org/history.html

Susan Miller (1999). *Gender and Community Policing: Walking the Talk*. Northeastern University Press of New England.

Tamuno, T.N. (1970). *The Police in Modern Nigeria: 1861-1965*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.

Political Economy of Policing and Insecurity in Nigeria

AGBO UCHECHUKWU JOHNSON

28

INTRODUCTION

In historicising policing and security, its conceptualisation has been imperialistic because its origin is associated with the Greeks and the Romans. They are short-sighted to understand that every society, whether primitive or modern, police themselves for the overall security of the people. The word "police" is derived from the Greek word *polis*, defined in the safety, health and order of the state. The Greek politeria meant that the art of governing and regulating the welfare, security needs and order of the city-state in the interest of the public. The Roman *politia* meant the same thing as the Greek politeria. But the Romans conceptualised police as a symbol of power residing in central authority (or the sovereign) (*Wikipedia*, retrieved on 14 March, 2010).

A critical look at the two conceptualisation of police and policing, shows that the Romans systematically modelled police as an instrument of state

power, away from the Greeks police, based on human considerations. Policing in Africa is more in line with the Greek concept because policing in the Roman sense did not exist. The traditional African community was itself a police service, where everyone was a police officer (Akosa-Sarpong, 2010), working for the welfare and security of all. The police service and policing in Africa in its contemporary form was brought, like most structures existing now, by the colonialists (Akosa-Sarpong, 2010). The problematic nature of policing and insecurity in Nigeria, therefore, cannot be thoroughly examined without tracing it to colonialism. This took away the concept of policing from the people to the state (or central authority) as an instrument of oppression.

WHAT IS POLICING?

Policing and police share both similarities and distinctions (Somorin, 2001). Policing is the whole gamut of providing the citizens of any state security, defined in physical and human security. It encompasses socio-economic and political engagement of the citizens in security matters. For effective policing in the traditional Africa sense, the welfare of the people were considered in the affirmative, the moral of the people were checked through societal ethics and religions. The police service was only used against those the society considered as deviants after receiving the basic human security protection from the society.

Policing in Africa rests in the entire citizens as an obligation and duty. For instance, in the Igbo society policing is the duty of every adult citizen, while the middle age-grade/group serves as the police force. In the same manner, in Britain, policing developed as a local affair, and the community plays a great role which has remained till now. It is the responsibility of every person to maintain law and order. This role is rooted in history and the common law tradition of Britain that each citizen had a duty to suppress crime and disorder in his area. Failure to do so entailed the payment of fines. The burden of policing was placed on every adult citizen. It was a vocational obligatory policing (Wikipedia, 2010).

The police in modern times is conceptualised by the élite away from the obligatory policing of all citizens to the narrow interest of people in state power. In Nigeria, police is defined as, "A department of government responsible for the preservation of public order, prevention and detection of crime and enforcement of all laws and regulations". In the same vein, section 4 of the Police Act states that:

The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehensive of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with

which they are directly charged, and shall perform such military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required by them, or under the authority of this or any other Act (Cap. p. 19, 2004).

By the two definitions, the police became an agency of government and a vocation for police officers. The import is that police became government instrument in the hands of people in state power.

The issue is that policing and police work did not start as a paid profession. It started as a noble, incorruptible profession with considerable responsibilities. When the first paid professional police was proposed in Britain, it was strongly opposed by people who feared that it would lead to repression and threat to the freedom of the individual and democracy (Wikipedia, 2010). They feared that the loyalty of the police would be for those who held state power, who might use the police for repression in governance and limit socio-economic and political rights of the people, and the end-product would be insecurity.

THE CONCEPT OF INSECURITY

The concept of insecurity can simply be said to be the opposite of security. For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighborhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by the state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution? (UNDP, 1994: 229). Insecurity in policing, therefore, arises more or less when human security is threatened. Security is an all-encompassing concept about the attribute which individual or state may be adjudged to have when they are safe and free from danger or anxiety. It is a condition which enables them to live in peace and harmony, with equal access to resources and participation in the process of governance (Obasanjo, 2000).

Security involves the protection of life and property and the provision of a peaceful and tranquil atmosphere in which individuals can pursue lawful activities. (National) security is the sum total of measures and efforts of both government and the people of a country to detect, prevent, eliminate or ameliorate all sources of danger and risks whether internal or external, natural or man-made, which threaten the collective interest of the citizens of the country (Horsfall, 1991).

These positions are in line with Mahbuh Ul Haq's idea of human security – "It is humanity we are talking about, and humanity we must protect". Nations grew up in the first place to promote and protect human security. The question about policing and security is socio-economic and political. Policing without human security will be in infamy. Human security is a

child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons; it is a concern with human life and dignity (UNDP, 1994:229)

McNamara in his *The Essence of Security* notes that security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it; security is development, and without development there can be no security (cited in Gambo, 1991).

Policing and insecurity emerged when security became conceptualised from the point of view of physical security away from human development. Policing in this vein became instrument of oppression in the hands of the ruling class to maintain hegemony. This came into being when the police institution in Nigeria was created under colonial rule without factoring in the values and institutions of the people. They only appreciated the oppressive police institutions in the centralised political system in the emirate system in the north and the *Oba* system in the southwest.

HISTORICISING POLICING AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

The police in the modern form have its origins from the colonial rule. Colonialism took away the concept of policing in African tradition, defined in human security. The colonial police was formed to "teach the uncivilised" Africans sense (Akosah-Sarpong, 2010). It was in this direction, that Alemika (1997: 71-72) posits that:

> the British colonial ruler and government in Nigeria – laid and fortified the foundation for repressive policing in the nation. Those who interpret police brutality (insecurity) in post colonial Nigeria only as the product of the authoritarian leadership in country have missed this historical the impact of colonial policing on modern Nigeria.

The irony is that the British citizens feared the idea of paid professional police by the state. They rightly reasoned that state police would be oppressive and loyal to the abstract state in place of the citizens. In the British colonies, the colonial master appreciated state police as they preserved and increased the oppressive police system they met in some of the centralised pre-colonial states in the geopolitical entity known as Nigeria today.

Prior to the creation of the Nigeria police, there existed traditional police system such as the *dogari* in the emir's palace among the Hausa-Fulani, the *Balogun* (*ilari*, *emese* and *agunren*) in different parts of Yorubaland, and the age-group system among the Igbo. The advent of colonialism and the attendant need for a law enforcement agency to protect the immediate and long-term interests of the colonial administration, according to them, culminated in the

establishment of the Nigeria police (Somorin, 2001). Rotimi (2001:1), therefore, traced the development of police (and policing) in modern Nigeria from the time when the first of such was established in Abeokuta, Western Nigeria in 1905 to the mid-1920s when the process of transforming most of them from their inherited pre-colonial form was initiated. In broad terms, the forces came into existence either through the adoption of pre-colonial police organisations of the centralised emirate states of the north and those of the Yoruba and Edo kingdoms of the west or through creation in areas, especially the more acephalous communities of the south, where they had not existed before.

In a similar vein, the Nigeria police was recorded to have begun with a 30-member consular guard formed in Lagos colony in 1861. In 1879, a 1,200-member armed paramilitary Hausa Constabulary was formed in Calabar in 1894 under the newly proclaimed Niger Coast Protectorate. In the north, the Royal Niger Company set up the Royal Niger Company Constabulary in 1888 with headquarters at Lokoja. When the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were proclaimed in the early 1900s, part of the Royal Niger police, and part of the Niger Coast Constabulary became the Southern Nigerian Police. Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated in 1914, but their police were not merged until 1930, forming the Nigeria Police Force, headquartered in Lagos. During the colonial period, most police were associated with local governments (native authorities). During the First Republic, these forces were first regionalised and then nationalised (NPF, Wikipedia, 2010).

What is important in all these is that policing emerged from the local level, or from the people. The British also transformed the pre-colonial policing amongst the centralised states into the colonial police. The import of transforming policing from the local people to the national level means that policing is no longer the obligation and/or duties of the people, the state took over the maintenance of law and order, not necessarily for the citizens but to teach people where power lies. It also reflected in the reason the British preferred the centralised state policing system.

Take, for instance, the *dogari* in the emirate political system in northern Nigeria, they performed the important police duty of preventing crime or detecting, and bringing into judgment criminals after a crime had been committed. They also executed the commands of justice (Rotimi, 2001). The *dogari* had also the duty to capture and discipline offender and to guard the town together with warders (Smith, 1960). Apart from their role of policing, the *dogari* provided the necessary security for the emirs and his officials, given the police of legitimacy to their tasks they ere also involved in regulating the economy particularly in the markets where they kept the peace, collected tolls and controlled the traffic (Rotimi, 2001).

From the forgoing, the *dogari* policing in the pre-colonial period was

transferred to the Nigeria police. Like the emirate *dogarai* in the North, in the Yoruba kingdoms, the *ilari, emese, agunren* and *balogun* were responsible for policing. They apprehended and arrest criminals and executed the commands of justice (Johnson, 1921; Rotimi, 2001).

What accounted for the colonial rulers to model policing in Nigeria in line with the centralised political system under the emir (*sarki*) in the north and *Obas* in the West? Three reasons may be advanced to appreciate the problem of policing and insecurity in modern Nigeria. One, the emirs in the north and *Obas* in the Yoruba kingdoms had already usurped the function of policing from the citizens; two, those that performs the duties of policing were human robots (slaves) and three, the emirs and *Obas* had already perfected the use of the police for repression and suppression of the people in order to maintain hegemony in the name of maintaining law and order. The emirs and the *Obas* saw the people they rule as subjects not citizens. Historically, people have had long-standing resistance to centralised governmental control except they are forced through military actions which the police force provided.

In the process of making people to submit to the sovereign, policing and police were used to oppress them to submission. The choice of the kings for slaves and eunuchs were well articulated, as they were totally loyal to their master as their property, and would go the extra mile to ensure that the will of their masters were achieved. It also provided them opportunity to pay back to the society of the free-born that enslaved them in a repressive manner. Their mode of operations and intimidating features attest to the position made above. They all wore scarlet *rigas* (sometimes with another colour inserted) with great scarlet turbans, ill-balanced on their heads and a huge sword (Bello, 1962).

These awfully intimidating features of the *dogari* still exist in the emirates. They are common in emirs palace in their shouting colours *rigas*, with *koboko* used to teach the people who disobey the Emirs lessons. In the Yoruba kingdoms, the *ilari* and *emese* share them same characteristics with the *dogari*. They shave their heads "scar-head" as a sign that they are not for beauty business but action in their duties. Orogo (1971) states: "Each time *emese* went on an errand he held a beaded baton (*Opa ileke*) carefully chosen to signify the purpose or gravity of his mission. These batons were of various sizes and designs. For example, "an *emese* sent out to arrest people accused of affray would carry a baton of smaller size and simpler design than the one sent to arrest a thief".

In all these, policing and police were no longer within the realm of the people. It was these oppressive features that the British appreciated that led to their sustenance of the emirate and *obaship* policing in the name of Indirect Rule.

The British ignored the system of policing in the decentralised Igbo political

system and other acephalous political systems in Nigeria that were not oppressive in nature. The colonial masters, therefore, conceptualised policing and police service not in security terms, but as an instrument to hold on to power for the exploitation of the colonies. Alemika (1997) captures this:

> despite the elaborate structure of the force, its performance is unsatisfactory as a result of long history of domination from the public and enduring police-public hostility due to a culture of incentives to the citizenry created by the colonial practice of deploying police as an attack force against the public. The practice has been largely sustained by post-colonial rulers.

Because of the pre-colonial and colonial concepts of policing which gave birth to the modern Nigerian police, it became an occupying force in the hands of the ruling élite with overwhelming power, illegal within the law and illegal with the societal norms, but accommodated by the state. It was this insecurity which the police brought in their duties that Izere (2008) captures: "The police in Nigeria wield awesome powers which are mostly outside the scope of the Police Act or the law establishing same. They are intoxicated by this power to the extend that they look upon Nigerian as lesser beings".

Policing and Insecurity in Nigeria: Socio-Economic Explanations

Colonialism imposed capitalism on the colonies, which required a new state formation based on individualism as against communalism in Africa. Ake (2008) posits

> the tendency of the mode of production or the economic system to shape the other aspects of social life, etc . . . the political system, the legal system ideological system (cannot be overemphasis). These none, economic aspects of social life that are dependents on the economic system are collectively called the superstructure . . . The substructure and the superstructure – or what is the same thing, the economic system and the superstructure corresponding to it-together constitute the socio- economic formation. What we have been referring to rather crudely as society or the broader society is more accurately the socio-economic formation.

The importance of the development of productive forces to a society cannot be over-emphasised. The state of the development of productive forces decisively influences social organisation, culture, the level of welfare, and even consciousness. The history of Africa itself bears testimony to the importance of productive forces. Once the mode of production or the economic system is understood we have a fairly good idea of what the general character of the other aspect of the social system will be like (Ake, 2008). This includes policing and insecurity in the society. The African society before

colonialism was a simple one. The socio-economic system then called communalism was not capitalistic as no one was denied the means of production, mainly land. The introduction of the capitalist mode of production violated the concept of human security in Africa's economic system, Policing and insecurity began here as Africa societies were atomised into individualism. Ake (2008) observes that, "the capitalist mode of production polarises into a very small group of people who monopolised the available means of production . . . capitalist turned to foreign lands attacked and subjugated them and integrated their economics to those of western Europe".

In order to entrench capitalism, the colonial state redistributed land and determined who should produce what and how. It attended to the supply of labour, sometimes restoring to forced labour, churned out administrative instruments and legislated taxes to induce the break-up of traditional social relations of production, the atomisation of society and the process of proletarianisation (Ake, 2001).

The change from the traditional social relations of production to the capitalist economic system that is oppressive in its exploitation of man by man no doubt impacted on policing and insecurity in Nigeria. The class struggle that ensured in capitalism created very few people who used state power to spread poverty to the majority. Since capitalism is an anti-African social relations of production which takes care of human security, force was used by the colonialist to plant. The police was, therefore, handy to implement the exploitative economic system.

Political Explanation

In the first place, the state came to being to protect human security. Human security is not a concern with weapons (physical security), it concerns human life and dignity (UNDP, 1994:229). A human security approach demands that government spends more, not less, on basic health and education (Obasanjo, 2000). In Nigeria, the violation of human security in economic and political terms began in the 1980s when corruption assumed unprecedented levels. Nigerians began to live on less than $2 per day and now that most Nigerians live on less than $1 per day (UNDP, 2002).

The development maxims of international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank globalise economic violence and insecurity. These maxim are "free trade benefits everyone", "economies need direct foreign investment to develop", "liberalisation and privatisation deliver a level playing field", "governments should not intervene in the economy" and "markets know best" (Anna, 2004).

The inability of these economic solutions utopia by the IMF and World Bank to solve Nigeria problems, the state was set against the people. The

import of this is that the Nigerian state lost her legitimacy. Kukah (2007) posits:

> The legitimacy of any community or government rests on its ability to find and nurture the glue that will hold it together . . . when the state fails to continue to serve as a platform for the individuals to attain their potentials; human beings tend to find alternative means of creating a sense of belonging. Disengagement then sets in as men and women adopt new survival techniques ranging from belonging to armed gangs, cults and extreme religious or cultural groups, or they adopt false nationalist agendas cast in tribal and religious moulds. They then begin to unleash all forms of terror on the state, its citizens and agencies.

The inability of the state to confront these challenges led to what Kukah (2007) describes the state as a fortified city.

> In the fortified city, communication between those inside and those outside is severely restricted by the nature of the fort itself. The thicknesses of the wall, its height, its impenetrability, are what make it a respectable fort. These characteristics are supposed to inspire awe and intimidation in the minds of observers (citizens). This forms the basis of its existence and gives it respectability. The result of course, is that the fortified city is a barricade, a siege . . .

This explains the position of political leaders in Nigeria as the chief security officers of their various forts. Constitutional provisions state that the police is accountable to the president through the inspector-general, while police functions are subject to the dictates of the chief security officers of the respective states, who may not necessarily be policemen. This provides the most probable explanations for the vulnerability of the police to the manipulations of successive governments, who used them for unwholesome practices, largely to the detriment of the collective good of the society (Somorin, 2001). Indeed, policing and the police have been directed to protect the hegemonic leaders who live in the forts of Nigeria's presidency and state capitals. The police no doubt have been manipulated for political purposes in contradistinction to their original purpose of putting the service of the people above any other interest.

REFERENCES

Ake, C. (2001). *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

_____ (2008). *A. Political Economy of Africa*. England: Longman.

Akosah-Sarpong, K. (2010). "Analysis: Understanding Ghana's overburden police", *The Gambia Echo* 10 June, 2010.

Alemika, E.E.O. (1997) "Policing and Crime Control in Nigeria", *Nigerian Journal of Policy and Strategy (NIPSS)*, Vol. 12, No. 1 & 2, pp. 71-72.

Anna, M.G. (2004). Power, Border, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from II.

Bello, A. (1962). *My Life*. Cambridge: University Press.

Gambo, M.A. (1991). "National Security: Setting the Agenda for Debate", in *State of the Nation: Policy Briefs for Politicians*. Abuja. Centre for Democratic Studies.

Horsfall, A.K.(1991). "Brief on National Security", in M.A. Gambo, op. cit.

Izere, O.G. (2008) "Strong Arm Tactics, Holding Charge, Debt Collection and Politics. A Lawyer's Bird's Eyeview of Policing in 21st Century Nigeria", in J.M. Nasir, Nwoke, F.C. Angwe, R.B. Alubo, A.O. Ibrahim, A. and D. Asada (eds.) *Contemporary Readings in Governance, Law and Security: Essays in Honour of Sir Mike Mbama Okiro*. Ibadan: Constellation Publishers.

Johnson, S. (1921). *The History of the Yorubas*, O. Johnson (ed,), London: CMS.

Kukah, M.H. (2007). *Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Obasanjo, O. (2000). *A New Dawn (Volume Two): A Collection of Speeches*. (ed.) Ad'obe Obe. Ibadan: Spetrum Books Limited.

Odekunle, F. (1979). "The Nigeria Police Force: A Preliminary Assessment of Functional Performance", *International Journal of Sociology*, pp. 61-83.

Oroge, E.A. (1971). "The Institution of Slavery in Yorubaland with Particular Reference to the Nineteenth Century", Ph.D thesis, Birmingham.

Rotimi, K. (2001). *The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience*. Ibadan: College Press Ltd.

Smith, M.G. (1960). *Government in Zazzau, 1880-1950*. London: Oxford University, Press.

Somorin, K. (2001). (ed.) 37th Farm House Dialogue: Police and Good Governance. Ota: Africa Leadership Forum.

UNDP (1994). *Human Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UNDP (2002). *Human Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wikipedia (2010). *The History of Policing*. Retrieved on March 14, pp. 1-2.

SECTION H

Nigeria in World Politics

Abimbola, O. O.A (1997) "Nigeria and France: Towards Rapprochement (1960–75)", Matatu, 23–24, 2001; In Ekeh, (ed.), (P.P.) and Bodunrin, (M.A.), (1979), Second two parts. In Aso Commerce, vol National Museum, Nairobi, Literatures, Ibadan, vol. 2 I (2001). Power, Politics, Regions, Nigeria, Ibadan: University Press.

Akin-ja, Friedrich (ed.), On the Social Sciences University of Ibadan Press.

Awolowo, Frederick of the Social Sciences, London: Oxford A Social-nationalist perspective in Epidemic, Abuja: Centre for Development Studies.

Danmole, A. K.A (1981), "Tradition Statecraft", in M.A. Ọmọlọṣọ (ed.), ... two Commercial Arena Traders Hull and Cherry, Their Colleagues and ...

Bottom A Comparative Dynamics of Federalism in 21st Century Nigeria", in African Studies Review, O.A. Vol 4, no 2, pages 115, August, 231. August, August 301. ... African Commerce in ... Ibadan: Government; Ground Anthropology Ibadan ... Institute Communication ... Foundation.

Asiwaju, A.I. Ikime, Obaro ed. Yoruba, H. Edegwamen, London, Lagos.

Ademola, G (1985), "The effects of In Lagos and (1992), "Commercial World operation", in ... African African Studies, WORLD, 20/21. Africa, German.

Ọgunremi, G.O. ... Ibadan ... Ọyọ, ... Ibadan ... African Geographical

Adebayo, A.G. (1982), "... In ... ... African University Press.

Isola, Akinwumi ... "... University ... Yoruba, ... African Geographical ...

Biobaku, S. (1957), The Egba and their Neighbours 1842–1872, Oxford: Clarendon ...

Smith, M.G. (1960) Government in Zaria, 1800–1950, London: Oxford ...

Ajayi, J.F. Ade (1965), Christian Missions in Nigeria ..., Essays in ... the Making ... London: Longman.

The Oxford ... (2001), History Dictionary Oxford University Press.

WWW (2001) ... Russian History and ... Online Library University Press.

Wikipedia (2006), the Historical Russian. Retrieved in March 30 2008, slide show

Issues in Post-Soviet Russo-Nigerian Relations

AKIN ADEMUYIWA

29

INTRODUCTION

Relations between the Soviet Union and one of its successor states – the Russian Federation – and Nigeria have spanned fifty years. Nigeria in its early years was reluctant to associate with the communist world unrestrained by external imperial forces when the Soviet Union held sway. Cooperation between the two countries was based on a perception tainted with third-party prejudices. Then, the relationship was affected by the prejudices of the Western countries. The whims and caprices of these countries heavily influenced the perception of the Soviet Union.

This attitude continued until the Soviet Union and its atheistic tendencies was confined to the dust-bin of history in 1991. But in spite of the ideological redirection and the Russian experiment with Western-type democracy, can it be safely said that the relations of these two countries are now cordial and rewarding?

461

SOVIET-NIGERIA RELATIONS, 1960-1991

Right from the creation of the Soviet Union, the Western world did not hide its disdain for the world's first communist country. Most of the countries in Europe at that period were colonial masters and the attitude of the colonies was dictated by the interests of the colonial overlords. In the late 1950s, the federal government of Nigeria banned a total of 33 books and pamphlets that were considered as communist propaganda materials. In 1957, the last colonial Chief Secretary announced in the House of Representatives that "it is the policy of the Government, endorsed by this House to exclude active Communists from the Public Service and from the service of Public Corporations . . . and in pursuance of it, it has been necessary, from time to time, for the Governor-General, acting in his own discretion to withhold passports or travel documents from people who wish to travel without apparent reason, to countries behind the Iron Curtain" (Epelle, 1964:10). And as if re-affirming the anti-communist position that the colonial administration established, Balewa assured Her Majesty's Government in London that: "while we are responsible for the government of the federation of Nigeria and for the welfare of the people, we shall use every means in our power to prevent the infiltration of communism and communist ideas into Nigeria" (Ogunbanjo, 1986:253).

This position prevented the immediate exchange of diplomatic missions between Nigeria and the Soviet Union which was eager to establish its presence in Lagos. In fact, the exchange of missions was not to take place until December 1961 when Balewa accepted the credentials of the first Soviet ambassador. This was after an economic delegation from Nigeria had visited the Soviet Union in July 1961. The delegation was led by the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, who told a group of British businessmen in London that "the trip to the USSR had not in anyway changed him in that he had kept his skin intact". Thus, the Okotie-Eboh delegation made little efforts to utilise the credit facilities of $44.5 million and the 45 scholarships in Soviet institutions of higher learning that Moscow offered.

This attitude reinforced the anti-Soviet posture of the Balewa administration which despite its avowed policy of non-alignment was overtly pro-Western, because of the belief that Western moral and values were superior to those of the Soviets or socialist world – "the one we have had is democratic which is pro-western and there is no harm in our pro-western attitude", a leader in the first Republic was quoted as saying.

Such were the initial problems the Soviet Union encountered in its early contacts with Nigeria. While it was true that Soviet attention was not concentrated on that part of Africa because Black Africa did not become a serious concern of Soviet foreign policy until late in the 1950s, especially after the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, sincere efforts

were made at independence to woo Nigeria. Moscow offered Lagos loan facilities at a rate of 2.5 percent interest but the government of Nigeria rejected such offers. The bias against the Soviet Union was such that unprecedented logistic and bureaucratic restrictions were imposed to marginalise Soviet diplomats when they eventually established their presence in Lagos.

The stance of the Balewa administration did not go down well with the "progressives" who felt that the country was not operating within its own policy guidelines. Non-alignment in foreign policy, according to them meant the lack of bias against the two blocs into which the world was ideologically divided. It was in line with such criticism that the Action Group, led by Obafemi Awolowo, as opposition party in the federal parliament earned the support of many radicals, especially when it opposed the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact which had been concluded in secret on the eve of independence. The Action Group could later claim some honour when the defence agreement was eventually abrogated following demonstrations by students and workers. The party also attacked the federal government for putting every obstacle in the way of the Soviet Embassy being opened in Nigeria. Such moves were to the delight of the Kremlin, and helped in forcing the Kremlin to adopt a less doctrinaire approach to Nigeria by de-emphasising ideological puritanism.

Hitherto, Nigeria in Soviet eyes was a country in the firm grip of the capitalist world having embarked on a path of economic development retained all the attributes of "free market economy", thanks to the influence of Britain. Now according to Pribytkovsky and Fridman, the country is now opposed to military blocs and stands for decreasing international tension, for peace, and for the complete abolition of all forms of colonialism and oppression.

As the Kremlin changed its attitude towards Nigeria so also did Lagos towards the USSR. The Balewa administration gradually relaxed its anti-Soviet posture by allowing pro-Soviet organisations like the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, the Nigerian Youth Congress and the Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers party to function and maintain contacts with their Soviet counterparts. These organisations helped to further Soviet interests in Nigeria especially since they were non-governmental organs that operated openly. Soviet trade unions and the NTUC maintained very close contacts and the Soviet aid was able to offer scholarships to Nigerians through it. In later years, the NYC and the NSWFP also had scholarships awarded to them.

Of great importance was the link between the communist party of the Soviet Union and the NSWFP. Led by Dr Tunji Otegbeye, former leader of the NYC, the NSWFP was a Marxist-Leninist outfit that declared scientific socialism. When in December 1965, the NSWFP held its first Congress in Lagos, the CPSU sent a delegation. This was reciprocated the following year when the NSWFP sent a delegation to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in

Moscow. All these contacts had their beginnings during the Balewa administration.

If the Balewa government was cool towards the Soviet Union on the diplomatic level, it was not so in regard to economic links. The Nigerian economic delegation that visited the USSR in 1961 opened the way for economic relations that fared better than diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union participated in the Lagos International Trade Fair in 1962 and the warmth shown by Nigerians at the Soviet stand towards Soviet products must have convinced many businessmen that the USSR was a place to explore. In 1963 a trade agreement was signed between the two countries though the volume of trade between 1963 and 1966 when the Balewa administration fell was rather insignificant it did mark a step forward in the trade relations between the two. Prior to this Nigeria imported virtually nothing from the Soviet Union while goods were sold to the USSR only by way of Britain and Holland.

There was no doubt that Nigeria's economic fortune was tied to that of Britain and the Holland as Ogunbadejo (257) puts it "the Nigerian economy was firmly and intrinsically tied to the Western economies so much so that the Balewa administration had little or no economic leverage to move towards the USSR, even if it had the political will to do so". The inability to manoeuvre was to affect Nigeria's search for foreign financial and technical aid in the Soviet bloc in that the offers from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland totaling $50 million were rejected despite the generous conditions they carried.

The Balewa administration was overthrown on 15 January, 1966 and the Ironsi military administration that succeeded it was initially hailed by the Soviet press as being progressive in that the unitary system that it hoped to bring in its wake would augur well for Nigerian development. But the short period of Ironsi's rule did not enhance Soviet-Nigerian relations in the economic sphere as the West continued to maintain its grip on the Nigerian economy. There was, therefore, no room for the expansion of Soviet trade or influence. The Ironsi administration then came under criticism of the Soviet press.

A military coup in July 1966 installed Lt. Colonel Yabuku Gowon in power and it was the expectation of Kremlin that the new administration would be more cordial in its relations. The events that followed the Gowon accession to power were to be to the advantage of Moscow especially after the secessionist move of Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu in May 1967. Prior to that, however, the Soviet Union and Nigeria had negotiated agreements on air service, student exchanges and cultural affairs. The two sides had also discussed trade and development credits. It was under this condition that the Soviet experts – scientists and economists – were able to visit Nigeria at the end of 1967. They were able to explore the possibility of establishing an iron

and steel industry for Nigeria and the 9-man delegation toured the country.

At that point in time it seemed the east was the only region that wanted to benefit from what the Soviet Union had to offer in that Moscow committed itself to building a 600-bed hospital in Enugu while at the same time a pledge was given to assist in the expansion of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. The commitment made by 4-man delegation that visited Nigeria after the earlier visit of the experts became confirmed through agreements reached between 15 May, 1967 and 23 May, 1967. Soviet sympathy in the Nigerian crisis seemed to be on the side of Ibos who were seen by the soviet side as being 'persecuted' by others. But the outbreak of hostilities between the Nigerian federal side and the secessionists was to change the posture of the Kremlin.

Moscow had initially joined countries like the United States, France and Britain to maintain a neutralist stand on the Nigerian conflict and refused to send arms shipments to the warring sides. It later was an opportunity of moving into a field that Nigeria's traditional suppliers of arms had left open. The Soviet Union, it must be admitted, was for the retention of territorial integrity of Nigeria and could, therefore, not have refused to support Nigeria at a time secession threatened its existence.

Soviet domestic policy made it incumbent on the Kremlin rulers to support Nigeria because of the similarity of the situation in the USSR itself. As a nation of over 100 nationalities, Moscow could not afford to support secession in that it would have repercussions at home. When Nigeria's application was approved for the supply of arms in August 1967, the basis was laid for closer diplomatic and economic relations, albeit, for the duration of the ensuing civil war. In an authoritative statement on the conflict, the Soviet Union committed itself irrevocably to the federal side vide a letter written by the Soviet prime Minister, Aleksei Kosygin to General Gowon which stated, *inter alia:* the Soviet people fully understand the desire of the Nigerian federal government to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state and to prevent the country from being dismembered.

Kosygin went on to say that "we proceed from the fact that attempts to dismember the Federal Republic of Nigeria run counter to national interests of the Nigerian people" (Tarabrin, 1977: 12). Arms steadily flowed to Nigeria from that time on and Moscow enlisted the support of other socialist countries for Nigeria. Czechoslovakia for example supplied L-23 Dolphins and other weapons while others contributed other items.

The Soviet Union supplied MIGS and Ilyshin aircraft, a considerable number of Kalashnikovs and 107-mm recoilless rifles. The bombers were, however, not flown by Soviet pilots. The Egyptians handled them. Experts claimed that Soviet ground items proved very useful to the federal troops especially the 122-mm guns supplied towards the end of the civil war. They helped to bring the conflict to a swift end in 1970. Nigeria's ambassador in

Moscow Mr George Kurubo, was to state later that "Soviet aid was responsible for the federal victory more than any other simple thing, more than all other things put together" (Lagueur, 1983: 56).

During the period of the civil war, trade between the countries grew in volume. Soviet trucks and passenger cars, motorcycles, machines fabrics, sugar and other consumer goods found their way to the Nigerian market while Nigeria supplied cocoa, groundnuts, palm produce and timber. By 1969 trade had reached ₦14.3 million.

All this while the Gowon administration let Moscow realise that "Nigerian development could be attained only by remaining in the system of world capitalism" it was in that regard that the Gowon administration clamped down on some 'lefties' in the country even at the peak of Soviet assistance to the nation during the civil war. In January 1969, for example, the passports of leading trade unionist including the president of NTUC, Mr Wahab Goodluck, were seized while at the Ikeja airport to travel out to attend a meeting of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation. In June of that year, Tunji Otegbeye who had traveled to Moscow to attend the international meeting of the communist and workers' Parties had his passport seized on arrival. But in spite of all that Soviet-Nigerian relations were maintained at a very good level culminating in the signing of the agreement on aero-magnetic and ground surveys of Nigeria's potential iron and coal resources. The much debated iron and steel complex at Ajaokuta was tom be agreed upon by a new administration. After the civil war Gowon did not commit himself to any major economic project until he was ousted in 1975.

Though he honoured the Soviet ambassador, Mr A.I. Romanov with the award of the Commander of the Order of Niger title for his efforts in enlisting Soviet support during the civil war, Gowon did not visit the USSR until 1974 to show the country's appreciation of the moral, political and the material support the Soviet Union gave to Nigeria during the civil war.

On 29 July, 1975 which was the ninth anniversary of the coup that brought Gowon to power a new regime, military, was installed with Murtala Mohammed as head of state. It looked as if the issue of the iron and steel complex was high on the agenda of the new military government in that negotiations started soon thereafter. By June 1976 a formal cooperation agreement had been signed on the complex which would have an initial annual output of 1.3 million tones on the completion of the first phase. The other two phases to follow would take the capacity to 5 million tones thus making the complex the largest steel works in Africa.

The Obasanjo administration which came into being following the assassination of Murtala Mohammed on 13 February, 1976 showed interest in economic links with the USSR. In fact the new government was seen as a continuation of the previous one and quite often it was referred to as the

Murtala-Obasanjo administration. This administration was undoubtedly attracted by the prospects offered by economic ties more than the usual diplomatic parade. In line with this policy the Soviet firm, Tsvemeporm export was awarded contracts to contract two oil pipelines at a cost of $120 million. The volume of trade between the two countries remained at a tolerable level between 1975 when it recorded a turnover of 108.3 million Roubles and 1978 when it went down to 92.2 million Roubles.

Economic links aside, Nigeria and the USSR saw eye-to-eye on major African issues. Both were committed at this period to the national liberation movements in Southern Africa especially in Angola where Nigeria sided with the USSR and other African countries in confronting the FNLA and UNITA forces that were being supported by the racist regime in Pretoria. Once the Cuban leader announced that he would be sending troops to support the MPLA regime led by Augustinho Neto the Soviet Union poured in arms and ammunition while the Nigerian government provided cash grant and military and economic aid worth over $100 million. The understanding between Lagos and Moscow helped the Angola cause and to a large extent affected the liberation war in south-west Africa (Namibia). So strong was Nigeria's commitment to the Southern African cause that Obasanjo refused to join President Carter on a visit to Nigeria in 1978 in condemning Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola. To do otherwise would be to negate all Nigeria stood for in that part of the continent. All the same while showing appreciation for all that Moscow was doing to help, Obasanjo stressed that it should not overstay its welcome.

Before the Obansanjo administration handed over to a civilian regime in 1979, the second in command, General Shehu Yar'Adua paid a 4-day visit to the USSR to re-affirm the faith the two countries had in each other and broaden the political, economic, trade, scientific and technological relations between them.

The Shagari Administration: Lagos and Moscow

President Shehu Shagari was a conservative politician whose outlook resembled that of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa. In spite of all this, however, he was able to maintain a working relationship with the USSR. He was pro-West but did not allow that to affect the project he inherited from the previous administration.

Shagari was particularly interested in the iron and steel complex and that interest compelled him to create a new ministry of Steel Development. His administration was convinced that the project was vital to Nigeria's industrial and technological take-off. In pursuance of that goal Shagari replaced the Nigerian Steel Development Authority with six companies following the enactment of the National Steel Council Act of 1975. Five of

the companies were located in different parts of the country – Osogbo, Kastina, Jos, Aladja and Ajaokuta – while the six, the Associated Ores Mining Company was to exploit the iron at Itakpe and elsewhere.

When rumours began to spread that the Soviet Union was becoming lukewarm in going on with the iron and steel project, Shagari sent his minister in charge, Ali Makele to the USSR. Makele saw for himself the various equipment being manufactured for the complex at the Kramatorsky steel plant in the Ukraine. Makele then appealed to the Soviet authorities to provide *in situ* training for Nigerians. Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov who received Makele on behalf of the Soviet authorities promised that deliveries would be speeded up to enable the project take-off as planned.

Despite its pro-western posture the Shagari's administration still managed to be its own master on foreign affairs regardless of the pressure on it by the West. In 1980, for instance, when Washington put pressure on many countries to boycott the Olympic games in Moscow as a consequence of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Shagari dispatched the Nigerian contingent stressing Nigeria's neutral position. He was later to state that "Nigeria owes no apology for its stand on Moscow Olympics".

Shagari's second term as President lasted only three months. Because of economic mismanagement, corruption and incompetence, the military again intervened to the delight of the people of the country on 31 December, 1983. Thus, ended the Shagari administration.

The Military Interregnum

On 1 January, 1984 General Muhammadu Buhari emerged as Nigeria's head of state and had as his second-in-command General T unde Idiagbon. The centrepiece of the administration's foreign policy was Africa and so little attention was paid to the Soviet Union except on the issue of the Ajaokuta Steel Complex. Therefore, it could be claimed that like the Shagari administration before it, only a working relationship with the USSR was maintained.

When on 27 August, 1985 a bloodless palace coup replaced Buhari with General Ibrahim Babangida who assumed the title of President, the same trend continued. The military rulers of Nigeria seemed to be pro-West and they believe that the world they know is better than the one they know little of.

Babangida was able to keep the project at Ajaokuta going and was able to retain the economic links with the USSR at the normal level prevailing at the time he assumed office when the USSR itself collapsed in the wake of the reforms that President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced but which were ill-applied if there was any concrete move in that direction at all.

Perestroika and glasnost could not sustain the socialist political and

economic formation on which the Soviet society was founded and as the republics that made the USSR began to pull in different directions, the Soviet Union got dissolved without any constitutional resolution or decision. The three leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia on December 8 met in Minsk and declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist as political and legal entity. President Gorbachev was not even consulted and neither was the Soviet parliament.

The Soviet Union thus passed into the annals of history and Gorbachev had to resign on 24 December, 1991 since there was no country to preside over. Babangida's government later recognised Russia as a successor state to the USSR.

Soviet-Nigerian relations, therefore, ended with the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

POST-SOVIET RUSSO-NIGERIAN RELATIONS

As earlier stated, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and from its ashes emerged 15 independent republics. But of all the republics, Russia emerged as the successor state of the Soviet Union with its assets and liability inherited by the Russian Federation. Nigeria on the other hand became a democracy in the late 1990s with Obasanjo, a former military leader elected as president. It is instructive; however, that economic interests rather than ideological considerations dictate relations between these two countries. Nigeria has been a beneficiary of the technical and scientific aids from Russia as stated by Alli-Balogun (1986:46-55):

> The nature of the technical and scientific ties between Nigeria and Russia is such that Russia is the donor and Nigeria the recipient.

Just like any other foreign aids which Nigeria has failed to their use, Alli-Balogun went on to say that:

> even though these ties have existed for almost four decades now, they have not solved the problem of the technological and scientific backwardness of Nigeria. The problem is ascribed to both the weakness of the Nigerian state and East-West politics. The two sides have to develop the relationship on a mutually advantageous basis. (55)

Russo-Nigeria relations has fared better under the present democratic dispensation in that the Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Mill is receiving attention and in the area of cultural exchange, the Russian government continues to award scholarships to deserving Nigerians through the Federal Ministry of Education. It is equally on record that the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo paid a state visit to Russia to strengthen the emerging bound between Russia and Nigeria as narrated by Ajala (1997 112-21):

our two countries are bound together by long standing ties. We are friends in the struggle for development; we are allies in the quest for peace; we are co-workers in the labours of progress and prosperity. These are strong bonds reinforced by only recently by the state visit of our president to your country three weeks ago.

CONCLUSION

It has been established through this essay that Nigeria was not free to associate with the communist world unrestrained by external imperial forces when the Soviet Union held sway. Cooperation between the two countries was based on a perception tainted with third party prejudices. This was the case, in the early relationship between Russia and Nigeria via the then Soviet Union. In this period, the relationship was affected by the prejudices of the Western countries. The whims and caprices of these countries heavily influenced the perception and, therefore, the character of the contact Nigeria had with the entire Soviet Union and, thus with Russia.

Since November 1968 when Nigeria signed the first Technical Agreement with the then Soviet Union for geo-physical mapping of the country's iron ore reserve in the hope of establishing an integrated steel company, other forms of cooperation have been pursued in areas like oil and gas, geology, health and education. They then went on to extensively analyse the Ajaokuta Steel Project, the Petroleum Training Institute and oil pipelines projects, all which the former Soviet Union helped to establish or construct in Nigeria.

In conclusion even though the technical and scientific ties between Nigeria and Russia have existed for almost 40 years, these ties have not resulted in the technological development of Nigeria, a problem largely ascribed largely to the weakness of the Nigerian state and East-West politics.

Nevertheless, there are still areas of immense possibilities for technical and scientific collaboration between Nigeria and Russia like in oil and gas, steel, agriculture, military, finance, insurance, shipping and banking. The issue at stake is not to continue signing new agreements, but to strengthen existing ones.

REFERENCES

Ajala, Adekunle (1997). Africa-Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Nigerian Forum 18 (7 & 8): 112-21.

Alli-Balogun, Gbolahan (1986). Nigeria-Soviet Relations: A Futuristic Analysis. *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 46-55.

Sam Epelle, (ed.) (1964). *Nigeria Speaks. Speeches of Alhaji Sir Abubaka Tafawa Balewa.* Lagos: Longmans, p.10

Ligueur, Walter (1983). *The Pattern of the Soviet Conduct in the Third World.* New York: Praeger, p. 56.

Oye Ogunbanjo (1986). Nigeria and the Soviet Union, 1960-1985 in Nigeria's External Relations. NIIA, University Press Ltd., Ibadan, p. 253.

Daily Times, Lagos, 17 October, 1967.

Pribytkovsky, L. and L. Fridman. (1963). Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizu, No. 2.

Solodovinkov, V.G, (ed.) (1969). *Africa Today*, Moscow, p. 34.

Tarabrin, E.A (ed) (1977). *USSR and the Countries of Africa.* Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 12.

SECTION I

Challenges of Development

Railway Management in Nigeria, 1978-1990

MUTIAT TITILOPE OLADEJO

30

INTRODUCTION

Railway system of transportation in Nigeria was developed and managed by the British colonial authorities from 1898 to 1960. With the exit of the colonial administration, the Nigerian Railway system gradually became less functional and unstable. Various factors accounted for this. Thus, the focus of this paper is to analyse some of the causes of instability in the railway sector of the economy. To ensure stability, the inefficiencies hindering the Railway system prompted the Federal Military Government in 1979 to seek the assistance of foreign experts for technical and managerial functions. The activities of the experts lasted till 1982 after which there was a reversion to absolute Nigerian administration. In this regard, the paper examines the activities and impact of foreign experts in the Nigerian Railways. Furthermore, the state of the institution is analysed after the exit of foreign experts. The study argues that with or without foreign expertise, the Nigerian Railway system can be

functional to the economy if our value and education system can be reconstructed. The study adopted oral and written sources. The oral views were sourced from interviews with present and former staff of the Nigerian Railways. The written sources are obtained from newspapers, magazines, journals and books.

Several studies were carried out on the railway system of transportation in Nigeria. Tamuno focuses on the aspects associated with the politics of construction and operation.[1] Oyemakinde also focuses on issues related to labour on the railway with emphasis on the actions and reactions that manifested among the Nigerian labourers and the colonial administration as well as the socio-economic implications on the Nigerian society.[2] Furthermore, Faluyi concentrates on the impact of the railway on palm produce, cocoa, groundnut and other cash crops which constituted the bulk of the articles in Nigeria's economy in the colonial period.[3] Accordingly, the impact of the railway on cash crop transportation can be related to Rostow's take-off stage as a means of sustaining economic growth. However, the purpose which the railway was expected to serve was not realised. It was argued that the means of transportation excluded certain areas such as the cocoa producing areas of Ondo, Ife, Ilesa, and Ekiti.[4] The colonial plan on railway construction was strategically located at the initial stage to link the north to the south and possibly reduce the cost of construction and operation.

Hence, as opposed to the expectations of the take-off stage in Rostow's explanation, the railway transport system favoured the colonial economic plan and it was not necessarily for the development of the masses and the rural population. In spite of the inability to meet up with the expectation to ensure mass development, the railway transport system remains an asset for concern in the economic development of Nigeria. The purpose of this work is to examine the features that manifested in the management of the Nigerian railway from 1978 to 1990. The period is chosen because there was a landmark effort to embark on a process of modernisation. This was the aim of the Nigerian government as part of the measures to revive and ensure proper operation of the railway transport for the maintenance of the economy.

Earlier studies explained that the colonial government was selective in the construction of rail lines and also maintained that the colonial government was bias in the use and treatment of Nigerian labour. The use of Nigerian labour was basically for unskilled jobs. The administration created the impression that the railway was not Nigerian. The problem of managing the railways emanated from inception. This was because the Nigerian workers were not treated and secured as expected.[5] The major challenges were low wages and long hours of work, which reduced the enthusiasm and motivation of Nigerian workers who had earlier abandoned farming and other indigenous vocation for a modern vocation as they perceived the railway.

With the challenges inherent from the colonial period, the work force maintained their new occupational status. The indigenous occupations were not reverted to as a means of survival. The emerging urbanisation from railway transport development appeared promising for a new future as against what was obtained in the rural areas. The compromise of Nigerian labour with the colonial government and vice versa was due to the fact that Nigerians found it uneasy to abandon the new lifestyle, while the colonial government was constrained with the availability of non-Nigerian staff. For Nigerian workers, the Railway Workers' Union became a medium to seek for negotiation. Due to the expansion in Nigeria's economy in the postcolonial period, the colonial plan that was earlier strategic became complicated and problematic for the sustenance of a growing economy. Furthermore, the discovery of crude oil aggravated the neglect of rail infrastructure for the development of other natural resources.

FEATURES OF THE RAILWAY IN COLONIAL NIGERIA

The Railway is one of the oldest means of modern transportation in Nigeria. The actual railway construction started in 1898 with 32 km line of 1,067mm guage from Iddo (in Lagos) to Otta (in Ogun).[6] Other places were networked subsequently; Ibadan-Jebba 1907-1911, Kano-Borno 1922-1927, Jebba-Minna 1914-1916, Port Harcourt-Enugu 1922-1927. The series of construction was meant to connect areas with abundant raw materials that served the colonial economy.

The Railway was managed by the colonial government. It was categorised as a government department. The Nigerian Government Railways emerged in 1912.[7] The emergence and the convenience of administration was part of the factors that led to the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates in 1914. The existence of the railway and the amalgamation redefined the nature of inter-group relations because of the movement of traders from one region to the other. New commercial towns were formed and this led to inter-marriages among peoples from different ethnic background.

By the Railway Act of 1955, there was a transformation from a mere government department to a corporation. The act stipulated the activities of the railway under the general objectives that it is meant for carriage of goods and passengers in a manner that will offer full value for money, meet cost of operations, improve market share and quality service, ensure safety of operations and maximum efficiency, meet social responsibilities in a manner that will meet the requirements of rail users, trade, commerce, industry and the general public. This act stipulated at a time in the colonialism, meant a lot as a feature of post-colonial development in Nigeria's transport system. The all encompassing functions was in preparedness for development in post-colonial Nigeria.

Table 1: Progress of Rail Construction in Nigeria

Section	Year	Distance
Lagos-Ibadan	1898-1901	193km
Ibadan-Jebba	1901-1909	295km
Kano-Baro	1907-1911	562km
Jebba-Minna	1909-1915	225km
Port Harcourt-Enugu	1914-1916	243km
Enugu-Makurdi	1916-1924	220km
Kaduna Junction-Kafanchan	1922-1927	179km
Kuru-Bauchi	1958-1961	166km
Bauchi-Gombe	1961-1963	166km
Gombe-Maiduguri	1963-1964	302km
Ajaokuta-Warri	Under Construction	277km
Port Harcourt-Onne	Under Construction	19km

Source: Rail News, Vol. 4, No. 6, March 2006.

NIGERIAN RAILWAY CORPORATION

The Railway Act of 1955 was guideline to the technical and managerial administration of the corporation.[8] Within two decades of operating the postcolonial guideline, the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) achieved less of the objectives. The operations dwindled rapidly. The reasons for the decline and inefficiency can be ascribed to numerous factors. The Nigerian nation between 1955 and 1975 witnessed series of crises that brought about instability in the implementation of policies. The frictions created by the crises and the continued subjection of the nation's economy to global manipulation devalued not only the economy, but disabused socio-psychological state of mind of the citizenry. Within the NRC, internal inefficiencies recurred to the extent that the financial grants from the government could not restore efficiency in the activities of the corporation. The continuous demand for funds to purchase new locomotives gulp more funds than expected. To solve the problems of purchasing locomotives that lasted for a while, the Association of Locomotive Drivers, Firemen, Yard Staff and Allied Workers of Nigeria instituted a press release to the Federal Government headed by Major General Yakubu Gowon to scrutinise thoroughly the locomotives purchased at exhorbitant rates.[9]

From the previous locomotive engines purchased, about 80 percent were not functioning, either under repairs or completely out of service. This allegation on the part of the workers' union is plausible, because they had direct contact with operations. Even though at the executive managerial level,

such features were refuted. The association further argued that contract negotiations are accustomed with irregularities which eventually led to inefficiencies in the corporation. In 1970, the contract for the purchase of 54 mainline diesel locomotives was estimated to cost £500,000 and in the contrary, it was valued at £5.2 million.[10] In an attempt to resolve some of the irregularities, the Federal Military government embarked on downsising and reorganisation of the personnel.[11] Apart from the fact that the corporation had problems in implement and checking its administrative policies, the most surmounting challenge was the sustainability of the technology involved.

Considering the fact that the Railway system in Nigeria is a network of steel rails, plied by trains that consist of diesel-electric or steam engines, coaches, tanders, etc. the relevance of technology cannot be underestimated. It could be argued that the engineering professionals are probably less competent to handle the complex technical needs of the Railway system, but it may be put forth that the foreign experts are also as qualified as Nigerians. The major technical problem of the Nigerian Railway system has been that of steel development.[12] The backwardness in steel development has affected the maintenance of the rails. As at the 1970s, one of the challenges to the efficiency of the NRC was that of communication. This could not be astonishing, because the problems in NRC also applied to Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL). The process of communication between stations and points on the railway network gradually declined. Amidst the challenges and irregularities, the Federal Military government came up with the idea of modernisation as a panacea to resolving the general economic problems. The budget read by Lt.-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo stated that:

> We are aware that in order to achieve our plan targets, we need the cooperation of all well meaning people. Our primary aim is to modernise the Nigerian economy. Modernise, not in the sense of copying the structure of the so-called developed economies but in the sense of brining to bear upon, and adapting the relevant experiences of other economy will involve a substantial amount of transfer of technology. A large proportion of this transfer will take place through mutual partnerships with foreign private and public enterprises. We welcome such contributions, and will continue to provide adequate incentives in that regard.[13]

This statement was the hallmark of government's proposition to solve the ensuing problems that had engrossed the corporation and parastatal. The process of modernisation simply implied that foreign expertise was needed to solve the economic problems. The implementation of the modernisation reform as emphasised by Obasanjo involved the engagement of foreign experts in reviving the moribund corporations and to provide expertise in the formation of new service corporations.

Indian Expertise and the Nigerian Railway Corporation

As a follow-up to the programme on modernisation, the Federal Military government signed a techno-managerial agreement with the Government of India to revamp the NRC-Rail India Technical and Economic Services (RITES).[14] The agreement was a formal invitation to seek the assistance of India. The RITES team was expected to reactivate the moribund NRC. The invitation of a corporation under the government of India was based on the colonial experiences, which both countries had. And the understanding of south-south cooperation and Afro-Asian relation were part of the consideration in Nigerian partnership with India.[15] The 3-year contract agreement was signed by the head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo. The RITES team contained Indian experts, the first set arrived December 1978 with 36 senior railway managers. Subsequently, 396 engineers and technicians joined.[16] As a process in modernisation of the Nigerian economy, the RITES team was expected to train Nigerians by imparting technology, so that the aims and objectives of development among African and Asian countries would be realised.

According to the expectations of the Federal government, the NRC was active during RITES presence. The rate of service delivery was tremendous as the real expertise manifested in technical operations. The locomotive engines which had been purchased exorbitantly but not functioning were revived. About 84 locomotive engines, which had been abandoned at the railway compound in Ebute-Metta were repaired for operation.

To ensure consistency, the RITES team introduced a double rail track to reduce time loss. Beyond the rehabilitation of moribund equipment, RITES increased cargo activities and the time schedule for train movement was strictly adhered to. The increased rate of wagon movement within the period of Indian stay affected the earnings of NRC. Shortly after their arrival, the earning increased to ₦3.82 million and it was previously ₦2.78 million in 1978.[17] The trend increased and the stability in the earnings was due to the efforts of RITES to contract with companies to improve transportation of goods. The contract agreement between West African Portland Cement, Ewekoro and Peugeot Automobile Plant for bulk carrying of goods increased the revenue of NRC.[18]

In spite of the enormity of success achieved by Indians, it was argued that all they did was to justify their stay and worthiness for the contract; they practically did nothing to import knowledge.[19] Part of the activities that justified Indian expertise was the importation of equipment used in training Nigerians. However, if this was really to justify their activities, the Railway Technical School (RTS) would not have been necessary, because the RTS assisted in imparting knowledge, but probably for the lower technical staff. According to a retired staff of NRC:

When the Indians were here, they made us to learn and watched us with keen interest, they made sure we understood what they were doing. It was a team work, we were always teaching ourselves one thing or the other. The practical aspect of the job was their focus. They institutionalised the practical aspect by establishing the Railway Technical Schools across Nigeria.[20]

To collaborate with RTS, Nigerians were sent to India for training under the ITEC/SCAAP programme as part of efforts in south-south cooperation. Apart from the technical aspect of RITES activities, the functions were basically techno-managerial because, they are interdependent. While the Indians were employed in NRC, the lower cadre staff eulogised the Indians, and those of the upper cadre reacted otherwise. Both categories of staff attested to the fact that the NRC functioned efficiently within the period of Indian stay, but the differences in the perceptions of the upper and lower cadre staff are probably due to the dichotomy, which had existed in the pre-Indian era.

The lower cadre staff comprising the technical staff argued that within the period of Indian stay, the conditions of service was better as salaries were not delayed and system of promotion was reviewed to leverage the working conditions.[21] The upward review which was in favour of the lower cadre staff was not really welcomed by the upper cadre because it appeared as an indictment on the expertise of the Nigerians previously in charge. To the Indians, the improvement of the working conditions for the lower cadre, appeared as a strategy to facilitate and motivate labour to enhance success. But if it was a strategy, the other institutions established and revived might be an attestation to the fact that the Indians were almost relatively interested in sustaining NRC. Beyond Salary standardisation, the health sector of the NRC was revived to take care of workers. The existing health centres were expanded, while new ones were established. The expansion of health facilities widened the access of workers to medical care and this could be described as part of the prerequisites to motivate NRC workers. In addition, the housing facilities were improved and modernised to occupy workers of all cadres. It is obvious that the strategy adopted by RITES was holistic as all sectors that motivated workers were improved and subsequently productivity was high within the contract period. The contract agreement with NRC would not have been terminated in 1982, but for the complaints by Nigerians upper cadre staff of the corporation that they were being neglected in decision-making. And it was even advanced that the RITES cost of operation in the NRC was too high and if such could be given to Nigerians to manage, NRC would be better. In essence, the "Nigerian Syndrome" led to the eviction of Indian expertise from NRC. Despite the criticisms, a pertinent issue was the position of NRC after the exit of the Indians.

The Post-Indian Era

During the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the contract with RITES to assist NRC was terminated. The reasons for the termination were possibly due to the petitions among the top echelon staff and some godfathers who manipulated the corporation underneath. However, if the Nigerians in charge in the pre-Indian era had managed the corporation efficiently, there would not have been the need to invite foreign experts. While the Federal government terminated the contract agreement with RITES, the workers expressed displeasure. In fact, the workers in the Eastern District of NRC demonstrated with placards stating: No Chacraberti, No Railway!![22] The implication of such was that the workers perceived the presence of Indians as the solution to the efficiency of the corporation. In spite of the protests, the contract was terminated. The argument on the part of the Federal Ministry of Transport was that Nigerians can perform the Indian miracle. But if that was the case, why were the Indians invited in the first instance? Did Nigerian management perform the sustaining miracle after the exit of Indians?

The exit of Indians in NRC, the management was entrusted with Nigerians as it were before 1979. The Eastern District of the corporation witnessed what was described as a mild set back after the departure of Indians.[23] The setback was due to the breakdown of four trains. While other districts comprising Lagos, Kano and Maiduguri suffered from bad state of spare parts. The reasons for this were mostly due to the fact that the engineering staff of the corporation lacked the drive to engage the complexities that could ensure continued services. Lack of maintenance was identified as another problem of efficiency as maintained by the Chief Public Relations Officers as at the 1980s.[24] Probably, the Nigerian management in the NRC had overlooked the fact that the resources available are not sufficient to maintain the infrastructures. Be that as it may, the status of the personnel in the corporation changed after the exit of Indians. The Federal government advanced the fact that the inefficiencies in NRC are due to the high cost of operation, hence, downsizing personnel and functions would bring efficiency. This led to series of mass retrenchment. The process of downsizing started in 1984 with the retrenchment of 2,000 workers. The mode adopted was to advance criteria for retirement.[25] The downsizing process was perceived as a means of enhancing efficiency in the corporation. The Nigerian management failed to learn from the strategies adopted by (RTES) Indians, rather the reverse was considered. The 1984 retrenchment by retirement was the threshold of other forms of downsizing. Due to the retrenchment, the officials of the Railway workers' union declared a state of emergency in 1986 in reaction. The declaration of the union demanded for a mutual agreement between the management and the workers and that all forms of arbitrariness in decision-making should be avoided.[26]

Barely two years after the initial retrenchment, the management of NRC came up with series of explanation to justify another process of downsizing. The general manager – Mr. Nathaniel Okoro instructed all directors not to renew any form contract.[27] The Chairman of the corporation – Brigadier Saidu Balogun met with the representatives of the Nigerian Union of Railway men to discuss the financial challenges of the corporation and steps towards remedy, the approach adopted was to reduce cost of operation in all stations and reduction of staff strength. In this regard, the management of the corporation embarked on the roll call of all staff. The medical team was prepared to test the physical fitness of workers. By the roll call, 35,000 workers were in the corporation as at 1986, to serve 233 stations in the country. The retrenchment process was thus shelved because the NUR officials were able to work as a union to protect the interest of workers. As demanded by the workers, a dialogue process was set up between the chairman and union representatives. It was in this forum that it was revealed that; solving the problems of NRC could not be realistic by downsizing, rather the financial impropriety of the upper cadre staff was the bane of the corporation. The union advanced that retrenchment might not be the most desired because the upper cadre staff of the management ought to be retired, but they are not compelled to.[28] Voluntary retirement was suggested by the union as a solution and such people interested must be paid immediately without delay.

The Revival of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC)

The challenges identified in the NRC were in gross and the 1986 retrenchment was not feasible in spite of the fact that the amount allotted to the corporation was less sufficient. Despite the fact that the settlement of salaries and wages gulped up about 90 percent of the grant, the chairman still attempted to secure other means of survival without retrenchment. The first step was to maintain the existing workforce and recycle them for duties in all stations. This was in response to the 1984 retrenchment which left posts vacant.[29] The need for more workers was particularly in demand for the maintenance of construction problems in Abeokuta, Offa and in the north eastern part of the country.[30]

Second, to reduce the cost of importation, the corporation resorted for the first time to fabrication of parts locally. The break blocks for locomotives and wagons were fabricated in NRC workshop. The plan for fabrication was meant to reduce the cost of operation as part of measures aimed at revival of the corporation, but there was about twenty percent attainment of fabrication for the spare parts requirement. The processes of cost reduction were attainment to a certain extent and it was supported by internally generated revenue (IGR). The IGR was to be realised by the commercialisation of serviceable sectors. The advertising agency of the corporation was founded with ₦250,000 to

start competitive advert business to serve the public.[31] The other sectors such as the printing department and computer centre were commercialised. Furthermore, the NRC workshops were relatively commercialised through third party jobs. For instance, bread ovens were made for bakers among other technical works.[32]

Revenue from land and landed properties was focused and reviewed considering the fact that the sources derived from them were too meagre when compared to the uses. The lands and properties were taken for free. Even the charges on the land before commercialisation were almost not managed to the extent that the outstanding arrears on land as at the end of 1985 totalled ₦2,238 million.[33] During the chairmanship of Brigadier Saidu Balogun, a committee of debt collectors was set up to manage the collection and a sum close to ₦1 million was realised. Private individuals occupying NRC land pay less and develop it for lease at exorbitant rates, for instance, NRC tenant in Maiduguri acquired land at ₦500 per annum, built six ware houses on the land and leased them to Nigeria National Supply Company at thousands of Naira. It is important to note that the series of commercialisation and cost reduction efforts was due to Federal government's refusal to allocate funds as it were to the corporation. During the RITES presence, the funds released from the government facilitated the technical and managerial activities of Indians to the extent that the moribund sectors were revived. Probably the critics of the Indians that advocated for the termination of their contract in NRC, felt that the allocation from the government would continue after the exit of Indians, but the majority of the NUR continued to assert that the problems of the corporation was due to corruption in form of mismanagement of funds by the upper cadre staff.[34] This was evident when the chairman of the NRC stipulated that all senior officials must travel by rail, instead of air. The chairman maintained that the cost of traveling by air was much expensive for the corporation to bear.[35] Despite the availability of the workforce, the management of the corporation still prefers to contract out some of the technical works of the corporation. This, in one way, affected the financial capability of the corporation. Without plans for the development of landed property, the NRC in northern Nigeria continued to acquire lands and the telephone bill sky rocketed annually. The revelations from the union workers showed that the telephone bills piled up not for the functioning of NRC, rather the upper cadre staff used it for personal purposes. Apart from unwarranted contract awards and inflated payments, the financial transactions lacked documents.[36] The financial management of the corporation was specifically weak as NRC became a permanently bad creditor. Government Institutions, the military and private business men owed the corporation heavily.[37] Different task force and committees were set up to solve the problems and manage the challenges in NRC, even though they might have succeeded

in identifying the problems, but the political interest of those in government determined the extent of the efficiency in the policies and strategies adopted to revive NRC. However, all the measures did not shape the corporation as it were.

The use of the word 'management' in this discourse is purposeful to highlight the constraints that hindered efficiency of NRC despite the aims of the Nigerian government to modernise and make it work for Nigeria's economic development. The activities of Indians via their expertise could have revived and sustained the corporation to a certain extent, but the level of Nigerian cooperation at the executive managerial cadre was quite questionable. The intricacies of administration in the NRC occurred in various dimensions since inception. The ethics for Nigerian development is yet to take shape. The challenges to effectiveness and efficiency of the corporation are multidimensional and require a high sense of responsibility to effect change. In other words, the change needed in the NRC is all encompassing as it entails the combined efforts of the state, the workforce in the NRC and the consumers, that is, the citizens.

CONCLUSION

The state should adopt a transformative approach to the development of the railway transport system and other essential sectors that are relevant for the progression of the economy.[38] The basis of transformation as explained is to adapt indigenous knowledge and production systems to the development of facilities that 'makes things work'. In other words, manufacturing processes ought to be locally improved to reduce the dependence on foreign technologies and expertise. This is because the importation of machines is a prerequisite for the invitation of foreign experts. Furthermore, the work ethics and values of workers about development for Nigeria need emphasis to ensure maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

ENDNOTES

1.   Tamuno, T.N. (1965). Genesis of the Nigerian Railway Nigeria Magazine No. 84, pp. 31-43.
2.   Oyemakinde, W. (1974). "Railway Construction and Operation in Nigeria, 1895-1911: Labour Problems and Socio-Economic Impact" JHSN vol. VII, No. 2, pp. 303-324.
3.   Faluyi, E.K. (1996). "The Railway and the Development of Agricultural Export Crops in Nigeria 1900-1950", Lagos Notes and Records, Vol. VII, No.1, July.
4.   Faluyi E.K. "The Railway and the Development . . .", p. 139.
5.   Oyemakinde W. "Railway Construction . . .", p. 313.

6. *Rail News*, vol. 4, No. 7, March 2007, p. 2.

7. *Rail News* March 2007, p. 3.

8. The act was established in preparedness by the colonial government to hand over the management of the Nigerian railways to Nigerians. More so, the purpose which it was meant for had been accomplished.

9. *Morning Post* "Loco men want NRC probed" 20 January, 1971, p. 16.

10. *Morning Post* "Loco men want NRC probed" 20 January, 1971, p. 17.

11. *Nigeria Herald* 27 August, 1975 p. 3.

12. The Ajaokuta Steel project which was the first attempt at steel development in Nigeria, has rarely embarked on production, when it is almost three decades that it was initiated.

13. 1976/77 Budget Speech Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, March 31, Release No. 425

14. *Daily Star*, 28 February, 1982, p. 9.

15. Even though Indians had been in Nigeria and other parts of Africa before the 1950s, the 1955 Bandu ng conference held in Indonesia marked the threshold of conscious solidarity for cooperation among African and Asian countries.

16. See *National Concord* "Nigerian Railway and Indian experts". 14 April, 1982.

17. See *National Concord* "Nigerian Railway and Indian experts". 14 April, 1982.

18. *National Concord* 1982, 14 April, p. 2.

19. Oral interview with Mr. David Ndakotsu Staff of NRC 21/10/09.

20. Oral interview with Alhaji R.A. Azeez retired staff of Works Dept. of NRC on 21/10/09.

21. Oral interview with Mr. J. K. Etuk retired staff.

22. *Daily Star*, "The Indians and the Nigerian Railway Corporation' 25 February 1982 p. 29.

23. *Sunday Concord* "Breakdown in Railway Services', 30 September, 1984 p. 24.

24. As stated in Sunday concord, the Chief Public Relations Officer was Mr. I. Abdul Azeez.

25. Oral interview with M. J. K. Etuk.

26. *Newswatch*, "Purge Imminent at Railway", 17 April, 1986, pp. 20-21.

27. *Newswatch*, 17 April, 1986, p. 20.

28. *Newswatch*, p. 21.

29. *Newswatch*, 5 May, 1986.

30. *Newswatch*, 5 May, 1986.

31. *Newswatch*, 5 May, 1986 p. 26.

32. *Newswatch*, 5 May, 1986.

33. *Newswatch*, 5 May, 1986. Lagos division had outstanding of ₦1.298 million, Eastern division had ₦332,409, Western division had ₦286,395 and Northeastern division had ₦266,82.

34. Sourced from oral interviews conducted with retired railway workers.

35. As at 1985, the corporation spent ₦24,707 on air tickets to finance the travels of senior officials."

36. In 1983 a clearing agent – Emmanson International Limited in Apapa was

paid ₦25,000 without supporting document from the stores office.

37. As at the end of 1985, government institutions owed ₦10.7 million, private companies owed ₦6.03 million, while the military owed ₦4.5 million.

38. The idea of transformative approach to development was emphasised in E.G. Iweriehbor's *Nigerian Technology Development since Independence* Ibadan: Book Builders 2004.

Post-independence Urbanisation and the Dilemma of Economic Development in Nigeria

HEZEKIAH DARAMOLA OLANIRAN

31

INTRODUCTION

Urbanisation has been defined as a process of human agglomeration in multi-functional settlements of relatively substantial size (Mabogunje, 1981: 8). It is a shift from a rural to an urban society, and it involves an increase in the number of people in urban areas during a particular year. Urbanisation is the outcome of social, economic and political developments that lead to urban concentration and growth of large cities, changes in land use and transformation from rural to metropolitan pattern of organisation and governance (Kwasi Nsiah-Gyabaah, 2004:1). In recent years, there has been an unprecedented case of increased urbanisation all over the world. The 2009 survey revision of the department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations provides estimates and projections of the population of urban agglomerations with at least 750,000 inhabitants for the period between 1950 and 2009. The revision showed that between 2009 and 2050, the world

population is expected to increase by 2.3 billion, passing from 6.8 to 9.1 billion, a 33.8 percent increase. Population of people living in the urban areas is projected to gain 2.9 billion – passing from 3.4 billion in 2009 to 6.3 billion in 2050 an increase of 85.2 percent. Without doubt, this indicates that population growth expected in the next four decades will be absorbed by the urban areas. The department also reported that urban explosion will be experienced in cities and towns of less developed countries, with Asia accounting for about 1.7 billion, Africa 0.8 million and Latin America and Caribbean 0.2 million of the world population.

In Africa, Nigeria is one of the most urbanised. With a rich pre-colonial urban history, the country in the last 50 years has witnessed a rapid urbanisation. For example, the city of Lagos an urban agglomeration in Nigeria was reported to have a population of over 9 million in the 2006 national population census. It was estimated to have about 10.2 million inhabitants in 2009 and projected to be home to about 15.8 million people in 2025. With 4.96 average annual rate of change by percentage of population growth between 1975 and 2009 and 2.74 annual rate of change between 2009 and 2025, the city of Lagos has been ranked among the highest of the world mega-cities (United Nations, 2009: 7).

Urbanisation is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria; it has been with us even before colonialism. What is new is the rate and scale at which it is increasing. Arguably, Nigeria is the most urbanised country on the African continent; this can be attested to by the magnitude and spread of urbanisation across the country (Abumere, 2002: 88). The 1991census of Nigeria put the number of settlements with populations of 20,000 or more at 359. In Nigeria, an urban centre is defined as a settlement with population of 20,000 or more. This has no reference in any way to functions (infrastructures, facilities, services) or levels of manufacturing. Estimates for the year 2002 put this number at 680. By 2006, the number of urban centres has risen to more than 840 with over ten cities with populations of over a million. Projection has also indicated that in another decade, four additional cities in Nigeria will qualify as mega-cities.

Urban population in Nigeria over the last 30 years has been growing close to about 5.8 percent per annum. It rose from a mere 3.2 million (10.6%) in 1953 to a staggering 70 million (50%) in 2007. Projections indicate that by year 2025 more than 60 percent of Nigerian will live in urban centres. The number of people living in Lagos, the fastest growing megacity in the world, is expanding at more than 5 percent a year. However, there is a mismatch between urban growth and the available resources to manage it as economic growth had been stunted at 3 percent per annum, amounting to USD $390 per capital GDP. Urbanisation in Nigeria is not accompanied by industrialisation as it is in developed countries. The share of oil in government

revenues is 76 percent and it is 95 percent of her export earnings (Falade, 2009: 4). The implications of the above for economic development of the country are grave and pose a dilemma for an increasingly urbanised country.

It has been established that there is a positive relationship between urbanisation and economic development. Since time immemorial, cities have been centres of economic growth and cultural creativity. Cities around the world are playing an ever-increasing role in creating wealth, enhancing social development, attracting investment and harnessing both human and technical resources for achieving unprecedented gains in productivity and competitiveness. Cities are also engines of rural development. However, challenges of rapid population growth, unaccompanied by industrialisation or economic growth; lack of economic dynamism; governance failures; severe infrastructure and service deficiencies; inadequate land administration; and poverty and social breakdown are making urban centres in Nigeria to be parasitic rather than being generators of economic development.

PRE-INDEPENDENCE URBANISATION IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is one of the few countries in Africa which had many large pre-industrial cities before the colonial period. The south-western and the northern parts of the country are said to have urban centres as far back as at Middle Ages (between 7th and 19th centuries). As Abumere (2002) notes, "the growth of the towns in northern Nigeria can be accounted for almost wholly by the Trans-Saharan trade." This resulted into the emergence of towns such as Kano, Zaria, Katsina, Kukawa, Yerwa (Maiduguri) and Daura. In the south-western zone, which is by far the most urbanised in sub-Saharan Africa, evidence of large concentration of people in areas known today as Oyo, Ibadan, Ogbomoso, Abeokuta, and Ede exist. One of the major factors which explain the development of pre-colonial urbanisation in this area was the continuous internecine war among the Yoruba. This forced peasants to find refuge in walled cities. During 19th century more than 36 towns existed in the area known as south-western Nigeria. Six towns among them reportedly had populations of more than 40,000 people each by the mid-19th century (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1993: 252-255, cited in Fourchard, 2003: 2).

Apart from war, other factors that account for the growth of towns in this region is the Atlantic trade with the Europeans, first in slave trade and later in legitimate trade. Urbanisation at this period was essentially agro-driven. If the Nigerian official definition of 20,000 populations is to be used as yardstick to define an area as urban, then there were over twenty urban centres in the present area known as Nigeria during the pre-colonial era. From the north to the south, area that qualify as urban included; Sokoto, Ilorin, Zaria, Kano, Dikwa, Degoa, Kiama, Wawa, Tabra, Ibadan, Abeokuta,

Iwo, Oyo, Ijebu-Ode, Ijaiye, Ogbomoso, Ede, Oke-Odan, Iseyin, Koso, Epe, etc. It must be noted, however, that urbanisation in the south-eastern Nigeria is a recent phenomenon dating mainly back no further than colonial era. The area has fewer urban centres compare to the south-west that had greatest number of urban centres in the country. The administrative structure created by the colonial government at the beginning of the 20th century changed the pattern of distribution of towns in Nigeria. New towns appeared as administrative headquarters (Kaduna and Nsukka, for instance) or as industrial settlements (Jos and Enugu). In the south-west, the presence of a railway station and an administrative headquarters reinforced the positions of a few towns (Ibadan, Ilorin and Ogbomoso), while some decline or become less important.

Although, the rate of urbanisation remained very low during the colonial period, the seed of disparities in the spatial distribution of urbanisation across the country was sown at this period. Table 1 shows the regional distribution of urbanisation in Nigeria.

One outstanding fact from the table above is that the Middle Belt is missing completely from the picture. The reason for this will soon be discovered in the next section. The presence of pre-colonial cities indicates that there is a well-defined urban system before colonialism. These systems of cities depend on trading and the level of trading activities in these cities defined the level of their economic development.

Table 1: Regional Distribution of Urbanisation in Nigeria

Region	% Urban	
	1963	1991
Mid-West	11.19	38.76
North	10.69	22.87
South-East	11.17	28.81
South-West	53.83	66.00
Nigeria	19.30	35.74

Source: 1953, 1963 and 1991 Census of Nigeria (Abumere, 2002: 89).

POST-INDEPENDENCE URBANISATION IN NIGERIA

The post-independence era witnessed an upsurge in urbanisation, with intensification of the existing spatial order. By 1931, less than 7 percent of Nigerians lived in urban centres (settlements with populations of 20,000 and above). The proportion rose to ten percent in 1952; 19.2 percent in 1963 and 42 percent in 1991. Instability since independence in 1960 and the 3-year civil

war (1967-1970) led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people, including many rural-dwellers, who ended up settling in urban areas. During the 1970s, the massive injection of money into the construction of urban utilities and infrastructure attracted a flow of rural migrants, and of citizens of other West African countries into the federal capital city of Lagos and into some towns selected as state capitals. The oil boom of the 1970s led Nigeria to neglect its strong agricultural and light manufacturing bases in favour of an unhealthy dependence on crude oil. In 2000, oil and gas exports accounted for more than 98 percent of export earnings and about 83 percent of federal government revenue. New oil wealth, the concurrent decline of other economic sectors, the lurch toward a statist economic model and creation of new states and local government areas fuelled massive migration to the cities.

The creation of the new Federal Capital Territory named Abuja in 1976 changed the course of urbanisation in Nigeria. The Middle Belt which was once a completely rural area became suddenly urbanised with the location of the new federal capital in the region. From three regions in 1960, Nigeria today has metamorphosed into a country of 36 states and Abuja (the FCT) and as many as 774 Local Government Areas. The astonishing part of this is that the capitals of these states and seats of these local governments had been transformed into urban centres in their own levels with indication of further growth. Table 2 showed the number and growth of urban centres with population of 20,000 persons and above between the period of 1911 to 1991.

Table 2: Number and Growth of urban centres (population 20,000 + persons)

Year	Population (% '000)			No. of Urban Centres	% Urban	% Growth from 1921		
	Rural	Urban	Total			Centres Popu-	Rural Popu-lation	Urban lation
1911			16,054	2				
1921	17,375	1,345	18,720	29	7.18			
1931	18,625	1,431	20,056	27	7.14	-0.71	0.69	0.62
1952/53	27,166	3,237	30,403	56	10.65	2.09	1.42	2.79
1962/63	44,925	10,745	55,670	182	19.30	4.43	2.29	5.0
1991	57,185	31,807	88,992	359	35.74	3.52	1.70	4.52

Source: 1991 Population Census of Nigeria. (Abumere, 2002: 90).

The number of urban centres in Nigeria rose from 2 in 1911 to 359 in 1991 as indicated in the table above. The percentage of urban population rose steadily from 7.18 in 1911 to 35.74 in 1991. If we are to take all the state capitals and the local government headquarters as urban centres, which in deed majority of them qualified to be, then we could say we have over 800 urban centres in Nigeria today.

The very dense network of these urban centres across Nigerian space is unequalled anywhere in Africa. Today, Nigeria's urbanisation is one of the fastest in the world; it is unique in scale, pervasiveness, and in historical antecedents but driven by natural population increase, rural-urban migration, creation of administrative towns and population concentration in towns blessed with natural resources rather than industrialisation as obtained in the western countries. The bourgeoning numbers of urban centres in the country have both positive and negative implications for its socio-economic development. However, the negative implications may outweigh the positive due to unguarded urbanisation.

Fig. 1: Major Urban Centre in Nigeria (Abumere, 2002: 91)

OVERVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

Since independence in 1960, the major economic development goal of the country is to achieve stability, material prosperity, peace and social progress. However, a variety of self-induced problems have made this lofty objective unachievable. Some of these problems included, inadequate human development, primitive agricultural practices, weak infrastructure, poor growth of the manufacturing sector, a poor policy and regulatory environment, and mismanagement and misuse of resources. Nigerian economy is public sector dominated; private sector involvement in the economy has not been adequately encouraged, while her fiscal federalism is lopsided. The revenue sharing formula is skewed toward the federal government (35% to the federal government, 50% to the 36 states and FCT [about 1.4% to each state] and the rest 15% to 774 local Governments [0.045% each]) while other tiers of government go cap in hand for paltry monthly allocation. Thirty years up to 2004, economic growth had been stunted at 3 percent per annum, amounting to USD $390 per capita GDP. The share of oil in government revenues is about 85 percent and it is 95 percent of its export earnings (Falade, 2009). The performance of the manufacturing sector, which is expected to be a major driver of the economy, is abysmal because many industries are no longer operating due to lack of enabling environment. More than 90 percent of the Nigerian workforce is employed in the informal sector and less than 10 percent of the 6 million new entrants into the labour market each year gain access to formal employment. Since the return to civil rule in 1999, there has been appreciable growth in the economy. Table 3 provides information on the real GDP Growth Rates from 1961-2007.

Table 3: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1961-2007

Years	Real GDP % Growth Rates
1961-1970	5.1
1971-1980	5.0
1981-1990	1.0
1991-2000	5.0
2001-2007	6.0

Source: Human Development Reports Nigeria 2008-2009.

Between the periods of seven years (2001-2007) the economy witnessed average growth rate of 6 percent. However, this growth has not resulted in appreciable decline in unemployment and poverty prevalence. Human development is poor and unimpressive. Performance in human development

does not compare favourably to levels achieved in many other developing countries, and there is no serious effort at changing the tide of things in the country. Nigeria is at the lowest rungs of the ladder among all developing countries with an HDI of 0.50 (*see* Table 4). Since March, 2009 as observed by the Nigerian finance Minister, about 12 million Nigerians are unemployed despite the appreciable level of the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) put at 7.23 pecent by the first quarter of the year. The minister in a national daily regretted the rising level of unemployment. He describes the unemployment situation as un-salutary and more alarming because, the nation's youth who are the hope of tomorrow form the bulk of this large brigade. Obviously, Nigerians between the age brackets of 15 to 24 years resident in urban areas account for 49.9 pecent of the unemployed. This portends a dilemma for the country.

Table 4: Population and HDI Components by Population Group, 2005

	Popu-lation	% of world	LE	GER	Literacy	GDP	HDI
Developed	961,261	14.8%	79.8	92.7%	98.7%	34,293	0.95
FSU	284,833	4.4%	66.6	83.8%	98.8%	8.586	0.79
China	1,312,253	20.2%	72.6	65.8%	92.6%	4,076	0.75
India	1,130,618	17.4%	62.7	61.0%	64.5%	2,234	0.59
Indoneaia		219,210	3.4%	69.7	69.4%	91.2%	3,197
0.72							
Brazil	186,075	2.9%	71.7	87.2%	89.1%	8,505	0.80
Pakistan	165,816	2.5%	65.6	–	49.9%	2,184	–
Bangladesh	153,122	2.4%	64.6	51.2%	51.5%	1,069	0.52
Nigeira	140,879	2.2%	47.3	53.3%	70.0%	1,731	0.50
Other							
Deve- Africa	780,015	12.0%	56.4	52.4%	62.6%	2,487	0.52
loping Asia	679,197	10.4%	70.5	69.8%	87.2%	5,922	0.74
LAC	370,057	5.7%	73.7	79.4%	91.0%	9,292	0.81
Europe	119,082	1.8%	73.8	85.8%	98.5%	12,510	0.85
Oceania	8,777	0.1%	69.0	73.8%	95.2%	4,137	0.75

Source: Molina, G.G (UNDP, 2010).

High youth unemployment is both a waste of Nigeria's potential and a contributory factor in crime and violence. The large numbers of unemployed young men and women is the major underlying causes of conflict and fragility in Nigeria. This situation is attributable to a variety of factors that have persisted as important policy challenges; such factors included the structure of production, the nature of growth in the economy, weak infrastructure, the high-cost of and restricted access to finance and the lack-lustre performance

of Nigerian cities in term of investment and employment opportunities. Inadequate and expensive power supply has been a major obstacle to people setting up their own small businesses as buying a generator and the fuel to power it is often beyond their means. High transport costs, arising from poor roads which have decayed because of decades of inappropriate maintenance due to funding shortages and lack of institutional capacity has made the cost of raw material to go sky-rocketing. It is reported that only 15 percent of federal roads are assessed by the government as being in good condition. The railways barely function. The resulting transport problems depress investment returns and act as a deterrent to business (DFID, 2009: 18).

For the country to move out of the doldrums it has been suggested that private investment will have to play the decisive role in increasing non-oil growth and creating jobs; particularly as government funding is likely to be affected by the fall in oil revenues. Nigeria's future economic growth will require the fixing up of infrastructure to reposition cities to play their required role as generator of wealth. Also, much greater access to finance and banking services have to be granted to small and medium-sized business and for individuals in order to promote self-employment.

Urbanisation: A Necessary Evil

There are two schools of thought on urbanisation and its implications on development. The first is the optimistic school which believe that urbanisation bring about improved income level, easy access to healthcare facilities; educational facilities and other infrastructural facilities that make life easy and comfortable (*see* Boserup, 1981 and Hoover, 1948). To this school, urbanisation is good and necessary to achieve development. The second school of thought is pessimistic, believing that people gravitate to the cities due to bias in government policies on investment that favours the cities and neglect the rural regions (*see* Henderson 2000, 2002 and Mcmanara, 1984). In order to feel government presence and find meaningful livelihood, out-migration from rural regions to urban centres is the way out for rural inhabitants. This solely accounts for overstretching of infrastructure, emergence of slums, structural unemployment and all evil and vices being witnessed in our cities. To the pessimist urbanisation is synonymous with nightmare and as such evil. How bad can urbanisation be for the development process?

Historically, urbanisation has been driven by the concentration of investment and employment opportunities in cities. Productive activities both in industry and services cluster in cities, and since time immemorial, cities have been centres of economic growth and cultural creativity. Cities around the world are playing an ever-increasing role in creating wealth, enhancing social development, attracting investment and harnessing both human and

technical resources for achieving unprecedented gains in productivity and competitiveness. As countries develop, urban settlements account for a larger share of national income. It is believed that about 80 percent of the world's GDP is generated by urban areas. However, in developed and developing countries, cities generate a disproportionate share of GDP and provide huge opportunities for investment and employment. Urban-based economic activities account for up to 55 percent of gross national product (GNP) in low-income countries, 73 percent in middle-income countries and 85 percent in high income countries.

Apart from being generator of wealth, successful cities had been centres of entrepreneurship and innovations that attracts talented and skilled workers which foster greater productivity and growth. The combined increasing spending powers of cities population encourage market expansion, variations in choices, ingenuity in product design, production and service delivery. Cities provide many opportunities for investment, which not only support urban development but also contribute to rural development in an environment of strong urban-rural linkages. Improved infrastructure between rural areas and cities in one hand increases rural productivity and enhances rural residents' access to education, healthcare, markets, credit, information and other services, while on the other hand, enhanced urban-rural linkages benefit cities through increased rural demand for urban goods and services and added value derived from agricultural produce. Increased productivity and competitiveness also fuels the urbanisation process: all over the world there are examples of sleepy fishing villages becoming thriving ports, barren outposts becoming major trading centres and railway depots or harbours becoming capital cities. Therefore, if urbanisation is evil, it must be a necessary evil which cannot be avoided.

ESTABLISHING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBANISATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It has been established that a country's level of urbanisation is directly correlated with its level of economic development (as measured by per capita GDP) (Choe, K. et al, 2008: 10; Mabogunje, 1965, and Quigley, 2008). Economic development, according to *The Encarta Encyclopaedia* is the promotion of more intensive and more advance economic activity through such means as education, improved tools and techniques, more available financing, better transportation facilities, and creation of new businesses. *Wikipedia* simply defines it to mean the development of economic wealth of countries or regions for the well-being of their inhabitants. From a policy perspective, it can be defined as efforts that seek to improve the economic well-being and quality of life for a community by creating and/or retaining

jobs and supporting or growing incomes and the tax base.

From pre-industrial societies, to the period of Arab agricultural revolution from around 8th to 13th centuries, down to the period of industrial revolution and the recent emergence of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs), everything that revolves around economic development and industrialisation has been machinated through the cities. Cities of the medieval Europe, North America, Japan, China and the present Four Asian Tigers, otherwise known as Newly Industrialising Countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea), have played dynamic role in the economic development of their various regions. The GDP which is the major indicator of economic development and which can be readily measured by the secondary, tertiary and quaternary activities only take place in cities. Giovanni Botero (1544-1677), was probably the first to express the immense significance of cities in economic development. In his work *The Magnificence and Greatness of Cities* published in Italian in 1588 and in English in1606, Botero describes the importance of great cities for countries and their rulers. He observes that neither the pleasures of living in a great city nor the necessity of the protection provided to its people explained its magnificence. To him what matter most, are the city's diversity of industry, trades and crafts, interaction with surrounding agricultural districts, the presence of a community which accepts and includes immigrants, has an efficient and effective justice system, schools and studies, and a physical location with access to good ports, which makes trade with other cities and countries possible. Only cities can provide the necessary environment for increasing incomes and power, he thought.

Hartshorn (1980) believes that the level of development in a region is often related to the presence or absence of large cities. This he said considering the advantages they offer for growth and employment (Taylor, 1997: 269-270). Wilbur Thompson (1965) relates regional and national development to the creation of a regional metropolis where the dominant city provides services to its regional hinterland. Perroux (1951) views cities as growth poles capable of drawing activities to themselves. Other scholar corroborate his view and emphasised the strong pull of urban growth centres usually refers to as "diffusion process" as capable of filtering down growth from large urban centre to smaller one, thereby spreading development across the space and bringing the periphery into regional development (*see* Boudeville, 1966, Berry, 1975 and Friedmann, 1966). Stressing the role of cities in national development, Jane Jacobs believes that the key to national development is city-building because rural economies can never produce rapid development. To her, cities should serve the role of catalysts for development instead of being parasitic, drawing resources from its hinterland without bringing development to its rural regions.

The paradox of the matter now is that, while cities in developed countries

of the world are playing significant roles in economic development of their countries, the reverse is the case in the less developed region of the world particularly the sub-Saharan African countries. There is increase in urban growth but decrease in the corresponding development associated with urban growth as experienced in developed nations. In many sub-Saharan African nations cities and towns are often in crisis and the challenges that they face include rapid population growth, unaccompanied by industrialisation or economic growth; lack of economic dynamism; governance failures; severe infrastructure and service deficiencies; inadequate land administration, poverty and social breakdown. More than 50 percent of the urban population in countries such as Chad, Niger and Sierra Leone are in abject poverty. In Nigeria, urban and rural poverty percentages are almost equal. Urbanisation in most developing nations is a constraint on economic development.

CITIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Nigeria has the largest population in Africa, with high urban concentration. It is the eighth most populous country in the world. Her post-independence era witnessed a change from agricultural economy to an oil economy with an upsurge in number of cities across the country. Almost half of its inhabitants are urban-dwellers, about 48 percent urbanised population as at 2005 (UNICEF, 2006).

Fig. 2: Urban Agglomeration in Nigeria, in the year 2000 (CEPED, 2009).

The city of Lagos in Nigeria, the fastest growing megacity in the world, is expanding at more than 5 percent per annum in terms of the number of its inhabitants. The city, apart from being the economic focal point of Nigeria is also a home to heterogeneous population with most parts of the nation being represented in it. Despite the relocation of the Nigerian federal capital to Abuja, Lagos still remains strongly the commercial capital and nerve centre of Nigeria (World Bank, 2005 *cited in* Odufuwa, 2009:243). More interestingly, it harbours almost all the headquarters of multinational companies in the country. This partly gives the city the opportunity to tap from capital and social network in the global arena. Apart from Lagos, there are over ten urban agglomerations in Nigeria that are capable of turning the fortune of Nigerians around for good given an enabling environment.

Table 5: Population of the ten largest Urban Agglomerations in Nigeria in the year 2000

Agglomeration	Population
Lagos	8 052 958
Ibadan	2 489 974
Kano	1 855 340
Kaduna	1 029 918
Port Harcourt	883 919
Benin City	848 162
Jos	766 821
Ilorin	666 031
Maiduguri	506 632
Uyo	488 318

Source: CEPED, 2009.

However, rather than being an agent of wealth generation, conditions of these cities have made them a constraint to economic development. None of the cities listed in Table 5 above are exempted from major problems that are associated with urbanisation in most developing countries. Despite oil wealth, poverty levels are high in most of these cities. More than half of the population of urban-dwellers are living on less than $1 a day and one in five children are dying before the age of five. Some of the problems rendering these cities less productive included; rapid population growth and infrastructural deficiencies, inefficient spatial integration of urban system, marginalisation in the world economy, deteriorating terms of trade for primary products, limited availability of domestic capital, failure to attract foreign direct investment, increasing indebtedness, social disorder, limited government

capacity, lack of good physical planning and lack-lustre performance in implementing policies and plans, corruption and environmental crisis. These are further discussed as follows:

Rapid Demographic Growth, Inefficient Spatial Integration of Urban System and Infrastructural/Service Deficiencies

From the early years of independence, the structure of spatial economy and the spatial integration of urban system imposed a form of constraint on economic development. Mabogunje (1965) is probably the first to draw attention to this. Considering the spatial integration of urban system in pre-colonial Nigeria built essentially on transportation and trading activities, which the British met on ground and built new spatial order of urban system upon, he observes that the construction of roads and railway lines by the British to facilitate export of commodities led to the decline of some cities which become "stranded centres". New cities established by the colonial administration and the old lucky ones that found themselves at the transport nodes become "favourably located centres" that was served with transportation and other urban infrastructure. To these were many young able bodied people flocked to, while the stranded centres are majorly left with young children and aged ones. Questioning the explanations of the central place theory of Walter Christaller and the location theory of August Losch on spatial integration of cities built on transportation; he asked the following theoretical questions:

> what happens when on a system of cities developed under one set of market and transportation conditions a new, faster, more effective, more capacious transportation system is imposed? What happens when this is done in a rather selective manner as to the area served? What happens when the new spatial economic integration which is achieved by this new transportation system focuses the flow of commodities within the system to a few selected points, with a view to facilitating the export of these commodities out of the country? What is the nature of the adjustments that can be postulated as taking place within the system in consequence of this new development? What effects would these adjustments have on the efficiency of the system and the growth of the economy? (Mabogunje, 1965: 422)

His factor analytical explanations showed a "complex, bewildering pattern of urbanisation and "de-urbanisation," of moving into and out of cities, and of a wide array of levels of adjustments to the new economic conditions." The effect of the readjustment of a system of cities in Nigeria to a new transportational integration and to new economic and political conditions brought by the colonial policy spread over economic, demographic, social, and political aspects of the country. However, the economic dimension is

perhaps the most obvious. The locational change among economic centres brought about changes in aggregate, and perhaps per capita income, it led to major shifts in demand schedules, in sales volume as well as in prices, but most significantly in selective migration of the main income – earning group – the young men and women between the ages of roughly 15 and 49 from the stranded cities to centres with decisive locational advantage for the new economy. Increased rate of migration to favoured cities over years laid the foundation for the current situation that most Nigerian cities find themselves. The cities are experiencing rapid demographic growth unaccompanied with industrialisation and economic growth which in turn led to pressure on the existing urban infrastructure, unemployment and many social vices of monumental proportion. Urbanisation pattern in Nigeria is in part the result of distorted incentives that encouraged migrants to move to cities to exploit subsidies rather than in response to opportunities for more productive employment.

Over years, attempt to improve urban infrastructure has not yielded positive result because investment in social and economic overhead capital is relatively low. For example, investment in power infrastructure before 1999 was grossly inadequate, but between 1999 and 2007 there was improvement. About $2.06 billion was spent on power sector. However, about 38 percent of the money was spent on rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure, yet despite this huge investment generation went to as low as 1,750 megawatts. The cities are the worst hit in term of power supply. It will be a miracle of the millennium if manufacturing survives in such situation. There is a strong relationship between economic growth and system of cities in any economy on one hand, and the amount of investment in social and economic overhead capital on the other. Increase in numbers of cities and dramatic changes in systems of cities affect the role of the cities especially as regard to capital investment, this constitutes a major constraint on the rate of economic development as witnessed in Nigeria today.

In the literature on economic development, social and economic overhead capita refers to those basic services without which primary, secondary, and tertiary productive activities cannot function. In its wider sense, it includes all public services from law and order through education and public health to transportation, communications, power, and water supply, as well as such agricultural overhead capital as irrigation and drainage systems. The absence of these and poor condition of the existing ones had made majority of Nigerian cities to be less productive. They have become more or less "parasitic" rather than being "generative" in the word of Hoselitz (1955: 279). Infrastructural development remains the live-wire of activity system of cities. Thus, adequate infrastructure and efficient management of it helps to broaden the perspective of city-dwellers and foreign investors; it enhances the quality

of life of individual as well as the city as a whole. Effective delivery of public services and improved accessibility to employment, education, health, and other public services is a necessary element in alleviating poverty, improvement of the welfare of the people and the city itself.

Unplanned Development, Lack of Urban Renewal Programmes and Inadequate Land Administration

Unplanned development, lack of clarity and security with respect to tenure typify most Nigerian towns and cities. There is no effective urban land delivery system in Nigeria. From independence till date urban land delivery is still done through commercial sale by families and land speculators. There is no adequate property right, urban land is at the prerogative of the governor of each state and land ownership in cities favours the rich, while the poor are left squatting. Nigerian cities are mostly in a state of chaos. The way and manner most of them seem to be organised gives the impression of cities without plans. With an urbanisation rate averaging 5.3 percent per annum, crisis is imminent in most of our cities. For instance, the situation in Lagos is somehow frustrating. The state's commissioner for physical planning once commented, saying that "Everywhere in Lagos was a source of concern because Lagos was going haywire . . . A plan was made for Lagos but was abandon during military days. Everybody was doing whatever they liked . . ."

The situation is not different in other Nigerian cities. The starting point to correct this anomaly is to examine again the master plans of each city and update them. Alternatively, new plans should be drawn up where none existed. However, the most fundamental aspect of it is to have a will and a commitment to enforce the master plans. The urban renewal programme of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and the ongoing radical transformation of the city of Lagos is in the right direction. As Nigeria's economic capital reclaiming Lagos will require concerted efforts of the federal, state and local governments, as well as the private sector. Lagos and Abuja if remodelled would become centres to reckon with in the world economy. They would be examples to other cities in Nigeria, and state governments should be encouraged developed their cities in order to make them deliver.

A Dysfunctional Economy in a Globalised world

Nigerian towns and cities have economies that cannot support their growing populations. They are not serving as engines of economic growth and structural transformation. At independence there is limited investment in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy this led to government investment in direct production and nationalisation of existing privately owned company. However, there are restrictions on who was permitted to enter

certain areas of economic activities as a result there is limited private domestic and even more limited external investment. The performance of the manufacturing sector, which is expected to be a major driver of the city's economy, is abysmal. The capacity utilisation in Nigeria's manufacturing sector is reported to have dropped to 38 percent. Crippling power crises, failed basic infrastructure and rising cost of refined petroleum products have been identified as factors responsible for the real sector's decline. The cost of production in Nigeria is said to be about eight times that of production in China, about four times that of production in Europe, six times that of production in the United States and almost two times the cost of production in Ghana. Over 70 percent of factories in Kano city were reported to have shut down, while those that are open are working at 40 percent of installed capacity or less. Many manufacturers had been forced to relocate to neighbouring countries, especially Ghana due to lack of enabling environment for production. The resultant effects of the above are constrained size of urban economies, retrenchment and increase in number of city's workforce that are engaged in informal sector activities. In the city of Lagos about 69 percent of urban workforce was reported to be in informal sector in 1990 (World Bank, 2000b, Table D.2). Many of them engaged in extremely small-scale business with very low profit margins.

Cities in this era of globalisation are facing alarming competitions as centres for development and platform for multi-national interactions (Rondinelli et al., 1998; Cohen, 2004 cited in Odufuwa, 2009). Globalisation is seen as a process of geographical realignment of networks of production and consumption and sites of power (Beall 2002:42), It is the growing interconnectedness and interdependence of countries resulting from the increasing integration of trade, finance, people and idea in one global market place (Hammonda, 2000: 34). Under the focus of globalisation the whole world is considered as a single community served by electronic media and information technology. City's economy under globalisation is essentially knowledge based and technology driven; the key principle behind globalisation is 'liberalisation' of the national economy, culture, and currency. It starts with the premise that for development to take place, privatisation, deregulation, downsizing of government and reducing the role of city and national governments must be guaranteed. This process leads to international integration of production, trade and culture. The key manifestation is in the economic sector exemplified by trade – where international corporate bodies (multi-national or transnational companies) play a leading role. Power shifts from city and national governments to these corporations. Governments' role is reduced to opening the frontiers for free flow of goods and services, liberalising and privatising development (IIED, 2002). Other attributes of globalisation include a growing network of sites for investment, trade, and

financial transactions, cross-border affiliates and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Globalisation has made urban competition the leading principle that determines the future of urban system both in developed and developing cities. However, African cities are marginalised in the new global economy due to deteriorating terms of trade for primary products, limited availability of domestic capital and lack of significant Foreign Direct Investment in their economies. Situation in Nigeria shows that cities have not adequately and effectively responded to the opportunity that comes with globalisation as well as urbanisation. For instance most cities in Nigeria are often affected by inconsistent national and supranational policy as regard infrastructure and finance. They are inhibited by inability to attract appreciable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost export potential of their economies and lack of ability to fully utilise the potentials of telecommunication sector to turn around their fortunes as it is in most Asian and Latin American cities that have dynamic economy. In the case of financing, taking the city of Lagos as a case in point, the successive federal government (military or civilian) have been reluctant to come to terms with the truth about its population and the need to accord it the appropriate status by applying what political economist call "Asymmetric Federalism" in financing allocations. Asymmetric federalism or asymmetrical federalism is found in a federation in which different constituent states possess different powers: one or more of the states has considerably more autonomy than the other sub-states, although they have the same constitutional status. The division of powers between sub-states is not symmetric. This is in contrast to a symmetric federation, where no distinction is made between constituent states. As a result, it is frequently proposed as a solution to the dissatisfactions that arise when one or two constituent units feel significantly different needs from the others, as the result of an ethnic, linguistic or cultural difference. More power should be assigned to city of mega status like Lagos to raise financing for its development if such would be economically viable and efficient.

Although it has been argued that globalisation would brings negative outcomes such as; increased incomes leading to changes in life style and consumption patterns, high prices and profit levels in internationalised sectors, making it difficult for, other sectors to compete for space and investment, new investment causing eviction of the poor from central positions usually preferred by multinationals companies, privatisation of basic amenities (water, electricity and waste management) leading to price increases which further encourage informal methods of solving the problems by the poor, increase in inequality and poverty, increase in waste generation: quantity and variety, acceleration of urban population growth and increase in spontaneous settlements, leading to increased informal activities, strain on municipal services

to deal with the boom, poverty and reinforcement of urban primacy in developing nations. However, if its potential is well harness it will definitely turn around the fortunes of cities of less developed countries and integrated them into the world urban system.

Governance Failure, Poor Funding and Corruption

In Nigeria, post-independence attempts to establish democratic politics have been disturbed by long years of military rule, poor electoral system and lop-sided revenue allocation system. Although Nigeria is said to be a federating states, however, the military imposed a kind of centralised structure which concentrated power in the centre at the detriment of the federating states and the local governments. There is a lack of coordination and cooperation between the three tiers of government. States are not required under the constitution to account to the federal government for the use of the funds allocated to them. State and local governments differs in terms of development, but is being characterised by particularly weak institutional capacities and many of the problems that have characterised local politics and government since the 1960s still persist (DFID, 2009). This situation, to a large extent has affected the governance and administration of Nigerian cities to date. States still depend on allocation from federal government for their finances and in most case depend on federal intervention for solutions to most of their urban environmental problems.

Foreign Direct Investment is a key element for economic growth. It provides much-needed capital, and access to technology, know-how and international markets (Simon 1997). However Nigerian cities are inhibited by inability to attract appreciable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost export potential of their economies and poor infrastructure. In part the poor economic performance of urban economies in Nigeria can be linked to limited national economic growth, but in part it can be attributed to failure to provide much needed urban business environment. Economic development policies and investment have traditionally been regarded as national responsibilities. Local economic development is not a traditional local authority responsibility; municipalities have neither the legislative base nor the expertise to do it. As a result efficient business operation and private investment are strangulated. Corruption has become "endemic" at every level of government in Nigeria and across society more broadly. An estimated 60 percent of public procurement expenditure was reported lost to corruption in Nigeria (DFID, 2009).The effect of these is seen in inflated urban infrastructural projects which at later time usually become abandoned projects. Corruption hinders economic development and lessens productive capacities of cities. It negatively influences the administration of justice and enforcement of laws, contributes to the misallocation and mismanagement of scarce resources, increases costs and

deters private investment.

For cities in Nigeria to be productive and conducive for investment, financing autonomy needed to be granted to various municipalities, effective system of taxation needed to be designed to boost cities income and expenditure and transparency needed to be imbibed at every level of government and administration.

Poverty and Social Breakdown

Most Nigerian cities are poor due to insufficient budget. Extreme and widespread poverty and social breakdown are prevalent in them. Report indicated that 20 percent of Africa's poor people live in Nigeria. Nigeria's population was estimated to be 148 million in 2007, with a growth rate of over 2.8 percent. Almost half of its population are urban dwellers, about 48 percent urbanised population as at 2005 (UNICEF, 2006). The number of poor people in Nigeria remains high, although there is a spatial disparity in distribution of poverty in Nigerian space. It has been estimated that a third of Nigeria's poor are concentrated in the three north-west states of Kaduna, Kano and Sokoto. Poverty is more endemic in the north than in the south. The total poverty head count rose from 27.2 percent in 1980 to 65.6 percent in 1996, an annual average increase of 8.83 percent in the 16-year period. However, between 1996 and 2004, poverty head count declined by an annual average of 2.1 percent to 54.4 percent. Over the same period, the percentage of population in the core poor category rose from 6.2 to 29.3 percent before declining to 22.0 percent in 2004 (NHDR, 2008-2009). Most of these poor people are urban residents who mostly live in slums without access to basic public services. The high rate of poverty is related to both spatial and human inequality. There is a wide gap between the rich and the poor in cities on one hand and between cities (rich areas) and rural (poor) regions on the other hand. Endemic poverty in cities is the root cause of social disorder; armed robbery, gangsterism and cultism, prostitution, religious violence, kidnapping, vandalisation of public properties and other social crimes which had crippled many cities in recent times. The fact that over 50 percent of the total population is officially poor should be of major concern to policy makers and urban planners in Nigeria.

Ethnic conflict has become a recurrent decimal in most Nigeria cities. Nigeria was reported to have 200 ethnic groups and 500 indigenous languages. These are divided into ethnic "majorities" and "minorities". The major ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the north; the Yoruba in the south-west; and the Igbo of the south-east. These three groups represent over half the population. There are also large minorities such as the Ijaw, Kanuri, Edo, Ibibio and Nupe and most of these ethnic groups are fairly represented in all cities of Nigeria. Cities in Nigeria are often divided on ethnic lines, as urban

space is organised socio-spatially with certain ethnic group occupying certain areas of cities. The socio-spatial organisation of space in cities often produced disparities in wealth and access to services. The resultant effect of this is ethnic intolerance and religious bigotry which often lead to conflict and violence in cities. The OPC-Hausa-Fulani crisis in Lagos, Jos Massacre between the Berom and Hausa-Fulani herdsmen, Boko Haram disturbance in some cities in the north readily come to mind here. Violence and conflict repel investment and disallow development in city.

Environmental Crisis

The development potential of cities in Nigeria is increasingly threatened by serious environment related problems. After the independence, our consumption pattern changed. There was preference for foreign consumer goods which increase the rate at which waste was generated. Changes from biodegradable materials for packaging of food and other household items to non-biodegradable materials worsened environmental crisis in our cities. Among environment-related problems commonly found in our cities included those problems usually referred to as the 'Brown Agenda'. They include; lack of safe and sufficient water supply, inadequate drainage system, waste management and pollution control, inadequate and sub-standard housing, overcrowding, degradation of urban lands and poor urban transportation (Olorunfemi and Raheem, 2008). In recent times, there is increasing vulnerability of urban areas to disasters. This may assume a monumental proportion in no distant future due to increasing threats by climate change. Flooding and erosion are common urban environmental hazards noticeable not only in coastal cities, but in many of the cities that are far away from the coast. During the rains, virtually all streets/roads in the metropolis are flooded, causing havoc for road users. Between 2000 and 2001, more than 200,000 people were reported displaced by anthropogenic and environmental emergencies. More than 1,000 deaths were recorded, many homes, and businesses were destroyed (Olorunfemi and Raheem, 2008: 74). June this year, a terrible flood swept the core business area in the city of Osogbo in Osun state, rendering many homeless and jobless and property worth billions of Naira destroyed. Close to twenty lives were reported lost to the incident including children.

The root cause of these problems is not unconnected to rapid concentration of people in these urban centres due to high-scale rural-urban migration. Other factors accounting for these problems include; poor physical planning and environmental monitoring, corruption, poor governance at all level, especially at local government level and increased commercial activities due to dysfunctional manufacturing sector. Although most of these problems are inescapable outcome of growth, however, the urban poor are the worst

hit. Occurrence of these problems increases the rate of poverty in our cities and hinders economic development. The challenge of urbanisation, particularly to urban planners and policymakers now, is how to sustain economic growth while solving these problems. To find solution to these problems and achieve development in our cities we must find better ways of balancing the need for urban environmental sustainability and the pressure brought about by human needs. Sustainable Cities Programme would come to the rescue. This programme stresses that properly planned and managed cities hold the key to faster human development in a safer environment (UN-HABITAT, 2008). Good Urban Governance characterised by the principles of partnerships, transparency and accountability is the key to achieving sustainable cities.

The foregoing do not intend to paint a gloomy picture of Nigerian urban centres, but rather to identify their problems and what needed to be done to place our cities in the right position in order to make them productive as other urban economies in other climes. Drastic measures needed to be taken to make cities contribute to economic development in Nigeria. The next section suggests what need to be done to achieve urban sustainability. Urban sustainability involves a re-examination of urban development, including environmental, social and economic policies, politics and practices, and an acknowledgement of the role of cities in global environmental change.

FIFTY YEARS OF URBANISATION; WHAT NEXT?

After fifty years of rapid and continuous urbanisation, the nagging question now is how do we transform cities in Nigeria to economically viable economies? What need to be done now is to put in place a radical sustainable programme that will improve social conditions and cohesion in our cities, make them resource efficient and economically sustainable. To achieve urban sustainability, good governance that encourages peace and democracy should be put in place. Electoral reform that will bring about credible government at various municipalities is *sine qua non* for good urban development. Aside this, inclusion and participation of different stakeholders in cities developmental activities is paramount. Environment, housing, transportation, water, health, economic, waste management, city administration, security, education, and a host of other issues in cities cannot be handled in isolation of the others. Good networking between public sector and private sector must be allowed or considered in city governance or administration for effective provision and delivery of public infrastructure. Transparency and accountability of city government towards management and development of cities should be highly encouraged.

The position of cities in the global economy varies as their window of

opportunities for development. In developed countries for example, there are cities offering good networks and benefits to the rest of the world. If cities in Nigeria will be economically viable and promote economic development, infrastructural development remains an undisputed factor. Adequate infrastructure and efficient city management will broaden the perspective of city-dwellers and foreign investors and enhances the quality of life of individual as well as the city as a whole. Improved urban infrastructure as well as effective delivery of public services, accessibility to employment, education, health, and other public services would alleviate the poverty burden on urban dwellers and improve human development in our cities. The burden of infrastructural development on government shoulder can be lessened if private sector is efficiently engaged.

Massive urban development reform and urban renewal programme are germane to city physical growth and economic development, Cities master plans should be updated and where none exist new plans should be drawn up. Critical to this is the will and power to enforce the master plan. Town planning officials at every level of government – federal, states and local government – should be trained and empowered to effectively discharge their duties. Corruption should be totally abhorred by these officials. Egunjobi (1999) has once pronounced our cities as gasping cities. Perhaps they are no longer gasping now, but may have become dead completely. Reclaiming our cities from slums and other environmental problems will revive them and make them alive (productive) again. The present urban policy (National Urban Development Policy, 2006) is encompassing, however, it must be reviewed and made more holistic as to state in clear and concrete terms how those objectives and strategies contain therein shall be achieved. The traditional land tenure system should give way for a new urban land administration that will empower urban residents irrespective of their status or position with property right.

The development of Geographical Information System/ Environmental Management Information System for urban planning and monitoring is essential. One big problem for most Nigerian cities is the unavailability of maps at appropriate scale for planning use. GIS and Cartographic department should be set up in various town planning department, workshop and training on Environmental Management Information System should be organised routinely for officials of town planning department and Geographic Information System and remote sensing facilities should be employed to produce maps at various scales for cities. Maps are potent instrument for economic development. Its importance should not be ignored in planning urbanisation and economic development in Nigeria.

The potentials of city growth in stimulating productivity and economic growth will be maximised when effective macroeconomic policies are put in

place to stabilise the economy. No economy can flourish in the midst of macroeconomic instability. This is because large fluctuations in the price level, the exchange rate, the interest rate, or the tax burden serve as a major deterrent to private investment, the proximate driver of growth (NHDR, 2009). Policies should be geared at integrating commercial and industrial activities in urban areas with the rural production and consumption. These policies must be practicable and ingenuous. Conscious efforts to slowly but firmly adapt to vertical city expansion will free some land for other uses and ease communication difficulties. Above all, efforts must be made to ensure a high level of output growth in order to generate the necessary resources to meet the needs of the rapid urbanisation otherwise urbanisation will continue to constitute its own developmental challenge (Otto, 2008). As it is today, the rate of city growth and the necessary infrastructural growth needed to support that growth are not correlated. This has led to several socio-economic problems which we are still battling with till date.

CONCLUSION

The world is experiencing an unprecedented growth in cities. With about half of the world population living in cities, cities are expected to absorb the bulk of increase in population between now and 2050 when the world's population is projected to expand from 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion. This would lead to smaller and medium sized cities growing bigger while bigger cities are becoming mega-cities. Cities of developing nations have been projected to house most of the world urban population some decade to come. Increased rapid rate of concentration of men in urban centres of developing nations had been a source of concern to many. Scholars, non-governmental organisation, international institutions and various governmental institutions especially in sub-Saharan countries are getting worried on daily basis about this scenario. Increasing urbanisation had been fingered to be a major factor limiting African development. The pace of urbanisation in Nigeria is alarming at an average growth rate of about 5.3 percent. Urban growth is accompanied by environment related problems such as; lack of safe and sufficient water supply, inadequate drainage system, waste management and pollution control, inadequate and sub-standard housing, overcrowding, degradation of urban lands and poor urban transportation (Olorunfemi and Raheem, 2008: 74). In recent times there is increasing vulnerability of urban areas to disasters particularly those related to environmental change – erosion, flood, desertification, shortage of rainfall, etc.

Urbanisation with all its benefits and impacts was irreversible in Nigeria as close link between gains in economic efficiency and the urbanisation of populations in most parts of the world have been established. What is needed

is a management paradigm that would enable stakeholders in the public and private sector, including civil society, to harness urbanisation as a potent and desirable force for socio-economic development of the country. We can turn our cities into veritable social and cultural centres for national renewal and prosperity. Functional, economically productive, socially inclusive and pro-poor, environmentally sound, safe, healthy and secure cities would be achieved if efforts are put in the right direction.

REFERENCES

Abumere, S.I. (2002). "Urbanization" in Africa Atlas: Nigeria Paris: Les Editions J.A. pp. 88-91.

Alkali, J.L.S. (2005). Planning Sustainable Urban Growth in Nigeria: Challenges and Strategies. *A paper presented at the Conference on Planning Sustainable Urban Growth and Sustainable Architecture*, held at the ECOSOC Chambers, United Nations Headquarters, New York.

Beall, J. (2002). "Globalization and social exclusion in cities: framing the debate with lessons from Africa and Asia." *Environment and Urbanization* Vol. 14, no.1: 41-51.

Bert, Hoselitz. (1955), "Generative and Parasitic Cities." *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 2, No. 3. 278-94.

Berry, B. (1972). "Hierarchical Diffusion: The Basis of Development Filtering and Spread in a System of Growth Centres", in Hansen, W. (ed.) *Growth Centres and Regional Development.* New York: The Free Press, pp 108-38.

Boudeville, J. (1966). *Problems of Regional Economic Planning*. Edinburgh: University Press.

Boserup, E. (1981). *Population and Technological Change: A Study of Long-Term trends* Chicago: UCP.

Botero, G. (1979). *The Magnificence and Greatness of Cities.* Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum.

CEPED, (2009), Urban Growth in West Africa: from explosion to proliferation. *La Chronique* Issue 57-GB France.

Choe, K. et al. (2008). *Urban Development Experience and Visions-India and the People's Republic of China.* Asian Development Bank.

Egunjobi L (1999). "Our Gasping Cities". An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Ibadan on Thursday, 21st October.

Falade, J.B. (2009). "The Role of Cities in National Economic Growth." Paper presented at the National Stakeholders Meeting held in respect of the project-Preparation of State of Nigerian Cities Report 2009/2010 held at Abuja.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2006). National Urban Development Policy.

Fourchard, L. (2003). *Urban Slum Reports: The Case of Ibadan*. Nigeria. IFRA. Ibadan.

Friedmann, J. (1966). *Regional Planning Development Policy; a Case Study of Venezuela.* Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Hammonda, H.B, (2000). "Perspective on Globalization and its Structure", *Codestria*

Bulletin 1: 34-38.

Hartshorn, T. (1980). *Interpreting the City: An Urban Geography.* New York: John Wiley.

Henderson V. (2002). "Urbanization in Developing Countries" *World Bank, Research Observer* Vol. 17, No. 1: Washington.

_____ (2000). *How Urban Concentration Affects Economic Growth* Washington: World Bank WBIEDRG.

Hoover, M. (1948). *The Location of Economic Activity* New York: McGraw-Hill.

House of Commons International Development Committe, (2009). *DFID's Programme in Nigeria.* (Eight Report of Session 2008-2009 Vol. 1). House of Commons London.

IIED (2002). Globalization and cities. *Environment and urbanization.* London, IIED. Vol.14, no. 6

Jacobs, J. (1985). *Cities and the Wealth of Nations.* New York: Vintage, p. 92.

Jenks M, Burton, E, Williams, K (1996) The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form? E&FN Spon, London.

Mabogunje, A.L. (1965). Urbanization a Constraint on Economic Development. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 413-438.

McNamara, R. (1984). *The Population Problem: Time bomb or myth, Washington*: World Bank.

Molina, G.G, and M. Purser, (2010). *Human Development Trends since 1970: a Social Convergence Story.* Human Development Reports, UNDP.

Nsiah-Gyabaah, K. (2004). Urbanization Processes – Environmental and Health effects in Africa. *A Panel Contribution to the PERN Cyberseminar on Urban Spatial Expansion.* Population-Environment Research Network cyberseminar, 29 November – 15 December, 2004. www.population environmentresearch.org

UNDP, (2009). *Achieving Growth with Equity.* Human Development Report Nigeria 2008-2009. Abuja: UNDP.

United Nations, (2001). *Handbook on Census Management for Population and Housing Censuses,* New York, USA: United Nations.

Odufuwa, et al. (2009). Cities, theories and reality. Journal of Geography and Regional Planning. Vol. 2 (10). Pp 243-248.

Olorunfemi, F.B and Raheem, U.A. (2008). Urban Development and Environmental Implications: The challenge of urban sustainability in Nigeria. *Ibadan Journal of Social Sciences.* Vol.6, no.1: 69-78.

Otto, G. (2008). Urbanization in Nigeria: Implications for Socio-economic Development. *Journal of Research in National Development.* Vol. 6. No 2. Accessed at www.transcampus.org on January 16, 2012.

Perroux, F. (1951). Economic Space, Theory and Applications'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 64, pp, 90-97

Quigley, J.M. (2008). *Urbanization, Agglomeration and Economic Development.* The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

Simon, D. (1997). Urbanization, globalization, and economic crises in Africa. The UIrban Challenge. In Rakodi, C (1997). *Africa: Growth and management of its cities.* Tokyo: The United Nations University Press.

Taylor, R.W. (1997). Planning Development through Urbanization in Nigeria. In Chatterji, M. And Kaizhong, Y. (Eds). *Regional Science in Developing Countries.* London; Macmillan, pp. 267-283.

The Punch, Friday, 4 June, 2010, p. 3.

Thompson, W. (1965) *A Preface to Urban Economics.* Baltimore, Md: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 15-16.

UN-HABITAT, (2006). The Sustainable Cities Nigeria Programme (1994-2006). Building platform for environmentally sustainable urbanization. UN-HABITAT. Nairobi, Kenya.

United Nations (2009). *World Urbanization Prospects: the 2001 Revisions.* New York: Population Division Department of Economics and Social Affair of the United Nations.

_____ (2002). *World Urbanization Prospects: the 2001 Revisions.* New York: Population Division Department of Economics and Social Affair of the United Nations.

Williams, K. (2007). Can Urban Intensification Contribute to Sustainable Cities? An International Perspective. Accessed at http://www.urbanicity. org.

World Bank (2000b). Cities in Transition: World Bank Urban and Local Government Strategy. Washington DC, World Bank.

Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia (2009). City. Wikimedia, Inc.

Federal Character: The Untold Realities of the Nigerian Geo-politics

BOLA DAUDA

32

INTRODUCTION

Religious and ethnic identities in contemporary Nigeria are more than faith and cultural affinity. The reality is about access to power and how to have a share of the so-called national oil cake. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria coded, institutionalised and legitimised 'political patronage, representative bureaucracy, and spoil systems' for sharing the national positions and resources. It provided not only the clauses of 'federal character' at the national level and 'diversity' at the local and state levels of government, but also instituted a Federal Character Commission to oversee, implement and ensure compliance. In practice, political parties translated and interpreted the 'federal character' and 'diversity' constitutional provisions as 'zoning' of political posts and positions while the party in government adopted 'quota and patronage systems' and also a total politicisation of both the civil service and the armed forces of the federation. In reality and in plain

language, the generality of Nigerians perceive themselves as *strangers* and *refugees* and are blatantly treated as such outside of their states and indeed local governments of origin.

THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL CHARACTER: A REINCARNATION OF AMERICAN SPOILS SYSTEM

Federal Character as it is presently being interpreted and practised in Nigeria is more akin to or synonymous with spoils system than Positive Affirmative Action. Affirmative Action is often run on merit. It is merit programme that is calculated to redress any imbalance in representation as a result of acknowledged past discrimination. For example, if a man and a woman competed for a job and they were equally qualified, the woman might be selected because there were not enough women in the establishment. Federal Character is so much spoils that I understand that the staff of a university have a quota and a lower standard for the admission of their children either through the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board or into a secondary school that is within their campus!

The spoils system evolved in the early 19th century and relied on the then well-known political adage – 'to the victor belongs the spoils'. The irrational system of selecting the American federal officials and supervising their work was adopted in the early years of American independence. Andrew Jackson the 7th President of the United States (1829-1837) once remarked that, 'only few (officials) die and none ever resigned'. How could the Democrats have loyalty for their policies from the Republicans? Jackson, therefore, thought the idea of rotation in office to be 'democratic'. In 1829 he declared: 'No man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another . . . The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance'. This was not true in 1829, and was certainly not true fifty years later. The constant turnover provided no institutional memory; government workers panicked at every election and had little sense of loyalty to their jobs, because their tenure was often of such short duration.

Over the years, the flaws became more serious and obvious and by 1883, the Pendle Act (Civil Service Reform Act) was passed following the assassination of President Garfield by Charles Guiteau, a disappointed office-seeker. The Reform not only brought an end to the sale of public office but also introduced merit and examination for selection of public officers. A Civil service Commission was also established to make regulations for and to control the selection examinations. It is an irony that has adopted a form of spoils system almost 200 years after an American president had been killed and consequently the country was forced to drop the idea.

In most western democracies, however, there continued to be a growing concern about the powers of bureaucrats and their use or misuse of discretion. Consequently, in the last 90 years, a number of organisational, legislative and judicial measures and reforms have been developed for political control of bureaucracy. Such administrative reforms are intended to make bureaucrats responsible for implementing laws as intended by the electoral representatives. One such reform is the use of representative bureaucracy, which simply means restructuring or reconstituting the public bureaucracy such that its staff is drawn from all the groups that make up the society. The term was coined by Donald Kingsley (1944) as the title of his study of the British civil service in the 1930s. He was American Ford Foundation representative in West Africa and also advised the Nigerian federal and regional governments between 1958 and 1962. He argued that representative bureaucracy resulted in administrative responsibility, as well as in political harmony. For Third World countries, political harmony may be interpreted as the difficult objectives of political stability and peaceful change of government. These are goals which are transparently difficult to attain.

Federal Character and the Realities of the Game of Politics

Politics as a game of 'who-gets-what-when-and-how' means that the genius and ingenuity of skilful players are determined by how much they could mobilise their political powers and resources of persuasion or coercion to win. Politics is, therefore, a game of personality and ability to mobilise people. But social and economic issues are of different nature. They are about the concept of social justice, human rights and welfare, and about wealth generation. They require the faceless impartiality of bureaucratic institutions, systems and processes.

Ironically, in the case of the American presidential system, the job of controlling, managing and making a faceless bureaucracy responsible and accountable is left to the whims and caprices of the politicians who head the executive arms of government. Unlike the United States, contemporary Nigeria does not enjoy the luxury of almost 200 years not only for socio-economic and political development but also to work out ethnic and religious differences. Time too had changed. Both Europe and the United States developed in times when 'Might was Right' and disputes were settled on the battlefield rather than in local, national or international courts.

The American 'pilgrims' and the 'founding fathers' also had the ethos of work and honesty. Nigerians have not developed a political culture of not only the integrity and probity expected of public officeholders but also the independent overseeing checks and balances of the other arms of government: the legislature, the judiciary and of course the fourth arm, the media. Functioning democracy, even in the developed countries, is in reality a rule

of the few, often the middle class, in the name of the majority.

In contrast, however, Nigerian middle class has not established themselves as spirited politicians to govern in the interest of the whole society. More important is the fact that Nigeria became independent at a time of human rights; a time of equal opportunity for all, irrespective of sex, race, religion or age; a time of franchise and political freedom for the slaves and women; at a time of equality before the law and the supremacy of democracy and rule of law; and above all at a time of global and internet electronic mails and information technology that make a mockery of official secrecy, cabal and 'snail' postal mails. While the Western educational qualifications were criteria for employment and participation in government administration, Nigeria became independent with northern Nigeria that constituted more than 50 percent of the nation's population only having about 1 percent of the Federal Civil Service!

Democracy requires more than either endless balkanisation of Nigeria into more states or the rhetoric of constitutional arrangements. It requires fostering a common political culture to replace the existing dual practices of voting for personalities as against policies. It also requires a common pursuit of women emancipation, mass education, and nationalism that will transcend the divisive forces of religion and ethnicity. Unfortunately it cannot be decreed by forcing people into 2-party system or by rigging elections and imposing demagogues on the people, but rather by action and honesty of purpose both of which endeared Murtala Muhammed to patriotic Nigerians.

Democracy in theory more than anything else is about legitimacy, involvement, fairness, equality before the law or the rule of law, and freedom to choose and to have one's say rather than one's way. In practice, it is more about what Thaler and Sunstein (2009:5-6) describe as 'libertarian paternalism' or 'liberty-preserving'. Libertarian aspect of the strategy rests with the straightforward insistence that people should be free to do what they like – and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so. Paternalistic aspect lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people's behaviour in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better. It involves self-conscious efforts by institutions in private sector and also by government to steer people's choices in directions that will improve their lives. Policy architects and institutions and the educational system of each country are the best instruments to promote these aspects of democracy.

The Incumbent Factor and the Nigerian Geo-politics

The obviously over-flogged explanation for contemporary Nigerian geo-politics in terms of the north-south power relations, ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts is fundamentally a product of imbalance in socio-economic and political development. Almost all forms of tensions and conflicts in

Nigeria are rooted in its colonial artificial creation as a nation, in the short-term nature of politics on the one hand and the modern global and long-term nature of socio-economic and political development on the other. In the historic 10-year period of regional self-rule before the Nigerian independence, the rival Nigerian nationalist leaders exploited and perpetuated ethnic and religious identities in their ethnic and regional constituency strongholds. Paradoxically, for the non-Muslim areas of northern Nigeria, neither the Nigerian flag independence from the British rule nor the 1967 Gowon's magic wand of a new form of 'divide-and-rule-policy' with creation of states had translated into a full independence from the Hausa-Fulani Muslim colonisation and caliphate hegemony.

In 1898, as the secretary of state for the colonies, Chamberlain set up the Selborne Committee with the responsibility for deciding how the new country Nigeria was to be acquired and administered. Nicolson notes that, 'it was the civil service in Nigeria which from the beginning planned not only the infrastructure of roads, railways, harbours and telecommunications, and social services of health and education but the very country itself, as if it were, to use one of Chamberlain's favourite expressions, a vast undeveloped estate (1966:139). In disputing the claim that the first Development Plan for Nigeria was in 1962, Nicolson asserted that there was enough evidence to support a grandiose development plan by Chamberlain's government. It is out of the scope of this paper to engage in the polemic of the history of development plans in Nigeria.

Although there often remained wide gaps between plans and implementation, it is sufficient to note the role of colonial administrators and hence the civil service in such plans. Of a greater interest, however, is the implicit suggestion that the gap could be traced to the transfer of the principle of representative bureaucracy to Nigeria from the early years of colonisation:

> a fateful beginning was made by Chamberlain himself in the choice, for the unhealthy Lagos, of a Scottish medical doctor; in the choice, for the unruly Southern Nigeria Protectorate, of an Irish police officer High Commissioner; and for the protectorate of Northern Nigeria, much of it already under a formal rule which was military in origin, of an English army officer. (These men were, respectively, Sir William MacGregor, Sir Ralph Moor, and Sir Fredrick Lugard) (Nicolson, 1966:145).

In effect, Nicolson notes that the contrasts in the political and socio-economic development between the northern and southern Nigeria can be explained in the personalities of those involved with the plans rather than the unintended outcomes of the plans themselves. 'Divide and rule' as one of the major tactics and expedient policies of imperialism was covertly manifested in the posting of these men. They also personified the United

Kingdom's tense and uneasy relationships among Ireland, Scotland and England. Their stay in Nigeria not only reinforced the potentials for tense ethnic politics but reflected British politics *par excellence*. The differences in their personalities and attitudes and their interpretations of colonialism have continued to have far-reaching effects on the contemporary Nigerian nation-state.

First, 'rule *by* the chiefs was MacGregor's watchword; and rule *through* the chiefs, a very different thing, was Lugard's' (Nicolson, 1969:148). Second, MacGregor, like his predecessor, McCallum and Moor, understood the work of and task of colonial administration as that of a process, peaceful penetration, gradual and diplomatic and not of the 'pace forcing' (Nicolson, 1969:43-4). According to the *Dictionary of National Biography*, MacGregor distinguished himself by 'tact, patience and firmness with native races, and determination to prevent their exploitation by Europeans'. He was quoted to have said that,

> Soundness on railway extension, on provincial government by the chiefs, and sanitation should be the great political tests applied to the public men of this country [Nigeria] (quoted in Nicolson, 1969:46)

This was in line and perhaps in compliance with the normative guideline from the then secretary of state for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, who admonished colonial administrators in these words, 'Our rule can only be justified if we can show that it adds to the happiness and prosperity of the people' (*quoted in* Nicolson, 1969:20).

In contrast, however, Lugard had 'the born soldier's love of fame and glory', but here the plan (of Chamberlain) was for peaceful development not of glory. According to Nicolson, Lugard had the soldier's love of discipline and ranks, each obedient through the official hierarchy to its head; from him law and authority proceeded downwards; they were not working arrangements evolved through discussions and diplomatic process. His military pride, and connections with men like Goldie and Chamberlain made it all the more difficult for him to accept directions from those whom he called at various times, the 'mandarin', the 'Office Clerks', and 'hostile microbes' of the Colonial Office and the Treasury. His marriage to Flora Shaw, Colonial Editor of *The Times*, opened a new and important sphere of influence which neither he nor she hesitated to use to advance his views and ambitions. The significance of such influence could only be appreciated in the context of contemporary Britain as wittily presented by Paxman, *Friends in High Places* (1991).

Lord Lugard regarded himself, as army officers are apt to do, as 'the servant of the King and Nation, not the servant of the Secretary of State' (Nicolson, 1969:45). Hence his 'administration was conceived in classic militaristic and authoritarian terms' (Nicolson, 1969:45). Of a lasting

consequence for today's Nigeria is that while he introduced politics of *personal rule and government with no socio-economic development policies* to northern Nigeria, he also believed that Christian ideas and Western education would militate against the successful development of his system of Indirect Rule:

> . . . this preaching of equality of Europeans and natives, however true from a doctrinal point of view, is apt to be misapplied by people in low stage of development, and interpreted as an abolition of class distinction . . . the premature teaching of English . . . inevitably leads to utter disrespect for British and native ideals alike, and to denationalised and disorganised population (Orr, 1911:263, quoted in Coleman, 1971:137).

On the other hand, Nicolson describes the machinery built in Lagos as 'quite sophisticated'. He noted that the pattern was basically that of the crown colony first developed in the original colonies of British settlement in America, containing the same seminal ideas of the common law and of the separation of powers inherent in the Supreme Court, the Legislative Council, the Executive Council and the Colonial Office. To these were connected the departments necessary for collecting of revenue and for its expenditure on the tasks considered to be of priority. The Lagos élite were 'actors', so to say, in the early days of Nigeria and especially in the tenure of MacGregor they had freedom and prestige and they played a prominent role in the administration of the colony. These privileges were lost to Europeans after the amalgamation of 1914. For instance, according to Nicolson,

> Something of MacGregor's administration can be conveyed through the institutions he founded or encouraged; there was the Lagos Ladies League, meeting at multi-racial luncheon parties at the Palladian Government House to discuss and decide on ways and means of reducing infantile mortality in the town by free distribution of quinine; there was Nigeria's first Agricultural Show, held in the grounds of Government House; there was the Lagos Institute where 'mutual self-improvement in knowledge' was the object of evening lectures by men like the Governor, and Dr Blyden, the Vice President (Nicolson, 1969: 36).

The contrasts between the incumbents of the south and north could become more glaring if it is noted that with the person of MacGregor in Lagos, 'at the turn of the century, there were about twenty Africans in a total civil establishment of senior posts of some ninety (Nicolson, 1969:147) and four of the sixteen established posts of medical doctors were occupied by Africans. There was a clerical service with competitive standards of entry, with salaries and conditions better than they were to be again for a long time – positions of trust, dignity and comfort occupied by Africans which later disappeared when Lugard took over the administration of the entire country.

The operations of government by the respective colonial administrators planted the seed of dual socio-economic and political economy, hence the bane of policy and democracy in contemporary Nigeria. Unfortunately the Nigerian leaders have reinforced the duality of Nigerian policy and politics as a nation divided into authoritarian power-holders for its sake and the marginalised egalitarian power-seekers for the sake of welfare policies. They have continued to use and take political advantage of ethnicity, religion, economic and gender issues. They have allowed personal interest to override the national interest. The future of democracy and policy in Nigeria lies with conscious recognition of this heritage and deliberate actions to address it. To redress the colonial 'divide-and-rule' and 'direct-and-indirect-rule' heritage demands patriotism from the Nigerian leaders. It demands that all Nigerians are prepared to put national interest above all other interests.

FEDERAL CHARACTER AND THE REALITIES
OF THE EDUCATION FACTOR

The outcome of Lugardian ideals of 'a perfectly government education' was the absence of 'an English-speaking educated class' in northern Nigeria in the early period. This necessitated the 'importation' of thousands of southerners into the north as clerks and artisans. In 1920, Sir Hugh Clifford who succeeded Lord Lugard as Governor of Nigeria lamented as follows:

> . . . after two decades of British occupation, the northern provinces have not produced a single Native of these provinces who is sufficiently educated to enable him to fill the most minor clerical post in the office of any government department (Coleman, 1971:140).

The emphasis on Western education in the south against traditional and Islamic education in the north has immense consequences for the contemporary local democracy in Nigeria and, above all, for the bureaucracy as the machinery for policy processing. It is interesting to note that a dual educational and developmental structure is not peculiar to Nigeria. In Sri Lanka and Ghana there are the same north-south differences in educational development. Although Sri Lanka has not resolved the problem, Ghana seemed to have prevented it from threatening its nationhood as much as it has continued to do in Nigeria. Opinions are varied on how each country has coped with colonial heritage of imbalance in development, but the degree of the gap is obviously unhealthy for the Nigerian bureaucracy and of course most dangerous for democracy and the Nigerian nation-state.

The impact of Universal Primary Education (UPE) between 1975/76 and 1984/5 academic sessions showed that enrolment share of northern Nigeria increased from 1.5 million (26.39%) in 1975/76 to 6.95 million (or 47.34%) in 1984/85 academic session. What is strikingly interesting is that at

the primary school level, between 1976 and 1984, the gap between the south and north was virtually bridged. The process would have been about completed in the early 1990s if the federal government was committed to extend the policy to secondary and higher education. The introduction of free education at all levels by the five states (all in the south) controlled by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) between 1979 and 1983 showed a decrease in the percentage share of secondary school enrolment by the north.

But like the incumbency factor during the colonial era, education policy has continued to suffer from adversary politics, so to say, of a two party system of 'north/south' dual structure. The north being the governing party while the south and in the case of educational policy, the west, led by and personified by Obafemi Awolowo, remained the opposition party offering alternative policies. The core of the argument shifting from the imperialistic perspective to the 'quantity' v. 'quality', or rather, popular education v. qualitative education. Whatever accounted for the difference, it appears the incumbency factor in terms of the personality of Nkrumah, his attitude against imperialism and thus his readiness to change things his own way, and above all his generous policy of free education up to university level (which is still in operation today) for those from the educationally backward area of northern Ghana, all stand out and lend support to how far Africans could change the so-called colonial heritage.

Education both in terms of cognitive value (education for its own sake, that's for knowledge and wisdom) and certificate or qualifications (that's for skills and know-how) is the core of all the tensions in Nigeria but also the instrument to re-branding Nigeria, i.e. to achieving whatever form of policy, bureaucracy and democracy. The significant role of education in reducing ignorance, disease and poverty in the contemporary Nigeria has never been disputed. If democracy has to do with the level of participation in public affairs, education provides the basis for the quality of such participation and consequently the output and outcomes of such participation.

Nigeria needs a civil process to develop values as merit and personal achievement, honesty and service even to oneself, trust and confidence in oneself, and education for the development of appropriate character and interpersonal skills of self-reliance, self-respect, not ambitiously to mention to serve others and the state. These are educational issues of socialisation which not only sustain democracy and make bureaucracy responsive to the concerns of the people it is supposed to serve, but they indeed sustain individuals within different institutions, including the family, school and the wider society. Professor Thomas Lambo, the renowned Nigerian psychiatrist and former deputy director of the World Health Organization, must have observed the absence of these values to remark that Nigerian leaders must be insane to contemplate the level of theft and misappropriation of public fund!

The role of education in such a process for change is so enormous that the 1977 national policy on education and 1979 constitution are inadequate means of bridging the gap between the north and south. A more positive and definitive policy is required. The progress so far made in bridging the gap at the primary school level shows that with a plan of 16 years (i.e. 9-3-4 educational policy - 9 years of Universal Basic Education (UBE) and 3 years senior secondary and 4 years university), it is possible to remove the educational imbalance between the north and south. This would have given a healthier relationship among the states than a lip service and politicking with reverse discrimination under the umbrella of the *federal character or the quota system*. In economic terms, it only requires a short-term price of allocating more funds to the north, otherwise described as educationally disadvantaged areas. Although these areas are already enjoying a greater proportion of annual special grant of 50 million Naira from the federal government since 1980, this is tokenistic and paternalistic. A more purposive and proactive measure has to be taken to bridge the gap, rather than *ad hoc* and quick fix approach.

What emerges from the foregoing examination of the incumbency and education factors is that the separate development period of 1900-1912 did not only set the style and the precedents for what followed after the 1914 amalgamation but resulted in two political cultures and two distinct ruling élite groups in Nigeria. In the south, partisan politics was based on policy programmes such as education, health, infrastructures. In the north, it was based on law and order or political control. It is also the root of differences in political development among the élite. It is interesting to note that one of the seven programmes of the present administration under a president from the north is rule of law!

The southern élite whose claim to prominence in politics, administration and business is based on access to and attainment of western education and Christian and liberal democratic culture as against the northern elites with Hausa-Fulani oligarchy which has been reinforced by the Lugard's belief in fame and power and whose indirect rule was based on birth and connections with the paramount Hausa-Fulani emirate and Islam.

The future of democracy depends not only on the recognition of the roots of the failure to democratise Nigeria and its bureaucracy but the total commitment to address the issues rather than to take advantage of them. So far there seems to be no such commitments from the previous leaders, and if there were, such commitments have not been convincingly demonstrated. Unfortunately, the contemporary globalisation of the world economy and politics has left Nigeria with little room for manoeuvre.

FEDERAL CHARACTER AND THE REALITIES OF NIGERIAN CITIZENSHIP

At 50 years, there is no doubt that the Nigerian nationhood remained fragile even after it has survived a 30-month civil war. Ethnic cleansing and religious bigotry are realities of Nigerian nation-state. One of the roots of religious tensions and conflicts in Nigeria could be traced to the pre-colonial Hausa-Fulani Muslim conquest and hegemony over the modern day Northern Nigeria. Although it is too simplistic to single out one factor for the recent crises and clashes between the Christian *natives or indigenes*, and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani *settlers* in Jos, Plateau State, the often overlooked predominant factor is that the native Plateau people resent any real or perceived over lordship of the Hausa-Fulani settlers.

Obviously adoption of federalism in 1954, the process of self-rule, and subsequently 'Northernisation' of the Northern Region Public Service and the flag independence for Nigeria in 1960 did not translate into political independence for the ethnic minorities and non-Muslims in the old Northern Hausa-Fulani emirates. Under the political party, Northern Peoples' Congress and the premiership of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sultan of Sokoto, the region was run, up until the coup d'état of January 1966 and the beginning of creation of states in 1967, as an autocracy of the 'One People' united by the Islamic faith and the Hausa language.

Religious and ethnic identities and consequently the emanating conflicts and violence in contemporary Nigeria are more than an issue of faith and cultural affinity. They are more than either a desire for one group to have a political domination over others or indeed for access to land, market and economic resources or political power and how to have a share from the national oil cake. They are also about human nature, about humanity, and about the universal human desire for freedom and social justice. They are about the human desire to make sense of confusing and distorted human history, having meaningful explanations and a culturally acceptable resolution, redress and closure to either real or perceived unjust and unjustifiable significant events in human affairs. They are about the ever complex, difficult and often intractable challenge of how to deal with and free the self from the entrapment of shared beliefs and values and break the bondage and shackles of group history.

They therefore require the leadership courage of the calibre of Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Dr Ian Paisley of Northern Ireland, and our Nigerian Yakubu Gowon to forgive the past and to shake hands with the enemy! It requires determination to break bonds from the pain and the entrapment of group history. Scriptural laws and codes, I dare say with all due respect and humility, are rather too static and often

inadequately dated, rigid and fixated to deal with the fluid situational changes of modern acceptable standard practice and plausible challenges of a global village.

Both the Nigerian Christians and Muslims may have to wake up to the realities and be under no illusions or delusions that times have changed. It is indeed in their self-interest and to avoid embarrassing reactions that they may have to embrace and respond to the changes in pragmatic and positive ways. Both Christianity and Islam were established long before the *modern concept* of family relationships, citizenship and nation-states. Both Christians and Muslims shall need to face the reality of living together in a nation that is now literally no more than a small hamlet in a global village. They both have to come to terms with the realities of our times when 'Might is no longer Right' and playing politics of 'survival of the fittest' or 'an-eye-for-an-eye' or 'life-for-life' is no longer the acceptable way neither to resolve disputes nor to spread their religions. If anything, playing politics with human lives is now counter-productive and unhealthy for all the parties involved.

As in marriage relationships, religious and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are a story. Every conflict is a story, and like all stories, it is subject to its participants' distorted perceptions and memories that preserve the narrative as each side sees it.

The greatest untold story of all the ethnic and religious crises and conflicts in Nigeria is that, unlike in the Mandela administration and leadership in the post-apartheid South Africa, or indeed Gowon's policy of reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation at the end of the civil war, there has never been a closure to the 'master-slave' relationship between the Hausa-Fulani and the people of the Middle Belt of Nigeria. It was not enough to admit that apartheid was evil but there was a Truth and Reconciliation Commission headed by a personality that was acceptable and respected by both the victims and the perpetrators, the Nobel laurate, Bishop Desmond Tutu. Ironically, in the pursuit of peace and unity in Ireland, in South Africa and in Nigeria after the civil war, there were amnesty and state pardon rather than prosecution and judicial resolution. These are a great lesson and food for thought for those asking for revenge, vengeance and the law to take its course to resolve centuries of tribal and religious wars and conflicts.

A long period of contemptuous and resentful relationship had developed into a lack of trust, malice and animosity that can only be redressed with a shift in attitude of respect for each other and trust in each other as humans of equal status and rights rather than as 'superior-inferior' 'slave', 'demagogue' or 'infidels'! No amount of plea for calm and incarceration of the perpetrators can bring solace to warring factions that view and treat their opponents with contempt and perceive them as less than human and uncivilised and, therefore, undeserving to live and to be respected. They must first admit that they are in

conflict with other humans and Souls rather than 'infidels or demagogues' that deserve to be slaughtered with impunity.

Ironically, while the Constitution aimed at guaranteeing and safeguarding the interests and equality of all Nigerians as citizens of 'One and indivisible nation', in reality and in plain language, the generality of Nigerians perceive themselves as strangers and 'refugees' and are blatantly treated as such outside of their state and indeed local government of origin. For example, the state governors that evacuated and supported their 'sons and daughters of the soil' who returned from the Plateau state during the January 2010 riots in Jos were hailed and praised for being kind and generous. They played politics and gained political points for welcoming *'their indigenes'* as *refugees from another state of the federation*.

As in the Middle East Islamic countries, the *strangers*, who in this case are mostly other Nigerians from the south, are kept in *Sabon Garri* (strangers' town) usually a distance outside the walls of the old Muslim cities of Zaria, Kano, Sokoto, Maiduguri, Katsina, and so on. Even Kaduna, as the seat of northern government, is far away from the old village of Kaduna, just as Jimeta the present seat of government of Adamawa state is relatively distant from the acknowledged state capital and traditional city of Yola. The contemporary implication for Nigerian citizenship is that Nigerians are viewed as *strangers outside their states of origin.*

There have continued to be alleged cases of discrimination against officers serving in states outside their own state of origin. In September 1986, however, it was observed that Sokoto and Bauchi respectively appointed one and two permanent secretaries who were not from their states. One of the two in Bauchi was from Bendel, while the other in Bauchi and the one in Sokoto were from Kwara. In Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Rivers, in effect, in most southern states, there were no cases of 'outsiders' as administrative officers, or as permanent secretaries. The appointment of a southerner, the former Federal Internal Affairs Minister, Mrs Janet Akinrinade, to the Executive Council of Plateau state during the Second Republic was not only unique but a celebrated extraordinary political gesture. Recent slaughter of southerners in Jos showed that the new leaders in Plateau state did not share the patriotic and nationalist policy of their Second Republic's predecessors. Another significant exception was the appointment of a Christian and a Yoruba, Mr Michael Olowolaiyemo, as Secretary to the Government in Borno state between 1979 and 1983.

In 1951, Nnamdi Azikiwe alleged that Obafemi Awolowo won the Lagos election through malpractice in the form of ethnic politics. In the 1987 local government elections, a Yoruba and an Igbo won in Kano state. Setting aside these exceptional cases and notwithstanding a gerrymandering factor of their being voted in by the Yoruba and Igbo in *Sabon Garri*, only few people ever contested and won a legislative seat in a state or local government

area outside his or her ethnic group.

In practical terms, this is one of the problems to which a solution eluded the military administration in Nigeria. Whilst in power, it was possible to circumvent the problem because the hierarchical structure of the armed forces makes it possible. For instance, officers were assigned as governors and commissioners sometimes to states other than their state of origin. Under military administration such officers were not responsible to any political faction and might govern with less concern for support and legitimacy. But conflicting interests cannot be ignored in the arena of democracy. Indeed, ethnic, religious and other cleavages are political weaponry exploited to win support and legitimacy (Dauda, 1990).

FEDERAL CHARACTER AND THE REALITIES OF HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY

Given the crisis in the oil producing Delta region, the Nigerian nation-state continued to grapple with the centrifugal forces of ethnicity, religion, and contest over the sharing of the national resources. The federal character of Nigeria has been politicised to the extent that every Nigerian feels that s/he is a stranger outside his/her local or state of origin, and also fears that s/he might be deprived in the share of national placements in employment and education, for example, because of accident of birth in a relatively advanced state. Merit and personal achievements have no meaning within the Nigerian quota system.

Merit and personal achievements have no meaning within the Nigerian representative quota system. Yes, one may argue that merit is applied to all candidates within what is coined as the cut-up point for each catchment's area. But the story is not that simple in practice. In real life, for example, a university graduate could have accelerated advancement in an educationally disadvantaged state and within five to seven years rose to the position of permanent secretary. He/she could then transfer to the federal service as permanent secretary on Salary Grade Level 17, but his or her cohorts from the same state, who were appointed direct into federal service, would only have become either a senior or principal assistant secretaries on Salary GL 10 or GL 12 respectively! Not only will the transfer be resented by other officers from the educationally advanced states but also by those from the educationally disadvantaged state of the transferee.

Paradoxically, while the Nigerian constitution provides that bureaucrats and public officials (civil and military) are appointed on the basis of quota representation, it also demands that they are given oath of office to operate rationally and fairly to all without fear or favour, ill-will or affection! Apart from the decline in the influence of the bureaucracy, Nigeria has a peculiar

circumstance of a distinct source of political from administrative leadership. Thus, the application of quota system has posed a threat to the very national unity and integration which it is intended to promote.

Recently Nigeria has launched a campaign to rebrand Nigeria. We may as well start the rebranding by abolishing the quota system. Quota is antithetical to our national unity and nation-building. We need calculated and deliberate policy to bridge the educational gap between the north and southern Nigeria. Most recent neurological and psychological research into how humans make decision and take action has shown that our brain is divided into two parts: Automatic System and Reflective System. Automatic System is uncontrolled, effortless, associative, fast, skilled and unconscious whereas the Reflective System is controlled, effortful, deductive, slow, self-aware and rule-following. To bring up and literally to brainwash people from placements into high school through university education and subsequently to recruit them into public service on the discriminatory basis of their local and state of origin and their religious beliefs and to expect them to think of the nation first is nothing but a wishful thinking that will never happen. The human brain does not operate that way.

Our cognitive system, that is, the way we think shows that human decisions, actions and behaviours are systematically wired and biased in favour of our primitive survival automatic system. I must admit how frightened I was when I read about how people can be simultaneously so smart and dumb. The greatest enemy of good governance in Nigeria is rooted not in the conventional conspiracy theory of the structural institutional school but in how unconsciously our Misleading Pre-judgments, Misleading Experiences, Inappropriate Self-interest and Inappropriate Attachments hijack and override our decision-making process (Finkelstein, Whitehead and Campbell, 2008, Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, Gardner, 2009). The good news is that we can train our Automatic System with lots of repetition, but such training takes a lot of time and effort.

The Way Forward is to Break Bonds with our National History

As we celebrate Nigeria's 50th Independence anniversary, one would like to draw attention to five issue areas as the way forward for Nigeria. First, Nigeria has to face the realities of globalisation of the world politics and economy. Globalisation has changed the contemporary meaning of citizenship and nation-states, and hence the operational meanings of local democracy and policymaking process. National bureaucracies have to operate within what is now internationally determined as democratic and good policy. Nigeria is a weak state and has inherited strong society traditions as an ex-colony of Britain. Dominant among the strong society traditions is the belief in the dichotomy between the private and public sectors and indeed between politics

and administration. It has also inherited a dual socio-economic and political developmental imbalances, especially in education and political élite group perceptions of what constitutes the art of governance. Obviously, attempting to reconcile the differences within a short time of fifty years have generated political and socio-economic instabilities, which neither policies nor the bureaucracy could cope with.

Second, federalism has been the foundation for the Nigerian state. With the present 36 states, 768 local governments, and 6 Area Councils, Nigeria has all the necessary political institutional structures for decentralisation, and hence for contestation, inclusiveness and for access to resources. It is a structure which could easily be abused if political leaders operate in a manner which blatantly alienates either the majority or the minorities within such structures.

The electoral principle of *the-first-past-the-post* or *the-winner-takes-all,* and a policymaking principle of the *zero-sum game* in which what you get is what I lose are both harmful to the future of democracy in Nigeria. They turn electoral process to a 'do-or-die' business; win at all cost and with violence and intimidation of opponents. The two principles are characteristic of the British political system and policy making, but Nigerians have not evolved to the level of civility of the British!

Nigeria would have to consider and adapt one form or the other of the German electoral proportional representation, and of course consider the Japanese policymaking innovation system in which no policy is adopted if losers could not adequately be compensated or assured of a better thing to come in the nearest future. Such principle will guarantee the rights of all, and definitely it is not culture bound in terms of being relevant to Japan only. It will if sincerely adopted and honestly implemented in practice reduce the agitation for more local and state governments, since the underlying motive behind such agitations is the fear of losing out in the share of and access to the *national cake or resources.*

Third is the invaluable role of women. Women are grossly under-represented in government, in education and in the Nigerian bureaucracy. For example, by 31 December 1984, there were 302,349 officers in the federal civil service. Of this figure only 39,651 (or 13.12%) were women. More importantly, there was only one woman permanent secretary out of 31 (including the head of service). The same under-representation of women prevailed at the state and local government levels.

To ask for emancipation and freedom of women is the least one could expect if Nigeria is to have sustainable and meaningful democracy, after all, females are about half of the population. But the real problem lies with men: as domineering brothers, uncles, fathers, husbands, religious leaders, i.e. Christian priests and Muslim imams, and bosses.

The case of women in policy, bureaucracy and democracy is ironically

similar to the paradox of the case of bureaucracy in any society: to control them and make them effective and responsive, they must be strengthened, allowed to operate with freedom associated with professionalism. For women to play their role in promoting democracy in Nigeria, they must be given space at home, in schools, and in the entire society to develop their potentials. Their contributions too, in all ramifications, have to be recognised. The question is, 'Are the Nigerian men ready to give the space and the recognition to women?' This question, I am afraid, is for all the Nigerian men to answer and your guess is as good as mine, while the future is as bright as the answer from them.

Fourth, the Nigerian media has been resilient even before independence. Although there have been occasional hiccups, they have enjoyed a considerable freedom especially from the civilian administrations. This has been mostly by design rather than by accident since most prominent Nigerians (Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Aminu Kano, Maitama Sule, Lateef Jakande and Bisi Onabanjo) were all journalists or writers of repute. However, Nigeria still operates The Official Secret Act 1962 which prohibits publication of any information which may embarrass the government.

Given the current levels of global mass communication and information technological development which have turned the whole world into a small global village and the fact that public contestation and having one's say rather one's way are prerequisites for effective democracy, it appears the use of the secrecy law is outdated and unnecessary. Contemporary Nigeria has a lot to learn from the Swedish mandatory constitutional provision of press freedom and the free public access to official information. Transparency in government processes helps to safeguard against the implicit dangers of both individual and institutional cognitive dissonance of self-serving, self-justifying, self-confirming and self-upholding implicit theories, biases, beliefs and prejudice.

Fifth, as models of democratic 'administrative states' (Peters, 1987:266), the experiences of France and Japan confirm that bureaucracy represents a force for stability and development in all its ramifications rather than a hidden government. Ironically, effective policymaking and sustainable democracy in contemporary Nigeria may mean having to strengthen and develop nationalist and confident Nigerian bureaucracies that, paradoxically, are presently misconceived of as overstaffed, overpaid, and too strong for democracy.

Nigeria has a few structural adjustments to make in order to consolidate its past achievements. The bureaucracy is only a product of the educational system and there is no doubt that imbalance or inadequacy in the educational system affects all the other sectors. Paramount among the article of faith of democracy is freedom, social justice, and equality before the law, and protection of individuals and their property. The prevailing feelings and fears

of being a stranger in one's nation are inhibiting to the performance of the bureaucracy and to fostering any faith in democracy. Indeed, Nigerians have little faith in the practice of democracy; hence they referred to politicians in the Second Republic as mad people: *them-all-crazy*, a pejorative term for democracy.

The interdependency of democracy and bureaucracy in providing relevant policies to sustain the faith of all citizens in democracy makes it necessary for contemporary Nigerian leaders (policy architects), if only for self-interest, to pay a particular attention to the quality of its bureaucrats so that they could have innate pride to be in the service of the nation. Such attention should be extended to women, the police, the media, and to de-politicise religion and ethnicity by de-emphasising if not abolishing the use of quota system for educational and employment placements.

CONCLUSION

One great cause for celebration on the occasion of the 50th Independence anniversary is a solid and albeit necessary institutional or federal structural foundation for a meaningful democracy has been laid. As I write in July 2010, I could look back on how the fracas in the Western Region House of Assembly in 1962 resulted in the breakdown of law and order in the region and consequently to the fall of the First Republic. Fifty years on, we now only treat such fracas not only in the same House in Oyo state but even in the House of Representatives as nothing but news or old men and honourables behaving badly! Nigeria has, indeed, come of age.

But Nigeria needs to fine-tune such institutions and redefine its constitutional provisions for national identity and 'Federal Character' Given the crisis in Plateau State, the Nigerian citizenship and nation-state are faced again with the centrifugal forces of ethnicity, religion, and contest over the legitimacy of the 'natives' and the 'settlers' to land and property, regardless of how long their ancestors have been 'settlers'! The Federal Character of Nigeria has been politicised to the extent that every Nigerian feels that he/she is a stranger outside his/her local or state of origin, and also fears that he/she might be deprived in the share of national placements in employment and education, for example, because of accident of birth in a relatively advanced state.

To rectify the errors of colonial history, there is a need for political leadership that is consistently committed to the long-term needs of the Nigerian people. Such leadership must also operate with the technical *know-how* of a stable and professional public service that is recruited and trained on the basis of merit and committed to equal opportunity for all. Such leadership must accept the need for a special affirmative programme to bridge the north-south gap in socio-economic development, and other pockets of gap within

each state. It must also promote political and patriotic education that transcends ethnic and religious loyalty and affiliations and enables Nigerians **unconditionally** to exercise all their citizenry and human rights to move and do business, feel belonged, secured and safe in any part of the country.

Nigeria requires the type of citizenship and nationality that enabled Barack Obama who was born in Hawaii of a non-American father, indeed, an African father, to stand for legislative elections after working in Chicago for only three years and in the same state to contest for the state and federal senatorial seats and subsequently be elected the first African- American president of the United States. Nigerian politicians need to accept the policy that enables any British citizen to contest elections in any part of the United Kingdom.

REFERENCES

Abernethy, David B. (1969). *The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Adamolekun, Ladipo (1986). *Politics and Administration in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books in association with Hutchinson, London.

Adebo, S. O. (1984). *Our Unforgettable Years*. Lagos: Macmillan.

Adger, W. Neil and Jordan, Andrew (eds.) (2009). *Governing Sustainability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ashby, Sir Eric (1960). *Nigeria Investment in Education: The Report of the Commission on Post-School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria*. Lagos: The Federal Government Printer and the Crown Agents Representatives in North America and St Clement Press, London.

Axworthy, Thomas S. (1992). 'Democracy and Development: Luxury or Necessity?' in Bauzon, Kenneth E. (ed.) *Development and Democratization in the Third World: Myths, Hopes, and Realities*. London: Crane Russak, A member of the Taylor and Francis Group. 111-118.

Bara, Judith and Pennigton, Mark (eds.) (2009). *Comparative Politics: Explaining Democratic Systems*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Bealey, F. (1987). 'Stability and Crisis: Fears about Threats to Democracy,' in *European Journal of Political Research*. 15 (6), 687-715.

Boucher, David and Kelly, Paul (eds.) (2009). *Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boyd, R. (1986). 'Government-Industry Relations in Japan: Access, communication, and competitive collaboration' in Wilks, S and Wright, M. (eds.) *Comparative Government Industry Relations: Western Europe, the United States and Japan*. Oxford: Calrendon Press.

Cassese, A. (1991). 'Violence, war and the rule of law in the International Community', in Held, D. (ed.) *Political Theory Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Chomsky, Noam (1991). 'The Struggle for Democracy in a Changed World' *Review of African Political Economy*. 50: 12-20.

Cohen, Y (1987). 'Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military

Dictatorship in Brazil.' In *World Politics*. 40 (1), Oct., 30-54.

Chabal, Patrick (ed.) (1986). *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coleman, James S. (1971). *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1964). 'Power, Pluralism, and Democracy: A Modest Proposal,' paper delivered at American Political Science Association annual meeting quoted in Dye , Thomas R. and Zeigler, Harmon (8th ed.) (1990) *The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics*. California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove.

Dahl, R. (1971). *Polyarchy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Daly, Herman E., and Cobb, Jr. John B. (1989). *For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Dauda, Bola (1990). 'Fallacies and Dilemmas: the theory of representative bureaucracy with a particular reference to the Nigerian public service 1950 to 1986.' in *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. 56 (3):467-495.

_____ (1991). 'Taking Democracy Seriously: Democracy-Bureaucracy Relations' in Cohen, R. and Goulbourne, H. (eds.) *Democracy and Socialism in Africa*. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press.

_____ (1993). 'Industrial Policy and the Nigerian Bureaucracy, 1900-1988' in *African Economic History* (21) pp.73-96. (African Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison).

_____ (1995). 'Philosophical Issues in Public Service Reform' in *The Chinese Public Administration Review* 4(3) June: 43-74; *The Journal of Institute of Public Enterprise* (July-September; October-December) 18(3&4): 127-143.

_____ (1997). 'Global Context of Public Service Reforms: A review of Nigerian Reforms 1945-1988' in *Politeia* 16(1) pp.20-46. (University of South Africa (Unisa)).

Dudley, B. J. (1966). 'Federalism and the Balance of Political Power in Nigeria.' in *Journal of Commonwealth Studies* 4:16-29.

Dunleavy, P. and O'Leary, B. (1987). *Theories of the State: The politics of liberal democracy*. London: Macmillan.

Fainstein, Susan S. and Fainstein, Norman I. (1980). 'The Political Economy of America Bureaucracy' in Weiss, Carol H. and Barton, Allen H. (eds.) *Making Bureaucracy Work*. London: Sage Publications.

Falola, Toyin and Ihonvbere, Julis, (1985). *The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-84*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Finkelstein, Sydney, Whitehead, Jo and Campbell, Andrew (2008). *Think Again*. Boston: Harvard Business Press.

Forster, Philip (1980). 'Education and Social Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18 (2):201-36.

Gardner, Dan (2009). *Risk*. London: Virgin Books Ltd.

Garner, Robert; Ferdinand, Peter and Lawson, Stephanie (2009). *Introduction to*

Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grey, Chris (2005). *A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Studying Organizations*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Handy, Charles (1995). *The Empty Raincoat: Making Sense of the Future*. London: Arrow Books Ltd.

Heclo, H. Hugh (1972). 'Review Article: Policy Analysis', *British Journal of Political Sciences 2* (1), Jan., 83-108.

Heclo, H. Hugh and Madsen, Henrik (1987). *Policy and Politics in Sweden: Principled Pragmatism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Heclo, Hugh and Adams, Carolyn Teich (1990). (3rd ed.) *Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in America, Europe and Japan*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.

Held, D. (1991). 'Democracy and globalization' *Alternatives*. 16 (2).

_____ (1992). 'Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order?' in Held, D. (ed.) *Prospects for Democracy*. Norwich: Blackwell Publishers for the Political Studies Association of the UK.

Hennessy, Peter (1990). *Whitehall*. London: Fontana Press.

Hunter, K. W. (1990). 'Trends in government foresight and planning in the United States: an agenda for further research'. *International review of Administrative Sciences*. 56 (3):497-520.

Hyden, Goran (1983). *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*. London: Heinemann.

Joseph, Richard a. (1987). *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

King, S. Desmond (1987). *The New Right: Politics, markets, and citizenship*. London: Macmillan.

Lane, Jan-Erik and Ersson, Svante (1994). *Comparative Politics: An Introduction and New Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Maitland-Jones, J.P. (1973). *Politics in Ex- British Africa* (London).

Marshall, T.H. (1964). *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. New York: Doubleday & Co.

Martinussen, John (1997). *Society, State & Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

McKay, David (7th Ed.) (2009). *American Politics and Society*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Mervin, David (1990). *Ronald Regan and the American Presidency*. London: Longman Group UK Ltd.

Metcalfe, Les and Richards, Sue (1990). *Improving Public Management*. London: Sage Publications.

Miroff, Bruce (1993). *Icons of Democracy: American Leaders as Heroes, Aristocrats, Dissenter, and Democrats*. New York: Basic Books, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers.

Moran, Michael (2005). *Politics and Governance in the UK*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Munck, Geraldo L. and Snyder, Richard (2007). *Passion, Craft and method in Comparative Politics*. Baltimore: The John s Hopkins University Press.

Nicolson, I. (1966). 'The Machinery of Federal and Regional Government', in Mackintosh, J.P. (ed.) *Nigerian Government and Politics*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

_____ (1969). *The Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960: Men, Methods and Myths*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Oyediran, O. (ed.) (1979). *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-1979*. London: Macmillan, see in particular contributions Olugbemi, S. O., 'The Civil Service: An Outsider's View' pp.96-109 and Oyediran O. and Olagunju, O. 'The Military and the Politics of Revenue Allocation' pp.192-211.

Owen, Jo (2009). (2nd ed.) *How to Lead*. Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd.

Paxman, Jeremy (1991). *Friends in High Places: Who runs Britain?* London: Penguin.

Pempel, T.J. (1982). *Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism*. Philadelphia: Temple Press.

_____ (1984). 'Organizing for Efficiency: The higher Civil Service in Japan' in Suleiman, E. N. (ed.) *Bureaucracy and Policy-making*. New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 72-106.

Peters, B. Guy (1995). (4th ed.) *The Politics of Bureaucracy*. White Plains, New York: Longmans Publishers USA.

_____ (1995). 'Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Politics of Policy- making' in Lane, J. E. (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Public Choice*, London: Sage, 255-282.

Ponting, Clive (1986). *Whitehall: Tragedy & Farce*. London: Sphere Books Ltd.

Potholm, C.P. (1970). *Four African Political Systems*. Englewood, Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Ravitch, Diane and Thernstrom, Abigail (eds.) (1992). *The Democracy Reader: Classic and modern Speeches, Essays, Poems, Declarations, and Documents on Freedom and Human Rights Worldwide*. New York: HarperPerennial, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers.

Robbins, Anthony (1992). *Awaken the Giant Within: How to take immediate control of your mental, emotional, physical and financial destiny!* New York: Simon Schuster, A Fireside Book.

Rose, Richard (1973). 'Comparing Public Policy' *European Journal of Political Research* 1: 67-94.

_____ (1984). *Understanding Big Government: The Programme Approach*. London: Sage Publications.

Seers, D. and Vaitsos C. (1980). *Integration and Unequal Development: The Experience of the EEC*. London: Macmillan.

Scott, Gerald E. (1992). 'Structural Adjustments in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of IMF Stabilization Programs' in Bauzon (ed.) op.cit. 201-220.

Stewart, Frances, (1987). 'Should Conditionality Change?' in Havnevik, Kjell (ed.) *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, Impact, and Alternatives*. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 29-45.

Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein, Cass R. (2009). *Nudge: Improving Decisions About*

Health, Wealth and Happiness. London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Vanhanen, Tatu (ed.) (1992). *Strategies of Democratization*. London: Crane Russak, a member of the Taylor and Francis Group.

Vogel, Ezra (1979). *Japan as No.1: Lessons for America*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co.

Weiss, Carol H. and Barton, Allen H. (eds.) (1980). *Making Bureaucracies Work*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Wilks, Stephen (1984). *Industrial Policy and the Motor Industry*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Private Universities in Nigeria: Patterns and Trends

TOLULOPE OSAYOMI

33

INTRODUCTION

Almost all regions of the world are witnessing a rising demand for university education, which cannot be fully met by the limited number of public universities. As a result, private universities have emerged as "a natural response to the global hunger for higher education . . ." (*The Guardian* UK, 2011). Today, private higher education has become ". . . one of the most dynamic segments of post-secondary education at the turn of the 21st century" (Altbach, 1998 cited in Obasi, 2007), and exist in three broad forms (Varghese, 2004), namely: state supported private universities (they receive state funding for operations and management), not-for-profit private universities (they are not profit seeking) and for-profit private universities (their sole objective is to make profit). The recent worldwide surge of these private institutions is attributed to a mix of domestic and foreign drivers (Obasi, 2007 and Varghese, 2004). The foreign factor is connected to the prevalent global neo-liberal

reforms which concurrently reduce government's involvement, and increase private sector participation in the provision of higher education. The domestic factor, on the other hand, views local challenges such as numerous union strikes, poor academic standards, inadequate facilities, unstable academic calendars, etc. to be contributory factors to the emergence of private universities.

In Nigeria, their rise, although, has been the outcome of the two above mentioned factors, it can be argued that this significant development responded more to the poor state of the government-owned universities than the global forces. In fact, these private institutions are largely viewed to be part of a holistic response from the federal government to the state of public universities in the country.

Prior to their coming, public universities (comprising federal and state universities) were the sole providers of university education in Nigeria. They operated in unfavorable conditions such as limited physical infrastructure, scarce educational materials, excessive population, poor management and campus violence. Given these challenges, the federal government promoted private sector participation in the provision of university education, following Act No. 9 of 1993 which permitted private investors to establish universities in accordance to government guidelines (Okogie, 2008).

Thus, in 1999 three universities, namely Igbinedion University, Babcock University, Madonna University came out as the first generation of private universities in Nigeria. The number of private universities dramatically increased to 34 by 2009. In fact, the last ten years can be said to have experienced a private university explosion, so to say.

Available literature on the advent and proliferation of private universities in Nigeria have focused on the historical development (Obasi, 2005), quality assurance (Ajayi and Ekundayo, 2007; Erinosho, 2008), and factors influencing their upsurge, access, and financing (Adebola, 2007; Obasi, 2007). However, there is no known study that has drawn attention to the geographical implications of the upsurge of private universities in Nigeria up till 2009 and the factors responsible for variation in their spatial distribution. This paper, therefore, sets out to explore these latter aspects.

Specifically, the objectives of the paper are three-fold. The first is to assess patterns and trends of private universities in Nigeria; and the second is to provide an explanatory framework for the observed patterns and trends and the third would present the theoretical and practical implications of the results.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Public universities dominated the university education scene in Nigeria. The first of these public universities, the University College, Ibadan (now University of Ibadan) was established in 1948 during British colonial rule. Shortly after independence, the three regional governments in the country at the time set

up theirs: there was Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, in the north; the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), Ile Ife, in the west, and University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in the east. Besides these that were established by the regional governments, the University of Lagos was subsequently established by the federal government, in 1962. The University of Lagos was thus the first federal university to be established in Nigeria. In 1975, the regional universities were taken over by the federal military government. In the same year, free tuition in the federal universities was declared – a benefit which is still being enjoyed by every Nigerian students up till date.

The 1970s to 2007 (particularly the oil boom years), witnessed the establishment of many more federal universities in different parts of Nigeria like the University of Benin, Benin, Edo state (1970); University of Port Harcourt, Rivers state (1975); the University of Agriculture, Ogun state (1992); and the Federal University of Petroleum Resources, Effurun, Delta state (2007), to mention just a few. States did not own universities until 1979 when education was put on the concurrent list of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Adeogun et al., 2009). States in the federation consequently got the mandate to set up universities. Rivers State University of Science and Technology (RUST), Port Harcourt was the first state-owned university; it was established in 1979. RUST was followed by Bendel State University (now Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Edo state), in 1980. From 1980 till the present, the number of public universities in the country have grown up to sixty (see *The Nation*, 16 February, 2009). However, due to the conditions of these public universities and the low standard of education they offered, it was proposed that the establishment of private universities be encouraged.

It should be noted that two efforts were made at the development of private universities in the country (Obasi, 2005; 2007). The first was made by the government of President Shehu Shagari during the Second Republic (1979-1983). However, the initiative was scrapped by the General Muhammadu Buhari administration in 1983. The effort was renewed by the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, in the Fourth republic. The Nigerian Universities Commission (NUC) received and screened applications from prospective private universities' owners. The three universities, Igbinedion, Babcock, and Madonna in 1999, successfully emerged as the pioneers. Since then, the number of private universities has been increasing.

In terms of ownership, religious institutions own a sizeable proportion of these universities. Babcock University is owned by Seventh-day Adventist Church; Redeemer's University is owned by the Redeemed Christian Church of God; Bowen University, by the Nigerian Baptist Convention; Joseph Ayo

Babalola University, by the Christ Apostolic Church; Katsina University by the Katsina Islamic Foundation; Al-Hikmah University was founded by the AbdulRahim Islamic Fund; and the Methodist Church also owns Wesley University of Science and Technology. This observation agrees with Varghese' (2004) claim that religious institutions, from a global perspective, are major providers of private higher education. The other private universities are owned by individuals and corporate entities. Among those owned by individuals, for instance, are the American University of Nigeria and Bells University of Technology. Pan-African University was established by a corporate entity, among others. Following Varghese' (2004) classification, private universities in Nigeria belong to two groups only namely not-for-profit private universities and for-profit higher education institutions.

Patterns and Trends

Spatial patterns

The spatial distribution of private universities is shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. Proportional bars are used to illustrate the spatial pattern. A cursory look at the Table 1 and Figure 1 shows that there were spatial disparities in the distribution at two levels, namely: regional and state levels.

On the regional level, a distinct south-north pattern of the private universities distribution is evident in the data. Out of the 34 universities, 26 (76.5%) are found in the south while the north has eight. In other words, there is a marked concentration of private universities in the southern part of the country. This is probably due to the south's earlier exposure to western education through Christian missionary endeavours and British colonial policies; the Awolowo legacy of free primary education in the south-west, and the predominance of educational facilities in the region.

At the state level, the private universities are found in eighteen states of the country. Ogun state has the largest number of private universities, totaling six (6); Lagos and Osun have 3, followed by Oyo, Osun, Abuja, Delta, Edo, Ondo, Anambra and Enugu with a share of 2 each. The other states in the federation have one university each, as shown in the Table 1.

Trends

The first three Nigerian private universities, namely Igbinedion, Babcock and Madonna were established in 1999. The number steadily rose to eight (8) in 2003, and went on to twenty-three (23) in 2005, and 34 in 2007, and remained so until 2009. Clearly, this signifies an upward trend in the growth of the private universities in the country. Though extant literature have attributed the quantum leap to the conditions of the public universities failure hypothesis (*see details in* Obasi, 2005) and to soaring demands for university education

(Ajadi, 2009), another possible explanation yet is the perceived success of the first generation private universities. Indeed, following the successful takeoff of the first three private universities, university education was seen to be lucrative by prospective founders. The founders were eventually motivated to invest in the education sub sector with the hope of high monetary returns. Partly, this explains the sudden rise in the number of private universities.

Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3 as following show the growth trend in the private university education sub sector.

Table 1: Distribution of Private Universities by State

S/N	State	Number
1.	Akwa Ibom	1
2.	Lagos	3
3.	Ogun	6
4.	Oyo	2
5.	Osun	3
6.	Kwara	1
7.	Abuja	2
8	Adamawa	1
9.	Katsina	1
10.	Delta	2
11.	Edo	2
12.	Ondo	2
13	Taraba	1
14.	Anambra	2
15.	Enugu	2
16	Benue	1
17.	Kogi	1
18.	Plateau	1
	TOTAL	34

Source: Compiled from *The Nation*, 16 February, 2009.

Table 2, Figures 2 and 3, as earlier indicated, obviously demonstrate the fast growing nature of the private university education sub-sector. Notwithstanding, the state university education sub sector in the country had stiffly competed with their private counterparts. In fact, observation shows this competitive trend will likely continue till all the thirty-six states of the Nigerian federation each owns at least a university. On their part, federal universities seems to have stagnated in growth in the country; over the years the federal government has reduced her involvement in the provision of

university education. With these current trends, it is highly probable that private universities in the near future will again well outnumber public universities in the country.

Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Private Universities in Nigeria, as at 16 February, 2009.

Table 2: Temporal Growth Trends of Private Universities in Nigeria

Year	Number
1999	3
2001	4
2003	8
2005	23
2007	34
2009	34

Source: The Nation, 16 February, 2009.

Figure 2: Temporal Growth Trend of Private Universities in Nigeria 1999-2009.

Figure 3: Number of Federal, State and Private Universities in Nigeria: 1999-2009.

EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SPATIAL PATTERN OF PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES IN NIGERIA

Several factors are likely to affect the spatial distribution of private universities in Nigeria, many of which can be measured and their relative importance ascertained. Nearness to public universities could have significant implications

for distribution. The argument is that some of the private universities were located near the public universities for specifiable reasons, an instance of which was the private Lead City University in the same city as the premier University of Ibadan, Ibadan, necessitating the proximity to public universities could be the need by the private universities for professional and technical expertise, use of infrastructure, opportunities for linkages, as well as for training, in particular. The private universities probably hoped to benefit from the pool of human resources, especially the academic staff, in the public institutions. It was also believed they would want to utilise certain infrastructures in the public universities till they were able to acquire theirs. The private universities were sited near the pubic universities because their academic and non-academic staff could enjoy training opportunities in the public institutions, a good example of which was postgraduate education.

Degree of urbanisation and population size of each state is expected to affect the location of private universities. According to the Longe Commission Report (1991) on the review of higher education in Nigeria, prospective owners must ensure the university site's distance from an urban complex takes into cognizance the presence or absence of municipal services such as water, transportation, accommodation, etc.

The number of secondary schools is perceived to be a major determinant. This lies in another eligibility requirement for the establishment of private universities which stipulates that they should have an adequate enrolment base (see Longe, 1991). An adequate enrolment base can found where there are a large number of secondary schools.

It is generally believed that the level of economic development affects the distribution of private higher education. The fact is that economically developed states would attract large number of private universities. Indeed, population in such states could better afford private university education than those in less developed states. Thus, in this regard monetary returns would be a locational objective of the private investor. No provider would site a private university in a state where little or no financial returns could be guaranteed.

Besides these, there are other important factors though unquantifiable, that could influence their patterns, such as community development and evangelism. Community development might be an evident factor where the individual founder located a university in his/her hometown with the hope of bringing development to the region. For instance, ABTI – American University of Nigeria, and the Igbinedion Universities were, and are, located in the hometowns of the individual owners. Their locations should facilitate the towns' development, in terms of education and employment opportunities to their kinsmen and townsfolk.

Also, a number of the private universities might be sited in their locations

on religious grounds. Certain of the private universities obviously had shared a common vision to improve quality of education, inculcate godly values and form godly characters in the Nigerian youths, and populace, at large. It is likely they have nurtured an implicit objective of propagating their religious faiths. This could motivate the location of such institutions in territories of non-adherents of the faith in question.

It is, therefore, evident that a variety of factors could be responsible for variations in the spatial pattern of universities in Nigeria. In an attempt to put forward a tenable explanation, a step-wise multiple regression was performed:

$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \ldots + b_nX_n + e$

Where Y is the number of private universities in each state

X_1 to X_n are predictor variables such that

X_1 is the number of public (both federal and state) universities in state

X_2 is the number of secondary schools in each state

X_3 is the literacy level in each state

X_4 is the total population of each state

X_5 is the state's degree of urbanisation

X_6 is the gross domestic product per capita per state

X_7 is the number of commercial bank branches in each state

X_8 is the proportion of population in the non agricultural sector in each state

a is the intercept, constant or the value of Y when $X_1, X_2, \ldots X_n$ are all zero.

b_1 to b_n are the regression coefficients

e is the error term or stochastic disturbance.

All the variables except X_5 (degree of urbanisation) were measured on the ratio scale of measurement. X_5 was expressed in binary form. States whose population density values were above the national average of 151 persons per square kilometre (based on the 2006 national census) were classified as urban and assigned the value of 1 while states below the benchmark were labeled as rural and given the weight of 0.

X_1 to X_3 variables suggest that the level of educational development contribute to the explanation of private universities. X_4 to X_5 variables are important because they serve as indices of market size for these private institutions. X_6 to X_8 variables bordered on the level of economic development. It is believed the level of economic development will influence the number of private universities.

On the whole, all the eight variables were hypothesised to have a positive contribution to the number of private universities in Nigeria. In plain terms, the larger the values of the variables, the larger the number of private universities would be.

Table 3: Results of stepwise regression analysis

Independent variables	Regression coefficients	Standard error	Level of explanation (%)	Level of significance
Number of public universities	0.490	0.387	30.8	0.017
Proportion of population in the non-agricultural sector	0.452	0.021	20.0	0.026
Constant	-4.123			
Multiple R_2	0.508			

Table 3 above shows the summary of the results of the step-wise regression analysis. It must be stressed that the variables in the table are not all that there are in an explanation of private universities. For instance, variables such as community development and evangelism although obviously important were not included because they were not measurable. Nevertheless, table 5 contains information on the relative importance of some of the variables that should help explain the spatial distribution of private universities. From the table above, only two (2) out of the eight (8) variables are established to have significant influences on the variation in the distribution of private universities, that is, the public universities and the proportion of population in the non-agricultural sector. These two independent variables accounted for about 51 percent ($R_2 = 50.8\%$) of the total variance in the number of private universities. The public universities factor has a greater contribution (30.8%) than the other (20%). In addition, the regression model is significant at 0.01 level. Therefore, the spatial pattern of private universities is significantly explained by the number of public universities and the proportion of population in the non-agricultural sector.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this study has analysed the patterns and trends of private universities in Nigeria, up till 2009. The paper has attempted to provide explanations for the variation in the spatial distribution of private universities. Eight variables were hypothesised to be significantly related to the number of private universities.

From the study, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, up till 2009 private universities assumed a spatial character at the regional and state levels. Second, the number of private universities has been on the increase, and they will possibly outnumber the public universities in the near future. Third, the spatial distribution of private universities is significantly explained by the spatial variation in the number of public universities and the proportion of population in the non-agricultural sector in each state. Finally, it has been underscored that some other possible factors, such as community development and the propagation of religious faith, influence the spatial distribution of private universities in Nigeria.

The theoretical and practical importance of this work lies in the fact it provides both a useful framework for understanding the spatial behaviour of private universities in Nigeria, and a basis for efficient and effective educational planning.

REFERENCES

Adeogun, A.A., Subair. S.T. and Osifila, G.I. (2009). "Deregulation of University Education in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects" *Florida Journal of Educational Administration and Policy* (Winter 2009), Vol. 3, Issue 1.

Ajadi, T.O. (2010). "Private Universities in Nigeria – The Challenges Ahead" *American Journal of Scientific Research*, Issue 7:15-24. Retrieved from http://www.eurojournals.com/ajsr.htm. Accessed on 19/3/2010.

Ajayi, I.A. and Ekundayo, H.T. (2008). "The Deregulation of University Education in Nigeria: Implications for Quality Assurance" *Nebula*, Vol. 5, No. 4.

Erinosho, O.A. (2007). "The Quality of Nigeria's Private Universities". *Ibadan Journal of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 5, No. 1.

La Torre, G., Van Beeck, E., Quaranta, G., Mannocci, A. and Ricciardi, W. (2007). "Determinants of Within-Country Variation in Traffic Accident Mortality in Italy: A Geographical Analysis" *International Journal of Health Geographics*, Vol. 6: 496.

Obasi, I.N. (2005). "New Private Universities in Nigeria" *International Higher Education*, Number 45 (Fall 2006). Retrieved from http://www.bc.edu/cihe/newsletter/Number45/p14_Obasi.htm.

_____ (2007). "Analysis of the Emergence and Development of Private Universities in Nigeria (1999-2006)" *Journal of Higher Education in Africa*, Vol. 5, Nos. 2 &3: 39-66.

Okogie, J.A. (2008). "Licensing, Accreditation and Quality Assurance in Nigerian Universities: Achievements and Challenges" A paper presented at the CHEA Summer Workshop, 26 and 27 June, 2008.

The Nation (2009). 17 February. "List of approved Universities in Nigeria" *The Nation*, 26-27.

Varghese, N.V. (2004). "Private Higher Education in Africa". UNESCO.

Nigeria's Porous Borders and their Implications for Human and National Security

EMMANUEL OSEWE AKUBOR

34

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's borderline is estimated at 923,768 sq. km; a breakdown shows that 1500 km is with Niger republic in the north, 90 km with Chad in the northeast, 700 km with Benin Republic to the west and 1700 km with Cameroon to the east. On the other hand, her maritime border along the Atlantic Ocean is put at 850 km (Asiwaju, 1989; Barkindo, and Asiwaju, 1989, 2003 2003). These are too extensive to be effectively policed by the Nigerian security forces, thus exposing the country to activities of bunkerers, illegal arms and ammunition importers and human trafficker. It also constitutes a loss of revenue as well as threat to the lives of citizens living around the border and the country in general.

For a meaningful discussion of this topic, it is imperative to examine the importance of human security to overall security. It argues that the growing insecurity around the country's borders and other related issues as smuggling

is as a result of poor attention placed on the human security aspect. For the purpose of proper understanding, this paper will deal with the concept of security which is analysed from both the traditional/classical school and human security angle.

THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL AND HUMAN SECURITY

It must be noted from the outset that just as there who are scholars interested in security studies, so also are many definitions of the concept of security. It is, however, interesting to note that while the concept of security grapples with the issue or idea of a common definition, it has been elevated to the status of an ideology and, characteristically, ideology like theology is hardly questioned (Gaultena, 1985: 82). As suggested by Gaultena and his associates, the concept and terms used to describe security are at best not more than intelligent guesses and generalisation based on what seems to be the interest and actions of most states for the most times. It is in line with this that the author is of the view that security (whether international or national) suffers the problem of definition. But in spite of this obvious conceptual problem, many scholars have attempted to define security in different ways.

In his analysis, Galtung argues that security which is the sustenance of a society is a combination of two things; namely, that the society remains essentially stable; and any basic change is essentially from the inside (indigenous) brought about by the internal dialectics of the society. (Gauthang, 1982: 85). On the other hand, Morgenthau (1978: 121) defines national security as the integrity of the national territory and its institutions. He argues that this refers the conglomeration of measures undertaken by the governments of nation-states in proving assurance of national safety (security) to the collective population of the state. The measures included in achieving this assurance refer to the requirement to maintain and exercise the use of national political and economical power, the exercise of diplomacy, and military power projection.

Both definitions above have been summarised by Wolfers (1969:279), who posits that security in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to required values. In a subjective sense, it is in the absence of fear that such values may be attached. According to Holsti (1974: 137), these values include national survival and the issues of national survival revolves around four basic needs; *viz*, national unity, preference of home territory, social and economic welfare, as well as defence of strategically vital areas. On the other hand, human security is people-centred, focusing on protecting individual persons that make up the territory. The important dimensions are to entail the well-being of individuals and respond to ordinary people's needs in dealing with sources of threats. In addition to protecting the state from external

aggression, human security would expand the scope of protection to include a broader range of threats, including environmental pollution, infectious diseases and economic deprivation. Human security not only protects, but also empowers people and societies as a means of security. Human security holds that a people-centred view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability (www.wikipeadia/ security ing).

To scholars like McNamara (1968:22) and Francis Stewart (2006), once the issue of security of a territory is placed as topmost in priority, development follows. In the view of McNamara, development and security are mutually reinforcing:

> Security means development, security is not military hardware. It is not military force Security is development; and without development, there can be no security . . . development means economic, social and political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living, in this context requires continual redefinition; what is reasonable in an earlier stage of development will become unreasonable on a larger state (McNamara, 1968:22).

While Stewart (2006), posits thus:

> Human security forms an important part of people's well-being, and, is therefore an objective of development . . . Lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth and therefore development . . . Imbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities is an important source of conflict (Stewart, 2006:11).

We can, therefore, argue that human security is the future of development and that poverty and inequality lead to individual vulnerability. This gives a complex and contested relationship between human security and human development, addressing the material and physical concern of the citizens. This is the aspect of overall security that has not actually been tackled in Nigeria especially when the nation's borders are brought into focus. The absence of human security as we shall see has created a situation where people and the borders are vulnerable and as such become susceptible to unsalubrious acts.

Definition of Scope (Space)

The vastness of Nigeria has put the country at the mercy of arms smugglers and the traffickers. This is because both arms smugglers and traffickers use these porous borders to smuggle into the country different and dangerous items such as drugs and arms. In most cases, these items are smuggled into the country hidden in clothings, vehicles and other machines.

The situation is even complicated by the heterogeneous nature of the border communities. This is because the 1884-1885 Berlin conference did not

take into cognisance the tribes and ethnic groups living along the arbitrary boundaries. This resulted in the placement of tribes/ethnic groups to different countries, making it difficult along the Nigerian border (as in the areas the issues of who belongs to which country. This has, therefore, made the issue of majority difficult. This can be exemplified by the existence of the Yoruba and Borgu ethnic groups living in both Benin and Nigeria; the Hausa, Mandara, Kanuri, Fulani and Kotoko groups living in Cameroun and Nigeria; the Kanembu and Shuwa Arabs in Nigeria and Chad and the Hausa and Fulani living in Niger and Niger (Usman and Abba, 2005; Ajaegbu et al, 2000). This situation as indicated earlier has made majority nearly impossible. This is clearly seen in Borno state, where owing to the porous nature of the border with Cameroun there has been constant (illegal) crossing using various means of transport, especially during the dry season. This has rendered all the effects by various administrations to curb the activities of illegal aliens, bandits and smugglers ineffective (Adejo, 2005). Thus, between 1964 and 1994, the country witnessed over 30 border incidents with Cameroun. Before the establishment of Joint Patrol Teams (made up of personnel from Cameroun, Niger, Chad and Nigeria) in the early 1980s there were cases where Chadian gendarmes harassed Nigerians living on some inlands in Lake Chad. Of recent, the activities of trans-border bandits led to the death of over 2000 people in Tipto, Kisa, Samne Bangi, Wurki and Gwe in Lamurde Local Government Area of Adamawa state. In a similar development in 2009, 19 persons including a policeman were shot dead and over 40 others wounded in Ganye town of Adamawa state, when trans-border herdsmen attacked the Ganye International Cattle Market situated near the border with the Republic of Cameroun (Onah, 2010).

These activities have put the lives of the people and officials around the border at risk. In 1994 customs officials intercepted smugglers along the Ilela Sokoto area, trying to smuggle arms and petroleum products into the area. The smugglers resisted, which led to a scuttle in which the smugglers were killed. The reaction of the immediate community was to attack the enforcing squad which eventually led to the death of Kabiru Mafara Yabo, a customs official (Police Command Sokoto, 1997:10).

In the south, between September 1987 and May 1988, over 2000 drums of highly toxic and radio-active waste materials were imported from Italy and dumped at Koko in present-day Delta state. Radiologists reported that the radio-activity rate of the waste read 100 degrees 50 km to Koko and 200 degrees in Koko itself, considering the dump to be highly lethal. Nana, on whose land the toxic was dumped earned a monthly revenue of 500 Naira (*Newswatch*, 1988:40). Recently, a vessel operated by American President Lines, APL, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Singapore-based Neptune Orient Lines, that had in its hold, among other things, 70 storage (lead) batteries classified

as Basel code A1180 and broken television sets, was captured at the Tin Can Island Port Customs Command, after it had discharged some of its toxic waste on 9 April, 2010 at the Federal Ocean Terminal at Onne in Rivers State (Oritse and Bivbere, 2010).

The porous borders have continually threatened the development of the Nigerian textile industry. For example, despite the country's huge potentials in the fabric industry, the borders have continually witnessed influx of low quality materials into the country. Analysis has it that Nigeria is continuously becoming a dumping ground for Asian products which are selling two-thirds the ex-factory price of Nigerian made fabrics (*Analysis*, September 2003:19). Most of these smuggled or "imported" textiles are not only four times the quantity of the locally produced textiles; most of them do not pay the prescribed imported duty, which makes it possible for the goods to flood the market. For example, in 2001 alone, 20,000 containers of textile materials from Asia came into Nigeria, representing two billion meters of fabrics. As at 2003, the total production in Nigeria was 500 million meters (*Analysis*, September 2003:19).

Apart from the fact that these were goods that were on the proscribed list of importation, most were stuffed with weapons – both small and light arms and kitchen utensils.

Table 1: Table of Weapons seized around the country's Border

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
	Arms and Ammunition		
a.	AK 47 rifles	3	
b.	G3 Rifles	3	
c.	Locally	7	
d.	Russian pistol	1	
e.	9mm ammunition	8	
f.	7.65 //	24	
g.	AK 47 //	774	
h.	Locally made single barrel	5	
i.	Single barrel rifles	2	

Source: Madugu, N.M. (2006). "Protection of Nigeria's Maritime Strategic Installations: The Role of the Nigerian Navy." Paper submitted to the Department of Joint Studies, Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji; *See also*, Barkindo B.M and Lipede, A, (ed), (2007). *Human Trafficking and Economic Crimes Across Nigeria's International Borders.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Along the Atlantic coast, smuggling of arms and ammunitions have continued unabated. In addition, the phenomenon of sea piracy and robbery has reached a level whereby foreign ship operators feared trenchancy on Nigerian waters. The International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre reported that between 2003 and 2004, about 50 shipping mariners were killed worldwide. Out of this number, 15 mariners were killed in Nigeria in 2003 alone. In 2004, 30 others were killed in Nigeria and the Malacca Strait (Barkindo, 2007: 216).

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN AND ACROSS THE BORDERS

In 2003, the security operatives that fought cross-border crimes especially child trafficking and forced labour discovered in the western states of Nigeria, child slave camps. About 116 children from age 4 to 13 years were rescued from these camps. The camp owners later revealed that the children were smuggled into the country through the border of Benin Republic and were brought in sacks (JDP/Caritas, 2009).

In the eastern part of the country, even with specific reference to Ebonyi and Enugu states, child trafficking is very lucrative, as children are both trafficked to neighbouring states and even outside the country. Internally, there are recorded cases of children trafficked from Edo and Cross Rivers states in the south, to Ogun and Ondo states in the west, to work in rubber plantations. Recently, a large consignment of children was intercepted in Jos, Plateau state, as they were being transported to Kano (*TELL*, September, 2007:14).

In the first week of March 2005, over 100 children were rescued from traffickers in two separate incidents, while on 4 March, 2005, the immigration authorities monitoring Nigeria's border with Togo Republic intercepted a truck carrying 52 children. Among the four suspects arrested was a clergyman (UNICEF, Nigeria, 2005). On 5 March, 2005, policemen intercepted a refrigerated truck containing 64 severely dehydrated children from Mokwa in Niger state, passing through Lagos to unknown destinations where they would work as domestic servants. Between 2004 and 2006, NAPTIP repatriated 757 child victims. According to the UNICEF 2007 Report, about 1,475 children (about 80% girls and 20% boys) were rescued from traffickers. In January 2008, about 105 children were returned to their parents; these children were discovered in a lorry as they were being trafficked to serve as beggars and servants. It was discovered that the children were given to the 'strangers' with the promise of feeding and educating them. On 8 October, 2008, BBC reported that the police raided a private hospital in Enugu in connection with what was described as "Baby Farm". Seven pregnant teenagers were rescued. It was discovered that the supposed hospital was notorious for abducting pregnant women, keeping them till they give birth and sell the babies for about 15,000 Naira ($127, £72) (JDP/Caritas, 2009).

ILLEGAL BUNKERING AND CRUDE OIL THEFT

The porous nature of the borders has also encouraged illegal bunkering and crude oil theft, especially in the Niger Delta area of the country. This has contributed to the great financial losses being experienced by the federal government. Illegal bunkering involves transfer of petroleum from one or more vessels to others without obtaining approval from the appropriate authorities. On the other hand, crude oil theft is stealing crude from the pipelines, manifolds or through any other illegal means. In 1999 alone, for instance, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) recorded about 497 cases of pipeline vandalisation across the country, which seriously undermined the corporation's effort at ensuring regular supply of fuel to the public. Also, in September 2001, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) recorded 1,336 cases of destruction of its oil installations (Nzelu, 2002:5). In 2001 and 2002, SPDC lost 858,572,000.00 and 751,127,000.00 US Dollars respectively as a result of the activities smugglers, illegal bunkerers and vandals (SPDC, 2003). According to Shell 2005 annual report, the loss

Table 2: Details of arrest and seizures made by Eastern Naval Command in 2005.

Serial (a)	Designation (b)	Number (c)	Remarks (d)
1.	**Person Arrested**		
	a. Illegal bunkering	210	Handed over to police
	b. Pirates/Sea robber	19men	"
	c. Militant youths	9	"
	d. Hijackers	20	"
	e. Pipeline vandals	13	"
	f. Human traffickers	3	"
2.	**Seizures**		
	a. Barges	50	5 partially submerged
	b. Tug boats	6	3 partially submerged
	c. Worden boats	20	
	d. Self propelled barges	4	
	e. Speed boat	6	
	f. Outboard engine	40	
3.	Arrested vessels	6	
4.	Trucks and cars	22	

Source: Madugu, N.M. (2006). "Protection of Nigeria's Maritime Strategic Installations: The Role of the Nigerian Navy." Paper submitted to the Department of Joint Studies, Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji.

was between 1000,000 and 200,000 barrels per day. Current, SPDC daily losses to crude oil theft and illegal bunkering is estimated at 40,000 barrel per day. From the period 2000-2005, huge losses were recorded by the SPDC. For example, in 2000, daily production losses amounted to 145,000 barrels; in 2001, it was 148,000 barrels; 2002 recorded 150,000 barrels; 2003 was 155,000 barrels. It was only in 2004 and 2005 that the least losses were recorded, i.e. 90,000 barrels and 40,000 barrels respectively (*The Week,* 11 October, 2004). When quantified in monetary terms, this is large enough to have been used for many development projects.

A very good example was the case of oil bunkering and bunkerers in and around the Lagos axis. In December 2006, over 260 people died as a result of a fire outbreak around the Abule Egba area in Lagos, while the bunkerers were scooping fuel. In some instances, they blew up major oil pipeline as in the case of 8 May, 2007 blow up of three major oil pipeline in Brass Local Government Area of Bayelsa state.

Piracy

Piracy is a menace to Nigeria's maritime industry and it constitutes a serious threat to Nigeria's maritime interest. According to International Maritime Organization (IMO) 2004 report, about 50 percent of reported cases of piracy incidents in West Africa occurred on Nigerian waters. In 2004, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) based in Kuala Lumpur, classified Nigerian waters as high-risk for seafarers, only better than the Strait of Malacca and Somali waters. In 2004, 13 percent of piracy which took place were at anchorage and 44 percent while streaming, the remaining were alongside. The activities of these unscrupulous elements make the maritime environment unsafe for sea-farers. These people have really affected oil and gas production. To be able to achieve this, people involved have turned the area into mass importer of illegal arms and ammunitions. This is clear from both oral and documented evidence in arms discovered in various parts of the Niger Delta, where these arms are now being used against the state. From available evidence, it is obvious that trade in arms which gets into the country through the porous borders is a booming business. It is now an established fact that between 2003 and 2004, the illegal bunkerers and oil barons paid 6.5 million, 4.5 million and 13.24 million, 11.86 million Naira on arms. Also, during this period a new AK-47 with two magazines sold for approximately USD 1,700 and a 200 round machine gun went for USD 7,400 – a relatively inflated price that indicates that the demand is very high and the business lucrative in Nigeria (Asari, 2007).

The activities of armed gangs along Nigerian borders mostly comprising youths is becoming alarming. These involve around kidnappings, bunkering, attacking village industries, as well as destruction of infrastructure. In response,

Table 3: Pirates and Sea robbery attacks on ships in Nigerian water in 2004

S/N (a)	Date/ Time (b)	Vessel Attacked (c)	Location of Vessel (d)	Incident (e)	Action Taken (f)
1.	22 Mar 04 0935	Fishing Trawler MFV STAR SHRIMP ER	13 nm off Bonny Anchorage	Vessel attacked by armed pirates shooting in to the air	Crew of trawler hauled up the fishing net, attacker escaped
2.	23 Mar 04 1030	MT ALMAK	Chanomi Creek	Vessel hijacked fuel siphoned	Foreign agents reported to Nig Embassy, NNS DELTA informed 3x boats with troops deployed. Attacking youths escaped
3.	9 Apr 04 0630	MFV STAR SHRIMP ERXV	11 nm off Forcados River	Armed attack On vessel	Crew of trawler fired Parachute flares in to the air. Pirates left unsuccessful. Hull of vessel holed by bullets.
4.	12 Apr 04	MFV LILY II	18.6 nm off Forcados river	Violent armed attack by pirates operating in a sea boat	Crew scared pirates by firing rocket Parachutes Hull of fishing vessel riddled with bullets from pirates.
5.	16 Jul 05 0200	MFV ORC II NO. 500	Off Lagos	Vessel attacked. Ship's equipment and personal effects seized	Case reported to NHQ commend advised to investigate and step up Patrols.
6.	5 Aug 04 2030	MF VLILLY III	11.5 nm off Bonny Oil Terminal	13-man gang attacked ship, injured two persons. Navigation and personal belongings stolen.	FOC EAST directed to carry out detailed investigation incident
7.	23 sep 04 0445	MT BELA	3 nm off Bonny Ancho-rage	Two armed pirates boarded during STS transfer of POL. One person injured	Pirates escaped FOC WEST directed to investigate

8.	27 Oct 04 2030	AFV COSMOS VII	13nm off Bonny Oil Terminal	Ship attacked from a boat. Shot and injured 2 persons	FOC EAST directed to investigate and intensify patrol of area.
9.	25 Nov 04	MT ALLEGRA	At Lagos anchorage	15 pirates approached in 2 seaboats and attacked. Robbed ship	FOC WEST directed to investigate and report. Also to intensify patrol of area to forestall future occurrence.
10	02 Dec 04 0130	MT AWERO	Lagos Roadstead	12-man gang armed gang attacked ship captain injured. Ships money and crew personal belongings seized.	FOC WEST directed By NHQ to investigate and intensify patrol around general area
11	13 Dec 04	MV SNOWMA SS	5.3 nm south of Logos FWB	Vessel attacked by gang with Knives at anchorage. Crews overpowered pirates.	FOC WEST directed by NHQ to investigate and intensify patrol around general area.
12	15 Dec 04 0210	MV ZONGAU	Lagos Roadstead	Pirated attacked and boarded vessels	FOC WEST directed by NHQ to investigate and intensify patrol around general area

Source: Madugu, N.M. (2006). Protection of Nigeria's Maritime Strategic Installations: The Role of the Nigerian Navy. Paper submitted to the Department of Joint Studies, Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji.

instead of addressing the issue squarely through the provision of employment opportunities and other basic infrastructures that would keep the youths busy, government's response to use military efforts and actions to calm the situation and round up those involved have proved largely ineffective, brutal and counter-productive. Instead, this has led to the abuse of human rights as well as widening the schism between local population and the federal government. The situation does not only threaten the hospitality culture of Nigeria, but also the corporate existence of the country.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the vastness of the country's border, its porous nature as well as the inability to effectively monitor it (due to inadequate human and material resources) is fast becoming problematic for both the people and government of Nigeria. This has been summed up by a former Comptroller-General of Customs, Jacob Buba Gyang,

A situation where you send a Customs officer to the border, he has no vehicle, he has no rifle, has no accommodation, the only house he can get to rent is that which belongs to the smugglers, how do you want him to be effective? (Ubani, 2004:31).

This is a very serious issue that should attract urgent attention, for the security of lives and properties are to be taken seriously. This is because for the security operatives to function effectively there is need to equip them with modern crime combating equipment. It is a fact that until recently, the security operatives at Jibia border post would have to go to Katsina to make telephone when it is necessary. In the case of Ilela in Sokoto, it is very difficult to communicate with the security operatives, as the reception is always poor. Apart from the issue of security, the country loses millions of Naira to the activities of smugglers across the borders.

Table 4: Statistics of Goods seized around the borders from 2002-2005

Year	No. of seizures	Value (₦)	Duty Rate (₦)	Duty paid Value (₦)	No of vehicle involved	No. of period Arrested
2002	2,137	1,325,747,163.64	625,722,259.82	1,989,909,423.38	1,387	70
2003	2,605	3,563,211,128.67	1,612,038,570.52	5,175,249,699.19	1823 + 8 canoes	59
2004	2,342	7,997,109,976.60	3,506,698,405.04	11,508,808,381.64	921	148
Jan-July 2005	1,642	2,804,664,192.04	1,776,755,635.81	4,581,419,823.85	762	105

Source: Barkindo, B.M. and Lipede, A. (2007). (ed). *Human Trafficking and Economic Crimes Across Nigeria's International Borders.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Table 5

S/N	Types of Commodity	Total Seizure	Value	Duty	Duty paid value (DPU)₦
1.	Arms and Ammunition	2	9,230,162.00	6,579846.00	15,816,008.00
2.	Frozen poultry	59	27,357,560.70	18,656,015.70	46,013,576.85
3.	Vehicles	650	347,308,717,10	133,942,756.58	481,251,423.68
4.	General Merchandise	458	970,248,368.45	671,217,464.10	1,641,465,832.55

Source: Barkindo, B.M. and Lipede, A. (2007). (ed.) *Human Trafficking and Economic Crimes Across Nigeria's International Borders.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Recommendations

Generally, it is important to note that human security means safety of people. It is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives (Hubert, 2001). It is pertinent to stress that a human security approach is not synonymous with humanitarian action. Instead, it highlights the need to address the root cause of insecurity and to help ensure people's future safety. It is, therefore, in line with this that the so-called security votes should be channelled into the provision of adequate security for the people, the family and the nation's borders. Thus, human and national security provides an enabling environment for human development. It is enhanced by reducing people's vulnerability and preventing the conditions which made them vulnerable in the first place. This will go a long way in improving the human security of citizens strengthens the legitimacy, stability, and security of a state (Akindele and Bassey, 2001:162).

REFERENCES

Adejo, P.Y. (2005). "Crime and Cross-border Movement of Weapons: The Case of Nigeria", in Anatole A and Ibrahima Sall; (2005) (ed). *Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa.* United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva.

Wolfers, Arnold (1969). *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics,* Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

Dokubo Asari (2007). "Dear Diary; This is Asari" *National Standard,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 15 November.

Asiwaju, A.I. and O.J. Igue (eds.) (1988). *The Nigeria-Benin Trans-border Cooperation,* Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

Asiwaju, A.I. and B.M. Barkindo (1989). *The Nigeria-Niger Trans-border Cooperation,* Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited.

Asiwaju, A.I. (2003). Boundaries and African Intergration: Essay in Comparative History and Policy Analysis, Lagos: Panaf.

Ate, B. and B. Akinterinwa (1992). *Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbour: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s.* Lagos, Nigerian Institute for International Affairs.

Barkindo B.M. and A. Lipede (ed). (2007). *Human Trafficking and Economic Crimes Across Nigeria's International Borders.* Ibadan, Spectrum Books Limited.

Department of Statistics/Operations Nigeria Customs Service. H.Q. Abuja. August 2005.

Don Hubert (2001). "Human Security: Safety for People in a changing world," in Akindele, R. and Bassey, E. (eds) *Beyond Conflict Resolution: Managing African Security in the 21st Century.* Ibadan: Vantage Publishers.

Stewart, Francis (2006). "Development and Security in the 21st Century." Paper presented at Annual Conference for Global Development, Pennsylvania.

Gaultung, J. (1982). *Environment, Development and Military Activity: Towards Alternative Security Doctrine.* London: Boston Press.

Hans Morgenthu (1978). *Politics Among Nations.* New York: Knops Press.

Holsti, K.J. (1974). *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis.* London: Prentice Hall.

Imobighe, T.A. (1983). "National Security Linkages." A Seminar Paper presented at Social Science Open Lecture, University of Jos.

JDP/Caritas (2009). *The Nigerian Child: Hope for the Future.* Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, Abuja.

Kwanashie, G. et al (1987). *A Little New Light: Selected Historical Writings of Abdullahi Smith.* Zaria: Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research.

Madugu, N.M. (2006). "Protection of Nigeria's Maritime Strategic Installations: The Role of the Nigerian Navy." Paper submitted to the Department of Joint Studies, Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji.

Okoduwa, A. (1997). (ed). *Studies in Esan History and Culture.* Benin City: Omo-Uwessan Publishers Ltd.

Onah, M. (2010). "Trans-border Bandits Wade War on Adamawa Communities" *ThisDay,* Vol. 15, No. 5414, 17 February.

Oritse, G. and G. Bivbere (2010). "Toxic waste ship arrested in Lagos". *Vanguard,* 16 April.

Otoabasi, A. (2006). "Conflicts and Crisis in the Management and conflict Resolution." A paper presented at the National Congress of Historical Society of Nigeria, University of Jos, 1-5 June.

Robert, Mandel (1994). *The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis.* London: Greenwood Press.

McNamara, Robert (1968). *The Essence of Security.* London: Hodder and Stoughton.

TELL (2007). "How Military and Criminal Turn Hostage Taking to Lucrative Business," No. 51, 17 December.

TELL (2007). "The Booming Trade in Women and Children," No. 39, 24 September.

Usman, Y.B. and A. Abba (2005). The Misrepresentation of Nigeria: The Facts and The Figures. CEDDERT. Zaria.

UNDP (1994). *Human Development Report.*

Vogts, M.A. (1990). "Nigeria's Defence Policy: An Overview", in Ekoko, A.E. and M.A. Vogt (1990). *Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems.* Lagos: Malthouse Press.

Walter Jones (1985). *The Logic on International Relations.* Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.

http:/www.wikopeadiaq/security/national/human/development/ng. nig. org
http:/www.oil/nigetrdelta/development/poverty/hostagetaking.ng.org
http:/www.marsh/securityrisk/nigerdelta.org

Historicising Development Policies in Nigeria Up to 2010: An Anatomy of External Occasions for Nigeria's Economic Backwardness

OLISA GODSON MUOJAMA

35

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the World Bank described Nigeria as a paradox. The paradox was that the poverty level in Nigeria contradicts the country's immense wealth. Among other things, Nigeria is enormously endowed with human, agricultural, petroleum, gas, and large untapped solid mineral resources. Particularly worrisome is that the country earned over US$300 billion from one resource – petroleum – during the last three decades of the 20th century. But rather than record remarkable progress in national socio-economic development, Nigeria retrogressed into becoming one of the 25 poorest countries at the threshold of 21st century, whereas she was among the 50 richest in the early 1970s.[1] The increasing incidence of poverty, both within and among locations, was in spite of the various resources and efforts exerted on poverty-related programmes and scheme in the country, thus suggesting that the programmes and schemes were ineffective and ineffectual.[2]

In the survey carried out in Nigeria and Chad, it was concluded that children in these countries still face unacceptably high mortality from preventable diseases.[3] Similarly, maternal mortality ratio in Nigeria is one of the highest in the world.[4] In the urban areas, instances abound wherein women die in the hands of good medical doctors only because they do not have the money to pay. In the rural areas, the disaster is expanding more quickly for want of the basic necessities of modern life: pipe-borne water, electric power supply, road communication, and schools for children. High maternal mortality in Nigeria, estimated to be 1,000 per 100,000 births, will not go away as long as these three fundamental issues prevail: mass poverty with gross inequalities, unbooked emergencies, and illiteracy which bestrides and underlies both.[5] Using disability-adjusted life expectancy, or DALE, which measures the equivalent number of years of life expected to be lived in full health, average life expectancy in Nigeria has been put at 38.3 years, making it to be one of the lowest in the world.[6]

To be sure, basic life dimensions outlined by Friedman[7] as the measure of economic growth are poorly developed in Nigeria. For instance, evidence have shown that people do not live long in Nigeria due to many, albeit preventable, circumstances and diseases. The percentage of Nigerians who have a roof over their heads is no doubt low, and those who have do not have adequate indoor plumbing and sanitation. Added to this is the high level of illiteracy, and superstition which is widespread among various strata, including even the educated. Most basic necessities of life are not in play for a good number of the citizens. All these situations of economic underdevelopment have affected negatively social attitudes and public policies. The moral benefits accruing from economic growth (such as political and social reforms which allows for possibility of economic mobility and fairness and provide the substance for democracy) are elusive in Nigeria.

However, these problems are not sudden occurrences, but accumulate over the years in spite of "efforts" by various administrations in Nigeria since independence. The big question, therefore, is, Why have these situations of underdevelopment persisted in spite of the so-called efforts, development plans and policies as well as development aids from foreign institutions in the forms of manpower, expertise and finance?

Earlier attempts at answering these questions have emphasised bad leadership, corruption, and ethnicity. All these factors are true, internal and endogenous. In this paper, attempt is made at shifting the buck in a rather different direction. Although internal factors have contributed to these problems, there are considerable share of external and exogenous factors in the causation. These external factors include the dynamics of the capitalist world economy, neo-colonialism, unequal exchange, and particularly the actions and inactions of the BrettonWoods institutions (World Bank and

IMF), their policy drives and the conditionalities given to the developing countries that need their financial aid for development projects. These conditionalities are often incompatible and incongruous with the country's development needs, but in line with the general policy changes of the World Bank in its global operations. Thus, the stagnation or dwindling of economic development in Nigeria, as is the case with various African countries, in spite of the aid, financial and technical, coming from these institutions, is partly due to this incongruity and incompatibility of some of these institution's policies with the sociology of the country.

DEVELOPMENT POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

The term "development" has been used in various ways by different schools of thought. It is a multi-dimensional process, one that changes the economy, polity, and society of the countries in which it occurs.[8] According to Kuznets,

> development requires high rates of growth of per capita income, Gross national Product (GNP), of population and of total factor productivity (especially labours productivity). It also requires high rate of social, ideological and political transformation (through modernisation). It involves increase rationality, planning, equality, equality and improved institutions and attitudes. It also requires greater international economic links through increase exports and greater international influence.[9]

Development means progress in a range of areas. It must mean economic progress, as well as the fulfilment of basic human needs – material, emotional and cerebral. Economic progress requires growth, structural change and distributive equity.[10]

"The advent of capitalism in the 15th and 16th centuries, however, and above all the advent of industrial capitalism in the late 18th century, forced the fact of human economic, social, political and cultural development on people's attention. Various thinkers, from Condorcet to Kant, began to conceive of a 'universal history' which would disclose the cumulative pattern and meaning of it all, and its ultimate destination; but the decisive innovators were, of course, Hegel and Marx."[11] While Hegel saw world history as a process of development, ('a progression to the better'), Marx also saw history as progress, as a series of modes of production, each disclosing a higher level than before of the uniquely human capacity for self-realisation, and succeeding each other through the working out of contradictions in their inner dynamics.

Whether development should be guided by human agency or should be left to operate independently has been a matter of debate. According to Stolper, "Economic development and deliberate policy to accelerate its pace are relatively recent concepts, but the facts of development and economic policies to bring it about are, of course, ancient. Mercantilist, Colbertian, cameralist,

Smithian policies, all had in mind what now is called development."[12] However, the idea of planning was not unknown to economists; the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto had written about a fully planned economy, and another Italian economist, Enrico Barone, had taken Pareto's speculations much further.[13]

But the idea that an economy could be controlled like a machine was foreign to much of 19th-century thought. Marx never discussed it with any seriousness since, for him, the economy was a self-regulating process.

All this was to change as a result of the outbreak of the World War I. Isolation was forced upon the German economy, almost from the first day. Germany was very dependent on raw-material imports, and did not have an imperial network on which it could rely. Walter Rathenau, a dynamic young businessman, proposed to the German military authorities on the second day of the war that they should allocate the scarce raw materials in a properly coordinated way. He was immediately absorbed into the German war machine, and became its first central planner. Rethenau's efforts inaugurated a practical experience in planned allocation of resources. The Germans called their experience of a planned was economy 'war socialism'.[14]

In France, the exigencies of the war as well as the temper of the times, were important factors in determining the formation of policies. *Laissez-faire* and free trade, the dogmas of the classical economists, were being supplanted by state interventionism and protectionism. The basic theory of national economics, that national economic strength is measured by state aid, was gaining ground.[15]

In Britain, the alternative method of mobilising resources was, of course, that of direct control, whereby the government would take possession of the goods and services which it needed, and allocate them to different uses according to the system of priorities based on its own estimates of its military need.[16] The mechanism of the market would be practically superseded and the stimulus to change would not be a movement in relative prices but the fiat of the responsible official. There was no one at this time to present the theoretical case for direct state action, and the controlled economy was not seen and planned as a whole, but allowed to grow subject to regulation, as specific needs arose.

The war also involved the government of the United States in the nation's economic life on an unprecedented scale. The interventions included direct controls over production, labour and foreign trade, food rationing and a complete takeover of railways and shippings.[17]

Such in very brief outline were the ways in which governments influenced economic life during the war other than the operation of the market. Although liberalism was restored after the war, the Great Depression of the 1930s also gave rise to another form of economic policies and planning. Orthodox neo-

classical economic theory with its faith in free market or *laissez-faire* capitalism as the mechanism of economic equilibrium could provide no solution to the mass unemployment of and pessimism of the time. It was at this decisive moment in the history of capitalism that John Maynard Keynes produced his celebrated *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936), in which he advocates government's active role in the economy in contrast to the passivity advocated by the neo-classical theory of the free market.[18] State expenditure is also the key to economic recovery. This will stimulate demand and create a ripple effect on the economy. Keynes had given governments a perfect reason to do what they loved to do but were afraid of doing: borrow for public spending. It was three years after Keynes publication that the World War II broke out. Thus, Keynesianism became the economic ideology of de-globalised capitalism, a method of managing capitalism in order to overcome its contradictions. Keynesian theory was at the bottom of the Bretton Woods arrangement of 1944.

Since World War II, economic development has become a major consideration of policy, whatever the state of economic theory concerning it.[19] Governments in other parts of the world – Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and some European countries as well – have become increasingly 'development minded.' A good many of these countries have embarked on the preparation and execution of economic plans.[20]

The development theory which emerged in the 1950s was to deal with a far narrower issue: namely, how the economies of the colonies of Britain, France, Portugal and other European powers, colonies comprising some 28 percent of the world's population, might be transformed and made more productive as decolonisation approached, in the context of the still 'semi-colonial' condition of the former colonies of Latin America (accounting for a further 7 percent).[21]

The first formulations of development theory were the work of economists, all strongly influenced by the ideas of Keynes and the wartime and post-war practices of state intervention in the economy, including the perceived success of the Marshal Plan, which was in many ways a model for later ideas about 'aid'. They shared the broad social-democratic ethos of the period, including its commitment to planning and its conviction that economic problems would yield to the actions of benevolent states endowed with sufficient supplies of capital and armed with good economic analysis. They produce what Preston has aptly called development theory's 'positivist orthodoxy'. They wrote development plans for both newly independent countries and not yet independent colonies of Africa, based on the idea of raising rural productivity and transferring under-utilised labour out of agriculture into industry.

However, the abandonment of the post-war international trading regime was followed in 1979-80 by the abandonment of the Keynesian economic

policy.[22] Capitalism once again becomes global. This is the new era of neo-liberalism in which development planning would be abolished and government would privatise the public sector, reduce the scale of government spending and give up all policies, from exchange rate controls to subsidies and re-distributive taxation that alter any price that would otherwise be set by the impersonal forces of the market.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN NIGERIA UP TO 1960

The idea of economic development in underdeveloped countries is a concept of relatively recent origin. There was no deliberate policy of developing Nigeria from Amalgamation in 1914;[23] but then, it was not considered the proper role of government to provide economic development at home by the colonial powers. The general policies were, however, clear enough: peace and efficient administration; the gradual supply of what has come to be known as social overhead; the expansion of trade. Most important, the resources for all these things had overwhelmingly to come from within the colonies.[24]

The first change towards a deliberate development policy, as we understand this today, came with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1929[25], but the great depression, combated everywhere by deflation and retrenchment, cut short any substantial aid to the colonies. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 substantially enlarged the scope of assistance to colonies, both as to amounts involved and as to the schemes eligible for loan or grant financing, but like its predecessor it did not get off the ground, this time because of World War II.

It was after World War II that the world became interested in development issues such that economic development planning began. In Nigeria, deliberate development really got started only with the third act of 1946 that made £120 million available to all colonies for the ten fiscal years ending 31 March, 1956. As the result of this act, each colony was asked to produce a 10-year development plan. Nigeria's plan envisaged expenditures of £55 million (out of a total of £180 million for all seventeen colonies that submitted a plan), of which £23 million were to come from funds provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. In 1948, a Select Committee of the House of Commons made a critique of the plan, pointing out that "the allocation of expenditure on the 10-Year Plan . . . does not give anything like a complete picture of the future development of the territory. The Plan does not propound a complete strategy of development; it is merely an aggregate of proposals for spending money . . ."[26]

The experience with the 10-Year Plan of 1945 led to a revision for the years 1951-1956, but with impending regionalisation a new approach was needed. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was

invited at the request of the governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom. The task of the mission, as agreed upon by the two governments and the bank, was to assess the resources available for future development, to study the possibilities for development in the major sectors of the economy and to make recommendations for practical steps to be taken, including the timing and co-ordination of developmental activities[27] as well as to make an economic survey in 1953, which in turn led to four government programmes for the years 1955-1960. Alkali puts it in a more graphic way and arrives at the same conclusion, "five years before Nigeria attained independence, the World Bank sponsored and undertook a critical study on the Nigerian economy entitled the *Economic Development of Nigeria* and made critical examination of the structure of the Nigerian economy and its prospects in the years ahead".[28]

This report on Nigeria[29] was significant considering that it was the first report by the International Bank on an African country, and Nigeria, with a population of 32 million, was both by far the largest British colony.[30] The mission proposed an appreciable expansion of government activity and suggested approximate doubling of government expenditure on both capital and current account over the 5-year period 1955-60 covered by its development plan. Substantially, increased government expenditure was suggested on medical and health services, education, certain administrative services, and various agricultural and industrial projects, ranging from agricultural research and extension work through loans and grants for various industrial enterprises to government participation in a hotel in Lagos. It would be striking to see the same Wold Bank turn around in the 1980s to recommend government withdrawal and cut on expenditure on public utilities.

However, this marked the first involvement of a Bretton Woods institution in economic development of Nigeria. The second imprint was made in 1958, when the World Bank granted a loan of $28.0m to Nigeria in order to extend railway to Bornu,[31] most especially from Gombe to Maiduguri.[32] That was the last loan sought by the colonial government of Nigeria before independence in 1960.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN NIGERIA, 1960-2010

The mood on the eve of the development plan, the structure, objectives as well as the achievements and critique of the plans have been done by various analysts. Thus, there may not be enough space for them in this peace. The main aim is to expose the continuously external and exogenous contents and determinants of the developmental process of Nigeria since independence. In summary, the 1962-68 Plan stressed three priority areas: agriculture, industry and the development of high-level and intermediate manpower.

The 1962-68 Plan represents the first comprehensive effort at development planning in independent Nigeria. However, it should be noted that "in 1960, at independence, Nigeria still had on its payroll a large number of British colonial officials in key positions in government. For instance, in each region, the permanent secretary, Ministry of Finance, was expatriate; if he was a Nigerian, the next in line to him would often be expatriate".[33] What this means is that the degree of participation of Nigerians or, put in more current term, the local content in the development plan, is in doubt. To be sure, The Ministry of Economic Development (at the federal level) and Planning (in the regions) were manned by Nigerian permanent secretaries, but they also employed – seconded to them under an arrangement with the Ford Foundation – economists and technicians sent to help them in framing and articulating the Plan. At Central government level, there was an economist on loan from the World Bank, one Mr Prasad who was attached to the Prime Minister's Office as Economic Adviser, and there were economists – Professor Wolfang Stolper, and Dr Lyle Hasen – attached as advisers to the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and working out of Economic Planning Unit. At the regional level, there were also Ford Foundation-supported economists.[34] Foreign experts, therefore, took charge of the organisation of the economic aggregates which served as a basis for the macro-economic policies; they also defined the targets in macro-economic terms, thereby influencing the formulation of the overall objectives.

This was so because in 1960, there were very few Nigerians who had advanced training either in economics or in planning. Of those who were qualified, few were in government; the new universities were all scouting for professional economists to absorb into the fledgling departments of economics. Under those circumstances, although the ministries were supposedly run by Nigerian ministers, and in some cases, Nigerian permanent secretaries, the technical professional cadres were filled by non-Nigerians who were in the service of the federal governments and the regional governments. The interactions necessary to establish the macro-economic variables such as balance of payments, national income, investment, consumption, etc. were carried out by the foreign experts, while their Nigerian collaborators helped with the collection of the raw data.

In terms of the objectives of the plan, it was a reflection of the Keynesian economic theory that dominated the world economy of the post-war period. This was characterised by a mixed economy, a democratic competitive capitalist system with emphasis on growth. It also included government spending in public utilities even if it leads to deficit financing. That the plan sought to achieve the highest possible standard of living is evidence of this global economic climatic ethos in the independence development plan of Nigeria, dominated by foreign expertise familiar with Keynesian theory. In

this way the decision-maker's view of development in 1962-68 was very much the same as in the 1945-56 Plan. It meant the provision of water, clinics and health facilities, roads (particularly rural feeder roads) and schools (particularly primary and secondary schools). In agriculture, while there was some emphasis on food production, the main attention of the governments was concentrated on what were called 'cash' crops, namely export crops as was the case in the colonial period. This is evidence of colonial hang-over, characteristic of the colonial officials who were still in the employ of the Nigerian government after independence, instead of industrialisation which should enhance economic growth.

That the government borrowed from the World Bank to finance the projects is another evidence of external content and control of the development process of Nigeria. Foreign aid is an instrument for the promotion of the domestic exports of the donor country. The projects that attract offers of aid are often those that promote the exports of the donor country. In many instances, the project itself may have very little importance in the scheme of the recipient local authorities. Thus, projects rise in the priority ladder not because they have become important in themselves but because some donors have been pressing their offers on the department of government. Identical offers were made to all the Nigerian governments, federal and state, separately but simultaneously by the same donor countries. None of the donor countries were interested in financing a programme so that Nigeria could decide for herself on what projects to apply the aid. The issue of such aid was, therefore, left to the multilateral agencies like the World Bank which showed interest mainly in the large schemes like the Kainji Dam or Iron and Steel Complex for finance on commercial terms. The International Development Association showed interest in social development schemes like education on which soft loans were required. Alkali corroborates this evidence,

> Over the years, since the Wold Bank extended its first loan to Nigeria, it has made three distinct shifts in its lending operations in Nigeria with each shift resulting from and being part of the general policy changes of the World Bank in its global operations. These phases which overlap each other can be broadly categorised into three namely: infrastructural development, agricultural development, and Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL). Firstly, in the early 1960s, indeed up to 1970, the World Bank lending to Nigeria concentrated mainly on the areas of highway transport, sea ports, telecommunications, and electricity energy.

What this means is that the direction to which the loans should be channelled were not determined by the Nigerian government, but by the donor countries and institutions, to the detriment of the real development needs of the country.

The unrest and uncertainty of 1966 and the civil war that followed in 1967 had a disruptive effect on agricultural production in Nigeria as a large chunk of labour was channelled towards war effort. It also resulted in the slackening of investment activity and a fall in the rate of GDP growth. The war which ended in 1970 drained Nigeria's resources and disrupted the proper implementation of the First National Development Plan of 1962-1968 and led the extension of the plan to 1969.

The end of the civil war in 1970 was followed by the Second National Development Plan (1970-1974) which was concerned primarily with the requirements of reconstruction and rehabilitation and which was under the administration of the military government. The objectives of the Plan included "a united, strong and self-reliant nation" and ultimately welfare of the individuals, inter alia. The 1962-68 Plan had stressed three priority areas: agriculture, industry and the development of high-level and intermediate manpower. The 1970-74 Plan reaffirmed these priorities. Within each category, the planners had to select projects and programmes of investment such as conformed to the criteria stated above. But the lion's share of the allocation in the 1970-74 Plan went to transport and communications – roads, waterways, and telecommunications. These represented 40.1 percent of federal government's capital programme compared with 32.5 percent in 1962-68. In the field of agriculture, there was a significant difference in the approach taken by the federal government in 1970 from the stand it took in the 1962-68 Plan. "Government established food production companies which have brought into cultivation more than 60,000 acres for the production of substantial quantities of food items such as rice, maize, cassava, etc".[35]

To demonstrate support to this plan, in July 1970, the World Bank extended to Nigeria a loan of $10.00m in order to finance industrial projects. There were almost dramatic increases in international obligations.[36]

In 1971, the second shift in lending operation of the World Bank commenced and centred on agriculture and rural development. According to Alkali, with the rise of the Green Revolution technology and politics of food, during the second 'Development Decade', agriculture became an arena of action for the World Bank.[37] For instance, in April 1971, Nigeria received $80:00m for "imports" [not for internal production] for post-war rehabilitation programme, while it received $7.20m in May 1971 for agriculture such as cocoa production rehabilitation, farm credit, training, studies for future production. In 1974, the bank sponsored four pilot enclave Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) in Funtua, Gombe and Gusau and two more were added in Lafiya, and Ayangba in 1977, all in the northern states.

It is clear from the figures of the loans that more money was devoted to importation of food from developed countries than for local production. These foodstuffs should come from the countries that control the donor

agencies, in this way creating market for the farmers in the developed economies and importing unemployment into Nigeria. At this time, Nigeria needed to rescue its agricultural sector which had been displaced by the oil sector. According to Obadan, "Up to the early 1970s, agricultural commodities were exported in appreciable quantities. From 1972, however, the export quantities of these commodities started to drop".[38]

Again that the World Bank provided money for agricultural purposes was not due to the need of the country in that direction but due to the shift in lending operation of the institution which had the Green Revolution and food politics as its central core.

In 1973, the oil boom set in. The boom was a windfall for Nigerian. While oil importing countries were in tough time, Nigeria and other oil exporting countries benefited. The gains that accompanied the oil boom increased the yearnings of Nigerians and appetite for more development initiatives. The Third National Development Plan of 1975-1980 which followed contains tinges of this optimism. This is because the overall strategy of the Third Development Plan was, first, to use the resources from oil to develop the productive capacity of the economy; and second, to lay the emphasis of policy on 'a more equitable distribution of incomes'[39] and to control inflation. The 1975-80 Plan recognised the problem of lack of redistributive equity: redistribution between the federal government and state governments, among the state governments, among political and economic regions, between the urban and rural sectors, among persons and households. 'It is necessary', states the 1975-1980 Plan, 'to recognise that about 70 per cent of the Nigerian population live in the rural areas and have benefited relatively little from the rapid economic growth of the past few years.'[40] In 1980, towards the end of the Third National Development Plan, the oil price began to fall, due to the alternatives to oil developed by the West. The direct effect of this was world recession. Because of heavy reliance on oil for revenue, after the displacement of agriculture, the Nigerian economy entered a period of crisis. Falling oil output and prices contributed to another noteworthy aspect of the economy in the 1980s – the decline in per capita real gross national product.

The Fourth National Development Plan 1981-1985 came into place during the period of the economic crisis. The new civilian administration installed on 1 October, 1979 was overthrown in 1983 before the end of the Development Plan. The general philosophy of the guidelines adopted in the outline of the development is more about people than about things. It criticised the focus on growth in the previous Plans as wrong and misconceived. 'True development must mean the development of man – the realisation of his creative potential, enabling him to improve his material conditions of living through the use of resources available to him.'[41]

The collapse of the crude petroleum trade and the resistance to the curb on imports of consumer as well as producer goods created a widening gap in the balance of payments, turning a surplus on current account of ₦1.3356 billion in 1980 to a deficit of ₦2.744 billion in 1985. At the same time as the external reserves were drying up and external indebtedness was pilling up, the government was embarking on expansionary fiscal policies as evidenced from the growth in domestic debt. Nigeria being a mono-economy since the oil boom could not even boast of agricultural production whose contribution to GNP growth between 1973 and 1984 was negative, i.e. -0.5 percent against 60 per cent contribution in 1960.[42]

In 1985, the Buhari's government, which overthrew the civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1983, was itself overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida, and the Fourth National Development Plan, which was to end in 1985, was further extended to allow the new government more time to study the problems left behind by the two preceding governments. Faced with severe disequilibrium in the balance of payments and a crushing debt service, the government of General Babangida took a number of drastic decisions regarding the direction of the economy. Under Shagari and Buhari, negotiations had been in progress with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for stand-by facilities to help Nigeria restructure the economy. The Babangida administration took the unprecedented step of throwing open to public debate the principle of the intervention of the IMF in the resolution of the Nigerian balance of payment crisis. The result of the debate rejected the IMF intervention and prescribed self-medication as an alternative course of action. Having put the IMF out of the way, the administration adopted its own several measures, with the advice of the IMF, namely: devaluation of the domestic currency, deregulation of imports and use of other measures than prohibition, to control import demand, liberalisation of external trade, reduction in government spending and in the rate of increase in money supply, removal of subsidies, etc. These measures represented a radical departure from the economic regime that had prevailed in the past generation; they sought to dismantle in one swoop the practices, habits and institutions of economic, commercial and financial administration of the past 30 years and open them up to the interaction of market forces. It threw out exchange control system previously in force and substituted a weekly auction by the Central Bank of available foreign exchange to be bidded for by the commercial and merchant banks denominated as official dealers. To safeguard the integrity of pre-existing international obligations the government promulgated the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market Decree 1986 creating two tiers of foreign exchange transactions.

This policy prescription was in tandem with the new global economic regime of neo-liberalism, resulting from the collapse of Keynesianism and

rejection of the BrettonWoods arrangement of the post-war era. By so doing, the BrettonWoods institutions changed their original objectives of government intervention to government withdrawal from the economy in line with new system of world economy based on neo-liberalism. According to Stiglitz,

> Over the years since its inception, the IMF has changed markedly. Founded on the belief that markets often worked badly, it now champions market supremacy with ideological fervor. Founded on the belief that there is a need for international pressure on countries to have more expansionary economic policies – such as increasing expenditures, reducing taxes, or lowering interest rates to stimulate the economy –today the IMF typically provides funds only if countries engage in policies like cutting deficits, raising taxes, or raising interest rates that lead to a contraction of the economy. Keynes would be rolling ever in his grave were he to see what has happened to his child. The most dramatic change in these institutions occurred in the 19109-80s, the era when Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher preached free market ideology in the United States and the United Kingdom. The IMF and the World Bank became the new missionary institutions, through which these ideas were pushed on the reluctant poor countries that often badly need their loans and grants. The ministries of finance in poor countries were willing to become converts, if necessary, to obtain the funds, through the vast majority of government officials . . .[43]

In September 1986, Nigeria formally introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the primary aim of which was to address and perhaps resolve the problems of rising debt, increased dependence on petroleum oil as the only major export commodity, to introduce reforms in the foreign exchange allocation, etc. According to Oresotu,

> Structural Adjustment Programme implies the elimination or reduction of the excessive controls which had been in vogue in the 1970s and 80s to levels that could sustain growth and development . . . The structural changes in the financial sector were designed to foster competition, strengthen the supervisory role of the regulatory authority, and streamline public sector relationship with the financial sector . . . The monetary policy reform measures have been designed to stabilise the economy in the short-run and to induce the emergence of market-oriented financial sector for effective mobilisation of savings and efficient resource allocation. A major element in the structural adjustment measures . . . was the adoption of trade and exchange liberalisation involving the establishment of a foreign exchange market, the elimination of exchange controls, quota restrictions on imports and import licensing. The country also rationalised the list of banned imported goods and revised downward its schedule of import duties.[44]

The lower spending of the 1980s was partly the result of SAP in effect

from 1986 to 1990, first mooted by the IMF and carried out under the auspices of the World Bank, which emphasised privatisation, market prices, and reduced government expenditures. This program was based on the principle that, as GDP per capita falls, people demand relatively fewer social goods (produced in the government sector) and relatively more private goods, which tend to be essential items such as food, clothing, and shelter.

Funds were released by the World Bank in order to help the Nigerian government cushion the severity of the effects of the recession, inaugurating the third phase of the shifts in World Bank lending operations in Nigeria, characterised by non-project and quick disbursing Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL). In November 1986, the World Bank approved the first loan of $452.0 million to support what the bank referred to as "Trade Policy and Export Development" in Nigeria.[45] There were other contributions in the area of policy prescription. In 1987, Ishrat Husain, the World Bank President Representative in Nigeria, wrote *Perspectives on the Nigerian Economy*, arguing that what Nigerian economy needed was the infusion of more foreign capital to enable the country cross what he described as the "debt hump". According to Alkali, Husain's book in fact turned out to be the blueprint for SAP launched by the Babangida government.[46] In 1989, the second loan of $952.0 million was approved by the World Bank and disbursed to Nigeria as part of the implementation of SAP. In addition, a number of other loans for business finance, small- and medium-scale enterprises and for privatisation were extended to Nigeria in the period 1986-1993, within the overall context of the adjustment programme. SAP no doubt had austere effects and social consequences on Nigeria. It complicated the debt crisis in which the country had entered and created unemployment.

Amidst this situation, the Fifth National Development Plan 1988-1992 came into place. "There were strong indications that the Federal Government will include major elements of the Programme [SAP] into Fifth National Development Plan."[47] However, this Plan did not take off until 1990. It was, therefore, to run for two years. This was because the life of the military government was scheduled to end in 1992 with a transition to civilian rule. It would, therefore, be judicious of the Fifth Plan to terminate with the military administration and thus give the incoming civilian administration an opportunity to promulgate its own plan. However, the civilian administration that was to take-off in 1992 would need time to evolve its own plan based on its own philosophy of development. The civilian administration never took off as the interim government was overthrown by the military administration of General Sani Abacha in 1993. Thus, the Fifth National Plan had no proper atmosphere to operate both nationally and internationally. According to the Central Bank, "the Nigerian labour market showed signs of further deterioration as the unemployment situation worsened owing to the slow-

down in the tempo of general economic activities experienced during the first half of 1993".[48] The slow pace of world economic recovery partly contributed to the low performance of Nigeria's economy during the first half of 1993. The vital sectors of the economy such as agriculture and manufacturing, continued to record low output, while industrial requirements unable to secure their raw material requirements locally continued to operate far below installed capacity. The depressed international crude oil price, with its implications for foreign exchange earnings, adversely affected government revenue projections for the period. This compelled the federal government to rely on increased borrowing from the banking system to meet some of its obligations.[49]

The 5-year rule of Abacha hardly produced a development Plan. It was more interested in establishing itself and dealing with its enemies and oppositions and grappling with all manner of sanction imposed on Nigeria by the outside world. The death of General Abacha in 1998 gave rise to a new agenda for transition initiated by General Abdusalami Abubakar.

In 1999, democracy returned to Nigeria. This was followed by various structural changes in the process of economic development of the country. A new plan for economic development of Nigeria was drafted. The IMF and the World Bank supported Nigeria's development programmes, in terms of personnel, technical and financial aid. The economic system of the country was thus restructured. The Washington Consensus of liberalisation, commercialisation, and privatisation was adopted. During 2003-2007 Nigeria was attempting to implement an economic reform program called the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). "The goal of NEEDS is to mobilise the resources of Nigeria to make a fundamental break with the failures of the past and bequeath a united and prosperous nation to generations to come".[50] "NEEDs will lay a solid foundation for sustainable poverty reduction, employment generation, wealth creation, and value re-orientation".[51] The economic and development agenda under NEEDS must of necessity be complemented by other reforms – especially in the electoral and political governance architecture – that are consistent with deepening and sustaining future. The government hoped that NEEDS would create 7 million new jobs, diversify the economy, boost non-energy exports, increase industrial capacity utilisation, and improve agricultural productivity. A related initiative on the state level is the State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS).

In a bid to creating a competitive private sector, the newly democratic government urged on by the IMF engaged in the privatisation of public corporations under the Bureau for Private Enterprises. In this way, the corporations hitherto run by the government on behalf of the Nigerian citizens were sold to few individuals who had the capital to buy them. However,

instead of stimulating the economy as expected, this scheme has contributed in the contraction of the economy as most of the companies so privatised have folded up. Some of these companies were bought by foreign firms who used Nigerians as fronts. Evidence show that some of these companies have had their equipment dismantled and carted out of the country by the foreign buyers. Thus, the country is now more and more dependent of foreign goods for its survival including on food stuffs hitherto produced locally.

CONCLUSION

There has been external colouration to the National Development Planning in Nigeria since the colonial period. Even after independence when formal power had been transferred to Nigerian leaders the neo-colonial status continued with the top officials and policy advisers being citizens of the colonial power. The final assumption of an independent planning responsibility was not achieved until a full decade after independence.

There are still external influences to the formulation and execution of the plans. The borrowing of funds from external donors came with conditionalities inimical to the development of the country. These conditionalities were in tandem with the shifts in the lending operation of the BrettonWoods institutions and out of tune with the fundamental needs of the country. In this way the fund would create little or no impact on the general well being of the people. Again, the technical assistants sent to the country by these external donors and institutions were not familiar with the land and peoples of Nigeria. Consequently, their ideas and vision would be from the benefit of the developed world's experience which they are familiar with, without factoring into their consideration the particularity of the recipient countries.

Again, the debt crisis, a situation of irredeemable debt, which the country had found itself before the debt buy-back arranged by President Olusegun Obasanjo with the Paris Club (a group of 19 richest governments). About 70-90 percent of export earnings were expended on debt services. This also brewed socio-political difficulties. The government of Nigeria in 2006 paid $12 billion in exchange for a debt cancellation estimated $18 billion out of the $30 billion debt. And fresh borrowing has again started. "Countries entrapped in foreign debt have some perceptible symptoms. Representatives of the creditor institutions take over strategic financial institutions of the country such as the central bank and the finance ministry, to mention a few. This is done to monitor and ensure that no resources are misappropriated or diverted to anything other than servicing the external loans."[52] This had been the case in Nigeria, whereby the Governors of the Central Bank or the Minister of Finance would be someone trained by them even when he or she is a Nigerian. Even in the '70s, when there was no need for external loans

due to the oil boom, Nigeria was still borrowing, based on the advice of foreign expertise. This debt burden has become so acute that some people are calling for debt cancellation and even for the abolition of the IMF.[53] In fact, "over the years, Nigeria has depended greatly on international and domestic financial institutions for her economic development. These international financial institutions include the World Bank, IMF and ADB, among others".[54] All these external factors have no doubt affected adversely the development of the country. There is need to balance globalisation with localisation.

ENDNOTES

1.   Mike Obadan. "Poverty Reduction in Nigeria: The Way Forward", *CBN Economic and Financial Review* Vol. 39, No. 4.

2.   Ibid.

3.   R.F. Grais, C. Dubray, S. Gerstl, J.P. Guthmann, A. Djibo A, et al. (2007). Unacceptably High Mortality Related to Measles Epidemics in Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. PLoS Med 4(1): e16. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040016

4.   A.O. Ujah, O.A. Aisien, J.T. Mutihir, D.J. Vanderjagt, R.H. Glew and V.E. Uguru (2005). Factors Contributing to Maternal Mortality in North-Central Nigeria: A Seventeen-Year Review, *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (December), pp. 27-40.

5.   Kelsey A. Harrison (1997). Maternal Mortality in Nigeria: The Real Issues, *African Journal of Reproductive Health* Vol. 1, No. 1 (March), p. 7.

6.   Colin D. Mathers, Ritu Sadana, Joshua A Salomon, Christopher J.L. Murray, Alan D. Lopez (2000). World Health Report.

7.

8.   Uma S Kambhampati (2004). *Development and the Developing World*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 12.

9.

10. Uma S Kambhampati (2004). *Development and the Developing World*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 12.

11   Colin Leys (1996). *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*. London: James Curry, p. 4.

12. Wolfgang F. Stolper (1963). "Economic Development in Nigeria". *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (December), p. 391.

13. Meghnad Desai (2002). *Marx's Revenge: The Resurgence of Capitalism and the Death of Statist Socialism*. London and New York: Verso, p. 107.

14. Meghnad Desai (2002). *Marx's Revenge: The Resurgence of Capitalism*, pp.107-8.

15. Shepard B. Clough (1964). *France: A History of National Economies, 1789-1939*. New York: Octagon, p. 260.

16. E. Victor Morgan (1952). *Studies in British Financial Policy, 1914-1925*. London: Macmillan, p. 35.

17. Jim Potter (1974). *American Economy Between the Wars*. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 18.

18. Steve Pressman (2001). "Keynes, John Maynard." In *Encyclopedia of Political Economy* edited by Anthony O'Hara, 617-621. London and New York: Routledge, p. 620.

19. Robert Baldwin (1966). *Economic Development and Growth*. New York: John Wiley, p. 1.

20. Benjamin Higgins (1959). *Economic Development, Principles, Problems, and Policies*. London: Constable and Company, p. 3.

21. Colin Leys (1996). *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*. London: James Curry, p. 5.

22. Colin Leys (1996). *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*. London: James Curry, p. 20.

23. P.C.N. Okigbo (1989). *National Development Planning in Nigeria, 1900-92*. London: James Curry.

24. Wolfgang F. Stolper (1963). "Economic Development in Nigeria". *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (December), p. 398.

25. Wolfgang F. Stolper (1963). "Economic Development in Nigeria". *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (December), p. 398.

26. Wolfgang F. Stolper (1963). "Economic Development in Nigeria". *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (December).

27. Wolfgang F. Stolper (1963). "Economic Development in Nigeria". *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (December).

28. Alkali. *Nigeria and World Bank*. p. 60.

29. Wold Bank (1955). *The Economic Development of Nigeria: Report of a Mission Organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

30. P.T. Bauer (1955). "The Economic Development of Nigeria," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 63, No. 5 (October), p. 388.

31. N.I. Ekeoku (1986). "Government External Borrowing in the Nigeria Post-Boom Era: Some Simulation Result and Implications," *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (December), p. 359.

32. Rufa'I Ahmed Alkali (1997). *The World Bank and Nigeria*. Kaduna: Baraka Press, p. iii, 69.

33. P.C.N. Okigbo (1989). *National Development Planning in Nigeria, 1900-92*. London: James Curry, p. 39.

34. P.C.N. Okigbo (1989). *National Development Planning in Nigeria*, p. 39.

35. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Development. *Second National Development Plan*, 1970/1979, p. 13.

36. Ifeyori Ihumode (1985). "External Loans and Debt Servicing Problems in the Nigerian Economy," *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March), p. 103.

37. Alkali. *Nigeria and World Bank*, p. 70.

38. Michael Obadan (1983). "Prospects for Diversification in Nigeria's Export

Trade," in *Diversification of the Nigerian Economy*. Nigerian Economic Society Annual Conference, Jos, May, p. 4.

39. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Development, *Third National Development Plan*, 1975-80, p. 28.

40. Ibid

41. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of National Planning, *Guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan*, 1980/85, p. 20.

42. Joshua Ajewole (1990). "Structural Adjustment Programme for Effective National Economic Management: Lessons of Experience from Nigeria," In *National Training Programme on Budgeting for Efficient Management*, by National Centre for Economic Management and Administration. Ibadan, p. 4.

43. Joseph Stiglitz (2002). *Globalization and its Discontent*. London: Penguin Books, p. 13.

44. F.O. Oresotu (1992). "Interest Rates Behaviour under a Programme of Financial Reform: The Nigerian Case", *Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June), p. 113.

45. Rufa'I Ahmed Alkali (1997). *The World Bank and Nigeria*. Kaduna: Baraka Press, p. 71.

46. Rufa'I Ahmed Alkali (1997). *The World Bank and Nigeria*. Kaduna: Baraka Press, p. 9.

47. Joshua Ajewole (1990). "Structural Adjustment Programme for Effective National Economic Management: Lessons of Experience from Nigeria," In *National Training Programme on Budgeting for Efficient Management*, by National Centre for Economic Management and Administration. Ibadan, p. 15.

48. Central Bank of Nigeria (1993). *Economic Report for the First Half of 1993*. Lagos: Research Department, p. 17.

49. Central Bank of Nigeria (1993). *Economic Report for the First Half of 1993*. Lagos: Research Department, p. 17.

50. National Planning Commission (2005). *National Empowerment and Development Strategy, Nigeria*, Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria, p. iii.

51. Ibid.

52. Funso Aluko and Dare Arowolo (2010). "Foreign Aid, the Third World's Debt Crisis and the Implication for Economic Development: the Nigerian Experience", *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (April), p. 120.

53. Harry Cleaver (1989). Close the IMF, "Abolish Debt and End Development: A Class Analysis of International Debt Crisis," Capital and Class, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 17-50.

54. A.C. Abimiku (2000). Financial Institutions and Nigeria's Economic Development, *Journal of Economic and Financial Issues*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December), p. 46.

Index

On 1 October, 2010, Nigeria as an independent nation was 50 years. Nigeria emerged from over 60 years of British colonial rule, the largest country in Africa with enormous resources capable of transforming the entire continent. Nevertheless, the colonial past continues to haunt Nigeria.

This book grows from the proceedings of the two-day International Conference, organised by the Department of History, University of Ibadan, in commemoration of the 50-year anniversary of Nigeria's Independence. The conference which took place on 9 and 10 August, 2010 at the Conference Centre, University of Ibadan was entitled "Nigeria at 50: Politics, Society and Development". The conference attracted scholars from Nigeria and abroad who presented papers from a broad spectrum of academic disciplines. The conference identified various challenges confronting Nigeria, 50 years after independence. Causes and effects of these challenges were also identified as well as the solutions.

The neglect of History as an academic field of study has obliterated the memory of Nigerians, so to say. It has robbed the people and those in governance of the guiding principle in their actions as well as national consciousness. This neglect is exemplified in the removal of history from both primary and secondary schools curricula, the non-invitation of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN) to the National Conference of 2005, non-inclusion of HSN in the preparations for the 50th anniversary of Nigeria's independence, non-inclusion of HSN in the compilation of the on-going compendium of Nigerian history, etc.

This book is a valuable resource for historians, diplomats, political scientists, and all other stakeholders in the Nigerian project.

Babatunde Sofela is a Reader in the Department of History, University of Ibadan, where he has been pioneering Latin American History since 1993. He is the author of *Emancipados: Slave Societies in Brazil and Cuba*.
Sofela was the immediate past Head of the Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

Victor Osaro Edo is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of History, University of Ibadan. He is a specialist in Benin Studies as well as Political and Cultural History. Edo has published many articles in books and journals, nationally and internationally and has co-edited *African Culture* with G.O. Oguntomisin (2005), and has co-authored *African Culture and Civilisation From the Earliest Times to 1500 AD*, also with G.O. Oguntomisin (John Archers, 2007). He is a member of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN). Dr. Edo was a former Co-ordinator of Postgraduate Programmes of the Department of History, University of Ibadan. Presently, he is the Acting HOD, Department of History, and the Quality Assurance Officer, Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan.

Rasheed Oyewole Olaniyi is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of History, University of Ibadan. He is the author of *Diaspora is Not Like Home: A Social and Economic History of Yoruba in Kano, 1912-1999* (Muenchen: Lincom Europa, 2008)