ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND SETTLEMENT DYNAMICS IN PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA, 1994-2012

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ABSTRACT

Persistent communal conflicts in Plateau State underscore the differences between ethno-religious identities and aggravated segregation in human settlements. Existing studies on ethno-religious conflict have focused on colonial segregated settlement policy otherwise known as the Sabon Gari. These studies have neglected settlement dynamics as both cause and effect of ethno-religious conflicts. This study, therefore, interrogated the complex interaction between ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics in Plateau State. This is with a view to showing how conflicts structure and restructure settlements and their implications for inter-group relations, group mobilisation and infrastructural development.

The study adopted Lawler's Relational theory and case study research design. Respondents were purposively selected from four Local Government Areas comprising Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom. Primary data were collected through 46 in-depth interviews from twelve neighbourhood leaders, eleven ethno-religious group leaders, three members of civil society organisations, four estate managers, two security officials, two academics and twelve youth leaders. A total of six Focus Group Discussions were held: one each with Afizere, Anaguta and Hausa ethnic groups in Jos North, Berom in Jos South, Igbo in Barkin-Ladi and Fulani in Riyom. Non-participant observation method was also employed. Historical documents from National Archives, Kaduna were sourced and utilised. Secondary data consisted of Government white papers, gazettes, reports, petitions, books and journal articles. Data were content and thematically analysed.

In the historical evolution of Plateau State, the climate as well as inter-group relations played significant roles in the settlement dynamics. In pre-colonial Plateau State people lived on top of mountains for fear of being attacked by foreign elements. Colonial Plateau State experienced relative peace. Nevertheless, the colonialists divided the area into Native Town and Township which facilitated forms of identity conflicts. Before 1994, different groups lived together without considering ethno-religious identities. However, persistent violence between ethno-religious groups since 2001 led to the emergence of exclusive neighbourhoods for Christians (AngwanRukuba, Gyel, Kashan-Gwol, and Shonong) and Muslims (Gangare, Kasali, AngwanSarki and Gashish). This trend deepened in rural areas from 2012 as conflicts intensified. The emerging settlement dynamic has created atmosphere of fear, giving rise to ethno-religious insecurity, impacted trust and created a culture of violence. It has also facilitated group mobilisation for violence by aiding the drive to safeguard the emerging settlements. Groups build worship centres and community halls within the new settlements and these structures have reinforced group mobilisation and bind their capability and legitimacy for conflicts. This has affected infrastructural development; certain neighbourhoods have been totally neglected while the exclusion narrative in the area has further intensified violence.

Settlement dynamics are central to ethno-religious conflict because of their identity and security implications. Group segregation in settlements is a security threat and conflict factor. To mitigate conflicts and promote inter-group peaceful relations, it is imperative to develop in neighbourhoods, structures of inter-group relations like sports complexes and town halls. Faith based organisations should be monitored to limit radicalised views. Government and philanthropists need to collaborate to rebuild destroyed homes and facilitate people's return after conflicts.

Keywords: Settlement dynamics, Ethno-religious insecurity, Plateau State Nigeria
Word count: 497

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this research work was carried out by Onyekachi Ernest NNABUIHE in Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my late father Pa Michael Uzoma Nnabuihe who championed peace wherever he sojourned during his lifetime.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

APC- All Progressives Congress
COCIN- Church of Christ in Nations
FCS- Fellowship of Christian Students
FGD- Focus Group Discussion
GRA- Government Reserved Areas
HDR- Human Development Report
IDI- In-depth Interview
JDA- Jassawa Development Association
JIBWIS- Jama'atu Izalat al Bid'awa Iqamat al Sunna
JUTH- Jos University Teaching Hospital
JODICO- Jos Divisional and Cultural Organisation
LGA- Local Government Area
NAK- National Archives Kaduna
NCCF- Nigerian Christian Corpers Fellowship
NIFES- Nigerian Fellowship of Evangelical Students
PCRC- Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee
PDP- Peoples Democratic Party
PIDAN- Plateau Indigenous Development Association Networks

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to Study

The past few decades have witnessed an unprecedented intensification of identity based conflicts. Although, humankind was struck by previously unseen dimension of the phenomenon, the waning of inter-state conflicts and its growth at intra-state level since the end of the Cold-War has kept the world in fear. Yet, it was widely believed that identity-based conflict was another problem that developing countries faced in addition to disasters and poverty (Horowitz, 1985). Contrary to this believe, however, the events in former Yugoslavia Federation in the early 1990s revealed it could also happen in Europe. These violent events have had disastrous consequences both during and after the conflicts. One of such consequences is the tendency for violent conflicts to structure and restructure human settlements across space and time (Kaufmann, 1996; Toft, 2001, 2003; Weidmann, 2007, 2009a; Gandu, 2011; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013; and Gambo, 2013). This is not a recent development. Historical experiences of several peoples and nations of the world are littered and dotted with cases of violent conflicts structuring and restructuring human settlements.

Several cases illustrate the above claim. For instance, black/white relations in the United States of America during the closing years of the 19th century was characterised by recurrent violence (Putnam, 2000:406). Ethnic cleavages reinforced class lines and facilitated virulent ethnocentrism. Racism became entrenched in the history of black areas like Detroit with race riots dating back to 1833 (Neil, 2004:125). At the end of Reconstruction (an era of transformation following the civil war) in 1877, control over emancipated blacks by local whites became more violent. To this end, the blacks claimed that "the early 1900s brought nearly complete exclusion from politics, legal segregation of virtually all public and private facilities and a sickening explosion of race riots and lynching" (Putnam, 2000:407). With the raging violence, black/white relations were further affected and segregation in residential areas continued to grow. However, narratives of exclusion began to change at the opening years of the 20th century given the activities of civil rights movements (Neil, 2004:125). Nevertheless, the race riots of the 1960s in Newark, Detroit and Los Angeles deepened segregation in human settlements (Bergesen, 1982) as whites further moved away from the blacks and congregated in existing white settlements or new settlements.

In South Africa, apartheid was a factor that had the most influence on living space (Rodrigues, 2009:42). Apart from apartheid laws that engendered residential segregation, black neighbourhoods were considered dangerous areas by the white population because of the violent group relationships that existed between the whites, colour and blacks (Salm and Falola, 2005:xxiii). At that period, the whites had expelled the people of colour to an area in Cape Town known as the Cape Flats and the blacks to Eastern Cape (Locatelli and Nugent, 2009:5). Therefore, living spaces were racialised as the themes of belonging and exclusion continued to play themselves out. Several years later coloured population attempted to reclaim the streets of Cape Town city from the whites. The post-apartheid period witnessed another dimension of violent interactions which profoundly changed spatial organisations and created new social enclaves (Gbafou, 2009; Rodrigues, 2009). Similarly, in Canada, Jews carved out their own spaces within the society using local community centres and alternative religious spaces to maintain identities and escape from the racialization of certain ethnic groups (Teelucksingh, 2006; Train, 2006; Panagakos, 2006). This development affected the residential pattern within the wider Canadian society.

In India, the Hindu/Muslim conflict has affected the residential pattern (Varshney, 2002:150-151). On June 3, 1947, a partition of the Indian subcontinent was announced (Zamindar, 2007:1) which became a demarcation between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. The partition was done in the midst of what Zamindar called incomprehensible violence which shaped and deepened negative relationships between Hindu and Muslims. Although Vazira Zamindar argued that the partition is not necessarily a consequence of the Kashmir conflict as argued by scholars of security studies, rather it was formed through series of attempts to resolve a political partition existing between Hindus and Muslims (2007:3). Nevertheless, the biggest development of Hindu/Muslim relations in post 1947 India is communal and residential segregation (Varshney, 1998a, 1998b, 2002). This resulted from several violent events between the two religions in India. For instance, a mosque in Ayodya, Surat was demolished by the Hindu on December 6, 1992 which sparked a nationwide riot and helped the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to emerge as a national force in Indian politics (Varshney, 2002:16). Indian society and polity have not remained the same since the demolition. That single event increased the segregation of Muslims in urban India and deepened the Hindu/Muslim differences.

In Northern Ireland, conflicts which began in 1968 over issues of Irish nationalism and British politics between Catholics and Protestants also emphasised residential segregation and reshaped the settlements (Boal, 1982; Doherty and Poole, 1997). Similarly, in the case of Yugoslavia, a state born on December 1, 1918 was proclaimed originally as the Triune kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Roe, 2005:76). It emerged as ethnically heterogeneous state with Serbs and Croats as the most dominant groups. Other lesser groups include the Slovenes, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Hungarians and Germans (Roe, 2005; Oliver, 2005). The diversity was further reinforced by religious distinctions as Croats, Slovenes and Hungarians identified as Roman Catholics and the Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians identified as Eastern Orthodox. The Albanians, along with a significant number of Slavs in Bosnia-Hercegovina identified themselves as Muslims- converting to Islam under the period under Turkish rule. Quite early in the history of Yugoslavia, unstable heterogeneity was apparent between Serbs and Croats. Narratives of old hatreds and stiff group competition facilitated conflicts which changed the living pattern and eventually led to the country's balkanization (Donia and Fine, 1994; Kaufman, 1996; Roe, 2005; Oliver, 2005; Weidmann, 2009). Although group populations were regionally distributed (ethnic enclaves), other areas like Bosnia-Hercegovina was mixed with Serb and Croat Christians in the midst of Bosnia Muslims (Donia and Fine, 1994). Thus, the war of the early 1990s profoundly altered residential pattern particularly in Bosnia-Hercegovina where recommendations were made to either partition the group settlements or transfer populations to their ethnic regions in order to create three mini-ethnic states (Donia and Fine, 1994:7).

In other parts of Africa, human settlements in different parts of the continent have been severally affected by conflicts in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times (Cohen, 1969; Bingel, 1978; Schildkrout, 1978; Udo, 1980; Albert, 1994; Salm and Falola, 2005; Njoh, 2008; Locatelli and Nugent, 2009; Kasara, 2015). This is evident in Nigeria (Cohen, 1969; Albert, 1994, 1996) Ghana (Schildkrout, 1978) and Cameroun (Awasom, 2003). In contemporary time, the trend is visible in Kenya where land conflicts have altered settlement pattern and reinforced segregation (Kasara, 2015).

Nigeria is not immune to these violent identity-based conflicts. Several of the conflicts have severely threatened the country's stability since pre-colonial period (Bingel, 1978) to the point that observers of independent Nigeria predicted disintegration (Tamuno, 1970). Most of these identity conflicts were taking place in the northern region (Falola, 1998). The conflicts took a

religious garb and intensified in the 1980s following global resurgence of religion which began with the Iranian revolution of 1979 (Comolli, 2015:19). This triggered a significant shift in the global status quo. There began from then a revival of religions, especially Islam, and several parts of the world, including the Middle East, North Africa, even Indonesia and then West Africa, witnessed a revival of an extreme form of religious fundamentalism (Rupesinghe and Anderlini, 1998). This religious fundamentalism was partly in reaction to the popular belief of western cultural domination and the West's support of often corrupt regimes. This led to the rejection of any form of secularism and the call for a return to basic Koranic tradition. In Nigeria, a combination of ethnic grievances with the emergent religious fundamentalism led to ethno-religious conflicts. Therefore, since the 1980s, northern Nigeria has experienced periods of violent ethno-religious conflicts unprecedented in length and intensity. In particular, Plateau State has been the most affected in the past decade. Apart from structuring and restructuring settlements, identity based violent conflict in Plateau State, has greatly affected the humanitarian space by displacing people and raising concerns that the Nigerian state have been unable to address.

Nevertheless, the history of identity conflict (ethnic tensions) in modern Plateau State can be traced to1932 when it was rumoured that the colonialists were leaving for Europe following the Depression period of 1929-1934 but it became violent in 1945 (Plotnicov, 1967; 1971; 1972). In 1994, the conflict took ethno-religious dimension (Dung, 1994), but it was contained by the then military government. The return to civil rule in 1999, however, came with the opportunity for people to express themselves and some chose to do it violently. Tension built up in Plateau State. By 2001 it exploded to a bloody confrontation between Christians and Muslims (Best, 2007). In northern Plateau State the major actors in the conflict include the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom who are referred to as indigenes and predominantly Christians and Hausa and Fulani who are referred to as settlers and predominantly Muslims. The violence later spread to southern Plateau. The intensity of the violence led to the imposition of emergency rule in 2004 by the Federal Government (Plateau State Government, 2004). While the conflict in southern Plateau has since been contained; that of northern Plateau has lingered (Best and Hoomlong, 2011; ICG, 2012).

In December 2011, the deepening violence led to the imposition of another emergency rule by the Federal Government. This time the imposition was on Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom Local Government Areas (LGAs) and not on the entire state as was the case in 2004 (Taft

and Haken, 2015). When the emergency rule was lifted in June 2012, the violence multiplied in Barkin-Ladi and Riyom and abated in Jos North and Jos South. It is important to note that unlike the Jos areas, most parts of Barkin-Ladi and Riyom are rural in nature. The conflict trends help to underscore the interaction between violent conflicts and settlement dynamics. Before the 1994 conflict in Jos Plateau, people lived where they wanted without considering ethnicity and religion. This is inspite of the dominance of p articular ethnic groups in certain areas. The settlements, however, changed from 2001 conflict and people began to choose place of residence based on ethnic and religious considerations. Dominant discourses in the literature on conflict and settlement dynamics have emphasised the role of conflict in the making of human settlements. This is done with little attention on how settlement dynamics influence conflicts. Therefore, the interaction between conflict and settlement dynamic is discussed from a single causal direction. However, empirical evidence of the Plateau State case revealed that conflict and settlement dynamics are both cause and effect. This is because while ethno-religious settlements emerged as a result of the conflict since 2001, settlement dynamic has historically played a role in the conflict.

This study focuses on how violent conflicts altered human settlements and how the altered settlement in turn influenced conflict. In addition, the study interrogated the complex interaction between violent conflicts and settlement dynamic and provided the linkages between how groups get mobilised and apply violence and how violence further alter human settlements.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Studies on Plateau State conflict have focused on the narratives of myths of origin as a way of unearthing the roots of violence and insecurity in the area (Temple, 1965; Plotnicov, 1972; Gwom, 1992; Jacobs, 1995; Bingel, 1998; Usman, Jimada and Mohammed, 2004; and Fwatshak, 2006; Best, 2007). Others tend to attribute ethno-religious violence to elite politics (Higazi 2011), religious fundamentalism (Falola, 1998), economic inequalities (Higazi, 2011; Taft and Haken, 2015) and competing claims which resulted from adverse poverty that was caused by the implementation of certain political and economic policies that have weakened the capacity of the State to provide social goods to its citizens (Egwu, 2004; ICG 2010). Other aspects of the literature have been concerned with the instances of violence and the mere mention of how the conflict has led to the emergence of residential segregation in Plateau State (Dan Fulani and Fwatshak, 2002; Harneit-Sievers, 2004; Best and Hoomlong, 2011; Gambo, 2013; Musa, 2014;

Taft and Haken, 2015). These studies discuss settlement dynamics in a way that portrays it as less important phenomenon in explaining ethno-religious conflicts. This is because little attention is given to the perception of group cohesiveness and the fear it generates. Such fears have the tendency to create chaos and further alter harmonious societal relations. Thus, there is a strong connection between ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics.

Nevertheless, several other studies interrogating the nexus between conflicts and settlement dynamics have extensively drawn attention to the colonial segregated settlement policy otherwise known as the Sabon Gari in Nigeria as well as other colonial African territories (Plotnicov, 1967; Cohen, 1969; Schildkrout, 1978; Albert, 1994; 1996; Awasom, 2003; Olukoju, 2003; Njoh, 2008; Fourchard, 2009; Locatelli, 2009). Studies in Nigeria have considered settlement dynamic barely as a consequence of violent conflicts (Albert, 1996; Harneit-Sievers, 2004; Best, 2007; Ostien, 2009; Fourchard, 2009; Best and Hoomlong, 2011; Higazi, 2011; Krause 2011; Gambo, 2013; and Musa, 2014). These studies neglect how conflicts influence settlement dynamics and how settlement dynamics in turn influences conflicts. As a result, they offer restricted insight into how protracted violent conflicts shape or reshape existing settlements in urban and rural Nigeria (Albert, 1996; Fourchard, 2009).

In addition, the conventional thinking in the literature is that segregated human settlement is an urban phenomenon (Albert, 1996; Egwu, 2004; Njoh, 2008; and Fourchard, 2009). Yet, rural Plateau State has provided a case where violent conflicts along ethno-religious line have led to changes in residential pattern. The implication of this is that little attention is allowed in the literature for the exploration of the rural dimension of the mutually reinforcing circle of settlement segregation and violence. Therefore, interrogating the complex interactions between violent conflicts and settlement dynamic has received little attention in the literature. This implies that there is a missing link in understanding the intensified nature of the conflict and the factors reinforcing the segregated settlements. This is the gap in knowledge this study intends to fill.

1.3 Research Questions

Based on the foregoing, the following research questions are raised:

i. How has the persistent ethno-religious conflict in Plateau State structured and restructured settlements?
ii. What are the implications of the settlement dynamics for inter-group relations?
iii. How does the settlement dynamic facilitate group mobilisation for conflicts?

iv. How has the conflict affected infrastructural development in the emerging settlements?

1.4 Research Aim and Objectives

The aim of this study is to examine and explain the relationships between the ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics in Plateau State. The specific objectives are to:

i. Identify how ethno-religious conflict in Plateau State structured and restructured settlements;
ii. Examine the implications of settlement dynamics for inter-group relations;
iii. Examine how settlement dynamics facilitate group mobilisation for conflicts; and
iv. Investigate how the conflict has affected infrastructural development in the emerging settlements.

1.5 Justification of the Study

There is a renewed emphasis on identity conflict research in Africa. This follows the increasing consciousness of cultural differences and the challenges thrown up by these differences in heterogeneous Nigeria. A plethora of literature and popular discourse exists on ethnic and religious relations in Nigeria. Ethno-religious conflicts have therefore become the focus of intensive studies, particularly in the context of religious fundamentalism and deep-seated insecurity in northern Nigeria (Kukah, 1993; Albert, 1994; Falola, 1998; Fourchard, 2003, 2009; Best 2007; ICG, 2010; Gandu, 2011). Some of these studies present politicisation of ethnicity and religion as explanations for the violent ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria and Plateau State in particular. Thus, scholarship has engaged with a recent trend in many societies across the world which shifts from the state towards ethnic enclaves to contest exclusion or promote inclusion. However, there is a scanty literature on the nexus between ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics. Although Weidmann (2009) and Weidmann and Salehyan (2013) have examined some of the issues, the content and context of the problem need to be properly defined in literature as the above scholars' conclusions may not apply to Plateau State.

Furthermore, extant studies on identity conflicts in Nigeria tend to attribute ethno-religious violence to elite politics (Higazi 2011), religious fundamentalism (Falola 1998), economic inequalities (Higazi 2011) and competing claims which resulted from adverse poverty that was caused by the implementation of certain political and economic policies that have weakened the capacity of the State to provide social goods to its citizens (Egwu 2004; ICG 2010). While the above factors may explain ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, their explanatory paradigm is

limited as to understanding and explaining the relationships between persistent conflicts and settlement dynamics. This is because they fail to examine how the persistent conflicts reshape the existing settlements by altering residence and reinforcing violence or mitigating it. Colonialism established a tradition of ethnic neighbourhoods on the Plateau, especially in Jos. However, the post-independence period experienced a shift in the structure producing inter-mixed neighbourhoods, and the crisis that engulfed the state in recent years have reinforced the intensity of exclusive neighbourhoods. Before now, neighbourhoods like Gangare, Rikkos, Angwan Rogo, and Bauchi Road were associated with the Hausa and Fulani Muslims (Egwu,2004) with pockets of Igbo and other ethnic groups of Plateau State origin (Gwom 1992). Areas like Jenta Apata and Busa-Buji were dominated by the Igbo, Urhobo and other Plateau ethnic groups. Areas like Hwolshe, Jenta Adamu and Kabong were dominated by natives and Nassarawa was dominated by the Yoruba. The persistent conflicts however led to the emergence of "safe" and "unsafe" areas for Christians and Muslims. For instance, it has been argued that at some point, if you are a Christian you cannot go to Angwan Rogo and come out alive. The same applies to a Muslim going to Hwolshe (*Tell*, 2011). Persistent conflicts have ossified political identities and worsened residential segregation (Krause 2011; ICG 2012).

Thus, any attempt to explain how ethno-religious conflicts interfere with settlement dynamics and deepen the circle of violence is significant to academic literature. If this yawning gap is not filled in the literature of ethno-religious conflicts, the academic community is likely to remain unaware of how persistent violent conflicts reshape human settlement and the implication of the emerging settlements for inter-group relations. This study fills the gap in knowledge on the interface between ethno-religious conflicts, settlement dynamics and group mobilization processes. It shows how homogenous group settlements provide easy access for group mobilisation and how it determines where violence is applied. The work indicates why perceived threat and sectarian violence increases identity consciousness and how such consciousness leads to segregated settlements. Thus, this study contributes to academic and analytical discourses that aim at defining the relationship between ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics epistemologically, theoretically and methodologically.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The scope of this study is to discuss how the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State has structured and restructured human settlements in the study area. The period covered is from

1994 to 2012. Thus the scope is divided into the temporal and spatial. While the temporal is from 1994, when the conflicts in Jos assumed ethno-religious dimension, to 2012 when the trend deepened in the rural areas. This period helps to divide the objectives into blocks of time to plan and understand the trend of the conflict and the settlement dynamics. The spatial covers four (4) out of the seventeen (17) Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Plateau State shown in map 1.1. These LGAs have been grossly affected. They include Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom, all in Plateau north. The choice of these four LGAs is informed by the frequent clashes in the areas along ethno-religious lines and the attendant settlement dynamics. There are two conflict zones in Plateau State: the northern and southern zones. The central zone has been relatively peaceful. Like already pointed out, the choice of the northern zone is informed by the intensity of the recurrence of conflict in the zone and the apparent shift in human settlements. This study, therefore, showed how recurrence of identity-based violence has structured and restructured settlements and deeply affected inter-group relations.

CHAPTER TWO

Conceptual Clarification, Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

2.0 Preamble

There is a plethora of literature on identity-based conflicts and settlement dynamics, yet there exists a wide gap in this area. The relationship between ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics has not been fully explored. This chapter focuses on conceptual discourse, theoretical framework and review of existing literature. As is the norm in all academic studies, there is need for clarity as regards the meaning of the concepts and the context in which the concepts are employed. The key concepts in this study are conflict, ethnicity, religion, settlement dynamics, residential segregation, social interaction and mobilisation for conflict. It is also important to ascertain how the concepts are related to the problem of study. The need for laying the theoretical foundation of the study is not difficult to understand. Ragin (1994) has argued that the social scientific representation of social life involves more than addressing social theory, but includes a clear dialogue between social theory on the one hand and empirical data on the other as an essential part of the research process. The reconstruction of social theory is only feasible on the basis of this. For these salient reasons, this study is required to review extant literature and explore the conceptual and theoretical issues surrounding inter-ethnic and religious relations.

2.1 Conceptual Clarification

2.1.1 Ethnicity as Identity

Ethnicity is a very complex concept to define. It is viewed as a form of identity. There is no agreement among scholars on the definition of the concept. Due to the notoriety in definition and the lack of agreement by scholars on the concept of ethnicity, there has been a call to abandon it altogether (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). However, Nnoli (1978) defined ethnicity as a "social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups" (pg 5). Osaghae (1992), cited in Fawole and Bello (2011), defined the concept as a "social formation resting upon culturally specific practices and a unique set of symbols and cosmology" (pg 212). A belief in common organs and a broadly agreed common history provides an inheritance of symbols, heroes, values and hierarchies, and conforms social identities of both insiders and outsiders. This study adopts the use of ethnicity as a social phenomenon which provides the basis for inter-group interactions and identity formation. Ethnicity is the most basic as well as politically salient form of identity in Nigeria. Several identifiable markers are used by groups to conceive themselves. These markers include language, culture and even religion. Different

theoretical basis of ethnicity exist but whether as a given (primordial), as an instrument, or as a construct, it is a weapon of competition usually employed by its users to dislodge contenders. Osaghae (1995) argues that as "a social construct, ethnicity can be regarded as the employment of ethnic identity and differences to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict and cooperation" (cited in Fawole and Bello, 2011:212).

2.1.2 Religion

Religion is one of the oldest forms of identity. For instance, in seventeenth century North America, the English were originally called "Christians" while the African slaves were described as "heathens". The scenario changed after about 1680 when a new dichotomy of whites and blacks supplanted the former Christian and heathen categorisation (Horowitz 1985). Like the concept of ethnicity, religion is also difficult to define. Ayinla (2003), cited in Fawole and Bello 2011) sees religion as a "particular system or set of systems in which doctrines, myths, rituals, sentiments and other similar elements are interrelated" (pg 213). In this study religion is seen as a system which constantly defines what should constitute social behaviour and reinforce "otherness". In northern Nigeria, religious identity is more critical than ethnic identity and in fact serves to activate ethnicity (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). In his assessment of Nigeria's social relations, Nnoli (1978) argues that religion has a high potential for separating people from one another. This to him is because religion has a way of defining what should constitute appropriate social behavior. With such definition, conflict is bound to ensue when what one religious group calls "appropriate social behavior" cross-purposes with that of another (Nnoli 1978:128-129). The divisive power of religion is always reinforcing the question: who are we? This question has aggravated group consciousness as people tend to answer it in terms of ancestry, cultural groups (tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations) and, at the broadest level, civilisations (Huntington 1996).

2.1.3 Settlement Dynamics

While settlement pattern is "the spatial organisation and built environment of a given geographical area" (Rapoport 1994:482), settlement dynamics connote the changes that occur over time within human settlements. Settlement pattern is the manner in which a population distributes itself within the geographical space it occupies. Robinson and Reeve (2006) contend that settlement patterns are characterised by a distinctive regional geography, a local geography which reflects group clusters. Toft (2001) claims that it is a place where groups live which

indicates their population strength. She further argues that it indicates a regional concentration of a group, particularly a geographical area where a group's capability and legitimacy are considered to be high. In his study Kaufmann (1996) argues that settlement patterns could "create real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic "cleansing", and prevent de-escalation" (pg 137). Toft (2001) associates different types of settlement patterns with violence and this study intends to build on that. Particularly, when settlement patterns are discussed, attention is given to the historical flows and migration patterns of the population over time. Also observed are the population growth rates and density rates in particular areas. This can be understood in varying forms of size, composition, location, arrangement, organisation, function and history. By functions in particular we mean that people benefit from living in settlements. Thus, settlements occur where locations provide opportunities and therefore advantages. Settlement dynamics therefore, implies changes in settlement patterns. Within the dynamics is the pattern, the trends and processes of change. In this study, settlement dynamics refer to the manner in which people are distributed within a society and how it changes over time. The settlements could be inter-mixed or segregated, religious or ethnic.

2.1.4 Residential Segregation

The creation of ethnic and religious enclaves is not new to African history. There have been several of such enclaves created in pre-colonial and colonial Africa (Fourchard, 2003). The term "segregation" is defined as "a process of clustering wherein individuals and groups are sifted and sorted out in space based on their sharing certain traits or activities in common. This clustering takes place when people find that close spatial proximity is advantageous" (Van der Zanda, 1996 cited in Adeboye, 2003:304). People of same faith or belief, language or culture who find themselves in a supposedly foreign land can decide to segregate themselves along the above divide. Such system is sometimes referred to as "ethnic enclaves". In this study, it is referred to as ethno-religious enclave or neighbourhood or exclusive settlement pattern. Adeboye (2003) adds that segregation could be a result of government legislation or policy by which certain groups are separated spatially from others. However, Albert (2003b) has defined the concept in a more elaborate manner or what can be described as a more absolute term. He posits that "segregation refers to territoriality, racial/ethnic separateness, or the drawing apart of people of conflicting beliefs, whether spatially or ideologically" (pg 59). He adds that segregation "enables urban dwellers to avoid sustained contact with strange way of life and protects a majority or minority culture from pollution" (pg 59). This definition restricts segregation to the urban context

neglecting rural ethnicity that has become common in the Nigerian environment. In specific terms, Albert (2003a) contends that residential segregation reflects "how people of specific social characteristics (class, ethnicity, religion etc.) concentrate in a specific part of a city, while those having contrary characteristics live elsewhere" (pg 59). Residential segregation therefore means discrimination of one group against the "other". It leads to an attitude of "we versus them". Several reasons have engendered segregation. These include security, religion, socio-economic factors, quest for self-determination and territorial control. At other times segregation in residential areas or what Teelucksingh (2006) refers to as "claiming space" serves as a resistance to political exclusion or alternative way to assert ownership of a territory. This is because most times inherent within segregated communities are struggles over power and resources (Train, 2006).

2.1.5 Conflict

Conflict is a term etymologically derived from the Latin verb, "confligere". It is a phenomenon that occurs in every society and relationship, and it refers to confrontational or reactionary attitudes between individual or groups resulting from opposite or incompatible ends or means (Schmid, 1998). The outcome of conflicts can be functional or dysfunctional. Increasingly, conflict workers and handlers are trying to achieve better interpretation of conflict and the way it works with a view to responding to the specific problems identified in the relationship between parties (Best, 2006). Conflicts arise from the pursuit of divergent interests, goals and aspirations by individuals and/or groups in defined social and physical environments (Otite, 2000). Changes in the social environment, such as contestable access to new political positions, or perceptions of new resources arising from development in the physical environment, are fertile grounds for conflicts involving individuals and groups who are interested in using these new resources to achieve their goals. Thus, conflict stands as a poser to humanity and violent conflicts are not inevitable. These conflicts are brought about by so many factors and there are many definitions of the term. Its conceptualisation is necessary to understand how the concept works and what brings it about.

One of the most cited traditional definitions of conflict is Coser's (1968) view as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure, or eliminate their rivals. This suggests that conflict may be conceptualised as a way by which problems originating from opposing interests can be settled. Similarly, Park and

Burgess (1922) posit that "conflict is designed to resolve divergent dualism (and achieve) some kind of unity, even if it is through the annihilation of one of the conflict parties" (cited in Otite 2000:157). This argument draws from Machiavelli's fourth principle which states that "conflicts are resolved through power and violence" (Wallensteen 1988:54). As we have noted, conflict may not be viewed only from its negative point as it may be functional if it is designed to resolve divergent dualism. Thus, conflict is not always characterised by a breakdown in communication, though it follows that conflicts could be consciously built. Otite (2000) posits that conflict is a conscious act involving personal or group contact and communication. In his view, conflicts do not occur in a vacuum; rather they are given space to operate. Otite (2000) states further that "together with, though distinct from competition, struggle, and contests etc., conflict is a normal process of interaction, particularly in complex societies in which resources are usually scarce (pg156)". Though conflict may exist whenever incompatible activities occur and this may create a win-lose situation, especially in asymmetrical conflict which is common with African conflicts, however, if agents of conflict management, transformation, and resolution are put in place, then the situation can be a win-win outcome.

In light of the above, it is necessary to consider Coser's (1968) elaborate definition of conflict:

> Social conflict may be defined as a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Such conflicts may take place between individual, between collectivities or between individuals and collectivities. Inter group as well as intra group conflicts are perennial features of social life (pg232).

This definition gives us a clearer view of conflict. Adding to that, Otite (2000) posits that conflict can hardly be discussed outside the concept of pluralism, adding that Smooha (1975) points out that both pluralism and conflict are related in complex ways. So many scholars have contributed to the concept of pluralism. As Otite (2000) posits, recent and current ideas of pluralism regard it as multi-disciplinary and multidimensional and define it in the context of cultural diversity and social segmentation of an encapsulating society. Thus pluralism becomes a factor in conflicts as it is characterised by co-existing but distinct from cultural diversities.

2.1.6 Social Interaction

Social interactions are patterns of association. According to Gerald Berreman (1962) "social interaction is inherently symbolic, that is, it has meaning". They are expressions between persons that manifest in patterns of inter-personal behaviour (pg334). Mackinnon (1994) conceptualized social interaction as an "ongoing process of mutually adjusted response among interactants" (cited Neil J. Mackinnon and Jeffrey W. Bowlby 2000:44). The point to underscore is that social interaction structures and explains inter-group attitudes. It has the ability to foster consensual status belief. Social interaction is a form of consciousness that evolves among human beings as they meet the exigencies of living in groups (Tamotsu Shibutani, 1968:84). They are processes of all sorts in various contexts- at work; in politics, schools, families and all the workings of society (Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman and Eric C. Marcus 2006:xii). Thus, social interactions refer to the nature and processes of inter-group relations. It is to be used to explain group processes in the area under study. How are their (groups) relations of trust and distrust? How do built networks work?

2.1.7 Mobilisation for Conflicts

Mobilisation is seen as "the extent of resources under the collective control of the contender; as a process, an increase in the resources or in the degree of collective control" (Charles Tilly, 1978:54). It is a group's degree of planning, organisational effort and strategic deliberation for collective action that is referred to as mobilisation. Wolf (2007:6) contended that violent ethnic conflicts of high intensity only occur when a critical number of people have decided to pursue their goals through violent means (cited in Peter Vermeersch, 2011:1). Such decisions indicate a form of organisation, planning and deliberations. Vermeersch argued that mobilisation is a process whereby actors encourage people to participate in an action that could occur in a range of patterns and forms and has a distinctly collective dimension (2011). Such collective decisions or programmes could be consciously or sub-consciously carried out. Johan Galtung and Finn Tschudi, 2000:225) have reiterated this when they affirmed that "there is mobilisation of conscious and subconscious energies to fulfill collective programme, delivering the cultural script intact into the final document". In an environment where religious or ethnic sentiments are high and discriminations occur; there will be the tendency to employ mobilisation processes for protest or for violence. Thus, mobilisation become manifest when there is interest, organisation and coordination to achieve that interest. When there is a high level competition along group lines

there is the likelihood for mobilisation. It was for these reasons that Jonathan Fox (1999 cited in Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger 2000) argued that:

> When grievances over religious discrimination are high, religious institutions appear to facilitate mobilisation for protest. The presence of religious institutions also tends to promote mobilisation for rebellion when political discrimination and grievances of autonomy are at high levels (pg 657).

Mobilisation for conflict in this study will be viewed as a process of planning, organisation and strategic deliberations to achieve a given interest by a group either ethnic or religious or both through violent means.

2.1.8 Complex Identities and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

Nigeria is usually characterised as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are forcefully or violently contested along the lines of complex ethnic, religious and regional divisions (Smith and Robinson, 2001 cited in Osaghae and Suberu 2005). It has been argued that the country is one of the most complex states in Africa with its politically salient identities that have fostered chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability (Osaghae and Suberu 2005; Okpanachi 2010). Since its creation at the dawn of the twentieth century by the British, Nigeria has grappled with issues of state legitimacy that have challenged its efforts at nation building and achieving national integration and cooperation. The most outstanding of the crises and hindrances to national cohesion in the country has been the civil war of 1967-1970 as argued by Okpanachi (2010). Nigeria continues to be troubled today by power struggles, militancy, terrorism, poverty, ethnic and religious divisions and leadership crisis. It is common knowledge therefore, that Nigeria is significantly infested with ethnicity.

Violent inter-group (ethnic and religious) conflicts became a prominent and frequent feature of the Nigerian environment. The conflicts took an ethno-religious dimension in the late 1970s when a new form of religious fundamentalism appeared in northern Nigeria. However, military dictatorship within that period contained the intensity of the conflicts until the return to civil rule in 1999 and Plateau State in the north central that earlier appeared immune to the conflicts became one of its worst victims. The persistent conflicts created a social dislocation in the entire system, leading to the emergence of exclusive settlement patterns with particular reference to Plateau State. There is a myriad of complex identity groupings politically functional in the

Nigerian society and its effect on the country has been enormous. In addition, in light of its significant population, Falola (1998) argues that "what happens in Nigeria affects a quarter of the African population with a tremendous impact on the global community" (pg 1).

British colonial administration had earlier identified the problem of social group relations at the dawn of the 20th century and implemented a policy of separate settlement which distinguished natives and strangers. Colonialism, for one, encouraged different forms of labour migration by creating white collar jobs. The migration was south-north and north-south. The north was predominantly Muslim and the south predominantly Christian and to control the Christian southerners immigrating to the Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria, the British created the Sabon Gari settlement pattern around 1911 (Albert 1994, 1996). This was in response to a promise earlier made to the Emirs in northern Nigeria by the colonial administrators that they would check the incursion of Christians into their territories (Albert 1994). Such segregated residential system which later spread to other parts of Nigeria was regarded as British divide and rule strategy to entrench colonialism by Kukah (1993) and Olaniyi (2006). Olaniyi (2006) argues that "the establishment of Sabon Gari system was a central thrust of the British divide and rule system constructed to make colonial rule flourish on ethnic divisions; the creation and recreation of identities and enforcement of segregation" (pg 133).

The phenomenon featured prominently in several other colonial African cities as the colonial administrators employed segregationist projects to control movements, activities and residence (Gbaffou 2009). Without doubt, the cities were built in line with the racial, economic and social stratification of the time (Rodrigues 2009). For instance, in Eritrea such segregated enclave existed with the name Kombishtato, a word that originated from the Italian phrase "Campo Cintato" (Locatelli 2009) and depicted separate settlement. In Cameroon such enclaves were known as Abakpa/Bamenda, a settlement for Hausa traders (Awasom 2003); and in Ghana it was called Zango, another Hausa settlement (Fourchard 2009), meaning "transit point" or "temporary place". These settlements had enormous effects on different societies where they existed. It has been argued in literature that the Sabon Gari creation in northern Nigeria as a residential policy hindered interactions among Nigerians and hampered social development (Albert, 1994; 1996; Fourchard, 2009).

In post-colonial Nigeria, the factors of ethnicity and religion reinforced the exclusive settlement pattern and complicated the divisions in Nigeria. Common to divided states are disintegration,

civil strife, civil war, violent conflicts and minority agitations. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) have argued that:

> The issues that generate the fiercest contestation include those that are considered fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing groups tend to adopt exclusionary, winner-take-all strategies. These include the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship. As a consequence, deeply divided states tend to be fragile and unstable because almost by definition, there are fewer points of convergence and consensus among the constituent groups than are required to effectively mitigate or contain the centrifugal forces that tear the society apart (pg 1).

As a result of the above point, Nigeria's post-colonial situations have been enormously challenged as modernisation and nation-building have come to grief. Here, political and economic activities have coincided with ethnic and religious cleavages, thus making the Nigerian society segmented and inherently conflictual. Ethno-religious and communal identities have become the basis of political conflicts. It has been argued that the politicisation of ethnicity and religion and factional mobilisation along the same lines is a by-product of the monopolisation of power and assets by the ruling elite (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2006). Thus it must be argued that "ethnic identities in Nigeria are not a natural given, despite the substantial impact that such identity has played in the country's history. Its ethnic identities are historical constructions with political value. Their "truth" is not based on indisputable fact but on subjective conviction, allegiance and mutual identification" (ICG 2006:2). The point made, as already argued by Egwu (2004) is that we must understand the phenomenon of the resurgence of ethnic identity as well as its political mobilisation as part of the prevailing system of seeking power and authority, and as a part of the strategy of attaining material and psychological survival. It is within this arrangement that discrimination is employed. Without doubt what ethnicity represents in the struggle for power and resources is the resource value and we must take cognisance of this.

According to Coleman (1958), at the time of British occupation of northern Nigeria in 1900, the people of the region were broadly classified politically under three main groups: people of the North East who were mainly the Kanuri speaking people of Bornu and the Lake Chad area and directly under the Shehu of Bornu; the second were those in the North West comprising the Fulani and Hausa who were mainly Muslims under the leadership of emirates, ruled by Fulani aristocrats who paid allegiance to the supremacy of the Sultan of Sokoto; the third were people of

the Middle Belt on the Jos Plateau and several others interspersed at the lower region, these include the Fulani, Berom, Tiv, Gwari, Anaguta, Afizere, Idoma and several other linguistic groups that were described as "pagan tribes" who either existed in what Coleman called "precarious autonomy" or under the Fulani emirates (Coleman 1958:20). Contrary to Coleman's position, Danjibo (2005) argues that there were several minority groups in the North West like the Zuru who were autonomous from the emirate. Before British incursion, people of this region, like other regions, experienced "inter-tribal wars, migrations and internal slave trade" which no doubt aided the mix of its people. The social relation between the Hausa and Fulani Muslims and the people of the Middle Belt seen as "pagan tribes" has been described as that of "social symbiosis where no effort was made to convert the people of the hills and indigenous life was little influenced by Islam until after the area was first administered" (Kukah 1993:1).

The Fulani, who were the dominant power in northern Nigeria through the emirate councils, had attempted severally to entrench themselves in some parts of the Middle Belt without success but the colonial administration that later conquered the region handed it over to them for administrative convenience (ICG, 2006). The ICG posits that "British colonialism benefited the emirs and effectively handed them control of areas in the Middle Belt they had been unable to conquer" (pg 4). Within this framework, Jos, the capital of Plateau State, and its environs were placed under the Emir of Bauchi (Albert 2003a). The divide and rule strategy of the British colonial administration however played out as the British sought to entrench firm control that they encouraged pan-tribal federations, stimulating group consciousness. Kukah (1993) argues that British indirect rule reinforced communal identity even where it had not existed.

Ethnic competitions in Nigeria, therefore, have been characterised by zero-sum struggle, especially among the three major ethnic blocs—Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba—and their actions in several occasions resulted in violence but surprisingly, despite the complex ethno linguistic and religious diversity in northern Nigeria and especially the Middle Belt, the groups largely perceive themselves as northerners. They had in the past fought on one side against southern Nigerians. Indeed, it has been observed that in "the ethnic and communal killings that preceded the civil war in Jos, both in 1945 and in 1966, northerners perceived the southerners as enemies and took part in the hostility against them" (Plotnicov 1972:5; Egwu 2004:29). The Northernisation policy in Northern Nigeria, according Nnoli (1978), was the region's institutionalised form of limiting the

competition for national resources to northerners and by extension certain factions within the region.

The policy was to be a unifying factor for all northerners as well as an instrument against the south. However, politicians in the Christian-dominated Middle Belt also resisted being used by the Northern People's Congress (NPC) led by the Fulani oligarchies to further its ethnocentric and religious interests (Albert 1998). At this point the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy was said to have exploited religious symbolism and sentiments to promote their political interest. Thus at most times they were at logger heads with some ethno-religious groups in the Middle Belt, especially the Tiv and sometimes the Berom. So, to perpetually take hold of the entire north, the dominant ethnic groups employed religion. According to Albert (1998) "the simple strategy was to present the southerners to the northerners as Christians who should not be rated better than infidels {kafiri}. Of course it had been argued as early as 1824 by the Hausa that the intelligence of an infidel should not be rated more than that of an ass" (pg 51).

Religion was therefore a strong tool for winning mass support in northern Nigeria. Extremist Muslims and Northern Orligarchs manipulated religion and considered the southerners as well as Christians as unbelievers with whom a true Muslim should not have anything to do. This form of manipulation however contradicts the general Northern ideology which professed a policy of unity in diversity as the slogan "one North one people, irrespective of religion, rank or tribe" became an everyday language in the region. With this policy at that stage, the northerners saw themselves as one (Albert 1998). A former premier of the region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, had blamed the British for the unchecked migration of southerners into the region and had expected the southerners to have voluntarily left with the Europeans at independence. Albert (1998) posits that with such position Bello did not recognize the right of the southern Nigerians to live in the north as espoused in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. To buttress this fact Albert succinctly captures the argument of Sir Ahmadu Bello in the Northern House of Chiefs Debate of 19 March 1965 this way:

> The person who brings a stranger into the house should expect that when the owner of the house has gone, the stranger too should pack up and go (pg 59).

Ahmadu Bello's position reinforces autochthony in Nigeria but what is not too surprising however is how the question of indigeneity and contested citizenship that existed between the north and the south has now torn the north apart. What needs to be understood is how and at what

point the Northernisation policy collapsed. How did indigeneity come in? Why was indigene certificate issued in Plateau State? Of course it was because new identities had been created, and new boundaries were being drawn which had implications for ethnic relations. Following the above scenario, the pattern of ethno-religious relation has been based on the power to dictate the trend of politics, development and cultural behaviour. To manage these issues beginning from the 1960s, Nigeria's federal government split the old regions into states and new local governments were also created to curb the discriminatory tendency of indigeneity. As argued by Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2006) the minority northern groups at independence agitated for liberation from the Hausa whom they regarded as their historical oppressors. Human Rights Watch has argued that it was in response to the yearnings of the Middle Belt minority to salvage them from what they regarded as the systematic marginalisation by the Hausa-led regional government that Plateau State among others was created in 1976. The creation of states and local governments, however, was later to become the basis for extreme violent contestations.

Since the colonial times therefore, ethnic and religious self-determination have led to different forms of identity conflicts in Nigeria with an upsurge after the country's political independence. The year 1994 is significant in the history of violent conflicts in Plateau State as the events of that year deepened the identity-based crisis in the state and still linger in the resultant settlement dynamic. The history of identity conflict (ethnic tensions) in Plateau State can be traced to 1932 it became violent in 1945 (Plotnicov, 1967; 1971). In 1994, the conflict took ethno-religious dimension but its intensity was contained by the then military government. The return to civil rule in 1999 however came with the opportunity for people to express themselves and some chose to do it violently. Tensions built up in Jos Plateau and in 2001 the explosion happened with grave casualty for both Christians and Muslims. Violence later spread to southern Plateau and lingered until 2012 when the conflict began to de-escalate.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The deep-seated insecurity in Plateau State arising from violent ethno-religious conflicts started from a struggle for territorial ownership and local political control and has altered the human settlements. The indigeneity phenomenon as practiced in the Nigerian state led to the political exclusion of certain groups on the basis of ethnicity and religion which has exacerbated the competing claims and violent contestations between different ethnic and religious groups on the Plateau. In fear of sectarian violence, search for safety and resistance of the exclusion, people

tend to relocate to areas with high concentration of their group members. That is, persistent sectarian attacks have sparked "unprecedented movement" of whole groups in search of safer territory and this has entirely altered settlements in the state. This in turn is seen as claim to space, assertion of ownership and resistance to the limits of political exclusion and segregation. The point is that the persistent violent conflicts in Plateau State have altered inter-group relations, causing a shift in the settlements and this scenario has reinforced violence in some parts of the state. This section provides the theoretical foundations for explaining the interaction between ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics. Classical literature in this area have focused on why ethnic groups engage in conflict. Often, these studies in providing explanations for the motivations for group conflict tend to classify groups as unitary actors with less emphasis on the heteregenous internal structures of each group. That is, there is little attention on how groups mobilize for conflicts. While these thereotical explanations on why people fight are important they are not sufficient in explaining how they mobilise for conflict. It is important to examine some classical thereotical explanations on why groups fight and how they mobilise.

2.2.1 Relative Deprivation Theory

Within the ambits of explaning why people fight, the theory of relative deprivation advanced by Ted Robert Gurr claims that a group's violent reaction is caused by the perceived differences between what a group thinks they are entitled to as members of a state and what they get in reality (Gurr, 1970). This discrepancy is often measured along economic lines. For instance, when a group is systematically excluded from high income positions in a state. However, relative deprivation can also occur politically, for example by not granting group members access to political elite positions, or otherwise not allowing the group to participate in politics. This perceived deprivation, according to Gurr, leads to a feeling of collective frustration of the group. To this end, Gurr draws on the "frustration–aggression" hypothesis from the psychological literature to link perceived deprivation to collective violence (Weidmann, 2009; Gurr, 1970). Nevertheless, relative deprivation as a motivation for conflict is not restricted to ethnic groups but it is most likely to be effective if ethnic group boundaries coincide with socio-economic divisions.

2.2.2 Manipulation of Religion

The manipulation thesis as advanced by Y.B. Usman claims that Northern Orligarchy are partly responsible for the violent conflicts experienced in the Northern states of Nigeria in the 1980s

(Usman, 1987). Usman had argued that a that point in the history of Nigeria, millions of Nigerians were increasingly realising that the country's economic and social systems have not considered their well being except for landlessness, indeptedness, unemployment, destitution, disease, illiteracy and chronic and pervasive insecurity. His position underscores the intensification of political campaigns around religious differences which can be understood in the larger context of economic and social dislocation and as a continuation of a political pattern which can be traced back to the radicalisation that trailed the last years of the Gowon regime (Usman, 1987:9).

Usman clinically analysed some incidents of religious violence in Northern Nigeria beginning with Maitatsine uprising in Kano from 18 to 29 December, 1980 leading to the loss of 4,177 lives. Others include the Bulukuntu riots in Maiduguri from 28 to 30 October, 1982 with a death toll of over 400 persons; the acrimony that attended the Sharia debate in the run up to the second republic; the attempt to read religious meanings into the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed and the riots in Kaduna from Friday, 29 to Saturday, 31 October, 1982 as well as the violent demonstration in Sabon Garin, Kano by the Muslim Students Society on Saturday, 30 October, 1982 (Ayobolu, 2012). In relation to the last incident, Usman observed:

> Only two people were killed according to newspaper reports. But the great significance of this incident is that it involves for the first time, the calculated destruction and burning of Christian churches in what seems to be a violent assertion of the 'Islam Only' slogan painted all over the streets of Zaria in an aggressive demonstration by the Muslim Students Society in 1980. The attack on and destruction of Christian churches in Sabon Garin Kano, marks the highest and most dangerous, point this systematic manipulation of religion has reached in its opposition to the unity of the people of this country (Usman, 1987:48).

Usman's rigourous analysis is manifest in Nigerian society several years after. The manipulation thesis has been utilised in several other studies to capture the contemporary manifestation of religious fundamentalism in Nigeria (Danjibo, 2009; Ladan-Baki, 2015). This is important in understand the role of the intermediary bourgeoisie" in the manipulation of religious conflicts in Nigeria.

2.2.3 Ethnic Security Dilemma

Security dilemma is a dominant concept in international security theory. The concept was first expounded at the beginning of the 1950s by the British historian Herbert Butterfield (1951), and the American political scientist John Herz (1951). The kernel of the security dilemma model

defines a situation whereby one actor in its traditional manifestation, (the state) tries to increase its security, causes a reaction in a second, which, in the end, decreases the security of the first. As a result, a twisted process of action and reaction is manifest in which each side's behaviour is seen as threatening. For scholars of security dilemma (Butterfield, 1951; Herz, 1951; Snyder, 1984; Posen, 1993; Roe, 2005), the key explanation to the emergence of security dilemma is misperception. In this case, defensively motivated actions are misinterpreted as offensive moves, thus requiring some kind of countermeasure. In this way, Butterfield (1951) described the situation as a 'tragedy', inasmuch as the protagonists seek to avoid conflict of any sort. Barry Posen (1993) was the first to apply the theory to explain the variance across regions in the risks and intensities of inter-group conflict. He wrote that, "the claim that newly released, age-old antipathies account for this violence fails to explain the considerable variance in observable intergroup relations". In essence, what Posen has done is to identify factors that increase the risk of violent conflict when imperial order breaks down.

This approach of using the security dilemma theory to understand inter-group violence provides analytical insight into the increasing identity conflicts ravaging Africa, Nigeria and Plateau State in particular. Roe (2005) distinguished between tight and loose security dilemma. Roe draws attention to real incompatibility in terms of security requirements and what he called 'required insecurity' of groups as the basis for security dilemma. He contended that:

> A tight security dilemma can be said to occur when two actors, with compatible security requirements, misperceive the nature of their relationship and thus employ countermeasures based on – and borrowing from Kenneth Boulding – an 'illusory incompatibility'. It is this type of security dilemma that fits most with Butterfield's original conception. In a regular security dilemma, while the protagonists may still be seen as security-seekers, there exists a 'real incompatibility' in terms of their security requirements; that is to say, security for one side may well necessitate insecurity for the other – what I call… 'required insecurity'. Finally, in a loose security dilemma what is most important is that 'offense–defense variables still play a role in explaining war' (Roe, 2005:2).

The eventual result of the above pattern of relationship is a division of a system into two rival coalitions. Posen (1993) argues that security dilemma is particularly intense when three conditions hold. The conditions include, the indistinguishability of offense and defense; the superiority of offensive and defensive action; and, when windows of opportunity are present.

Let's look at these conditions and thereafter examine the explanatory value of this paradigm in understanding ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics in Plateau State.

First, the indistinguishability of offence and defence position implies when offensive and defensive military forces appear more or less identical. This is most likely to raise the following arguments:

Newly self-determined groups must first determine whether their neighbouring groups are a threat to their existence. This is because the weaponry available to such groups is often fundamental and their offensive military capabilities will be as much a function of the quantity and commitment of the 'soldiers' they can mobilise as the particular features of the weapons they hold. Thus, each group will have no choice but to assess the other's offensive military potential in terms of the group's cohesiveness and offensive history.

Given the above argument, the "group solidarity" of the ethnic, religious or cultural groups that emerge from collapsed empires, weak, fragile, collapsed or collapsing states gives each of them an inherent offensive military power, driving groups to fear each other. It is also clear from such logic that a history of armed clashes or bitter rivalries between groups furthers the tendency of groups to perceive each other as offensive threats.

Second, the superiority of offensive over defensive action, that is, when offensive operations are more effective than defensive ones, two main factors are generally seen as affecting the superiority of offensive or defensive action: technology and geography.

On technology, Posen restricts his treatment of the technology factor to a discussion of nuclear weapons. This is because group solidarity would not contribute to the ability of either side to mount a counterforce nuclear attack, nationalism and "groupness" (discussed above) are less likely to affect the security dilemma cases where groups hold nuclear weapons.

Geography, Posen, contends, is a more widely relevant variable. Where one territorially concentrated group has "islands" of its members distributed across the nominal territory of another group, the protection of these pockets in the event of hostile action can seem extremely

difficult. Isolated ethnic groups can produce incentives for preventive war if one side has (or believes to have) an advantage that will not be present later.

Third, the 'when windows of opportunity are present' has to do with the collapse of central authority. According to Posen, when central authority has recently collapsed, the emerging groups calculate their current position relative to each other and make judgments about their relative power in the future (and by extension, their incentives for preventive war). The relative rate of state formation influences these incentives. Posen reiterated that "if those with greater advantages expect to remain in that position…then they may see no window of opportunity. However, if they expect their advantage to wane or disappear, then, they will have incentive to solve outstanding issues while they are much stronger than the opposition". Again, expectations about outside intervention (on either side) will also affect the decision to engage in preventive war. Additionally, groups wishing to initiate offensive military action, but fearing outside opposition, may move quickly when international actors (institutions, great powers, etc) are preoccupied with other conflicts or crises. Some of these conditions may not always occur in non-war scenario. Yet, while some of them have repeatedly intensified the violent situations in Plateau State and other parts of Northern Nigeria others have manifested in the larger Nigerian environment and other parts of Africa.

Furthermore, from Posen's conditions for an intensified security dilemma, certain variables could be identified as factors reinforcing and exacerbating such intensity and violence. These variables include the perception of group cohesiveness; history of rivalry and violent clashes; presence of exclusive or isolated ethnic islands or enclaves; existence of small bands of fanatics; anticipated shifts in relative power; expected intervention of allies; and existence of large number of conflicts and crisis in the international environment. Posen (1993) had utilized the security dilemma model to explain the egregious violence that swept through the former Yugoslavia Federation. That is, the open warfare between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. He also applied it to explain the tensions between Ukrainians and Russians as well as between Armenians and Azeris. Allan Collins (1998) also applied it to explain the ethnic violence in Malaysia. Varshney (2002) applied it to the Hindu/Muslim conflict in India. Roe (2005) reinforced it in explaining the Yugoslav experience and reiterating how it deepens ethnic conflicts in the Krajina society. He added to that, the experience of the Romanians and Hungarians. While these conflicts are large scale wars, Xu (2012) argued that the security dilemma approach could also be applied to less violent conflicts.

The Plateau State case has provided new context in which to examine the explanatory value of the security dilemma model.

2.2.4 Social Capital: Bonding versus Bridging

The thesis of social capital has been independently invented severally since the twentieth century. Each time, the term is used to call attention to the ways our lives are being influenced (Putnam, 2000:16). Putnam in his famous book "Bowling Alone" presents social capital to represent a group with a common interest and collective strength and which wields power and resources to forge collective benefits. Social capital, therefore, is what ties people of common interest. It indicates what drives a people to pursue a goal and achieve it. This present to us different forms of networks and the roles they have played in either preventing or creating and sustaining communal perennial violence. Thus, it has been used to understand levels of communal violence and peace in different countries and cities of the World. Varshney (2002) explained the Hindu-Muslim conflict using the social capital and what he called civic engagement. For Varshney, inter-communal networks for civic life bring different communities together. In his attempt to establish an integral link between the structure of civil society on the one hand and ethnic or communal violence on the other, Varshney (2002:3) contended and differentiated associational forms of civic engagement and everyday forms of civic engagement. Civic engagement and social capital entail mutual obligation and responsibility for action.

There are different forms of social capital. It could be a tie among family members, neighbours, people with shared experience or cultural norms. According to Putnam, social capital can have a group base, a network base or an institutional base. Social capital operates with tools of inclusion and exclusion. It serves as protection and access to those who belong and as a threat and denial to those who are considered outsiders. It is for this reason that Putnam contended that:

> Networks and the associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for those inside the network, but the external effects of social capital are by no means always positive. It was social capital, for example, that enabled Timothy McVeigh to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. McVeigh's network of friends, bound together by a norm of reciprocity, enabled him to do what he could not have done alone. Similarly, urban gangs, NIMBY ("not in my backyard") movements, and power elites often exploit social capital to achieve ends that are antisocial from a wider perspective. Indeed, it is rhetorically useful for such

> groups to obscure the difference between the pro-social and antisocial consequences of community organisations (2000:19).

The implication of the above is that group formation supported by certain features of society can improve harmonious societal relations or create chaos by altering harmonious societal relations. The point to underscore is that social capital can be used for nasty, antisocial purposes. Although social capital could have positive consequences like mutual support in society, cooperation, trust and institutional effectiveness; it has some negative manifestations like sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption and genocide or ethnic cleansing. It provides us with an analytical tool to understand increasing ethnic violence and settlement dynamics in Plateau State. Thus, how has social capital contributed to the violent identity conflicts and the emergence of exclusive neighbourhoods on the one hand and how social capital contributes to peace on the other hand in the State. Putnam provided us with two approaches to examine social capital as bridging versus bonding in social capital. The distinction between bridging (inclusive) and bonding (exclusive) are the most salient forms of social capital for this study. The distinction was further explained by Putnam who argued that bonding social capital is inward looking like ethnic fraternal organizations while bridging social capital is outward looking and cuts across divers social cleavages like civil rights movement (Putnam, 2000:20).

Bonding social capital is used for mobilising group solidarity. Exclusive neighbourhoods for example provide critical social and psychological support for less fortunate members of a given community. This is in terms of security, access to economic and political incentives and cultural solidarity. In contrast to bonding, bridging networks are better for linkage to external assets and economic diffusion. Most times, bonding networks sustains master cleavages as it is presented as valuable to oppressed groups and the marginalised members of a society to band together in groups to fight, forge and support a collective interest. It is a social network between homogenous groups. Putnam contends that "bonding social capital, by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism", (2000:21). It is therefore expected that bonding will breed negative external effects. However, both bridging and bonding social capital could have powerfully positive social effects if properly utilised.

Fukuyama (1995) had cautioned that bonding in an environment with high level exclusion and denial can have negative consequences, as in the case of criminal gangs and factions based on ethnic or political lines, which promote exclusionary practices based on distrust, intolerance and

hate. The exclusive settlement in Plateau State has provided a form of in-group bonding among the ethno-religious groups that inhabit it. As a matter of fact, the exclusive patterns have deepened the bonding in organisations that tend to reinforce identity formation and promote practices that reinforces distrust, intolerance and hatred.

2.2.5 Victim Mentality Theory

Victim mentality theory as advanced by Richardson Jr and Sen (1996) shows that groups often present themselves as victims of oppression to justify their present behaviour against a supposed opposing group. They argued that members and leaders of contending ethnic groups, whether they are presently discriminating against a subordinate group or the object of discrimination, often portray themselves as victims (Richardson Jr and Sen, 1996:5). A "victim" mentality helps unite group members behind their leaders. and justifies present sacrifices. Moreover. members of a victimized group feel justified in victimizing others- being a victim in the past, real or imagined, thus does not ensure humane treatment of rival ethnic groups in the present. Ethnic leaders seek control of state power to ensure their group is never victimized again, to right past wrongs and to avenge past oppression. In the case of Plateau State, the Anaguta, Afizere and Berom view themselves as victims of British colonialism and Hausa domination under colonial rule. On the other hand, the Hausa and Fulani in Plateau State also see themselves as victims of the indigenous groups' domination in the post independent period. Victim mentality theory provides explanation why the conflict is persistent in Plateau State.

2.2.6 Relational Theory

The proponents of relational theory, Apter David (1961), E.J. Lawler (1992; 2010), and Samuel P. Huntington (1996) assume that conflict is a result of interaction of different individuals and/or groups with differing cultural orientations, values, and interests. They also assume that conflict is at the heart of all human relationships (FEWER, Training Manual 2002). Basically, the theory attempts to understand identity-based conflicts that are prevalent in different countries of the world today. It seeks to understand why people tend to resent those who are different from them. Studies have shown that at the sociological level, differences challenge individuals' and groups' identity formation processes. These differences create the tendency for "otherness" and causes people to see those different from them as intruders who must be prevented from encroaching upon established cultural boundaries (Faleti, 2006).

Proponents of relational theory argue that political economy explains the recurrent tensions between groups. They contend that groups who share a common resource are likely to engage in a violent conflict than those who do not. Power provided by the political economy and the advantages that accrue become a key source for the tensions and in heterogeneous society where multiple groups share a common fixed resource, they tend "to eliminate, injure or neutralise the other" (Coser, 1968), or monopolise such a resource, thereby providing the background for negative relationships (Moaz, 1982 cited in Faleti, 2006). Most identity-based conflicts grow out of shared memory or historical antecedents. Violent historical relation can perpetuate a divide among groups and may entrench the dehumanisation of the other (FEWER Training Manual, 2002). Most times, such violent interactions produce negative outcomes like cultural stereotypes, racial intolerance, and discrimination. As observed by Faleti (2006) "such a history of negative exchanges between groups may make it difficult for efforts to integrate different ethnic and religious groups within a society to succeed because their past interactions make it difficult for them to trust one another" (pg 55).

This analytical framework becomes relevant to the discourse of ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics when we understand that violent conflicts deepen mutual distrust and perpetuate a culture of discrimination, segregation and hatred. The framework puts the persistent ethno-religious crisis in Plateau State and the attendant settlement dynamic in perspective. The unassuming presence of cultural differences indicates a conspicuous individual or group interest which varies from that of the other and the tendency that this difference will throw up a challenge which will sometimes lead to clashes inevitably. Indigeneity in Plateau State is seen as a tool for exclusionary politics which is viewed as a denial of opportunity and access. It is evident that ethnicity and religion are the organising variables for group cohesion and discrimination in Plateau State. Economic opportunities in the state are mainly available within the political economy and traditional institutions but access to these opportunities are restricted to the few categorized as indigenes. Consequently, this has translated into poor communication, miscommunication, negative stereotype and prejudice as one group perceives several of her interrelationships with other groups as illegitimate.

Furthermore, this framework is relevant to the study of ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics given the fact that protracted violence sparked a movement towards exclusive

neighbourhoods and the attempts by its occupants to protect that territory. The interest in gravitating towards an exclusive neighbourhood is to defend one's group or to be protected from violence. The opportunity provided by this enclave could help the group to efficiently mobilise for conflict. This framework is critical in understanding how mobilisation for conflict spreads through the group population. Why and how do they mobilise? Group violence provided by inter-group's historical antecedents would possibly address this question.

Ethnic cohorts and religious fundamentalists tend to engage in violent conflicts to assert ownership and to protect their cultural boundaries from being invaded by alien practices; thus they prejudice and dehumanise each other in a highly tense mutual violence. With this, people are likely to move away from the scene where they consider their lives threatened by sectarian violence towards a neighbourhood that will guarantee their safety (Lysaght and Basten, 2003). As they move, their experiences are built into narratives which trigger violence in their new location. These movements alter the structure of society and restrict the interactions within it, leading to possible disintegration of such societies. The scenario is conditioned by a web of social relations that stretch beyond the individual; their repercussions transcend the individuals involved to affect society at large. It is evident that the above scenario will deepen prejudice and mutual hostility because individuals' interactions become characterised by fear and violence. Thus the move towards ethno-religious neighbourhoods is to seek protection from violence and a resistance to the level of discrimination. Apparently, this explains why conflict recurrence is in the upsurge in Plateau State and gives credence to the applicability of integration theory to our discourse. The theory provides us with the tool for mapping and understanding the recurrent conflicts in Plateau State.

2.3 Review of Literature

A plethora of literature exists on ethnic and religious relations in Nigeria, yet there is need to investigate the link between violent conflicts, ethnicity and religion and settlement patterns. There is a wide consensus among scholars on the origin of ethnicity, its nurture, growth and persistence as a colonial urban creation. The context that gave rise to the phenomenon was urban engineered manipulation of communal identity and socio-economic scarcity which provided the platform for zero-sum competitions for jobs, housing, trade and commercial activities as well as the insecurities that trailed the colonial urban centres (Nnoli, 1978; Otite, 2000; and Egwu, 2004). Those competitions were purely ethnic in character. In its quest to perpetuate its rule, colonialism

employed the divide and rule strategy to keep the different nationalities within the polity. Thus it reinforced identity consciousness. This new consciousness is what Chazan et al (1988) call "enforced ethnicity" (pg 103). Of course Ekeh (1983) has argued that the concept of being Igbo or Yoruba is a new creation. Several of the identities were created during the colonial period and the ruling elite, for selfish reasons, have continued with such creations. For instance, Ekeh (1983) posits that the Ikwerre in River State until the civil war were Igbo. However, the elite have made conscious efforts to keep to the strategy so as to control the political economy. Thus, manipulation of cultural values has kept ethnicity as a vibrant tool in the hands of the elite and several of such manipulations have led to devastating violent conflicts. Specific body of literature in this subject has chronicled the link between conflict, ethnicity, religion and settlement patterns.

2.3.1 Colonialism and Space: The Manipulation of Ethnicity and Settlement Dynamics

2.3.1.1 Colonialism and the Manipulation of Ethnicity

Academic study of group relations and settlement dynamics in Nigeria began in the 1960s when scholars undertook an agenda to understand the role of urbanism in the emergence, nurture and growth of ethnicity (Plotnicov, 1967; Cohen, 1969; Nnoli, 1978). Rather than examine and exemplify how political and administrative policies mobilised and manipulated ethno-religious consciousness and produced exclusive neighbourhoods that emphasised differences, studies of that period concentrated on understanding the exclusive neighbourhoods as an attempt by Islam to be free from what they referred to as "pagan beliefs". The pioneer scholars of this subject in Nigeria such as Plotnicov (1967) and Cohen (1969) concerned themselves with explaining associational ethnicity through which the Hausa manipulated cultural values and monopolised trade.

Later studies attempted to show the pervasive nature of ethnicity and ways to correct, attenuate or even eradicate the phenomenon. Rather than attenuating, it continued to pose multifaceted problems in Nigeria. An examination of the concept of ethnicity earlier indicates that the concept has great divisive power. It has been argued that the concept of ethnic group like ethnicity is relatively new. Ekeh (1983) contends that just like being a Nigerian is a new kind of conception, being Yoruba or Igbo is not very much older. These groups can be formed and can also crumble due to how fluid ethnic boundaries are. It is an indication that while these social formations of ethnic groups are being made to achieve specific goals, they crumble afterwards because people

will definitely rediscover new ethnicity for other goals. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) argue that both in competitive and non-competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity. The authors further posit that "ethnicity is demonstrably the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria" (pg 8). They added that in a survey on "Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria" conducted by Lewis and Bratton in 2000, it was discovered that "close to two-thirds of the population see themselves as members of primordial ethnic, regional and religious groups…Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of workplace…" (pg 9).

The affirmation above is not surprising going by the fact that ethnic formations are perhaps the most historically enduring behavioural units in the country and were further reinforced by colonial and post-colonial regimes (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). This argument supports the claim that it was during the colonial phase in Nigeria's development that the ethnic components of the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo groups were aroused through the people's competition for limited opportunities offered by the colonial environment (Nnoli, 1978; Albert 1994). From whatever perspective we look at it, ethnicity employs the strategy of discrimination. Ethnic identities and boundaries, as argued above, are fluid. A good example is the Ikwerre in Rivers State Nigeria who before the civil war was Igbo but rediscovered their Ikwerre identity after the war (Ekeh 1983; Horowitz 1985; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). Also, it has been argued that the Hausa in northern Nigeria is a congregation of several tribal societies that have reasserted their self-consciousness (Coleman 1958; Ekeh 1983). Ethnicity therefore is a very complex phenomenon. Thus it is ethnicity that has restructured the once self-acclaimed one north that was common during the colonial period and the first two decades after independence.

Ethnicity has led to several destructive conflicts in Nigeria and most of them are products of political or administrative policies which employed divide and rule strategy to manipulate ethnic consciousness. Ethnicity itself is said to be a product of the colonial urban situation (Nnoli 1978). Scholars writing on ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics in Nigeria during the 1960s and 1990s focused extensively on the colonial heritage of Sabon Gari settlements. These studies Plotnicov (1967), Cohen (1969), Nnoli (1978), Kukah (1993), Albert (1994, 1996) and Olaniyi (2006, 2011) have argued that the British colonialists were the first to employ divide and rule strategy that mobilised and manipulated ethnic consciousness and manifested in deep-seated inter-ethnic conflicts. They examined the emergence of this separate settlements first introduced in

Kano in 1911 and later in Ibadan in 1916 (Albert, 1994). In pre-colonial Kano, there existed a separate settlement for migrants, who at that period were Muslims and were in Kano mainly for religious purposes but also for commercial ends. Albert (1994) contends that religious homogeneity informed the calmness or the peaceful atmosphere of the pre-colonial Kano despite the presence of different nationals, but Nwaka (2008) argues that the Maguzawa (Animists) also existed alongside Muslims. It needs to be pointed out that the pre-colonial Hausa states welcomed all Muslim immigrants and pilgrims as well as traders from West and North Africa. This policy promoted the integration of strangers into Hausa society. The local and foreign merchants as already indicated lived within the walls (Fourchard, 2009). Barth (1857) has argued that some traders settled near city gates. Reasons for this have been observed by Lovejoy as to minimize the difficulties in making livestock readily available (Barth, 1857 and Lovejoy, 1980 cited in Fourchard, 2009). This point will be further discussed in this section.

As shown in existing literature, things however began to change when the construction of railway lines from Lagos to Kano between 1892 and 1912 (ICG, 2010) and from Port Harcourt to Jos in 1927 (Plotnicov 1972) opened the north to southerners. The influx of southern Nigerians into northern cities in search of greener pastures and the culture shock experienced by the host community (following the cultural practices of the southerners) troubled the British who had at the invasion of that region promised the Emirs that they would curtail the migration of the southerners into northern territory. The colonialists therefore categorised Nigerians and grouped them in different enclaves that include the Birni (walled city), Tudun Wada and Sabon Gari. Lord Lugard who made the above promise to Lamido of Adamawa and Sultan of Sokoto had pointed out that a typical southerner is "quite certain to give much trouble in his dealings with natives and by his fondness for litigation" (cited in Nwaka 2008). Thus, Temple, a colonial administrator contended that "the Sabon Gari Kano should be occupied by non-native Africans, and by such natives as might cause trouble if they live in Kano city" (cited in Albert 1994:25).

Segregation is usually an outcome of inter-group or sub group interaction. Peil (1981) argued that "propinquity can encourage understanding and friendship, or merely raise tensions which would be absent if people of differing norms and values had no need to interact so closely" (pg 114). Since no man or group exists without having need of another group, close interaction becomes inevitable. Some groups, however, have a culture of segregating themselves wherever they are. An example of this is the Hausa who would always segregate themselves wherever they sojourn

in a neighbourhood called Sabo for religious and socio-economic reasons (Akinyele 2003). But segregation from whatever perspective that one looks at it involves discrimination. It is discriminatory because people are sorted in categories and once people are sorted in categories, it must be done spatially (Sundstrom 2003). It is this sorting by category in neighbourhoods in Plateau State, whether it is societal or self-delineation or by official policy which is referred to here as residential segregation and settlement dynamics. Before Temple's stratification of Nigerian groups, however, the Yoruba and the Nupe had co-existed with the Hausa in the walled city (Olaniyi, 2006).

Furthermore, Schildkrout (1978) separated ethnicity from the processes of migration and urbanization. She argued that studies on the subject of ethnicity confuse the consequences of migration and urbanization with the nature of ethnicity. Her study rather viewed ethnicity from the changes in the concept of ethnic identity. To this end, Schildkrout argued that ethnicity in Africa is the result of centuries of dealing with strangers and incorporating migrants into their societies. She contended that in the pre-colonial Africa, methods of accommodating cultural differences and population movements were many and varied, depending upon the type of contact and the cultural and structural features of the groups involved (1978:3-4). Using pre-colonial Asante, Schildkrout argued that government regulated the number of immigrants admitted as war captives, slaves, refugees, or merchants, so that the influx of aliens never surpassed the state's ability to cope with them. At some occasions, strangers came as conquerors but the numbers in such category were frequently small. Conquest usually led to intermarriage and to the cultural incorporation of the intrusive population into the host society. Incorporation at that instance defines the changes in ethnic identity as most of the intruders will take the new identity of their host society.

Schildkrout's study showed that the non-incorporation of very large numbers of strangers or aliens is a modern phenomenon in Africa (1978:4). This followed the changes in the patterns of migration in colonial Africa. According to Schildkrout, pre-colonial migrations in Africa were primarily migrations of persons, usually involving resettlement. However, the migrations of the colonial period were, on the whole, migrations of labour. During this period, host communities lost the control over migrants and the political status of the migrant was determined by the colonial government. Thus, strangers and hosts were more or less categorised as subjects of colonial powers. To this end, the inability of African hosts to determine stranger policy, as well as

a great increase in the number of strangers, disrupted the established processes of incorporation which previously regulated migration. At the end of colonial rule this raised serious concerns as both hosts and strangers were confronted with complex questions about who had the power to control the situation: demographically, economically, politically, and socially (Schildkrout, 1978:4).

She argued that these events and other factors facilitating migration led to the creation of stranger communities known as the Zongos in Ghana. Such communities are similar in some ways to the Sabon Gari in Nigeria described by Cohen (1969) and Albert (1994). While Schildkrout identified tensions arising from host-stranger relationships and changes in ethnic identity, the study did not show how the strain alters human settlements.

2.3.1.2 Colonialism and Space: Colonial Divisions in Urban Nigeria and Africa

Writings on space and colonialism in Africa and particularly Nigeria have focused on how colonial administrators attempted to segregate from Africans on health and security grounds and the division of Africans as administrative policy to exploit them (Peil, 1981; Olukoju, 2003; Fourchard, 2009). As important as these studies are they tend to neglect the fact that space is a material product of the political economy. Henri Lefebvre has argued that "space is permeated with social relations; it is not only supported by social relations but it is also producing and produced by social relations" (Cited in Hayden, 1999:142). Hayden has observed that in a conflict situation the production of space often proceeds at an extremely rapid pace. This is because violent conflicts requires that societies organise themselves for offence or defence. Thus existing territorial constraints may deepen, intensifying residential segregation. To this fact DeLancey (2005) focused on how traditional African social organisation, environmental concerns and the input of Islam played fundamental roles in the spatial organisation of economic, social, and religious spaces in the cities of the Sokoto Caliphate. For him, Islam enhanced the importance of a central religious space and the mosque replaced the palace as the centre of urban space. This however did not usurp the forms of social organisation rather Islam was instrumental in unifying different cultures and lessened the differences in the perception of built spaces. Thus DeLancey (2005) was interested in how religion influenced settlement dynamics in pre-colonial Nigeria. His study however, consigned to insignificance the inter-group relations in such cities. That is, how

did Islamic adherents interact with Traditional religions adherents? What was the perception of these two religions on built space?

Furthermore, extant studies on space and colonialism in Africa indicate that there is not a single, unified and complete structure but a collection of distinct neighbourhoods separated by class, race, ethnicity and religion. Thus, segregated urban spaces became commonplace in African cities during the colonial era. Existing literature suggest that rural-urban divide grew very early in the colonial era when Europeans sought to control the development of urban space by instituting strict policies of segregation and encouraging the development of separate spheres based on racial stereotypes of traditional and modern (Otiso, 2005; Muranga, 2005; Visser, 2005; Sandwith, 2005). While the Europeans promoted urban spaces as modern constructs, they suggested that Africans belong in the 'traditional'. This led to a feeling of alienation for the Africans. Post-colonial Africa however has replaced that European urban stratification with divers categorisation following increasing cultural differences and elite desire to keep perpetual hold to power. In the same manner of "traditional" and "modern" Mahmood Mamdani's (2009) book provides an account of Dafur's troubled history and place the origins of the present conflict in Sudan in British colonial administrative policies that served to activate and harden ethnic identities and cleavages. He argued that the literature on colonialism often downplayed the role of modern empires in the re-identification of peoples and the exalting of narrower identities as legitimate. According to him, British colonial governance was about identity formation. Thus, Mamdani claimed that the British Empire took the old Roman strategy of "divide and rule" a step further: "re-identify and rule". The point to underscore is that colonialism categorised Africans and sorted them out; once people are categorised and sorted out it must be done spatially. However, Mamdani (2009) restricted his argument to the categorisation neglecting how such categorisation influenced and affected built space and influenced inter-group relations.

According to Salm and Falola (2005) global influences have long had an effect on the development of African cities. Urban spaces (cities) are home to different people who came to the city at different times and for different reasons. Thus the hybrid nature of the urban environment was determined by immigration, religious factors and continuing conflict between 'traditional' and 'modern' space. Thus existing literature on space and colonialism have also identified African agency on shifting space and transformation of identities. They have shown that identity formation is closely linked to the processes of change in residential space. Jeremy Rich (2005)

examined the connections that tied Libreville, Gabon, to the Atlantic and imperial worlds and attracted different Africans, Asians and Europeans and particularly Vietnamese who were used for labour by the French during the early colonial era. This helped to shape the physical and social space of Libreville. However, the different groups faced difficulties in adapting to their new environment but were instrumental in determining the spatial development of the city. Rich (2005) drew attention to the need for researchers to be preoccupied with the level of global influences in early colonial era and acknowledge their importance in the economic, social and cultural development of African cities. This call necessitates the urgency in examining global influences in post-colonial Nigeria on settlement dynamics and transformation of identities.

On the other hand, Amutabi (2005) was not limited to interrogating the problematic legacy of colonialism in Kenya, but he also suggested the need to move away from migrationist histories toward an analysis of what happened to immigrant groups once they settled in their new cities. Amutabi contend that researchers must consider the combination of pre-colonial and colonial legacies and rural-urban migration in relation to the present and the future. His study of Kenya shows that the concerned group (Isiolo) has a long history of contact with global influences. In Amutabi's work, Isiolo portrays the importance of the pastoralist economy. It also reveals a colonial legacy of religious conflict between Christians and Muslims and the military importance of northern Kenya in the colonial attempt to control the borders with imperial Ethiopia. Today, Islamic institutions conflict with western ideologies of non-profit aid and development organisation and has led to conflicts relating to construction, food preparation, women's roles, spatial organisation and night life. Amutabi's study is of great relevance to this study as it draws attention to Christian-Muslim conflict especially in the area of settlement dynamics. Amutabi (2005) however has a limited insight on how conflicts alter human settlements (spatial organisation).

Also important here is Eric Ross' (2005) study of Touba, Senegal, which reveals how area's urban space is determined by African, Islamic and global religious forces. Ross affirmed that rather than colonial and post-colonial administrations, it is the Islamic brotherhoods that have controlled the planning and development of Touba. The author contended that occasional conflicts between members of different brotherhoods led to divisions of urban social and physical space and, in some cases, entirely new neighbourhoods. It is important to point out that Touba, is not only independent of the control of the national government, the city is also aligned to a larger

network of Muslim towns throughout Senegal and the international circles. This form of interaction could have grave effects on Senegal's national security. Particularly, the question needs to be asked, what is the implication of this kind of neighbourhood for the unity and cohesion of Senegal?

Stephen Legg (2007) examined the residential, policed and infrastructural landscapes of New and Old Delhi under British rule. He drew on the governmentality theories and methodologies presented in Michel Foucault's lecture course (Security, Territory, Population). Through this, Legg interrogated deeply the problems of social and racial segregation, the policing of the cities, and biopolitical needs in urban settings. Legg's study undertook a critique of colonial governmentality on the basis of lived spaces of everyday life. The strength of his work is its conceptual rigour. He brings a geographer's emphasis to the importance of different spatial formations and points to the excessiveness of place that is lacking in the governmentality literature. However, Legg (2007) offers only a restricted insight into how Delhi's governmentalities created multiple landscapes and how these landscapes interacted. This is because the author emphasised on the relational character of disciplinary, biopolitical and sovereign power which are different landscapes.

Glasco (2010) examined the spatial, material and cultural dimensions of life in eighteenth-century Mexico City, through programmes that colonial administrators created to renovate and reshape urban environments. The study revealed various points of conflict and discord over how various social groups defined and shared the public spaces in the city, and understood their place in a wider colonial system. Drawing from the archives, the study is empirical and sheds new light on the critical roles that urban planning played in the social and cultural dynamics of the city. Glasco's study is important to this research given the fact that it contested and questioned modern urban milieu where she claimed that the very rich sealed themselves off from the population in their walled residences and carriages while the poor are left vulnerable in slums. Residential spaces therefore serve as forms of security.

2.3.1.3 Colonialism, Internal Migrations and Settlement Dynamics in Nigeria

Internal migrations in Nigeria started in a low scale during the first decade of the twentieth century when colonial rule had been firmly established (Udo, 1983). Studies on human geography of Nigeria have attempted to understand the link between colonialism, population growth and

distribution, settlement dynamics in both rural and urban settings and patterns and processes of urban development (Afolayan, 1983; Udo, 1983; Gana, 1983; Ayeni, 1983). Using, central place theory, these studies provided empirical evidence on why people moved from one place to the other. They have drawn attention to how colonialism facilitated internal migrations which brought about the inter-mingling of different ethnic and religious groups and the modification of localized systems of organisation and thought.

The above strand of literature tended to examine the link between human geography and the economy (Afolayan, 1983; Udo, 1983; Gana, 1983; Ayeni, 1983). Thus, they contended that what informed internal migrations and rural and urban patterns of settlement were economic reasons. To this fact, settlement dynamic was conditioned by "central places" like markets, schools, mosques, churches and where other central functions were situated. Particularly, Gana (1983) contended that "central place" settlements did not only ensure proximity to work places but substantially reduces the amount of energy spent on conquering distance. He also drew attention to the fact that the tendency for ethnic groups to congregate together in distinct sections (spatialised segregation) is informed by the fact that some ethnic groups are identified with particular economic activities. At other occasions, lineage and warfare is said to structure human settlements. Gana posited that in Tivland, Nupeland and on the Jos Plateau, lineage segmentation played central role in settlement arrangement. He added that the Kambari who formerly lived in large towns now live in scattered settlements following the decimation of population by warfare throughout the region in the 1850s (Gana, 1983:175). However, despite the inter-group disharmony created in colonial urban Nigeria, these studies examined the issues of internal migrations, spatial distributions of population and segregated settlements without drawing attention to the frictions foregrounded by these issues. This brings to the fore why we need to interrogate conflicts and settlement dynamics in Nigeria.

Furthermore, explanations on why the academic study of conflicts and settlement dynamics are significant have been provided in literature. Albert's (1996) suggestions on this are illuminating. He sheds light on how a single, united community becomes two, indicating a linkage between ethnicity and the use of urban space as well as the relationship between history and geography. Albert contends that some separate settlements in Nigeria were religiously, ethnically, professionally, or economically motivated. Fourchard (2003) and Olukoju (2003) added that exclusive settlements most times emerge for security reasons. These studies argue that the

colonial administration was concerned with reducing contact between Africans who were assumed to be in conflict with one another. However, Nnoli (1978) contends that group contact alone does not breed conflict but the competing claims between groups do. Nigerians had lived in harmony with one another as against the popular Western view that contact among Africans was characterised by conflict but to support this view, the colonialists created the separate settlements, especially in northern Nigeria. It was against this background that Plotnicov wrote in 1967. His study provides the foundational background to the study of inter-ethnic relations in Jos Plateau. He draws our attention to early colonial policies in Nigeria and northern region particularly and its severe effects on inter-ethnic relations. Such colonial policies include the enforcement of segregated residential systems, different administrative systems for different ethnic groups and administrative inconsistency and, sometimes, indecision on the part of the colonial administration. The last point explains why the colonial authorities simultaneously acknowledged the distinct identity of the indigenous "pagan tribes" of the Plateau and yet promoted and protected Hausa political and cultural interests. Such indecision can be explained as the colonial divide and rule tactics that mobilized and manipulated ethnic consciousness. This point has been highlighted in several literature (Nnoli, 1978; 2003; Kukah, 1993; Albert, 1998; Egwu, 2004; Gandu 2011). The practice of indirect rule may as well explain that point because it involved restructuring local traditional authorities and deposing those office holders who resisted colonial rule, so as to create a compliant local power base that furthered British interests (ICG, 2010). Hence the problem of administering a plural Nigeria and the north particularly was obvious. Plotnicov (1967) argues that “the problems of administering a heterogeneous community were recognized as early as 1962” (pg 44) and that “the extreme heterogeneity of Jos reflects the variety of peoples of Nigeria, of whom almost all are represented” (pg 61). Thus, he clearly examines the emergence of different ethnic and cultural associations as an attempt by the immigrants to reproduce the cultural lifestyle of their various homelands which was a feature of the urban situation. This gives credence to Nnoli’s (1978) argument that Jos is among the cities that nursed ethnicity from its cradle.

In a later study, Plotnicov (1971) x-rays the British colonial divide and rule tactic and indicated how the administration’s manipulation of ethnicity resulted in the first major inter-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. To understand the 1945 Hausa/Igbo riots in Jos city is to understand the genesis of several inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and why residential area is an issue. This conflict is less publicized and the events leading to it partly discussed. Yet, it is important in understanding the

British divide and rule tactics and its consequence on ethnic relations in Nigeria. It preceded the 1953 Kano riot though the gravity of the two cannot be compared; the Jos conflict remains very significant. The study documents the 1932 near ethnic riot in Jos that was instigated by two pervasive rumours. As has been observed, the eventual 1945 violence between the Hausa and the Igbo was over market and residential area. The incident which saw an Igbo and Hausa trader argue over monkeys and potatoes led to two-day violence and resulted in the death of two people while also leaving several others injured. Plotnicov (1971), who succinctly builds the background of the events leading to the 1945 ethnic violence, indicates that the factors upon which the inter-ethnic hostility occurred were of British manipulation.

Plotnicov (1972) argues that from the inception of Jos when the city was officially founded, the Hausa have been in the majority and were therefore confined to the native town as against the popular wish of the native tribes who were confined to the township. The township covered present day Ahmadu Bello Way, Bukuru Road, Ibrahim Taiwo Road, Joseph Gomwalk, Murtala Mohammed Way, Tafawa Balewa, Rwang Pam Street, Church Street, Panyam Street, Zaria Crescent East, Tudun Wada and all of the Jenta divided by the railway line linking Jos and Zaria. The railway line passes behind eastern side of Maternity, east of JMDB and crosses Masalacin Juma'a at the roundabout at old Kasuwan Kaji and runs straight to the eastern side of the Gospel Centre directly bisecting the old National Bank, Jos Market Branch and along the new Market Road near the overhead bridge to Terminus Hotel and links the present railway station. The native town began from the present site of Jos North LGA and covers present day Abba na Shehu, Garba Daho, Jenta Adamu, Sarkin Arab, Ali Kazaure, Gangare, Garba Mohammed, Bauchi Road and Angwan Rogo (Gwom 1992:20-24). The authority of the native town was vested in the hands of the Hausa for two reasons; one because they were the majority in the town and secondly because their traditional political system suited the Lugardian indirect rule system of administration whereas the indigenous tribes (so-called pagan peoples) traditionally lacked formal political leaders and a centralised political system. One reason given for this was that the indigenous tribes who resided in Jos were not in any significant number until after the Second World War. Thus the highest offices held by Africans in Jos from 1914 to 1952 were that of Alkali and Sarki and the occupants of those positions were Hausa Muslims (Plotnicov, 1967, 1972).

Plotnicov argued that the Hausa believe that these arrangements were eminently suitable not only because they served to protect Hausa commercial interest in Jos but also because they enhanced

the Hausa belief in their divine right to rule throughout northern Nigeria (1967:34). This position gives credence to the argument by Plateau natives that the persistent conflicts are the continuation of the Jihad that was halted by colonialism (Best, 2007). Thus, the area that could not be conquered by the Emirates or the Caliphate in the 19th century by force was delivered to her by divine provision through the help of British intervention (Coleman 1958; Plotnicov 1972; ICG 2006). Hence, the conflicts on the Plateau can partly be explained as "the ethnicity of old hatred that was rekindled on contemporary events" (Plotnicov, 1967; Horowitz 1985:54); it could also be explained by the victim mentality theory. Plotnicov's (1972) preoccupation with ascertaining the owners of Jos indicates that the Hausa were disgruntled over the loss of control of Jos and were therefore reluctant to relinquish that control. However, the British colonial situation and its manipulative tendencies provided the environment for ethnicity and hostility.

Indeed, the British colonial administration dramatically altered the patterns of host-stranger relations in Nigeria. Citing Geschiere and Jackson (2006), Fourchad (2009:187) contends that "a recurrent contradiction all over the continent was between the formal effort by colonial regime to territorialize people, on the one hand, and their equally common preference for migrants on the other". Thus, the colonial insincerity and its divisive administrative arrangement to rule different groups in an increasingly mixed ethnic and religious environment not only institutionalised the distinction between natives and settlers but also enshrined an exclusive settlement. This led to the internalisation of the phenomenon by Nigerians which was further exacerbated at independence by the elite (Fourchard, 2009). Although the colonialist's orientation of divide and rule which was perpetuated by post-independence elite altered host-stranger relations and reinforced residential segregation, some other factors contributed in exacerbating the phenomenon. However, these factors cannot be discussed in total isolation of colonialism.

As indicated earlier, it has been argued in literature that traditionally the Hausa live separately wherever they sojourn for religious reasons but also for economic reasons (Akinyele 2003; Awasom 2003; Fourchard 2009). Existing studies indicate that separate or exclusive settlement was also a feature of pre-colonial Hausa land. For instance, pre-colonial Kano was characterized by specialised quarters and by 1859 it was organised into 74 quarters (Nwaka, 2008). Lovejoy (1980), drew a distinction between the cities where Muslim merchants formed a minority and cities where the government was Islamic. Light has been shed on the second category above where Hausa states welcomed all Muslims. In the first category, Muslim traders (Hausa)

frequently lived in distinct quarters which protected their economic, social and religious autonomy. Lovejoy (1980:42) contends that "this isolation helped the dispersed Muslim settlements to retain their international connections with other commercial centres outside the local states and was based on a division between Muslim foreigners and non-Muslim local citizens". Cohen's (1969) study of the Hausa in Ibadan fits this category. Here, Cohen captures the Hausa attempt to monopolise kolanut and cattle trade in Ibadan by systematically keeping off threatening incursions from non-Hausa through the creation of an exclusive neighbourhood called Sabo. From his analysis, the Hausa employed ethnicity to perpetuate its monopoly of the aforementioned trade and residential area. He describes an Hausa group network or associational ethnicity which depends on "manipulation of customs, values, myths, symbols and ceremonials from their cultural tradition in order to articulate an informal political organisation as a weapon in that struggle" (1969:2).

The role of ethnicity here cannot be overemphasised. It was employed as an organising principle for the Hausa as well as a discriminatory tool against others. Cohen's (1969) study indicates that the separate settlement for the Hausa in Ibadan was not established for religious reasons but basically economic. Hausa group cohesiveness led to the creation of the Sabo ethnic enclave in Ibadan. Later studies have shown that the Hausa migrants in Ibadan asked for this policy of residential segregation following the example they saw in northern Nigeria in the early 1910s (Albert, 2003a) which was established in 1916 (Albert, 1994). There is need to understand how such enclaves keep conflicts alive.

Several other studies on ethnic enclave or exclusive neighbourhood (Adeboye, 2003) provide valid reasons why settlement dynamic should be studied. One of such is that it is a factor for conflict because it is seen by its occupants as a separate city that responds to their identity needs (Albert 1994; 1999). Like Cohen (1969), Albert's (1994) study of migrant neighbourhoods or stranger enclaves in Kano and Ibadan is a unique contribution to the study of exclusive settlements and its implication for inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria. Colonial labour migrations, according to him, aided "the demographic exchange among different Nigerian peoples and exclusive settlements established for migrant groups" (pg 25). The migratory processes towards the occupation of the new settlements have several implications for contemporary Nigerian cities. This is because, within the new settlements, for instance, the mostly Christian southern Nigerians in Kano and the mostly Muslim northern Nigerians in Ibadan became easily identifiable through

their cultural markers like spoken language, dress pattern and distinct facial marks and the exhibition of this trend outside the traditional homeland of the migrant groups was at some point seen as aggressive by the host and that became the basis of inter group relations. Most times, the stranger elements tended to see this enclave as "an extension of their places of origin in which they could live their lives as they wished and at the same time exploit the economic opportunities of a foreign land" (Albert 2003a:96). Understanding this group network or associational ethnicity provides the tool for questioning existing studies' positions that have become inadequate in explaining the phenomenon of emerging exclusive settlement or "ethno-religious Empire" building in urban and rural areas once a violent conflict has been initiated.

Albert (1994) contends that "the religion of Islam played a great role in the origin, growth and character of the Sabon Gari, whether in the north or south" (pg 36). Albert's position gives credence to the claim that the inability of migrants or stranger elements and their hosts to assimilate provides the platform for likelihood of conflict. It is the migrant, however, that should assimilate the culture of the host. For instance, despite the discrimination of the Ijebu in the first half of the 20th century by the Native Authorities in Ibadan, their integration within the local government in the 1950s gradually decreased the rivalry between them (Adeboye, 2003). Similarly, early Yoruba migrants to Kano were confined to a land close to the central market in the city called Ayagi Quarters and they have been completely assimilated into Hausa culture through the adoption of the language, customs, kinship and religious practices of their hosts (Olaniyi, 2004; 2008). Unlike the Yoruba in Kano, the Hausa in Bamenda which later came to be known as Abakpa/Bamenda were indifferent to the culture of their Bamenda hosts. The Hausa resettlement in 1916 at Bamenda Cameroon by the British after they took over the Province increased mutual misunderstanding and induced a feeling of exclusion among the two peoples. The Germans who were the earlier colonial officers within that Province had allocated the settlement to the Hausa though with the approval of the Chief of Bamenda land. Awasom (2003) attributes the existence of residential exclusionism by the Hausa in Bamenda to the reasons earlier mentioned (the questions of security, socio-economic factors, religion and the relationship between them (Hausa) and other African ethnic groups). He contends that the Hausa community's loyalty to the German colonial administration and later to the British handed them the enclave as Hausa settlement. Their interactions led to violent clashes with religion (Islam and Traditional African) playing great roles. As a result, the exclusive neighbourhood was interpreted by the

natives to mean assertion of ownership and the formation of a different kingdom as the position of Sarkin Hausawa suggests.

Exclusive enclaves do not only portray ownership or formation of a different kingdom; in times of conflict it becomes a source for recurrence. Albert (1999a) has examined the effect of this on the Ife/Modakeke crisis. In the study, he contends that Ooni Abeweila's attempt to bring the conflict to an end in 1847 by creating a separate settlement for the Modakeke people compounded the problem. He argues that "had the Modakekes been allowed to integrate into the Ife society rather than be segregated in a particular settlement, they would have by now mixed so much with the Ife population that it would be difficult for them to lay claims to any separatist identity" (pg.168). The position that residential segregation compounds the problems of a plural society rather than solves it lends credence to this study. In the same manner, separate neighbourhoods for the Hausa migrants and their Atyap host in Zangon-Kataf kept the conflict for a longer period. This is because as argued by Akinteye, Wuye and Ashafa (1999) the settlement dynamic in Zango hindered social interaction between the Zango (Hausa) and their Kataf (Atyap) host as inter-group relation was only within the market place. Hence, communal integration was absent and this, according to them, was probably why the two communities could not develop the spirit of living together. In as much as it is true that group dynamics contributed to the growth of ethnicity and residential segregation, colonialism gave rise to and worsened these issues.

Colonial administration no doubt succeeded perfectly in dividing Nigerians into several ethnic communities; however, at independence the elite also continued with these divisions as the situation provided the platform for ascending political positions and acquiring economic power. The competitive dynamics of the independence period led to the perceived exclusion of some groups and fostered an environment in which politicians engaged in extensive gerrymandering, electoral fraud and ethnic violence (ICG, 2006). These events further sharpened identity consciousness and reinforced group animosity.

It can be deciphered that the act of creating a separate residential area for stranger elements deepened inter-ethnic rivalry and created room for conflict. Of course the autochthonous people felt their land had been taken away from them as the migrants were directly under the Township authorities and in the case of Jos Plateau, the Hausa were in control of the Native Authority, therefore hindering any form of interaction between the peoples. Separate settlement forced Nigerians to live in segregated housing areas that could even create suspicion among the groups.

Such polarisation of cities facilitated ethnic mobilisation and manipulation. Nnoli (1978) argues that the allegiance of several Nigerian groups to parochial associations destabilized inter-ethnic harmony. The politicisation of religion by the elite and the zero sum nature of group competitions reinforced the application of violence. Nnoli (1978) contends that religion has a high potential for separating people from one another because it has a way of defining what should constitute appropriate social behaviour. With such definition, conflict is bound to ensue when what one religious group calls "appropriate social behaviour" crosses purposes with that of another. The divisive power of religion is always reinforcing the question: who are we? This question has aggravated group consciousness and reinforced segregation in residential areas.

From the foregoing, it is clear that existing literature has generally stressed the colonial heritage of separate settlements, otherwise referred to as Sabon Gari, in such a way that barely treats or examines the phenomenon as a consequence of violent conflicts. As important as the existing studies on this subject are, they offer only a restricted insight into how violent conflicts reshape or alter existing settlements in contemporary Nigeria and Plateau State in particular. Although Albert (1996) mentions that survivors of a violent conflict would flee afterwards to areas with high concentration of their group members to avoid being lynched, it calls for an in-depth interrogation. Examining how conflicts restructure human settlements will help us understand the role of exclusive neighbourhoods in keeping the conflict alive. There is need to find out how the pattern of residential segregation may be responsible for determining where violence is applied once a conflict has been initiated.

Humans all over the world, when confronted with violence or even perceived threat, attempt to seek protection and usually, such protection is sought under or around residential segregation. It has been argued that a principal function of segregation in the urban environment is provision of physical defence (Boal 1972, cited in Doherty and Poole, 1997). Thus, a prominent feature of the persistent conflicts in Plateau State is the "isolated households", with each group moving towards their respective ethno-religious "heartlands during those recurrent periods of violence (Doherty and Poole, 1997). This informs the increasing shifting settlements or residential segregation of Muslims, Christians, Hausa-Fulani, Berom, Anaguta, Afizere, Igbo, Yoruba and several others in Plateau State during these times of upheaval. The basic fact is that certain areas are associated with violence and, for fear of sectarian attack, people move from one neighbourhood to another during the crisis. These movements have wider implications. Once survivors of sectarian attack

during or after a conflict flee from one settlement to the other, lines are hardened and the possibility of re-attacking the 'other' abound. "Just as violent attacks do not occur in a social vacuum but are conditioned by a web of social relations that stretch beyond the individual; their repercussions transcend the individuals involved to affect society at large". Within that framework, it is certain that the events or the incidents are 'digested' by communities and built into narratives, which, in addition to personal experience, provide pivotal sources of subjective local knowledge. Such narratives form the basis upon which individuals construct their perceptions of safety and danger in relation to their environment (Lysaght and Basten, 2003). The result of such constructs produces a spatialised violent behaviour. This is because people do not merely exist fixed in a single location; instead they engage in a multitude of production and consumptive activities as they go about their lives (Lysaght and Basten, 2003). In the case of Plateau, this entails moving out of their exclusive ethno-religious neighbourhood and crossing the enclave of the 'other'. Consequences of this scenario in northern Plateau State have been tremendous to the point that constant violent attacks are the results of crossing the 'no go area' boundary (*Tell*, March, 2011). Hence, how has the persistent conflict altered settlements in Plateau State?

2.3.2 The Role of Indigeneity and Exclusion in Settlement Dynamics and Inter-group relations

Despite the gravity of the subject under study, existing literature has shed little light on the implication of the settlement dynamic for inter-group relations. Studies have examined the contending issue of land ownership and linked it to the recurrent conflicts in Plateau State (Best 2007; Ostien 2009). These earlier studies have treated indigeneity and exclusionism in isolation from settlement dynamics. To effectively understand the role and effect of indigeneity and exclusion in Nigeria, it is necessary to examine how residential segregation deepens indigeneity and exclusion and establishes a culture of distrust and violence. The distinction between indigenes and settlers, commonly referred to as indigene/settler question, is an age long problem in Africa and indeed Nigeria. The mass movement of people over time across cultures and space makes it difficult to define who owns a place. According to Adesoji and Alao (2009), "the relative association of peoples with different areas; a product of their settlement and the seeming dominance of their cultures or perhaps the outcome of their ability to conquer and occupy a relatively virgin area, has resulted in situations whereby some came to identify themselves as the indigenes of a particular place" (pg 152). The problems follow "the border game that exists in the

political system where people who are indigenous to Nigeria were defined as non-indigenes in law" (Mamdani, 2010:32-34).

The continuing importance of these divisions has been reflected in the constant episodes of identity-based communal conflicts. Most Nigerian communities use the phenomenon of indigeneity to distinguish between who is qualified or eligible to hold chieftaincy office in a particular place but in recent times it has gone beyond the distinction category to ascend a traditional stool. Human Rights Watch (2006) has argued that "in a broader and more amorphous sense, indigeneity reflects the communities' efforts to keep track of who their members are by placing an emphasis on the historical memory of individuals' familial connection to a particular place" (pg 12). These issues are complicated by what Nnoli (1978) refers to as "ethnic watchers"or what Egwu (2004) calls "ethnic entrepreneurs" who invoke ethnic or religious identity for political or economic ends. Their role cannot be underestimated. Kukah (1993) has already observed that Hausa and Fulani hegemony in northern Nigeria was made possible via the instrumentality of religion.

Stemming from the aforementioned, several identity-based conflicts have hindered stability and instigated economic and social dislocation in the country. In Plateau state, over 30 ethno-linguistic groups are recognized officially by the State as indigenous to it (Higazi, 2011) and these groups have different histories of their migration to the area they currently occupy. Plotnicov (1967) argues that the extreme heterogeneity of the area reflects the variety of the peoples of Nigeria. The state therefore has a complex ethno-linguistic configuration. Existing studies have indicated a clash of interest between these linguistic groups over territorial ownership. Although it has been argued that none of the ethnic groups perceived to be indigenous to Plateau is large enough to claim majority, it is arguable that the Berom is among the largest group of the minority ethno-linguistic groups in Plateau State. The divide between autochthones and strangers have manifested in deep political exclusion and discrimination in Nigeria. Attempts have been made by scholars and successive governments in Nigeria to contain or even eradicate such discriminations and their attendant violent clashes.

However, the Nigerian State, in an attempt to allay minority fears for marginalization, adopted the term "indigene" in its constitution. This phenomenon, which has been attributed a discriminatory role, deserves critical attention. Scholars of inter-group relations in Africa and Nigeria

particularly have identified the war of "who is who" in discourses of nationalism and citizenship (Marshall-Fratani, 2007). The pre-occupation of such studies is the definition of citizenship and group boundaries or what Englund and Nyamnjoh call politics of recognition (Gwom 1992; Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004). Extant literatures barely engage the discourses of indigeneity, exclusion and settlement dynamics, examine their relationships and attempt an explanation of their implication for inter-group relations in Plateau State. In his study, Bach (1997) contends that indigeneity is such a serious issue in Nigeria because it exemplifies the boomerang effect of Nigeria's brand of federalism and social engineering. Citing Awa (1983), Bach (1997) affirms that indigeneity is one of the most intractable forces militating against national integration. It is difficult to refer to one as a Nigerian within Nigeria. The indigeneity protagonist would insist that one is an indigene of a particular place. Therefore, others outside this category are not autochthonous to the place but its settlers. The term was first recognized officially in 1954. Bach (1997) affirms that the Native Authority Law of 1954 first made a formal distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes that were then known as strangers while regionalizing the Nigerian civil service in 1954. The term, he contends, was loosely defined as "any Native who is not a member of the native community living in the area of its authority" (pg17). It must be argued however that the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, in its quest to give legal backing to federal character principle, approves this discriminatory act on a citizen. The constitution stipulates that the President shall reflect the federal character principle in appointing a minister "provided that, in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid, the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such a State" (section 147 (3)). Bach believes that the term and its antecedents constitute a citizenship problem in Nigeria. In the whole, Nigerians employ the term "indigene" to draw a demarcation between those who are eligible or qualified for an access and opportunity in an area. It is characterised by exclusion and the resistance of those excluded have led to ruinous conflicts not only in Plateau State but Nigeria in general.

As indicated above, those who are assigned the status of non-indigenes in their states of residence brought about patterns of migration during the colonial period for socio-economic reasons, mainly the search for jobs, lands, religious reasons and other factors. These movements became possible by amalgamation of Nigeria into one entity. With independence the indigeneity issues increased enormously and the minority groups saw reasons why they should be free from the subjugation of the majority. Thus, the split of the former regions in 1967 and 1976 came as a relief to the minority groups but could not address the issues because the desire of the minorities was not

merely autonomy but the privileges. The groups, therefore, wanted a place that could be associated with them while they benefitted from whatever came in to enhance livelihood. On these grounds, the federal character discussed above came into play as an affirmative action package. As earlier said, it did not address the problem; rather it depicted the interest of all ethnic groups to material advantage.

One attendant problem of social exclusion is violence because exclusion antagonists see violence as the last resort. Human Rights Watch (2006) and Higazi (2011) have observed that in Plateau and Kaduna States and indeed Nigeria, people are accorded the status of an indigene of an area by the issuance of indigeneship certificates. These certificates are issued through the local governments and signed by district heads. Possession of such a certificate gives the holder access to state services and resources such as school or university scholarship, or jobs in the state civil service as against non-indigenes' discrimination from such services or resources. At such instance, a whole community, not just an individual, faces the discriminatory tendency of non-indigene settlers and is therefore denied the benefits that accrue to the indigenous communities. According to Higazi (2011) "there are allegations that state and local governments in Plateau State allocate resources, infrastructure or other development projects to areas where 'indigenes' are concentrated but neglect 'settler' neighbourhoods or villages. Those excluded from politics as a consequence also tend to be excluded from the state's patron client networks" (pg 10). Here lies one of the major bases for violent contestations in Plateau State. In other words, the war of who is who and political exclusion in Plateau has produced a trend of exclusive neighbourhoods contrary to the existing pattern but questions need to be asked on the implication of the emerging settlement on social group interaction. How has the pattern created a culture of violence and distrust? Best (2007) has also argued that indigeneity and the attendant exclusion are among the contending issues in the Plateau State crisis. He affirms that in June 1999 the chairman of Jos north LG issued a circular addressed to the Gbong Gwom directing that all applications for indigene forms be channeled through village areas and village heads. According to him, the memo had village names attached to it with most of them bearing Anaguta names, although the settlements within the central Jos city were not mentioned in the memo. This is not difficult to understand because the then local government chairman, Dr. Bagudu Frank Tardy, is an Anaguta man. Soon after, the local government engaged in a screening exercise using newly designed indigene forms and of course the actions were interpreted by other ethnic groups, especially the Hausa and Fulani, to mean exclusion from the turn of events. Plateau State government under the

leadership of Jonah David Jang has long renamed several streets in Jos city particularly. Some residents of the city allege that the Governor merely targeted areas with established Hausa names. Indigeneity and exclusion is also an issue in the southern Plateau conflict. The questions have been who owns Jos? Who owns Yelwa-Shendam? Who owns Wase? Who should have access to resources? Do they belong here? The question goes on and on that way.

The military governor of Plateau State in 1976, Colonel Dan Sulaiman, had anticipated this scenario when he sought an amendment to the Plateau State General Order by which "settlers" in the state who had stayed for twenty (20) years would qualify to enjoy all the rights and privileges of Plateau indigenes. Rather than applause, this landmark public policy was, however, greeted with opposition and resentment, especially from Plateau State elites and subsequently had to be withdrawn (Egwu, 2004). The rationale behind the amendment was seen as progressive because it attempted to improve the concept of local citizenship in Plateau State by introducing residency requirements. Specifically, the proposed amendment by the military governor was to the effect that "any one born and (who) stays in Plateau State for at least twenty years, now qualifies for all entitlements and privileges of an indigene of the State". In this light, the amendment was "necessitated by the need to afford opportunities to members of communities of settlers who have had generations of families over a period of 40-50 years but were hardly regarded as citizens of their place of abode (cited in Egwu 2004:277). Such amendment was to address the increasing agitation and restiveness by the Hausa and Fulani in particular who alleged discrimination and marginalization in the state, particularly in Jos. It was also in the reconciliation spirit after the civil war. However, the protest and the subsequent withdrawal of the amendment killed what would have been the panacea to the pogroms experienced today in the state and Nigeria at large.

Thus, the deep-seated divisions between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” have not only been institutionalized in Nigeria but have been internalised by various communities and further exacerbated by the elite (Fourchard, 2009). As pointed out above, Bach’s (1990) assessment of the indigeneity scenario indicates that state creation in Nigeria is the result of the country’s pursuit of development through fragmentation of existing units and once this is done, the status of a citizen is then restricted to a particular area. The point made is that the indigeneity phenomenon automatically makes a Nigerian citizen a non-indigene in 35 out of the 36 States of the federation. Most times the lucrative arrangement of Federal Revenue Allocation generates demand for these new administrative units but it is sometimes also motivated by other factors like minority

concerns. One basic fact is that the demand for these new states and local governments are made on ethnic and sometimes religious basis. Competing claims between groups over territory are usually the basis for seeking autonomy. These actions have reinforced group divisions. It is on this ground that the Berom have accused the Hausa and Fulani in Jos of manipulating the creation of Jos North in 1991. Scholars of this subject have examined the resurgence of the native/settler phenomenon that has come to be known as autochthony and argue that its processes have been very divisive (Marshall-Fratani 2007; Fourchard 2009). It has been argued that the potency of indigeneity in Plateau State is reinforced by its frequent conflation with religion (Higazi, 2011). The processes of issuing the indigeneship certificate are ambiguous and subject to abuse because indigeneity is not properly defined. Some of the people referred to as settlers live in their states of residence permanently and others have lived there for generations. In Plateau State, both in the northern and southern zones as in other places in Nigeria, discrimination of a citizen on the basis of ethnicity and religion is constant. This frequent discrimination against a citizen has been responsible for several violent contestations in Plateau State.

Dominant discourses on the Plateau conflicts have identified indigeneity and exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion as some of the principal factors responsible for the emergence and sustenance of the conflicts but there is still need to examine the nexus between indigeneity, exclusion and settlement dynamics. How has political exclusion reinforced residential segregation, hindered group interaction and created a culture of distrust? Of course a climate of distrust creates a demand for protection. At this point such protection is sought in exclusive neighbourhoods. But how do these neighbourhoods seek protection? Kohn (2008) argues that such situation results in security dilemma. Thus, one strong consequence of indigeneity and exclusion is the violent conflicts that have produced what Train (2006) calls claim for space and referred to here as settlement dynamic.

To what extent do the residents of these neighbourhoods trust colleagues or neighbours at work places and members of the task force (military and police) who are from the opposing ethnic group and religion who dominate their neighbourhood to provide them with security? How has the issue of indigeneity, exclusion and residential segregation deepened suspicion among the residents of Plateau State? Indigeneity and political exclusion has reinforced exclusive residential neighbourhoods and it is seen as an attempt by groups to assert ownership of the territory that they exclusively inhabit or an alternative way of seeking representation. It is perceived as a

resistance to the limits of exclusion. This is because as argued by Teelucksingh (2006) all "social actors are segregated at some level, they must live or perform or do segregation" (pg5). Hence, this study will interrogate how the emerging settlements have reinforced otherness and stereotypes in Plateau State. Such settlement is a means for communities to create places of safety, security and refuge for their members. Inasmuch as such settlement dynamics are seen as "safe zones" for group members from the hostility of the locality or state, it is a demand for inclusion within the locality or the state. Thus the call is no longer for tolerance but for acceptance. Hence there is need to go beyond the discourses of indigeneity and exclusion and examine the interface between the variables and settlement dynamics. We need to know how the emerging settlement is exacerbating mutual distrust. We need to understand how violent autochthonous contestations have created two societies out of one. Does such creation deepen the culture of violence? This is a serious issue yawning for investigation.

2.3.3 Religious Awakening and Group Mobilisation in Settlement Dynamics

Existing studies tend to neglect the role of religious awakening in deepening exclusive neighbourhoods and how such settlements may provide easy access for group mobilization for violence. Literature of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria and indeed, Plateau State have failed to recognize the link between religious awakening, group mobilisation and settlement dynamics. Although a plethora of literature exists on the link between violence and religion, we know little on the interface between the two and settlement patterns. Plateau State has a critical religious configuration due to the significant presence of Christians and Muslims and the insignificant presence of the adherents of African Traditional Religion (ATR) within her borders. In Plateau State, as is typical of African societies, traditional beliefs and practices associated with groups and local communities referred to as ATR predate the spread of Islam and Christianity. Today, as indicated earlier, the proportion of people claiming their religion is "traditional" has shrunk to 1 (one) percent (Forum, 2010 cited in Best and Rakodi, 2011:12). It is necessary to point out that indigenous religions have historical influence on both Christianity and Islam, but the attitudes of many Christians and Muslims as well as the colonial government towards it can only be described as hostile (Mbachirin, 2006 cited in Best and Rakodi, 2011). Although there are no census figures to back this, it is a truism that today most Nigerians are either Muslims or Christians.

Scholars have established that religion and religious civilisation would constitute the greatest threat to security in the 21st century following cultural differences or identity consciousness

which has thrown up issues of global concern, and Islam has been penciled as the most belligerent of these religions (Huntington, 1996). These existing studies have failed to provide any empirical evidence on how group clusters can provide the environment for such security threat. In other words, how has reinvigorated religious consciousness facilitated group mobilization for violence? Does group residential cluster play a role in such mobilisation? Extant studies on ethno-religious crisis in Plateau State have not been able to shed light on these issues.

Islam is the oldest of the foreign religions in Nigeria. As claimed by several scholars, Islam arrived to the present day Nigeria from the north, in association with trans-Saharan trade, during the 11th and 12th centuries, and became well established in the 15th century following the conversion of the Borno Empire and later the Hausa kings (Falola, 1998). Islam therefore took root among ethnic groups in today's northern Nigeria but also among the Yoruba of south west Nigeria as a result of trading links with Mali. The Islamic incursion was however resisted by ethnic groups in the Middle Belt and Plateau State particularly. Thus, Islamic expansion into the Middle Belt was halted between the 16th and early 19th centuries (Best and Rakodi, 2011). However, the dawn of the 19th century witnessed the second phase of Islamic expansion which started as a revivalist revolution. The architect of the revival, a Fulani preacher, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, led a jihad initially aimed at purifying Islamic practices in northern region and ultimately at installing a new righteous leadership (ICG 2010). The expansion process registered a significant success within that period. Between 1804 and 1808, the despotic Hausa kings who were then ruling fourteen states, were replaced with Fulani emirs, and the overarching Sokoto Caliphate was established (Falola, 1998). The people of the northern region supported Dan Fodio because he preached against oppression and injustice and because of the social and economic improvement that resulted from the new wave of Islam (Best and Rakodi, 2011). Islam spread among groups where the Hausa and Fulani had made permanent conquests when they moved from their traditional settlement in the north-west. The Caliphate was responsible for the spread of Islam and the extension of Sharia law after a strong contest with the older Islamic empire of Borno. Warriors from the emirates constantly raided and looted peripheral regions regarded as heathen's territory to capture slaves who worked on the plantation labour for the prosperity of the Caliphate. Indeed, "memories of that era still haunt relations, especially between the Fulani and the smaller groups the raiders plundered" (ICG 2010:4). In addition, the Hausa and Fulani jihad of the 19th century destroyed the old Oyo Empire and several other kingdoms in Yoruba land (Best

and Rakodi, 2011). Thus, Islam was consolidated and the northern part of Yoruba land became emirate.

Northern Nigeria was declared a protectorate in 1900 by the British colonialists who persuaded the emirs to accept colonial rule and the existing political and legal systems provided the basis for indirect rule of the protectorate (Crowder, 1966 cited in Best and Rakodi, ibid). The Middle Belt became part of the then Northern Protectorate and this also provided the opportunity for the spread of Islam in that area. It has been argued that "Muslims constituted only six (6) percent of the Middle Belt's population by 1931 and ten (10) percent by 1952 and the Muslims were concentrated in the towns and cities and were more scattered in the rural areas" (Clarke, 1982 cited in Best and Rakodi, 2011:14). The 1963 census however indicated that Muslims constituted 26.1 percent, Christians 23.2 percent and other 50.7 percent (Ostien 2012:8). It is necessary to point out that people of the Middle Belt and particularly those of Jos Plateau converted to Christianity in large numbers mainly in reaction to the perceived oppressive power of the emirate administration and also against the colonial government's policy of protecting Hausa and Fulani rulers and the Muslim identity (Egwu 2004; ICG 2010).

The discovery of tin in Plateau State encouraged an influx of Hausa and Fulani migrants to the area and most of them remained in the State at the collapse of tin economy. On the other hand, "Nubian and Coptic Christians arrived in the Benin Kingdom around the 15th century" (Kenny,1979 cited in Best and Rakodi, 2011:14). It is on record that the Portuguese were the first European group to make contact with Nigerian groups. They monopolized trade along the coast line until the 1650 when Dutch, English and French traders broke their monopoly (Dzurga, 1991 cited in Best and Rakodi, ibid). The coming of the Portuguese introduced the Warri and Benin areas to Catholic faith around 15th and 16th centuries but Christianity did not take root in Nigeria until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when chaplains accompanied traders to evangelize and specifically convert the African people to Christianity. Mission stations were established at trading posts and it paved the way for trade expansion, Christianity and also entrenched colonial rule (op.cit). Three categories of Christian missionaries arrived in Nigeria at this period. They were Catholics, Protestants and Pentecostals. A majority of these missionaries were in the south but a few of them headed to the north. Although there were restrictions placed on missionary activities by the colonial government as a way of keeping the agreement made with northern emirates, the few missionaries that headed up north established control over the Middle Belt

(Kukah,1993; ICG 2010). The largest protestant mission established in 1893 was the Sudan Interior Mission, which resulted in the establishment of the Association of Evangelical Churches of West Africa (ECWA). Apart from the missionary's primary purpose of spreading Christianity, its activities had wider social, economic and political implications (Mbachirin, 2006 cited in Best and Rakodi, 2011). To enable the newly converted Africans to read the Bible, develop technical abilities and improve their farming methods and run churches themselves, the missionaries gave education to Nigerians through the introduction of schools; although they were not allowed to build schools in the Muslim north (Coleman, 1958).

However, schools were built in the Middle Belt and this enabled the minority ethnic groups, who had resisted Islam and emirate rule, to accept Christianity and become trained in Western education in a wide variety of occupation. This had enormous influence on the peoples' way of life. While it enabled them to seek employment in the colonial administration, it also created self-awareness and consciousness that they sought political self-government (Kukah, 1993; Akinteye, Wuye and Ashafa, 1999; Best and Rakodi, 2011). Although Islamic education in northern Nigeria had produced the officials that ran the Caliphate and emirates, it did not provide the required knowledge and skills for employment into the colonial government. With this, the colonialists turned to the Christian missionaries to educate the Muslims, but fear of Christians' conversion agenda deterred Muslims from attending mission schools and the northern rulers and religious establishment resisted this approach. This led to the establishment of secular schools and later Muslim schools like the Ansar-ud-deen schools but the educational inequalities between Christians and Muslims in northern Nigeria resulted in high unemployment, particularly among young (male) Muslims (Best and Rakodi, 2011).

Since the late 20th century, resurgence of religions around the world has intensified religious consciousness and the rise of fundamentalist movements. Such intensification of religious consciousness has reinforced religious differences leading to severe fault line conflicts. The war in old Yugoslavia is a good example of deep-seated religious crisis between the Orthodox, Muslims and Christians. It must be added that this growing consciousness has not necessarily involved significant shift in the proportions of the world's populations adhering to different religions (Huntington 1996). However, fundamentalist religious consciousness emerged in Nigeria in the 1980s following the global resurgence of religion which began with the Iranian revolution of 1979. This triggered a significant shift in the global status quo. There began from

then a revival of religions, especially Islam, and several parts of the world, including the Middle East, North Africa, even Indonesia and then West Africa, witnessed a revival of an extreme form of religious fundamentalism (Rupesinghe and Anderlini, 1998). This religious fundamentalism was partly in reaction to the popular belief of western cultural domination and the West's support of often corrupt regimes. This led to the rejection of any form of secularism and the call for a return to basic Koranic tradition.

This position has reinvigorated a new consciousness for religious identity in much of the world. For instance, in Bosnia, the emergence of extremist Islamic groups is, in part, a consequence of the Muslim population's anger at what they perceived as western indifference to their plight. On the other hand the promotion of Islam in Chechens as part of a new national identity is a means of distancing themselves from their former Russian rulers (Rupesinghe and Anderlini, 1998). It has been observed, that, a common religion knits people together and the lack of it pulls them apart (Horowitz, 1985). Inasmuch as this is true, it is not fixed, given the dynamic nature of identity formation. The case in Rwanda is a point at hand where people of one religion (Christianity), who profess the same Roman Catholic faith killed themselves in 1994 (Weidmann, 2009). However, a single or official religion has ethnic cohesion building capacity and this variable can link elite and mass concern (Horowitz, 1985). Religious revitalisation throughout the world is not restricted to Islam; the manifestation of fundamentalist Christianity since the 1980s has deepened religious identity consciousness as each group attempts to reassert itself.

Among Muslims, Islam became a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope, epitomized in the slogan "Islam is the solution". It is entirely a revival of Islamic ideas and this Islamic fundamentalism is commonly referred to as "political Islam". A useful analogy for this form of Islam is the Protestant Reformation. Like fundamentalist Islam, Protestant Reformation is a reaction to the stagnation and corruption of existing institutions and a strong call for a return to a purer and more demanding form of religion (Huntington, 1996). The fundamentalists advocate their belief as the best way to structure society. In Nigeria, while the Christians profess their "born again" theology, Muslims call for the application of stringent Sharia legal system (Albert 1999b; 2011).

Thus, the critical configurations of religious identities in a plural Nigeria have generated militarized intra and inter-religious relationships, beginning with the religious fundamentalism of

the 1980s. As indicated above, Plateau State and Jos particularly have become for both Christians and Muslims a centre for proselytisation in northern Nigeria and the area has proved to be a fertile ground for the establishment of new religious movements and ideas (Higazi, 2011). Northern Nigeria, especially the far north, has historical antecedents of several Islamic scholars from North, West, and Central Africa who introduced the region to fundamentalist Islam and this culminated into conflicts beginning with the Maitatsine riot of December 1980 (Albert, 1999b).

Jos Plateau is, however, a relatively new city that is barely one hundred years old and without the long established traditions and religious orthodoxies in old northern cities like Kano and Zaria (Last, 2007:607). Jos Plateau was for this reason attracted to the Muslim reformers, who saw the necessity and possibility of establishing themselves in the area. Jos therefore became the take-off ground and the headquarters of Izala in 1978. Izala is the largest Islamic reform movement in Nigeria, with a presence in the territory of Nigeria's neighbours. The group-*Jama'atu Izalat al-Bid'a wa Iqamat al-sunna* (the Association for Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna) is considered Salafist, who emphasizes the Sunna in its call for a more orthodox, scriptural Islam and denouncing the supposedly heterodox practices of the Sufis (Loimeire, 1997). Jos is also the headquarters of several Christian bodies in Nigeria and the city has come to be known as the unofficial Christian capital of northern Nigeria (Je'adayibe and Kudu, 2011). The area has provided an enabling environment for evangelizing the Middle Belt since the colonial days.

Mazrui (1988) traced the origins of religious conflicts in Africa to what he called Triple Heritage of politicised religion which is the interplay between indigenous Africanity, Islam and Christianity in the experience of post-colonial Africa. This raises the issue of competitiveness between the proselytizing foreign religions of Islam and Christianity against the non-proselytizing indigenous African religions. Thus, revivalism and expansion have been the mark of Islam and Christianity in Africa and Nigeria in particular where the two religions have constantly engaged each other in violent conflicts resulting from quest to spread. According Mazrui (1988:499), Islamic expansion and revivalism have been the two central issues to religious speculation in independent Africa. It was on this ground that Mazrui distinguished between expansion and revivalism. For him, expansion points to the spread of religion and its scale of new conversions while revivalism refers to the rebirth of faith among those who are already converted. To this end, religious expansion focuses on geography and populations. This is usually attempts by a religious group or religious groups to search for new worlds or lands to conquer. On the other hand,

religious revivalism draws attention to matters of history and nostalgia which tends to search for ancient worlds to re-enact. Both expansionist and revivalist tendencies have played significant roles in the increasing religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria. However, Ayoade (2014:159) argued that it is rather poverty, lack of religious literacy and high rate of youth unemployment that has made the manipulation of faith a plausible option which has in turn facilitated several violent conflicts. Thus, he maintained that the religious crisis in northern Nigeria and Plateau state to be precise is not an issue of religious expansion rather a desire to expand and preserve the political space (Ayoade, 2014:174). While the political expansion analysis is valid for the Plateau case and the larger Middle Belt region as raised by Kukah (1993), religious expansion as demonstrated by the Dan Fodio movement of 1804 cannot be ruled out.

The Hausa homeland and its environs in what is today Northern Nigeria were unified politically as well as religiously under Sokoto Caliphate after 1804. The Fulani as well as the Hausa had spread carrying with them commerce and Islamic religion towards the Benue valley. These movements had great influence on the Middle Belt region both positively and negatively. The mercantilist Hausa were therefore responsible for the emergence of several markets in that region (Adamu, 1978; Abubakar, 1980). Yet, it created tensions between the intruding Fulani and Hausa Islamic faithful and autochthonous African religious adherents given the Islamic religious proselytisation for expansion. Thus, the theme of religious expansion has been overtly expressed in the history of Northern Nigeria. Adamu's (1978) study highlighted this when he emphasised the role of Hausa influence in West Africa on the spread of trade, Islam and Hausa culture. The author's view indicated that the economic basis for Hausa commercial expansion was the remarkable range of Hausa manufactures. The institutional basis for the manufacturing industry and commercial activities was the freedom of commerce from state control, which permitted emigration of the commoners from whom merchants and *mallams* were drawn (Manning, 1980:690). Adamu's study, therefore, shows the skill of Hausa emigrants in developing markets for their goods, setting up commercial networks, and establishing close ties with political authorities wherever they went. He emphasizes that Hausa emigrants brought new goods and opportunities for the non-Hausa they served and, at the same time, raised the prestige of the Hausa ethnic group and the Islamic religion (Adamu, 1978). This gives credence to both Mazrui's (1988) position on the role of religious expansion and Ayoade's (2014) argument on expanding the political space in facilitating identity conflicts.

Mazrui (1988) claimed that colonialism provided the atmosphere for the spread of Christianity against the expansion of Islam. This could be connected to the manner colonialism in Nigeria halted the spread of Islam towards the south at the dawn of the 20th century (Falola, 1998; Best and Rakodi, 2011); and the activities of the second set of colonial administrators after the second World War to propagate Christian religion in the Middle Belt against the wider Northern Nigeria that was Islam dominated. However, post-colonial Africa and Nigeria in particular favoured the spread of Islam. According to Mazrui, this is facilitated by several factors including the decline of the prestige of Western civilisation in Africa and the decline of Nigeria's fascinating with it; and the decline of the influence of Christian missionaries in Nigeria but especially the reduced role of mission schools in Nigeria's education. Other factors are the post-colonial change on focus of missionary work in Africa as a whole. The change records a shift from the mission of saving souls to the mission of saving lives, from commitment to salvation in the hereafter to the commitment to service in the here and now. Mazrui added that the growing proselytisation and spread of Islam in Nigeria follows the huge resources thrown into it by the post-colonial prosperity of oil-rich Arab countries. This according to him, the oil prosperity "has given Islam resources for missionary work in Africa which are unprecedented in modern Islamic history" (Mazrui, 1988:505). Thus, Islam began to be economically competitive with Christianity in the rivalry for capturing different locations but particularly in the Middle Belt region.

Kukah (1993) maintained that before now, the relationship that existed between the Muslim core north and the so called 'pagan' Middle Belt was that of social symbiosis; the Muslims did not convert the hill peoples and they lived side by side with one another. Jos became the base for evangelizing Plateau people who until the 1930s were unconverted to both universal religions (Christianity and Islam), and with the presence of southern Nigerians in the area and in protest to Hausa and Fulani domination, Plateau became more oriented towards Christianity (Higazi, 2011;Best and Rakodi 2011). Muslim presence in northern Plateau dates back to the dawn of the 20th century (Plotnicov, 1967) but they had existed in the southern Plateau since the 19th century, especially in Yelwa, Wase and Kanam (Best, 2007). However, strong competition between her and Christianity became manifest in the 1980s. Kukah (1993) emphasizes strongly the instrumentality of religion in downplaying and segregating other groups in Nigeria, particularly in the northern region. Religious identity more than ethnic identity is indeed more critical in

northern Nigeria. As observed, traditional religious identity and conflict are insignificant as far as northern Nigeria is concerned, although we have had masquerade activities associated with traditional religion as major sources of conflict in some parts of Kogi, Kwara and Nassarawa States all in north central (Middle Belt) Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). It has been argued that the old northern region owed its formation to ethno-religious identity where religion was the most common factor for social mobility. Just as Muslims forged identity as a political weapon, the Christians as well forged identity for the same purpose. The clash of these two religious identities is the crisis in northern Nigeria today. However, Lugard had claimed as far back as 1913 that the problem in Northern Nigeria is majorly the issue of struggle for land (Lugard, 1970:340).

Kukah (1993) contends that the Islamic religion was a linking factor in northern Nigeria between the elite and other Muslim faithful. Religion was thus the basis for inter-ethnic relation in the region. As in Northern Ireland where religion is a tool for ethnicity between Catholicism and Protestantism (Doherty and Poole, 1997), in northern Nigeria, Christianity and Islam are the tools for ethnicity. The multiplicity of movements among both Christians and Muslims in Plateau State have had to formulate their own responses to the rising insecurity and conflict in the region which has led to the decentralisation of mobilisation processes and the readiness for future conflicts. However, severe violent conflicts that were prevalent in other northern states were hitherto unknown to Plateau State until the introduction of Sharia legal system in twelve northern states in the early 2000s. This introduction marked a point of departure in the Plateau conflict as the state witnessed an influx of people fleeing from violence in the Sharia states (Best, 2007). Some Plateau indigenes, so to speak, saw this as a total takeover of their land and this further heated the already heated polity and the explosion happened soon after.

Since 2001, Plateau State, which was hitherto known as the "Home of Peace and Tourism", has become a home of pieces and terror (Best, 2007). People were killed in the name of religion and sometimes these conflicts generated reprisal attacks elsewhere. For instance the February and May 2004 killings in Yelwa led to attack on Christians in Kano city on May 11 and 12 (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

Huntington (1996) argues that in coping with identity crisis what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. Thus with fluid group boundaries, people are seeking identity and security and they are frequently looking for roots and connections to defend themselves against the unknown. Hence they rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values and

institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones. Huntington (1996) contends that conflicts between clusters of civilization have their boundaries largely following religious lines. To this end, revitalization of religion is reinforcing cultural differences because religion, as argued by Huntington (1996) is the principal defining characteristic of civilizations. His position that conflicts may occur in a location at the fault line between different civilizations gives credence to the Christian/Muslim clash in Plateau State. An example of this scenario is in the former Yugoslavia where Orthodox, Muslim and Western civilizations (Christianity) clashed.

With these bloody conflicts in Plateau State, the variables of level of income, class, status symbol and/or decent environment no longer inform the decision to change residency; rather it is informed by "safety". Safety, according to Gandu (2011), is now defined in terms of taking residency where a person's ethno-religious group is in the majority. The implication of this is that people affiliated to a particular ethno-religious orientation take up residency in one clustered colony (Gandu, 2011). This trend, though applied as a security measure, is dangerous for national integration as well as a threat to human security. For instance, Jos had areas associated with particular ethnic groups: Gangare, Angwan Rogo for Hausa and Fualni; Jenta Apata, Busa Buji and parts of Ali Kazaure for Igbo and Urhobo; Nassarawa Gwom for the Yoruba; Hwolshe for the Berom; Naraguta for the Anaguta; and Rikkos for the Afizere (Egwu, 2004). However, the persistent conflicts have deepened the existing prejudice not only in Jos but in most parts of Plateau State. Although these settlements were not exclusive for the above groups but they were the dominant groups, and the persistent conflicts have compelled them to move, emphasizing more the variable of religion to the point that if you are a Christian you cannot go to Gangare, Angwan Rogo, Rikkos and vice versa (*Tell*, March 2011:52).

Nevertheless, the quest to understand increasing rise of militant religions and the suppression of traditional syncretistic Islam in Islamic studies literature necessitated studies like John Paden (2005). Paden provided a careful analysis of the role of Islam in Nigeria's politics since independence. His analysis is situated in the context of traditional Islamic culture in northern Nigeria and emphasized the conflict carrying capacity of Islam as he indicated the ability of Muslims to negotiate their differences. He made this known through what he termed the gateway (kofa in Hausa). The gateway is a form of an intermediary through whom the public might negotiate or manage a conflict before it could reach crisis stage. This is however rooted in traditional Hausa culture and not necessarily Islamic. His claim that Muslim ideals are rooted in

preventive diplomacy or conflict management mechanism is rather bogus as what he termed compromise could be seen as an avoidance rather than problem solving. The shortcoming is that Paden attempted to understand Islam from a political perspective. As crucial as Paden's (2005) work is to this study in understanding how Islam could mitigate group mobilisation for violence in the face of vigorous proselytisation, he consigned the issues of competitive proselytisation using separate settlements to insignificance.

Therefore, existing literature on ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria and indeed, Plateau State tend to consign to insignificance the nexus between religious awakening, group mobilization and settlement dynamics. However, some questions need to be asked: How has separate settlements facilitated group mobilization for violence in Plateau State? Does exclusive neighbourhood promote vigorous religious proselytisation? How has religious awakening and exclusive settlement mobilized groups in Plateau State for a protest against discrimination and grievances? These questions are rarely asked and thus scarcely discussed in the literature on ethno-religious conflicts. A lot is still missing on the interface between religion, mobilisation for violence and settlement dynamics.

2.3.4 Recurrent Conflict and Infrastructural Development in the Emerging Settlement in Plateau State

Despite the extensive literature on ethno-religious hostilities and emerging exclusive settlements in Plateau State which explore the intricacies of pluralism; the persistence of the conflict indicates there is a missing link in our understanding of the relationship between ethno-religious conflicts, settlement dynamics and infrastructural development. This is probably because the role of settlement dynamics in group hostilities or violent conflicts has not been properly defined in literature; thus the way in which the phenomena are interacting with infrastructural development is missing. Weidmann (2009) and Weidmann and Salehyan (2013) have studied how mass violence lead to disintegration by hardening ethnic identities and the intensifying ethnic hatred. Violence, they argue, has generated massive migration but they conclude that ethnic homogeneity should reduce the level of violence. While this has not served as a panacea to persistent conflicts in Nigeria; it is evident that ethnic residential homogeneity may have exacerbated group hostilities given the fact that certain areas are neglected in terms of infrastructural development in Plateau State (Higazi, 2011). We know little from literature about how settlement dynamics increase the tendency for violence and how government's neglect of human settlements deepens the crisis. Does the settlement provide high capabilities and networks for violence? Underscoring

the evolution of Plateau State will reveal the attention given by relevant authorities to the settlements in the area.

Plateau State is a product of half a century of boundary adjustments arising, on the one hand, from the ambition of the colonial masters to create a province which consisted largely of non-Muslims under one Resident in order to protect the railway line being constructed at that time and guarantee the sustenance of tin mining activities which began in 1902. On the other hand, it arose from the strong desire of the peoples in this area for political self-determination (Ostien, 2010). The colonial conquest of Northern Nigeria was completed in 1903 by the British who brought all communities in the region under the control of Emirs and Jos, Pankshin and Shendam Divisions (which later became Plateau Province and eventually Plateau State) were placed under the Emir of Bauchi (Albert 2003a). Jos city was however founded officially in 1915 (Plotnicov 1967; 1972). In 1926 Plateau Province was created exercising Jos and Pankshin Divisions from Bauchi Province but the Emir of Bauchi retained the right to appoint Hausa and Fulani rulers over Jos city where the indigenous populations belong to separate ethnic groups (Albert2003a). Plateau State, a majorly Christian area in northern Nigeria, according to the 2006 census, has a population of 3,178,712 (Ostien 2012). Northern Nigeria as a whole has a majorly Muslim population but there is a significant Christian presence, especially in the Middle Belt. Plateau State has been described as a miniature Nigeria with over 30 ethno-linguistic groups indigenous to it (Higazi, 2011). The high plateau (northern zone and part of the central) constitutes only part of the state but the lowlands (southern zone and part of central) have a larger portion of its territory. Muslim presence in the lowlands dates back to the 19th century when the faithfuls established more settlements in Wase and Kanam—the two emirates within Plateau State. Muslim presence in this area has been more extensive than in the high plateaus (Higazi 2011).

The mining industry attracted several people to Plateau State and the introduction of railway lines linking Jos city with Port Harcourt and Lagos brought the area into the orbit of the world economy. The development of the tin mining industry has generated both positive and negative impacts on Plateau State. With the influx of migrants, Jos Plateau became cosmopolitan, thus playing host to more Hausa and Fulani migrant labour in the tin industry along with several other nationals (Nnoli, 1978). Plateau State is situated in the central belt of Nigeria, properly referred to today as the "Middle-Belt" region. Its occupants are described by Coleman (1958) as people of the hills and pagans. The temperate climate of the area makes it one of the coldest in Nigeria, and

its plateaus add to its scenic beauty as a major tourist attraction (Je'adayibe and Kudu, 2011). Plotnicov (1967) describes Jos as "one of the healthiest places in West Africa" (pg 33). As argued above, due to the political consciousness of the people and their consequent persistent complaints for freedom from Hausa and Fulani domination, the British transferred the rulership of Jos back to the indigenes, the Berom in 1947 (Albert 2003a). Mallam Rwang Pam therefore became the first ruler of the indigenous people under the title "Sarkin Berom" (meaning chief of Berom). The Hausa and Fulani however argue that up till this point they (Hausa and Fulani) still retained the title of "Sarkin Jos" (the chief of Jos). This lasted till the promulgation of the chief of Jos order of 1969 which granted the title "Sarkin Jos" to the Berom.

That notwithstanding, it must be argued that the correct title to the paramount ruler of Jos "Gbong Gwom"' was granted by the British in 1951 in an attempt to wrest Jos from the hands of northern Muslims (Albert 2003a). The title thus changed from "Sarkin Berom" to "Gbong Gwom Jos" in 1951. With independence, the new Gbong Gwom Jos, Dr. Fom Bot was in 1969 granted the title Sarkin Jos. Earlier in May 1967 Jos had emerged as the capital of the old Benue-Plateau State, one of the twelve states created by the Yakubu Gowon military government to tilt a balance between the north and the south as well as give voice to the minority groups when secession and national calamity were imminent. Again in 1976 the military government of Murtala Mohammed created seven states to total the number to nineteen and this time Plateau State was created out of the former Benue-Plateau and Jos retained the seat of government. At this point, Plateau State had ceased to have anything to do with Bauchi and Jos was already severed from all the vestiges of its colonial past. This, however, was to become the basis for violent host-stranger conflicts in the city (Albert 2003a).

One pull factor to the growth of Jos is the presence of religious and educational organizations. The city gained the status of "missionary centre" because of its accommodation of several spiritual organizations' headquarters. These include Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS), Nigerian Fellowship of Evangelical Students (NIFES), and Nigeria Christian Corpers Fellowship (NCCF). It is host to three theological seminaries and Bible Colleges. It is easily seen as the unofficial centre of Christianity in the North. Jos is also the national headquarters of the Jama'atu Izalatu Bidiah Iqamatu Sunna (JIBWIS) (Je'adayibe and Kudu, 2011). Jos is indeed cosmopolitan and heterogeneous, with the presence of people of diverse ethnic groups and different nationals.

Since its inception, Jos has contended with the heterogeneous population due to its strategic location and role in mining activities. Plotnicov (1967) notes that, "the problems of administering a heterogeneous community were recognised as early as 1962" (pg 44), and states further that, "the extreme heterogeneity of Jos reflects the variety of peoples of Nigeria, of whom almost all are represented" (pg 61). With the collapse of the tin mines, the diverse people that found home in Jos remained in the city and that encouraged strong competitions for scarce resources that were available in local governance and farming. A report of the Federal Ministry of Information of July 25, 2012 indicated that the Hausa and other Muslim elements that were among these teeming population had arrived in Jos earlier in the 20th century either to work in the tin mines, farm, do leatherwork, cut nails and hair, teach the Qur'an, trade or do business and no doubt for many other reasons as well. This report added that as they arrived on the Plateau, they established their own self-perpetuating, always expanding, and largely self-governing communities in Jos and elsewhere on the plateau (Aminat, 2012). The preceding argument sheds light on the later events in Jos city and its environs. Aminat (2012) argues that this was responsible for the 1991 subdivision of the old Jos Local Government Area into two smaller pieces—Jos North and Jos South. Jos North comprises the city of Jos itself. Jos South has its headquarters at Bukuru, about 15 km to the south. The Jos East LGA was carved out later, mostly from Jos South. This political arrangement since 1991 has not only re-interpreted the history of Jos but has also altered inter-group relations in the city. Nnoli (1978) indicates that Jos witnessed 7.6% rural-urban migrations between 1952 and 1963, and Jos was one of the major cradles of ethnicity as were Kano, Zaria and Kaduna.

Other aspects of literature on the subject under review have examined the processes that led to Plateau State becoming a conflict scene which did not start in a single day (Danfulani 2006; Best 2007). Understanding the causes and consequences of inter-group hostilities remains a central theme in the literature of ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State. However, a lacuna exists between our empirical understanding of complexity of inter-group hostilities and our representation of settlement dynamics as a causal mechanism. While empirical literature is replete with examples of identity formation (Best 2007; Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010), residential segregation (Doherty and Poole 1997; Gandu 2011) and mobilisation for violence (Weidmann, 2007), these studies rarely incorporate the complexities. These studies have neglected the link between conflicts, settlement neglect and infrastructural development. In addition, they have been unable to tell us the involvement of the emerging settlements in violent conflicts. How has

settlement dynamic aided a quick spread of violent conflicts from a few extremists? How does this interaction deepen group hostility? How is infrastructural development implicated in the recurring conflicts? These issues are very critical in understanding how recurrent ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics have affected infrastructural development.

Moreover, social interactions, though sometimes leading to tensions, are also believed to facilitate the development of trust, mutual support and cooperation among individuals and also secure group solidarity (Peil, 1981; Bryceson, 2009). This argument does not picture the situation in Plateau State for over a decade; rather social interactions have led to distrust, antagonism and divisions. Jos and other suburbs of Plateau State have defied such moral scales. Several factors are responsible for this scenario some of which have been mentioned in the historical background of Plateau State. The crisis that gutted Plateau State was a chain of events. Since colonial times, Plateau State and Jos particularly have experienced different inter-group conflicts despite the separation of natives and strangers by the colonialists. Most urban centres explode violently because of population size and the influx of people at various times in Jos city's history culminated into strong competitions for scarce resources and the consequent violence in the city. Bryceson (2009) has argued that "city populations grow to sizes far beyond the limits of interpersonal encounters, begging the question of how social distrust, economic envy, political friction and violent confrontation are avoided in the cultural and economic space of expanding urban settings" (pg 241). The tin mines and the commercialization of Jos city coupled with the early 20th century labour migrations became the pull factor for the population growth of Jos and the eventual competing claims for space that is peculiar in urban centres (Freund, 1981).

Conflicting interactions among the groups in Jos date back to 1932. Plotnicov (1971, 1972) argues that in 1932 an ethnic conflict nearly erupted in the city. The 1932 ethnic tension pitched the Berom against the Hausa. It was during the depression period of the 1930s, prior to the Second World War and jobs in the city were only available in the mines, civil service, and related sectors. It is necessary to point out that petty trading was dominated by the Yoruba and the Hausa and after the war they were joined by the Igbo. Nnoli (1978) contends that at the height of the depression there was an exodus of European miners from the tin mines around Jos occasioned by the scarcity of the period. The non-event of 1932 provides us the analytical keystone to the condensed history of ethnic conflict in Jos (See Olaniyi and Nnabuihe, 2010). Plotnicov (1972) posits that the idea that the Europeans were leaving sparked off two pervasive rumours based on a

general interpretation that it portended the end of colonial administration and the re-establishment of their traditional autonomy. One of the rumours alleged that the unemployed minefield labourers, mainly Hausa, who came into Jos as a result of their retrenchment elsewhere as a result of the Depression, were planning to take the property of all the departing Europeans and drive all non-Northern Nigerians and non-Muslims out of the town. The other rumour alleged that instead, the indigenes of the Jos area were preparing to drive out the Hausa and revert to their pre-colonial forms of political administration. This illustration indicates the genesis of how Jos emerged as the centre of inter group tensions in Nigeria leading to immeasurable pogroms.

The rumours above, as argued by Nnoli (1978), indicated two patterns of ethnicity in the city. One arose from socio-economic competition within colonial enclaves between southerners and northerners and the second was ethnicity which arose from local resistance to the colonial administration's imposition of Hausa and Fulani emirate rule through the native administration of the area. The city, however, witnessed its first recorded violent inter-ethnic conflict in 1945 when the Igbo clashed with the Hausa over monkeys and potatoes on the one hand and residence on the other. The conflict began as a common squabble that could occur among traders in a market place. An Igbo trader and Hausa trader had argued over monkey and potatoes. The escalation of the conflict beyond a common market dispute could be linked to the political de-colonisation in which Igbo and Hausa engaged in political rivalries. The Igbo supported the Nnamdi Azikiwe-led National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) that served as a major voice in the agitation for independence, while the Hausa were members of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) that had the sympathy of the British. It was generally perceived that the scarcity of the commodities occasioned by World War II was part of Igbo traders' strategy to send away the British. Thus the British incited the Hausa against the Igbo. The conflict escalated to a high degree with shops and houses of Igbo traders attacked and destroyed. The Igbo, who were largely traders, artisans and clerks, began a rush for the purchase of cutlasses. It has been argued that "Gottschalk, the largest hardware store in Jos, sold out its stock of cutlasses within a short period. Two people were killed while many sustained injuries. Many Igbo disguised themselves by borrowing Hausa and Yoruba robes and sought refuge with neighbours". The British Resident in Jos convoked a meeting of about 40 locally influential Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba for a plan to restore order (Olaniyi and Nnabuihe, 2010).

Inter-ethnic strain was further deepened in 1947 when the stool of the paramount ruler of Jos, the "Gbong Gwom stool", was created. However, the title was not granted until 1951. The Hausa and Fulani who had ruled over Jos through Bauchi Emirate council felt the new arrangement was a way to dislodge them from participating in the administration of Jos Plateau (Best, 2007). The installation of the paramount ruler in 1948 culminated into a crisis in the Native Authority and lingered till 1958 when some angry Berom women marched to the then Jos Native Authority Secretariat and attacked some people whom they alleged were instrumental to the crisis in the authority (Gwom, 1992). The conflict assumed a life of its own in 1991 when the old Jos local government was split into north and south. As argued by Ostien (2010), this subdivision of course changed the local political equations. Within the new Jos North in particular, the local peoples were no longer so predominant as most of them were then living with fewer admixtures of other ethnic groups in Jos South. The Jos natives and other Plateau indigenes saw this as a ploy to wrest the political control of the capital city from them. The implication was that during elections to city-wide offices in Jos North, therefore, members of a particular group were expected to emerge winner. This was demonstrated with an election to the Jos North local government council chairmanship held soon after the new LGA was created in 1991. The winner was Sama'ila Mohammed, a Jasawa. According to Aminat (2012), this was exactly what the Jasawa had worked toward and the indigenes had feared. Aminat (2012) adds that the elections passed off peacefully, and there were no incidents of communal violence during Sama'ila Mohammed's term. However the indigenes complained about his appointment of other Jasawa (Hausa and Fulani in Jos) to key positions in the local government. The complaints were most majorly over the fact that he began issuing indigene certificates from Jos North to Jasawa as well as to Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom. Sama'ila Mohammed's tenure of office ended prematurely in November 1993, when General Sani Abacha, upon seizing control of the federal government, dissolved all democratic structures in Nigeria, including elected state and local government positions.

The conflict took an ethno-religious dimension in April 1994 when Mohammed Mana, a Hausa and/or Fulani Muslim from Adamawa State and then military administrator of Plateau State, appointed Alhaji Aminu Mato, another Hausa Muslim, as the caretaker committee chairman of Jos North. This was applauded by the Hausa and Fulani who believed it was a well-deserved appointment but was vehemently rejected by Berom, Anaguta and Afizere on account that he was a non-indigene. They did this by staging a protest to the government house. Mato was sworn-in but was stopped from assuming office. The Hausa and Fulani counter protested and the conflict

degenerated into chaos and violence in the city leading to destruction of property and death of persons. In 1996, another Jassawa person, Ado Ibrahim, was appointed education secretary in Jos North but once again it was vehemently opposed by the acclaimed indigenes and the government responded swiftly by removing him, knowing that violence was imminent. The political ward creation of 1998 further deepened the identity crisis. Also, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) chairmanship primaries of the locality in 1998 hardened the positions of the parties to the conflict. Sani Mudi, a Jassawa, stood for chairmanship and received overwhelming support from the Hausa and Fulani who also believed that he won the primaries but he was denied the position and reverted to the position of deputy chairmanship by the same scheming of the indigenes. These actions added to the frustration of the Hausa and Fulani in Jos (Best, 2007).

The positions of the parties was further distorted and hardened when Dr Bagudu Frank Tardy, an Anaguta person, issued indigeneship certificates and exempted the Hausa and Fulani from the category (Human Rights Watch 2006; Best 2007; Higazi 2011). The conflict reached a crisis stage in 2001 when violence was exacerbated following the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed, a Jassawa Muslim, as the coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for Jos North by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration. His appointment was met with resistance and protests that eventually culminated into violence and became a point of departure in the Jos conflicts. The conflict escalated to other parts of the state and in 2004 President Olusegun Obasanjo imposed a state of emergency in the state, which was led by Colonel Chris Ali (Rtd) (Best, 2007). On March 15, 2008, elections were conducted into the local government chairman offices in Plateau State. They were concluded but cancelled by the Plateau State government after the security reports gathered from warning signals were studied. It has been argued that the results, especially of Jos North, would have incited another dimension of violence, but for the control measure adopted by the state government (Ostien, 2009). However, the same election led to another round of violence on Friday, November 28 2008. These issues have been fully documented but it is necessary here to understand the consequent residential segregation and its attendant circle of violence as well as how it has affected infrastructural development. According to Je'adayibe and Kudu (2011), "the crisis began shortly after state-wide local government council elections of November 27, 2008, which were considered by some as "peaceful, free and fair". Security reports gathered and the warning signals before the elections prompted the government to postpone the elections till a more convenient date as indicated above. However, some elements had reasoned that their continuous disenfranchisement was only fitting

and convenient for the state government which had been accused of biases even before the polls. While the announcement of the election results was being awaited, trouble broke out at the collation centre which had been moved to Kabong shortly before the elections. Since then, there have been cases of secret killings and night ambushes. Casualties have been high on both sides with several churches and mosques burnt (*Tell*, March 21, 2011). During these periods, five local governments in Plateau north were engulfed by these ruinous conflicts except for Jos East that has remained untouched (Best 2007; *Tell*, 2011). However, the conflict has remained recurrent in four LGAs: Jos north, Jos south, Barkin-Ladi, and Riyom.

The conflict in the southern Plateau was reinvigorated by the escalation of the Jos incident in 2001. Crucial to the conflict in this area, like that of the northern zone, is complex historical interpretation of origin and territorial ownership. While it may be admitted that the southern Plateau conflict which became manifest in 2002 predates the one discussed above (in northern Plateau) which manifested in 2001, the conflict became unprecedented in its protractedness and in the way it engulfed the entire southern region (Best, 2007). The conflict within Jos and its environs provided the conditions that led to the explosion and escalation of the conflict in Yelwa-Shendam and Wase. The Yelwa-Shendam conflict pitched the Jarawa Muslims against the Gomai who are Christians on the one hand and adherents of traditional religion on the other, while that of Wase pitched the Hausa and Fulani Muslims against the Taroh Christians. There were contestations over political offices and traditional authorities in the said areas between the different peoples mentioned above. The contest reached its climax on June 26, 2002 when the conflict assumed a crisis dimension (Best, 2007). The magnitude of the crisis and its recurrence led to the imposition of the State of Emergency aforementioned. The groups, especially the non-Muslims, demanded for a separate market as a way to totally demarcate them from the Muslims. Plateau State indeed has become what Gandu (2011) describes as a melting pot with un-melting identities. As argued above, a plethora of literature has documented these conflicts but there is need to examine the interface between settlement dynamics, recurrent group hostilities and infrastructural development. What role does the emerging settlement play in reinforcing or reducing identity consciousness and how has it affected infrastructural development? These issues are critical and deserve interrogation. It is a subject for academic investigation. Hence this study sets out to fill a gap in the literature on ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Preamble

The complex interaction between ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics is a reality that can be understood from different vantage points. However, "reality is not an objective fact to be discovered by the researcher but inter-subjectivity constructed by those participating in it" (Geertz, 1973 cited in Hoechner, 2013:18). From this vantage point, the relationship between conflicts and settlement dynamics cannot be understood unless approached from the perspectives of those involved in the conflicts, relocation, and security provision. This informs the utilization of combined methodology through interviews, ethnography and historical documents. Thus, this chapter provides the procedure through which data for the study was collected, collated, analysed and presented.

3.1 Research Design

This study adopted case study research design. Case study researches according to Anthony Orum "is an intensive examination of a single case of a particular phenomenon" (Shrank, 2006:21). Orum's view of case study research is limited given Andrew Bennett's expansion of the term's purview. Bennett saw case study to "include both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons between or among a small number of cases" (Shrank, 2006:21). Based on the nature of the research questions and the phenomena under study, case study design became appropriate given the fact that it involves the utilization of a wide array of different data sources and a number of different analytic strategies (Shrank, 2006). The idea of a case study design is to understand 'what', 'where', 'when', 'why' and how a phenomenon occurs (Babbie, 2007:87). Therefore, the design helped to describe the evolution of Plateau State, migratory trends, origin, development and spread of inter-group conflicts and settlement dynamics in the area. It also helped to interrogate why the violence has continued to reoccur in segregated neighbourhoods while the mixed neighbourhoods remain peaceful. This was salient in determining how the groups mobilise for conflict. Case study design also helped in understanding how the emerging settlement has affected infrastructural development.

Two cases served as the unit of analysis for this study; they include; the Jos North and Jos South case and the Barkin-Ladi and Riyom case. The cases are grouped in these ways given their urban/semi-urban and rural/semi-rural nature respectively. The cases are informed by similar

issues and were used to ascertain how they ignited conflict and sparked movement towards exclusive neighbourhood.

3.2 Study Area

The study area is Plateau State in the Middle Belt region otherwise called North Central Nigeria. The state is bordered by Bauchi State to the North East, Kaduna State to the North West, Nasarawa State to the South West and Taraba State to the South East as shown in figure 3.1. Plateau State, with an area of 26, 899 square kilometres, has an estimated population of over three million people. It is located between latitude $80^{0}24$'N and longitude $80^{0}32$' and $100^{0}38$'E. Named after the picturesque Jos Plateau, a mountainous area in the north of the state, it has bare rocks that cover the grasslands across the state. Plateau State has seventeen Local Government Areas (LGAs) distributed among the three senatorial districts of north, south and central. The area considered for this study is Plateau North Senatorial District otherwise called northern zone. The northern zone is made up of Bassa, Barkin-Ladi, Jos East, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom LGAs. This study, however, was carried out in Barkin-Ladi, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom LGAs. Bassa and Jos East have not been deeply engrossed in the conflict since 2001 and there are no attendant shifts in settlements.



Figure 3.1: Administrative map of Plateau State.

Source: Plateau State Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (2008)

Particularly, attention is given to areas grossly affected by violence for over a decade. The LGAs were purposively selected and the choice is informed by the frequent clashes in the areas along ethno-religious lines and the attendant shift in settlements. Since 1999, Plateau State according NEMA Annual reports has witnessed the highest number of communal and ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria (NEMA Reports, 2012; 2013 and 2014). Data monitored from the Nigerian Watch data base revealed that the four local governments aforementioned have witnessed the highest casualty figure of the communal violence since 2006. Plateau State witnessed the imposition of emergency rule in 2004 under President Olusegun Obasanjo. However, when the second round of the emergency rule was imposed in 2011 by Prseident Goodluck Jonathan it was only on Barkin-Ladi, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom LGAs. Also, Newspapers were awash with reports of the emergence of 'no go areas' for either Christians or Muslims in Jos metropolitan areas. There are two conflict zones in Plateau State- north and south as shown in figure 3.2. But the persistence of the conflict in the north and particularly in Jos north, Jos south, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom and the attendant shift in settlement is a legitimate object of academic investigation. This site was selected using the frequent communal and ethno-religious clash, the high level casualty figure, the imposition of state of emergency and the shift in settlements.

The persistent conflicts and settlement dynamics in Plateau State places the puzzle that 'violent conflicts have structured and restructured human settlements and deepened the culture of violence' in perspective. Therefore, northern Plateau State and the four LGAs aforementioned are appropriate for interrogating the connections between the circle of conflicts and settlement dynamics.



Figure 3.2: Conflict Zones in Plateau state

Source: **Krause, 2011:37**

3.3 Population of Study

Barkin-Ladi, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom were involved in this study. According to the 2006 census Barkin-Ladi has a population of 175, 267; Jos North has 429, 300 population; Jos South is 306, 716 and Riyom has 64, 910. However, the target population comprised literate males and females of Hausa and Fulani descent who are Muslims, literate males and females of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere descent who are Christians and literate males and females of Igbo and Yoruba descents in the localities selected. These are people who have lived in these local government areas for a considerable length of time (25 years and above); those who are knowledgeable of the conflict, migratory trends and settlement dynamics. Others include those that have been affected by the conflict and those that have moved from one settlement to another for safety reasons. Sample was drawn from the target population.

3.3.1 Sample Size

A total of thirty-two (32) settlements were selected for this study representing the ethnic and religious groups (see appendix XV for list of settlements selected). The LGAs are not of same size and population. A total of thirteen (13) settlements were selected in Jos North, eight (8) in Jos South, seven (7) in Barkin-Ladi and four (4) in Riyom. However, the settlements selected are small communities with about same size in population as provided in the 2006 census. Given that the settlements are about the same size in population three (3) people were selected from each settlement. A total of ninety-six respondents were therefore sampled for the study.

3.4 Sampling Method

This study utilized the purposive sampling technique. Purposive sampling involves a process where the researcher deliberately chooses respondents whom he considers knowledgeable on the phenomenon studied. This technique was necessary given its usefulness in identifying and tracking the needed respondents when the members of a special population are difficult to locate.

3.5 Sources and Methods of Data Collection

Data was collected through both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include In-depth Interviews (IDI), Focus Group Discussions (FGD), Non-participant observation and documents from the National Archives, Kaduna. The secondary data consisted of Government

white papers, gazettes, reports, petitions, books, journal articles, newspaper and magazine articles, advertorials and unpublished works.

3.5.1 In-depth Interviews (IDI)

A total of forty-six (46) In-depth interviews (IDI) were conducted and gathered through twelve neighbourhood leaders, eleven ethno-religious group leaders, three members of civil society organizations, four estate managers, two academics, two security officials, and twelve youth leaders. Open ended questions were used to elicit information. This was to allow respondents discuss freely the objectives of the study. The discussions centred on how the conflict has structured and restructured human settlements and the implication of the emerging settlement for inter-group relations; group mobilisation and infrastructural development.

3.5.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)

Six (6) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) sessions were carried out one each with Afizere, Anaguta, Berom, and Igbo ethnic groups who are Christians; and Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups who are Muslims. Each session is made up of about eight to ten participants comprising literate elders and youths (See list of participants in appendix II). They were selected based on their stake in the phenomena studied. That is, the selection was based on those who have moved from previous residential location as a result of the conflict, those that have been affected, those that have lived in the LGAs for twenty-five years and above, and those that are knowledgeable about the conflicts, migratory trends and settlement dynamics. The help of research assistants and community people aided the selections. While the data gathered from the FGD complemented the IDIs it also acted as a check and validity on the IDI and observations. The discussions centred on how settlement dynamic has facilitated group mobilisation for conflict and how the conflicts affect infrastructural development in the emerging settlements. Table 3.1 shows the FGD sessions in different localities.

Table 3.1: FGD sessions in different localities

Location	Ethnic Group (s)	Category of Discussants	No. of Participants	Total of FGDs
Angwan Rukuba, Jos North	Anaguta	Youths	8	1
Jos Jarawa, Jos North	Afizere	Youths	8	1
Yan Shanu, Jos North	Hausa	Youth/Elders	10	1
Bukuru, Jos South	Berom	Youth/Elders	8	1
Gura Kworos, Barkin-Ladi	Igbo	Youth/Elders	8	1
Bachit/Gashish, Riyom/Barkin-Ladi	Fulani	Youth/Elders	8	1
Total	-	-	50	6

Source: Field work, 2014

3.5.3 Non-participant Observation

Non-participant observation method was used to understand inter-group relations and the extent the relations have been affected by the settlement dynamics. As a former resident of the research community, it provided the opportunity to attend some neighbourhood and community meetings where issues of neighbourhood security were discussed.

3.5.4 Archival Documents

Documents from National Archives, Kaduna were consulted to understand the historical evolution of the research community, migratory trends and settlement dynamics. These Archival materials detailed how colonialism altered human settlements in the area studied and how colonial and post-colonial policies and politics shaped identities.

3.6 Instrument of Data Collection

Two different guides were utilized as the instrument of eliciting information. An interview guide containing open-ended questions designed based on the research questions. This enabled the respondents to discuss at length and opened up several issues. Another guide was designed to enable the participants of the FGDs freely discuss the objectives of the study.

3.7 Data Processing and Method of Data Analysis

Data collected from the interviews, FGDs, and Archives were processed, pooled together and categorised into themes based on the research objectives. The data was content and thematically analysed using descriptive and narrative styles and reflecting the objectives of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT IN PLATEAU STATE

4.1 Evolution of northern Plateau State: The Structuring and Restructuring of Conflicts and

Settlement Dynamics

4.1.1 Peoples of Northern Plateau State and Inter-Group Relations

Modern Plateau State and the northern part in particular is a congregation of disparate ethnic nationalities and religious groupings which evolved through different lines of migrations. Formally of Plateau Province, the state came into existence in 1976. Plateau Province itself emerged during the reorganisation of Northern Provinces in 1926 (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921; C.G. Ames, 1934). The Province was divided into five Divisions, namely; Jos, Jemaa, Pankshin, Shendam and Southern. Plateau Province on its part was created out of the then Bauchi, Muri and Nasarawa Provinces. The reorganisation saw the disappearance of the former Muri and Nasarawa Provinces as they were entirely absorbed in other areas. The Plateau Province as argued by Ames in the Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria in 1934 emerged following its absorption of the following areas:

a) From Bauchi Province, the Jos Division became part of it without any form of adjustment. On the other hand, the Pankshin Division was also unbroken including the Gindiri Village Area, the Plains Angas District, and the Kanam District.
b) From the former Muri Province came the Shendam Division which included less of Awe District and the Wase District proper. That is, the Plains of the Yergam District of the former Wase Emirate remained part of the Shendam Division.
c) From the former Nasarawa Province, the Jemaa Division became part of the new Plateau Province without adjustment although it had earlier been reduced by the transfer of three independent ethnic units of the Moroa, Kagoro and Jaba to Zaria Province. Also included was the Lafia Division (exclusive of the Lafia Emirate) which later became the Southern Division (Ames, 1934:7-8).

Plateau Province, therefore, was a mixture of Provinces and different levels of boundary adjustments. Thus, different ethnic nationalities that occupy the present day Plateau north as its

indigenes are a combination of autochthonous peoples and lines of migration. Although scholars of ethnic relations have argued that common ethnic identities carried by most Nigerian groups and the current level of ethnic consciousness are recent creations; some people had lived in their various locations for long dating back several centuries. Plateau north is not an exception to this as several historical sources have indicated that while a people have lived there from time immemorial others are recent migrants. A respondent who spoke on behalf of the Ujah of Anaguta contended that "with the exception of a few, most ethnic groups that claim indigeneship in northern Plateau have lived here all their lives" (Interview at Amanza Road, Dogon Karfe, Jos North, October, 25, 2014). Plateau north area is noted for large number of very small ethnic groups, including Afizere (Jarawa), Anaguta, Amo, Berom, Buji, Ganawuri, Irigwe, Rukuba and Pakara (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). However, three of these indigenous groups including the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom are found in the four local government areas studied. While the Berom have their political and spiritual throne in Shonong, the Afizere have links to a lager Jarawa group in Bauchi, the Anaguta on the other hand have their ancestry in Naraguta and are said to have intermarried with the Jarawa. Though migratory histories have indicated that the groups migrated to their present location in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from close and distant places (Ames, 1934; Temple, 1965; Morrison, 1976;), a people have lived around these settlements since time immemorial (Shaw, 1980). These groups have intermarried and have had violent interactions in the past among themselves and with later migrants to the area.

Scholars of the history of peoples of Plateau north have always had the problem of beginning such venture with the dilemma of terminology. Most of the peoples of Plateau State and northern part in particular have at least two names (Isichei, 1982:1) and this has been with us till now. This problem arose from the indigenous group having a different name for themselves and their place while the Hausa have another name for such people and places. According to Isichei:

> In the first thirty years of the European presence, ethonyms multiplied. The Birom (sic) became for a time the 'Kibyen', or they were called 'Burrum' or 'Burumawa', the same name being used for the Boghom of Kanam.... More seriously misleading, the Afusare (sic) were called Jarawa, or Hill Jarawa creating a confusion which is still with us (1982:2).

A respondent at Shonong claimed that the Berom has never been Kibyen nor Burrum, rather that those ethonyms were descriptive words used by the Hausa to identify the Berom. For that

respondent, such identification was not only derogatory but also a form of stereotype; given that the intention was to recreate the Berom myth of origin and trace them somewhere else (Interview, at Shonong, Riyom LGA, 2014). The Berom myth of origin traces them to Shonong and Lwa villages in present day Bachit District before moving to Riyom town all in Riyom Local Government Area. However, a historical analysis based on genealogies, suggests that the present population of the Plateau have lived there only since the first half of the seventeenth century, when the proto Berom first settled at Riyom and Shonong (Isichei, 1982:7).

Although it was claimed in the "Notes on the Tribes of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria" that the Berom came from Wukari (Temple, 1965:34), but this has been jettisoned by Ames (1934:25) who viewed such analysis as "unwarrantably and incaustiously precise". Berom myth of origin, however, claimed that man was created in Lwa from where they multiplied and moved to other areas including Shonong and Riyom. This is confirmed in the H.A. Prankerd report which showed that Riyom is the first settlement of the Berom and their political and spiritual headquarters (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). The Riyom influence in the pre-British Berom administration waned significantly. Thereafter, Heipang village was of considerable importance as it had the power to confer the sovereignty of the village head of Foron. Heipang's power also decayed while that of Foron grew stronger. This was because Heipang is situated on the plains and was subject to constant attacks and strategically defenceless. What is clear, however, is that the Berom have lived in their present location since the seventeenth century alongside their neighbours.

The Afizere group also called Jarawa is believed to have origins with the Jarawa of Bauchi (NAK/JOSPROF/257/1914). An Afizere chief who responded to this study did not disassociate their origins with the Bauchi group rather he claimed that they had reached Jos before several groups (Interview at Jos Jarawa, October, 26, 2014). They later became known as the Foburawa or the hill Jarawa in Jos (NAK/JOSPROF/257/1914; Temple, 1965:8). On the other hand, according to Temple, the origin of the Anaguta is definitely not known but they are believed to come from beyond the Jarawa hills (1965:8), but Ames noted that the Anaguta were part of those that left the Jukun Empire to free themselves from the Jukun yoke. He added that they had climbed the plateau and moved North-East and settled at Naraguta (1934:25). Nevertheless, S.E.M. Stobart, a colonial District Officer in his report showed that the Anaguta lived among the hills at Naraguta. His report showed that the Anaguta are bounded on the East, North East and South East by the Jarawa (Afizere) who are associated with the Bauchi Emirate. The group is

bounded on the North West by the Narabunu, on the South West by the Berom and on the West by the Rukuba ethnic groups (NAK/JOSPROF/257/1914). Stobart, however, did not show if the Anaguta migrated from somewhere or if they have lived at their present location from time immemorial. The Anaguta on the other hand insist that Naraguta is their origin. The Anaguta narrative of Naraguta as their origin is also upheld in some colonial records. However, they may have been earlier migrants to the area. The Report of Mr. H.A. Prankerd District Officer of Naraguta shows a connection between the Anaguta and the Du people (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). He contended that they are the inhabitants of Naraguta and came from Bujel near Tilden Fulani in Bauchi Division. The then Naraguta District bordered Jos and Bauchi Divisions as shown in figure 4.1 below.



Figure 4.1: Political Map M60 0f 1927 Showing Jos Division, the boundaries and the Districts

SOURCE: Modified from NAKJOSPROF/M60/1927

Prankerd's report indicated that the Anaguta culture assimilated with that of the Afizere to some extent though they remained significantly distinct. He offered an explanation that the Afizere were the inhabitants of Jos but he did not dispute their origins in Fobur and Jarawa hills in Bauchi. Both the Anaguta and the Afizere fought side by side to drive out the Fulani that had camped on the outskirts of Jos and to maintain control of the area before the advent of colonialism (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). However, by their contact with Europeans and the Hausa, the Anaguta custom underwent considerable modification. They were for a while administered through the Islamic justice system.

In essence, tracing the origins of the Berom, the Afizere and the Anaguta are complex and hardly precise. While it can be confirmed from different historical sources that the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom have a Jukun connection (Ames, 1934; Temple, 1965; Isichie, 1982), it is not clear if they originated from there. What is clear is that the three groups have lived side by side for centuries and intermarried with each other and belong to the same Chadic linguistic family though they speak distinct languages. In the same manner, movement of the Hausa and Fulani groups into what is today northern Plateau State was a complex historical process that took place over centuries (Isichie, 1982:16). Their interaction with Plateau north societies in the precolonial period was characterised by violent and at the same time peaceful exchanges (Morrison, 1976; 1982).

However, Shaw (1980) has shown that the peoples of Plateau polities have existed in their present location since the prehistory times. Such archeological investigations have linked people of the Jos Plateau to the Nok civilisation which thrived between 200BC to1000AD. These according to Shaw (1980) is evident in the most prolific site known on the Jos Plateau where two layers of gravel at Mai Idon Toro (pg26) and the rock shelters at Rop (pg29) in present day Jos South and Barkin-Ladi Local Government Areas of Plateau State. Thus, discovery of artifacts of the Acheulian era as well as the remains of the Late Stone Age man at the above sites indicate that a people have inhabited the present Plateau North polity for several millennia.

The above notwithstanding, it has been established that history of the Plateau environment has featured many waves of human movements (Udo, 1980; Abubakar, 1980). Some ethnic groups within this area are said to have migrated over long distances while others only moved within

single geographical region. Abubakar (1980:166) maintained that the "migrations resulted from intense conflicts and struggles accompanying the establishment of large centralised states in the area". This argument follows the demographic appearance of the areas. Although ethnic groups' migrations have in some instances assimilated other ethnic groups but the autochthonous people of the Jos Plateau were possibly not overwhelmed by any alien immigrant group. Sa'ad Abubakar (1980:166-7) had reiterated this when he noted that:

> Undoubtedly, some of the ethnic groups on the upper Benue basin and the Bauchi plateau migrated from the north. However, this does not mean that there had been no autochthons but only empty lands into which the various immigrants moved. In the north Benue region, there is said to have existed an aboriginal group which the Bata assimilated, and in the south, the Chamba assimilated the Jangani and Kpenyienbu both being the original inhabitants of the region. Thus, it can be said that in most areas the autochthons that had existed were probably eventually overwhelmed by the alien immigrants, except possibly on the Jos Plateau.

The above position is underscored by several respondents to this study who argued that the Jos Plateau had never been conquered by any group nor have they been expelled from current location (interview at Amanza Road, Dogon Karfe, Jos North, October 25, 2014). Migration of the groups is discussed in brief detail in the next section. Each of these groups had distinct political organisations and leadership but it was during the colonial period that the peoples of the Plateau North polity came under a single leadership in the Bauchi Province (Ames, 1934; Temple, 1965; Morrison, 1976).

The administration of the Plateau Province differed from that of the bordering Provinces where the existence of recognised Emirates made the application of indirect rule principle possible. Within the Plateau Province, it was clear from the beginning that, apart from the Jemaa Emirate, Kanam District and later the independent Shendam District, Government could not immediately create responsible Native Administration as were applicable in the so called Hausa states; neither could the principle of indirect rule be adopted in the entire Province (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921; Ames, 1934). The difficulty lingered because the contact (both pre-colonial and colonial) with majority of the ethnic groups in the area were established through the use of armed force and in most cases maintained by the show of armed force and intermittently by the use of such force. Force became the viable option when the people resisted colonial contact. A respondent reiterated that "…when the colonial masters came there was a resistance from the natives…" (Interviews at

Amanza Road, Dogon Karfe, Jos North, October 25, 2014). Thus, such resistance made the peoples of the area vulnerable to armed attacks. It was evident to the colonial officers that the large number of separate and distinct units will prevent any possibility of organising the peoples into one single government. However, colonial administrators created what C.G. Ames (1934:46) called artificial Native Administrations in those areas without Emirate as a way to solve the highlighted problem. Each of the patterns of Native Administration had its own Treasury, Prison and Police Force (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). These different administrative units and the disparate ethnic and religious groups continue to pose challenges even today especially in Plateau north area formally known as Jos Division. The challenges reinforced contestations for ownership and migratory histories between the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere on the one hand and Hausa and Fulani on the other.

As captured earlier, the Jos Division at the creation of Plateau Province in 1926 had fifteen Districts named after the town of the Head Chief of each District; they are; Achakka, Amo, Buji, Foron, Ganawuri, Gashish, Heifam, Jere, Kuru, Kwal, Machi, Naraguta, Rim, Rop and Vom (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). Created during the reorganisation of Jos Division, the Districts were therefore established as Native Courts with the Chief of each area serving as the President of the new Native Courts. These were later approved as Native Authorities (NAK/JOSPROF3169/1921). In a correspondence between the Resident Plateau Province and the Secretary Northern Provinces, the Resident suggested that the most common title among the indigenous people is the Berom's "GWOM" meaning Chief. Therefore, it was recommended and later adopted that the Berom words "Manje la Gwom" meaning "Chiefs in Council" be used to replace the Hausa term "Sarki da Majalisa" (NAK/JOSPROF/211/1920/55). Before now, holders of various positions in Jos Division were aliens of Hausa cum Mohammedan type (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921/81). However, the indigenous people who were considered to be developing fast and in good moral position replaced the Native aliens. The indigenous people of the areas studied include the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom reflecting in figure 4.2 below.



Figure 4.2: The People of Plateau Area, Northern Nigeria

Source: Modified from Memorandum submitted to Plateau Resolve by Ujah of Anaguta.

The fifteen Districts earlier mentioned are in tin mining areas except for Jere which later formed part of Bassa Local Government Area. Consequently, the mining industry attracted several aliens of both African and non-African extraction leading to large population and adding to both administrative and social problems in the Division (Interview at Heipang, Barkin-Ladi, November 12, 2014). Aside the tin economy, the population of the area increased tremendously with the completion of railways linking Jos and Port Harcourt in 1927 (Plotnicov, 1967). The point to underscore as already argued by C.G. Ames is that "Government first arrived on the Plateau at the end of 1904 owing to the urgent requests of the Niger Company whose representatives had …been there for years". Although underlying issues could be traced beyond the emergence of government on the Plateau, administering the area- particularly Plateau North, formally the Jos Division has been a fundamental issue. Thus, the underlying issues in the Plateau State crisis have been those of power and histories of migration.

To that effect, in a memo to the District Officer of Jos, H.A. Prankerd, Mr. P. Lonsdale argued that there was no any Native Authority worth speaking of in the Jos Division (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). This view stagnates the state of affairs within the Division when compared to those within the well-organised Emirate in Northern Provinces. Hence, every year, the Hausa referred to as the alien Native elements by the colonialists grew more and more influential while the indigenous groups' influence receded. The British administration deemed it necessary to alter their earlier arrangement of promoting Hausa and Emirate practices over the indigenous people of the Plateau. In their view, it was necessary to enhance efficient Native administration in Jos. They jettisoned the essence of Hausa practices in the development of the indigenous people. In this sense, Lonsdale noted that foisting any alien scheme of administration on to the natives of the Plateau was unnecessary since the people would have evolved some such administration had the British not arrived (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921).

The idea behind the reorganisation was to have one chief administering the people and different from the Hausa Muslims. According to Lonsdale, "the alien-native so-called "Hausa" settlement must, for some time to come, be dealt with separately as an area within a Native Administration area proper" (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). This raises the issue of how the Hausa became defined as part of the people of the Jos area. But in critical terms Lonsdale's assertion attempted to locate the Hausa under a Native administration controlled by the indigenous people. As a

result, the Alkali courts were replaced with Native courts in the reorganized districts to deal with judicial issues. The prevalence of the Mohammedan courts earlier was as result of the assumption that there was little or no cohesion among the people of the Plateau and that they were not under the jurisdiction of any Native court. However, the colonialists reckoned that there was what they called "pagan courts with sickly growth". Judicial works were done in those areas by the Headmen or the 'Sarkin Tsafi' (juju priest). Despite the weaknesses of this medium, the testimony from colonial records showed that things worked amazingly well. The role of the headmen was complicated when the British appointed Hausa men in that position therefore altering the modus operandi of cultural processes (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921/53). Power struggle between the indigenous groups and the Hausa was therefore created.

Although the British administrators classified the indigenous people into two groups- "independent pagans and pagans under Mohammedan rule", for administrative purposes, such classification further entrenched the power tussle. This is because "Hausa settlements" which were obviously connected with the Mining camps were controlled by the Hausa while a significant number of the Hausa that established themselves in the neighbourhood of indigenous communities did not submit to the headship of the headmen in those communities (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). The implication of such relationship was far beyond craving for 'control' and 'submission' but includes domination for political and economic purposes. Indigenous communities were later to interpret the non submission of the Hausa as strategies to grab the land and control all that is within it.

Despite the flaws of administration, Plateau people lived happily with all foreigners including Europeans, Hausa, Kanuri, Fulani and all occupants of the mining camps. According to G.J.F. Tomlinson it was the most highly industrialised area in Nigeria (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). Nevertheless, crime was comparatively rare, taxes were paid and maximum security prevailed. Tomlinson recorded harmonious relations that existed between the indigenous Plateau people of Jos Division and all alien residents. This does not contradict those periods of upheaval.

4.1.2 Migration, Settlement Dynamics and Conflicts in Northern Plateau State

Migration scholars have indicated that from time immemorial intrepid adventures from every part of the world had gone out in search of unknown lands and had moved from place to place (Johnson, 2000; Cerasarani and Fulbrook, 1996; Olson, 1993). Olson, writing on the origins of dictatorship distinguished between roving and stationary bandits in which he claimed that the two

types of bandits were responsible for the evolution of modern states. His position is that people had moved and conquered places and either killed them or made them subjects. Such movements or voyages marked turning points in world history. The result of the migrations and intermingling of cultures that followed was the slow but steady or at some point never complete assimilation of cultures. It is evident from the history of migration that in certain areas when the immigrants arrived in increasing numbers the indigenous or autochthonous population went into decline. Johnson (2000) had reiterated this when he noted that the contact of the Eastern and Western hemispheres had led to the Europeanization of territories and to indigenous population of some areas becoming victims of episodic warfare that broke out as the new arrivals invaded the land. Thus, while many who claim to be autochthonous to a place may be after all right, others might have lost their true migration history. This is adumbrated by the fact that both ancient tradition and modern archeological findings point to a catastrophic overthrow of indigenous population in most parts of the world since pre-history days (De Burgh, 1961:96).

Studies of migration, therefore, are replete with several explanations of the "push" and "pull" factors accountable for the movement of people from one point to another. Some, for example, emphasize the primacy of economic factors in the movement of people (Harris and Todaro, 1970). Others focus on demographic changes such as high population density and ecological problems as Udo (1980) has demonstrated about the 1973 flood in Nigeria which necessitated the movement of people into several areas. Others still emphasize psycho-social factors resulting from changes in the migrant's need dispositions due to the forces of urbanization and culture contact (Imoagene, 1967; Mabogunje, 1970). While human migration is conceived as a permanent movement, short term movements are known as circulation (Zelinsky 1971 cited in Albert, 1994). The concern here is on permanent movements that inadvertently influences the structures of societies.

Migration and its resultant conflicts therefore have highlighted the fact that in every community, there are common-sense understandings of who belongs, and who does not. In this sense, Cesarani and Fulbrook (1996:156) noted that “societies the world over have developed conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’, the ‘civilized’ and the ‘barbarians’, those who belong and those who are ‘beyond the pale’. Identities have been forged on the basis of many possible imagined attributes: the myth of common ancestry, the inheritance of blood, the binding force of ethnic origin and tradition, custom and belief are historically among the most widespread. The recent

rise of ethnocentrism, indigene/settler conflicts and ethno-religious conflicts in Africa and Nigeria in particular has focused public attention on issues concerning migrant groups. Yet, migration is not a new phenomenon in Africa, and has not always been associated with inter-group violence. Immigrant communities have often been successfully integrated and new social and national identities have developed over time.

Nevertheless, the narratives on migrations and conflicts in Africa have foregrounded the fact that in its earliest forms, some migrations were as result of conflicts and such migrations also initiated or re-initiated other conflicts. In any case, the peoples of Nigeria today and particularly northern Nigeria were products of gradual fusion between different groups including invaders or intruders of different origins. Udo (1980:7) has shown that "history is replete with wars and conquest by migrants fleeing from desiccating environment to areas which are better endowed with food resources". The issues of droughts, invaders, attacks and conflicts have underscored the great need to understand the role of geography in the making of history.

The origins of present day peoples of Plateau State and particularly the Plateau North area, including present day Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom LGAs may be complex to trace. Although, given the evidence produced by Shaw (1980) of the Nok culture and remains of Old Stone Age antiquity in the area showing that people had lived there from time immemorial, colonial administrators and historians of great repute have shown that the area witnessed different lines and patterns of migrations. While each group migrated, they had settled temporarily at several locations before finally settling at the present locations (C.G. Ames, 1934; Abubakar, 1980). However, a respondent to this study argued that the people of Plateau North area who are indigenous to the area did not migrate from anywhere (Interview at Jenta Adamu, Jos North, October 5, 2014). Yet, C.G. Ames (1934:20) argued that "the history of Plateau Province begins at several distinct sources, all of which are outside the Province and many of which are very distant indeed".

The point to underscore is that the people of the Plateau have different migration histories and many originated from very distant places. This claim is supported by Ikime (1980) and Mangvwat (1984). Further, the groups in the Plateau North area after crossing the boundaries into the Plateau Province had through their interactions experienced little squabbles and skirmish which

sometimes led to fragments also breaking farther away. At other times, groups had separated amicably and by mutual agreement. Wherever this happened on a large scale, as argued by Ames had resulted into the brake away fragment becoming distinguishable from the parent body. At some occasions the splinter group had preserved the main features of the customs and language of the parent body, but has adopted additional customs or has altered details of former customs. This gives credence to the views of a respondent to this research who affirmed that the Berom and the Anaguta have a relationship in lineage.

Monday Mangvwat (1984:108) has given a clear illustration of group migrations and the phases of those migrations this way:

> The peopling and formation of groups on the Jos Plateau areas can be traced to several phases. The first phase, C. 200BC to 1000 AD was the pre-historic period. The second C. 1100 to C. 1700 AD was occasioned most largely by developments in the Kanem-Bornu region particularly following the establishment of the second Kanuri Empire which occasioned the emigration of groups of people who refused to be incorporated into the new Kanem polity to the Jos Plateau. The third C. 1600 to C. 1800 AD was associated with the Jukun Kwararafa activities. The fourth phase C. 1800 to 1907 AD was related to the Fulani herders and Hausa traders which culminated in the Sokoto Jihad.

Considering the above, the argument substantiates the position of C.G. Ames in the Gazetteers of Northern Provinces of Nigeria of 1934 that the people of the Jos Division like the Afizere (Jarawa), Anaguta and the Berom going by tradition and culture probably migrated into Jos Division from the Kanem-Bornu region and the Jukun activities. Also suffice the above to say that the Hausa and Fulani groups were later migrants to the area which became Jos Division and later Barkin-Ladi, Bassa, Jos East, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom Local Government Areas. Several respondents to this research who are of the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom extractions alluded to this migratory history of the Hausa and Fulani, noting that the initial attempts were to conquer them for religious and economic purposes. One respondent noted that:

> There were attempts by the Hausa and Fulani Muslims to conquer this area called Plateau State today. Continually they tried but continually they met resistance by the indigenes. Almost all attempts they made was futile but specifically around 1873 they came again in full force but yet again the indigenes with a combined force defeated them and captured their horses and soldiers. The natives even captured a village in Bauchi, around

> Tilden Fulani and Lere. So from 1873 when they came again but were defeated they never attempted to conquer the people again until the white man came (Interview at Heipang, Barkin-Ladi, November 12, 2014).

The implication of the above is that the fourth phase of migrations to the Jos Plateau were characterised by different levels of conflicts. In other words several migrations to the Jos Plateau can be associated with conflicts and these conflicts had implications for where and how the constant victims settled in their new locations. The position of the above respondent is vividly captured in the account of a colonial administrator District Officer Lonsdale in charge of Bauchi who chronicled the 1873 event. Bingel (1978) and PIDAN (2010) drew their conclusions on Hausa and Fulani migration to Jos Plateau from Lonsdale's account. The colonial administrator's interview with a participant in the raid of Jos Plateau by Bauchi forces, Abdu Wazirin Wunti is captured thus:

> Amadu Sarkin Yaki (war chief) told his son and us to get up to Lemme and follow Ciroman Bauchi Usman dan Sarkin Bauchi Ibrahim. We found him and his fighting men at Rinjin Makur… from Rijin Makur we went to Barga, then to Toro, then Tilden Fulani and then onto Naraguta. Thence we proceeded to Jos where about 3p.m., close to the present site of the Canteen stream, we were attacked by a large number of the Naragutawa, Bukurawa, Jarawa, Bujawa and Amo men. They beat us and we all separated in flight reaching Tilde at night. The pagans returned from Rafin Jaki. Forty one (41) of us were killed and twelve of our horses were captured. We captured 18 of their cattle. After this we did not fight them again till the white men came (NAK/JOSPROF/257/1914).

Afterwards the groups entered into a pact of trust known as "Amana". This was before tin mining and before the advent of colonialism (Interview, 2014). That pact was more of a memorandum of understanding and with that the groups established trade by Bata. So from 1873 there was no history of any conflict between the supposed autochthones of Jos Division and the jihadist who were coming through Bauchi.

It is important to point out that the Jos Plateau area is characterised by wide-ranging plains dotted with various hills of different forms. Mr. S.E.M. Stobart pointed out that the people of the area live in cactus-protected compounds (NAK/JOSPROF/257/1914). Historically, as noted by a respondent, the plateau hills and the cactus-protected compounds have had great significance in providing security and defense outposts for aborigines who were constantly attacked by more powerful forces for slave raiding and Jihadism. At some occasions it served the same purpose for

refugees fleeing from more powerful invaders. Respondents of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom extractions had maintained that their forbears had settled on these hills as security measure to wade off nefarious invaders who were mostly Fulani and Hausa. Thus the first form of settlements in this area was one in which natural outposts and the climate provided defence and protection. In other words, the first form of settlement dynamic was necessitated by safety. Writing on human interaction and natural features as plains of protection Udo (1980:8-9) noted that:

> Although many of these hill settlements were starved into submission after a long siege, many others were able to hold out against various invaders. Hence, the survival of many hill settlements during the colonial period when some of them were forced to relocate on more accessible sites on the plains. The ability of many of the so-called pagan groups to resist the Fulani mounted warriors owed much to the protection offered by these natural defence outposts. In many localities, including Jos Plateau foothills,… the slopes of these hills were terraced and intensively cultivated with food crops.

The above forms of group settlements were rural but contradict the positions that rural settlements were structured by economic factors (Gana, 1983). Linking human geography and the economy, scholars have contended that what informed internal migrations and rural and urban patterns of settlement were economic reasons (Afolayan, 1983; Udo, 1983; Gana, 1983; Ayeni, 1983). To this fact, settlement dynamic was conditioned by "central places" like markets, schools, mosques, churches and where other central functions were situated. Particularly, Gana (1983) contended that "central place" settlement dynamic did not only ensure proximity to work places but substantially reduces the amount of energy spent on conquering distance. He also drew attention to the fact that the tendency for ethnic groups to congregate together in distinct sections (spatialised segregation) is informed by the fact that some ethnic groups are identified with particular economic activities. While it is evident that lineage and warfare structures human settlements, as demonstrated by Gana using Tivland, Nupeland and on the Jos Plateau, the segmentation in pre-colonial Plateau north was necessitated by migration patterns and safety from slave raiders and invaders.

Although the argument of economic activities is not out of place but historical sources like the Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria compiled in 1934 indicate the people of the Jos Plateau congregated at the hilltops primarily for physical security. A respondent affirmed that Jos has a rocky topography, surrounded by mountains and hills. Thus, in the evolution of Jos the

climate has played a significant role in determining how and why people live where they lived. In most cases, in pre-colonial Jos, because of fear of an attack by what respondents called "foreign elements", the people lived in groups in the rocky areas especially on top of the mountains (Interview at Amanza Road, Dogon Karfe, Jos North, October 25, 2014). This was to help them see before hand, any group or foreign elements trying to attack them. But the plain lands were meant for farming activities. So, as at that time it was a family settlement (nucleated settlement). As many observers have noted, migrations heightened tensions between autochthones and emigrants. Most times, the expulsion of hundreds or thousands of residents from their homes and villages in search for new lands has constituted the primary means by which violence spread and settlements altered. Sidel's (2008) study of the Muslim/Christian identity of Indonesia is an example of this.

Furthermore, nineteenth century Fulani jihad that swept almost the entire area that was later designated Northern Nigeria had grave implication for migrations, conflicts and settlement dynamics in Jos Division. The "jihadists incursions had forced many fugitive groups to take refuge on the Jos Plateau" (Morrison, 1976:73). Activities of Fulani herders and Hausa traders which culminated in the Sokoto jihad had created a new set of circumstances in which the factor of refugee migration increased the numbers of people in the uplands of the plateau later known as Jos. Although the jihadic years of early nineteenth century were periods of unsuccessful attempts to subjugate the people of Jos Division under the Fulani Emirate rule, the several invasion attempts by the jihadists met strong resistance from the combined forces of the ethnic groups that migrated to the area in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and caused indiscriminate internal changes within the polities. Internal divisions arose given the fact the congregants of the said area were pushed further afield by the activities of the jihadist forces and farming space (land) became an issue of contest. Issues of superiority also arose among the hill peoples. Particularly, among the Berom, though, the political and spiritual significance of Riyom was non contestable, Kuru, Foron and Heipang had the tendency of initiating leadership.

The consequence of the nineteenth century Fulani jihad for Plateau North is enormous. Detailed account of the expansionist tendency of both the Bauchi and Zaria Emirates has received adequate attention (Temple, 1965; Morrison, 1976; Isichie, 1982). The Plateau lay between 125 kilometers west of Bauchi and 140 kilometers south-east of Zaria. Both Emirates had advanced on several occasions to take much of Plateau but it was the Bauchi Emirate that succeeded in reaching the

northern Plateau through the eastern side. The attempts by the two Emirates led to inter-emirate conflicts that were necessitated by the urge for territorial expansion and hegemony over those they tagged "unbelievers" or "infidels". Thus, the Bauchi-Zaria inter-emirate conflict was not that of military confrontation but this extension of emirate struggle for control over non-Muslim territories forced the people to flee to the relative safety of the Plateau (Morrison, 1976). The indigenous groups of the Jos Division including the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom contend that this expansionist tendency is still the driving force behind the conflicts in the area today. One respondent discussing the issue of expansion noted that:

> To understand this crisis and the dynamics you must understand the Hausa man's expansionist tendency. They want to expand, expand their territory. And you know what? Once the expansion is done they want their own emirate in Jos particularly and then control Plateau state (Interview at Jos Jarawa, Jos North, October 20, 2014).

The peoples of Plateau north considered the expansionist tendency of the Hausa and Fulani States an imperial expansion that aims at subduing them and forcefully making them Muslims and such intentions of imperial yoke and religious and cultural suppression definitely came with conflicts and the re-ordering of settlements. In Toft's (2003) study of Russia and Chechens, she found out that with the waning of Turkish and Persian power at the end of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire moved south in its quest for imperial expansion. The defeat of the Persians and Ottomans by the Russians at the dawn of the nineteenth century prompted the attempt to subdue the newly acquired areas' local population by the Russians. This became the focal point. That region became host to series of struggles known as the Caucasian Wars, beginning from 1817 up till 1864. The implication of these struggles for the twentieth and twenty first century Russia and Chechens is a reinforced violent conflict and altering of settlements. Thus, in like manner, the nineteenth century jihad has had grave implications for inter-group relations in twenty and twenty first century Plateau North. The patterns of inter-group relations are defined by the expression and extension of old hatred. The jihad was vehemently resisted though, but to a great extent, it threatened the way of life of the people of the Jos area. This is because the threat from the jihadist forces intensified throughout the nineteenth century and the so called pagan tribes rejected Islam as well as Emirate rule. The people of Plateau North consider the current conflicts traceable to the motives of the jihadist incursions (Interview at Heipang, Barkin-Ladi, November 12, 2014).

However, this does not suggest that the Fulani jihad of the nineteenth century destroyed a calm Plateau north that its nights were full of glory. In other words, Plateau north was not in any way a latent land that was a fixed or stationary society. Morrison (1976) had revealed that people's movement into Plateau State in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as earlier indicated were not free from all forms of conflicts. The increasing population in the areas and the consequent limited farmlands increased the frequency of conflicts. Inter-group strain in Plateau North was not as a result of the Fulani jihad but the jihad had a way of reinforcing identity consciousness and group nationalism. These patterns of inter-group relationships began to shape and reshape the interactions and settlements of the Hausa and Fulani on the one hand and the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom on the other.

The point to underscore is that every ethnic and religious group around the Jos Plateau has its migratory histories to the area, though some are said to have lived there from time immemorial as shown by archeological findings (Shaw, 1980). Each ethnic group started with a village when their ancestors first settled there, increasing population necessitated finding more farmlands and at other times, feuds and quarrels were the basis for founding other villages (Ames, 1934). The main considerations for exploring new territories, therefore, were often security- economic, political, social and cultural security. Thus, while the people of the area were open to and often engaged in cooperation, they resisted subjugation and subordination. Hence any attempt at subordination was considered a source of conflict and that altered patterns of human settlement and inter-group relations.

The origins of the conflict in Plateau state and the settlement dynamic, therefore, are strongly connected to the migratory histories of the peoples. Although the Hausa claim to have founded present day Jos, other groups like the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom believe that their (migrations) to the area known today as Jos became possible only in the nineteenth century. As pointed out above, the three groups contend that their interaction with the Hausa and Fulani groups had been violent to some extent before the area was first administered by colonialism. Indeed, as one respondent noted the conflict started a long time ago. It began before colonialism. It is essential to realise that northern Nigeria like every other region of the country was not united under a single leadership before colonialism. The bond that existed among the disparate groups of the area during the pre-colonial period especially that of the Hausa states, the Caliphate and the precarious autonomies of the Middle Belt area was not that of common language or political union rather one

based on treaty known to them as 'Amana' meaning trust. The Amana relations were necessitated as indicated earlier in this section by the constant attacks of the Plateau by Hausa and Fulani forces. The last of such attacks being in 1873 as contended by Lonsdale were later followed by non aggression pacts between the several polities in the Jos area of Plateau and the Hausa and Fulani states. This led to a period of calm and trade between the different groups before colonialism.

The first settlement of Hausa in Jos was at Naraguta which was originally founded by the Anaguta. S.E.M. Stobart a colonial administrator in his report on the Anaguta and Afizere shows that the settlement was earlier sacked during the Hausa and Fulani raids of the area for slaves (NAK/JOSPROF/257/1914). Stobart's account indicated that the sacked ethnic group (the Anaguta) settled among the hills (Naraguta Hills) and occasionally came down to farm. It was after this period that few Hausa warriors settled in Naraguta and converted the village as a base for launching attacks to other areas (Bingel, 1978:2). The Anaguta later joined forces with the Afizere to reclaim the area (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). Naraguta was later designated Hausa village when colonial administrators took over the administration of the area in 1904 (Ames, 1934). By the term 'Hausa', the colonialists referred to "all or most of the aliens from other parts of the Northern Provinces and from French territory" (NAK/JOSPROF/3169/1921). Nevertheless, among the Hausa, the Naraguta area was administered by a Chief, a vassal of the Emir of Bauchi in the person of Mallam Bunu before the arrival of the first Europeans. The Hausa had minimal interaction with the Anaguta and the hill people south of the Naraguta hill but the occupation of Naraguta which most of it was a farming space for the autochthones reinforced the hatred between the groups. Colonialism facilitated the circulation of the Hausa around the area later known as Jos Division. The settlements at this time were rural and defensive. However, among the Anaguta existed the Ujah who doubled as spiritual and political head who was called Sarkin Tsafi (NAK/JOSPROF/29/1933). The Ujah accepted in 1932 the District Headship of Naraguta.

Alongside the Anaguta, as at the time of colonial incursion of the Plateau, other groups like the Afizere and the Berom also occupied important settlements within the Jos vicinity. Leader of the European occupation of the Plateau at the down of the twentieth century Colonel Laws had argued that "… a small hill village called Guash, occupied the present location of Jos. Hausa traders who arrived supposedly mispronounced Guash for Jos, and the name stuck" (Cited in Bingel, 1978:2).

The tin economy became a major pull factor for movement of several groups into the area known today as Jos. The Niger Company had been on the Jos Plateau for over a year before British occupation of the area and the establishment of government. British occupation reinforced the 1873 unity of the ethnic groups around Plateau north to resist the intruders like they did to Bauchi forces three decades earlier. With the take over and establishment of government by the Europeans, the unity among the indigenous ethnic groups withered away and this scenario was further exploited by the British colonialists. In October 1904, the British colonial government set up a mineral survey team on mineral exploration in the Northern Protectorate. It was such exercise that led to the discovery of tin deposits in the Jos-Plateau area at commercial quantity. With the development of the mining industry the influx of alien population of African extraction increased in an unprecedented manner around Barkin-Ladi, Jos and Bassa (Interview at Amanza Road, Dogon Karfe, Jos North, October 25, 2014).

Given the development and the introduction of the railways, Jos Division was urbanizing and residential pattern was gradually changing. C.G. Ames (1934) recorded that those working on the tin mines were provided with "camps" where they lived in the properties of the Mining Companies. During the Depression Period (1929-1935), the jostle for properties of the Mining Companies and Colonial administrators between the indigenous groups and the Hausa almost led to the first inter-ethnic conflict in 1932 when it was rumoured that the owners of the properties were leaving finally for Europe (Plotnicov, 1967). Respondents who alluded to this argued that the creation of residential camps for mining workers and making some of the workers who were mostly Hausa leaders of the "camps", (NAK/JOSPROF/29/1933) was an attempt by the British colonialists to hand over Jos Division to the Mercantilist Hausa. One respondent pointed out that:

> … during the tin mining period, the mining camps that were set up by the colonial masters and after recruiting those foreign elements, they appointed certain leaders to those camps so as to be able to extract taxes from them. Those were leaders of the labourers in specific camps. They were appointed as head men or head labourers to ease communication with the labourers or to easily control them. It is those people that the Hausa today refer to as ward heads or traditional heads. As at that time, Plateau state was under Bauchi province which Jos was a territory inside the province. So the administration of the province was from Bauchi because that was where the headquarter was. So for easy collection of taxes the head labourers were used to extract tax and send to Bauchi as a result they were frequently made reference to by the Bauchi emirate as

> leaders of those communities… (Interview at Amanza Road, Dogon Karfe, Jos North, October 25, 2014).

The above respondent maintained that by the time of the depression between 1929 and 1934, the Hausa, given the prominence they have received from the colonial administrators through the emirate specifically for tax collection, really wanted to take over the land's administration but were once again resisted by the indigenous groups. So because there was a strong resistance from the autochthons there was no way they could assume control of the land.

The key issue here is that migrations to the Jos area reinforced conflicts and such conflicts re-initiated further migrations and the ordering and re-ordering of residential space. The spaces changed from the defence culture pattern to a nucleated (family) pattern and then to the camp system which is urban in nature. Each of these patterns has security and conflict implications.

4.1.3 The Evolution of spatial ordering in Colonial Plateau State

Plateau State is a post-colonial creation but urban Jos is a colonial emergence illustrating historical continuity in disjuncture across multiple pre-colonial and colonial spaces. Studies on colonial spaces have either explicitly or implicitly raised issues about urban, national and imperial citizenship (Blunt and Mcewan, 2002; Salm and Falola, 2005 Legg, 2007; Glasco, 2010). This is because spatial ordering in colonial Africa and Nigeria in particular were in a racialized, ethnicized and class-based manner (Olaniyi, 2011b). In a study of the colonial geography of Madras, India, Kumar (2002) argues that the invocation of various forms of law and regulation helped to create a special form of colonial urban civil society, which sought its identity by remaining aloof and separate from rural India. In this way urban space was not only made representational, but also nostalgic and hygienic and ridden with conflicts of interests. Kumar explores how class became an overriding issue along with 'race' in maintaining difference and how a discursive space co-existed with representational space, which ordered segregation in a hierarchical space along caste, class and 'race' lines.

From the point of colonial entry into the area today known as Plateau State, particularly the northern part, geographical spaces were captured and boundaries established in the area with multiple interactions. The European and Non-European reservations in colonial Jos produced a multilayered social spatiality. Such spaces were used to highlight ethical standards and gradations of what Kumar (2002:87) called cultural appropriateness in time. Kumar added that spatial

appropriateness was premised on specific moral, economic and political strategies of conquest. Lord Fredrick Lugard, Nigeria's first Governor-General after colonial conquest had in a handbook entitled "Political Memoranda: Revision of Instructions to Political Officers of Subjects Chiefly Political and Administrative" reiterated the guiding principles for the establishment of townships in Nigeria. It was these principles that gave rise to colonial administrators segregating urban settlements by separating white settlements from African settlements on the one hand and separate settlements for different African groups on the other. Lugard had contended that "to give effect to this policy, the system of "permits to reside", has from the earliest times been invoked in the Northern Provinces where townships were never created alongside Native cities except Lokoja and Ibi, which were made by the Royal Niger Company (Lugard, 1970:417).

According to Lord Fredrick Lugard, the Township Ordinance carries the policy of spatial ordering "into a different sphere of administration, and its main purpose is to establish the broad principle of Municipal responsibility" (1970:405). However, the ordinance appears to include other and quite distinct principles, such as that of segregation. Nevertheless, Lugard's preoccupation was the ordering of spaces in colonial Nigeria. The position was that Native Africans should as far as possible live in their own towns under their own Chiefs and Native Courts. The colonial prototype of a Native Town was succinctly captured in Lugard's words this way:

> Streets in the Native Reservation should be broad, and parallel or at right angles to each other, and the main street should run in the direction of the prevailing breeze so as to promote a free current of air. Where space permits, the main street should be 100 feet wide, other streets 50 feet and back-lanes 20 feet. They should be shaded by avenues. Over-crowding in the Native Reservation must, for reason of health, be prevented. The area covered by buildings, including outhouses in each leased plot should not exceed a third of the total area of the lot, and the eaves of all buildings should not be less than 6 feet on the boundary fence. The number of occupants of a plot should not usually exceed ten (Lugard, 1970:418).

With the above, European model of settlement was promoted in Nigeria of which northern Plateau State is among. Jos Division, therefore, emerged as a colonial urban area and administrative headquarter with ordered spaces in the European model through a proposal conveyed by the then Resident of Central Province at Naraguta, F.B. Gall. Before 1913, Government Station was at Naraguta but it was eventually moved to Jos. Mr. Gall's proposal for the establishment of Jos was sent via telegram dated May 29, 1913 to the Chief Secretary of

Northern Protectorate at Zungeru (NAK/JOSPROF/233/13/1913). The proposal was approved by the Chief Secretary and the Jos station came into existence. The town plan that followed between 1917 and 1918 indicated a grid lay-out which was called "Government Station Jos". The Jos proposal later received a legal backing by Sir Hugh Clifford's declaration gazetted as No.41 of July 1, 1920. The Town Ordinance declaration of 1917 which shows:

> Under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by section 3 of the Native Ordinance 1917, as amended by the Township (Amendment) 1919 (No. 11 of 1919), I do hereby order that Jos shall be and hereby declared to be a Township of the second class and that the limits of the said Township are and shall be as shown on the plan signed by me on the 26th day of June 1920 and deposited in the office of the Surveyor-General at Lagos (NAK/JOSPROF/176/1918).

The Plan of modern Jos into ordered spaces differed greatly from what was obtainable in other northern towns and cities. Lord Lugard had reiterated this when he noted that Townships in Northern Provinces were never created alongside Native cities except for Lokoja, Jos and Ibi. A respondent to this study had alluded to the fact that spatial ordering was part and parcel of northern Nigerian experience due to cultural and religious factors. The respondent therefore distinguished between traditional northern cities and colonial northern cities. The respondent contended that in Jos:

> The pattern of settlement was not in any way different from the pattern in other cosmopolitan cities in Nigeria. You see, there are the older cities that can be said to be traditional and now cosmopolitan, if you talk of cities like Kano, Zaria, Maiduguri, Bauchi, Katsina, Sokoto, all these are known as traditional or ancient cities. That is what they are called. But when you talk of cities like Jos, Kaduna, Makurdi, Minna; all these came up as cosmopolitan cities. They have never been traditional to a people. These cities came up virtually at the time Nigeria was being colonized. So they benefited from that and the cities were cosmopolitan. They were cities with European trends of evolution. Although those cities had European quarters, they were not like the ancient cities that had quarters that accommodated other Nigerians, other Africans and other races, they were in groups where they lived. We don't have such privilege of living together in places like Kano of course the Sabon Gari, Zaria, Sokoto and co. It is in places like Kaduna, Jos, Minna that people lived together.

The above corroborates Allen (1972:17) position that "some Middle Belt towns like Minna, Kaduna, Jos and Makurdi owe their existence and expansion entirely to the advent of the Europeans". The implication of the above position is that Jos and environs were not traditionally spatially ordered. However, as indicated in previous section, the migration of the Hausa into Naraguta and the increasing conflict between them and the autochthones of the area led to a thick line in the living space between the Hausa and the Anaguta. The origins of spatial ordering of social, political, cultural and economic spaces are strongly connected to the tin mining labour and colonialism. The processes of spatial ordering in the local government areas of Riyom, Barkin-Ladi, Jos South and Jos North as well as in other parts of Plateau North were uneven. This was because urban processes that were prevalent in what later became Jos North and Jos South which was scarcely missing in what later became Barkin-Ladi and Riyom; although the four LGAs had large deposit of tin ore. As a result, mining camps created by the mining companies became the first ordered living pattern. Freund (1981) contended that recruitment of mines labourers particularly in 'pagan' areas of Plateau State where challenged on several aspects. Majorly, the unwillingness of the Natives of the Jos area to work in the mines necessitated the recruitment of Hausa elements and the creation of mining camps to accommodate them. Highlighting these issues, a respondent pointed out that "in the year 1904 when tin mining began at commercial level on the plateau, it was then that the colonial masters recruited the Hausa". The respondent's position suggested that the colonial administrators recruited labourers across, mostly from the north east of Nigeria but also from Kano, Zaria, Sokoto and the rest for the purpose of tin mining.

Tin mining started at Naraguta village with residency provided for the mine labourers within the camps. This was in part to reduce cost, provide security and also to have effective control over the workers. The mine companies feared that the foreign workers of Hausa origin will be attacked by the natives given that they (indigenes) had resisted both Hausa domination and colonial rule. They preferred to work in the farms which they also felt was threatened by colonial incursion and tin mining activities. The expansion of the minefield was also expansion of settlement areas. This raised centrifugal issues since the mining camps were dominated by the Hausa, "but administratively there is a centripetal tendency for the new settlements given that they will come under the aegis of established centres" (NAK/JOSPROF/394/1917). At first, the plan was to pattern Jos area with the principle of "angwai" (partly a street and a close) as was practicable in Pankshin but was difficult at that stage. The explanation for this was because unlike Jos, Pankshin had few mining camps.

Camp residency and the organisation of groups in Jos Plateau suggest the effectiveness of spatial ordering in the Township Ordinance of 1917. Plotnicov (1967:41) argued that Jos as at 1912 had enough residents to warrant the designation "Hausa Settlement, Jos". At inception, the colonial administration tried to keep culturally dissimilar ethnic groups separate. This was enforced by dividing Jos into two separate administrative units. First was the Native Town, subsidiary to the Jos Divisional Native Authority then located in Naraguta. Second was the Township which was a separate entity of its own within Jos Division, where Asians and Europeans eventually settled, but in a special "reservation" apart from most of the Africans (Plotnicov 1967). It is necessary to point out that the indirect rule policy first expounded by Lugard highlighted the traditional native authorities and categorised people in spaces. Tin mining camps alongside the Township Ordinance reinforced spatial ordering on the Jos Plateau. The point to underscore is that the Township Ordinance and the Public Health ordinance of 1917 emerged to provide alternative settlements and spatially order the towns.

Jos and its environs became ordered along Native Town, Township, European quarters, non Europeans, Native Africans and non Native African quarters. Some ethnic groups however claim that certain areas are or can be described as their original settlements. The Hausa in particular contend that the Native Town was their original settlement and to that effect they were made in charge of the Native Town by the colonialist. This situation created a hegemonic indigenous question which the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom claim was constructed by the Hausa and Fulani through colonial authorities to perpetually control them. Historical evidence, however, indicate that the people of Jos Plateau were independent of Fulani emirate rule (Ames, 1934; Abubakar, 1980; Coleman, 1985). It is also evident from historical sources that the Jos Native Town housed people of different ethnicities. For instance, Plotnicov (1967) reported that the Igbo and the Hausa had in 1945 fought over Monkeys, Potatoes and residential space in Sarkin Arab ward located in the Native Town. Again the movement of people of southern Nigeria origin in 1953 in response to the Kano riots and massacre of people of Igbo origin buttresses the point that the Native Town was a residential quarter meant for Native Africans contrary to Hausa position that it was for them alone. Such movements from the Native Town to the Township due to political problems in Kano signify the first shift in residential areas alongside ethnicity and religion. Bingel (1978:8) captured it this way:

> In 1953… an important political event occurred in Northern Nigeria which had its effect on the movement of the people from

> the Native Town to the Township area. In that year, there was the political riot in Kano which led to clashes, murder and destruction of property in Sabon Gari, Kano. In Jos this riot had two important effects. Firstly it led to the movement of large numbers of southerners who had been living in the Native Town to the Township and consequent increase of population.

The movement of people of Igbo extraction was to avoid repetition of the Sabon Gari experience hence they feel safety in numbers. The increasing population of southerners into the Township comprising those fleeing Kano and those fleeing Jos Native Town compounded Town planning problems. As a result the planning officer for Northern Nigeria resident in Kaduna adopted the method of not allocating plots for development to groups but to individuals with record of long and honourable service to the North (cited in Bingel 1978). It is salient to underscore that from the above that residential spaces were ordered by race, ethnicity and even religion.

Although we can have places that are described as original settlements within the Jos Plateau and specific areas being predominantly occupied by some ethnic groups like Hausa in Angwan Rogo, Igbo in Apata, Yoruba in Nassarawa and ethnic groups of Plateau extraction in Jenta Adamu, Tudun Wada and Angwan Rukuba; some of these areas had pockets of people of other ethnic nationalities (Bingel, 1978; Egwu, 2004; interviews 2014). However, despite this historical evidence the Hausa insist that the Native Town was exclusively occupied by them alone. One respondent argued "at the top of the central place of the Township in Jos is dominated by the Hausa; it has always been like that. Even though the colonial authorities divided it into the Native Town and the Township, the Hausa lived in the Native Town while people from other parts of the country lived elsewhere". The respondent maintained that the division was not necessarily with any discrimination or whatever, may be for cultural reasons. One striking standpoint of most Hausa respondents about the original inhabitants of the areas is that "we had outside the Township where people of other ethnic communities that can be found originally here reside". The implication of this argument is that the indigenes were pushed farther afield while other groups of Nigerian origin enjoyed the privileges within the town.

Incidentally, Massalacin Juma'a was also part of the area designated Native Town but another respondent of Hausa extraction pointed out that the street originally called "Layn Sukuwa" which translates "race horse" that is where horse races take place had Igbo houses dating back sixty years. The respondent argued:

> So, from roundabout there down to Massalaci area, it was not a tarred road, the old mosque is just behind here but the new mosque at its present location was built in 1964. That was how the name of the street changed to Massalacin Juma'a street. At that period, you will find some Igbo houses here dating back 60, 70 years. That is to tell you that living together was not a problem then. What we are now experiencing is very unfortunate.

The point to underscore is that the urban and rural 'spatial strategies' invoked in colonial Plateau State became crucial in describing the contestations associated with the evolution of Jos and environs. Spatial continuity is largely a cultural construct of the pre-colonial imprint, which was forcibly transformed by mercantile and colonial imperatives, with race, ethnicity and religion as signifiers. Although the city became a space for assimilating differences, boundaries were created and maintained in colonial Plateau State as essential for social relations. Jacobs (1996) and Kumar (2002) have emphasized the importance of the politics of cultural representation in space. While this process of assimilation was clearly visible, it is not contradictory to argue that spatial boundaries were created and normalized as essential (Kumar 2002:86). The argument highlighted here is that colonial planning on the Jos Plateau reinforced spatial ordering and inspite of the assimilative spaces, boundaries were entrenched and salient.

In Plateau State, separate settlements defined by race and ethnicity emerged as Europeans established fortified settlements exclusively for non-native residence in northern Nigeria. In Plateau State, Natives migrating from the rural areas to work in the new urban centre of Jos (fragmented into different settlements) resided in the surrounding areas, which came to be known as the Township. These separate settlements introduced a sense of hierarchized space that had not existed in the pre-colonial era both in the urban and rural areas. The social intermixing of races and ethnic nationalities in colonial Plateau State were limited. The situation appeared different in colonial Madras where Kumar (2002) observed that intermixing occurred only among a small number of the Indian elite and among domestic servants.

Memory of some respondents of this study suggests fear and hatred were constant components of that stalemated situation where spatial ordering in Plateau was structured by social conflicts and had long term implications for inter-group relations.

In colonial Plateau, space for different communities became communally constructed. Europeans, Asians, Africans, and Native Africans all occupied separate spaces, based on criteria of race and ethnicity. On the one hand, the areas occupied by non Europeans but particularly Africans were represented by the colonial administration as a repellent space, a space of dirt and disorder. On the other hand, spaces occupied by different ethnic groupings represented political and economic contestations in wider Nigeria. It is important to underscore that spatial ordering in colonial Plateau also coincided with different mining camps for workers in the tin mines.

4.1.4 Policy and Politics in Conflicts and Settlement Dynamics in Jos Metropolis

Scholars of policy and politics tend to identify and focus on those who influence public policy and also examine the particular economic, social, and political forces that structure politics and public policy (Van Horn, Baumer and Gormley Jr. 1989). Others attempt to better understand policy making process and to supply policy decision makers with reliable policy-relevant knowledge about pressing economic and social problems (Dunn, 1981; Fischer, Miller and Sidney eds. 2007). These plethora of literature have made little effort in situating policy and politics in the making of inter-group conflicts and settlement dynamics.

Historical evidence in the previous section indicates that persistent conflicts and increasing indigene/settler question in Jos metropolis are not recent. These conflicts date back to the pre-colonial period when the Hausa and Fulani continually attacked the autochthones of Jos Plateau. However, Jos started urbanizing in the early twentieth century. The Hausa had settled in Naraguta but moved into Jos when the area was designated 'Hausa' in 1915 through colonial policy and politics. The indigene/settler and Christian/Muslim crisis in Jos was fuelled by certain policies and politics that altered social spaces and identities in the area beginning from the colonial period to the present. Jos metropolis therefore emerged out of colonial policy that partitioned the city into "Native Town" and "Township". The partitioning deepened the gulf and inequality existing between the Hausa and the autochthones and reinforced the struggle for spaces between them.

Nevertheless, protagonists of neighbourhood partition have argued persuasively that ethnic enclaves should assume national policies to avoid the repetition of the pogroms, genocide and ethnic cleansing experienced in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia Republics (Deutscher, 2001). Using Switzerland, Deutscher claimed that initiating a policy of partition is one sure way of preventing inter-group conflicts (2001:118). The core argument is that Switzerland has

survived territorial and linguistic pluralism for centuries without internal violence because the groups have remained isolated. What Deutscher neglects is how such policies created stereotypes and deepened inequalities. Most times, the isolation model has proved that conflicts are only being avoided. Such avoidance may have perverse effects (Kaufman, 1990:304), as was the case in Apartheid South Africa where such avoidance deepened the conflict issues and inequality.

In the case of Plateau State policy but particularly public policy and politics has been in the forefront of initiating and sustaining group inequalities and this has actively played a role in the making of conflicts. Although Mamdani (2002:10) has argued that inequality has existed throughout time; however, metropolitan fragmentations in colonial Nigeria suggest inequality is not a thing but a relation. Glenn Loury (2015) contended that group inequality has different economic and sociological logic from inequality among individuals. Thus, group inequality most times is sustained by what is called collective reputation and selective association. Collective reputation is an attempt to treat a population collectively by categorizing them as negative or in the words of Barry Buzan (1991) securitizing a people. For instance, the idea of associating Islam with terrorism or seeing every Muslim as a potential terrorist is a collective reputation. Another example of collective reputation is the categorization of Christians as infidels in Northern Nigeria. On the other hand, selective association is an attempt by a group to select the group they relate with. Groups in their relation attempt to select the group they inter-marry with, those to live with and where to live. Both collective reputation and selective association have a way of sustaining group inequality. According to Loury (2015) both issues (collective reputation and selective association) "entail self-reinforcing feedback loops and problems of collective action. "Inequality traps" arise. Yet, policy interventions exist that can reduce the disparities". However, there is increasing debate whether it is politics that determine if such policies are adopted. Indeed, politics functions as a rallying point between government, the people and policy. Hence policy and politics are salient in the making and the unmaking of conflicts.

Collective reputation which forms part of the politics on the Jos Plateau is a form of stereotyping that has been sustained by policies. It is important to note that stereotypes and stereotyping in Plateau and elsewhere have complicated the narratives of hate crimes, fear, genocide and ethnic cleansing. They are essential part of a dangerous development of a culture of violence. Those stereotyped have become emblematic for the "fear of the unknown". In 2009, Chimamanda Adichie raised the issues of stereotype and argued that stereotyping "emphasises how we are

different rather than how we are similar". This attitude creates a fixed idea about a group and classifies them as negatives. Stereotypes create new identities of who a people are. According to Adichie (2009) it is constantly defined by the principles of power. It is within the structures of power that such construction as stereotype gives rise to inequalities and inter-group conflicts.

The issues of stereotype have been properly situated in Glenn Loury's (2002) illuminating study on racial inequality in the United States. Professor Loury contended that "the practice of grouping people together on the basis of their common possession of visible bodily marks is a universal aspect of the human condition" (2002:17). Loury's study of race relations in the United States provides an insight in understanding horizontal inequalities that has constantly confronted the Nigerian society where pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial politics, policy and all forms of social conditions have created disparities between different groups. This is evident in Shenton's (1986) study of Northern Nigeria where he showed how the British colonialists who at the time of occupation of the area called northern Nigeria today classified the Fulani and the Hausa as higher racial groups than other population of the area. In this order, the British colonialists had referred to a segment of the indigenous people of Jos Division as "a primitive people of a low order of intelligence" (NAK /JOSPROF/1623/1922).

The Lugardian policy of "indirect rule" can be seen from the lenses of collective reputation and selective association. This is because the policy attempted to minimize the contact between Nigerians and in Jos metropolis like elsewhere in Nigeria it was used to keep culturally dissimilar ethnic groups separate. James Coleman (1958:162) describes the indirect rule programme as one designed to:

> Minimize the contact between educated Africans and the illiterate masses was implicit in Lugard's plan for a government educational system in the Northern Provinces, which included (1) cantonment schools for educated southerners, to confine them to urban communities and isolate them from the native administration system; (2) the training of northern mallamai to replace Western-educated clerks; and (3) the education of chiefs' sons, which had been the main motivation for opening Nassarawa School in Kano and Kings College in Lagos in 1909…The Lugardian policy of excluding educated elements from the native authority system and of preventing their contact with the masses was not peculiar to the north, although it was more through going and endured much longer there than elsewhere. It was characteristic of the official attitude throughout Nigeria until the early 1930s when signs of change began to appear.

The intent and result of the indirect rule policy and the subsequent division of Jos into Native Town and Township was not only to separate non-Africans from Africans but also to establish residential, administrative, and social segregation between different ethnic groups of Nigerian extraction. The colonial administration predicted there would be a gradual withdrawal of the more alien elements of the Native City population into the Township Sabon Gari [the Hausa term for "new town" but referring to Native Reservation] … [so that there might be] no disturbance or interference with the Native Administration (NAK/JOSPROF/208/1921). Although this view was later altered when the colonialists considered the possibility of amalgamation of the native reservation of the Township with the Native Town (NAK/JOSPROF/274/S.2, 1950-55), it was merely a consideration as it never happened. The point to underscore is that different groups of Nigerian extraction were systematically and perpetually kept separated. To be precise, the colonial policy did not allow for genuine integration between the Hausa and Fulani groups and groups of Plateau extraction like the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom. This is because the later considered the former as historical oppressors and enemies.

Thus, the colonial policy and politics of that period created and sustained group inequality which Sen (2000) tagged 'unfreedom'. As already pointed out, inequality is not a thing but a relation. The relational view to inequality is a sociological approach which considers institutional and relational clusters in which people, power and organisations are positioned and connected (Loury, 2015). In this sense, a relational setting is a patterned matrix of institutional relationships among cultural, social, economic and political practices. By implication inequality is produced. The argument here is that colonial policy and politics in Jos metropolis produced and sustained the inequalities that exist between the Hausa and Fulani Muslims and Afizere, Anaguta and Berom Christians. Responding to this study, a renowned political scientist alluded to how the colonialists produced the inequality existing in Jos through their politics and policy; he argued:

> The problem in Jos can be traced back to colonial politics. Although you cannot totally separate it from policy but it was more of colonial politics. The Hausa had moved from their earlier place of settlement when they first migrated to the northern Plateau area at Naraguta in 1902 to Jos in 1915. It will interest you to know that Colonialism attempted to make Jos a Hausa town. Indeed, urban Jos was designated Hausa from 1915. This was done given the indirect rule system that was operational and the colonialist wanted to use the Emirs to control people they termed pagan tribes… (Interview at National Institute for Legislative Studies, Abuja, April 16, 2015).

The issues raised by the above respondent were complicated when the actions of the second set of colonial administrators after the Second World War deepened the identity crisis. It was within this period that people of the Middle Belt region further developed a common consciousness to stand against the Hausa and Fulani domination in northern Nigeria. The Middle Belt region and Jos particularly developed a Christian identity as against the Muslim identity of northern Nigeria. Thus, reforms in urban Jos after the Second World War saw Christian identity become synonymous with Middle Belt identity. The argument by the respondent above aptly demonstrates what Mamdani (2002) called dilemmas of alien rule. While the indirect rule produced inequalities the Township Ordinance sustained it by reinforcing selective association and determining who lives where. The idea of moving the Government station from Naraguta to Jos was first mooted in 1913 and the designation of Jos as Hausa settlement compounded the already triggered issues on the Jos Plateau. Naraguta was first to be termed Hausa town; this was applied to their residential quarters up to 1913 because "majority of the people of the Naraguta village and the mining camp were Hausas", (Bingel, 1978:5). The colonial inconsistency in managing the issues emanating from the contending relationship between the Hausa and Plateau indigenes gave rise to the contestations over the founders of Jos city. From 1914, however, population increased in Jos tremendously due to the tin economy but the movement of the Government station from Naraguta to Jos was concluded in 1921. The move of the Government Station from Naraguta to Jos was documented this way:

> The move of the Naraguta Station to Jos was finally decided during His Excellency's visit in January 1920, but the building programme failed. A quite unexpected opportunity however for the Divisional Administration presented itself in February 1921 when the Jos Club was dissolved and the premises were placed at the disposal of the Governor by the Niger Company for the purpose of a new Club but that project had to be deferred and has now been indefinitely abandoned. The Government being committed to the repair and upkeep of the extensive premises I asked the permission for the Divisional Officer to set up there temporarily. The move was prepared and finally took place in the middle of May (NAK/JOSPROF/540/1922).

The above does not negate the fact that Jos was founded in 1915 officially as recorded in the Gazetteers of Northern Provinces of Nigeria (1934) but the movement of the Government Station was concluded in 1921. Before this time, Jos town was getting populated as tin mining camps were already situated at Gangare. Gangare was a mining village though not originally situated

within the Jos Township and considered by the colonialists as an unauthorized settlement inhabited by undesirable elements and considered a hide-out for thieves as at 1959. During a tour of the Minister of Lands in that year reference was made to Gangare noting that "the Minister was shown Gangare-Jos where an unauthorized settlement has sprung up on a Mining Lease". It was pointed out that "the Lessee had done nothing about it". This was partly because as the law stands, it was very difficult to eject squatters. Thus, part of the settlement spread into the Township and one householder had moved a survey beacon and he or another had built his house over a beacon. Based on the Minister's recommendation it was agreed that these should be prosecuted and it was suggested by the application of Health Rules or some such means "an attempt should be made to clear up this squalid, insanitary settlement, which apart from other considerations, was proving an embarrassment to the administration since it was a hide-out for thieves and prostitutes" (NAK/JOSPROF/LAY/20/1959).

It was not clear who founded Jos but colonial documents indicate that modern Jos emerged as a European model town. However, it is necessary to point out that before 1920 following the Township Ordinance Order, an Alkali Court already existed in the Native Town and later Courts in the area were Alkali Courts despite the strident protests of non-Muslims who sought to establish mixed (Native) Courts in the 1950s (Sklar, 1963:355-365). Jos Township had as early as 1915 a non Alkali Court presided over by the Local Authority (then called a Station Magistrate) and had jurisdiction over "all suits and matters to which a 'non-native' is a party" (Plotnicov, 1967:43). These processes were part of the politics that designated Jos Hausa settlement. This is because the Hausa Muslims had presided the Alkali Courts and the Native Authority.

In 1921, the office of the Hausa District Head was abolished. As at this period, Jos was bubbling with numerous alien populations and heterogeneous too. The Resident of Jos had observed that the alien and heterogeneous populations in the town "presented problems which required much thinking out" (NAK/JOSPROF/PL.16/1921). The ultimate solution to the problems in the Resident's view was to strictly adhere to and implement Lugard's indirect rule policy by having all communities under the administration of the local population. This solution was unlikely as the indigenous Plateau peoples were considered not 'developed' enough to manage the situation. They were perceived by the colonialists as remaining how they were when the land was first occupied. The continuous reference to "Hausa settlements" points to the strategic planning by the colonialists to Hausanize the Jos area this is inspite of the brewing conflict in Jos city giving the

fact that the foundations of a plural society had been laid. It is on record, however, that colonial administration considered the Hausa settlements as "purely alien enclaves having no sort of authority over the pagans [the native peoples of the Jos Plateau]". It was further unveiled that "the land is the pagans' and their rights are jealously guarded" (NAK/JOSPROF/PL.16/1921). In a memo to the District Officer of Jos Division in 1926, the Resident of Jos wrote that:

> In Jos Division there is no Native Authority worth speaking of…. We are not proposing to foist any alien scheme of administration on to these natives of the Plateau; for it is quite certain that, had the British not arrived, these people would have had to evolve some such administration for themselves or be annihilated through slavery or some such disaster…. The alien-native so-called "Hausa" settlement must, for some time to come, be dealt with separately as an area within a Native Administration area proper (NAK/JOSPROF/211/1920 dated November 20, 1926).

The inconsistency of the British administration in coordinating the relations between the Hausa and the natives of Plateau indicates their politics of division. These patterns of relationships between the Hausa and the natives of the Jos Plateau were fanned by the inequalities already produced by colonial policy and politics. This almost led to an inter-ethnic conflict as early as 1932 when it was rumoured that the depression period (1929-1934) was almost forcing the Europeans to quit. This led to competition for resources and power and almost resulted in ethnic conflict (Plotnicov, 1967; 1971; Olaniyi and Nnabuihe, 2010). The first inter-ethnic violence in Nigeria eventually took place in Jos in 1945 when Northerners and Southerners were manipulated by the British and made to fight each other.

On the whole, fragmented settlements instituted by British administration's policy and politics tended to provide spatial framework for ethno-religious politics and reinforced horizontal inequalities in Jos metropolis. This accounts for the continued struggle for political power and its consequent clashes in the city. The native administration in Jos strictly adopted the policy of maintaining separate ethnic lines. Thus, the native administration early on accommodated a system of civic participation by residential wards in the Native Town. Plotnicov (1967:46) has argued that "the exact nature of popular representation in the Native Town during the 1920s is uncertain". But Plotnicov's records suggest that the various ethnic communities in Jos were informally represented by tribesmen choosing by their ethnic groups and they held unofficial titles in Hausa as Sarkin Yorubawa and Sarkin Ibo (this is translated Chief of the Yoruba, Chief of the Ibo). Colonial records showed that from Naraguta to Jos, the Hausa chose one of their own to be

chief of their community with the title of Sarkin Jos. This is one of the contending issues in Jos as the Hausa community in Jos has a long king-list whom have supposedly ruled over Jos. The Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom on the other hand, have constantly rejected this list of kings paraded by the Hausa. In the Hausa list, the first two kings are Bunu and Barde but records show they had no full-fledged territorial control over the entire Jos but on the Hausa community. In a correspondence by the Secretary Northern Provinces Mr. E.J. Arnett to the Resident of Bauchi Province dated 23 November, 1920 stated that:

> … I can well believe that the Barde's predecessor the Bunu performed invaluable service to the administration in organizing these Hausa communities as described in paras 52-60 of the Bauchi Annual Report of 1913… I gather that he continued to all intents and purposes, as a District Chief in charge of them. Although he had no coadunate territorial area to control…(NAK/JOSPROF/380 P/1920).

It is important to point out that the Bunu and Barde as used in the Jos case were titles and not formal names. With reference to Bauchi Emirate, the Bunun Bauchi and Barden Bauchi were vassal chiefs who assisted the Emir of Bauchi in carrying out errands. This position was aptly captured in Freund (1981:98) when he stated that:

> The Hausa-speaking mining-camps communities were placed under the Bunun Bauchi until his death in 1918 and then under the Barden Bauchi. This plan collapsed when the Barde was found guilty of embezzlement and dismissed in 1920. In practice, Bauchi officials had no way of exerting any meaningful authority on the camps.

Some respondents re-echoed this traditional leadership as the remote cause to the conflicts in Jos. Discussing the conflict, its origins and settlement dynamics, a respondent reiterated the position that those referred to by the Hausa as traditional heads were heads of the Hausa communities. He noted that "during the tin mining period, the mining camps that were set up by the colonial masters and after recruiting those foreign elements, they appointed certain leaders to those camps so as to be able to extract taxes from them". Those appointed were meant to lead labourers in specific camps to ease communication with the labourers and for easy control. Respondents of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom origins contend that those were the people the Hausa refer to as traditional heads to have ruled Jos. This position not withstanding, the Huasa had a sphere of

influence given that Plateau state was under Bauchi province which Jos was a territory inside the province. So the administration of the province was from Bauchi.

Administrative reforms of 1947, however, altered the power relations in Jos metropolis. It has been established above that those referred to by the Hausa as kings of Jos had no coadunate territorial control over Jos in principle, the Hausa had in practice referred to them as kings of Jos (Plotnicov, 1967:46). The reform of 1947 witnessed the emergence of Bitrus Rwang Pam as Sarkin Berom (translated king of the Berom). This however is an outcome of the 1925 survey of the Native Administration in Northern Nigeria by the Secretary of Native Affairs Mr. G.J.F. Tomlinson. The recommendation from the survey emphasised the independent status of the "pagans" in Northern Nigeria and when adopted gave rise to and distinguished between "Pagan Administration" and Emirate indirect rule. To fulfill this, Plateau Province was created in 1926 for the "pagans". In the view of this shake-up, then

Governor General Hugh Clifford was enthusiastic and hopeful about the creation of Plateau Province. He noted that "the Plateau Province would provide, in a very real sense a school of pagan administration, functioning in an atmosphere undisturbed by the alien influence of the emirate" (NAI/CSO/20/11926).

That idea was suppressed when Clifford left Nigeria in April 1926 but resurfaced in 1931 when Donald Cameron arrived Nigeria as Governor General. The political undertone of these processes by the colonial administrators was to stall the overbearing influence of the Hausa and Fulani hegemony in Northern Nigeria that they earlier upheld. The administrative reforms of 1947 raised tensions in Jos metropolis between the Hausa and the Berom as a Berom man took charge. The Jos Town Council was formed in 1951 and the leader of the Hausa community always sat as its vice-president and assumed the title of the Magajin Garin Jos (Town Adminstrator). The Hausa have continued to protest this arguing that they were dislodged from the traditional leadership of Jos and thus petitioned to have the Native Town removed from the jurisdiction of the Berom Native Authority. In 1952, the Jos Town Council was suspended on the grounds that it was not working successfully due to deep political intrigues. This scenario mounted tension of a likely ethnic clash between the Berom and the Hausa and lingered till 1954 when another power play happened to further whittle down the Hausa hegemony. To alleviate this tension, therefore, the name of the Berom Native Authority was changed to Jos Native Authority and the Chief of Berom became Chief of Jos (Plotnicov, 1967:47; Albert, 2003a).

Nevertheless, these patterns of relationship further heightened the tension existing between the natives and the Hausa in Jos metropolis. While this ethnic politics was taking place residential fragmentation was deepening in the metropolis. This is because the Hausa community clung tenaciously to the areas they had tagged their Native Town and the mining camps. For them, these were to be instruments of resistance to exclusion and attack. The point to underscore is that the persistent conflicts in Jos metropolis and the attendant shift in settlement is a backlash of policy and politics in the area. The pattern of politics changed with Nigeria's political independence in 1960. The Hausa and Fulani returned to lording it over the people of the entire northern region; this time forcefully pushing the instruments of religion and ethnicity as tools to control the region. Some respondents of Plateau origin alluded to this which has received great attention in Kukah (1993). The region came up with a policy to unite the entire region. The Northernisation policy appeared to be a strong tool for unity in the region but its politics created enormous suspicion in the minority groups of the region. Such policies have been underscored as institutional forms of segregation (Nnoli, 1978; Mamdani, 2002).

In furtherance to the above, the Northernisation policy became official in the 1960s and was seen as a policy of political emancipation from the domination of southern Nigerians. However, the policy designed by the Premier of Northern Region Sir Ahmadu Bello is perceived by some minority groups in the Middle Belt to tend to favour a particular section of the North (North West and North East) and neglecting mostly those from the Middle Belt Region. Thus, it was particularly seen by those from the Middle Belt as another form of political patronage rather than a policy for political emancipation from Southern Nigerians (Albert, 1998:61). A respondent to this study who is of Plateau origin made reference to this when he argued that the Northernisation policy was meant to be a package to favour everyone from the "so-called" North but that for people of the Plateau to join the officers' cadre of the Military and the Police they had to add a name sounding Hausa or Muslim to their names. He made references to several retired military officers of Plateau extraction who had to adopt a name that sounded Muslim. This policy and the politics involved thickened the grievances existing between the Hausa and the natives of Plateau State. It also exacerbated the group inequalities that existed between them.

In post-colonial Nigeria, the Federal character principle further heightened the tension as State governments segregated against citizens as non indigenes. This followed the continued altering of Nigeria's internal territorial configuration. The unrelenting pressure from different groups for

state and local government creation is often interpreted as attempts by different minority groups to free themselves from the oppressions of the majority. However, these agitations for territorial adjustments or changes rather than receding have tended to intensify with each circle of the reorganisation (Suberu, 1998).

It will be recalled that Plateau Province (Jos Division and Pankshin Division) was excised from Bauchi Province in 1926. The new Plateau Province had five Divisions including Jos and Pankshin Divisions from Bauchi; Shendam Division from the former Muri Province; Jemaa and Lafia Divisions from the former Nasarawa Province and Jos Division was the headquarters (Ames, 1934). This was altered again in 1967 by the Yakubu Gowon administration creating the Benue-Plateau State with its capital still in Jos. This reorganisation changed the former Jos Division into local governments. Nine years later, in 1976, Plateau State was created by the administration of Murtala Mohammed and Jos yet again was the capital. The 1976 shakeup witnessed the emergence of Barkin-Ladi and Jos Local government areas. The agitations of groups continued to increase with government seeking means to address the highlighted problems. One fundamental problem was the issues of indigeneity and settlers. In 1976, the increasing tension between the Hausa and ethnic groups of Plateau State origin, particularly in Jos led the "Plateau State Military Governor, Colonel Dan Sulaiman to seek an amendment to the Plateau state General Order by which "settlers" in the state who had stayed for twenty (20) years would qualify to enjoy all the rights and privileges of Plateau indigenes" (Egwu, 2004:30). Such landmark public policy was, however, met with a stiff opposition and resentment, especially from the elite of Plateau State extraction. Consequently, the policy had to be withdrawn.

Politics of exclusion and resistance was brought to the fore and deepened the already heightened tension existing between the concerned parties. This lingered till the state and local government creation of 1991 by the Ibrahim Babangida's administration. The reorganisation led to the split of the Jos metropolitan area then known as Jos local government into north and south. The 1991 local government creation in Jos was the last straw that led to explosion of violence in the home of peace and tourism. Incidentally, the local government creation was to serve as affirmative action in bridging the gap (existing in the political and social circles) between groups of Plateau extraction and the Hausa. Rather than serving the purpose it exacerbated the existing conflict and introduced violent trend.

Examining how policy and politics have contributed to the making of conflicts and settlement dynamics in Jos metropolis, three mechanism appear to have played a role in the (re)production of inequality which has sustained the conflicts. These mechanisms include exploitation, opportunity hoarding and symbolic power. In Durable Inequality, Tilly (1999:34) explained that the dominating category in social inequality "enlists value-producing effort from people on the opposite side of the boundary, but allocates to those others less than the value added by their effort". This is the master narrative in Jos metropolis where the natives claim during interview sessions that the tin economy was used to build, educate and develop the Hausa while they were relegated to the background. This according to a respondent was "a way the regional government of Northern Nigeria chose to keep Plateau people below". Another mechanism is opportunity hoarding. Tilly (1999:34) contended that opportunity "excludes people on the opposite side of the boundary from use of the value-producing resource, captures the returns, and devotes some of the returns to reproducing the boundary." This is evident in the manner that the Hausa and Fulani Muslim communities have been perpetually kept out of becoming Local Government Chairmen in Jos North. People of Hausa and Fulani extraction alluded to this during the interview and Focus Group Discussion sessions. Opportunity hoarding appears to be also utilized in residential segregation as some claim that the Plateau State government receives allocation from the Federal government on behalf of them as part of the population of Plateau only for their neighbourhoods to be denied social infrastructure like health facilities, access roads and educational infrastructure. This point underscores the third mechanism reproducing inequality and sustaining the conflict in Plateau State- symbolic power. According to Bourdieu (1977:4) "every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations". This explains how meanings are assigned to the segregated neighbourhoods in Plateau and how such meanings are assumed legitimate to keep the levels of inequality and unleash violence on specific groups.

Hence, these patterns of relationship have further left Jos metropolis a violently contested space since 2001. The politicisation of religion and the replacement of the Middle Belt identity with Christian identity by the second set of colonial administrators in Nigeria after World War II renewed the contestations between the Hausa and the autochthones in Jos Plateau. The underlying argument here has been that policy and politics in Jos metropolis and Plateau State produced the

inequalities that reinforced the ethno-religious conflicts and the segregated settlements in the areas.

4.1.5 Contemporary Conflicts and Settlement Dynamics in Plateau State

Contemporary conflicts in Plateau State have received a wide coverage in literature. The conflicts have been attributed to several issues including the local government creation of 1991 and the occupation of the office of the Chairmanship of Jos North (Best, 2007). There is a missing link in our understanding of the conflicts and how they have structured and restructured human settlements. This is probably because the role of settlement dynamics in group hostilities or violent conflicts has not been properly defined in literature; thus the way towards building a culture of peace is missing. However, a respondent captured the issues of the conflict as "the mismanagement of the diversity within the Jos metropolis, precisely between the various communities that make up the Jos community".

The historical trend to the conflicts on the Jos Plateau has been established above but it is important to point out that the conflict assumed a life of its own in 1991 when the old Jos local government was split into north and south. As argued by Ostien (2010), this subdivision of course changed the local political equations. Within the new Jos North in particular, the local peoples were no longer so predominant as most of them were then living with fewer admixtures of other ethnic groups in Jos South. The Jos natives and other Plateau indigenes saw this as a ploy to wrest the political control of the capital city from them. The implication was that during elections to city-wide offices in Jos North, therefore, members of a particular group were expected to emerge winner. This was demonstrated with an election to the Jos North local government council chairmanship held soon after the new LGA was created in 1991. The winner was Sama'ila Mohammed, a Jasawa. According to Aminat (2012), this was exactly what the Jasawa had worked toward and the indigenes had feared. Aminat (2012) adds that the elections passed off peacefully, and there were no incidents of communal violence during Sama'ila Mohammed's term. However, the indigenes complained about his appointment of other Jasawa (Hausa and Fulani in Jos) to key positions in the local government. The complaints were most majorly over the fact that he began issuing indigene certificates from Jos North to Jasawa as well as to Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom. Sama'ila Mohammed's tenure of office ended prematurely in November 1993, when General Sani Abacha, upon seizing control of the federal government, dissolved all democratic structures in Nigeria, including elected state and local government positions.

The conflict assumed ethno-religious dimension in 1994 and witnessed two (2) deaths. Most respondents pointed to that event as the genesis of the contemporary conflict in Plateau State and Jos and its environs in particular. One respondent captured it arguing that "in 1994, there was a kind of ethno-religious crisis that erupted that was as a result of the appointment of one Aminu Mato by the then military administrator to become LG Transition Chairman. The idea was to impose him on the natives. When I say natives, I mean the Afizere (Jarawa), Anaguta and Berom". According to this respondent, "the arrangement started when Babangida split the old Jos LGA into north and south". That single act created a scenario where the majority of the indigenous communities were removed out of Jos north local Government. For Plateau natives, this was to give edge to the Hausa community to take dominance of the area. Before that creation, the old Jos had 10 (ten) districts. What the then President did was to remove nine districts to form Jos south local government. Only one district was left to form one local government which is the Gwong district. The other nine districts comprises of four in Jos south and five in Jos east of today.

Popular narratives on the creation of Jos North have presented the Hausa as victors and the only group that were happy with the split of the former Jos. A respondent had noted that the indigenous communities opposed the split of Jos into North and South. This is not totally inclusive. While the Berom and the Afizere felt dislodged from getting connected to the centre at the time of that creation, the Anaguta were not. This implies that a non-violent conflict exist among the three indigenous communities of Jos- Afizere, Anaguta and Berom. Gwong is said to be the only Anaguta district in Jos and as the the old Jos was split the people of Anaguta had rejoiced that they had been freed from domination. In a thank you message to the then Military President for the split of Jos in a letter dated Octerber 20, 1991, the Ujah of Anaguta, Mr Jauro Magaji expressed the Anaguta joy this way:

> We the entire peace-loving people of Jos North Local Government Area wish to express our deepest personal gratitude to you and the members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council… for creating Jos North and Jos South LGAs… This singular act of the Federal Military Governemnt has made it possible for us to inform the entire world of this good tiding of great joy… (Magaji, 1991).

The Ujah went ahead to mention that Gwong District formally called the Naraguta District belong to the Anaguta and that it was independent of neighbouring groups before the advent of colonialism. The Paramount ruler had called upon the President to disregard letters, calls and

visits to the presidency by some persons who claim that the creation of Jos North has tempered with their tradition and culture. The Ujah who pointed out that as the custodian of tradition and Culture in Jos North, he dares to say that their tradition and culture is still intact. The implication of this position is that the creation of Jos North after all did not displease all natives of the old Jos. This gives another dimension to the conflict in Jos. However, these differences have been buried to fight old and 'common oppressors"- the Hausa and Fulani communities.

In Jos North and South the current conflict started in 1994. This began with the rejection of Aminu Mato as Caretaker Chairman. A respondent narrated how the indigenous communities stopped his swearing-in and how the conflict started. He noted that "the indigenous communities demonstrated and rejected him as the caretaker committee chairman". The respondent added that he participated in the demonstration of 1994 and that the Hausa knew that Plateau natives were prepared for battle. So Mato was stopped from assuming office. At the end, the Hausa Muslims also counter-protested against Mato being stopped from getting into office and their response turned violent. That conflict relaxed afterwards because there were some military and police interventions.

Best (2007) has also documented that event. After the 1994 episode it came up again in 1996 this time in a small village in Jos South called Gyero. That experience came from a little squabble between dry season farmers and indigenous community of Berom extraction who picked a garden egg on their way home. He was said to have stolen it and he was killed. There were also little skirmishes in 1997. In 1998 there was the issue of the ward creation which the natives felt were manipulated to favour the Hausa Muslim Communities. Then came the bigger one in 2001; this coincided with the terrorist attack on America's tallest building the world trade centre, although that of Jos began few days before then, that is precisely on Friday, September 7, 2001 while that of America occurred on September 11. Narrating the experience a respondent explained:

> On that faithful Friday, it started when the Muslims were praying their Juma'a prayers and some University students were returning from school around Congo Russia. So it started because the students, particularly a lady passed through what the Muslims considered a reserved space. Yet it was the only way to the house of that lady and some people felt that at certain hours of the week some territories are no go areas for a specific people. In the long run the lady was attacked. We did not know that they planned the whole thing. So we were taken unawares. They blocked the

> road and said why would a woman pass there? The lady felt it was her right to go home from the only access route. So it started from there. It moved from Congo Russia to Nassarawa and then Bauchi Road (Field interview, 2014).

After that of 2001 in both Jos North and South, it was experienced again in November 2008. This time, it started in Nassarawa. It came as a result of what some respondents called "government interference in the politics of Jos North". According to a respondent of Plateau extraction, "clearly, ANPP won that local government election in 2008 but the government of Jonah Jang intervened in the matter". The respondent added that the collation centre used to be in Jos north local government secretariat where Gbong Gwom palace is but the collation centre was moved to Gada Biyu in one primary school there around Kabong. The popular narrative is that election figures were manipulated in Kabong. Explaining possible reasons behind the sudden change of the collation centre prior to the 2008 conflict another respondent argued that "Kabong is predominantly an indigenous neighbourhood and that has implications". He added that in that "arrangement in 2008, a Hausa man was the ANPP Chairmanship candidate but to foster unity they brought an indigene as the running mate. They won the election with over 25,000 votes but the figures were manipulated to favour the PDP who had a Christian candidate". Others argued that the candidate of the PDP in that election was brought from Jos South and that his brother is the Gbong Gwom of Jos. That single interference from the government altered a lot of things in Jos city as it took the conflict to another level.

The massacre following the November 28, 2008 elections further stilled the voices of peace and mutual tolerance in Plateau North. Most victims of the 2008 violence in Jos North and South were unarmed civilians and that scenario changed the pattern of violence in the Metropolis, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom Local Governments as it contained many elements that will keep recurring in the areas. It will be recalled that the betrayal of Plateau States' tolerant past through the shrill voices of the shouts of ethnic hatred and national and religious divisiveness was reinforced by arms. The perpetrators of ethnic and religious extremisms utilized political instruments. Conflict in Plateau State lends to few simple analogies and no easy answers. Attempts have been made above to provide the historical roots to the conflict. Yet, it is important to understand the complex situations surrounding the contemporary conflicts and arriving at guideposts for action. Some of these explanations have been provided in the opening sections of this study where attempts were made at discerning the patterns of the conflict rather than merely describing events.

Between 2008 and 2011 the crisis in the metropolis worsened especially in Jos South. These conflicts waned at the close of 2011 in the metropolis. While the conflict in Jos North and South was waning, that of Barkin-Ladi and Riyom LGAs was increasing. During one of the Focus Group Discussion sessions in Barkin-Ladi one discussant reiterated the origins of the conflict in the area. He explained that:

> I have lived in this town since 1977. From that point when I came here we have lived in peace with one another. There is no disagreement or whatever although we had our differences but we always settle that without a fight. Plateau state was so peaceful that people from other places envied us. But from 2001 Plateau was marred with crisis and that has been on till now. That crisis started in Jos city on a Friday after Juma'a prayers. This crisis has been all around Jos north and Jos south and surrounding rural areas in Riyom and Barkin-Ladi but it did not come into Barkin-Ladi town until November 24, 2011. We cannot say particularly what happened but nobody will forget that day. But all we heard was that some Hausa people who were going for a weekly market trading on a Thursday had met a road block and that one of them was killed. The Berom had claimed that one of their own was killed. That is how the crisis began in Barkin-Ladi town and till now no one can say he or she has had a rest of mind (FGD, 2014).

The discussants in the group above maintained that the conflict has many roots including ethnicity, religion, politics, economic and cultural factors. This is collaborated in another FGD with a different group where some respondents argued that the conflicts in Barkin-Ladi and Riyom are as a result of poverty. Discussing these issues one discussant noted "in my thinking, beyond the issues of religion and ethnicity like other speakers have mentioned there are also the issues of illiteracy and poverty". They wondered that in the context of the Jos environment, these ethnic and religious groups have been together for a long time but did not experience this form of extreme violence. They queried why these would be happening and why now? This has been a deep question given that the discussants maintained that they have lived with Christians since their childhood and both Muslims and Christians regarded one another as brothers. For them, there is something underneath. While the issues raised by that group on poverty and illiteracy as being fundamental to the emergence of the conflict, what is truly underneath is ethnicity and religion. This is because at the latent stage of the current conflict in Barkin-Ladi and the larger Plateau both Muslims and Christians had stereotyped themselves.

The issues of economics and governance have been raised as the bane of several conflicts in Nigeria but the dilemmas of belonging have served as tools for activating the crisis. The point to underscore is that the communities flared up on issues of sentiment, issues that bother on religion, issues of ethnic identity and of course where one belongs and these became the bases of belonging to the Plateau North communities rather than that of a common Nigerian identity. Discussing how religion has deepened the contemporary crisis in Plateau North one respondent contended that:

> Again what added to the conflict is the idea of globalization and religious modernity from both sides. People in both Christianity and Islam now feel they now have a better knowledge on how the society should be run. People who feel the way it has been going it is not yielding the expected result rather it should go the way their religion thinks is the better way. People who felt their own interpretations of the scriptures supersedes every other interpretation and understanding, of course this contributed in heightening tension polarizing and dividing the polity especially along religious lines. This added to the tension that was there all these while (Field interview, 2013).

Studies on Islam have coroborated the above position contending that reformist movements in post-colonial Nigeria and even West Africa have attempted to promote modernity rather than a return to traditions. Studies like Ousmane Kane (2003) and Perouse de Montclos (2008) have argued that Islamic movements of reform in post-colonial Nigeria have attempted to promote modernity. Kane (2003) contended that what the Yan Izala movement (founded in Jos in 1978) has attempted to do is to mediate social change. Kane's position is that the rise of reform movements was facilitated by social change which coincided with a new phenomenon called "Islamism" or "radical Islam" or "political Islam". Kane provided us with a useful and handy overview of the origins and ideological orientations of the Yan Izala, with particular interest to the "Wahhabi" view of Sufism as an un-Islamic innovation. His study stands in the tradition of recent Islamic studies literature preoccupied with the view that Islamist movements are modern and technologically progressive. This overview gives close attention to the interaction between religion and politics in northern Nigeria. This was conspicuously witnessed in Northern Nigeria and Jos particularly by the links of the leadership of the Izala steered by Sheik Abubakar Gumi with the Nigerian military. Stringent interpretation of scriptures in both Christianity and Islam has constantly been pointed at as a driving force of the conflict in Plateau North. Discussants during

the FGDs sessions both with Hausa Muslims and Native Christians accused the clergies for instigating the conflicts.

Giving the increasing conflicts in Plateau North, human settlement has drastically changed since 2001. It has been established that Jos in particular had neighbourhoods where particular ethnic groups were in the majority. For instance, Gangare was dominated by the Hausa with pockets of native population. That trend applied to Apata and Nasarawa that were dominated by the Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups respectively with pockets of Hausa and native populations. This however changed with the 2001 conflict. Studies on the interaction between ethnic or ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics claimed solution to the conflicts become possible when the conflicting parties stay apart (Kaufmann, 1996; Weidmann, 2009; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013). Kaufman argued that stable resolution of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves (1996:137). Although ethnic enclaves which were not exclusive had existed in Plateau North before the conflict turned violent in 2001, it is evident that the conflict has necessitated a shift into exclusive neighbourhoods defined by religion yet the conflict remains without a practicable solution.

Before the crisis in Plateau North exploded to an immeasurable proportion in 2001 the area had what can be termed significant mixed neighbourhoods. A retired civil servant and a neighbourhood leader had argued that before 2001 there were settlements that were predominantly Hausa and Fulani or predominantly Muslims, but there were Christian houses there and a significant number of non- Hausa and Fulani there too. People lived peacefully. There were no tensions whatsoever before that time" (Field interview, 2014). The exclusive shift, therefore, occurred after 2001. In the urban areas, before there were no exclusive settlement areas for both Muslims and Christians. There may have been predominant presence of either Muslims or Christian but there were no exclusive patterns but in 2001 exclusiveness began. The argument of most respondents were that Christian houses were burnt in predominantly Muslim areas and Muslim houses were burnt in predominantly Christian areas and segmentation started. Today, Muslim settlements are virtually exclusive settlements and Christian settlements are exclusively Christian too.

Discussing the settlement dynamic in Plateau North before the conflict respondents argued that there were significant mixed neighbourhoods despite the fact that ethnic enclaves existed though not exclusive. In Jos North, a respondent noted:

> Areas like Angwan Rogo, Dilimi, Bauchi Road, Gangare, Yan Shanu were Hausa Muslim dominated but with pockets of Christians of other ethnicities. Places like Apata, Jenta Adamu, Tudun Wada, Hwolshe, Angwan Rukuba, Tina, Rock Haven, Busa Buji, British America were Christian dominated but with pockets of Muslims. Today, while the Muslims have confirmed to move northwards, the Christians are moving southwards. Those places like Angwan Rogo and Gangare have become for Muslims alone, Apata and Tina here and several others have become for Christians. Here in Dutse Uku, the Dutse Uku itself separates the Christian neighbourhood from the Muslim neighbourhood. From Dutse Uku towards Yan Shanu is for Muslims and it has been renamed Angwan Damisa, while from Dutse Uku towards Tina Junction has become for Christians. That Rock separate the Muslims from the biggest Church in Jos Jarawa (COCIN, RCC) (Field interview, 2014).

Indeed, while the conflict deepened, religion has become the defining variable for settlement dynamic in Jos North but specifically for the security of the group moving. It has seriously reinforced religious consciousness. The above respondent is not alone on this view as other respondents in Jos North of other ethnic and religions hold the same view.

Graphic facts of burnt houses (Appendix XIII) provide reasons why the people had to move. In the Jos Jarawa area otherwise called Dutse Uku Muslim houses were burnt but particularly Hausa Muslim houses as no single Hausa Muslim lives there. This is quite interesting however because Yoruba Muslims still live with the Christians around there. Alluding to this arrangement, an Afizere youth leader during an FGD session pointed out that the scenario is so interesting that even the venue we used for the FGD belong to a Yoruba Muslim. In Muslim areas the burnt houses are Christian houses. People go to where they are tolerated or where they meet people with cultural similarities. Those Muslims who stayed in Tina, Jos Jarawa and survived the crisis what they did was to shift to areas like Yan Shanu or Gangare or any other Muslim neighbourhood while the Christians who stayed in the Muslim areas moved to Christian areas.

The ability of the Yoruba ethnic group to live with both natives and the Hausa and Fulani irrespective of religion was constantly re-echoed. Yet, issues were raised that Yoruba Muslims living among the Hausa and Fulani Muslims in the Muslim neighbourhoods were killed during

the 2008 and 2010 conflicts by fellow Muslims. This is captured in a respondent's words this way:

> There is something interesting about this area; we have Yoruba Muslims in this area but no single Hausa or Fulani Muslim is in this area. We also have Afizere Muslims in this area too but all Hausa and Fulani Muslims have relocated from here. This Tina Junction was the slaughter house. People were killed here. It is also interesting because the Yoruba used to live in Nassarawa and Rikkos (Both Christians and Muslims) but today, even the Yoruba Muslims have been sent out of the neighbourhoods the Yoruba now live at Angwan Rukuba. They were killed in Nasarawa and Rikkos in 2008 and 2010. So as they are killed they have no option than to move (Field interview, 2014).

The above position raised by a non-Muslim and a Plateau native contradicts the positions of Hausa Muslims who claim that they still live with the Yoruba and even the Igbo. He argued that:

> There are some amazing things all about the whole thing. You can still find Yoruba comfortably living among the Hausa and Fulani Muslims; even Christian Yoruba not just Muslim Yoruba. You will still find Igbo still living with us… right now this Massalacin Juma'a is predominantly a Hausa area but you still find the Igbo doing there trading activities. The down floor of this building is Igbo and here I am in the topmost floor a Hausa man. One of the floors is operated by a Yoruba man. So you can see my point. So those that have the confidence to live, are still living with the Hausa man (Field interview, 2014).

The above contradictions place both ethnicity and religion at the centre of the conflict. The paradox, however, is that while people kill for territory sake, the same territory also appears to be their form of defence against organised violence. It is imperative to point out that there is nothing like a neutral party to the conflict as residents of the areas either identify with the conflict in ethnic or religious terms.

The experience of residential exclusiveness in Jos South is not totally different from that of Jos North. Describing the experience in Jos South a respondent noted that there were mixed settlements from Angwan Doki to Sabon Lyn, to Mallam Idi, to Oyemmadu street, Ogbomosho street, down to Filn ball, to Gero road and even Kugiya were all mixed settlements. As the crisis persisted people moved. As already pointed out, in the time of crisis, people tend to trust those close to them especially in terms of religion. So since 2001, the settlement has been changing, at each point or round of conflict people move closer to those they have affiliation with whether in

terms of ethnic group or religion but often religion. Today in Jos South, neighbourhoods like Du, Zawan, Gyel are exclusively Christians, while Gero road, Sabon Lyn, Mallam Idi, Filn ball are exclusively Muslims. A place like Angwan Doki is divided into two. While Kasali street is for Muslims, Rwang Pam street and Vom Christian Hospital Annex are Christians hundred percent.

These experiences are not only within the urban milieu but it also applies to the rural areas as observed in Barkin-Ladi and Riyom. As a matter of fact, some rural areas in both Barkin-Ladi and Riyom have become totally exclusive as reports made around that the natives were sacked in Kurra Falls and Garshish areas of Barkin-Ladi. It was observed in Garshsish (Barkin-Ladi) and Bachit (Riyom) that they have become Muslim neigbourhoods. The point to underscore is that civic and social lives in Plateau North communities have continued to raise issues of concern. The underlining issue in Plateau North is the ascriptive tradition of us versus them. The we versus them relationship perceived in zero sum terms have continued to widen the inequalities in the areas and reinforcing violent conflicts.

4.2 Ethno-religious Insecurity: The Plateau State Experience with Settlement Dynamics

4.2.1 Security Dilemma and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Plateau State

The emerging settlements in Plateau State has created atmospheres of fear, anxiety, safe and unsafe neighbourhoods and therefore given rise to ethnic security dilemma. The conflicts and the settlement dynamics have raised the issues of security dilemma. As Posen (1993) argued, geography could intensify the security dilemma phenomenon. This is evident in the manner that the ethno-religious groups in Plateau State have killed and got killed in attempts to secure one's neighbourhood. Discussing the safety drive, a respondent explained:

> Since that crisis if you are a non Muslim and you go to a Muslim territory at a time when the conflict reoccur you will certainly be attacked that also applies to a Muslim who goes to a Christian territory. We then had safe and unsafe areas. No go areas did not just emerge on the scene, it started with people who are running for safety. When people are running for safety and they entered into a non Muslim area and if the person is a Muslim, the person could be killed. It happened severally. There are cases of both divides being killed because they were not of same faith with those they ran towards their territory. That is how it started and then degenerated into safe and unsafe neighbourhoods for certain groups. So people of both divides began to say "they killed one of us today in that territory" with that revenge and counter revenge

> set in and the quest to protect our territories from attacks (Field interview, 2014).

The above scenario captures Posen's condition of indistinguishability of offence and defence which states that the longing for security compels groups to go offensive. Another respondent while discussing how the emerging settlement increases the level of violence makes the security dilemma situation in Plateau State clearer this way:

> …to a great extent it does because whenever the people meet together such conflicts are discussed. There is something we call communal meeting but the key agenda in such meeting has always been the issues of security. It is always "be at alert". And if you are told every day to be alert the implication is get ready for action. Getting ready means acquiring weapons and try to protect your territory. In fact we have had Christian vigilante here and Muslim vigilante too. They don't work with empty hands; weapons are bought for them to protect your own area. With this kind of arrangement the fires can come up any time. See, contributions are even made in such meetings for arms acquisition. It has happened severally (Field interview, 2014).

From the above, it is clear that the separate settlements in Plateau State have resorted to self help in providing their security. Security dilemma exists in a self-help environment. In a place where there is a guarantor for the security of a population, there will be no need for the population to take measures to protect themselves. However, this becomes the norm where there is no guarantor for security. It has been established earlier in this section that the security dilemma was traditionally applied to explain the interaction of states in the anarchical international system. For this reason, the idea that the existence of sovereign regime is providing security for its population raises the question whether ethnic or ethno-religious groups in sovereign Nigeria are operating in a self-help environment. The challenge of determining whether a guarantor exists was overcome by Posen and Kaufman by applying the security dilemma to relations between states that are collapsing and thus where there is no effective sovereign (Collins, 1998). For the approach to be applicable to the increasing ethno-religious conflicts among ethno-religious groups in Plateau State, particularly the conflict between the indigenes- Afizere, Anaguta, and Berom who are predominantly Christians and the Hausa and Fulani Muslims; the issue becomes if they are living in a self-help environment.

This raises concerns about the Plateau case. While it cannot be convincingly said that Nigeria is at the point of collapse like the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union which propels self help;

Nigeria qualifies in Buzan's (1991) category of weak states. Weak states are practically unable to provide security for its population. As a result, the case in Plateau State has challenged the residents of that area to resort to self help. Narrating how his community was abandoned by the government in Plateau State giving the shift in settlements and weak governance system, a community leader explained how they had to resort to self help in all dimensions including physical security. He posited that as a leader of the Hausa community he knows what his people are facing. He argued that if one goes around Jos city it will be clearer that the Hausa community areas are neglected. For such communities, there is no government in such places.

The above perception of Hausa community in Jos that the government is not in any way interested in their wellbeing places the ethnic security dilemma in perspective. It indicates a population who feel abandoned can go the extra mile to provide their own security. A number of factors make up a groups security and when such factors are missing groups tend to see their security as being threatened. The groups consider the government as the chief instigator of all the deliberate act of violence since their security is not guaranteed. Thus, the act of government has led to frustration, lawlessness and in this kind of despicable condition, it becomes very difficult for people to be controlled. During an FGD session one discussant pointed out plainly that each group, Christians and Muslims prepare themselves for attack in anticipation that they would be attacked. The discussant argued that it is the segregated settlement that has given rise to this pattern of relationship where the entire society is in fear of what next the opposing group will do. He contended:

> Honestly speaking, this pattern of settlement creates fear in people. It has created violence. This is because people in Christian or Muslim neighbourhoods prepare themselves for attack by acquiring arms, once they notice tension around, they know that attack is likely. People have come to believe that the best form of defense is to attack else you will be attacked. Most times we the Berom who are mainly Christians have been attacked by the Hausa and the Fulani Muslims. So this segregation pattern of settlement makes it easier. This is because the people already know who is who and who lives where. To attack Christians, you simply go to their neighbourhoods at night, the same with Christians who wants to attack Muslims they also go to their neighbourhoods. This is dangerous. In as much as it serves as protection to its inhabitants because they join together to defend the territory, it has really made this place violent (FGD, 2014).

The issues in the above include that of identity (ethno-religious identity) and territory (segregated settlement). Therefore, the dilemmas function around the security of the groups' identities and in their residential territories. In the traditional sense of security dilemma, the key security issue has been that of territory. The dynamics of the dilemma in the traditional sense operates when states have acquired the military capability to change the status quo (Collins, 1998:264). On the other hand, in ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts as applied by Posen (1993), Kaufman (1996), Collins (1998), Varshney (2002) and Roe (2005), the issue is the security of groups' identity. The patterns of the dilemma become manifest and operate when the survival of this identity is threatened from one generation to another. In Plateau State, the dilemma is complex as it is both about altering of territories due to perceived military capability of groups and perceived threat to the concerned groups' ethnic and religious identities. The historical trend of the conflict in Plateau State indicates that the groups' in the area perceive their ethnic and religious identities to be under threat. The indigenes of the Plateau North area including the Afizere, Anaguta, and Berom also contended that the Hausa and Fulani expansionist tendency since the Jihad days have kept the conflict on.

The idea that separate settlement as argued here contradicts Kaufman's (1996:137) argument which contended that "intermingled population settlements create real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic "cleansing," and prevent de-escalation unless the groups are separated". Kaufman's argument suggests that attempts to rescue and re-integrate multi-ethnic societies ridden with identity violence should be abandoned. He argues that such attempts "must facilitate and protect population movements to create true national homelands". For him, "…defensible ethnic enclaves reduce violence. In Plateau North, like in metropolitan neighbourhoods of Federal Low Cost Housing estate, Bukuru Low cost, Kufang, Anglo-Jos and Dadin Kowa have intermingled populations and yet have experienced the least violence since 2001. This faults Kaufman's argument. Rather, what the case in Plateau State presents is that mixed neighbourhood facilitates de-escalation of inter-group conflicts.

Strictly speaking, the dilemma in Plateau North is what one respondent called "a perpetual suspicion". Mutual suspicion widens the security dilemma and reinforces violence between the conflicting groups.

The danger in the dilemma situation in Plateau State is that it reduces the interaction of groups and increases the spate and spectre of ethno-religious insecurity. The point to underscore is that

settlement dynamics and the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State have created the scenario of ethno-religious security dilemma in the area. This has formed the foundations for the architecture of violence in Plateau North in particular and the state in general.

4.2.2 Bridging versus Bonding of Social Capital: Conflicts and Emerging Settlement Pattern in Plateau State.

The processes of identity formation and change and political organizing of ethnic and religious groups have received a wide attention in Plateau State. I observed group bonding in terms of public presentation of the identities of Plateau State especially in Plateau North area- Afizere, Anaguta, Berom, Hausa and Fulani and their political maneuvering. To start with, ethonyms like "Hausa-Fulani", "Jasawa" as well as the concept of "natives of Jos", "indigenes of Jos" or umbrella bodies like Jos Divisional and Cultural Organization (JODICO) or Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN) are political identities created for political, economic and cultural purposes which have in different times provided forms of bonding for different groups with shared interest. The "Hausa-Fulani" coinage in northern Nigeria and in the larger Nigerian environment is seen as a design to grab political and economic relevance in a competitive environment. A renowned Nigerian historian Bala Usman has warned against the use of the "Hausa-Fulani" ethonym and argued that it was an attempt by power-mongers to stereotype complex processes of community formation. Usman contended that:

> There is the notion of the "Hausa-Fulani" which for anybody familiar with the primary sources of the history of the Emirate and Borno even in the 20th century is a ridiculous contradiction…. The Fulbe are Fulbe because they are not Habe. A Pullo cannot be a Kado. What we have are Hausawa, Kanawa, Zagezegi of varied antecedents and Fulbe (Fulani) of diverse backgrounds. But it suited the elites to foreign and local power-brokers and power-mongers to promote the Hausa-Fulani and thus stereotype complex processes of community formation and nation-building (1994: 13).

Usman's view was reiterated by the commission of inquiry set up to investigate the 2001 crisis in Jos metropolis in its report. The Commission among other things argued:

> The expression Hausa-Fulani is a double barrel coinage of relatively recent history, a nomenclature aimed essentially at achieving political, economic and religious ambition and relevance. Hausa is a tribe. Fulani is a tribe. The expression Hausa-Fulani in our view does not have any historical, cultural and even ancestral meaning or relevance. There is no tribe in Nigeria called Hausa-Fulani and the expression has no background in the culture

> and sociology of the two distinct Nigerian tribes (Commission of Inquiry, 2001).

The point to underscore is that the coinage "Hausa-Fulani" only serves as bonding to deepen the Hausa and Fulani oligarchy in northern Nigeria and exclude others in political and economic processes. On the other hand, the Jasawa is a coinage distinguishing the Hausa of Jos. It simply means the people of Jos. Linking Bauchi road to Terminus market stands a gigantic signpost reading "this is Jasawa land". The implication of the signpost as narrated by one respondent is that Jos belongs to the Hausa. In the Hausa language, 'wa' is a possessive word indicating ownership. Thus, the merchantilist nature of the Hausa led the colonialists to refer to the Hausa in Jos as Jasawa during the colonial period and designating them as owners of the land. However, Jasawa did not exist as a body. Formed in the 1990s to pursue the interest of the Hausa of Jos, Jasawa Development Association was registered by the Plateau State Government when Dacholom Jambol was the Secretary to the Government (Field interview, 2014). The formation of the group has organised the Hausa in Jos and serves as a tool of inclusion for them and reinforced a sense of loyalty to the organisation while excluding others. A respondent to this study had argued that those referred to as Hausa in Jos today is a mixture of people of different ethnic origins who became Muslims. He argued that majority of the people are historically from the northeastern Nigerian region. He pointed out "The people we call Hausa in Jos today were the recruited labourers, mostly from the north east of Nigeria but also from Kano, Zaria, Sokoto and the rest" (Field interview, 2014).

Again the concepts of "natives of Jos" and "indigenes of Jos" presents it in a way that it appears as if the indigenes of Jos are a single ethnic and cultural group. These are people of different ethnic and cultural orientations with sharp political differences. Yet, they came together under the JODICO or PIDAN umbrella to provide support for group members and achieve their interest. Therefore, organisations brought together different ethnic groups who were previously estranged and have fostered alliances between groups who belong to the same linguistic family (Hirsch, 2003). These groups, both in rural and urban contexts are bonding strongly for access to resources. It is important to situate these groups' formations and different levels of activism within the Nigerian state systemic exclusion of a citizen as a non indigene in 35 out of the 36 states and the Federal Capital on the one hand, and the northern hegemonic project of excluding others on the basis of religion, ethnicity, and region on the other (Nnoli, 1978; Kukah, 1993).

One point is clear from the above. Ethno-religious bonding in Plateau State has exacerbated conflicts in the area. In essence, it was the bonding which emanated from fear of losing one's life, property, group identity or losing value for one's religion in response to the conflict that ignited the move towards exclusive settlements. These are what Radcliffe and Westwood (1996) called geographies of identity. For them, geographies of identities refer to "senses of belonging and subjectivities which are constituted in (and which in turn act to constitute) different spaces and social sites". Radcliffe and Westwood added that "geographies of identities are lived geographies, constituted also in the sphere of imagination and the representational and in the daily life and practices of people" (1996:27). This is used by groups to frame surrounding geographies as the "other". In other words, residential pattern provides the bond for groups to frame their identity. In the Plateau case, identities are framed to sustain the level of exclusion existing between groups or to resist the level of exclusion. This is because the Hausa and Fulani Muslim areas in Jos metropolis are said to be neglected over the years by past administration but especially by the administration of Jonah David Jang in Plateau State. Thus the bonding around the Jasawa identity is a form of resistance that is enabled and fortified by the conflict and the settlement dynamic. On the other hand, the existence of such identities and the geographical attachment is seen by the indigenous groups as forms of antagonism.

Relating social capital to geography, Putnam (2000) raised the argument that the relationship of people is shaped and molded by the areas in which they live. The absence of bridging social capital and the ever growing bonding social capital in Plateau State has hindered inter-group integration and promoted sectarianism, ethnocentrism and municipal governance abandonment. Bridging social capital in Plateau State has manifested around formation of football clubs for both Christians and Muslims, vigilante groups that its members are drawn from both religions and different ethnic groups and belong to the same political party by the conflicting parties. These approaches have not yielded fruit. The neighbourhoods that bond the ethno-religious groups have made it practically impossible for the football clubs to stand. This is because one group's neighbourhood is a "no go area" for the other group. The same applies to the vigilante groups. As a result, in Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom there are Christian and Muslim vigilantes watching over their neighbourhoods. For political parties, since the first republic, the indigenes of Jos in particular and the Hausa have belonged to different political parties but in 1998 at the inception of the fourth republic they came under the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). During the party primaries a Hausa man who was a respondent to this study contested for

Chairmanship in Jos North and won but he was schemed out by the same calculation of indigenes. He was rather adopted as the deputy chairman which did not go down well with the Hausa. The Hausa had mobilised strongly for the All Progressive Congress (APC) candidate in the 2015 general elections against the PDP's candidate who is assumed to be strongly supported by a supposed Hausa arch political enemy- Jonah Jang.

Bonding social capital tends towards reinforcing violent conflicts, fragmenting residential areas and exacerbating identity divisions. Bridging social capital on the other hand promotes inter-group integration and peace. However, both bonding and bridging in an egalitarian society promotes peace but on the contrary, in an environment of exclusion or if they are weak opens up space for communal violence. One implication of settlement dynamic therefore is that it has deepened sectarianism and ethnocentrism in Plateau State and has reinforced the emergence of several identities in the area. The point to underscore is that ethno-religious bonding in Plateau State which manifests in exclusive neighbourhoods and the redefinition of identities has facilitated intolerance, aggression and violence.

4.2.3 Trust and Distrust: The Deepening Segregated Settlements and Conflicts in Plateau State

A close examination of neighbourhood attachment in ethnic and religious lines suggested direct relationship between diversity and outcomes such as inter-group interaction, societal order, conflicts and violence. It becomes imperative to examine trust and distrust relations in Plateau State. While trust lubricates social interaction, solves collective action problems and reduces the level of societal violence, distrust reinforces conflict and antagonisms result in physical separation between groups. Scholars of trust and distrust have constantly raised the argument that conflict over scarce resource has the tendency to affect the trust relations between groups. Trust is important in understanding inter-group interaction" because it is impossible to regulate every aspect of human interaction on the basis of legal codes" (Crepaz, 2008:93). Trust is necessary to enhance the quality of everyday life. Putnam (2000) in his discourse on social capital had argued that a robust social capital of which trust is part of facilitates an orderly, serene, and peaceful society. Trust denotes a condition that people desire. It is the fundamental element of a good society. Trust readily improves social and political interaction. In other words, "trust is a societal resource that allows people to achieve outcomes and engage with each other in interactions that make all of them better off than they would be if they did not trust each other" (Crepaz, 2008:94). When trust exists among diverse population of a state on the one hand and between the state and

its population on the other, security of the population is guaranteed and issues of intolerance are reduced. In other words, trust in a diverse society improves the security of the diverse population while its absence undermines security.

What enhances every system and ensures its smooth function is trust. Fukuyama in his book *The End of History and the Last Man* had reiterated the saliency of trust for societal efficiency. He argued that:

> A dictatorship could resolve conflicts in the name of economic efficiency, but the smooth functioning of a modern economy depends on the willingness of its many interdependent social components to work together. If they do not believe in the legitimacy of the adjudicator, if there is no trust in the system, there will be no active enthusiastic cooperation of the sort required to make the system as a whole function smoothly… (1992:114).

The role of trust in keeping a society together is best captured in the puzzle that struck scholars of ethnic and ethno-religious conflict. Despite ethnic and religious diversity in some places- regions, nations, cities, towns and villages; such areas still manage to stay peaceful whereas others experience long-term patterns of violence (Varshney, 2002:5). An example of a diverse peaceful nation is Switzerland; of course Nigeria qualifies as one experiencing enduring violence. Another puzzling experience is how some societies that have had a unique record of ethnic and religious peace suddenly goes into flames in a way that surprises observers. In this scenario, it is relevant to ask what sustained ethno-religious peace for a long time in Plateau State? A simple answer is the *Amana* and later the trust that existed in the northernisation policy despite its weaknesses. A respondent to this study pointed out that "the indigenous Christians and the Hausa and Fulani Muslims had lived together in peace which was sustained by trust". According to him, their peaceful interaction was established by a "trust pact" known as *Amana*. The tightly knit network of trust in Plateau State began to fall apart when the collective enterprise uniting northern Nigeria fell short of trust on the grounds of religion and politics. With the increasing conflicts and settlement dynamics a climate of distrust set in and heavily undermined trust and security in Plateau State.

Furthermore, a climate of distrust creates a demand for protection. Such protections are sought because of the level of societal volatility created by distrust. Mostly, exclusive neighbourhoods tend to provide protection to violently divided groups. The violence in Plateau State, therefore,

has deepened distrust religiously, politically, economically, socially, and culturally. A respondent argued that:

> The trust that used to be is no longer there. It has created a lot of enmity. There is something interesting here. You see in these non Muslim settlements, you could find Yoruba Muslims living there with non Muslims and nobody has killed them. They are there in Tina Junction and elsewhere. The point here is that ethnicity is a problem. The non Muslims trust the Yoruba Muslim because they are Yorubas but nobody here can trust a Hausa Muslim with his life, it is dangerous. You know this trend was deepened by the 2008 Election, so as 2015 election approaches people are seriously relocating. Yoruba Muslims are even moving out of Muslim neighbourhoods and selling their houses anticipating another killing spree. I also said it has affected us politically because 80% of Hausa Muslims in Jos are not in any political party or have decided not to be with us because of lack of trust. They feel that they cannot be where the government in power is (Interview at Jos Jarawa, October 26, 2014).

In Plateau State, the increasing distrust between the indigenes and the Hausa in particular has increased the incessant attacks on both groups. It also reinforced the fragmentation of settlements in the area. Population movements therefore have massive and widespread consequences that affect the social fabric of society and interrupt harmonious inter-group interaction in Plateau State. It is this climate of distrust that led to the emergence of Christian and Muslim vigilantes in Plateau State. This trend was on ground in Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom at the time of the field study. Focus Group Discussion discussants in the above local governments affirmed that the trend of each religious group having its own vigilante group became prominent after the massive violence of 2008 in Jos North and Jos South and the heavy tensions that mounted in Barkin-Ladi and Riyom. For both parties, the emergence of vigilantes along religious lines was to provide security as they don't trust the government to do justice to that. On the side of the indigenous Christians, they did not indicate any trust on the members of the Military Task Force. On the other hand, the Hausa and Fulani Muslims tend not to trust the Plateau State Government with their lives. Hence, both parties armed private citizens to provide them with the needed security. A similar experience occurred in the United States in 2004 "when armed private citizens, whom President Bush called "vigilantes," were patrolling the Arizona-Mexico border because they did not trust the governments' commitment to do its job" (Crepaz, 2008:4). Also in 2004, Christian-Muslim distrust grew extensively in Netherlands when filmmaker Theo van Gogh was assassinated by a radical Muslim for arguing that Muslims are "backward" and that the Dutch

government should put a stop to Muslim immigration. This led to excessive burning of Churches and Mosque. The distrust was heightened by the increasing unwillingness of the Muslim immigrants to mix with the natives; rather, they opted to segregate themselves in ethnic enclaves which has deepened the level of distrust between immigrant Muslims and natives. A similar scenario is also manifest in some parts of Malmo a town in Sweden where ambulance drivers as a result of distrust refuse to go to certain neighbourhoods without a police escort for fear of being attacked. Malmo, a town of 250,000 residents and about 40 percent of this population are foreigners and most of them recently arrived the town as Muslim refugees and over 50 percent are unemployed. This enormous population has refused to mix up with the Swedish population; rather they created an enclave and live exclusively apart (Crepaz, 2008).

In Plateau State, the diverse population tends to distrust the members of the task force (Military and Police) who are from the opposing ethnic or religious groups and are operating in their neighbourhoods as security agents. For majority of the population of Plateau origin who responded to this study, the military cannot provide them with security. As a matter of fact, they tend to see the security operatives as informants and foot soldiers of the Hausa and Fulani Muslims. When distrust exists in a society especially when there is no trust between diverse members of the population of a state on the one hand and between institutions that govern and those they govern on the other; suspicion becomes the order, division and violence prevails. By implication, an environment like Plateau State, where a climate of distrust rules, people fall back to their family, kin, ethnic groups, religion and neighbourhoods. This is because "every city and every state interacts with and to some extent depends on an ever-present form of commitment-maintaining connection: the trust network" (Tilly, 2011:7). Under the conditions of distrust it is difficult to envisage the rebuilding of community or civil society.

The point to underscore is that the collapse of the social fabric in Plateau State is as a result of exclusive settlement which overlaps the trust network and reinforced distrust. According to a respondent, the distrust has tended to move from ethnicity to religion and therefore, people even in trading are affected let alone living together. An example of the extension of the distrust to public space is in Bukuru where until recently, people were operating separate markets. A respondent noted that:

> The Christians were mostly in Gyel and Kugiya markets. The Muslims tried to operate their own market at the centre of the town around C.T.M…. their own market failed and they have gradually

> moved in with the Christians. Today, they are virtually selling together with the Christians at Kugiya. But they have not had the gut to go to Gyel market. But obviously, Gyel is a Christian market and that is the problem today in Bukuru. But the Christians have not been able to move into the centre of their own market (Interview at Du, Jos South, November 7, 2014).

Inter-group distrust in Plateau State therefore has become the normative pattern of inter-group relationships. This has deepened the enmity and rivalry existing both with the Christian indigenes and Muslim Hausa and Fulani. This distrust, however, is not restricted to the indigenes and the Hausa and Fulani Muslims. It also concerns all Christians and Muslims resident in Riyom, Barkin-Ladi, Jos South and Jos North. The interesting part of this relationship is that southern Muslims of Yoruba extraction are rather trusted by the indigenous groups than the northern Muslims. The Yoruba is perceived as moderate Muslim and could be trusted to live in the same enclave with indigenous Christians. This was observed in Tina Junction area of Jos North, General Hospital Road area in Barkin-Ladi but Bukuru in Jos South and Riyom are different as both Christians and Muslims live exclusively apart. The distrust-rivalry relationship is maintained to the point that if a Hausa and Fulani Muslim want to sale a land or building in a Muslim neighbourhood, they rather consult and sale it to a fellow Hausa or Fulani Muslim from outside the state than sale it to a Berom Christian or any other Christian who will rather sale it to a southern Christian than a northern Muslim even in a lower cost. The members of both religions believe strongly that each religious group has a hidden agenda. A committed member of one of the religious groups confirmed this when he pointed out that the distrust is centered on the idea that the other group has a hidden agenda. He added that "it has so created distrust that our people prefer not to sale land to any member of the other religion. Our people just sold a land to a group in our faith for just a little over hundred million while the members of the other faith were willing to pay two hundred million" (Field interview, 2014).

Furthermore, narrating how the emerging settlement has reinforced distrust and how mutual distrust has ravaged the communities, a respondent noted:

> It has so deepened distrust to the extent that both groups are skeptical about buying edible things from one another. Muslims prefer to buy from Muslims and vice versa….But mutual distrust is still very high here (Field interview, 2014).

The implication is that segregated settlement in any region, state, city, town or village serves as practically a necessary condition for distrust and subsequently physical violence; whereas

urbanism and dispersion as argued by Toft (2003:34) are practically sufficient condition for non-violent political activities. Although the common narrative in scholarship is that segregated settlement influences trust and creates less violence (Kaufmann, 1996; Kohn, 2008; Weidmann, 2009; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013), empirical evidence in the Plateau case suggest differently as inter-mixed and integrated settlements exhibits high level trust and little or no violence between Christians and Muslims.

Therefore, distrust has been the major hindrance to inter-group mixing in settlements and the integration of the fractured society of Plateau State. From the foregoing, the increasing distrust explains the different factors in Plateau State conflict. These factors include group perception of the other, ethno-religious politics, exclusion, conflicts, violence and segregated settlements. These factors are intertwined and have been influenced by distrust as much as they have influenced distrust. In a segregated community aggressors know where a group perceived as the enemy group lives and this makes it easier to apply violence. The absence of a reliable assurance of one's security when visiting a neighbourhood outside his/her settlement increases the level of fear and distrust in such places. In a study of trust in the Northern Ireland conflict Kohn (2008) contended that the question of trust is particularly fraught for taxi drivers who face additional hazards on top of the risks inherent to their occupation. This is because in a segregated Northern Ireland between Catholics and Protestants could fake and conceal names and addresses just to lure to an enemy neighbourhood. As a result, taxi drivers need security escort to go into certain areas.

Thus, the climate of distrust in Plateau State could be described as an emergency. This is because it is the factor that sustains other factors in the conflict. The potential for trust is correspondingly decreased with the recurrent conflict and the deepening exclusive settlement. In practice, discontinuing the conflict and inter-group mixing in settlements has the tendency to offset the distrust culture and establish integration in society. This reinforces the importance of trust in reducing inter-group suspicion and the dividing factors in Plateau State. A community leader in pointed out that "since 2012, the Special Adviser to the Governor on conflict resolution in Plateau State has been organising programmes that will bring the two parties together. Parties are organised for members of both religions at Sallah and Christmas". The target of such gathering is to re-establish trust and rebuild the Plateau society.

However, trust takes a long time to develop. Building trust in Plateau State depends on peoples' habits. According to Fukuyama:

> A strong and stable family structure and durable social institutions cannot be legislated into existence the way a government can create a central bank or an army. A thriving civil society depends on a people's action and must otherwise be nourished through an increased awareness and respect for culture (1995:5).

In other words, social re-engineering which is not an act of legislation is required to re-build trust in Plateau State. Fukuyama's position corroborates Putnam's assertion that trust arises from two related sources- "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement". For Putnam, the basis of collaboration in the civic community is "not legal but moral" (1993:171, 183). Developing such moral consciousness most times is relatively not easy in a diverse society like Plateau State. Putnam's engagement with civic community was a relatively homogenous society. Varshney's (2002) engagement of the civic community in a heterogeneous India suggested that informal groups and ascriptive associations like the one formed by the Adviser to the Governor in Plateau State should be encouraged. Varshney noted that "informal group activities as well as ascriptive associations should be considered part of civil society so long as they connect individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity, and facilitate exchange of views on matters of public concern—economic, political, cultural, and social" (2002:46). Such relationship can lighten the distrust if well received by both parties in the conflict. This could help in forming a quorum that will dictate the pace of providing security of a member of any ethno-religious group visiting the other's neighbourhoods.

Indeed, Huntington's (1996) thesis of the clash of civilisation is relevant here and bound to grow bigger in a climate of distrust in a diverse society. Thus, cultural differences have the tendency to link members of ethno-religious groupings with their ethnic or religious networks outside Plateau State to sustain the distrust. But cultural differences even though it sometimes generates tension, will not always lead to conflict. Fukuyama contended that "the rivalry arising from the interaction of different cultures can frequently lead to creative change" (1995:6). A third culture of trust could therefore emerge from the interaction of Christians and Muslims initiated by the government. Although this is seasonal it could become frequent to re-integrate the settlements. Yet, in bridging the ethno-religious groups, the groups may be well connected with distrust and inter-group conflicts while intra-group peace may be maintained; the long term interest should be to develop trust and re-establish a mixed settlement. Government involvement in religion may have a backlash or unintended consequences. Such interaction contradicts the advocacy of peace protagonists that religion should be separated from state. If it is alleged that the government

sympathy is tilted towards a particular religion as it is the case in Plateau State where the administration of Jonah Jang is accused of moving towards the Christian religion, this will further distance the Muslims from Christian neighbourhoods and deepen the distrust.

However, trust can only be established when the concerned ethno-religious groups re-integrate into their neighbourhoods. A respondent pointed out that as long as someone remains away from his legally acquired property and in his chosen neighbourhood he will neither repose trust on the government or on the other ethno-religious group that the conflict is against. Discussing how the separate settlement exacerbates distrust and keeps recreating the conflict a respondent maintained:

> If I have been living with you but because of the conflict that I left, that means at anytime we are ready to resume from where we stopped, old hatreds you know. This is because we don't live together and we didn't part in peace. We parted only to prepare for another round of conflicts. So, rather than changing locations, it is better we stand to get it solved. You know why? The later conflict will be more because we prepared for it. This tells you why the tempo of the conflict since 2001 has been on the increase (Field interview, 2014).

From the above, it is clear that segregated settlement sustained by distrust kept the violent conflict in Plateau State alive. Trust enhances productivity and grows the economy of any locality. Highlighting the interaction between the emerging settlement and distrust a discussant noted:

> The deep distrust which came as a result of Christian/Muslim separation in neighbourhoods affects productivity, it affects inter-group relations, affects national growth and development because as we speak to you, the economy of Plateau State has been punctured as a result of severed relationships and low inter-group interactions. So the implications are numerous, divided state, poor productivity, poor national growth, underdevelopment, fear, distrust and what have you. It is really affecting everything we have as a people (FGD, 2014).

The implication of the emerging settlement for inter-group relation therefore in terms of trust and distrust is that it has hindered trust and deepened distrust which has affected the economy of the state and the welfare of the individual in Plateau State. The thrust of the argument is that separate settlement promotes inter-group suspicion and groups' interest as against the general Plateau community's interest. This hinders trust and reinforces distrust between groups. The point underscored is that pursuing groups' interest undermines trust and builds distrust. The distrust structures are reinforced and aided the culture of violence to bud and blossom.

4.2.4 The Nexus between Conflicts, Settlement Dynamics and Culture of Violence

Scholars of ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics have contended that exclusive neighbourhoods or group exclusive territorial concentration creates and sustains inter-group peace (Kaufmann, 1996; Weidmann, 2009; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013). Since the 2001 ethno-religious clash in Jos violence seem to have flourished and created an order in Plateau societies especially in its north. Violence received a boost with the separation of ethno-religious groups in residential areas. Since 2001, reconstruction of Plateau North has been impossible as population of the area experience a fresh round of violence just before they settle down from the previous one. Scholars of conflict and violence contend that violence has become a way of life since the twentieth century (Roche, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008; Gebrewold, 2009; Taft and Haken, 2015). From World War 1 when global bellicosity organised different societies to fight on the assumption that violence will put an end to violence; till the present, the intensity of violence continues to swell. The war called "the war to end all wars" led to a global blood bath with losses exceeding 5,500 deaths per day. It was not long after that wrong global assumption when several societies but especially Adolf Hitler's Germany rearmed and kick started the conflict which saw the involvement of not less than 56 six countries in World War II. In that conflict, the Soviet Union alone suffered twenty million casualties, six million Jews and five million others were murdered in the Nazi Germany concentration camps (Roche, 2003:17).

The global trend of violence does not exclude Nigeria as the country was experiencing its own level of violence. From the 1950s organised violence resurfaced in Nigeria starting with the Kano riots of 1953. This does not negate the inter-ethnic conflict that claimed two lives in 1945 in Jos, rather it indicates that several organised violence claims several lives. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict had examined the sources of war and found out that deadly conflict is not inevitable. They pointed out that mass violence in deadly conflicts often resulted from deliberate political decisions. When violence is deliberately calculated it is organised.

Plateau societies especially in its north have unfortunately become conditioned by violence since 2001. Since this period, there has been a significant increase in the level of violence in northern Plateau LGAs but particularly those with Berom presence. It has been established earlier that the conflict has both ethnic and religious dimension and need not repeat that here. The violence was at its peak of lethality between 2008 and 2012. In a recent study it was discovered that between 2009 and 2013, the number of deaths in Plateau North is in the upward trajectory which signifies

either a rise in overall violence in those communities or an improved incidence reporting (Taft and Haken, 2015:63).

What then explain this increasing violence? Why is violence on the increase? It appears violence has been enshrined in those societies or it has become a culture. To say it is a culture may appear problematic. This is because culture itself is elusive. But people know it when they see it (Morone, 2014:15). Culture, in the view of E.B. Taylor, a social anthropologist "is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art morals, law, customs, and other capabilities and habits acquired by people as members of society" (cited in Morone 2014:15). Culture therefore, could be a shared, learned behaviour. Thus, when the act of inflicting pains becomes commonplace in society it becomes a culture. By that explanation, persistent violence can be a culture. Although Steven Pinker (2011) claimed that violence is on the decline globally, the Plateau case suggest differently. His argument appears logical though when the number of deaths in the first few decades of the twentieth century is put into consideration; it remains valid to state that in the holistic conceptualisation of violence, the trend, pattern and level of violence is on the increase. From this engagement, the nexus between the conflict in Plateau North and the culture of violence is the settlement dynamic. Settlement dynamics in any conflict environment influences groups capabilities to unleash terror and their legitimacy claim to violence. The just war theory may appear outmoded; group territorial concentration reinforces territorial self-defence against aggression as a plausible moral framework for violence. This is inspite of Monica Toft's theory of indivisible territory which demonstrates that demographic concentration alone cannot predict the likelihood of violence (2003:40). This is evidently because several groups have concentrated side by side for ages without recourse to violence. Yet, group's separate settlement is a factor that influences violence negatively though supported by other factors like security dilemma, group bonding, climate of distrust and fear.

It has been established that in a conflict environment especially in a diverse society, ethno-religious groups tend to protect their boundaries for fear of losing their identity or being invaded by other groups. In other words, segregated neighbourhoods harden groups' positions and reinforce violence. When ethno-religious conflicts are facilitated by primordial factors and violence prevails, fear takes the centre stage. Thus, in Plateau, with the recurrent conflict, perceived threat and fear for sectarian violence increased identity consciousness and formation and consequently led to a shift in settlement in segregated form. Sometimes, partitioning of

territory has been implemented as solution to inter-group conflict as observed in northern Nigeria and even in Plateau State by the colonial government. International conflict is filled with the legacy of partitioning groups. This has unfolded as a complex task and most times the results or outcomes have been negative. Zamindar (2007) examined the long partition between India and Pakistan and argued that partitions alter histories and sustain the conflicts. On the other hand, Chester (2008) gave close attention to continued conflicts in partitioned areas for decades as diverse as the Korean peninsula, South Asia and Ireland. This demonstrates that partition is not the all inclusive solution to ethnic or religious conflict as it appeared from the outset. In other words, segregated settlements have the tendency to structure actors in conflict to keep fighting. It allows violence to permeate every fabric of society. Segregated settlement according to respondents to this study led to increased violence in Plateau State. Divided settlements therefore create and deepen the culture of violence given the heightened division in the area. While explaining how the separate settlement in Plateau State has created violence one respondent likened the situation to apartheid South Africa where blacks lived in a separate settlement from the whites. He pointed out:

> A divided family cannot have peace. This concept of divided settlement can never bring peace. There is no way it can bring peace. Can you remember what happened in South Africa during Apartheid? There was a strong and sharp division between blacks and whites. They lived in separate settlements. There were no go areas for the blacks. It was so strong that Soweto residents dreaded the nights because that is when the opposing party attacked them. It hindered development in Black territory. It turned their territory into slums because there was no government presence in those areas. All they knew was violence. There were certain schools for the whites and some for the blacks. This is the picture we now have in Jos and you cannot say this creates peace rather what it creates is violence (Field interview, 2014).

Once neighbourhoods are separated on ethnic or religious grounds as result of conflict, militarization of such areas is usually the option to protect ethnic and religious identity, life and property.

Riyom LGA is rural in nature and common to rural areas is a family settlement where people live close to their farms. However, the prevailing conflict in Riyom is between ethnic Berom farmers and ethnic Fulani pastoralists. Both groups because of the nature of their professions had lived together in same neighbourhoods but the conflict in Jos and other parts of the Plateau had an

egregious influence on Berom/Fulani relations in Riyom. Thereafter, the Fulani went further afield and separated from the Berom farmers. While the Jos conflict was waning the Riyom scenario was increasing in intensity. When they lived together in same neighbourhoods they lived peacefully despite the differences and the constant encroachment of Fulani cattle into Berom farms. One respondent captured the pre-conflict relationship between the Berom and Fulani this way:

> …. When we lived together, we were just like one people. They come to us at any time of the day and we do same to them. There were no differences manifesting in our interactions. There was nothing like you are Berom this one is Fulani. The only difference was that they are cattle rearers and we are farmers. But with the killings especially the one of 24 December, 2010 they stopped coming to our houses. The only place we meet was in the farms (Field interview, 2014).

In the December attack a particular woman named Rifkatu Benjamin Shom of Lwa village was shot dead. The following month, on 21 January, 2011 on a Sunday, another person was killed by name Manu Bachen on a fresh attack on Lwa village. According to the Berom of Riyom, Fulani began to attack the Berom and the villages in Riyom shortly after the 2001 crisis in Jos. According to a respondent of Berom extraction "the peak of the killing of Berom by the Fulani was in 2003". The respondent added that:

> In Bachit District in August 2003, the Fulani came grazing into farmlands in Kyeng village and destroyed the farm produce. The youths went and chased them away but before you know it the Fulani attacked that village that same night with gunshots everywhere. They killed several people and burnt several houses. Afterwards there was dialogue and this area experienced what looked like peace from 2004 to 2010 and it came up again (Field interview, 2014).

On the other hand, the Fulani contended that the Berom usually strike the first attack against them and what comes from them is an act of protecting the Fulani population in Riyom from ethnic cleansing and being denied their constitutional right of citizenship. The point to underscore is that there is an increasing mutual violence between the Berom and the Fulani in Riyom. The violence is fostered by the increasing shift in settlement in the area along ethno-religious lines. The level of violence between 2009 and 2013 in Riyom is unprecedented. As a matter of fact Shonong village and some others in Riyom were totally deserted by the indigenous Berom at the time of this study.

Given the level of violence, Riyom was one of the Local Government Areas in Plateau State that State of Emergency was placed on by then President Goodluck Jonathan in December 2011 which lasted till June 2012.

Furthermore, Barkin-Ladi LGA and Barkin-Ladi Town in particular has been split into two- the Christian and Muslim neighbourhoods. Barkin-Ladi is one of the Local Government Areas affected by the 2011 State of Emergency. This followed the increasing violence which began in rural settlements of Barkin-Ladi LGA since 2002 but reached its peak in November 23, 2011 when Barkin-Ladi town (Gwol) was hit by massive violence. Majority of the violence in the outskirts of Jos have involved the Fulani herders and the Berom farmers. One of such violent days was May 30, 2002, when at least 10 people died in one of such clashes between Fulani herdsmen and local people in parts of Plateau State including Barkin-Ladi (Bello, 2013). Again June 20, 2002 recorded another dimension few metres away from Barkin-Ladi town at Kassa village where at least 30 people were killed in clashes between farmers and herders. Most of this violence was mobilized using ethnicity or religion since 2001 rather than on herder/farmer relationship. This is inspite of the fact that common wisdom interprets the violence from the lenses that it is sparked often by grazing/farming land. Popular discourse and existing empirical data tend to attribute most action in violence to offenders rather than the social structures of the community settings (Sampson and Wikstrȍm, 2008). The insight of this thinking is that both the Christians and Muslims have lived together for a long time in Barkin-Ladi without experiencing continued violence. Thus, the pattern of social interaction in these areas has embedded violence within the practices of the parties involved. The implication of this is that the pattern of residential settlement which evolved as a result of the conflicts has concentrated violence in specific areas because of the presence of targets' concentration along ethnic and religious lines. This practice of concentrated violence has become a norm in the sense that it has become a daily occurrence and experience of the inhabitants of different neighbourhoods that emerged in the various local councils.

Scholars of America's race riots of the 1960s in Newark, Detroit and Los Angeles (Bergesen, 1982) and products of early Chicago School in attempts to understand community disorganisation and violence (Shaw and McKay, 1942) have attributed community disorganisation to many factors including ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability. The idea of ethnic heterogeneity as a disorganizing factor is flawed. This is because in Riyom, Barkin-Ladi, Jos North and Jos

South there are heterogeneous neighbourhoods that have remained intact without violence since the crisis in Plateau North turned massively violent in 2001. However, the movement of people to concentrate in a particular neighbourhood along ethno-religious lines has disorganized the community. In the view of respondents, this peters from the fact that residents desire to live in safe environments which is free of predatory violence. To this fact, as a result of the increasing violence in Barkin-Ladi, people have continued to move to different neighbourhoods like Kashan Gwol, Gura Kworos, Sabon Layi, Angwan Kwano, Angwan Sarki, and several others along ethno-religious lines. Narrating the division in settlement and the deepening violence, a respondent contended that:

> After the conflict in Jos in 2001, tension mounted very high here and sooner the explosion happened. As a result, Christians who lived in Angwan Kwano, Angwan Sarki and those who lived in mainstream Katako. As well as Sabon Layi relocated to Kashan Gwol, Gura Kworos, and the outer part of Katako. While the Hausa Muslims within Kashan Gwol, Gura Kworos, outer Katako and Christian part of Sabon Layi all relocated to Angwan Kwano, Angwan Sarki, Muslim part of Sabon Layi or the inner part of Katako. It may interest you to know that Sabon Layi is divided into the Christian part and the Muslim part. What separated these two neighbourhoods is just a tarred road. But despite this separation by a road, there is a heavy tension in that place till now even though this place is highly militarized (Field interview, 2014).

Inhabitants of the separate neighbourhoods have continued to construct meaning into why the other group is moving. This tends to reinforce violence. This was manifest in Jol, a village bordering Bakin-Ladi and Riyom LGAs on Thursday, October 2, 2014 where over twenty (20) people were killed. Such arrangement has offered irresistible opportunities to those who are not naturally bloodthirsty and abhor direct involvement in violence (Kalyvas, 2006). Christians and Muslims hardly have anything together. Along Onoja Road in Barkin-Ladi stood a gigantic Baptist Church for many decades few meters away from an Ansar Udeen Mosque and another few meters away from Saint Marks Anglican Church and in the heart of Barkin-Ladi Town but the constant attack of the Baptist Church led to its relocation in 2011 to the Christian part of Onoja Road. Before 2001 in Barkin-Ladi, Christians and Muslims celebrated Christmas and Sallah together, had football teams together, inter-married but the constant violence has not just divided them, it has created hatred and subjected them to a culture of violence as anyone crossing another's neighbourhood is a likely victim for attack. When violence persisted, Christians and

Muslims sold their housing properties in neighbourhoods they are considered minority and at some occasion they exchanged houses with one another. A respondent presented it this way:

> We celebrated Christmas and Sallah together. You may also find it interesting to know that some people that are Christians and Muslims also exchanged buildings. That is, if you reside in a Christian area and you are a Muslim. What they did was to identify a Christian who is residing in a Muslim area and exchanged the house. Now depending on the quality of the houses, if yours was higher in terms of quality, you are balanced in monetary terms (Field interview, 2014).

It can be deduced from the above how violent attitudes are facilitated by the mutual agreement by both parties to stay apart. It is evident therefore that as the conflict increases the segregation deepens and the deepening exclusive pattern of residential settlement enshrines violence as part of the culture of those areas. The violent culture was emphasised by another respondent this way:

> For instance, the clash in Jol last week has raised tensions and so, if you are a Christian now, you don't go into Muslim areas and a Muslim does not go to Christian areas. The implication of going to either side is that the person may not come out alive. There are silent killings going on here and there. The worst part of it is that sometimes the soldiers don't get to know when these things happen until the shady deals are perfectly executed (Field interview, 2014).

The point to underscore is that emergence of separate settlement patterns or exclusive ethno-religious communities are accompanied by violent clashes in or between communities.

This trend has also ravaged parts of Jos metropolis. In 2001, the casualty figure in both Jos South and Jos North rose to over a thousand in six days. Subsequently, the killing spree continued aided by exclusive neighbourhoods. One respondent in Jos South had reiterated that the exclusive settlement provides the opportunity for either revenge of previous attack or launch a new attack when you are suspecting you are likely to be attacked. After the 1994 clash in Jos North, both Muslims and Christians still lived in same neighbourhoods. However, from 2001, the incessant secret killings occurring in Barkin-Ladi, Jos North and South, and Riyom deepened the level of segregation between Muslims and Christians as well as between ethnic groups of Plateau extraction and Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups residing in most parts of Plateau North. The more the tensions results to clash the more the settlement changes to a segregationist pattern. This

occurs in areas where the two groups live close by. These areas are no go areas for either members of the opposing groups at certain periods. Discussing the shift and the level of violence in Jos South a respondent pointed out that:

> Today as we speak, neighbourhoods like Du, Zawan, Gyel are exclusively Christians, while Gero road, Sabon Layi, Mallam Idi, Filn ball are exclusively Muslims. Where we are now is Angwan Doki and it is divided into two. While Kasali Street is for Muslims, Rwang Pam Street and Vom Christian Hospital Annex are Christians hundred percent. You see that junction there? It is called Gaza Street, separating the Muslims neighbourhood of Kasali which has been nicknamed Palestine from the Christian neighbourhoods (Vom Annex and Rwang Pam) all in Angwan Doki. You can see the relics of the crisis for yourself (Field interview, 2014).

Violent culture has compelled people to keep moving from place to place. Some areas have been completely deserted. For instance, one whole street separating Kasali Street and Rwang Pam Street is completely deserted at the time of field study. In Jos North, while Angwan Rimi, Angwan Rogo, Yan Shanu, Rikkos, Gangare, Yan Taya, Filn Ball and Dilimi are exclusively Muslim, places like Apata, Tudun Wada, Angwan Rukuba, Utan, Alheri, Tina and Jenta are completely Christian. New areas have also emerged and as a result of the unending violence people are moving to these new areas like New Abuja, Utan GRA, ECWA Staff and Gamjiko. These are said to be the fastest growing places in Jos North.

Some respondents had contended that the segregated settlement has created a culture of peace. For them, since the separation in residential settlement a level of peace has been ascertained. That is, when you live in a homogenous settlement defined either by religion or ethnicity, your security is guaranteed unlike when they lived in the midst of the other group as minorities. A respondent noted:

> For me, the separate settlement has created a culture of peace. This is because, in Jos South here since we began to live apart for some years now, there appears to be relative peace. Although, we have road blocks here and there which is not too good but we have relative peace now. My house is just meters away from a place we now call “Gaza Street" and was almost burnt in 2011 by the Muslims but my youth role saved it because Christian youths from Du, Zawan and Gyel intervened (Field interview, 2014).

This corroborates the view in some aspects of the literature that homogenous settlement or group territorial concentration along ethnic or religious lines reduces tension and creates a culture of peace (Kaufmann, 1996; Chester, 2008; Weidmann, 2009; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013). One other respondent contends that separation in settlement neither creates a culture of peace nor violence but a defence culture. He claims that it has made the Plateau societies more defence conscious. The contention is that the fear of dying led people to seek an alternative by relocating to other areas and stand to defend such areas at any time. The idea of fear and defence however suggest that there will be constant arms acquisition and usage. Thus, violence becomes an order in such society. The respondent noted:

> Well for me, it has created a defence culture. It is a defensive culture because the people believe that by virtue of them relocating they are safe. So it is a safety measure and an attitude towards defending yourself and territory. It is a defensive mechanism but it does not create peace because if in the real sense of peace we are supposed to live together. If we are living together how will one be afraid and talk about a separate settlement? But for both groups they felt they have found peace living apart. But why talk about peace when we live apart (Field interview, 2014).

Viewing this from the lenses of defence reinforces the ethno-religious security dilemma argument which sustains fear and the culture of violence. Thus, segregated settlement has a greater tendency to mobilise for violence and under development rather than for peace. During one of the FGD sessions, some discussants had contended that it leads to peace others differed and argued that it leads to circles of violence. One discussant considered the implication of the separation in settlement for peace and development and pointed out:

> I think I want to differ from the view that it has brought peace. If you look at the environment, there is need for expansion and by that we are talking about positive development. In the past, you could go to any area of your choice and acquire land provided you have the resources. You may want a large land for investment or for residency but the division has inhibited that. It is no longer obtainable. This is dangerous for peace and development. It will interest you to know that today in this town the Muslims occupy the southern area while the Christians occupy the northern area and with this kind of arrangement investment and development are

> hindered. People can hardly expand; you remain stagnant (FGD session, 2014).

The above discussant added that:

> At another level, since that area (the area occupied by Christians) is important to the Muslims and the area occupied by Muslims is also important to Christians it becomes a constant factor to fight for. In this way, it is creating violence. So when an area is overcrowded the people must remain like that and with that attitude slums will emerge and poverty lifestyle becomes the order. In fact the very pattern of segregated settlements is in itself an act of violence because we have denied people access to where they want to live in their own country. So divided settlements is a pattern of conflict. You know who lives where and it becomes very easy to attack any group when you chose to do so. You can even monitor their moves and annihilate them as a group. So it is dangerous because that same group could also be a threat to you by doing the same thing to you (FGD session, 2014).

Given the above position, groups' settlement dynamic or territorial concentration provides the motivation for incessant violence. In the above sense, settlement dynamic is not in itself an essential factor for conflict or violence a priori; it can have a huge conflict and violence potential. This becomes possible when other forceful actors and factors reinforce violence. This corroborates Gebrewold (2009:154) discussion on Sudan that long time separation of groups keeps violent acts between them alive. By implication, the persistent conflict and the increasing shifting settlement in Plateau State has created a culture of violence. This is because there is a connection between a culture of violence and distrust as well as between separate living and intensive violence. For instance, one respondent expressed the confidence that living together will teach their children culture of tolerance. He argued that by mixed living residents will learn about other people's opinion and even appreciate it. On the other hand, secluded environment hinders interaction and successive generations grow up to view the other territory as enemy territory or hold any other narrative handed over to them by the secluded environment. Such narrative will be accepted to be right even where it is wrong. The respondent added that:

> When there is no interaction between you and your neighbour you don't get to know each other as a result suspicion sets in, then fear, then distrust and because you don't trust one another, you people prepare for defence in case of any attack. By preparing you acquire weapons and any weapon acquired will be used one day. So you can see how long the process of entrenching violence takes. So most times when there is a physical separation there is also a mutual separation. As a result when you restrict yourself to your

> own environment from primary to university education, when you leave the university by the nature of today's world you cannot afford to confine yourself to same environment of seclusion. You will need to interact but because you have conditioned yourself not to be tolerant it becomes an express cause to violence. Because your environment has trained/conditioned you to only hear what you love to hear whether right or wrong and not what should be heard or done (Field Interview, 2014).

One recurring idea in the view of the respondents to a culture of violence in Plateau State is the mechanisms through which violence is applied on the society. In a study of the 2001 Jos crisis victims, Ozoilo et al (2013) examined the records of patients treated in the Jos University Teaching Hospital (JUTH) and identified the mechanisms used to inflict injury on the victims. The study indicated that victims of gunshots numbered 203; 161 victims were injured with machete/knife cuts; arrow impalements had 14 victims, clubs/sticks were 44 and those burnt by flames were 7 victims. After, 2001, small and sophisticated weapons have increased as different groups organised to acquire weapons for offence and defence. As a result, the intensity of the 2008, 2010, and 2011 cases were brutal, highly militarized, and consequently extreme violence. During one of the FGD sessions an issue was raised that in a meeting in Jos North a group with people from all works of life had gathered to discuss how to acquire weapons for subsequent conflicts. In a video presented to support this claim, members of that group had claimed they had done a close examination of the other group's armory and discovered that they could also afford such weapons and even have better ones. The issues were equally raised in that gathering to study how to besiege the territory of the opposing group else they will push further, annihilate them and occupy more lands. The implication of these patterns of relationship is increasing images of division and such strain continues to deepen the culture of violence in Plateau State.

The level of violence in Plateau State between 2008 and 2011 was massive till the imposition of state of emergency in December 2011. After then President Jonathan imposed the state of emergency, the situation improved during the first half of 2012. But then after it was lifted in June, the study of Taft and Haken (2015), as well as data from Nigeria Watch database suggest that violence increased considerably especially in Riyom and Barkin Ladi LGAs. One of such violent occasions occurred when gunmen attacked several villages on numerous occasions. In July 2012, violence reportedly killed over 100 people during a series of attacks, including the one in Dogo Na Hauwa during a funeral in which two prominent politicians (Senator Gyang Dangtong who represented Plateau North Senatorial District and Hon. Gyang Fulani who

represented Barkin-Ladi State Constituency in Plateau State House of Assembly) were killed (Taft and Haken, 2015:66). Later in 2012, two pubs in Heipang were reportedly attacked, killing several people. It is important to point out that members of Hausa and Fulani communities were sent out of Heipang in 2001. Beside one of the pubs attacked stood a Mosque before 2001 but it was brought down and its users expelled from that community. This has continued to breed violence because those who left still feel they are attached to that area, hence they keep fighting back.

The connection, therefore, of conflict, settlement dynamic and the culture of violence is that recurrent ethno-religious conflict and shifting settlement in Plateau State has created a culture of violence. Importantly, this connection distinguishes violence both as an outcome and as a process. Linking the violent conflict cases in Plateau North since 1994 establishes the ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics as both cause and effect. The conventional narrative is that victimhood and guilt are mutually exclusive categories; hence victims cannot be guilty (Binford, 1996). This study, however, contends that in a recurrent conflict environment and an environment of a segregated human settlement along ethnic and religious lines, violence becomes an order in such society where both victims and perpetrators are guilty. Kalyvas (2006:21) argued that "observation that political violence tends to be produced by very small group of people has led to the conjecture that most people remain uninvolved; they are unaware public at best and passive spectators at worst". The implication of this is that only instances of violence are taken into consideration and not with the complexities. Thus, recurrent ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics in Plateau State has enabled us to consider both the instances and complexities of violence. Sttlement dynamic is, therefore, the factor linking different episodes of the violence. Hence, violence is both an outcome and a process. This understanding is the result when the culture of violence is approached as a dynamic process. This allows a critical investigation of the chain of decisions and experiences that overlap to create violence.

4.2.5 Settlement Dynamics and the Atmosphere of Fear

From 1994, when violence gained prominence in Plateau State to 2001 when it took on a renewed ferocity with a dramatic and unflinching increase in the loss of lives and properties, fear has driven a passage in that society from passivity to feeling and action. Residents' perpetual fear of death and losing property has compelled them to move towards exclusive neighbourhood in

search of security. The pervasive nature of the insecurity of life and property is what Agbola (1997) called the architecture of fear. Of course, fear is the immediate response of people to acts of violence. Yet, fear is one of the cardinal weapons of violence. Scholars have been preoccupied with an engagement to understand how fear is shaping our space of action and its interaction with violence (Agbola, 1997; Rotker, 2002; Barber, 2003; Robin, 2004; Svendson, 2008; Evrigenis, 2008; Muggah, 2012). High level insecurity in Plateau State, therefore, has driven residents to buy safety by sacrificing freedom. This is manifested in the emergent settlement and the emergence of "no go areas" in Plateau North. By implication, fear begets fear and fear has become inimical to both the freedom and security of citizens in Plateau State. In fact, social scientists now claim that today's society can be described as having a "culture of fear" (Svendson, 2008).

In the midst of excessive violence and a culture of fear, increasing shift in settlement becomes a viable option as a coping mechanism to guarantee one's security. However, the shift in Plateau State increasingly reinforces the atmosphere of fear which broadens the degree of violence. The emergence of "no go areas" or "safe and unsafe neighbourhoods" was facilitated by the shift towards exclusive neighbourhoods. Fear of 'enemies' have been the basis for separate settlement and collective action in Plateau State. "Human beings form and sharpen their identities as much as by positive means as by reference to how they differ from others" (Evrigenis, 2008:xi). Exclusive neighbourhoods among other things have become a way of forming and sharpening identity in Plateau State and most times, the fear of the threat that such neighbourhoods posed have been the safety of others. That is, the fear that one may get killed while visiting the neighbourhood of other groups has been the security or the reason why many are alive. Saint Augustine in his famous *City of God* (1467) translated by Bettenson in (1972) had painted a similar scenario where fear kept a group together and its absence was a source of insecurity. Augustine had cited Scipio Nasica who opposed the destruction of Carthage, Rome's imperial rival at the time, and resisted Marcus Porcius Cato's proposal for its demolition in the Roman Senate. Citing Sallust who celebrated and immortalized Scipio Nasica's opposition to the destruction of Carthage, Augustine pointed out:

> …He was afraid of security, as being a danger to weak characters; he looked on the citizens as wards, and fear as a kind of suitable guardian, giving the protection they needed. And his policy was justified; the event proved him right. The abolition of Carthage certainly removed a fearful threat to the State of Rome; and the

> extinction of that threat was immediately followed by disasters arising from prosperity. To begin with, harmony was broken and destroyed by savage and bloody insurrections; then followed a succession of disastrous quarrels and all the slaughter of the civil wars, all the torrents of bloodshed, all the greed and monstrous seething cruelty of proscriptions and expropriations, so that the Romans, who in a period of high moral standards stood in fear of their enemies, suffered a harsher fate from their fellow-citizens when those standards collapsed…(Augustine, 1972:42).

The destruction of Carthage had increased the level of inequality, reinforcing fear and leading to a separation between the *plebs* and the *patres* and to other disputes in the city of Rome. The view of Sallust as observed by Augustine is that fear restrains wickedness and was responsible for the period of calm in Rome (Augustine, 1972:68). Contrary to Augustine's view, fear, though brought about by excessive violence, has been responsible for the separation in neighbourhoods and for deepening violence rather than peace in Plateau State.

In the sociological study of Giddens (1991), postmodernism was described as a 'risk culture'. This does not imply that contemporary human society faces more danger than what it was previously rather they have a different and greater awareness of these dangers. In conflict ridden Plateau State, segregated settlement has reinforced the risk culture. A basic feature of the society is that no one is out of danger. As a result, people fear that they may be affected depending on where they live. Given that ethnicity and religion have divided the Plateau societies, negative association has evolved from inter-group relations in the area. Fear is one factor that brings about negative association. Hence, ethnicity and religion have set the tone in the emerging settlement in Plateau State and as a result, "no go areas" have emerged for Christian and Muslim groups in the State. Narrating how safe and unsafe neighbourhoods emerged, a respondent noted that "the 2001 conflict was on the basis of religion. Since that crisis if you are a non Muslim and you go to a Muslim territory at a time when the conflict is reoccurring you will certainly be attacked". The same applies to a Muslim visiting a neighbourhood that is Christian. The "no go area" notion did not just emerge on the scene; it took some processes. It started with people who are running for safety. While running for safety people entered into territories considered being the opposing group's domain and they got killed. This was alleged to have happened severally. There are cases of both divides being killed because they were not of same faith with those they ran towards their territory. That is how it started and then degenerated into safe and unsafe neighbourhoods for the

Christian and Muslim groups. So people of both divides began to say "they killed one of us today in that territory" with that revenge and counter revenge set in.

The point made above is that killings of different magnitudes and proportions in diverse exclusive neighbourhoods set the motion for people being afraid of certain areas and considering them safe zones. Thus, fear, borne out of ethno-religious hatreds and suspicion has continued to organise extremists for violence through the segregated neighbourhoods. Secret killings were said to be the order of the day and this ignited the atmosphere of fear. This implies that fear of sectarian violence in a society characterised by ethno-religious residential segregation is in itself the source of violence. This fear has even conditioned how the people in Plateau North dress. Several respondents on both divides indicated that they have changed the way they dress because when you appear in a certain dress code people conclude you are either Muslim or Christian. For most residents of Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi, and Riyom the first level of fear is when people conclude that a victim is of a particular ethnic group and religion. One respondent noted that "what fears me most is not just that I am a Muslim visiting a Christian neighbourhood but my worst fear is that people think and conclude you are a Muslim especially when you wear long dresses with a cap" (Field interview, 2014). At such events where people are secretly or openly attacked and killed in another ethno-religious neighbourhood and there is a survivor of such attacks who escapes, the incidents are digested and built into narratives which form the building block for another set of violence. This is because when people are killed, survivors move and as they move they narrate their experiences to their kits and kins and as a result people now dread certain areas and possibly prepare for either revenge or a different attack. This was a common feature of the Catholic-Protestant segregation and violence in Northern Ireland (Lyaght and Basten, 2003) and the Christian-Muslim or Southern-Northern segregation and violence in Kano (Albert, 1996).

While sectarian violence has shaped spatial practices in Plateau State, spatialised fear has become a coping strategy to the level of violence. Fearing that unscrupulous groups would attack them at intervals, strong networks have evolved and historically insulated themselves from indiscriminate violence across space and time. Sixteenth century England was ravaged by series of violent events and the English society feared extremely being converted to Catholicism. In 1547, 10 year old Edward VI, son of Henry VIII and Jane Seymour, took the throne. Before his death in 1553, Edward signed a will leaving the throne to Lady Jane Grey out of fear that his sister Mary would

convert England back to Catholicism. Lady Jane Grey ruled for nine days, for alongside Dudley, she was soon arrested because Mary Tudor later gained support since she was the rightful heir to the throne upon Edward's death. Mary Tudor, who was later named “Bloody” Mary thus took the throne in 1553 and ruled until 1558. She was highly Catholic. In 1554, what Edward feared happened as Mary Tudor converted England back to Catholicism and burnt hundreds of Protestants at the stake, thus earning her the nickname "Bloody" Mary. She married Philip II of Spain. However, as a result of her illness from ovarian cancer, she was forced to recognize her Protestant sister Elizabeth as the heir (European History, Not Dated). Burning the Protestant community was probably a strategy to eliminate Protestanism and halt its spread. Mary herself like her brother Edward may have feared the return of Protestanism as such she was unwilling to recognize her sister as the heir to throne. At that level of violence, Protestants will seek other means to protect themselves from future violence. The point to underscore is that fear necessitates self help.

Thus, from Rome’s fear of Carthage to the Catholic/Protestant fear of sectarian violence in England and Northern Ireland, up to America’s Black/White racial segregation and violence, fears have integrated homogenous groups but disintegrated heterogeneous groups in a diverse society. The safe and unsafe neighbourhood phenomenon in Plateau State has provided an essential background to explain how fear integrates homogenous groups and disintegrate a heterogeneous one while deepening residential segregation and reinforcing violence. It is usually claimed that fear undermines rationality (Stevendson, 2008). Thus, fear effectively rubs conscience of all reason and makes violence prevail. During my field study in Plateau State, it was observed and reiterated by respondents that in Barkin-Ladi, Christians are scared of going to Gashish District for fear of being killed whether you visit during the day or night. The Christian Berom believe that Gashish District has become where the Muslim Fulani have insulated themselves and from where violence is initiated against other neighbourhoods within Barkin-Ladi and Riyom LGAs. Yet the Fulani in other Districts of Barkin-Ladi like in Heipang Foron and Fan have been attacked and chased out of those areas. So just like the Christian Berom fear Gashish, the Muslim Fulani fear Heipang, Foron and Fan. In Riyom the Fulani are now mostly domiciled in Bachit District. In Jos South Du, Gyel and Zawan have all sent out Muslim groups from those areas and such areas have become a dreaded area for them. Two different respondents of Christian faith noted that in Jos North the main Dutse Uku road linking to Gada Bako, to Jos Terminus market is a “no go area for Christians especially at odd hours because the consequence is usually death. So people do

not pass there because they are afraid of what will happen if they do. This fear was necessitated by several killings both openly and secretly. One of the respondents pointed out "as at now, a Christian cannot pass comfortably in a Muslim dominated area likewise a Muslim cannot pass comfortably in Christian dominated area especially at odd hours of the day" (Field interview, 2014).

However, such places that are now exclusively inhabited more than ever experience a high violence than areas that the two groups live together. One respondent observed that in the heat of the crisis each group would have to protect themselves and under the notion that the best form of defence is to attack. Most of these killings were engineered by fear of being attacked. Another respondent contended that due to fear both Christian and Muslim groups have one pattern of killing victims who enter each other's territory during conflict. He noted that "the Christian territories were not just killing for killing sake. They will first of all observe and know if that person is on a noble mission and if that is the case then nobody will do anything to you but if not, then you are in for it". On the other hand, "for the Muslims, once you are identified as a Christian the next line of action is to kill the person" (Field interview, 2014). Yet, several Muslims were killed in Christian territories immediately they were identified as Muslims. Nevertheless, during the first week of October, 2014, gun men had attacked a village in Riyom and particularly the family home of Late Senator Gyang Dantong, destroyed his father's house and burnt the cars there. The gun men were said to think that Dangtong's father was in the house. Fortunately for the old man, he had gone for medical check-up in Jos and incidentally did not come back. So when they attacked around 2am they destroyed the house completely. That incident left the entire Riyom and Barkin-Ladi axis in fear.

One point is clear from the atmosphere of fear discussed above. Fear has shaped the geographical space in relation to violence. Geography has featured as locations or as co-ordinates for violent attacks. The point to underscore is that geography in built form that is meant to serve as succor has become a source of fear rather than security. Fear and the striving for security create an increasingly vicious circle. This is what I have identified above as the sources of security dilemma. The implication of a climate of fear in a residentiatially segregated society is high level distrust. One observer formulated that "within the horizon of fear and risk there is not simply either good or evil, but rather individuals who are more or less risky" (Cited in Stevendson, 2008:94). The implication of this trend for Plateau societies is that every neighbourhood generates

fear and represents a great risk for both Muslims and Christians. This is because distrust is a recurring characteristic in the climate of fear and this produces a generation of a society that is prone to more violence. The Plateau cases have drawn our attention to how fear permeates people's perception of social space. That is, the way in which residential space is now conceived and tagged with the attributes of violence and security or safety and danger.

Boal (1982) in his studies on space and violence identified four main functions of residential space in a climate of fear and violence: defence, preservation of one's own culture, avoidance of contact with 'other' community and providing a base for attack on the opposition group. After the 2001 crisis, in Jos North, the Igbo around Masalacin Juma'a always close their shops on Fridays whenever Jumat prayer time is approaching. This was a behavioural response to the earlier crisis in which they lost lives and property. Fear of its recurrence led them to stay away during prayer hours with the view that life is worth more than property. Then the same feeling aroused among the Muslims who said, if the Igbo are closing their shops and going away, knowing fully well what the properties meant to the Igbo, yet they leave them and go, it suggests the likelihood that the Igbo man may likely come to attack the Muslims in prayer. This scenario led Muslim leaders to come together and reported to the authorities, that is the police. The Nigerian Police had called a joint meeting especially between the Muslim youth team and the Igbo youth team. One respondent noted that "rumour spread around that if you (a Muslim) don't live immediately after Friday prayer the Igbo will attack" (Field interview, 2014). Incidentally, the Igbo do business in Massalacin Juma'a but no single Igbo live in that territory. So while they can trust the Hausa Muslims who live in that territory with their property they cannot do same with their lives. This reinforces the mental attribute of danger and safety in residential space.

The movement of people from mixed neighbourhoods to exclusive neighbourhoods in Plateau State, therefore, is induced by fear of sectarian violence. This is compounded by the high level distrust. As demonstrated earlier, trust gives rise to more trust while distrust gives rise to more distrust. This could be explained partly because a climate of distrust separates people from situations where they learn how to effectively negotiate complex social relationships. It is a common practice among humans to fear the unknown more than they do the known. This implies that those we don't know may not be after all dangerous as we think. Once you interact closely with the unknown you relax your fears and begin to get along. I have established above that people fear neighbourhoods and its occupants in Plateau State based on ethnicity and religion as a

result the groups avoid what they fear. Stevendson (2008:98) contended that "fear prevents precisely that which could cause it to diminish: human contact". Stevendson's submission is remarkably evident in areas like Dadin Kowa, Bukuru, Low-Cost Housing Estate, Anglo Jos, and Kufang where Christian and Muslim contact has prevailed over fear and kept the level of violence at its minimal level. A visit to Dadin Kowa and Bukuru Low-Cost suggest that what limits the level of fear in those neighbourhoods is trust between Christians and Muslims. Respondents expressed a happy feeling of security and how neighbours watch each others' back. The implication is that fear and distrust are self-perpetuating.

Consequently, fear in a society with segregated settlement undermines social relations and particularly inter-group interaction. The atmosphere of fear then is a climate where distrust and violence prevails and residential neighbourhoods highly fragmented. The climate of fear and violence had several implications for many individuals on both sides (Muslims and Christians) as many people who had houses of their own are now renting houses in areas they feel safe or where their religious group members are domesticated. Some of those houses were either burnt or the people forced to leave the areas. Incidentally, despite the fact the conflict is subsiding in Jos North and South in particular, the people are afraid to go back to their houses because they feel it is not safe to do so. Narrating his experience on this a respondent noted:

> I can now see people (Hausa or Muslims) going to Eto-baba… the tensions of the conflict and several inhuman happenings of that period generated no go areas. But both communities realised the effects and today it is changing. There was a case of understanding, the youths of Eto-baba had to protect all the Hausa boys who were transporting them or within their territory and bringing them to their safe zones. They don't want anybody to touch them. And the same thing happened even in the Hausa community (Field interview, 2014).

Separate settlement in Plateau State was therefore seen by many people as a security strategy amidst insecurity. Despite the above claim that the situation is changing, most people are still carrying the nightmares of what they saw from both sides and they will hardly want to go back to those areas they consider slaughter houses. The atmosphere of fear and the separate settlements have also affected religious proselytisation. This is not really that proselytisation was inhibited by rules but it was restricted within the neighbourhoods of each religious group. This is unlike in the proselytizers in Tilly's (2005) engagement with Lyons where the barbes did not preach publicly,

for justified fear of persecution by authorities of the land, in Plateau State, religious proselytisation is inhibited due to pogroms that is prevailing over the segregated neighbourhoods.

Furthermore, respondents pointed out that they regulate their daily movements to avoid coming into danger zones and parents even impose the 'no go areas' in the minds of their children. Thus, interactants impose geographical boundaries on themselves. However, despite the sharp division and the fear existing in Plateau State, people in the both sides of the divide have detailed information of each other. Their names, their addresses, what they do and how they do it. In as much as this has its own security implication, that is, providing the details of how and when to unleash violence on whom they want; it could be utilised as a building block in re-familiarizing the communities and achieving trust and peace. The point to underscore is that trust could be re-established in Plateau despite the current climate of fear and violence underscored by segregated neighbourhoods.

4.3 Settlement Dynamics and Group Mobilisation for Conflicts

4.3.1 Group Identity, Place Attachment and Mobilisation for Conflict

Scholarly preoccupations with settlement dynamics and conflict have contended that ethno-religious groups' attachment to places or territories generate conflicts (Toft, 2003). What is not clear in the literature is how and the extent to which settlement dynamics provide the bases for the groups to mobilise their population for conflict and how segregated neighbourhoods enables them legitimate their claims. Forced relocation or compulsion to move as a result of violent conflict represents a major disruption in the life of a group. Most times, this has a negative consequence as the people forced to move find a new front to bargain for power relations especially in a society with high level exclusion. The new settlement becomes part of and shapes the peoples' identity as well as provides the basis for negotiating that identity.

Group identity is built on a common language, religion, ancestry and way of life (Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 1986). Smith added that another observable feature of group identity is its attachment to a homeland or geographical location. Geographical attachment here does not have to necessarily be on the basis of who settled first rather represented by group's collective history. Geography has provided the opportunity for groups to construct a common identity. In Plateau State, the emerging settlement has distinguished the several ethnic groupings in the State into Christian and Muslim settlements. Such group identity constructed by separate settlement dynamic has

continued to reinforce the violence in the State. This follows the argument raised by Horowitz that group identification plays a role in mass violence during conflicts. The fact that ethno-religious groups in Plateau State since the emergence of violent relationships in 2001 tend to cluster in space has also raised questions on how the clustered space has provided the groups security as well as an opportunity to mobilise for future conflicts.

Settlement dynamics, therefore, constructs and shapes identities as well as imagined futures. For ethno-religious groupings, settlement dynamics have contradictory capacity to affirm violence against an opposing group as a resource for keeping the neighbourhood and at the same time it also affirms friendship and solidarity for the group inhabiting it. It is within the framework of friendship and solidarity that groups mobilise themselves for conflict against a supposed opposition. The point to underscore is that the movement and inhabiting of a separate settlement by ethno-religious groups in Plateau State is not just explaining the constructions of identities around those neighbourhoods, but it provides an alternative representation for bonding different individuals together in residential spaces. "Although violent ethnic or ethno-religious conflict often look like highly unorganized and spontaneous outbursts of popular anger; but in reality they always involve a certain degree of planning, organisational effort and strategic deliberation" (Vermeersch, 2011:1). This is possible because when people congregate together along ethnic and religious lines especially as a result of conflict like we have it in Plateau State, it is easy to have an agreement to fight a common enemy. They agree on who to fight, when to fight and how to fight and therefore go ahead to mobilise to buy arms for the execution of that struggle.

Historically, several groups have hinged their survival to a place. Thus, place attachment provides succour and serves as mark of group identity. In the Baltic region, the Serbs, the Croats, Slavs and Bosnians identified themselves originally with different territories and this was later to become a strong tool for fighting for the survival of the above groups. In Plateau State, the relationships between the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom Christians and Hausa and Fulani Muslims and between activities in the area emphasize that from its formation, settlement dynamics were produced through negotiating connections that stretched beyond the State. The groups locate the formation of their respective settlements as part of their identities. Movements of population as a result of conflict to an exclusive neighbourhood, the new neighbourhood is seen by various populations that moved as a vital resource to their continued existence. Efforts are then made through various means to organise. The salient corollary of this deep-seated survival concern is that these groups

tend to see settlement dynamics in terms of obtaining, maintaining, developing, measuring and mobilising resources for defence or attack (Toft, 2003:20). This was a common occurrence in Plateau State as ethnicity and religion were used within the ethno-religious settlements to organise groups for conflict.

With a common religion, common language, and a common territory it becomes easy to appeal to sentiments. Experience of respondents revealed that reports go round that Muslims are been attacked by Christians at specific neighbourhoods, the intention at such occasion is to appeal to sentiments to re-enact the raging fury. At that point religion and territory provided the platform for appealing to the emotions of the concerned group. Such occasions are followed by the alarm "anfara" (it has started) and the trouble emanates from there. A respondent during one FGD session blamed the recurrent conflict in Plateau State partly on the segregated settlement. As an elder in his community he explained how separate settlement has provided the platform for mobilisation and for subsequent attacks. He contended:

> ...I think it is one major reason why the crisis has continued. It truly provides the congregants the opportunity to mobilise easily for violence against another group. Mostly, what is used as an excuse is security of the occupied area. Arms have been acquired on both sides of the divide and in the name of religion people are easily mobilised. So mobilisation is easy. Just tell the youths that they should defend their territory and most times the fear that you will be attacked has led to one group initiating the attack with the view that if they don't they will be attacked. We know the boundaries and any time something happens whether by a group or an individual we just attribute it to one particular group probably because we want to attack them (Field interview, 2014).

The above position corroborates Toft's (2003) position that separate settlement facilitates collective action. The speaker exemplified how geography affects group mobilisation mechanisms for conflict. The first mechanism is that separate settlement dynamic which emerged as a result of violent conflict drives the quest to safe guard the new territory against invaders. This drives the concentrated neighbourhoods to acquire arms and pursue their collective cause. The second is on the grounds of religion. As these neighbourhoods are emerging Churches and Mosques are emerging with them. Several of the emerging neighbourhoods in the four local governments studied are constructed with either a church or a mosque. While the Jos Central Mosque is still situated around Massalacin Juma'a probably because it is coordinating Muslim neighbourhoods like Delimi, Yan Taya and Sarki Street; Christian Cathedrals are being relocated probably as a

result of constant attacks. In Barkin-Ladi town, between 2001 and 2012, Churches and Mosques have moved from their previous locations and new ones have emerged. This is significant in two ways. One, it foregrounds the group identity of the inhabitants of the emerging neighbourhoods. This is because as one respondent observed "the neighbourhoods build Mosques or Churches or halls within them and as a result these structures keep them together. They then establish networks as other sister settlements both in that town or other local governments and even states and beyond the country" (Field interview, 2014). To this effect, church, mosque or neighbourhood hall becomes a symbol of identity for the members of a separate settlement. Two, it provides and determines the interaction opportunities of different individuals. Since the exclusive neighbourhoods have structured the identities of its inhabitants around churches or mosques, it organizes them for action or inaction. In times of violent conflict, these structures become the sources of mobilisation for conflict.

The establishment of worship centre within the new neighbourhoods enables us to understand why respondents view religion as the stronger force and mechanism for mobilising for conflict. Majority of my respondents take cues on group matters from ethnic and religious leaders but particularly from the religious heads. As a result, they alleged that the decision to attack the other group is taken in churches and mosques. Apart from living within the same neighbourhood and the neighbourhood meetings where the issues of neighbourhood security is discussed as exemplified in the respondents comments earlier cited, worship centre provides frequent interaction of individuals. A single religion bonds its adherents in trust, common knowledge and becomes the basis of a frequent interaction. Wherever frequent interaction is made possible mobilisation becomes easily spread among the population through that singular identity in a way that collective action is most likely. This is because spatial proximity of individuals with a singular identity has a higher mobilisation tendency (Weidmann, 2009a:26).

Separate settlement defined by religion was used as a tool of mobilisation in the ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State since 2001. Allegations were made that the November 28, 2008 violence in Jos started after midnight meetings at an Ali Kazaure mosque. In a white paper made available after the inquiries by the commission set up by the Plateau State Government (2009) claims were made to the effect that youths held nocturnal meetings in Ali Kazaure street and thereafter the violence started. A witness had told the commission that "as early as between 0230 – 0330hrs…information filtered to the Police that some Muslim youths were holding nocturnal

meetings at Muslim dominated areas and soon thereafter there were reports of people shouting "Allahu-Akbar" along Ali Kazaure Street and other Muslim dominated areas in Jos North" (Government White Paper, 2009). Some respondents of the Islamic faith argued that most times decisions to attack Muslims are taken in the COCIN Church. One point is clear in these allegations- individual behaviour has a strong social element. This implies that the decisions of an individual are strongly persuaded by social peers. This perspective is not new. Social scientists have constantly raised the argument that individual behaviour critically depends on social networks. It is for this that Zuckerman (2005:xvi) explained that "individuals are especially likely to follow those persons from whom they take other cues, those on whom they depend, whom they trust, with whom they regularly interact, and whom they perceive as like themselves". The argument here is that separate settlement has provided the proximity and religion has shaped and affected inter-personal decisions in Plateau State.

Literature of social movements is filled with instances of collective unrest (Zuckerman, 2005; Tilly, 2005; Larsen, Urry and Axhausen, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). However, the Plateau State case has provided us the opportunity to understand how separate settlement mobilizes people who share a certain grievance for conflicts. Within a segregated residential space interpersonal networks are facilitated by religion or ethnicity or both to enhance the flow of information. Such information can be about intended actions or planned activities. FGD sessions with both Christian and Muslim groups revealed that youth activities within the segregated neighbourhoods have become stronger since 2001. During one of the FGD sessions a youth leader noted that regular youth meetings are held in neighbourhoods and as the future of that neighbourhood their utmost agenda is the security of their territory. Hence information is passed round at any crucial moment to alert people within the neighbourhoods and extend same to others who belong to different neighbourhood but of same faith. The youth leader added that:

> Once conflict erupts you have to mobilise your foot soldiers and these foot soldiers must be trusted people of your group and that is done within the neighbourhood. The mobilisation is according to your religious group, your cultural enclave and all that. I am a Christian of Plateau State origin and I live in an area that I have people of different cultural backgrounds except the Hausa Muslim people whom I consider the most common enemy, so when I mobilize people, I mobilise those that can think alike. When we mobilise, we don't think of bringing in a Hausa man because these are issues of security and they might use what you tell them against you. What we try to do is to pursue our interest by

gathering people who believe in the same cause (Field interview, 2014).

While modern communication technology has reduced the stress of spreading information and makes it a lot easier, a common group identity provided by religion and exclusive settlement have aided the bonding of groups and given them the cause to fight for. Common sense suggests that barriers of geographic distance are broken by modern gadgets, yet the opportunities made available by a separate neighbourhood has facilitated successful mobilisation for conflict. However, since most of the violence that have taken place in Plateau State appear to be spontaneous, the question then becomes how they are able to organise since some of them could be out of "their neighbourhoods" at the time of reoccurrence. Another youth member of the Islamic faith contended that they are always ready to defend their territory. He noted "I am Jassawa and these neighbourhoods are tied to our identity, so to allow people attack us in there means one day we will be no more, we then do everything possible to defend it". The view is that group members are now conscious and willing to defend their territories. For them to be constantly mobilised requires just a mere signal to indicate something has started. For the Muslims, once they see irate youths shouting "*ba za mu yarda ba*" (meaning- we will not accept) or chanting Christian songs with harsh voices, they know all is not well and wherever you are you need to take cover. On the other hand, the Christians claim that "most times, in neighbourhoods like Yan Shanu and Gangare what you hear is the shout of Allah, Allah, Allahu Akbar. Once we hear this we know there is a problem" (Field interview, 2014). Thus, attention of a prepared "army" is indicated by chanting one song of solidarity, revenge and attack or the other.

Furthermore, the debate of "motivation and opportunity" is constant in explaining why large scale violence erupts. The political and economic explanation to why large scale violence arises is prevalent in the literature (Gurr, 1970; Horowitz, 1985; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The argument has been that collective grievances are the underlying causes of large scale violence. The motivation paradigm is framed around material incentives. In the Plateau State case, the question will be if systemic economic exclusion alone explains the lingering conflict in Plateau State or has the lingering conflict provided a viable strategy for the fighting group in Plateau State to achieve material benefits (opportunity explanation). This is important in explaining the Plateau conflicts and has received a wide attention (Best, 2006; 2007; Best and Hoomlong, 2011; Gambo, 2013). The "motivation versus opportunity" debate in terms of neighbourhood also exists. Neighbourhood or territory as motivation or opportunity is a veritable explanation to how

settlement dynamic affects inter-group violence. It has been shown above that separate settlement affects the endemic inter-group violence in Plateau State through the mechanism of religion and/or ethnicity. The motivation argument holds that neighbourhood leads to conflict because groups fight for a territory they perceive to be theirs. This is why Toft (2003) contended that territory has a (perceived or real) value for groups and as a result it is the very reason why people fight. In terms of opportunity, settlement dynamic influences group communication and coordination for conflict. That is, "territory" as argued by Weidmann "sets the stage for violence to become a feasible strategy if spatial group distribution facilitates collective organisation of conflict" (2009b:527). Given the opportunity mechanism, single group identity defined by religion- Christianity or Islam and place attachment or exclusive settlement becomes the rallying point and indicates that there is a close interaction between settlement dynamic and group capability for conflict. This is because separate settlement facilitates the interaction of group members.

In sequence to the above, another mechanism of mobilisation is coordinated information sharing. Information sharing is a lot easier when there is a close proximity. The more distant the group members the less likely for mobilisation to take place without members of the opposing group getting to know the plans on ground. Respondents contended that modern technology is faster way to pass information yet separate settlement has provided them the opportunity for details. It is already pointed out how the worship centres provide the avenue for information dissemination. A respondent noted:

> I remember how a group gathered in one of the worship centres and deliberated on how to attack the other group. They passed information to their members to come for an urgent 'prayer to save the town" but alas it was a call to action. What they did is to incite the youth and allowed them to unleash terror on unsuspecting victims (field interview, 2014).

The youths who are assumed to be the foot soldiers for both Christians and Muslims co-opt other youths within the neighbourhoods by disseminating the information they had been given. They preach the agenda to others by telling them how that neighbourhood is under the threat of members of the other faith. In every conflict, the degree of mobilisation depends on the nature of the conflict. Conflicts could be value or interest based. But the case in Plateau is both value and interest based. This is because it involves the distribution of positions and the disagreement on the frame of reference. According to Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000:653) "conflicts about values

go to the heart of a community". Individuals identify with the values of their groups or community and once such values are at stake, individuals then perceive it as a threat; as a result, they indicate their readiness to be mobilised. As such, they are committed to investing time and resources towards the actualization of their group goals. Thus, in the case of Plateau State the values at stake are religion, ethnicity as well as the neighbourhood accommodating different ethno-religious groups- Christians and Muslims. Jonathan Fox had examined how religious institutions facilitate group mobilisation. He argued that "when grievances over religious discrimination are high, religious institutions appear to facilitate mobilization for protest. The presence of religious institutions also tends to promote mobilization for rebellion when political discrimination and grievances of autonomy are at high levels" (Cited in Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000:657). Mobilisation of a group therefore is simply dependent on how group leaders or certain individuals are able to construct meaning around identity and neighbourhood and thereafter send out the crowd.

In a community where everyday sermon by spiritual heads indicate division and suggests premises of inciting the followers to action, violence is most certain to happen. A cleric noted during an FGD session, "we simply preach peace and ask the people to embrace peace yet we know and tell them at the same time that the intent of the other group is to wipe our religion away and they must never allow that to happen" (Field interview, 2014). This is a pattern of mobilisation since the group members now feel that their identity and religion is threatened. This is what Hannah Arendt called the Banality of Evil (1963). Using that phrase, Arendt explained how and why some of the greatest evils in human history including the holocaust, clan cleansing in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda were perpetrated not by extremists or sociopaths but by ordinary and normal people who accept the dictums, mantras and premises of their group leaders and thus eagerly participate in such activities and seeing nothing wrong with their actions. This explains the situation in Plateau State where ethno-religious identity and exclusive neighbourhood have become tools for mobilisation and as a result, mobilisation has been achieved in worship centres. This has led to a culture of denial. Within such scenario as argued by an observer:

> …the culture of denial, a decidedly global phenomenon plays a decisive role in our lives. Denial involves seeking to ignore or refusing to believe an unpleasant reality, deriving in fact from a desire to pretend that all is well. Denial expresses itself on a continuum that runs from simply refuting fact to rationalizing, to

> intellectualizing, to generalizing, to blaming, to passivity, and finally to outright hostility… (Agbaje, 2010:66).

While ethno-religious group identity and group attachment to certain settlements have aided their mobilisation in worship centres and community meetings, the groups involved have constantly denied any form of organised violence. As a result, they ignore the pains and cries of others to organised violence. In one community meeting held in an exclusive neighbourhood in Jos North, an ethnic leader had asked members of his community to desist from running away from the other group; rather they should stand to fight it all out. In that gathering they had claimed to have detailed information of the other group's armoury, thus, group members were charged to sacrifice and build a collective armoury for the area. The leader admonished the people saying "so in as much as we wait for the authorities to intervene and provide us with security, we must get ourselves prepared and ready to strike back whenever they show up again…, face them with anything you think is your means of self defence, use it and fight them back". This form of speech has several implications. It presumes that the other party is an enemy that must be totally annihilated. Meaning is therefore constructed into self-defence and the need to protect your territory and group identity. Once mobilised in this manner, it is difficult to hinder the banality of evil. Members of different ethnic and religious groups in Plateau State (Afizere, Anaguta, Berom, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, South-South, Christians and Muslims) believe strongly that the violence in the area is a design that is been gradually implemented against them yet each group denies that they have orchestrated any against any group but it has been done against them. One discussant noted that:

> If you take close look at this crisis, you will see that the activities are well planned and perfectly been implemented. The violence is well organised; the bullet wounds of victims are strategic. So people must have been trained for this…. Another reason why I know is organised is this: if you watch carefully, from Shagari Corner to the area behind St. Augustine Seminary, Katako area up to Osumenyi Street, behind Fatima Catholic Cathedral even to Inland hotel; these areas are gradually vacating every Christian. So this is a deliberate and well organised plan that is been implemented for over a decade now… (FGD, 2014).

It was for the above reason that groups sought collective preparation and collective execution to save their identity and neighbourhoods. In every self-help environment, collective mobilisation and the unleashing of violence take pre-eminence. This is driven by the perception that the government is not giving adequate attention to the security of the different population and as a

result, the groups had to improvise. Relevant literature has documented the components and circles of collective mobilisation (Tilly, 1978, 2003, 2005). Mobilisation for violence in Plateau State therefore has manifested through different mechanism and patterns.

In addition, another means of disseminating information and mobilising for conflict in separate settlements is the formation of vigilante groups based on faith. In several neighbourhoods of the LGAs studied, different vigilantes based on faith exist to provide their territories with security. In Barkin-Ladi and Riyom, this was a constant discussion among the members of Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee (PCRC) comprising people of Christian and Islamic faith as well as security operatives. Christian and Muslim vigilante groups were once harmonized early in 2014 but it broke apart quickly when fresh rounds of attacks occurred. Such vigilante groups called "*Yan Banga*" are meant to secure the neighbourhoods. They are mostly armed and they do the service of providing security to the members of their faith and sometimes act as foot soldiers. One point to underscore is that separate settlement is a salient factor in reinforcing violence. The insight here is that separate settlement along ethno-religious lines is both an "opportunity" and a "motivation" for violence since it provides the opportunity for mobilisation and motivation for attack. A plethora of literature on models of collective behaviour (Tilly, 1978; Granovetter, 1978; Kuran, 1991) details how mobilisation for group conflict begins from a few extremist and several others get to join either voluntarily or compelled to pursue group interest. Toft (2003) and Weidmann (2009a) have differentiated how settlement dynamic provides the opportunity and the motivation for conflict. Because each group feels they are entitled to where they live, thus it becomes the drive to defend it. One respondent pointed out "shelter is fundamental to our existence and the primary thing is to find where to lay one's head". Affirming that most times the mobilisation come from a few extremists the respondent added "these issues most times are created by a few people and then they look for a way to impose it on the larger community or neighbourhood" (Field interview, 2014). Central to this position is how individual ideology or views is constructed to mean a group ideology.

Once the factors that nourish the conflict are allowed to continue, the circle of the conflict will continue to revolve around these factors. From the above engagement, separate living is one of these factors. This is because it provides for easy mobilisation.

4.3.2 Emerging Settlements and Group Capabilities for Conflict in Plateau State

Settlement dynamics are critical to the well being of its occupants. Toft (2003:2) has argued that it "binds the capability and legitimacy of an ethnic group's mobilisation" for conflict. Toft viewed actor capability as the ability or capacity to organise. Capability here refers to the capacity to wage or organise successful violent conflicts. In this sense, exclusive settlement enables groups to legitimize their struggle and gives them the capacity to defend and attack the opposition group. Discussions with respondents corroborates Toft's proposition. These separate settlements have formed the identities of the groups and have kept different groups together in a geographical space from where different networks for violent attacks are established. A respondent had raised the connection between settlement dynamics and group capability:

> These neighbourhoods…keep them together. They then establish networks as other sister settlements both in this town or other local government and even states and beyond this country. Such networks established, make arms accessible, finance available, interest maintained and secret kept. This segregationist pattern of settlement has provided high capabilities for violent conflicts. Sometimes people on both sides receive personnel from outside and these neighbourhoods helped them to plan for it, smuggle the people in and keep them till the mission is accomplished. Yet the other group will know nothing about it. They will only see themselves attacked and killed (Field interview, 2014).

Every group needs its members' cooperation, support and participation in collective actions during violent conflicts. The above position of a respondent adumbrates the fact that the support and participation of group members in conflict as well as generating material resources for executing the fight are best articulated around separate settlement. Scholars of asymmetric conflict have argued that exclusive settlement of groups have better political, economic and social networks that they can use to successfully start and sustain fighting (Toft, 2003; Weidmann, 2009a, 2009b). This is because spatial proximity has proved advantageous for mobilising the population for conflict and establishing different levels of networks that will serve the purpose of servicing and keeping the neighbourhood. While this has been applied at the national level in terms of fight against the sovereign state, it is not different in symmetric conflicts where groups have constantly sought to protect their ethnic and religious identity by protecting their residential settlement. Geographic concentration of a group has fostered the coordination of a group's activities and perfected the implementation of group's plans. Kohn's (2008) study of segregated Catholic/Protestant neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland has shown that social space has a way of structuring the interaction of individuals for a collective action. In this sense, group grievance can

be easily structured within an exclusive neighbourhood and link with other members elsewhere who share the same grievance and thereafter launch attack on those they consider enemies or aggressors. This has been the case where different groups in Plateau State have combined forces to fight using the advantage provided by the separate settlement.

This has created different conflict networks and the groups have established their exclusive neighbourhoods as a base for negotiating attacks as in a conventional war. The point to underscore is that group geographic concentration whether at international, regional, national or local level, provides such groups the capability to fight another group considered as the enemy group. This has been a constant experience in Plateau State. For instance, in Barkin-Ladi, the shift in settlement has encouraged and provided a link for people of Foron and Fan to come together and send/chase out a particular people (the Fulani) in those areas. A respondent pointed out that it has happened where people in these two communities (Foron and Fan) have come together to fight the Fulani. It is interesting to note that both communities are very large districts in Barkin-Ladi LGA and they are exclusively Christian with no single Muslim. Foron and Fan Districts have a boundary which becomes the linking point of the two communities. This is not peculiar to Barkin-Ladi it has occurred in Jos North and Jos South where people from Delimi, Yan Taya have linked with Muslim community in Yan Shanu to fight the Christian community in Jos Jarawa; while those from Zawan and Du have aligned with the Christian community in Angwan Doki (Rwang Pam) to fight the Muslim community in Angwan Doki (Kasali) respectively.

Lichbach (1995 cited in Weidmann, 2009a) demonstrated that geographic proximity is an important factor that facilitates and fosters the coordination of groups for conflict. Conflict facilitating effect of exclusive settlement has been attributed to three salient factors by Lichbach. One, he contended that spatial proximity of individuals facilitates constant interaction and leads to the formation of "cognitive proximity" within the group. According to Weidmann, this "cognitive proximity" is important since it fosters the establishment of collective action among a group's population. Two, group's exclusive residential pattern aids to coordinate collective action by reducing organisational cost. Three, it helps the group to monitor the activities of the group's population. These three factors have made separate settlement a formidable force for violent conflicts. This is because it has allowed people of same believe or interest to interact closely and easily and most times react to issues within their environment. In Plateau State, what we have from such experience is revenge and since every group has lost something as well as people,

when different group's try to revenge it becomes chaotic. This is the experience in the four local government areas.

The argument here is that separate settlement has provided the conflict actors the capability to fight in Plateau State. The reference therefore has been on economic, 'military', social, political and cultural capabilities. This follows the trend of strong networks that abound in those neighbourhoods. For this reason, the issue of mercenaries is common. Toft (2003:23) contended that urban residents have the highest capabilities for conflict. This is because they have access to money and media as well as dense networks (especially economic ones). Mixed neighbourhoods in urban centres may not have such capabilities as do the separate neighbourhoods given the fact that separate settlement does not only facilitate the mobilisation of more fighting men in times of conflict, it also gives access to resources and the possibility of acquiring the services of mercenaries. Ross' (2005) study of Touba Senegal presents a glaringly and vivid picture of how exclusive settlement could link larger networks and provide the capability for conflict. Ross revealed how Touba's urban space is determined by African, Islamic and global religious forces. He affirmed that rather than colonial and post-colonial administrations, it is the Islamic brotherhoods that have controlled the planning and development of Touba. The author contended that occasional conflicts between members of different brotherhoods led to divisions of urban social and physical space and, in some cases, entirely new neighbourhoods. It is important to point out that Touba, is not only independent of the control of the national government, the city is also aligned to a larger network of Muslim towns throughout Senegal and the international circles. This form of interaction could have grave effects on a country's national security as separate settlement provided by religion links different individuals of like mind together.

This raises the issue of how foreign fighters are engaged in smaller conflicts like the Plateau State case. Foreign fighters' engagement has characterised the history of wars but became a frequent feature of the Muslim world since the 1980s (Hegghammer, 2010). Reports emerged after the 2001 Jos conflict that mobs who were suspected to be civilian mercenaries appeared on army uniform and killed several people on Wednesday September, 12 around the Dilimi area (Human Right Watch, 2001:18-19). The "fake soldiers" theory was a constant allegation on both sides who claimed that foreign elements were brought in to unleash violence on unsuspecting citizens. The fighters were said to be majorly from Niger Republic and Chad because of religious affinity. The phenomenon of foreign fighters is applied here to represent mobilised fighters from outside

Plateau State and Nigeria. Long-distance foreign fighter mobilisation was a rare phenomenon until the 1980s. This is inspite of the clash of civilization thesis (Huntington, 1996) which can be traced beyond the encounter between Muslim merchants and Europeans at the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean in the 16th and 17th centuries to the Christian crusades of the 12th and 13th centuries (McNeil, 1967). This is also inspite of modern Islamism which rose highly in the 19th century when Islamist groups have used violence since the 1940s and armed conflicts existed between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the 20th century (Hegghammer, 2010; Comolli, 2015). In the case of Plateau State, the mechanism aiding the prevalence of foreign fighters which adds to the capability of groups in armed conflict is the separate settlement. Attention was drawn to this regard when a discussant contended that:

> Muslims in northern Plateau State constantly link with Muslims outside here to provide them with security and also to serve as fighters during attack. Sometimes they need the support of people from other places to achieve their goals and likewise the Christians too. Both sides have strong networks provided by exclusive neighbourhoods. You bring your contacts in and keep them without anybody knowing about it except you. That is why people can come from other places and move into a neighbourhood and kill people and go free because they have been provided all logistics including escape routes (FGD, 2014).

In Jos North as well as in the other three local government areas, there have been allegations and counter allegations of mercenaries fighting for both Muslims and Christians. Best (2007) reiterated that before the 2001 crisis several people of Niger Republic origin had found their way to Jos and this raised tension among the residents of the city. Few respondents had argued that over 60 percent of the residents of Rikkos (an exclusive Muslim neighbourhood) are of Niger Republic origin. This has significant implications. One of such is that, like Touba, there will be a constant link between that neighbourhood and other networks beyond the country. This implies that groups will fight at any length given the kinds of networks available to them to protect their neighbourhoods. As earlier stated, groups feel they have a legitimate cause to protect their neighbourhood as it has provided them the base for attack and defence. It will be recalled that on March 7, 2010, Dogo Na Hauwa, an exclusively Christian neighbourhood was attacked with several people killed. At another occasion, Muslims were attacked during Eid Prayers with a bomb on August 29, 2011. The perpetrators of both attacks were successful given the opportunity provided by separate living. Opportunity in this sense means that while geography has aided the mobilisation of single group which lives within it, it has also helped them to maintain secrecy of

attacks targeted against an opposition group. What really initiates group capability and legitimacy for violence is the meaning constructed around separate settlement. Such meanings as "our territory", "our space", "our homeland" "we are indigenes" and so on and so forth have continued to reinforce the desire to engage in ethno-religious violence against others. Conflict entrepreneurs play salient roles in these attacks as respondents claim that insiders who benefit from the conflict provide details of people's movements. Thus, separate settlement reinforces strong networks and capabilities for conflict. It makes for easy estimation of a particular population and how violence can be unleashed.

4.3.3 Segregated Settlements as Resistance to Exclusion and Quest for Inclusion in Plateau State

Dominant discourses on Plateau State conflict refer to political exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion, on the side of Muslims; and fears of religious and cultural domination on the side of Plateau Christians (Higazi, 2011:7). While the Hausa and Fulani Muslims claim to be politically excluded on the Plateau; people of Plateau extraction claim that the Hausa and Fulani are lording it over them and excluding them from the scheme of things in the wider northern region. Other scholars have alluded to this exclusion and reiterated that different groups have historically resisted political and economic exclusion in Plateau State (Morrison, 1976; Best, 2007; Krauss, 2011; ICG, 2012). To this effect, resistance to exclusion and quest for inclusion is not a recent phenomenon and not restricted to Plateau societies. Africa's history is imbued by narratives of resistance to domination. The extent to which Africans have resisted foreign rule or domination has been underscored by van Walraven and Abbink (2003) who argued that European settlement or occupation of Africa triggered a violent reaction in several African societies. It has been established earlier that pre-colonial relationship between the Islamic North and the so called pagan Middle Belt was characterised by different forms of domination and resistance. This foregrounds the establishment of Islamic theocracy in Sokoto and Borno which highlighted and earmarked the Middle Belt as peripheries to be exploited. The exploitation and domination of the Middle Belt by the Hausa and Fulani Muslims was further entrenched when British colonialists legitimized the core north's "indigenous imperialist systems" over minority ethnic groups in the Middle Belt where Plateau State belongs (HRW, 2006). Ethnic groups' of Plateau extraction

contends that British colonial administrators had established Hausa and Fulani northern hegemony by empowering them to subjugate Plateau people.

Furthermore, it will be recalled that pre-colonial interaction between the Middle Belt areas and the entire Sokoto Caliphate was that of slavery, raiding for and trading in slaves, expanding the Caliphate and the resistance such acts attracted. Respondents to this study who are of Plateau State origin attribute the raging conflict in Plateau State as a manifestation of Plateau people's resistance to the Hausa and Fulani peoples' desire to Islamize the Plateau since the nineteenth century. They argued that the Hausa and Fulani do not submit themselves to any other authority rather they like to rule themselves and others whom they have come to meet. This perception is built around the narrative that the Hausa and Fulani see themselves as higher beings and their religion exceptional to the point that it is meant to be accepted by all. The orientation of Hausa but especially the Fulani as higher beings was either built or compounded by the British colonialist's intervention in the affairs of what later became Northern Nigeria. This understanding is animated in the British colonialists' attitude to race. In keeping their racism, the British conceived one explanation to the highly stratified nature of the Sokoto Caliphate societies. This view held that "the Caliphate had originally been founded by a supposedly light-skinned and hence more intelligent racial group" (Shenton, 1986:23). The colonialists later identified this light-skinned group as "Fulani". This form of representation faced the problem of distinguishing the ruler and from the ruled in Northern Nigeria. The shocking ways in which the British represented the people of northern Nigeria other than the Fulani and later the Hausa presumed that the organised and intelligent Fulani group was corrupted by their intermingling with the lower black race. According to Shenton, "the British concocted an imagined history for the area in which the light-skinned rulers had been racially debased through interbreeding with their darker subjects" (pg.24) and this interpretation affected inter-group relations in northern Nigeria even in areas the Caliphate could not make inroads. It is against the background of conceived domination that groups tend to resist what they perceive as exclusion from the scheme of things and therefore seek to be included.

The above foregrounds the roles of colonialism and religion in shaping inter-group relations in northern Nigeria and particularly why resistance from both Hausa and Fulani Muslims on the one hand and Afizere, Anaguta and Berom Christians on the other hand to the different levels and

forms of what they consider subjugation in Plateau State. The jihadist activities of Dan Fodio in Northern Nigeria which had dual objective of converting the so called "pagan" tribes to Islam and raiding different communities for slaves had compelled many people to move into the Middle Belt region to stay away from being converted to Islam and being used as slave. It is important to point out that theocratic rule and the dissemination of Islamic rites were used to bind together the people of the northern region of Nigeria except that groups other than the Hausa and Fulani were considered inferior even where they converted to Islam; they occupied inferior positions in the highly stratified social system of the Caliphate. As a matter of fact, an observer contended that British colonial administration institutionalised the inferior status of non-Muslims. These activities generated high level insecurity in the Middle Belt and Plateau State in particular (Comolli, 2015:16, 17). Once in the Middle Belt in Mid nineteenth century the groups together with their likes that they met on ground saw 'their territory' as a unifying factor to resist oppression and exclusion in society. It is on this view that "a study by Uppsala University (Sweden) which examined conflicts that occurred between 1989 and 2003, concluded that when religious demands are at stake, a negotiated settlement between the parties is unlikely" (Comolli, 2015:11). Thus, segregated neighbourhoods in Plateau State today present a perspective where geography has become a factor to resist exclusion and negotiate a sense of belonging to society.

Resistance is sometimes mute and takes place through stealth. Yet, there is a strong connection between resistance and protest which assumes a more explicit form of articulation of grievances in the form of strikes, campaigns of defiance, riots and disorder (van Walraven and Abbink, 2003:8). However, as in the case of conflict and settlement dynamic, resistance presumes to respond to levels of political and economic exclusion through claims to residential spaces. In this sense, certain social and political orders appear to be the links between those resisting and those they appeal to. In line with van Walraven and Abbink's (2003) argument, it is clear that "resistance signifies intentions and concrete actions or positions for a variety of reasons, the most common being the perception of the position, claims or actions taken by others as unjust, illegitimate or intolerable attempts at domination" (pg.8). Sometimes, resistance involves acts of physical violence, at other occasions it does not. What is germane here is that resistance is defined by concrete acts that rise against established norms.

Throughout the history of northern Nigeria segregated neighbourhoods have served different purposes. In other climes in human history, segregated neighbourhoods on the basis of religion, ethnicity or race, have been specifically denoted to contain and manage a certain population. For instance, Train's study of Jewish segregation in Canadian cities revealed that Christian Europe witnessed the emergence of a Jewish segregated neighbourhood in Venice which was erected in 1516 and enforced until 1797. Later, Jews in Eastern Europe were forcibly relegated to the area known as the Pale of Settlement. In 1791, under a decree issued by Empress Catherine of Russia, all Jews residing in the Russian Empire were segregated and forced to live only in the parts of the country known as the Pale of Settlement. The Pale of Settlement consisted of Poland, which had come under Russian rule between 1772 and 1815, and the western part of Russia. Within the Pale of Settlement, Jews lived in *shtetls* (as they were called in Yiddish), or villages that were separate communities and exclusively Jewish (Train, 2006:46).

In northern Nigeria and Plateau State in particular, segregated neighbourhoods are products of various forms of resistance. First it represents a space where a people of common identity were contained and excluded from the mainstream of politics and economy of the region. This position is engrained in the discourses of the different groups in the State who claim that segregation was an all time strategy to exclude them from the political economy of either Jos North or the larger Plateau State. Groups of Plateau extraction who responded to this study claim that segregated neighbourhood is a long term plan by the Hausa to take over Jos. In this regard, they argued that the concentration in the heart of Jos and the continued influx of their kin from other northern States led to their scheming for the creation of Jos North LGA. On the other hand, the Hausa and Fulani claimed that segregating them and unleashing violence against them was a careful strategy by the Christian groups and the government in Plateau to scare them away and deny them access to the political economy of the State. Thus, both groups view segregated neighbourhoods as strategy to exclude them. Second, segregated neighbourhoods have also served the purpose of organising each group and therefore viewed as a place of the groups' self government. This is because the segregated neighbourhoods have further positioned each group's claim to space and contentions of belonging to the Plateau society. During my field work in Plateau State in 2014, I observed, at a high degree, this sense of self government in Hausa Muslim neighbourhoods in Jos North. The then Plateau State Governor, Jonah Jang had after the 2011 elections precisely in 2012 banned the operation of commercial motorcycle riders in Jos metropolitan centre and replaced

them with tricycle. However, as at December 2014, commercial motorcycle operators popularly known in the city as "*Going"*, where still operating in Hausa Muslim neighbourhoods of Angwan Rogo, Yan Shanu, Gangare, Rikkos and Yan Taya. Two different respondents from those neighbourhoods had noted that as far as the Hausa communities in Jos north are concerned, there is no government as the people are their own police, and make their own hospitals and schools. Another respondent had noted "we belong to Jos, the Native Town is our own territory, our ancestors lived in it, they were recognised in it, it is our home" (Field interview, Jos North, Yan Taya, 5/10/ 2014). While the segregated neighbourhoods have provided security to its inhabitants, it has also served as a factor for contesting different levels of exclusion; therefore, the different actors to the conflict are using segregated neighbourhoods to seek inclusion to the mainstream social, political and economic activities in Plateau State.

It has been established earlier that segregated neighbourhoods have bonded different groups for conflict but have failed to bridge peace among the population resident on the Plateau. It is necessary to point out that this has become possible given the extent to which the groups have used the segregated neighbourhoods to resist and protest horizontal inequalities. The Jasawa and other individuals of Hausa extraction in Newspaper paid advertorials insist that Hausa Muslim neighbourhoods in Jos North belong to them. These neighbourhoods said to be within the Native Town under colonial rule include Abba Na Shehu, Garba Daho, Ibrahim Katsina, Sarki Arab, Gangare and Ali Kazaure. One of these advertorials claim that the Hausa Muslim group were later maneuvered and excluded from traditional leadership and politics of Jos city by the Berom (Daily Trust Newspaper, January 30, 2009:38). This contention is a strategy applied by the Hausa to be included in the scheme of things and to share in the political economy of the area. It is evident from the yearnings of different groups within the segregated residential spaces that these spaces have risen as forms of resistance where marginalized groups struggle with state structures and other groups in society to claim new spaces (Teelucksingh, 2006). Struggles over residential spaces, therefore, represent both the desire of indigeneity forces to deny membership and inclusion to segregated settlers with opposing religious and cultural view, as well as the quest on the part of the opposing groups for inclusion and safety within Plateau society.

There has not been any serious attempt from whatever sphere to build structures to bridge peace by earnestly bringing the two groups together. The 1976 proposal of Governor Dan Sulaiman

which sought to address how the notion of indigeneity limits access of Nigerian citizenship was a major blow to the structures of peace. Later actions like the creation of Jos North Local Governemnt and the protests that followed in 1991; the appointment of Aminu Mato as Caretaker Committee Chairman and the violent protest and counter protest in 1994 widened the gap between the groups. Other events that compounded the problem include the appointment of Ado Ibrahim as Education Secretary and the outright rejection in 1996; the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) election primaries and the maneuvering and reverting of Sani Mudi as running mate to the Chairman in 1998. Other issues are the killing of Berom man accused of stealing a garden egg from a dry season farm of a Hausa man in 1998; the full implementation of sharia legal system in twelve northern states and the Christians viewing it as exclusion strategy to Christians in the far north in 2000 and the appointment of Samaila Mohammed as NAPEP Chairman and the subsequent protest and killings of hundreds in 2001. These actions serve to entrench the divisions of neighbourhoods. The claim to neighbourhoods is a rejection of exclusion and desire for inclusion. In this sense, claim to neighbourhoods serve to privatize public spaces, and to reproduce dominant ideologies of exclusion and inclusion that discriminate the undesirable people even in their absence (Teelucksingh, 2006:3).

Segregated neighbourhoods are therefore viewed as exclusionary tool. Exclusion and a lack of sense of belonging frustrate people. The Hausa communities tend to view the actions of the Plateau State government especially under Jonah Jang to have excluded them and their territories from the scheme of mainstream society activities. This view has not taken out violence from Plateau State; rather it has deepened the extent of the mobilisation of groups to seek inclusion most times through violence. In the light of the above, it is evident that the shifts towards exclusive neighbourhoods in Plateau State are concurrently a process whereby people segregate themselves in neighbourhoods for security reasons. It is also an alternative representation of group interests as well as the groups' resistance to the level of exclusion and quest for inclusion. Mobilisations for conflict have become possible in these segregated neighbourhoods given that they are spaces of solidarities and at the same time spaces of antagonisms.

4.4 Settlement Dynamics and Infrastructural Development in Plateau State

4.4.1 Government Neglect of Settlements and Fractured Development in Plateau State

Scholars of peace, crime and development have argued that neglect of a house, neighbourhood, town or city by a relevant authority deepens the level of disorder in the area (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Harcourt, 2001; Muggah, 2012). Their thesis is that unaddressed disorder is a sign that no one cares and therefore invites both further disorders and high level crime. Such argument is reinforced by the increasing ubiquity of violent conflicts and the impoverishing of citizens in Plateau State which has exemplified the emergence of what Robert Muggah (2012) called 'city fragility'. The segregated settlement in Plateau State has given rise to a fragmented development. While one area bubbles with life, the other earnestly begs for attention to be rescued. This is inspite of the increasing population in the exclusive neighbourhoods given the fact that people are constantly moving in search for safety around where their group members are concentrated. Allegations were rife that areas considered indigene neighbourhoods have constantly enjoyed government attention at all levels while those tagged settler neighbourhoods were vehemently discriminated. This found explanation in Higazi's (2011:10) study which contended that state and local governments in Plateau State allocate resources to infrastructure or other development projects to areas where the indigenes are resided. This argument corroborates the position of a Hausa community leader who responded to this study claiming that the Hausa community areas were being neglected by Plateau State Government. The respondent had emphasised:

> If you go round this city you will see things for yourself that the Hausa community areas are being neglected. Our neighbourhoods have become slums because they are abandoned despite the increasing population. There is a culvert in Hausa community area precisely in Bauchi road that has been abandoned. It is the only access route linking that community to other areas. Yet, it took the government over a month to look at that single access route that links that community. It took the sympathetic attention of the Red Cross to come and fill that broken culvert and give life to the people again (Field interview, Jos North, Massalacin Juma'a, 24/10/2015).

The above point is part of the exclusion narrative that has characterised Nigerian and northern Nigerian history and has grave implication for peace and development in Plateau State. In colonial Nigeria, Plateau State continually voted for the opposition political party against the wish of the ruling party of Northern Nigeria (Plotnicov, 1967:38). This continued up to the first, second and third Nigerian Republics when Plateau State against the dominant political parties in Northern Nigeria repeatedly towed the line of opposition. As a result of this trend in the then northern region that was controlled by Hausa and Fulani oligarchs, the leadership of the region had

diverted commercial, industrial, and other developments away from Plateau State. According to Plotnicov (1967:38), "Foreign businesses that sought to establish operations in Jos because of their advantages to their expatriate staff were compelled by the government to settle elsewhere in the Northern Region". This author added that new roads were built and old roads improved elsewhere in the Northern Region, but those leading out from Jos were left untarred or received only minimal upkeep. The 'old hatred' explanatory paradigm situates the indigene/settler relationship in Plateau State and places the above respondent's position in perspective. The historical dimension to the exclusion narrative gives an insight into the origins of neglecting the neighbourhoods of particular populations. However, the diversion of developmental projects from today's Plateau State to other areas in the old Northern Region differs slightly from the total neglect of certain neighbourhoods within the same city or local government area as alluded to by the respondent above.

Nevertheless, restricted development in a diverse society or in urban centre has the tendency to undermine peace. This is because denial of social and economic opportunities tends to reinforce a sense of exclusion and discrimination as predicted by relational theorists. Such sentiments have given rise to not just social and psychological stigmatization and fear but also reinforce violence. In the quotation above, the respondent alluded to the fact that their "neighbourhoods have become slums" which has compounded the conflict trend particularly in Jos. Slum portrays high level poverty and most of the violent conflicts in Plateau State has taking place in poor neighbourhoods with little or no impression made about conflict in highbrow areas. Another respondent contended that "it is the poor that is killing the poor; since this conflict, the GRAs have always been safe despite the mix-up of Muslims and Christians in those areas; probably because they have all amenities that they need and we don't have" (Field interview, Barkin-Ladi, 10/10/14). This perception foregrounds the connection between neighbourhood negligence and escalation of conflict. Since the area occupied by Christians is important to the Muslims and the area occupied by Muslims is also important to Christians and one of such areas is neglected it becomes a constant factor to fight for. In this way, it is creating violence. Given the separation and the abandonment people tend to yearn for the amenities they see in other areas. However, they are denied and the existing "wall" between the groups will not give them access to that enjoyed by others. A respondent had argued that "when an area is overcrowded the people must remain like that and with that attitude slums will emerge and poverty lifestyle becomes the order". For this respondent, "the very pattern of segregated settlements is in itself an act of violence because we

have denied people access to where they want to live in their own country" (FGD, 16/10/2014). To this fact, Samuel (2013:152) argued that "crucial factors quite typical of slums have contributed largely to the entrenchment of frustration among the residents of Jos city". Of course, relational theorists have underscored the interface between frustration and violence. It is on this basis that the Hausa community referred to above contend that for them, there is no government in Plateau State given the level of neglect of their neighbourhoods. Still referring to the broken culvert in Bauchi road, the respondent added that:

> Yet you say there is a government is such places? That area is something else. It is the community people that mobilised to address the issues of blocked drainage. Streets were tarred around other areas but look at the road leading Terminus to Bauchi road, look at the road to the old Massalacin Juma'a in Yan Taya, look at the road in Gangare. The markets located in Hausa areas are in deplorable condition. The few primary health care within our neighbourhoods are abandoned, no infrastructure (not well equipped, no staff, no drugs) and nothing yet we are in the same city centre with people who are enjoying all these amenities (Field interview, Jos North, Massalacin Juma'a, 24/10/2014).

During my field work in Plateau State in 2014, it was observed that several neighbourhoods in the area are in deplorable condition. While it can be said that government neglect of residential settlements spread across both divides of Christian and Muslim neighbourhoods as well as indigene and settler neighbourhoods but the Hausa Muslim areas are worse off. Moving round Rukuba road, Gada Biyu, Kabong, Rayfield, Du, Bukuru, Zawan and Gyel; there is a remarkable difference in terms of road construction from what is seen around Bauchi Road, Gangare, and Yan Taya except for Rikkos which had a newly tarred road. This form of neglect has contributed in creating the social and structural conditions for reinforcing violence and undermining peace and development. The neglect therefore is a form of structural violence and strictly antithetical to peace and development. People in this areas got out of control when they perceived that government neglect was a calculated attempt to weaken their economic strength. Such perception emanated from the closure of certain roads that the government considered "flashpoints" for violence. While closure of major roads for security purposes should be considered a temporary measure before addressing the underlying issues; the road leading to the temporary site of Jos University Teaching Hospital (JUTH) from the Jos Terminus market down to Murtala Mohammed Way was closed since a bomb exploded there. As at December 2014, that road was still closed. Although another bomb explosion had occurred close by as at December 2014. The

implication of the road closure is that businesses around that vicinity were also closed without alternative provision by the government. While the popular view by the Hausa Muslims who occupy that area is that the closure is targeted against them, the consequences of neglect does not fall upon a single group in the state. This is because a number of businesses were affected and majority of the people who could not negotiate for other areas had to leave the state which has greatly affected the economy of Plateau state. Again, the respondent contended that the broken culvert in Bauchi road at its worst state; killed Hausa, Fulani, Berom, Anaguta, Afizere, Igbo, Yoruba, Angas and several others. These deaths resulted from series of accidents.

The above experience draws the correlation between the relational theory, broken window theory and the increasing violence and underdevelopment in Plateau state. The continued neglect of these neighbourhoods has invited criminal elements to feast on the people and constrain them from advancing. Consequently, allegations became rife from other quarters that Plateau State government under Jonah Jang severely abandoned specific neighbourhoods for political reasons. A respondent of Afizere extraction alluded to the way the government had sectionalized the developmental process of the state arguing that only one local government benefits and the LGA is that of the then governor, Jonah Jang. Discriminating and neglecting a section of the population in a state enables violence to flourish while connecting the people through quality projects is the lifeline for peace and development. This raises the question of leadership in entrenching peace and development. A respondent argued:

> I must say that government must move beyond sentiments in spreading developments. Don't put development in one area. This is one problem in Plateau state. We have everything now in Jos South leaving the other sixteen LGAs to be backward. That is dangerous and cannot heal the wounds we are talking about. So leadership must improve the lives of the people to change the course and nature of this crisis in Jos. People right now are crying leadership, leadership, leadership. So what we can do again is to improve leadership and be just to everyone. So if we can have just 40% of good leadership then things will improve rapidly. So leadership is key to conflict management, peace and development (Field interview, Jos North, Jos Jarawa, 21/10/2015).

Peace and development demands that people must have access to basic necessities of life. Practical approaches to peace and development is a mutual responsibility of leaders and followers. However, it behoves on leaders to set the pace for the followers. Such approaches demand direct and constant engagement with both the material conditions of a community's

existence and the relationship of that community to the world around it (Olofu-Adeoye, 2013:178). All attempts at engendering peace in a conflict prone environment like Plateau State must take into account and even try to address all difficulties that accompanied the violence; these difficulties include the separation in residential settlements and the neglect of certain settlements. Jeremy Bentham's utility thesis had proposed maximizing that which we desire and minimizing that which we fear (Stokes, 2006:113). By implication, Bentham argues that in all societies what should matter is how the greatest good ought to be for the highest number of people. It is only in doing this that common good has been pursued which inadvertently engenders peace and development rather than restricting those essential indicators of development to a few people. The respondent above alluded to "healing the wounds", which implies as it is in contemporary discourse that peace and development focuses primarily on the human person. To this effect, Human Development Report (HDR, 1994:iii) considered human development as "development that not only generates economic growth but distributes its benefits equitably; that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it; that empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It is development that gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities and providing for their participation in decisions that affect their lives". This drive towards advancing the richness of human life rather than the richness of the economy articulates the role of quality leadership in guaranteeing common good (Sen, 2000:38). However, selective development among a few populations inhibits human development in its larger sense and undermines peace. Thus, peace and development becomes fragmented and further relapses to violence. This is because as Sen argued, "silence is a powerful enemy of social justice".

Furthermore, it has been adumbrated above that peace and development are mutual responsibilities of leaders and followers; yet, the government should bear the greater burden. Thus, government in Plateau State ought to strive for a balanced development to create a level playing field for all members of Plateau society to work for peace rather than seeking means to violence. It is a constitutional provision that government should encourage co existence or group integration. Discussing this, a respondent pointed out that "the government should encourage national integration but when the government does not do that and put in place policies that disintegrate then it is harmful" (Field interview, Jos North, 24/10/2015). The argument that Jang's administration was "silent" to and neglected certain neighbourhoods, especially that of Hausa and Fulani Muslims in his developmental projects, however, faces two serious objections. First, some of those who consider themselves indigenes of Plateau State especially the Berom contended that

Jang was merely implementing what they tagged the "Jos master plan" which intended to scrap some of the neighbourhoods in the city. Secondly, it seems the idea of neglecting certain neighbourhoods since the emergence of exclusive settlement in Plateau State is not peculiar to the administration of Jonah Jang. While the Hausa and Fulani Muslims have openly and constantly accused Jonah Jang to hate their respective groups, it was equally alleged that Joshua Dariye promised those communities several things but was never followed with action (Higazi, 2011; Krauss, 2011; ICG, 2012). The idea of a "master plan" shows these administrators were clearly interested in the development of Plateau State. The interest was not just on infrastructural development but also on human development and economic growth. But the approach towards implementing the said plan became suspicious when few neighbourhoods experienced a touch of new life while others remained stagnant.

Whatever the reason for neglecting specific neighbourhoods by the government which respondents alluded to, they had a prohibitive effect on the peace and development of Plateau State. While an alternative provision was never made for the increasing population in the area (especially within Hausa Muslim neighbourhoods), the government had expected a successful implementation of the "master plan". Although it was clear the Hausa were not ready to move away from an area they consider "their homeland", government aggressive posture towards alleviating the enormous suffering prevalent within the neighbourhoods made matters worse. This is based on the perception that the Hausa Muslims are too attached to the area and willing to use the areas to negotiate for other juicy areas in the State. A closer look at Plateau environment, there is need for expansion. This implies expanding and building positive development. In the past, as argued by some respondents in Barkin-Ladi, Jos North and Jos South, you could go to any area of your choice and acquire land provided you have the resources. But given the conflicts and the separation in settlement, the indigenous groups started frowning at what they termed 'indiscriminate selling of lands'. During two FGD sessions, some youths of indigenous groups claimed that the lands acquired so far from their fathers were fraudulently done, as a result they tend to move against any attempt to sale land to anybody who does not fit into the description of "their identities" which include religion and ethnicity. In other words, government neglect is reinforced by the activities of the population in their attempts to restrict residential and economic expansion of certain groups. One respondent maintained that:

> You may want a large land for investment or for residency but the division has inhibited that. It is no longer obtainable. This is

> dangerous for peace and development. It will interest you to know that today in this town the Muslims occupy the southern area while the Christians occupy the northern area and with this kind of arrangement investment and development become limited. People can hardly expand; you remain stagnant (FGD, 16/102014).

In the foregoing, several issues have been raised but two are clearly dominant. One, selective development as a result of segregated neighbourhoods greatly challenges infrastructural development and peace. Two, the division and neglect has created two different societies in a city. This is because certain communities claim that for them there is no government in place. These issues have tended in many instances to hinder peace and infrastructural development. Thus, government systematic neglect of certain neighbourhoods as a result of separation in neighbourhood along ethno-religious lines has hindered peace and development. Although, there is no outright policy of government that tend to hinder the spread of peace and development into Muslim areas or non-Berom areas, but it is evident that the separation in neighbourhoods have led to the neglect of certain residential areas leading to fractured peace and development in Plateau State.

At another level, it is important to examine the economies of the move towards exclusive neighbourhoods. Several residential houses in the now exclusive neighbourhoods were abandoned by its owners to flee for safety. Thus, several people, Christians and Muslims as well as people of different ethnicities lost their homes as a result of those movements with several houses still unoccupied. The losses of all kinds cannot be underestimated. However, the role of government and its agencies is to address the issues of the conflict and subsequently return people to their homes. This is yet an unachieved task as far as the Plateau environment is concerned. An important point to underscore is that people have seen themselves being denied access to their legally acquired properties. One respondent of Plateau extraction had lamented how he has been unable to pay up his rent since 2011 in his new location at Angwan Rukuba. This is inspite of the fact that he has a personal property at Angwan Rimi which he can no longer access. He lost his house to the 2008 crisis and lost his business to the 2010 Jos crisis. Incidentally, due to the increasing population in the Hausa Muslim neighbourhoods which has been attributed to influx of foreign nationals from Niger Republic and Chad, some of the burnt houses that have been abandoned by its owners have subsequently being occupied by these new migrants illegally. Although Hausa population in Jos refuted this claim arguing that it is their own abandoned residential homes that have been taken over by the indigenous Christians. In Heipang, Barkin-

Ladi LGA, A Fulani Muslim had shown me a building that was once a mosque but has been turned to a pub. An indigene of Heipang who is of Christian faith confirmed the narrative of the Fulani Muslim and argued that they had long sent out the Muslims so they had no business there. Illegal occupation of residential buildings abandoned during conflict is not totally new to Plateau State. After the 1953 Kano riots, several people of Igbo origin had moved away from the Jos Native Town for fear of their lives only for their houses to be illegally occupied (Bingel, 1978). However, some of the occupiers were later ejected. Again, during the July counter coup of 1966 and the civil disturbances that followed in Northern Nigeria as well as the years of the civil war, several buildings belonging to the people of Igbo origin within the Native Town were destroyed while others were illegally occupied by new immigrants coming into Jos. This remained this way till after the war in 1970 when few of their owners returned (Bingel, 1978:9-16). This was corroborated by a respondent who argued that:

> During the war, several Igbo people fled from Northern Nigeria and Jos in particular, and their houses that were not totally destroyed were illegally occupied until they came back after the war to prove the house belong to them before they got it back. A Hausa family had held to one of such buildings until the Igbo man proved it belonged to him by bringing out a 404 salon car he hid underground (Field interview, Jos North 2014).

This is a perplexing story. One would wonder how it is possible to bury a vehicle just as identification to that very house. This is however beyond ownership of property and its identification. It explains the attachment to that building. It tells the story of the owner, its worth to the fleeing family. It is quite symbolical. This brings to light a similar experience observed by Zamindar (2007) in his study of the long partition between India and Pakistan in 1947. Zamindar presents a picture of the pains of dispossession of one's residential property as a result of the Hindu/Muslim crisis and the subsequent partition to erect a border by separating India and Pakistan into two sovereign states. The Indian/Pakistan case indicates that a scroll on which the history of the family that owns the house is written and how the house itself was built is buried underneath the building. Such scroll is to be placed inside a bottle and buried under the doorway of the house which must be very deep somewhere. Zamindar had contended that "the physical house, the scroll under the threshold, contained a written record for posterity, for recovering a particular history in which he located his very belonging" (2007:122). The sentiment of loss was further put forward by a respondent in Jos who noted that their inheritance from their father (a family house) was totally destroyed during the conflict and worse of it all they can no longer visit

the territory where their father's grave lie. He argued on traditional grounds that he and his family have been disconnected from their ancestors. Majority of the people feel they were technically dispossessed of their personal belongings and forced to face a world without a home, a house and loved ones. One of the respondents pointed out "today we say there is relative peace, but how can we say we have peace when we have lost businesses, lost houses, we have lost properties that we can no longer go into because if you step your feet there you become a dead man" (FGD, Jos North, 2014).

As a matter of fact, empty communities portray a great danger to the state and it is a dangerous precedent for peace and development. In Angwan Doki, Jos South is a street that was totally raised down to ashes and the burnt buildings have been taken over by hoodlums who perpetuate evil from the abandoned areas. The abandoned buildings create psychological impression in the residents of such local governments. The common understanding is that the conflict is not over. Government has not helped matters as all they do is to respond with relief materials at each point of the crisis without systematic intervention to alleviate the plight of the people whose residential homes, businesses, villages, worship centres have been destroyed and yet they have no access to them for refurbishing. A respondent pointed this out when he noted that "people just seat in their offices in Jos and Abuja and draw policies that have no bearing with rural development". He added that "what they do is to release bags of rice to victims as if the issue is that of bags of rice" (Field interview, Jos North, 2014). Yet, people need shelter. In a situation they have access and resources, such destroyed buildings need to be refurbished or build new ones elsewhere. The implication of this is that rice dealers as well as building material dealers might be interested in the continuation of the conflict. For them, the conflict is continuation of business by other means. Thus, there is need for strong state policy that can address and guarantee the security of individuals and communities.

An estate manager who responded to this research pointed out that the divided settlements have affected them in two ways. One, it has reconfigured the types of clients they have. Initially, they had clients for highbrow areas, those who could access not too rosy areas and those who go for slums. But in recent time, clients approach them based on ethnic and religious affiliations. This has limited their incomes as given the neighbourhood divide their inability to access certain neighbourhoods for security reasons. Secondly, the abandoned buildings have limited the availability of residential homes as well as business premises for its consumers who have been

forced to relocate from the local government and at some point the state. This has weakened their economic strength and forced some of the estate managers to relocate.

However, the inability of individuals to return to the houses they abandoned during the conflict and which was subsequently burnt reflects lack of appropriate institution that would carefully ensure that people return to their houses. This has created what Zamindar (2007:124) called "imaginary ownership". Imaginary ownership implies a condition where people own property but have no access or when people illegally occupy a property they don't own just because there is no other alternative for shelter other than occupy such abandoned and neglected buildings. A security agent and a former Local Government Deputy Chairman who responded to this study contended that after the conflict each person has legal right to his/her burnt building. What is expected of such people is to consult the police and get the court to eject such illegal occupants. But this has not been possible given the persistent fear and constant relapse to violence which can be attributed to government neglect. Such neglects contravene the values of the welfare state. Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948 applied to Nigerians and residents of Plateau State. The article stated:

> Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with reorganisation and resources of each state, of economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality (in Johnson, 2000:453).

Nevertheless, the debate whether the state should be a major instrument of social welfare has been controversial, it remains the basis of state-citizen relations. Several residents of Plateau State maintained that they are part and parcel of Plateau State since they are allowed to vote in the State, be counted in the State during National Census, pay Tax in the State and subvention comes to the State based on him/her added among the population of the State then they are entitled to what is received by other members of society. To this effect, government neglect of some of the emerging settlements in Plateau State has frustrated attempts at personal development and engendered social and horizontal inequality in the State.

4.4.2 Driving Peace and Development amidst Changing Human Settlements in Plateau State

Peace is the top priority of every human environment and also the fulcrum of development. However, the structures of violence overwhelm the structures of peace and development in Plateau State. The government is expected to be in the forefront of driving peace and development in any post-conflict environment. Yet, it is the duty of the entire society to play an active role in driving peace and development in any community. This is however a difficult business where the populations have a fragmented view of their community and live in segregated neighbourhoods. However, it became incumbent on government, civil society and researchers to underscore what the issues are and seek ways to build peace and development. One underlying issue in the conflict in Plateau State is access to the political economy. Respondents from all divides of the conflict owned up to the fact that the core issues include unfair distribution of resources, land ownership, land scarcity, access to land and access to political as well as traditional offices, and economic freedom. In other words, cultural, social and economic development, if properly in place is capable of reducing the incentives that drive people to engage in violent activities. One respondent argued that the crisis does not reoccur only when politicians incite people. Rather, sometimes a group or individuals may want to incite trouble and kick start violence because they want to loot (FGD, Jos North, 2014).

The above argument was hinged on the level of poverty that people face in Nigeria. A report of RAND in 2003 indicated that "social and economic development… provides economic alternatives to potential (terrorist) recruits, and it creates new middle class that has a vested interest in maintaining peace" (cited in Kaplan, 2008:10). To this end, it does not suggest that poverty compels individuals and/or groups to join violent activities, rather, different groups in the area of study viewed violent activities as a feasible response to perceived political, economic, social and cultural injustices. This draws attention to my earlier argument that for any society to have positive peace, people must have security in their daily lives. Security in this sense suggests addressing all issues of injustice connected to the conflict. Field evidence, therefore, has revealed that one of the key drivers of violence in Plateau State is group inequality though it is not limited to that; but to have positive peace, conscious efforts are required to measure and address horizontal inequalities.

Conventional approaches by government is to set up committees of inquiry each time a major clash occurs usually with the mandate to investigate the root causes of the crises, identify the perpetrators, and suggest ways to address the issues. Before the setting up of committees of

inquiries, security officials (Military and Police) are deployed to safeguard the areas affected and other areas against mirror and neighbourhood effects, this measure is alongside dusk to dawn curfew. For the people of Plateau North, this has become a culture because military personnel are spread all over the place. As observed during the field work, soldiers and police are stationed within spaces of metres. Alluding to these interventions a respondent pointed out that "government has intervened in all conflicts in Plateau state by way of setting up committees of inquiry and deployment of security personnel beginning with the 1994 crisis, the 2001 crisis, 2004 crisis, 2008 crisis and so on and so forth; we have even had the FG intervene at some point" (Field interview, Jos North, 2014). Each of these committees have come up with reports and indicting some persons as culprits in the violence that engulfed the areas. Yet, the government hardly gets to issue a white paper. At some occasions, government white papers are never implemented as allegations of bias usually trail the constitution of the committees that produced the report that engineered the white paper. For instance, after the 2008 crisis, Plateau State Government and Federal Government of Nigeria had legal battles over constituting a committee of inquiry to investigate the conflict. Some of the actors in the conflict view the government of Plateau State as an actor in the conflict.

In 2004 and 2011, the Federal Government of Nigeria had imposed state of emergency in Plateau State which targeted unearthing the problem and nipping it in the bud. While the 2004 emergency rule was placed on the entire state, that of 2011 was on four local government areas in Plateau North, namely; Barkin-Ladi, Jos South, Jos North and Riyom. Each period of this state of emergency rule has witnessed a decline in violence in the areas but has tripled in an unprecedented manner each time it is lifted. Although different stakeholders and conflict actors had gathered in a forum in Kuru in 2004 with the theme "Plateau Resolves" to discuss what the problems are and address the issues headlong; but the continuation of the crisis a decade later reveals that core drivers of peace are not yet in place.

In driving peace and development, it is imperative to dismantle the structures of violence. To start with, it is pertinent to note that populations in Plateau live with systems that are structurally violent. This is manifest in the manner residents of the northern area are living in fear and are battling despair. There is unprecedented presence of heavily armed military and police men even in the remotest parts of Plateau north. Constant violence, curfews and roadblocks are visible everywhere in Barkin-Ladi, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom. The abandoned buildings and

neighbourhoods are signs of violence. The approach towards addressing the issues is in itself violent. According to a respondent, the state authorities push the view that the fundamental causes of the recurring violence are actions of specific people and/or groups within the state. They claim that such actions led the state to react. However, the 'real' structure of violence is based on the occupation and domination phenomenon. Some of the groups feel their future is uncertain yet no systematic attempt is made to allay such fears. Rather what is obtainable is the application of force to initiate order. This approach has never resolved or transformed a conflict situation (Horowitz, 1985; Holsti, 2002; and Roche, 2003). Although it appears that force is the ready instrument the state can employ yet they cannot force the communities to live together. It cannot also force them to separate. But the state can address the issues that facilitated the occupation and domination drive. One strong feature of the Plateau conflict is that the crisis has become frozen. This is because the tempo is not receding. Thus, the authorities need to address the fundamental issues of inequality and subsequently withdraw the military, dismantle the roadblocks and give attention to all areas of the state.

Nevertheless, while the government has a leading role to play, the population has a demanding task of negotiating communication and resisting every narrative of violence. Narratives of violence play salient roles in facilitating the conflict. Residents of the ethno-religious neighbourhoods that experience frequent violence like Bauchi Road, Jenta Adamu, Gyel, Gero Road, Garshish and Shonong need to take cues from the mixed neighbourhoods in Plateau state. In the mixed neighbourhoods, including Federal Low cost housing, State Low cost housing, Dadin Kowa, Kufang, Anglu Jos, Miango Road Muslims and Christians have lived together with insignificant violence since 2001. A respondent noted that what they have done in these communities is to draw a line against narratives of violence. These are close knit communities that are in constant interaction on how to improve the peace of their neighbourhoods. One neighbourhood leader noted that "the communities refused to accept any form of stereotyping, any form of ethnic or religious hatred and any story that will incite the people of the communities" (interview, 2014). Although, each time the violence erupts in other parts of Plateau north area, tensions build in the mixed neighbourhoods but it has not degenerated to any form of inter-group violence. However, in 2011, during the upheavals in Bukuru and some parts of Jos, Hausa Muslim youths had burnt down a home belonging to an indigenous Christian in Miango Road. But given the philosophy of peace that guides the area, Muslim community elders condemned the act and rebuilt the home immediately. This approach gave confidence to other

members of the community that they have not lost the peace drive. During the 2001 episode of the conflict there were also occasions where both Christians and Muslims hid each other in their houses and ensured they were safe. For instance, a young Hausa man had carried an Igbo man on his motor bike to prevent him from been lynched by angry Hausa mob in Dilimi and moved him to Apata. Such steps should be encouraged in other areas to dismantle every structure of violence and promote the structures of peace and development.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

This study examined and explained the relationships between ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics in Plateau State between 1994 and 2012. This is with a view to showing how conflicts structure and restructure settlements and their implications for inter-group relations; group mobilisation and infrastructural development. Adopting the relational theory put forward by Edward Lawler and David Apter as analytical framework and utilizing case study research design, the study established that conflicts have structured and restructured settlements in Plateau State aggravating the culture of violence. Old hatred narratives affected the dynamics and trends of the conflict leading to a process of residential shift and relocation among people of different ethnicities and faiths. The study showed that there is a link between the intensified nature of the conflict and the factors reinforcing and exacerbating it. It drew attention to the perception of group cohesiveness provided by the emerging settlement and the fear it generates. Such fears have the tendency to create chaos and further alter harmonious societal relations. This study, therefore, underscored how segregated settlements deepen identity formation and bond into a formidable 'army'. Bonding of a single identity group by an enclave in an environment of high level exclusion has negative consequences as it has been used for nasty and antisocial purposes. This is compounded by the inability of the Nigerian state and the government in Plateau state to deconstruct the structures of violence and build the structures of peace.

Data for this study were gathered through primary and secondary sources. The primary sources comprised of In-depth interviews (IDI), Focus Group Discussions (FGD), Non-participant observation and historical documents from National Archives, Kaduna. Secondary data consisted of Government white papers, gazettes, reports, petitions, periodicals, books and journal articles. These were content and thematically analysed using narrative and descriptive styles. Major findings are as follows:

- The study showed that Plateau state is noted for large number of very small ethnic groups. In the northern parts of the state the groups regarded as indigenes are the Afizere (Jarawa), Anaguta, Amo, Berom, Buji, Ganawuri, Irigwe, Rukuba and Pakara. However, three of these indigenous groups including the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom are found in Barkin-Ladi, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom LGAs. While the Berom have their political and spiritual

throne in Shonong, the Afizere have links to a lager Jarawa group in Bauchi, the Anaguta on the other hand have their ancestry in Naraguta and are said to have intermarried with the Jarawa. Each of these groups had distinct political organisations and leadership but it was during the colonial period that the peoples of the Plateau North polity came under a single leadership in the Bauchi Province (Ames, 1934; Temple, 1965; Morrison, 1976). It was difficult therefore administering the area. The difficulty lingered because the contact (both pre-colonial and colonial) with majority of the ethnic groups in the area were established through the use of armed force and in most cases maintained by the show of armed force and intermittently by the use of such force. Force became engrained in inter-group contacts and relations.

- In examining how the conflict structured and restructured settlements, the study highlighted the connections between migrations, settlement dynamics and conflicts. Migrations to Jos Plateau area reinforced conflicts and such conflicts re-initiated further migrations which led to the altering of residential space. The residential spaces changed from the defence culture pattern to a nucleated (family) pattern and then to the camp system which is urban in nature. Due to incessant conflicts and palpable fear, the pattern was later defined by ethno-religious identity. Each of these patterns has security and conflict implications.
- The study revealed that in colonial Plateau, space for different communities became communally constructed. Europeans, Asians, Africans, and Native Africans all occupied separate spaces, based on criteria of race and ethnicity. On the one hand, the areas occupied by non Europeans but particularly Africans were represented by the colonial administration as a repellent space, a space of dirt and disorder. On the other hand, spaces occupied by different ethnic groupings represented political and economic contestations in wider Nigeria. It is important to underscore that spatial ordering in colonial Plateau also coincided with different mining camps for workers in the tin mines.
- The theme of policy and politics played significant roles in the conflicts and the structuring and restructuring of settlements in Plateau state. The indigene/settler and Christian/Muslim crisis on the Jos Plateau was fuelled by certain policies and politics that altered social spaces and identities in the area beginning from the colonial period to the present. Things worsened when the second set of colonial administrators after the Second World War deepened the identity crisis. It was within this period that people of the Middle Belt region further developed a common consciousness to stand against the Hausa and Fulani domination in

northern Nigeria. The Middle Belt region and Jos Plateau particularly developed a Christian identity as against the Muslim identity of northern Nigeria. Thus, reforms in urban Jos after the Second World War saw Christian identity become synonymous with Middle Belt identity. On the whole, fragmented settlements instituted by British administration's policy and politics tended to provide spatial framework for ethno-religious politics and reinforced horizontal inequalities in Jos metropolis. This accounts for the continued struggle for political power and its consequent clashes in the city.

- This study interrogated the implications of the emerging settlement for inter-group relations and indicated that it has created atmospheres of fear, anxiety, safe and unsafe neighbourhoods and therefore given rise to ethno-religious security dilemma. The danger in the dilemma situation in Plateau State is that it reduces the interaction of groups and increases the spate and spectre of ethno-religious insecurity and consequently egregious violence. The point to underscore is that the emerging settlement and the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State have created the scenario of ethno-religious security dilemma in the area. This formed the foundations for the architecture of violence in Plateau state.
- Another implication of the emerging settlement is that it has deepened sectarianism and ethnocentrism in Plateau State and has reinforced the emergence of several identities in the area. The point to underscore is that ethno-religious bonding in Plateau State which manifests in exclusive neighbourhoods and the redefinition of identities has facilitated intolerance, aggression and violence.
- Still on the implication of settlement dynamic for inter-group relation, the study showed that the emerging settlement has hindered trust and deepened distrust. This trend in turn affected the economy of the state and the welfare of the individual in the area. The thrust of the argument is that separate settlement promotes inter-group suspicion and groups' interest as against the general Plateau community's interest. This hinders trust and reinforces distrust between groups. The point underscored is that pursuing groups' interest undermines trust and builds distrust. The distrust structures are reinforced and aided by the culture of violence to bud and blossom.
- This study investigated the extent to which the emerging settlement facilitated mobilisation for conflicts and demonstrated that group identity and place attachment facilitates collective mobilisation. Given such group identity and place attachment in atmosphere of conflicts, it is common to seek collective preparation and collective execution to save their identity and

neighbourhoods. In every self-help environment, collective mobilisation and the unleashing of violence take pre-eminence. This is driven by the perception that the government is not giving adequate attention to the security of the different population and as a result, the groups had to improvise. Relevant literature has documented the components and circles of collective mobilisation (Tilly, 1978, 2003, 2005). Mobilisation for violence in Plateau State therefore has manifested through different mechanism and patterns. Separate settlement binds the capability and legitimacy of ethno-religious groups' mobilisation for conflicts.

- It is evidenced in this study that the emerging settlement is a form of resistance to different levels of exclusion (political and economic) in Plateau state and a desire for inclusion in the mainstream of things.
- The study examined how the conflict has affected infrastructural development in the emerging settlements and indicated that government neglect of certain neighbourhoods resulted to fractured development in Plateau state. Nevertheless, restricted development in a diverse society or in urban centre has the tendency to undermine peace. This is because denial of social and economic opportunities tends to reinforce a sense of exclusion and discrimination as predicted by relational theorists. Such sentiments have given rise to not just social and psychological stigmatization and fear but also reinforce violence.
- The study showed that the structures of violence are yet to be deconstructed. Thus, the work advocates for the construction of the structures of peace with all groups, individuals and government joining efforts to resist the narratives of conflict and embrace those of peace.

5.2 Conclusion

Settlement dynamics are central to ethno-religious groups because of their identity and security implications. This is so much in a way that settlement dynamics have continued to reinforce violent conflicts. Settlement dynamics are not just spatial organisations or built environment of a given geographical area, for Plateau communities they are geographical areas that shows a groups capability and legitimacy for conflict. They create real security dilemma which inadvertently intensifies violence. Advancing this argument this work built on existing studies and establishes that settlement dynamics are factors intervening between diversity and conflict. Thus, the mutually reinforcing circle between separate or fragmented settlements and conflicts is established. The work pushes forward this research agenda by examining the connections between ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamics.

Much is known on how colonial institutions and knowledge shaped Hausa and Fulani Muslim identities as against Plateau indigenous Christian identities and constructed communalism and ethnocentrism as essential characters of Plateau State and Nigeria at large. But in what ways did spatial ordering of Native Town and Township drew the categories of 'Natives', 'non-Natives' 'Native foreigners', Hausa, Fulani, Berom, Anaguta, Afizere, Muslim, and Christian into the convolution or maelstrom of interests. This study showed how different categorisation of identities and spatial ordering shaped spaces of conflict and how such spaces have sustained conflicts in Plateau state. It tracks some of the institutional sites in which horizontal inequalities were built into ethno-religious groupings and how the conflicts resulting from such inequalities have restructured the settlements. Apparently, we cannot understand the landscape of contemporary Plateau State and the settlement dynamic without taking account of the evolutionary history.

Thus, the question on how conflicts have structured and restructured settlements tracks the evolution of Plateau State and shows the people, the migratory histories, evolution of spatial orderings, the politics and policies that intervened, the conflicts and the ethno-religious settlements. It is evident therefore that the violent ethno-religious conflicts and settlement dynamics did not occur in a social vacuum but are conditioned by a web of social relations that extends further than the individual. The consequence of the violence transcends the individual to affect society at large. Of course the issues of territory and territorial divisions in conflict have attracted much attention. But there is no detailed account of how residential space became an issue in the Plateau conflicts. This study provides such details by highlighting the making of the conflicts and the settlement dynamics.

Throughout the findings of this study, historical details revealed that cyclicality of violence in Plateau State have created spatialised fear and ethno-religious security dilemma. While fear multiplies, groups are bonding for conflict, mutual trust is shrinking and the culture of violence is becoming embedded in the landscape of Plateau State. Frustratingly, in spite of the many historical precedents described in this study, the state and the agencies charged with the responsibility of harmonious inter-group relations find themselves unprepared in the face of the recurring violence. Some claim that the emerging settlement has restored peace to Plateau State. This appears to be the case at a cursory view of the phenomenon. However, a closer and critical examination of the scenario shows that separate living has dangerous implication for inter-group

relations. It has not only hindered inter-group integration, it has also frustrated the emergence of a third culture or what Amitai Etzioni (2000) called "*The third way to a good society*". The implication of this is that transforming the conflict issues is hindered. This is because the shaping of an inclusive philosophy is consigned to the margins and the social space that is constantly structuring the interactions of individuals is itself defined by fear and violence. Every community aspires for a society that is good not just a civil society that is controlled by legal codes. One essential fabric of a good society is trust. Trust neutralizes fear, suspicion and violence. This study argued that the harmonious inter-group relations experienced in Plateau communities up to the 1990s was established by the *Amana* (Trust pact) between the Hausa and Fulani Muslims and the indigenous Plateau Christians. This was after periods of unceasing attacks and violence. The area relapsed to violence when that trust broke down. It behoves on all communities and agencies to rebuild that trust.

One way of mapping and tracking the conflict in Plateau state is a careful study of group mobilisation in ethno-religious conflicts. Therefore, addressing the issue requires viewing group mobilisation in the context of settlement dynamics. This is a way forward. Interrogating the question on how the emerging settlements facilitate group mobilisation for conflict, findings call for even more additional studies on identity conflicts and collective violence. Scholars need to study how settlement dynamics facilitate inter-group peace. In other words, there is need to study ethno-religious peace and settlement dynamics for us to have a full grasps of the theory of how settlement dynamics facilitate group mobilisation for conflicts. With religion and ethnicity at the centre of the settlements, this study shows how mobilisation spreads among the population. However, similar cues as the ones used for mobilising for conflicts can be used for bridging the gap and establishing peace. This could be achieved by emphasizing and building inter-communal networks and de-emphasizing intra-communal networks since communication is the central mechanism driving group mobilisation. The work argues therefore that while it was conflict that sparked the movement towards separate living the emerging settlement has in turn influenced the conflict. The central argument here is that conflict and settlement dynamics are both cause and effect.

The conflict affected infrastructural development in the emerging settlements in no small measure. While it denied certain groups a decent living by having the government neglect their neighbourhoods as forms of exclusion, it affected the economies of individuals, families,

communities and states. It created what Zaminder (2007) called imaginary ownership. A situation where people who owned houses in specific areas that is no longer under their control have been denied access or people occupying such buildings illegally. This study shows that government neglect of certain areas is historically embedded in the history of the relation between Hausa and Fulani North and the Middle Belt state of Plateau.

Therefore, the initial assumptions were upheld in the findings of the study. The assumption from the beginning was that violent conflicts alter settlements and that settlement dynamics in turn influences violent conflict. The contention was that the recent case in urban and rural Plateau State was not as a result of any state policy to separate people along ethnic and religious lines or to distinguish between 'native foreigners' and 'local natives' as was the case in the colonial period. Of course this existed and was referred to as the *Sabon Gari* (new towns) and is commonly advanced in literature. The study was also of the view that the emerging settlement has affected inter-group relations and that such patterns facilitates group mobilisation for conflict. Part of the assumption was that conflicts affects infrastructural development in the emerging settlement. The findings supported these assumptions. However, what changed is the 'how', 'when', and 'the extent' the assumptions happened. Tracing inter-group relations in Plateau State from the pre-colonial and colonial periods revealed that ethno-religious conflict and settlement dynamic have always been an issue though not in the magnitude and dimension it is witnessed today. The initial assumption was that it is a recent phenomenon that gained prominence in the 1990s. However, while the 1994 benchmark for understanding the recent experience as a sectional divide is justified; the interaction between conflict and settlement dynamic is historically embedded. Again, the assumption on the phenomena affecting development was hinged on the view that peace and security facilitates development and their absence is a default to development. Since public and private properties were constantly destroyed in the Plateau State conflict people moved their investments away from the state. In this light, this assumption is true. However, findings further revealed that basic infrastructure was abandoned in areas considered 'Hausa Muslim settler areas' by government. This is a threat to peace, security and development.

Thus, this study made three important contributions. One, it showed and explained the relationship between settlement dynamic and conflict from a mutual causal direction. This is a reverse of the dominant pattern that has only studied the relationship from a single causal direction. To this end, this study went beyond studying how settlement dynamic affect conflict to

interrogating the effects of conflict on settlement dynamics by examining pre- and post-conflict geographic distribution of ethno-religious group population in Plateau State. Two, the study related settlement dynamics to group mobilisation for conflicts. This provided detailed account of processes of group mobilisation and showed possible locations of ethno-religious violence in Plateau State. Three, this study stepped further from the critique of the complex interaction between settlement dynamics and conflicts as purely an urban phenomenon commonly advanced in scholarship, and engaged with how that complexity has affected rural areas alongside the urban. These are important because group separation is a security threat and that has not addressed the problem of inter-group (ethno-religiou) conflict at least in Plateau State. These security threats remain because contemporary policies in Plateau state have not countered the colonial idea of separated settlements as was the practice of Native Town and Township divisions.

5.3 Recommendations

Consequent on the conclusion drawn above on the interactions between ethno-religious conflict and the attendant shift in settlements it becomes imperative for state agents, philanthropists, individuals and communities to adopt stringent measures in order to mitigate the conflicts in Plateau State. Subsequent on the findings therefore, the study recommends:

- Group segregation in settlement is a security threat and conflict factor. Structures of peace should therefore be built to counter the structures of violence. Studies on the solution of ethnic conflicts have treated settlement dynamic as something that can be easily pulled apart to reduce the possibility of violent inter-group conflict. Kaufmann (1996) argued persuasively and recommended separation of groups as a geographic solution to identity conflicts. Findings herein revealed that group separation is a security threat and partition has not addressed such problems. Therefore, community of policy-makers needs to develop in neighbourhoods, structures of inter-group relations and peace. These may include the development of sports complexes and town halls to foster inter-group unity. Such structures should be established with a fora where ethnic and religious leaders seat together to educate their members on the need for peaceful interaction.
- Trust is the indispensable precondition for a revolutionary change in any climate of fear and security dilemma. Trust is required to upturn the security dilemma scenario in Plateau

State by building confidence among the different identity groups in the area. This can be achieved through constant dialogue and interaction to allay fears. Constant dialogue facilitates trust and lubricates an environment of violence to tilt towards peace. This is because in such climate dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust among dialoguers is the logical consequence for peaceful inter-group relations. To this end, faith based organisations and vigilantes should be monitored to limit radicalized views facilitating mutual distrust.

- The traditional models of third party intervention in the conflict should be improved. Findings revealed that the application of violence follows a settlement segregated pattern and influenced by groups' strength, strategic objectives and capabilities. At such, once violence breaks out it is possible to foretell the spatial progress of conflict. Most times, police and military officers charged with the responsibility of providing physical security are confronted with decisions of how and where to intervene. This is because protecting the civilian population is their topmost priority. Therefore, there is need for an assessment of the predictive accuracy of the settlement dynamics and groups' mobilisation strategies to provide guidance on how to apply precautionary measures even before conflict to limit casualty figure.

- Neglect or abandoning a neighbourhood is a sign that no one cares and an invitation for criminal elements and conflict entrepreneurs to drive their agenda by using such areas as a base to continue neighbourhood disorder. Thus, there should be appropriate authority who should collaborate with philanthropists to rebuild destroyed homes and facilitate people's return to their homes after conflict. Illegal occupants should be constantly ejected and adequate attention given to all parts of the State or city to avoid the people resorting to self-help.

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Appendix I

List of Interviewees

S/no	Name	LGA/State	Designation	Place of Interview	Date of Interview
1	Hon. Pius Gimba	Jos North	Former National President, Anaguta Nation	Amanza Rd., Dogon Karfe, Jos	October 25, 2014
2	Hon. John Izang	Jos North	For the District head Jos Jarawa	Palace of the District Head, Jos Jarawa	October 20, 2014
3.	Hon. Sani Mudi	Jos North	Former Deputy Chairman Jos North and Hausa Community Leader	Massalacin Juma'a Street	October 24, 2014
4.	Da Yohanna Dung	Jos North	Berom Community Leader	Gada Biyu	November 24, 2014
5.	Dung Dafom	Jos South	Berom Elder	Gyel	October 3, 2014
6.	Dacholom Maichibi	Jos North	Youth Leader (Jenta Adamu)	Jenta Adamu	October 5, 2014
7.	Emmanuel Ajang	Jos North	National Vice-President Afizere Youth Council	Tina Junction	October 11, 2014
8.	Sunday Madaki	Jos North	Secretary, Anaguta Youth Council	Angwan Rukuba	October 14, 2014
9.	Garba Inusa	Jos North	Hausa Elder	Gangare	November 6, 2014
10.	Philip Gyang	Riyom	Community Leader	Bachit	October 30, 2014
11.	Pam Mainasara	B/Ladi	Youth Leader	Onoja Road	October 9, 2014
12.	Prof. Sam Egwu	Uni. Jos	Academic	NILS, Abuja	April 16, 2015
13.	Philibus Haruna	Jos North	Youth Leader	Nasarawa Gwong	October 21, 2014
14.	Pastor Friday Bako	Jos South	Religious Leader	Angwan Doki	November 5, 2014
15	Mr. Musa Rondong	Jos South	Estate Manager	Bukuru Town	November 11, 2014
16.	Mr Amos Agwim Ajik	Jos North	Afizere Community Leader	Jos Jarawa	October 26, 2014
17.	Pastor	Jos North	Religious Leader	Rock	October

	Musa Ajiji			Heaven	16, 2014
18.	Mr. Amos Dung	Jos South	Youth Leader	Du	November 7, 2014
19.	Mr. Innocent Dokotiri	Jos South	Civil Society Member	Gyel	October 3, 2014
20	Mallam Mohammed Ali	Jos North	Hausa Community Leader	Angwan Rimi	November 1, 2014
21.	Mr. Bagere Zakka	Riyom	Chairman Berom Youth Council	Shonong	November 8, 2014
22.	Mr. Bitrus Dadung	Riyom	Community Leader	Lwa	November 8, 2014
23.	Habila Yohanna	Riyom	Community Leader	Riyom	November 8, 2014
24.	Mr. Yakubu Saleh Aljasawee	Jos North	Hausa Community Leader	Yan Shanu	October 23, 2014
25.	Egnr. McEsau Badung	B/Ladi	National President Nwok Culture/Community Leader	Foron	October 11, 2014
26.	Mr. Joseph Dalyop	B/Ladi	Neighbourhood Leader	Gura Kworos	October 7, 2014
27	Mr Idris Sulaiman	Jos North	Neighbourhood Leader	Yan Taya	November 10, 2014
28.	Mallam Ishaq Isa	B/Ladi	Neighbourhood Leader	Katako	October 17, 2014
29.	Abdullahi Yusuf	Jos North	Community Leader	Bauchi Road	November 10, 2014
30.	Bulus Gomos	B/Ladi	Neighbourhood Leader	Kashan Gwol	October 17, 2014
31.	Mohammed Adam	B/Ladi	Secretary, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association	Garshish	October 27, 2014
32.	Sadiq Bala	B/Ladi	Neighbourhood Leader	Sabon Lyn	October 10, 2014
33.	Philemon Daavey	B/Ladi	Neighbourhood Leader	Heipang	November 12, 2014
34.	Ibrahim Nyam	Jos South	Neighbourhood Leader	Rwang Pam, Angwan Doki	November 4, 2014
35.	Alh. Idris Bello	B/Ladi	Head, Fulani Community (Garshish)	Garshish	October 27, 2014
36.	Rev.	B/Ladi	Pastor, First Baptist	Gura	October

	Samson Amusan		Church, B/Ladi	Kworos	17, 2014
37.	Lucky Ugochukwu	Jos North	Youth Leader	Apata	November 5, 2014
38.	Barr Godwin Nding	Jos North	Member, Civil Society	Tina Junction	October 7, 2014
39.	Chief Toye Ogunseyi	Jos North	Former President, Yoruba Community Jos	Rock Heaven	November 20, 2014
40.	Hilary Mark	Jos North	Estate Manager	Zaria Road	November 20, 2014
41.	HRH. Da Edward G.M. Bot	B/Ladi	Dagwom Rwei/Ropp	Dagwom's Palace Ropp	October 16, 2014
42.	Hon Amos Shut	B/Ladi	Community Leader	Heipang	November 12, 2014
43.	Lolo Cynthia Rose Onyeacho	Jos North	Igbo Women Leader	Apata	November 5, 2014
44.	Shuaibu Ja'afaru	Riyom	Community Leader	Bachit	October 30, 2014
45.	Elkhanah Izang	Jos North	Academic	Nassarawa Gwong	October 21, 2014
46.	Nyam Philip	Jos North	Security Official	Angwan Rukuba	October 5, 2014

Appendix II

List of FGD Participants

S/No	Names of Participant	Ethnic Group	Location of FGD	Date of FGD	Category
1.	Mr Maxwell Azi	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22, 2014	Youth
2.	Mr. Arin Solomon Jang	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22, 2014	Youth
3.	Mr. Jeremiah Adamu Danjuma	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22,	Youth
4.	Mr. James Ajang	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22, 2014	Youth
5.	Mr. Peter Ajiji	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22, 2014	Youth
6.	Mr. Philip Azi	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22, 2014	Youth
7.	Mr. Irimiya Samson	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22	Youth
8.	Mr. Bulus Tsoho	Afizere	Jos Jarawa	October 22, 2014	Youth
9.	Mr. Sam Kewa	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1, 2014	Youth
10.	Mr. John Lamido	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1, 2014	Youth
11.	Mr. Daniel Yohanna	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1, 2014	Youth
12.	Mr Bitrus Daiyi	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1, 2014	Youth
13.	Mr. Gimba A. Gimba	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1,	Youth
14.	Mr. Emmanuel Madaki	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1, 2014	Youth
15.	Pastor David Bahal	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1, 2014	Youth
16.	Mr. Sunday H. Daiyi	Anaguta	Angwan Rukuba	November 1, 2014	Youth
17.	Mr. Gyang Chomo	Berom	Bukuru	October 5, 2014	Elder
18.	Mr. Caleb Dadung	Berom	Bukuru	October 5, 2014	Elder
19.	Mr. Sunday Gyang Chuwang	Berom	Bukuru	October 5, 2014	Elder
20.	Mr. Peter	Berom	Bukuru	October 5,	Elder

	Dafom			2014	
21.	Mr. Stephen Pyo	Berom	Bukuru	October 5, 2014	Youth
22.	Mr. Dalyop Nyam	Berom	Bukuru	October 5, 2014	Youth
23.	Mr. Luka Pam	Berom	Bukuru	October 5, 2014	Youth
24.	Mr. Markus Badung	Berom	Bukuru	October 5, 2014	Youth
25.	Mr Damina Rikko	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Elder
26.	Alh. Shuaibu Wada	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Elder
27.	Mallam Idris Haruna	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Elder
28.	Mr. Usman Bello	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Youth
29.	Mr. Yusuf Garba	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Youth
30.	Mallam Shehu Gadarko	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Elder
31.	Mallam Hamisu Tijani	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Youth
32.	Alh. Inusa Ja'afaru	Fulani	Bachi/Garshish	November 15, 2014	Elder
33.	Mallam Isa Adamu	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Elder
34.	Mallam Jubril Adam	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Elder
35.	Mallam Murtala Dangata	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Elder
36.	Alh. Salisu Usman Mai Doya	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Elder
37.	Alh. A.D. Idris	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Elder
38.	Dangata Inusa Shehu	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Youth
39.	Mallam Abdul Bala.	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Youth
40.	Mallam Sani Yahaya	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Youth
41.	Mallam Mohammed Bello	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Youth
42.	Mr. Bala Yusuf	Hausa	Yan Shanu	October 16, 2014	Youth

43.	Mr. Josiah Ejim	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Elder
44.	Mr. Innocent Ikemefule	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Elder
45.	Mr. Maximus Okoy	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Youth
46.	Chief Daniel Ebiziem	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Elder
47.	Mr. Nelson Iherobiem	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Elder
48.	Chief Sylvanus Alakwe	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Elder
49.	Mr. Uche Asika	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Youth
50.	Mr. Godson Okeke	Igbo	Gura Kworos	November 23, 2014	Youth

APPENDIX III

Interview Guide

A. How has the persistent ethno-religious conflict in Plateau State restructured settlement Patterns?

1. What would you consider the genesis/origin of the ethno-religious conflict and the shift in settlement patterns in Plateau State?
2. How would you link the protracted ethno-religious conflict and the increasing shift in settlement patterns in Plateau State?
3. How has these conflicts facilitated the emergence of separate ethno-religious neighbourhoods in Plateau State?
4. What is the pattern of this shift in residential areas: religious, ethnic or ethno-religious?
5. How did the idea of safe and unsafe areas come to be?

B. What is the implication of the emerging settlement pattern for social group interaction in Plateau State?

6. Do you think that this emerging settlement pattern has fostered the creation of stereotypes?
7. To what extent is this trend creating and deepening or lightening distrust between the concerned groups?
8. How would you describe the emerging settlement pattern: has it created a culture of peace or violence in Plateau State?
9. What do you think are the implications of this separate living for national cohesion?
10. Would you subscribe to the view that the emerging settlement pattern could create the atmosphere of fear leading to security dilemma? Why do you think so?

C. To what extent is the emerging settlement pattern facilitating or mitigating group mobilisation for conflicts in Plateau State?

11. How does exclusive settlement pattern facilitate or mitigate group mobilization for conflicts?
12. To what extent is religious identity reinforcing or ameliorating residential segregation and aiding or abating mobilization for group's common or shared interest?
13. How has group cluster reinvigorated religious consciousness and deepened proselytisation in Plateau State?
14. How has the emerging settlement pattern provided high capabilities and networks for violent conflicts?
15. To what extent does exclusive neighbourhood keep the conflict alive?

D. How can the issues thrown up by the recurrent conflict and the shifting settlement pattern be addressed?

16. How has this shift in residential areas affected public spaces like markets?
17. Do you think the segregation has also affected trade and transport?
18. What is the effect on infrastructural development?

APPENDIX IV

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION (FGD) GUIDE

A. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

(i) Number of Discussants in Group _____

(ii) Age bracket of Discussants

(a) 18-39 {}_____

(b) 40-59 {}_____

(c) 60 years and above {}_____

(iii) Sex of Discussants: Male_____, Female_____

(iv) Educational level of Discussants:

(a) Primary education

(b) Secondary education

(c) Tertiary education

(v) Discussant's length of stay in the communities_____

Length	No. of Discussants
(a) 0-5years	_____
(b) 6-10years	_____
(c) 11-20years	_____
(d) 21years and above	_____

B. QUESTIONS

A. How has the persistent ethno-religious conflict in Plateau State restructured settlement Patterns?

1. What would you consider the genesis/origin of the ethno-religious conflict and the shift in settlement patterns in Plateau State?
2. How would you link the protracted ethno-religious conflict and the increasing shift in settlement patterns in Plateau State?
3. How has these conflicts facilitated the emergence of separate ethno-religious neighbourhoods in Plateau State?
4. What is the pattern of this shift in residential areas: religious, ethnic or ethno-religious?
5. How did the idea of safe and unsafe areas come to be?

B. What is the implication of the emerging settlement pattern for social group interaction in Plateau State?

6. Do you think that this emerging settlement pattern has fostered the creation of stereotypes?
7. To what extent is this trend creating and deepening or lightening distrust between the concerned groups?
8. How would you describe the emerging settlement pattern: has it created a culture of peace or violence in Plateau State?
9. What do you think are the implications of this separate living for national cohesion?
10. Would you subscribe to the view that the emerging settlement pattern could create the atmosphere of fear leading to security dilemma? Why do you think so?

C. To what extent is the emerging settlement pattern facilitating or mitigating group mobilisation for conflicts in Plateau State?

11. How does exclusive settlement pattern facilitate or mitigate group mobilization for conflicts?
12. To what extent is religious identity reinforcing or ameliorating residential segregation and aiding or abating mobilization for group's common or shared interest?
13. How has group cluster reinvigorated religious consciousness and deepened proselytisation in Plateau State?
14. How has the emerging settlement pattern provided high capabilities and networks for violent conflicts?
15. To what extent does exclusive neighbourhood keep the conflict alive?

D. How has the conflict affected infrastructural development in the emerging settlements?

16. How has this shift in residential areas affected public spaces like markets?
17. Do you think the segregation has also affected trade and transport?
18. What is the effect on infrastructural development?

APPENDIX V



MODERN JOS

Source: Jana Krause, 2011

APPENDIX VI



The spread of Conflict and ethno-religious categorization of settlements in Jos Metropolis

Source: Jana Krause, 2011

Appendix VII: Graphics of Damaged Buildings in Northern Plateau State still abandoned

Damaged building at Jos Jarawa

Source: Field work, October, 2014

Damaged building at Jos Jarawa

Source: Field work, October, 2014

Damaged building at Rwang Pam, Angwan Doki

Source: Field work, October, 2014

Abandoned street between Rwang Pam and Kasali Streets in Angwan Doki, Jos South

Source: Field work, October, 2014

Destroyed buildings between Rikkos and Jos Jarawa

Source: Field work, October, 2014



The popular Dutse Uku separating Gada Bako (Muslim) and Jos Jarawa (Christian) communities

Source: Field work, October 2014

Appendix VIII: List of selected communities

S/n	**Community**	**Local Government Area**
1	Gangare	Jos North
2	Massalacin Juma'a	Jos North
3	Yan Shanu	Jos North
4	Yan Taya	Jos North
5	Bauchi Road	Jos North
6	Angwan Rimi	Jos North
7	Nassarawa Gwong	Jos North
8	Jenta Apata	Jos North
9	Jos Jarawa (Dutse Uku)	Jos North
10	Angwan Rukuba	Jos North
11	Dogon Karfe	Jos North
12	Rock Heaven	Jos North
13	Jenta Adamu	Jos North
14	Hwolshe	Jos South
15	Du	Jos South
16	Gyel	Jos South
17	Bukuru (Mallam Idi, Oyemmadu and Ogbomosho)	Jos South
18	Angwan Doki (Rwang pam and Vom Christian Hospital Annex)	Jos South
19	Angwan Doki (Kasali)	Jos South
20	Kugiya	Jos South
21	Bukuru Low-cost/ Dadin Kowa	Jos South
22	Heipang	Barkin-Ladi
23	Foron	Barkin-Ladi
24	Garshish	Barkin-Ladi
25	Angwan Sarki	Barkin-Ladi
26	Gura Kworos	Barkin-Ladi
27	Katako	Barkin-Ladi
28	Kashan-Gwol	Barkin-Ladi
29	Bachit	Riyom
30	Shonong	Riyom
31	Lwa	Riyom
32	Riyom	Riyom
Total	32	4

Source: Field Work