UTILITARIANISM AND THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ADULT EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

Much of what has been said and written on educational
aims has been prescriptive; it has asserted not what they
are, but what they should be. That happiness has been
prescribed indicates that it is an ideal, which finds
expression in a natural phenomenon. Because of its natural
and comforting illusions, aims such as this carry a
persuasive force of positive connotations which encourages
varieties of hyperbolically optimistic assumptions about
its effects. In order to avoid these assumptions becoming
unchallenged fashionable ideas in educational arena,
particularly in the realm of adult education, the need for
a careful scrutiny arises. Thus in prescribing Utilitarianism
as an aim for adult education, this study has examined the
following issues:

(1) The meaning of aims and the justification for the
     formulation of aims in adult education;

(2) Some philosophical theories that form the basis of
     the aims and objectives of adult education;

(3) Utilitarianism and education;

(4) Utilitarianism as an aim of adult education; and

(5) Problems associated with the achievement of
     Utilitarianism in adult education.

The above examination was carried out using the
instrument of philosophical analysis in the following manner:

First, major concepts were picked out for analysis
in order to understand the principles by which their uses
are determined. Thereafter, some crucial themes were
subjected to critical analysis so as to eliminate psuedo-
problems that are likely to arise at the practice and
implementation stages. This led to the clarification of the
underlying basic assumptions arising therefrom, so as to
put the real issue in clear perspective. Later, a synthesis
of all the positive ideas highlighted in the process of our
critical analysis of concepts and issues on the topic was
drawn together. The result of this exercise was the
restatement of the theory of happiness in the context of
adult education.

Finally, counter-objections to the new statement was raised
in the form of unbiased criticism and answers were provided
for such objections. The reason for this task is to dig
up any ambiguity that may be hidden in the new formulation.

It was found out that Utilitarianism is made up of
very many component parts of ethical theories that renders
it almost an impossible target to be aimed at. The problem
with utilitarian doctrine is that it obscures the

identification of appropriate goals and standards of
achievement in the education of adults. However, the
utilitarian doctrine sees man as primarily concerned with
the pursuit of happiness and as such regards the maximisation
of happiness and the minimisation of suffering as the supreme
of social action. Thus, the promise of a psychological
well-being as is contained in the utilitarian doctrine is
enough a factor that can attract political as well as
economic and academic attention.

Our conceptual analysis reveals it as a system of social
and political decision, as offering a criterion and basis
of judgement for administrators as well as a system of
personal morality. It is claimed that freedom of thought,
autonomous decision making and truth are important elements
for human happiness. Without freedom, there can be no
genuine interaction with environment, no willing involvement
in the life of society; and participation will become an
irksome imposition. Pedagogically, this points to an
education of involvement, of participation, of activity and
an education that involves discovery. Epistemologically,
what is to be known and learnt is to be derived from the data
of the product of the learner's experience. As such, it is
argued that education should not be seen as the privilege of
a few, but as the right and the obligation of all.

If this is to be achieved, the government has to restructure its present role concerning adult education. It is therefore recommended that adequate financial provision should be made available for the establishment of adult centres for learning. Adult learning calls for distinct methods; as such, efforts should be made to train adult teachers, and access to the adult centres should be based on individual's interest and not on government selection and finally, the curriculum of the centres should be structured in such a manner as to focus on the well-being of the learners.

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This has been the situation throughout this study, and
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CERTIFICATION

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I certify that this work was carried out by MRS. LAOLAT ABEKE ADESANYA in the Department of Adult Education, University of Ibadan.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work first to the blessed
memory of my father, Alhaji Sunmola (1912 - 1987) who
taught me never to relax until I have satisfied my
heart's desire

and

Secondly, my Mother-in-Law, a mother of mothers
late Chief Ruth Odubowale Adesanya (1896 - 1986) who
sacrificed her old age rest to make me what she was
never opportuned to be.

TABLE OF CONTENT

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER TWO: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF
               ADULT EDUCATION AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Table of Contents (contd.)

Table of Contents (contd.)

Table of Contents (contd.)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Problem

Underlying adult education aims and objectives are
assumptions concerning the characteristics of the adult.
An adult is assumed to be a mature, responsible, free and
autonomous individual. It is believed that an educational
goal geared towards the **perpetuation** of these characteristics
is the ideal type of education for the adult, because such
an education which is based on voluntary participation is
naturally alluring for the fact that it involves the choice
of one's own destiny. And also in view of the fact that
it consists in an advance towards a chosen goal, it affords
a sense of continuing progress in maturity which, according
to Bromley, "precludes the feeling of inner deadness and decline
that can light old age".[1] Furthermore, Bradley adds that
a person's happiness consists in "the finding of himself ...
the realisation of his concrete ideal of life."[2] Bentham[3]
adds that the ideal is to promote the preference of human
beings and no doubt these characteristics constitute the
adult preferences.

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1. Bromley, D.B., (1974): The Psychology of Human Ageing.
   (second edition); Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, p.265.
2. Bradley, F.H. (1962): Ethical Studies (second edition).
   London, Oxford University Press. p.96
3. Sen, A. & Williams, B. (eds.)(1988): Utilitarianism and
   Beyond. New York, Cambridge University Press, p.266.

The proponents of this aim claim that this type of education is worthwhile for its own sake. This type of aim is associated with those who already have had an initial education and who are willing to continue to experience the joy of what had earlier begun. It is therefore often criticized as being elitist and selective, whereas some proponents of adult education believe that it is a grassroot movement aimed at equality of educational opportunity at all levels, and they hold the view that education is a right and not a privilege of only a few.

Adult education has always been concerned with activities that are useful or instrumental, and this has always been the fundamental basis in any formulation of its aims and objectives. Useful education aims to serve as the means to an end. In more concrete terms, what this amounts to is that it tries to be useful, teaching information and skills which have a direct, practical value. A great deal of adult education has this kind of purpose. It tends to address specific issues and solve immediate problems. Forms of adult education that relate to specific outcomes are vocational education, community education, education for social change, extension education, political education and so on and so forth; all come under the umbrella of functional or pragmatic education. An excellent example of this type of instrumental education is the on-going mass (non-formal) education in this country

by MAMSER.   The Social Mobilisation Crusade for
Economic Recovery, Self Reliance and Social Justice (MAMSER) was
launched on 25th July, 1987 in Lagos. One of the aims of
MAMSER is "the inculcation in all of our citizens the
values, the habits of and the orientation which will lead,
without coercion to the emergence, ... of a great,
self-reliant, civic society in which justice, duty,
responsibility, tolerance and commitment to nation shall
hold sway".[1] This type of instrumental aim is not new.

For some time now, especially the period after
independence, there has been much talk about the need to
build a united Nigeria by the various political and military
rulers. The need arose as a result of the Nigeria's
diversified cultural and religious setting. Such a setting,
it is opined, will not augur well for the accelerated social
and economic progress that is needed for the successful
take-off and maintenance of her autonomous existence
after independence.

This need becomes more visible particularly during the period
after the civil war. This time, in addition to social and
economic stability, the need for   peaceful co-existence
becomes paramount. The ravages of war have done a lot to
disintegrate the people of Nigeria to the extent that
nobody is ready to help, trust or care for the other person.

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1.   Ogun State Information Service, 1978: MAMSER in a
         Nutshell. Abeokuta, Ogun State Printing Corporation.
         p.3

The result is that instead of becoming one Nigeria, we are becoming many and alienated Nigerians.

This situation is not peculiar to Nigeria; it has happened, for example, in the western world. The end of the Second World War brought into limelight the need for education and adult education in particular. On the one hand, the need for new knowledge in order to be able to cope with industrial take-off, on the one hand instigated organizations and communities into commitment to adult education; on the other hand, is the adoption of workers' Educational Movement founded by Albert Mansbridge designed to provide learning for living and not for earning a **livelih**ood.

Something, however, which is unique about adult education, is that its nature and purpose, as it is practised, reveals that its aims and objectives are fairly specific, arising out of need. For example,[1] in Italy, a low level of general education among workers, a politically divided society and government in action, all played a major part in the creation of the '150 hours' Scheme. This is a kind of collective arrangement reached between Unions and employers; employees were allowed some hours of paid leave depending on their status and number of employers in that establishment, to undergo some academic pursuit. The initial condition, however, is that employees on their own must put in as many hours of paid leave granted them out of their leisure time. In the old / German Federal Republic, citizenship education has been given so much attention because of the perceived need to create an informed, responsible citizenry capable of exercising responsibilities

1. Titmus, C. (1981): <u>Strategies for Adult Education: Practices in Western Europe</u>. Milton Keynes. The Open University Press.

which previous generations had neither understood nor
appreciated. France has provided vocational
adult education to all and sundry, partly because
of the free market philosophy of the Government, partly
because of employers' distrust of the formal education system
after 1968, and partly because it seemed to be the only way to
achieve the scale of provision desired, since there was no
existing nationwide machinery of adult vocational training.
In like manner, adult education is needed in Nigeria now
partly because of her depressed economy and partly as a
preparation for the take-off of the Third Republic.

The current situation, as it is put by Isola Folorunso,
is as follows: "When we reflect on some of the disturbing and
agonising aspects of our social behaviours of the past, and
recall the self inflicted problems that arose from our
different prevailing circumstances of those moments - dishonesty,
disharmony, distrust, lack of patriotism, indiscipline,
problems that have continued to appear intractable, ..."
He went on, "the anguished cries of all concerned Nigerians
for a change have long filled the air and can no longer be
ignored".[1]

In like manner, Kola Omotosho[2] lamented on the selfish,
careless attitude of the Nigerian elites. He made reference
to the physical environment, mountains of refuse, mileages

1. Folorunso, I. (1987): An Address delivered by
   Mr. Isola Folorunso, Ogun State Director for Social
   Mobilisation; in MAMSER in a Nutshell. Abeokuta.
   Ogun State Printing Corporation; p.8.

2. Omotosho, K. (1981): 'Who Can be Happy in Nigeria ?'
   in West Africa, No. 3437, 27th June.

of stinks, and yet affluent Nigerians are doing nothing to
improve this situation. Because they can afford generating
plants that will supply them with electricity, they are doing
nothing about the darkness into which their neighbours are
plunged by NEPA (National Electric Power Authority). For
as long as they can afford tb live in affluence and comfort,
what matters to them is how to keep the status quo. They thus
become sources of envy for their less able neighbours, and
the result is that some less successful elements attempt a sort
of crude redistribution of wealth by robbing with violence
and terrorism all over the place. So, the affluent is not
happy, neither is his less successful neighbour.

To this end, Oluwole advocated "the raising of people's
consciousness towards positive activities that will involve
attitudinal changes in us ...."[1] as a basis before embarking
on any programme of alleviating the present ills. Tugbiyele,
favouring the idea of attitudinal change, wrote:
"the tragedy of the Nigerian situation is that many so-called
highly educated Nigerians including many with doctorate
degrees are, in fact, functional illiterates. ..."
He continued, "unless our functional illiterates are made
literate, all efforts towards economic rejuvenation, social
mobilisation and political stability are doomed to fail".[2]

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1. Oluwole, S. B. (1989): "Welfarism: What is it all about?"
      in Sunday Times, January 22, page 10.

2. Tugbiyele, E. A. (1989): 'Tackling the Problems of
      illiteracy'; in Sunday Times, p.15.

As the saying goes that nothing is new in the universe, so it is found after all that this situation and the attendant recommendations to ameliorate it are not new. The situation bears similarity to the period in England when James Mill gathered round himself a group of men who called themselves 'philosophical radicals' who devoted themselves to the reform of English Society - in law, education, morality, parliament, the nation's economic life, in everything that embodied injustice in humanity, privilege and denial of reason.[1] Their aims were to be achieved not only by political activity, including the nomination of parliamentary candidates but also by powerful use of the printed and spoken word. There is a faith that human society is capable of improvement and it is the duty of responsible men and women to promote it.

This writer shares the view that change of attitude in Nigerians is long overdue. Assuming that it is possible to effect a change, what type of change are we to envisage? Or put it in another way, what effect do we want education to have on the learner ?

In view of the nature of the type of problems on hand, we would want a change from a selfish behaviour to an altruistic type. Also, the need for justice, cooperation

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1. Garforth, F.W. (1980): Educative Democracy: John Stuart Mill on Education and Society; England, Oxford University Press. pp. 12 ff.

and enlightenment which have been identified as a panacea
to virtually all our problems can only be achieved, according
to John Stuart Mill, by "unchecked liberty of thought,
unbounded freedom of individual action in all modes not
hurtful to others, but also by convictions as to what is
right and wrong, useful and pernicious, deeply engraven
on the feelings by education and general unanimity of
sentiment".[1]

The claim made by Godwin that "true objective of
education ... is the generation of happiness" and the
assertion by Lawson that education has a claim to public
support, not only because it makes people happier ..."
confirms that education in general, and adult education
in particular, is grounded in the search for happiness.
Those who come into adult education do so because they have,
on their own volition, discovered something missing in their
life style, the addition of which will make them happy, and
those who educate adults think that at the end of a programme,
they have at least succeeded in promoting the happiness of
the participants.

1. Mill, J.S. (1924) Autobiography: Oxford University Press,
        p.41
2. Godwin, W. (1797): The Enquirer (London) quoted in
        Garforth, F.W. (1985): Aims, Values and Education,
        Hull, Christygate Press. Page 31.
3. Lawson, K.H. (1979): Philosophical Concepts and Values
        in Adult Education (second edition). England,
        The Open University Press. Page 10.

Unfortunately, clear understanding of what happiness means is lacking in the teachers and the taught. In most cases, the instrumental aim of adult education alone is seen to be the only aspect of adult education that is capable of providing happiness. This is due to the practical exposure of the learner and the attendant monetary reward. Any adult education therefore that has no immediate applicability may not have the support and attraction of the participants. To this end, Lawson[1] warned that it is dangerous to rely on instrumental aims in adult education for there is the possibility of not attaining the anticipated ends.

This study therefore seeks not only to clarify the concept of happiness, but also to recommend structures and procedures for promoting it in adult education; in addition, it examines some of the difficulties likely to be encountered when these methods are employed in practice, and discusses how they can be overcome.

Utilitarianism means "happiness and the absence of pain"[2] The creed which accepts utility as the foundation of morals, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. In this instance, it is not the action that really counts but its effect. In any action therefore, it is the

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1. Lawson, K.H. (1979) op. cit., p.10
2. Mill, J.S. (1859): Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations, On Representative Government edited by Acton, H.B. (1987) Everyman Classics. p.7

motive and the resultant effect that counts in so far as it results into happiness.

Utilitarianism can also be classified as an altruistic philosophy in that the utilitarian morality recognises in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. Mill argues that the utilitarian doctrine maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly for itself. In other words, if by sacrificing your individual happiness, you are promoting the happiness of the society, then you are conforming with the doctrine, though one might as well be serving a double purpose, that is, satisfying ones happiness and that of the society.

The idea of unrestricted liberty is very prominent in Mill's writings; he believed that this will lead to happiness. We would therefore try to examine what happiness is; the way in which liberty can promote happiness. But very importantly is how liberty can be achieved through adult education. We would therefore examine some methods of teaching especially the method of teaching adults, through which happiness can be achieved.

1.2 Statement of the Problem:

Much has been written in recent years on those aspects of Mill's thought for which he is best known — social and political theory, ethics and philosophy of science. Yet none of these writers has attempted a practical application of his views to education in general, let alone adult education in particular; despite the fact that he was, as could be sifted from his various writings, convinced of the importance of education. His father, James Mill, had written that "the end of Education is to render the individual as much as possible an instrument of happiness, first to himself, and next to other beings".[1] To these two foci of educational purpose, the individual and mankind, John Stuart was also committed. For him, the ultimate goal is happiness, and this, he explains in his Utilitarianism as meaning the presence of "pleasure and the absence of pain.[2]

Happiness, in the ordinary sense, is an emotional state that all sentient beings desired. What, however, constitutes happiness for each individual is at variance from person to person and from culture to culture. The purpose of this research therefore is not to make a case for the desirability of 'Happiness'. What it sets out

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1. Burston, W.H. (ed.) 1969: James Mill on Education. London, University Press. p.52

2. Mill, J. S. (1859) op. cit., p.7

to do is to develop a pragmatic definition of happiness, such
as can be achieved when set as aims and objectives of adult
education. Neither is the researcher interested in formulating
additional aims and objectives for adult education programme;
these have been variously defined and amongst them is: "to help
the individual find meaning and happiness in life."(emphasis mine)
The problem with aims such as these is that they appear
to be inspiring and worth pursuing, but is it capable of
being achieved? Is it possible, for example, to break down
happiness into units of learning objectives that will be
evaluated at the end of a learning period? Is utility an
inherent and inevitable characteristic of adult education
aims and objectives? If so, are there degrees to
utilitarianism? What level of it will be adequate in an ideal
adult education aims and objectives?

   Another problem confronting the issue of aims particularly
in relation to adult education is at least two general
objections raised against any attempt at definition of aims.
On the one hand, it is maintained that a definition must
inevitably have a cramping effect on the educator.
It is suggested that adult education is carried on in an
environment of personal relationships which any defined
and defining formula may fail to take account of, to the
detriment of the educational process. The second
type of objection seems to be the generalisation

1. Akinpelu, J.A. (1981): 'Philosophy and Adult Education'
        in Bown, L. & Okedara, J.T. (eds.) An Introduction
        to the Study of Adult Education: A Multi-Disciplinary
        and Cross-Cultural Approach for Developing Countries.
        Ibadan, University of Ibadan Press; p.83

of the first in the social context. The opinion is
expressed that it should not be the special task of an
individual, or even of a restricted group of individuals,
to formulate what is in effect the joint concern of a wide
variety of persons. The formulation of a social aim - which
means a <u>common purpose</u> -.is beyond the power of anyone in the
context of the twentieth century divided society. It is
suggested that those cleavages which exist in contemporary
Society, cleavages rooted ultimately in different socio-
political and metaphysical commitments, cannot be resolved
but can only be recognised. Thus the questions arise:
'Should an educator have an aim? and in particular, should
adult educators have aims? If so, on what foundation should
such aims be based? These are very important questions
which will be discussed in this work.

<u>The Role of Philosophy in tackling the Problem:</u>

Among the various aspects of adult education which
figure in training courses are its historical, psychological,
sociological, organisational and economic aspects, and these
form clear fields for research. Workers in these fields
operate within relatively clear terms of reference, definite
results are expected of them. Now, what part can
philosophical inquiry play in the systematic study of adult

education ? Roberts,[1] suggests that it is needed because
adult education is too often concerned with "what to do
without examining sufficiently why we should do it."
An expansion of this concern can be found in Apps'[2] work.
A philosophy is essential, he feels, for answering
programming questions, for seeing adult education activities
in their relationship to other activities in society, for
answering what he calls "long standing and basic questions" and
for providing "deeper meaning to adult educator's life."
Bergevin, while recognising that adult education philosophers
will vary, feels that there is value in having some philosophy
to "establish a common point of reference, an integrated
viewpoint, toward certain beliefs, ideas, attitudes, and
practices."

It will be illuminating to know that a philosophy is
more than a description of what is going on in adult education,
more than a definition of the adult learner and the learning
process, more than any one aspect of the field of adult
education. A philosophy provides a framework, a structure
or set of basic assumptions and principles from which one can
view the entire field of adult education.

1. Roberts, H.W. 1976: "Goals, Objectives, and Functions
   in Adult Education". Adult Education. Winter, p.127
2. Apps, J.W. (1973): Toward a Working Philosophy of
   Adult Education. Syracuse, Syracuse University
   Publications in Continuing Education. pp.3-5
3. Bergevin, P. (1967): A Philosophy for Adult Education
   New York. Seabury Press. p.3

1.3 Purpose of Study:

It is now commonplace that in the Western world
there has been a 'revolution' in philosophy which has brought
with it similar revolution in educational philosophy.
Educational philosophy was transferred from an examination
of the theories and doctrines of the great educators into
a critical analysis of the language and concepts of education,
of its methods, of its aims and their justification.
Clarification of ideas and the neutral display of logical
relationships have/the place of prescription and exhortation.
                                taken
One result of such enquiries, it was hoped, would be greater
clarity in educational thinking, which in turn would
contribute to more enlightened and purposeful planning, and
thus to a greater change of success in achieving educational
objectives.

That initial impetus of the revolution has faded and
a fresh approach to problems in educational philosophy is
being put forward - recontextualising of philosophy.[1]
For a recontextualized philosophy, the context is pertinent.
Garforth[2] suggests that philosophical issues in education
should be seen first in a personal and historical context -
that is, in actual educational writers - and thereafter
abstracted, generalized and subjected to scrutiny.

1. Raywid, M.A. (1980): 'More Criticism of Analytic Philosophy
          of Education'. in Philosophy of Education. Vol.7,No.2

2. Garforth, F.W. (1979): John Stuart Mill's Theory of Education;
          England; Martins Robertson. Preface viii.

The present research is an attempt to examine the concept of aims in adult education, and the issues associated with it. The issue of aims in adult education as formulated by adult education thinkers has been based on prescription, imposing on the concept a value-content of their own or some ideology or religious doctrine to which they are committed. The intention here is modified. Rather, efforts will be made at an elucidation of aims in adult education which is descriptive and, as far as possible, make it typical and therefore widely acceptable irrespective of personal, political or religious commitment. At the same time, it is hoped to show that aims imply values, that the two are so intimately related that it is possible to view them as two aspects and that values should be central, decisive and directive in the theory and practice of adult education.

Significance of Study:

For some time now, adult education has been dealing with programme. The present research, however, is concerned with process in adult education, though it has not neglected the issue of programme in adult education. While this can be seen as a novelty, it is also very significant in that it provides a conceptual basis for adult education practitioners and planners.

The first chapter reviewed the Nigerian situation and discovered that the utility of adult learning and education is taken only in the context of instrumental aims. The need for a clarification of the other side of utility thus becomes paramount. And this brings about the need for a justification of aims in adult education. In chapter two, a review of some philosophical theories of adult education is undertaken. This involves an examination of relevant theories which form the basis for the various adult education forms.

In chapter three, an attempt is made to discuss the method of philosophical analysis being employed in this study. Chapter four attempts a conceptual clarification of the concept of utilitarianism, through analysis and deduction from the theoretical explanations as they relate to adult education is done. While chapter five looks at the various forms of adult education with a view to examining the types of utilitarianism contained therein. In chapter six, happiness is redefined in such a manner as to make it achievable when set as an aim; and this has implication for the process of adult education. The Summary of the research and its attendant recommendation is undertaken in Chapter Seven.

1.5 What are Aims ?

Much of what has been said and written on educational
aims has been prescriptive; it has asserted not what they
are, but what they should be. Frequently, this prescription
is disguised by using the language of fact instead of the
language of command or obligation. Examples of such
prescription   abound in the writings of many educational-
ists. Richard Steel, for example, wrote that "it is ...
the great end of education to raise ourselves above the
vulgar"[1], and William Godwin in his case declared: "The true
object of education ... is the generation of happiness".[2]
Here, Godwin's assertion is no doubt a prescriptive
recommendation - happiness should be the 'true object'.

Similar assertion can be found in abundance in recent
times, such as Percy Nunn's: 'The primary aim of all
educational effort should be to help boys and girls to
achieve the highest degree of individual development of which
they are capable[3]; in the same vein, White stated that:

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1. Steele, quoted in Garforth, F.W. (1985): Aims, Values
         and Education. Hull, Christygate Press. p.31

2. Godwin, quoted in Garforth, F.W. (1985): Ibid. p.31

3. Nunn, P. (1945): Education: Its Data and First Principles.
         Arnold. p.5

'the central aim of education ... ought to be that the pupil becomes a morally autonomous person'.[1] Others conceal the prescription by stating it as a fact; the Norwood Report,[2] for instance, declares that the purpose of education is to provide the nurture and the environment which will enable the child to grow aright'; and Rusk[3]: 'It is the function of education to turn capacity into ability'.[3]

It is not the intention of the present chapter to prescribe what the aims of education in general and adult education in particular should be (this will be tackled later in the course of this research) nor to state what, as a matter of fact, they are or have been in a particular society at a particular time. The latter is the task of the historian, the sociologist and so on; instead, what the philosopher seeks is clarification, the elucidation of meanings, the exposure of problems but without/adopting necessarily a positive stance except where fact or logic requires it.

The first task as such will be to take a linguistic analysis of the concept of aim in educational discourse.

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1. White, J. (1982): The Aims of Education Restated. Routledge and Kegan Paul. p.140

2. Norwood Report (1943): Curriculum and Examination in Secondary Schools. London, H.M.S.O. p.55

3. Rusk, R. R. (1928): The Philosophical Bases of Education. University of London Press. p.63

The variety of words used in discussing educational aims
can be a source of uncertainty and confusion. For example,
we find: end, object, aim, purpose, function, - all of them
purportedly
⌊expressing the same meaning; also to be found are: objective,
goal, point, use, intention; while principle[s] and ideal[s] are
all used in educational discussion.

Some writers have sought in this diversity a means of
illuminating the concept of education and its family in
drawing distinctions between for example, purpose and function,
purpose and aim. Gribble[1] accuses educational sociologists
of confusing analysis of the function of education with
analysis of aims, though he too is guilty of the same offence
for he failed to elaborate on the distinction. However,
it may be said that function includes the way in which a
process works, the design of its operation, its role, and
also the way it contributes to a larger context of purposes
(e.g. the function of schools within the total system of
education) - all this in addition to the analysis of
purpose itself. But, in practical usage, the notions of
function and purpose are commonly identified, and if someone
asks: 'What is the function of X ?' he usually means 'what
is it for, what purpose does it serve ? This is well
illustrated by a sentence of Peters: "The function of the

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1. Gribble, J. (1969): Introduction to Philosophy of Education.
          England, Allyn and Bacon. p.14

formulation of aims is to specify more precisely what one is trying to achieve ..."[1]   Here, function is indistinguishable from purpose and this latter word, and many of the others listed above, could be substituted for it.

This may not be unconnected with the reason why Langford suggested that in educational discussions, aims should not be used. He pointed out that aim in educational discourse is a metaphor and that metaphors, though they may assist understanding, can also be misleading because the analogy is never exact or complete. He concludes that "it might be better ...... to abandon the misleading terminology of aims, and use instead terms like "purposes", intentions, and ideals which are tailor-made to talk about the intentional aspect of activities."[2]   Purpose, he argues, differs from aim in having no metaphorical content, in suggesting a wider and more distant perspective, and in implying an internality of viewpoint - the activity as seen by those engaged in it rather than from outside. As compared with ideal, purpose has a practical ring while "ideals are the product of reflection and may be unattainable".[3]

1.   Peters, R.S. (ed)(1973): The Philosophy of Education. England, O.U.P., p.14 .

2. Langford, G. (1968): Philosophy and Education: An Introduction. England, Macmillan Press. p.48

3. Ibid. p.54

"Ideal and principle look further than purpose", he
contended, "they reflect a view of what life and education
ought to be" and concluded that "they have an ethical content
which both guides activity and assesses its worth". [1]

In spite of all these distinctions, one is still not
very clear whether the substitution of purposes, intentions,
ideals, for the terminology of aims is likely to achieve
greater clarity in our understanding of education and what
exactly it is for.

For Peters, the situation is this. He acknowledges
the metaphor in aim and draws implications of meaning from it.
"The concept of aim", he writes, "always carries with it
some of the nuances associated with its natural home in
context of shooting and throwing". [2]   Inclusive are
concentration of attention, specification of a precise object,
difficulty of attainment and possibility of failure. He
explained that aims is like trying and so to ask a question
of what one is aiming at is just like asking what one is
trying to do. He argues that aims are an attempt to persuade
people to specify more clearly what they are trying to do
and to concentrate their efforts accordingly; they serve,
therefore, more as exhortation than as requests for explanation.

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1. Langford, G. (1968): op. cit., p.55 .

2. Peters, R.S. (ed.)(1973): op. cit., pp.12, 13.

1.6 Must An Educator have Aims ?

Garforth argued that 'education is essentially an
activity intentionally directed towards purposes more or less
clearly envisaged and must therefore exclude the unplanned
and involuntary".[1]   In the same vein, J.S. Mill, in his
inaugural address chose to confine education to the "narrow
sense — the culture which each generation purposely gives to
those who are to be its successors ..."[2]   Education,
therefore, according to these two thinkers, as a process,
is both intentional and instrumental and these features
no doubt imply that there is a purpose for undertaking the
activity (education). After having identified such purpose,
the educator, if he is to achieve this purpose, has to
determine the method by which to attain it.

To aim at something is, in other words, to concentrate
attention on an object which must be hit, or pierced, an
activity which is similar to the dart board game. Its
internal accusative target covers anything conforming to
this specification. It suggests concentration of attention
on something which is the focus of an activity.

Hence it is no surprise that Peters raised an objection
to the use of purpose or motive like aim. Questions as to

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1. Garforth, F.W. (1985): op. cit., p.46.

2. _____ (ed.)(1971): 'Inaugural Address' in John Stuart
      Mill on Education. New York, Teachers College
      Press. p.154

the purpose of a person's activity, say building a house,
or one's motive in visiting a sick friend are usually
attempts to elicit information as to what one views these
activities as leading up to; but it would be odd to ask
for the aim of these activities, if we wanted to remove our
puzzlement about their explanation. "To ask for an aim",
he writes, "is to ask for a more precise specification of
what an action or activity is".[1] Questions such as what people
are aiming at would seem to arise only in situations when
they appear rather confused about their purposes or when
they are drawing up a plan of campaign and have to formulate
what they intend to do in a coherent way. Among these, he
continued, are specification of precise object, and measures
to be taken towards its attainment.   The function of aims
he concluded, are attempts to persuade people to specify more
clearly what they are trying to do and concentrate their efforts
accordingly; they serve therefore, more as exhortation than
as requests for exploration. Merger adds,[2] that aims are
like route maps in a sense that they guide travellers to
reach their destination.

Despite all these assurances about the ability of aims
in aiding the achievement of educational activities, adult

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1. Hirst, P.H. & Peters, R.S. (1970): The Logic of Education;
       Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. p.26

2. Merger quoted in Garforth, F.W. (1985) Aims, Values and
       Education. Hull, Christygate Press. p.35 .

educators are still opposed to the idea of formulating aims
in adult education. There are two sorts of objections, at
least, which are raised - the attempt to define the aim or
aims of adult education. On the one hand, it is maintained
that such a definition would impose a limit of jurisdiction
and this will in turn have a cramping effect on the educator.
It is suggested that adult education is carried on in an
environment of personal relationships, which any defined and
defining formula must fail to take account of, to the detriment
of the/educational process. These relationships, that is,
teacher/learner rapport constitute the essence of the educational
process and can develop only in an atmosphere of spontaneity,
whereas clearly defined aims, which bring in their train sharp,
formulated methods of instruction and evaluation will no doubt
destroy the good teacher/learner relationships.

The second type of objection seems to be the generalisation
of the first in the social context. The opinion is
expressed that it should not be the special task of an
individual, or even of a restricted group of individuals,
to formulate what is in effect the joint concern of a wide
variety of persons. The formulation of an aim - which means
a common purpose - is beyond the power of anyone in the
context of the twentieth century divided society. It is
suggested further that those cleavages which exist in
contemporary society, cleavages rooted ultimately in different

socio-political and metaphysical commitments, cannot be resolved but can only be recognised.

The objections may however be met by considering in detail, the reasons for elaborating the aim of adult education. Probably the most compelling reason for clarity derives from the necessity of defining the nature of the dependence of adult education on the broad purpose of the community providing both the context and the material resources for its activities and its relative autonomy within this context. This necessity in turn stems from the fact that education in all its stages and manifestations, is a planned activity.

1.7 The Justification for the Formulation of Aims in Adult Education:

A feature of adult education is the comparative freedom of programme planners, tutors, and students to make their own decisions about what shall be taught. They are not on the whole bound by prescribed syllabuses or by externally dictated objectives. Nevertheless, such freedom carries with it, on the one hand, the responsibility for justifying what is taught and, on the other, "modes of conduct and thought which have standards written into them by reference to which it is possible to act ...". Furthermore, there has to be justification for the spending of public money, there has

1. Lawson, K.H. (1973): 'The Justification of Objectives in Adult Education'. in Studies in Adult Education, Vol.5, No.1 .

to be justification in terms of the tradition and aims of
the providing institutions, and there has to be justification
on educational grounds, that is, in terms of basic conceptions
of what education is, and what it is for. We shall in the
course of this research examine the various aims ascribed
to adult education with a view to justifying these aims as
means of promoting the happiness of the adult. But for the
present, we shall be concerned with justification of aims
in educational activities.

The more widespread questioning of educational aims and
objectives and curriculum content and methods which has
developed in school education has focused attention upon the
question of justification and the value basis on which
justification rests. It has attracted the interest of many
educational philosophers and there have been a number of
attempts to provide an underlying rational for the educational
curriculum. Peters, for example, has argued that the
commitment to truth underlies education, while Hirst starts
from the nature and forms of knowledge; Phenix in his case
is concerned with the realms of meaning and Belth contents
himself with man as a builder and manipulator of symbols.

All these, including the wide range of social, moral
and political ideologies found among educators pose
difficulty and conflict   for anyone who attempts to
formulate a common experience.

1. Peters, R.S. (1966): Ethics and Education; Hirst, P.H. 'Liberal Education
        and the Nature of Knowledge'; in Archambault, R.D. (ed.)(1965)
        Philosophical Analysis and Education; Belth, M. (1965)
        Education and Discipline.

A resolution might be found in Peter's Ethics and Education
where he argues in favour of what amounts to
transcedental imperative, which helps the teacher to decide
on what he ought to do in respect of his curriculum. He
claims that "in more settled times, only the reflective
teacher was led to probe behind tradition for a rationale
of what he ought to do; nowadays, it is only the lazy or
dogmatic who can avoid such probing".[1] Peters, while claiming
that the standards of education are intrinsic, argues that
what is worthwhile in education derives its worthwhileness
"from the characters of the activities themselves and from
the form of life in which practical discourse has emerged
as a type of public discourse which is widespread in our
society".[2] Thus, commitment to truth becomes the touch stone
which is used as the justification of all curriculum
activities.

As for Hirst, his justification for building curriculum
is in terms of the categories of knowledge which he identifies
as being fundamental culturally. These categories or 'forms'
are identified as having their own central concepts: for
example, those of gravity acceleration, hydrogen and photo-
synthesis characteristic of the sciences; number, integral
and matrix in mathematics; God, sin and predestination in
religion; ought, good and wrong in moral knowledge.[3]

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1. Peters, R.S. (1966): op. cit., p.93

2. _____ (1967): 'In Defence of Bingo: A Rejoinder'; in
    British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol.XV,
    p.191

3. Hirst, P.H. (1965): 'Liberal Education and the Nature
    of Knowledge'; in Archambault, R.D. (ed.)
    op. cit., pp.128-129.

The forms have their own logical structure, techniques and skills, criteria and tests, by means of which we can explore our experience and conceptualise knowledge of our world. In as much as we are inheritors of public forms of knowledge in terms of which we operate and develop, then the educator's task is to encourage and assist individuals to operate more effectively within those forms or structures. He states their importance as:

(a) representing the whole cognitive framework of concepts and public criteria by which "the life of man in every particular is patterned and ordered. Without its structure, all other forms of consciousness, including, for example, emotional experiences or mental attitudes and beliefs, would seem to be unintelligible".[1]

(b) representing the ways through which mind itself is developed. "To be without any knowledge at all is to be without mind in any significant sense ...... The acquisition of knowledge is itself a development of mind and new knowledge means a new development of mind in some sense ... to fail to acquire knowledge of a certain fundamental kind, is to fail to achieve rational mind .... .[2]

This has at least provided a sufficient justification for curriculum activities.

Relating this justification to adult education, it could be argued that at least a partial solution to the problem of authority is offered. The question of who decides on

1. Hirst, P.H. 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge'. in Archambault, R.D. op. cit., p.124.

2. _____ (1969): 'The Logic of the Curriculum'. Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol.1, p.150.

what to teach is an important one; as the reliance on the
concept of meeting needs shows, some adult educators are wary
of determining objectives for others. But the arguments made
so far provide a basis of authority for doing so, which is
beyond both tutor and student. Education is in a sense made
neutral to specific personal and social demands because of
the attempt to root educational values in the most general
characteristics of society, knowledge, and man as they are
understood. The general objectives of education are deduced
internally from the concept of education itself. To be
engaged in an educational activity is to be logically concerned
with those things that are built into the definition.

The most important reasons for having a declared aim
have still, however to be stated. It is the aim, whether
declared or implicit, which conditions, sometimes determines
the method of education. As there are only a limited number of
aims possible for the educationalist, corresponding to the
potentials of the human species in the available environments,
so the methods of instruction are even more limited. If we
define our aim in terms of the individuality we wish to
foster, this automatically precludes certain
procedures, and indicates equally automatically certain other
procedures. It is not surprising that discussion of aim is

often deprecated and that the disputants thereupon dangle
on the field of method; the overlapping of aim and method
is so close that when the method is decided, this decides
the aim which may then be left undiscussed and undeclared.
In other words, unthinking routine can then be substituted
for critical awareness - a consumation often devoutly wished
by the educator. But a declared aim has these advantages
over a routine application of a stereotyped method:

(a) it can lead to a nice discrimination between methods
     based on a reasoned appreciation of their uses and
     their limits;

(b) it allows a modification of particulars of the method
     on the basis of principles since it offers a criterion
     by which the success or otherwise of the process as a
     whole and its several parts may be evaluated.

This is the ultimate justification of a discussion of
educational aims, that such discussion, unless it degenerates
into frivolous academic debate, tends to the betterment of
the instruction and this in turn reacts beneficially on those
personal relationships involved which many believe to be
at the heart of the educational process.

CHAPTER TWO

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF ADULT
EDUCATION AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

2.1 The Aims of Adult Education:

The philosophy of adult education can be traced to
those writers who see the aim of adult education as related
firstly to society, secondly, to those who see the aim of
adult education as an individual growth and development
irrespective of societal concerns and, thirdly, to those who
are concerned with the extent to which adult education should
work towards social change: the / has been interpreted by some
people to mean revolution.

Merriam[1] made an illuminating explanation concerning
these three aims. For those who see the aim of adult
education as related to society, reference was made to
Bergevin and Lindeman. Bergevin[2] recognized the validity of
presenting the adult an opportunity to advance as a maturing
individual. However, this maturity should be tailored towards
helping him to learn how to contribute his share to the
civilizing process. This aim may not be as easy to achieve
as the prescription goes. For an individual to be able to

1. Merriam, S. (1977):'Philosophical Perspectives on Adult
       Education: A Critical Review of the Literature',
       Adult Education, Vol. XXVII, No.4 .
2. Bergevin, Paul (1967): A Philosophy for Adult Education.
       New York; Seabury Press. pp. 3 & 4.

realise that there is something good he has to contribute
to complement a society, such an individual must have been
a typical individual whose life orientation is higher than
the Society in which he is living. If that be so, whatever
contribution (no doubt better) he is making would be a kind
of imposition. But there is nothing wrong in this, provided
that the contribution can be justified as making the Society
a more conducive place to live than hitherto. Though Mill
would not allow an individual's freedom to be toyed with,
suggested that those who have been judged as better knowledged
should be allowed to take lead in decision matters. So,
adult education which is aimed at nurturing the individual
to become a better member of the society should be undertaken
by those who are knowledgeable.

As for Lindeman, his views about the nature of man is
that he is a social being. He thus emphasized individual
growth and a situation-approach to learning. Man is to learn
what his situation indicates. This bears a semblance to
Champion's article: 'Towards an Ontology of Adult Education'
who claims that attempts to declare and justify our objectives
is in the state of affairs. The goals of adult education
according to Lindeman are derived from the surrounding
culture. He however emphasised on the democratic ideals

Champion, A. (1975): 'Towards an Ontology of Adult Education';
  Studies in Adult Education, Vol.7, No.1 .

as an aim. These two thinkers would want to see adult education in relation to societal improvement.

Knowles presents a contrast to Bergevin and Lindeman with his emphasis on individual development apart from external concerns. The aim of adult education is to help adults become liberated. He speaks of a model of a 'free man' but this is not a stereotyped model, since each individual himself defines what he will be when free. [1] All adult educators can rally round this common aim, he feels, because it allows for any type of adult education as long as the individual sees it as liberating. Society does not enter into the process except as a vehicle for providing a full range of choices to a potential participant in adult education. What Knowles perhaps overlooks here is that some selectivity must of necessity operate in providing opportunities and information to a learner. And what is selected to help an individual become liberated will depend, to some extent, on the existing social norms and values, together with the philosophy of the chooser.

An individualistic view would be consistent with the claim of Wiltshire[2] that individualism is a significant and

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1. Knowles, M. (1957) "Philosophical Issues that Confront Adult Educators"; Adult Education. Vol.VII, No.1, U.S.A.

2. Wiltshire, H. (1976): 'The Nature and Uses of Adult Education' in The Spirit and the Forum. (ed.) Rogers, A. Nottingham; Department of Adult Education, University of Nottingham. pp. 136-144.

dominant aim in adult education. Individuation he defines as self-discovery, and self-development voluntarily undertaken and this determines curriculum, organisation and method. Hence the ideology of adult education, according to Griffin[1] is identified as the needs, access and provision.

John Hostler in a recent monograph on 'The aims of Adult Education' concludes by identifying three most fundamental aims of adult education.

> The most fundamental of them all is autonomy, which prescribes the students right to choose the classes he will attend and to evaluate their success. Autonomy in turn implies individuality, which enjoins that he should develop in a unique way and that he should be able to select from a very broad curriculum. [2]

The aims of adult education may well be as Hostler claims, those of autonomy, individuality and equality.

No doubt, Paulo Freire is a kind of revolutionary. For him the world, the third world at least, consist of the oppressed and the oppressors. In his opinion, the aim of adult education is to liberate the oppressed and in so doing, also free the oppressor. This is done through a process he calls conscientisation. The revolutionary aspect enters into the process when human beings, having been aware of their plight, no longer tolerate their oppressed condition. A struggle to change the basic structure of society comes as a necessary part of such rejection. While Pedagogy of the oppressed can be criticized because its philosophical terminology is often difficult to grasp, Freire's position

1. Griffin, C. (1983): Curriculum Theory in Adult and Lifelong Education. London, Croom Helm. Chp.3

2. Hostler, J. (1981): The Aims of Adult Education, Monograph 17, May; Manchester University.

3. Freire, P. (1972): Pedagogy of the Oppressed. England; Penguin Books Ltd.

and its direct implications for adult education emerge clearly from the text.

Broudy reacts to what he calls the unqualified autonomy of the adult learner. If the emphasis is solely upon the individual, then "the problem of aims in adult education becomes, so far as the educator is concerned, a problem of means; in short, the problem disappears."[1] Neither does Broudy feel that adult education should only prepare/adults to effectively play their roles in society. This social roles approach, he argues, produces a dangerous conformity to institutional patterns. Rather, Broudy sees man as being in an <u>existential or cultural predicament</u> caught between the demands of a modern system of mass production and the democratic commitment to individual freedom and development. "The aim of adult education", he recommends, "is to make every adult aware of their predicament and his role in it. Adults who are sensitized to their predicament will then commit themselves to a self-cultivation".[2] It might be argued that Broudy over-estimates the motivation and/or ability to deal with one's predicament even though it has been acknowledged. The issue of whether adult educators should focus on developing

1. Broudy, H.S. (1960) <u>Aims in Adult Education: A Realist's View</u>. Chicago; Centre for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults. page 7.

2. Broudy, H.S. (1960) <u>Ibid.</u> p.11

self-directing individual learners or promote a positive

social order is still very much alive today.

But do we need a purpose in adult education ? asks

Lawson.[1] By purpose, he means an objective - an aim or a task

that is external to the idea of adult education. Left to him,

he does not think that adult education needs a purpose beyond

that of teaching adults about certain areas of human

experience and helping them to develop in certain ways which

are thought to be important. He affirmed that education is

of value as an end in itself; yet there is in adult education

an apparent desire for external objectives, and there are

claims that this is its prime purpose. There is no doubt,

however, that adult education is justified because it fulfils

particular external purposes or aims, a situation of failing

to achieve these specific purposes could arise. If it be so,

would it not be right to say that adult education is not

justified because it has not been successful or that the

particular purpose indicated were, after all, only arbitrarily

selected, and that adult education is worthwhile on its own

without the external aims? He went on to say that the

concept of an educational situation contains at least the

idea of an ordered logical study; of problems approached

in a rational way; of analysis and categorisation, and of

evaluation and judgement. "We pre-suppose", he said, "the

building of structures of knowledge with publicly. shared

1. Lawson, K.H. (1968): 'The Concept of 'Purpose';
    Adult Education, Vol.41, No.4, November. p.165

concepts tested against publicly accredited criteria.
We expect that certain skills will be developed and that there
may also be a development of aesthetic appreciation and of
moral judgement."[1] He is opposed to imposition of aims and
objectives and advocates for purposes internal to the concept
of education. He concludes that some of these characteristics
are what we regard as essential ingredients in our conception
of a developed individual. Since a society is made up of
individuals, it means that a civilised society will be that
which is made up of such developed individuals we have been
talking about. He therefore urged adult educators to have
a concern for their subject and for their students' responses
to it. They are not concerned as tutors with the many
possible uses to which the results of their educational
encounters might be put, for it would be impossible to
foresee, yet alone teach, with specific end products in mind.
So, they might well say that their teaching has no purpose
other than those contained in their conception of education.
What this implied is that adult education is not the same
thing as adult training.

Paterson on his own, based his rejection of imposed
aims on the basis that the adult is an autonomous person.
He rejected the aim of adult education as an agent of social
change. He argued that if adult education were to become
harnessed to the promotion of a set of social causes, then

1. Lawson, K.H. (1968); op. cit. p.169

it would become servile to those causes. Education is the
fearless transmission of truth and this knowledge is morally,
socially and politically neutral. An educative society
therefore is such a society that welcomes exposure to the
truth about itself, listens to continuous criticism, rational
and objective for the purpose of checks and balances.
"Social Change", he concluded, "however desirable in itself,
is for the educator, not an aim, but simply another subject
for unbiased investigation, for the development of free and
critical inquiry, and for that undeviating and fearless
transmission of truth which education essentially is."[1]
The aim of education, according to him, **is to transmit**
knowledge which is educationally worthwhile. He argues
consistently that just as he would not have adult education
promote social change, neither would he have it defend the
status quo.

There seems to be very little consensus as to the aims
and objectives of adult education. The spectrum ranges from
Freire's advocacy of radical social change to Lawson's and
Paterson's rejection of any goal save that of education for
its own sake.

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1.   Paterson, R.W.K. (1973): 'Social Change as an Educational
             Aim'; Adult Education, Vol.45, No.6, March,
             p.359.

In the absence of any agreed definition of 'adult education', one of the major problems which faces any writer in this controversial field is the difficulty of looking beyond the arguments about goals, objectives and purposes.[1] In common with other forms of education, adult education is presumed to have a specific effect on its learners. Consequently, there is, in the literature on the subject, a continuing debate about what that effect should be. Debate, in other words, is *not* only about the goals or tasks of this particular form of education, but also about the more fundamental question of the relationship between adult education and the society in which its activities are carried out. The relationship between adult education and the society within which its activities are carried out is a crucial one; it consists of defined goals, purposes and interests which combine to form, in Merton's words: 'a frame of aspirational reference'.[2] Some of these interests are those of society, others are more individualistic in their

1. Thomas, J.E. (1982): Radical Adult Education: Theory and Practice. Nottingham, Dept. of Adult Education.

2. Merton, R.K. (1938): 'Social Structure and Anomie'. American Sociological Review, Vol.3, p.673 .

subjectivity, but in either case, different interpretations
have been put upon them by a number of international writers.

Thomas[1] writes that the interaction between interests
and activities provides for adequate theoretical framework
from which an examination of the relationship between adult
education and society can be based. Although a great part
of the literature of adult education is concerned with practice
rather than theory, it is possible to see two interpretations
of societal interests which approximate to conflict and
consensus view, respectively, of Society. Conflict theorists
approach the question of interests from the standpoint of the
various individuals and groups within society. The needs and
desires of these factions, rather than the needs of society
as a whole, motivate their attitudes towards the division
of power and privilege. Their attitude was summed up by
Parsons who commented that:-

> The essential point is that, to Mills,
> power is not a facility for the performance
> of function in and on behalf of the Society
> as a system, but is interpreted exclusively
> as a facility for getting what one group, the
> holders of power, wants by preventing another
> group, the "outs" from getting what it wants .[2]

1.   Thomas, J.E. (1982); Radical Adult Education: Theory
           and Practice. Dept. of Adult Education,
           University of Nottingham.

2.   Parsons, T. (1957): 'The Distribution of Power in
           American Society'. World Politics. Vol.10,
           October, p.139.

Consensus, or functionalist, theorists, in contrast, approach the problem of societal interests from the viewpoint of society as a whole. The interests of society are then seen to be compatible with the interests of the individual, for it is the interests of the latter, as part of the whole which govern the needs and requirements of the total social system. The cohesion, stability and persistence of this consensus model therefore emphasise, not interests and power, but the significance of norms and values which are seen to be the basic elements of social life. To these theorists, adult education is not a facility for promoting the social policies of a particular group, but it is a means of transmitting the inherited knowledge and culture of the whole society. Value-judgements are then concerned with cognitive rather than social or political values.

Despite a widespread criticism of these consensus/conflict models of society, a criticism which has become one of the principal issues in the recent literature of social theory, both theories have a particular relevance in the analysis of the relationship between adult education and society. The nature of individual interests, as they are interpreted by supporters of the conflict model of society, suggests that to the mature adult, education is seen as a means whereby the power, prestige and privilege of the individual can be

increased. More importantly, the identification of the conflict
tend to change, encourage the belief that adult education is
primarily a vehicle of change. This concept of adult education
as a radical force, seeking to make a major impact on society,
means that an education programme is only valid or viable if
it seems to challenge basic assumptions about socio-economic
structures, value systems, and cultural and aesthetic norms.
There is a total rejection of any interpretation of goals of
adult education which identifies these goals with the
maintenance of the existing social system.

Supporters of the consensus model, believe that adult
education has no role as an instigator or supporter of change.
Society, that is its structures, value systems and norms, is
therefore accepted as a static framework which provides the
boundaries within which the activities of adult education should
be carried out. From this point of view, it is not the primary
task of adult education to challenge the validity of this
framework, although such a challenge may arise as a result
of the effect of education on societal interests.

The distinction between these two interpretations of the
relationship between adult education and society is, however,
rarely expressed in terms of polar extremes. The concepts of
adult education as a radical force, primarily seeking to make
a major impact on society, or as a conservative man are graduated.

They are, therefore, best seen as parts of a continuum.
At one extreme is the view that any system of adult education
which is to be effective, must challenge established economic
and social assumptions. At the other, is the view that adult
education contributes to the preservation of the existing
system.

Much as there appears to be distinction between these
two models theoretically, it will not be surprising to
discover that in practice, however, it may be difficult to
identify the particular characteristics which are usually
attributed to the two models in question. But in an attempt
at a reconciliation, it is important to remember that the
creation of the models owes a great deal to ideology.
For the adult educators, therefore, their importance is not
derived from their methodological correctness, but from the
reasoned ideological arguments which underlie the defence of
either or both of the two models. One effect of this, is that
the concept of maintenance, as it is interpreted by the
supporters of this idea of the relationship between adult
education and society, is associated with a wish to maintain
the existence of those norms which are considered to be the
basis of social life. They are particularly involved in the
maintenance of the underlying system or values which influence
the norms to be found throughout the society. There is

this ample evidence of a developed interest, not only in
ensuring a sense of commitment to those norms, but also in
creating consensus on the values which produce them. The most
suitable situation for ensuring the development of adult
education programmes oriented to these ends is found, it is
believed, in a stable social system which encourages the
maintenance of the status quo. Here, the formulation of
societal goals, in terms of the accepted norms and the creation
of a harmonious sense of values, encourages the creation of
teaching programmes which are specifically designed to
encourage social integration.[1]

The possibility of change is not excluded from consideration.
To be accepted as valid, however, this must be a planned
change which arises as society, as a whole, adapts to
universally accepted amendments to existing norms and values,
changes which are reflections of sectional interests are
disregarded on the grounds that these do not contribute
towards the maintenance of the whole. A resulting pre-
occupation with the believed needs of society can be discerned
in most discussions about the role of adult education in
relation to socio-cultural factors. Among these, for example,
a frequent cause of controversy arises from the postulated
need to produce a large number of educated specialists who can

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1. Cohen, P. (1968) Modern Social Theory. Heineman,

fill appointments as administrators, professionals, and
managers. It is here that the liberal versus vocational
argument is most frequently waged, although the force of
arguments used is weakened by the general agreement that
there is a need to achieve a synthesis between the two
conception of a literary or technical culture.

Another social need which, it is argued, can be filled
through the medium of adult education programmes, is the
requirement of Society for "productive workers who enjoy
their lives. This means the most economical and effective
use of manpower, and it also means that happiness is a factor
in efficiency."[1] The implications of this as an educational
goal are far-reaching. For many employers of labour, it
endows their belief in a custodial model of organizational
behaviour, in which the natural measure of morale is employee
satisfaction. Consequently, they approve or support adult
education activities which contribute to the development of
employee maintenance needs and increase the latter's
organizational dependency. After all, there is no dividing
line, the importance of adult education is that it should be
useful to the individual, the society, to the sponsors
whether government or philanthropists.

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1. Ottaway, A. K. (1953) Education and Society. Routledge
    and Kegan Paul, p.92

In other words, whether we agree with the consensus
or conflict ideologies, adult education is concerned with
the performance of alternate actions which are likely to
maximize the probable happiness of humanity as a whole.
The problem that is likely to arise from this utilitarian
position of adult education in the Society is that of making
moral decisions, that is, the problem of deciding what the
morally right action is in a given situation or in a given
class of situations. We shall defer discussion on this
question, until such a time when we shall have analysed the
concept of utility in Chapter Four. All that need to be
said here is that this issue falls within the realm of rule
and act utilitarianism, and that it will be argued later
that while utilitarianism is concerned with general practices,
moral rules are empirical generalization to all practices.

2.2 Humanistic Adult Education:

Humanism is a system of views based on respect for the
dignity and rights of man, his value as a personality, concern
for his welfare, his all-round development, and the creation
of favourable conditions of social life. It grew into a
distinct ideological movement at the time of the Renaissance
when it figured prominently as an element of bourgeois ideology
opposed to feudalism and medieval theology. It proclaimed
freedom of the individual, opposed religious asceticism,
vindicated men's right to pleasure and the satisfaction of

earthly requirements.

Humanism reached its zenith in the works of the 18th century
enlightenment, who put forward the slogans of liberty,
equality and fraternity and proclaimed men's right freely
to develop their natural essense.

Humanistic education therefore is based on forms of
education in various subjects aiming towards a greater
individual self-awareness as well as a mutual understanding
among people and cultures. Consequently, the humanist as a
scholar, we are told, was one dedicated to "learning for
learning's sake, _otium_, remaining within the limits of human
knowledge, aimed at neither transcendence nor practical
purpose".[1] The 15th century 'humanista' in the Italian
Universities studied and taught humanae litterae.(humane letters)
The curriculum contents are precisely stated as literature,
history, philosophy, languages and such social science
subjects. But contrary to the above observation is the
following comment:

> Humanistic education is more a diffuse and
> multiplex phenomenon than one that may be
> sharply caught and defined. Although in its
> own apologies it distinguishes itself quite

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1. Giustiniani, V.R. (1985): 'Homo, Humanus and the Meanings
   of Humanism'; in Journal of the History of Ideas,
   Vol.XLIV, No.2, April-June. p.171

> dramatically from other educational systems
> its rationale is elusive and the educationist
> must find his way through a series of exhortations,
> general statements on education ... and recipes
> for particular methods.[1]

One rarely finds extended statements of educational theory

that give enough detail and elaborated justification with

which to concur or not. While one is worried as to the

cause of the controversy, it was not difficult to detect

the genesis of Williams and Foster's contrasting ideas

to the tradition of humanism that we used to know. The

1971-72 Education Index which they cited as their point of

reference contained an entry where mention was made of a

'new' humanism in current educational thought. The entry,

according to the authors, defines the new humanism in the

following way.

> While traditional humanism views mankind in
> need of shaping from without because of an
> innate flaw, the new humanism sees the individual
> person containing within himself the power and
> pattern of his own development.[2]

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1.   Williams, A.J. and Foster, L.E. (1979): 'The Rhetoric
          of Humanistic Education'; in the Journal of
          Educational Thought. Vol.13, No.1, p.37.

2.   Ibid. p.38.

Not only does this new humanism show no continuity with this tradition, it also shows no continuity whatsoever with that faith in the power of human institutions to contribute towards betterment of life which Baier[1] identified as part of the modern conception of humanism inherited from the Renaissance. On the contrary, it is extremely sceptical towards all forms of institutionalized learning, most especially schooling, and emphasises the value of personal autonomy in its most radical form. In fact, roots of the kind of theoretical individualism suggested by the 'new' humanism can be traced back to the anti-Enlightenment naturalistic philosophy of Rousseau's Emile, which in like manner aligns itself 'in favour of the individual as an educational good in itself, and as prior to the consideration of the individual's contribution to society'.[2]

Power, independently of Williams and Foster, writes about 'romantic' humanism as constituting a distinctive if ill-defined trend in contemporary educational theory. He also attributes to this trend the same characteristic attributed to the 'new' humanism by the latter, distinguishing within it the same kind of radical subjectivism and eventually describing it as follows:

> what we shall call romantic humanism exudes
> an abundance of self-sufficiency and self-
> confidence. Tilting on the verge of arrogance
> it turns its back on the past, finds nothing

1. Baier, K.E. (1980): 'Freedom, Obligation and Responsibility' quoted in Wain, K. (1987): Philosophy of Lifelong Education. Croom Helm. p.106

2. Williams, A.J. and Foster, L.E. (1979): op. cit., p.40

of much worth in tradition, and justifies the
motives of each person to find his own satisfaction
in a face-to-face confrontation with reality[1].

2.2.1 Adult Education and 'Romantic' Humanism:

A comparison between the characteristics of the
educational theory of 'romantic' humanism, as identified by
Williams and Foster, and Power, and certain prominent aspects
of the lifelong education literature reveals some very close
similarities of viewpoint between them. With reference to the
former, both sets of authors agree on its main theoretic
framework such as exists; that the major influences on it
come from the humanistic psychology movement of the 1960s,
more particularly from the work of Rogers[2] and Maslow[3] whose
psychotherapies are based on fulfilment theories of the
personality. We find a variety of learning theories within
educational psychology, from B. F. Skinner's work on operant
conditioning to Carl Rogers' person centred approach. It is
the work of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow — both of whom
representative of humanistic psychology — which has had

1. Power, E.J. (1982): Philosophy of Education: Studies in
        Philosophies, Schooling and Educational Policies;
        New Jersey, Prentice Hall. p.159

2. Rogers, C.R. (1968): Freedom to Learn. U.S.A.,
        Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company.

3. Maslow, A.H. (1968): Towards a Psychology of Being.
        New York, D. Van Nostrand Company, 2nd ed.

profound effects upon recent developments in adult education.
Thus many of the techniques for teaching adults to be found
in the literature of the 60s and 70s have their roots in the
belief that learning involves self-awareness, "self-
actualization" in Maslow's terminology, and student's
participation in, and responsibility for, his own learning.
At the same time, Williams and Foster identify within it a
rationale couched in a sociological context characterized by
two main factors: a stress on the rapidity of change in the
environment calling for a new type of educated person able to
cope with such change, and, an attempt to mitigate the effects
of alienation on human beings living in technological
environments. The thrust of humanistic psychology in response
to these twin factors is toward a theory of motivation with
an emphasis on the growth of self-awareness as an ultimate
good.

Williams and Foster further point out that, eventually,
this emphasis, as is to be expected, is directed towards
objectives that focus upon the self-realization principle
in life, a principle which implies that 'the thrust of human
activities in healthy persons is towards growth, fulfilment
and creativity'. The principle, they say, is given its
theoretical shape by Rogers, who 'crystallizes his philosophy
of the person as he works through therapy'. In accordance
with the aims of this therapy:

·The client will move away from facades; he will
move away from 'oughts'; he will move away from
pleasing 'others'; he will move toward self-
direction, toward being process, toward openness
to experience, toward acceptance of others and
toward trust of self. [1]

And Maslow similarly emphasises this 'auto-centred'
approach, his theoretic approach being, like that of Rogers,
radically subjectivist. For both, the focus is on the
individual who, for good measure and consistently with
naturalistic philosophies, is also regarded _a priori_ as being
essentially good and perfectible.

As in therapy, the central aim of the educational outlook
of 'romantic' humanism, the authors continue, is to make the
learner progressively more self-aware, more in touch with
himself, his own uniqueness, how he differs from others.
There is therefore a centering of authority within the learner
himself which, taken together with the therapeutic pedagogy
implied by humanistic psychology, evidently transforms the
typical role of the educator away from its traditional form.
So that it actually comes to resemble that of the therapist,
its central task being to develop within the learner an attitude
of responsibility towards his own learning.

The lifelong education literature shares all these
tendencies, beginning with the sociological context. Lifelong

1.   Williams, A. J. and Foster, L.E. (1979): 'The Rhetoric
        of Humanistic Education', in The Journal of
        Educational Thought, Vol.13, No.1, p.43 .

education theory similarly locates its own rationale and justification within societies that are undergoing change at an accelerated rate pressed on directly or indirectly by the effects of a scientific and technological revolution which has assumed the proportions of a veritable 'knowledge explosion' in our times. This 'knowledge explosion', in turn, renders the traditional view of education as the transmission of a stock of knowledge from one generation to the next and as the forming of a stereotyped personality, irrelevant. Thus the Faure report speaks about the need for a new education for a 'new' individual, one who both understands in its different effects and dimensions, and is able to cope with it and turn its potential to positive outcomes.[1]

From a narrower angle than the above, Power states that the common theme of 'romantic humanism is exhibited most clearly in its criticism of traditional schooling. And this again is another clear point of similarity it shares with the lifelong education programme. One recalls among Dave's[2] 'concept characteristics' one that refers to the lifelong education programme as providing 'an antidote to the shortcomings of the existing formal education system'. And the criticism goes far beyond that of historical irrelevance just referred to. In his book on Gelpi, Ireland provides a synthesized list of the

1. Faure, E. et al., (1972): Learning to Be. London, Harrap.
2. Dave, R.H. (ed)(1976): Foundations of Lifelong Education. Oxford, Pergamon Press.

objections against existent schooling recurrent in the lifelong education literature and these are, in essence, very close to the one attributed to 'romantic' humanists by Williams and Foster, and Power.[1]

Thus Power,[2] for instance, says that the main charge 'romantic' humanists level against schools is that they are 'little more than assembly lines perpetuating a conspiracy against individuality by accepting a commission to produce a standard product', this neglect of individuality being typically described as 'dehumanizing' for the learner.[3] And the same accusation is made on the width of lifelong education by Lengrand[4] who similarly complains that no consideration is allowed in schools for individual differences of character. On the contrary, pupils who do not conform to pattern become marginal, as do those whose rate of development is slower than the 'average'.

Moreover, he argues, the need for selection prevails over pedagogical considerations and failure is thus institutionalised at the cost of senseless wastage of intellectual and monetary investment. Education should, Lengrand says, allow every individual to develop in accordance with his own nature and as a function of learning capacities that are his own, not in terms of ready-made models

1. Ireland, T.D. (1978): Gelpi's View of Lifelong Education. Manchester Monographs 14, University of Manchester, pp. 8 - 10.

2. Power, E. J. (1982): op. cit., p.160

3. Faure, E. et al., (1972): op. cit., p.95

4. Lengrand, P. (1975): An Introduction to Lifelong Education. London, Croom Helm.

models suited for one kind of personality, that of the 'gifted' pupil who learns easily and does not question the school order.

Finally, and from a slightly different point of view, he charges schools, as presently organized, of resting on a truncated conception of the human personality in that the capacity to acquire knowledge is given precedence over all other forms of expression; emotional, social, aesthetic or physical. They therefore adopt a learning programme which not only has the practical effect of fragmenting the personality but also of separating the individual from life.[1]

All these tendencies are appearing at a time when, lifelong education theorists argue, the human personality is already constantly menaced with 'abstraction', threatened with falling victims to elements within our contemporary civilization that conspire to divide it, to break up its unity. Lengrand is not the only one who emphasises these 'alienating' effects of the modern situation on persons, Suchodolski and others do so also.[2] In addition, however, Lengrand, like the Faure report, repeatedly accuses the school of contributing greatly to the 'dissociation of the parts of the personality' which is the main symptom of this alienation. This is because, corresponding with the priority given to knowledge acquisition, the school arbitrarily isolates one aspect of the personality, the

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1. Lengrand, P. (1975): op. cit., pp.78-79

2. Ibid. p.95

intellectual aspect in its cognitive form, as being alone educationally relevant while the other aspects are forgotten or neglected and either 'shrink to an embryonic state' or develop in a disordered fashion, threatening the very balance of the personality. In this situation, Lengrand argues, some essential elements of the human person are actually either atrophied by schooling or else are temporarily, and even, sometimes, permanently paralised.

While the Faure Report says:

> The neglect and disdain from which some elements
> of educational programmes continue to suffer, the
> deficiencies and imbalance of curricular appear
> to us to be among the most serious symptoms of the
> disease of which education is both the symptoms
> and the cause. The separation of its intellectual,
> physical, aesthetic, moral and social components is
> an indication of alienation, undervaluation and
> mutilation of the human person.[1]

And again we find that this tendency to separate education from life similarly constitutes the grounds for serious complaints levelled against schooling by romantic humanists. Couching their objections similarly in the language of 'relevance' they ask how schooling can be educationally relevant when in schools 'thought' is falsely divorced from 'life' which, they argue, is the crucible of real not fictional problems.

1.   Faure, E. et al., (1972): op. cit., p.69

And, in any case, they insist, the question of relevance is not one that can be decided by the school since, in fact, it is really a personal one and as such requires a private verdict not a statement of policy. For these reasons, there is a tendency among 'romantic' humanists to conclude that traditional schooling is largely a waste of time while, at the same time and for the most part, drawing back, like the lifelong education movement, from the inference that the whole concept of school be abolished.

The Faure report, in effect, regards the deschooling thesis as an'extreme' one based on the erroneous postulate that 'education constitutes an independent variable in each society.[1] What is in question for lifelong education theorists is not whether school in itself is important or necessary, but whether it is a good thing in its current form. From this point of view, the problem is not only that current schooling preserves the outworn formulae of the past but also that it continues to project the same dichotomies of the past, and there can be no remedy for this situation. Lifelong education theorists hold that before schools recognize this, at a time when abstract knowledge is coming to be viewed more and more as part of a continual process, acting on and reacting to daily life, new solutions are required. For on such recognition depends the further recognition that the common stream of education in schools should combine theory, techniques

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1. Faure, E.L. et al., (1972): op. cit., pp.20-21

and practice, intellectual and manual labour.

The dislocation of these different combinations
constitutes in concrete form the much criticized separation
of education from life; its consequence in psychological
terms, is that the child's personality is split between two
worlds each discordant with the other; one in which it learns
like a 'disembodied creature', some 'anti-educationsl'
activity. A conclusive comment on this issue is that:

> most education systems do not help their clients –
> whether they be youngsters or adults – to discover
> themselves, to understand the components of their
> conscious and unconscious personalities, the
> mechanisms of the brain, the operation of the
> intelligence, the laws governing their physical
> development, the meaning of their relations with
> one another and with the community at large.[1]

Yet another point of agreement between the two sides relates
to their criticism of the monopoly the school has always
exercised on education. That monopoly, both argue, helps
to conceal the insufficiency of what is on offer as against
the real educational needs of contemporary individuals.
Both, therefore, emphasise the educational importance of
the wider society. 'Romantic' humanists, rather surprisingly

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1. Faure, E.L. et al., (1972): op. cit.,   p.66

insist that 'social interaction' is the great educator; but the explanation could be that they view such interaction as a way to 'curb the school's pretensions'.[1] Similarly, the Faure report argues that the school must be transcended by 'broadening the educational function to the dimensions of society as a whole. It quotes Plutarch, in this connection, who said that 'the city is the best teacher', approvingly, and, of course, devotes much space to the elaboration of the principles and practices of the 'learning society'.[2] Williams and Foster refer to the seven goals which Roberts has claimed to be the main ones for a humanistic education. These concern:

> personal development, creative behaviour,
> inter-personal awareness, subject orientation,
> specific context, method of teaching, and
> teachers and administrators.[3]

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1. Power, E. J. (1982) op. cit., p.161

2. Faure, E. et al., (1972) op. cit., p.62

3. The authors have taken this quotation from Roberts, T.B. 'Seven major Foci on Affective Experiences: A Typology for Education Design, Planning, Analysis and Research' In Roberts, T. (ed.) (1975) Four Psychologies Applied to Education; New York, John Wiley.

What is especially interesting about these 'goals' and 'imperatives', because they are so close in essence (and sometimes even in description) to those distinguished in various places by lifelong education theorists, is their provenience. They are, Williams and Foster say, inspired:

(1) by the Social Education movement, which sought to foster cooperative individualism through education;

(2) by Progressive Education, whose common principles were seen by Dewey as the expression and cultivation of individuality, free activity, learning through experience, acquiring new skills as a means to attaining ends, concentration on the 'here and now', and acquaintance with a changing world; and

(3) by the Open Education movement which encourages an equally active role for teacher and learner in order to develop greater classroom democracy with an emphasis on a cooperative sharing environment.[1]

If the ordinary person is to live a life that shows the fullest realization of his potential as a human being, that prepares him for immersion into the mainstream of his cultural heritage, that equips him for genuine decision-making on fundamental social and moral questions, then that person must receive a humanistic education is the suggestion put forward by Gregor.[2] No reason is given for the advocation

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1. Roberts, T. (ed)(1975): op. cit., p.40
2. Gregor, A. (1981): 'Humanism: A Definition of Literacy'. in The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol.15, No.1, December, p.208

of this model of education. However, Kraut contends that "happiness requires a fit between a thing's nature and its surroundings." Humanistic education along the line written above no doubt is likely to result into what Kraut regards as happiness. Such a curriculum could not be easy though. To suggest that it could be is to ignore the complexity of our civilization's history and present state.

No one would doubt the advantages to be derived from this type of a programme; but at times it is not always easy, sometimes not possible to practicalise some lofty programmes. Some would relate such impediments to lack of fund, the right calibre of personnel and so on and so forth. Mostly, however, such impediments are due to the fact that there is no basis for the programme and at times the impossibility of being able to relate such programmes to actual life practices. In order to overcome this type of plight, we shall take a brief look at the way an adult educator has analysed humanistic adult education.

R. H. Tawney[2] succeeded in inscribing four pillars of thought onto the heart of British adult education. One of them may be termed the fellowship of learning, reflecting the humanitarian spirit of adult education.

1. Kraut, R. (1979): 'Two Conceptions of Happiness'.
    The Philosophical Review, Vol.88, p.187.

2. Elsey, B. (1987): 'R.H. Tawney - 'Patron Saint of Adult
    Education' in Jervis, P. (ed.) (1987)
    Twentieth Century Thinkers in Adult Education;
    England, Croom Helm, p.73 ff.

Tawney regarded adult education as a means to working class political power. In that sense, education was not just for personal cultivation but for political emancipation. Liberal adult education was for him the pursuit of knowledge for social purposes and personal development based on an ideal of intellectual excellence and the **inquiring mind.**

However, Tawney's socialism was based on two ideas which one would agree are mainly humane in nature. First, he was a man of deep religious conviction and Christianity was, in his view, founded on a belief in common humanity. This common humanity derived from a recognition of God as the Father of Man. It does not matter whether Tawney's God was 'out there' or an internal Spiritual force which men and women discover for themselves in the light of life experiences. The means of establishing a social order properly recognising the moral basis of our common humanity is the idea of equality of worth.

Man, according to him, has qualities which go beyond individual differences. These qualities of humanity express the potential for individual contributions for the common good. This idea is **underpinned** by a belief in the ultimate moral goodness of mankind and, in more concrete terms, the capacity of people to freely recognise their obligation towards others. The route to this essentially moral view of mankind is through a proper recognition of the equal worth of people and the need

for equal treatment. By such means, social relations and social order rest on a commonly accepted consensus of values.[1]

Tawney in his role as an adult educator, wrote Terrill, gave expression to the idea of treating people equally, as he did in his personal life too. He crossed the boundaries of a class ridden Society, with its deep in-built inequalities of material and cultural kind, through the simple act of treating others as equals and raising their self-esteem. He enabled teaching adults with the moral principle of regarding students as worthy people with skills to unfold and valuable contributions to make to a more just Society.[2] Equality is more than the distribution of power and wealth in this approach, for it demonstrates the humane quality of egalitarianism through social relationships. This is socialism as fellowship, and these constitute the bedrock of our common humanity.

The second dimension of Tawney's socialism, closely linked to the first, is the idea of equality as a means of personal freedom and development. This is not the same thing as greedy, self-seeking individualism for it involves a sense of obligation and the urge to do one's duty for the common good. Again, this is an essentially humane aspect to socialist beliefs, with its concern for distributional equality.

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1.   Elsey, B. (1987): op. cit.
2.   Terrill, R. (1974): R.H. Tawney and his Times: A Socialism of Fellowship. London, Deutsch. p.65

Freedom arises from within people who are given the
opportunity to explore their capabilities and develop themselves.
In this regard, adult education enables talents to develop
and become available for the common good of society. This view
rests on a belief in the desire of those who have benefited
from access to educational opportunities to service the
community through their abilities. Self-fulfilment, therefore,
is linked to the ideal of service which in the long run reduces
inequalities in society. This view bears resemblance to the
meaning of utilitarianism - happiness and the absence of pain.

Tawney has thus highlighted an important methodological
approach to adult education.

2.3 Adult Education and the Liberal Philosophy of Education:

The fully developed Greek notion of liberal education was
rooted in a number of related philosophical doctrines and there
appears to be three distinct interpretations to the phrase.
Education was conceived of as a process in which the mind's
development towards knowledge and understanding was not to be
inhibited by being harnessed to vocational ends. Knowledge
must be pursued for its own sake, not viewed as instrumental
to some other end. This is the first interpretation of liberal
education. It was strongly supported by nineteenth century
thinkers such as Mathew Arnold and Cardinal Newman in a context
of the rapid development of technical training and technology.

It is still very influential as a characterization of University education.

The second interpretation of liberal education is a plea against the mind being confined to one discipline or form of understanding. Newman's conception of all-round development was, to a large extent, a reaction against the growing specialization and compartmentalization of knowledge in the nineteenth century. Nowadays, liberal education is more or less identified with this demand for a general education as distinct from a specialized training. This demand is well exemplified in Paul Hirst's conception of a liberal education, which involves initiation into all the distinct forms of knowledge.

A third interpretation of liberal education relates to constriction on the mind imposed by dogmatic methods of teaching. An obvious example of this is indoctrination, in which a fixed body of beliefs is implanted in a manner which discourages criticism or an exploration of the grounds on which beliefs are based. These three interpretations will each now be discussed separately in order to clarify the issues involved.

Hirst[1] notes that the Greeks regarded liberal education as that form of 'education in the seven liberal arts, as

1. Hirst, P.H. (1965): 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge' in Peters, R.S. (ed.) (1973) The Philosophy of Education; Oxford University Press. p.115

introduction to and a pursuit of the forms of knowledge as
they may be conceived'. He goes on to argue that these forms
of knowledge may now be considered to be: mathematics, physical
sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and
the fine arts and philosophy. He claims that since liberal
education, in this sense, is about the comprehensive development
of the mind, it is necessary to study some aspects of these
disciplines.

Without discussing the validity of Hirst's forms of
knowledge, it may thus be seen that in this sense of the
concept, liberal education is similar to general education and
the debate about whether the educated person is one who has
breadth or depth of knowledge becomes more significant. In
addition, it must be recognised that the structure of
knowledge itself may be related to the structures of society
which may, in turn, relate to other social factors, including
the level of technology in a society and the ideology of the
elite.

Nevertheless, discussion will be deferred on the social
nature of knowledge, but it will be seen that one other issue
is significant here. The knowledge to be learned is not
prescribed necessarily, so that the selection may be made by
the learners in order for them to pursue their own interests
or it may be prescribed by the teacher, the syllabus, etc.
Hence, liberal education may be 'education of equals' or 'from
above' and in this sense, it may be regarded as a relatively
value-free concept, but one that is similar to general education.

Liberal education may also refer to education of the free man rather than education of the slave. In the sense, the meaning of the work 'liberal' is clearly made by Paterson[1] when he claims the postulate of liberal education is that man is 'free to become everything that it is intrinsically good for man to be'. This claim reflects the ideology of liberalism referred to in the opening chapter, that the individual is free and able to act rationally in order to pursue his life interests.

Two issues require discussion here: the extent to which people are free and whether rationality is itself a non-ideological concept. The fact that the concept of liberal education, as a concept, emerged in a society in which there were free men and slaves and that it was the education of the free which indicates that it is a concept that has certain biases within it. But it might be argued that there are now no slaves, so that this argument has no validity. However, no complex industrial society can exist without a ruling elite who have considerably more freedom within the social structure than those who do not have their wealth or power. Yet freedom is not only the prerogative of the elite, the middle class certainly have more control over their lives than did the slaves of Greece. Indeed, it might be claimed with justifi-cation that all people in a 'free' society have more freedom than that and while this would not be disputed, it would be true that those at the upper end of the social hierarchy

1.   Paterson, R.J.K. (1979): Values, Education and the Adult. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. p.37

probably have more control over their lives than do those at
the lower end. Hence, the phenomenon of liberal adult
education may have a conceptual bias towards those who are
more free. In addition, the idea that people are rational and
free to pursue their own interests raises a number of problems.
The logic of this position can be embraced by all, then all
people can be free to pursue their own interests and that it
is rational for them to embark on such a course. However,
in common with a position argued by Marcuse[1], it will be
suggested here that the rationality of this statement is itself
ideological. If everybody were free to follow their own
interests and that it appeared rational to do so, then the
social result would be chaos, as Hobbes recognised many
centuries ago. Hence, it is rational to impose a rule of
order which seeks to ensure that chaos does not reign but that
society's scarce resources are distributed amongst the populace.

It thus appears rational to have a rule of order and indeed
Lawson[2] claims that 'it is logically impossible to have any
kind of society which does not depend for most of the time
on rational principles because they underlie any form of
organization'. Yet if it is rational for free men to pursue

1. Marcues, H. (1971): 'Industrialisation and Capitalism'
    in Stammer, O. (ed.)(1971) Max Weber and Sociology
    Today. Oxford Basil Blackwell.

2. Lawson, K. H. (1982): Analysis and Ideology: Conceptual
    Essays on the Education for Adults. University of
    Nottingham, Dept. of Adult Education, p.16.

their own interests and rational to impose a rule of order that prevents free men pursuing their own interests, then the 'rationality' that prevails must itself be ideology or else one of the preceding claims is irrational. Before the argument is pursued any further, it is important to note what actually happens in society when this apparent conflict occurs. Harris (1968:136)27 indicates this clearly when he writes about the evolution of liberalism in Italy:

> More significant perhaps than the Right proper was the evolution of Liberalism itself in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For both intellectuals and businessmen were moving away from
>
> the conception of freedom in society that had been the essence of Liberalism. Pareto, economist and social theorist, is a representative figure in that he was both a Liberal and an anti-democrat, someone who more vividly felt the threat to his own freedom than the oppression of others his freedom might entail, and who saw in Mussolini a saviour of his freedom. [1]

Ultimately, then, for some people to have freedom, others must have their freedom curtailed. For some people to be free to pursue their own interests, others must be prevented from pursuing theirs. Hence, if liberal education is an essential element in the good life then it is for the good life of the few rather than for the many. [2] Hence, if liberal education

1. Harris, N. (1968): Beliefs in Society. London, C.P. Watt and Co. Ltd. p.136.

2. Hirst, P.H. (1965): 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge in Archambaull, K. (ed.)(1965) Philosophical Analysis and Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. p.28

implies that man is free and rational i.e. able to pursue
his own interests then the concept is more applicable to
those who have more than it is to those who have less freedom.

The third approach to liberal education is that it
'frees the mind to function according to its true nature,
freeing reason from error and illusion...'[1] In the sense
education is designed to produce in learners a critical
awareness is a claim that few people would dispute. As such
Paterson's[2] claim that in "characterizing certain activities
as 'liberal' we are proclaiming that they really are educational
activities" is almost indisputable. Indeed, if education is
any planned series of incidents that are directed towards
learning and understanding and understanding includes critical
awareness, then the prefix 'liberal' becomes superfluous
since a learning episode is not educational unless it results
in 'freeing reason from error ...' One of the results in
liberating the mind in this way is that the individual may
develop a profound dissatisfaction with the society in which
he lives and wish to reform it either gradually or dramatically
in a revolutionary form. In this instance, the result of an
educational activity that may have been regarded as liberal,
may only be interpreted as radical. Hence, the debate between

1. Hirst, P.H. (1965): op. cit., p.115
2. Paterson, R.W.K. (1979): op. cit. p.38
3. Jarvis, P. (1985): The Sociology of Adult Education.
        London, Croom Helm, p.5 .

liberal adult education and radical education as viewed by
Lawson[1] is unrealistic since they are not always opposing
concepts.

Thus it may be seen from the above discussion that the
confusion with the concept of 'liberal' had to be clarified.
Where 'liberal' refers to free and rational individuals, then
there are implications of power whereas liberal adult education
may be seen to be embracing individualistic and elitist
ideologies. The significant point is that the phenomenon
of adult education is being interpreted from a specific
ideological perspective: that man is free and able to pursue
his own interests in a rational manner.

This approach also seems to favour a form of 'education
from above' since Lawson[2] appears to imply that 'an imperative
exists which says that members of the working class ought ...
to be encouraged to accept the traditional forms of education',
even though he does pose this as a question in the context of
the quotation. Paterson[3] also seems to suggest that this form
of education must be 'education from above' since he claims
for the educator the duty to teach what is objective reality,
while omitting consideration of some of the broader curriculum
issues.

Whilst these are implications of this position, it

1. Lawson, K.H. (1982): op. cit., p.16

2. Ibid. p.16

3. Paterson, R.W.K. (1984): 'Objectivity as an Educational
    Imperative' in International Journal of Lifelong
    Education. Vol.3, No.1.

would be wrong to claim that either of these writers would claim that it is imperative that education is always from above. However, not all versions of liberal adult education were interpretations of the educational phenomenon from a liberal ideological perspective. The other two interpretations of the term refer to education per se or to general, non-vocational education. Since, in neither instance do they incorporate the ideology of liberalism, the term liberal adult education will be restricted to that form of adult education that incorporates within it the liberal ideology.

2.3.1 The Critique of Liberal Adult Education:

It is necessary at this juncture to examine the ideas of some radical adult educators who seek to reject the old liberal approach to adult education.

Nell Keddie regrets that adult education upholds an ideology of individualism, and argues that provision for deprived adults encourages the individualisation of failure.[1] Yet education for disadvantaged adults is politically glamorous as it can appeal across a wide ideological spectrum. Fletcher[2] argues that liberals regard it as 'compensatory education' or positive discrimination' and conservatives welcome it as cheap education to transform 'feckless and disruptive' adults into

1. Keddie, N. (1979) 'Adult Education - An Ideology of Individualism' in Thompson, J. (1979) (ed.) Adult Education for a Change. London, Hutchinson, p.89

2. Fletcher, C. (1979): 'The Theory of Community Education and Its Relation to Adult Education'; in Thompson, J. (1979): Ibid.

responsible citizens. Such provision is a hybrid between
adult education and social work.

Yet the pedagogic relationship between adult educators
and under-privileged adults is difficult. Fletcher proposes
to solve it by dialogue in which students teach teachers;
the type of Freire's conscientisation, in which workers are
led to discover their unarticulated grievances and demands.

Colin Griffin argues the case for a new adult curriculum
and asserts that "the conceptual framework of adult education
has been constructed in terms of needs, access and provisions,
rather than knowledge, culture and power."[1] Griffin is wary
of educational radicalism in the context of social conservatism.
In particular, so called radical pedagogy may not be radical
in effect since it leaves unchanged adult education's hidden
curriculum of political control. Similarly, Griffin
criticises the ideology of needs meeting which effectively
depoliticises adult education by avoiding the issue of aims,
on grounds of philosophical scepticism or professional
neutrality, and reduces decision making to a straightforward
technical exercise in which market forces constitute the
the logical stop. He also suggests that such conceptions
as lifelong learning and recurrent education are consistent
with established social constructions of knowledge.

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1.   Griffin, C. (1983); <u>Adult Education: Theory and
       Curriculum.</u> Beckenham, Croom Helm p.38

He supports Gelpi's view that "there exists a <u>possibility</u> of transformation through education", however, since education is relatively autonomous of prevailing social forces. This means that adult education should not "induce adults to adapt themselves to the needs of production, or to engage in cultural and educative leisure activities as a response to the alienation resulting from their work." He argues with Gelpi that adults should be motivated by "a wish to transform their working lives, improve their living conditions, and take part in their Society's management."[1] But this could be regarded as imputed needs meeting for the collective individual of adulthood. Griffin advocates a new curriculum for the social reconstruction of knowledge, and undermines the claims of some experimental pedagogy.

To Lindeman, education was, first and foremost, conceived as a lifelong process, and to regard it as preparation for an unknown future was to condemn teachers and students to intellectual stasis. Secondly, adult education was held to be unreservedly of a non-vocational character. He wrote that "adult education more accurately defined begins where vocational education leaves off"[2] and condemned the fact that "the possibilities of enriching the activities of labour

1. Griffin, C. (1983) <u>op. cit.</u> p.192
2. Lindeman, E.C. (1926): <u>The Meaning of Adult Education</u>, New York, New Republic. p.5

itself grow less for all workers who manipulate automatic machines"[1]. In his view, for workers to experience "the good life, the life interfused with meaning and with joy, opportunities for expressing more of the total personality than is called forth by machines will be needed.

It is the task of adult education to assist these workers to find meaning and creative fulfilment in the areas of their lives separate from the factory and to counter the development of fractional personalities seen as the inevitable consequence of a highly specialized division of labour. This defiant rejection of adult education having any involvement with vocational training was characteristic of most of his writings.

The third principle of adult education is that we emphasize situations, not subjects, in our teaching. Lindeman wrote that adult education began at the point at which adults found themselves needing to adjust to new situations, and in this stress on the educational potential inherent in adults' attempting to make sense of, and come to terms with, changed realities at work, in the family or in society at large. Finally, adult education was held to place primary emphasis on learners' experiences.

The importance of grounding curricula and methods in the experiences of adults is now something of a self-evident truism in adult education, enshrined as it is in the concept of andragogy and in

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1. Lindeman, E. C. (1926): op. cit., p. 5.

experiential theory of adult development. What remains distinctive about this, however, is Lindeman's constant attention to the connection between individual realisation through experience, and the need for adults to be involved in social change movements. To him, a major learning need in adulthood was "to change the social order so that vital personalities will be creating a new environment in which their aspirations may be properly expressed."[1]

The medium through which this can be achieved as put forward by Lindeman is the discussion method. The distinctive purpose of adult educational method, according to Lindeman was the inculcation in learners of a set of analytical skills which could be applied to understanding a range of different situations. He wrote that "education is a method for giving situations a setting, for analyzing complex wholes into manageable, understanding parts.[2] This idea of adults' developing a set of analytical procedures applicable to a variety of setting is, perhaps, a conceptual precursor of the notion of mathetics, of learning how to learn, as developed in adult education by Smith. To Smith, the chief purpose of adult education is to help learners to understand their idiosyncratic learning styles and to develop skills of inquiry, analysis and synthesis which can be adapted to different intellectual pursuits.[3] This idea of emancipation is the message of the liberal adult education theory.

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1. Lindeman, E.C. (1926): op. cit. page 9
2. Ibid. p.115
3. Smith, R.M. (1982): Learning How to Learn: Applied Learning Theory for Adults. New York, Cambridge Books.

2.4 Radical Adult Education:

Radical education was essentially an oppositional movement, gaining energies from contesting orthodoxies, in theory and practice. The first criticism of the sorts of schooling which were provided were formed in the period to 1820, under the shadow of a counter-revolution. The early schooling enterprises – Sunday Schools of the more Conservative-Evangelical kind, the monitorial day schools were seen as coercive and knowledge-denying. When more liberal schemes were put forward in the 1820s and 1830s – Mechanics' Institutes, the useful knowledge Societies infant schools plans for State education – they were opposed too, though more conditionally. Before the 1860s, there was not enough working class support for the State education to overcome the opposition of its Tory-Anglican opponents.[1]

Criticism was not limited to opposition. Alternatives were proposed. Education was differently defined. It was partly a matter of religion. Radical Education tended to be secular and rationalist; it drew on Enlightenment ideas of an expanding human nature. But there was a polarisation within Christianity too. The Philanthropic educators inherited a puritan-Evangelical view of human nature as finite,

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1. Johnson, R. (1977) "Educating the Educators"; "Experts" and the State, 1833-39". In Donajgrodiski, A. (ed.) Social Control in Victorian England. Croom Helm.

limited and flamed. They associate social evils like crime,
riot, pauperism, vice and sometimes epidemic as immoral
phenomenon and this holds the view that moral and religious
education was the answer. Radicals by contrast, developed
the legacy of natural theology (God known only through Nature),
and of Christianity as a morality of cooperation among equals.
There was also the appearance of secular knowledge, especially
as solvents of dogmatic religion and as keys to understanding
Society and human nature.

Yet another feature of the Radicals was a preoccupation
with education and politics, knowledge and power. Educating
yourself and others, especially in a knowledge of your
circumstances, was a step in changing the world. Knowledge
was a natural right, and unconditional good. The typical
middle-class argument – that only the 'educated' should be
able to vote – was dismissed in anger. Yet, there were
differences around education and politics within radical
movements too. Some groups, the Owenites for instance, were
more likely to adopt 'Schoolmastery' attitudes than others;
the others always insisted on some moral or physical force.
It was fairly difficult to know which educational practices
were for the here and now, as strategies for change, and
which could only be enjoyed once the change had come.

A prominent feature of radicalism is its approach of
questioning the assumptions on which organisations,

institutions and Society   rest.   Radicalism in other
words, is the "expressed intention to attack the foundations
of a system, complemented by a visible, manifest effort to do
so, whether or not that effort is successful".[1]   The radicals
wishes to question Social limits - political, social, and
cultural, and usually, to destroy them.

The origins of radical criticism in adult education lie
in two events which were roughly contemporary. There are the
rise and growth of adult education, and the writings of Marx and
the Marxists. The 'extension' development in the nineteenth
century universities, the establishment of the Worker's
Educational Association, and similar ventures were paralleled
by the most fevered debates about society and its institutions,
inspired by the Marxists. It was not long before the growth
of adult education, that social discontent, unrest, and Marxism,
became connected. To the debate about the desirability or
otherwise of 'utility' in education, there was now added
a new and more significant discussion. What was the broad
aim of education in relation to society and its values ?
And what was, or should be, the commitment of adult education
to that aim ? This was the question which interested left-
wing radical educators, especially in the early years of this
century and which expressed itself in the conflict at
Ruskin College.

1. Livingstone, R.W. (1941): Future in Education; C.U.P., p.44

In conventional education circles, the names of Illich, and Freire excite very strong feelings. These radical educators both embody and create its meaning.

Freire's concept of radical adult education has its origins in liberal humanism, theology and Brazilian nationalism. It is given its revolutionary edge through the adoption of Marx's ideas on class struggle and its cultural dimension from dependency theory and the writings of Fromm, Memmi and Fanon. Freire is further indebted to Marx for the view that in changing his circumstances, man changes himself, thus emphasising the dynamic unity between man, his activity and his environment. It was the dialectical interaction of man reflecting upon his action, on his social and material environment and in turn being acted upon which forms the essence of revolutionary praxis. It is found that Freire agrees with Marx that the dominant ideas of a particular historical period are those of the governing class, thus, it requires a revolutionary instrument in the form of a politicized language to inculcate a revolutionary conscious-ness in the oppressed.[1]

Freire's central theme is the revolutionary transformation of men's consciousness through which society can be fundamentally changed for the better. In essence, Freire

1.   Carnoy, M. (1974): Education as Cultural Imperialism.
       New York, McKay Company.

wishes to effect a capacity for cultural change through releasing the potential of action which he assumes resides in all oppressed peoples. The great dilemma confronting mankind lies in choosing between the humanization or dehumanization of man.[1]

The restoration of the oppressed's humanity can only come through the oppressed who best understand the 'terrible significance' of oppression and the 'necessity for liberation'. The poor, however, are so conditioned by the harsh existence of their poverty and oppression that they identify themselves with their oppressors whom they see as "their model of humanity".[2] In this condition, their consciousness is dichotomized between their desire for 'authentic existence' and their fear of it.

Herein lies the central problem of Freire's pedagogy. How can the oppressed overcome the dual oppression of their concrete existence and divided unauthentic self and participate in their own liberation? According to Freire, the answer lies in the oppressed first discovery that their consciousness is false. The second step lies in developing an independent authentic consciousness so that the oppressed come to recognise their own oppression. This will have the effect of "making real oppression more oppressive".[3]

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1. Freire, P. (1972): Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Middlesex, Penguin Books. p.20 .

2. Ibid. pp. 22, 24.

3. Freire, P. (1972) op. cit., p.28 .

The resulting interaction between the 'objective' conditions of poverty and oppression and the 'subjective' awareness of these conditions will be to compel men to act on their own situation and change it.

The key to the development of an authentic consciousness is the conscientization process. It is the process whereby man is transformed from an 'object', who merely responds unthinkingly to circumstances around him, to a 'subject' who, in seeing the social, economic and political realities behind poverty and oppression, acts on this reality to change it. Conscientization involves traversing "through the spontaneous stage of apprehension of reality into a critical stage".[1] It is the product of the creative dialectical interaction between man and his environment, a process of praxis which results in the "historical commitment" of men to "take the role of agents" to make and remake the world.[2] Conscientization, then, is the "critical insertion into history to create history".[3] It becomes a moral imperative to act in and on the real world. If such 'engagement' is absent, conscientization has not taken place.

1. Freire, P. (1976): 'A Few Notions about the word 'Conscientization"; in Schooling and Capitalism. Dale, R. England, M. and MacDonald, M. (eds.) (1976); London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. p.224

2. Ibid. p.224

3. Freire, P. (1976) op. cit., p.225

In the final analysis, "conscientization is a permanent critical approach to reality in order to discover it and discover the myths that deceive us and help to maintain the oppressing dehumanizing structures".[1]

Myths and dehumanized structures are, in Freire's view, perpetuated by formal education systems. Formal education is 'domesticating' in that it induces a conformity of mind which ultimately colonizes men's consciousness and ensures the continuity of the status quo, thus crippling men's confidence in their own capacity to change reality. 'Narrative education', as Freire calls it, is based upon the concept of banking. The teacher's task is to deposit facts and information into the students. Education becomes an "act of depositing'. Banking education is essentially 'manipulative' and encourages the individual to be passive in relation to the world and not active in transforming it. The educator's role is to "regulate the way the world enters into the student".[2] In human terms, banking education turns men into uncritical 'autonomous' being which in turn denies their humanity. It ultimately reduces men to objects and encourages the development of what Fromm calls "the necrophilous person ...

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1. Freire, P. (1976): op. cit., p.225
2. Freire, P. (1972): op. cit., p.45, 46
             Ibid. p.49

who loves control, and in the act of controlling kills life."[1]

Education for liberation calls for a more dynamic,
dialectical approach associated with 'problem-posing'
education. Problem-posing education is 'dialogical' in that
it tolerates an equal and interchangeable partnership
between the student and the teacher, thus resolving the
contradiction between them. Liberating education is the
process whereby education becomes the critical link between
'uncompleted beings' and an unfinished reality.'[2] It
therefore plays a creative role in the on-going transformation
of human consciousness and external reality.

2.5 Pragmatic Adult Education:

Pragmatism is, as it has often been described,
a distinctively American contribution to philosophy. In its
effort to clarify and extend the methods of science, and to
strengthen the prospects of freedom and intelligence in the
contemporary world, it represents also a philosophical
orientation of urgent general interest. It bears the
imprint of traditional modes of argumentation, and also of
advanced logical and methodological ideas; it addresses
itself not only to problems of philosophers but also to
problems of men. In its search for an integrated interpretation

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1. Fromm, quoted in Pedagogy of the Oppressed. p.51
2. Freire, P. (1972): op. cit., p.53
   Ibid. p.57

of human life, it strives to relate mind and nature, language and thought, action and meaning, knowledge and value, emphasizing always the primary significance of critical thought, logical method, and the test of experience in all realms of endeavour.[1]

A major effort of pragmatism has been to assimilate modern science within philosophy, and to criticize traditional philosophical outlooks in the light of new scientific developments. Firstly, it is the theory of evolution and the new statistical modes of reasoning that have exercised the greatest impact upon pragmatism, and that have led it to criticize inherited conceptions of science itself. Secondly, pragmatism takes quite seriously the legitimate demands of other modes of human experience - morality and social practice; art, poetry, history, religion and philosophical speculation. It does not use de facto science as a device for excluding or downgrading these other modes. Rather, it takes science as a suggestive of more general concepts of critical thought, in terms of which the continuities among all modes may be revealed, and in light of which they may all be refined and advanced.

Thus, Peirce[2] develops the notion of logical method as an underlying conception capable of unifying the various

1.   Scheffler, I. (1986): Four Pragmatists: A Critical
         Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey.
         London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

2.   Ibid.

oppositions that has been mentioned above. James stresses

the appeal to experience as a common test to which all

constructions are to be brought." "The various speculative

philosophies" he wrote, "for example, are like so many

separate hotel rooms, all differently furnished, to be sure,

but connected by a common corridor of experience, through

which they may be put into communication". Mead lays primary

stress upon symbolism as the indispensable basis for human

selfhood as well as for more differentiated and sophisticated

forms of human consciousness.[2] And Dewey elaborates a theory

of intelligence in offering a unified conception of thinking as

an active interchange between organism and environment – an

interchange which reveals the continuity between the humblest

bit of learning by a 'child exploring its room and the most

refined piece of theorizing by an experimental scientist

investigating the natural world'.[3]

Education provides an important application for Dewey

The aim of education, according to Dewey, is first and

foremost, to develop critical methods of thought. Its task

is not to indoctrinate a particular point of view, but rather

to help generate those powers of assessment and criticism by

which diverse points of view may themselves be responsibly

judged. In pursuit of this task, the school ought to exemplify

1.   James, W. (1910): Pragmatism. New York, Longmans;   p.54

2.   Scheffler, L. (1986): op. cit., p.2

3.   Ibid.   p.2 .

the application of critical method to all the domains of
human life. This implies the need to present these domains
with an emphasis upon their meaning, that is, in their
relatedness to one another but, most particularly, in their
bearing upon the realm of purposive activity. For the more
meaning we grasp, the greater the context we can take into
account and the more we are able to evaluate critically.
This is the central idea of Dewey's theory of education,
which he develops into a notion of proper method and
curriculum.

> Study is effectual in the degree in which the
> pupil realizes the place of the ... truth he is
> dealing with in carrying to fruition activities
> in which he is concerned. This connection of an
> object and topic with the promotion of an activity
> having a purpose is the first and the last word
> of a genuine theory of interest in education. [1]

Proper method requires that the subject be placed in a broad,
and growing context - a context that embraces the students
own purposes and potential activities as well as the urgent
problems confronting the human community of which he is a
part. In the matter of curriculum, Dewey's emphasis is on
continuity and meaning. "The criterion of the value of
school education is the extent to which it creates a desire

1.   Dewey, J. (1963): Democracy and Education. New York,
          Macmillan, p.135 (Original date of publication,1916)

for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire
effective in fact."[1] His definition of growth was "a general
and persistent balance of organic activities with the
surroundings, and of active capacities to readjust activity
to meet new conditions. The former furnishes the background
of growth; the latter constitute growing."[2]

Dewey's notions of growth have been criticized because
some would argue that whereas growth is taken as the basic
value and result of education, Dewey did not specify the
direction or ultimate goal of growth - save itself. But
as Scheffler has pointed out,

> the ideals of intelligence, growth, and freedom
> open-ended as they are, are not amorphous or
> directionless; ... they make the most stringent
> of demands upon those who would embody them in
> human institutions and strive to rear their young
> by their light.[3]

It is clear that Dewey would judge any institution or process
according to how far it had succeeded in enabling individuals
to develop their innate powers of awareness and analysis.
These powers might well differ, depending on each individual's
capacity, but the disposition to continue their exercise
indefinitely, in order to bring past experience to bear upon

1.   Dewey, J. (1963) op. cit., p.53
2 ·   Ibid. p.52
3.   Scheffler, I. (1986) op. cit., p.247

new experience, conditions or problems was never to be abbreviated.

According to Dewey, therefore, armed with the capabilities for intelligent enquiry and solution, (which are the properties of effective growth) no one would be debarred from being intellectually and personally developed to act confidently, discriminating and acting from a position of wisdom, at every phase of adulthood, and learn "from life itself".[1] This was necessary in order to negotiate life's contingencies, and on a grander scale, so that man would be able to select that which contributes to the quality of all. Elitist education for the few was, therefore, dismissed by Dewey. To him, the 'educated person' was one whose innate analytical powers were developed sufficiently to enable him or her to be effective in all aspects of life and work. Thus, 'ways of knowing', rather than 'States of Knowledge' were of primary importance to Dewey.

These views are similar to those expressed by advocates of lifelong education. For example, Cropley says: "What is needed is a system in which adult and school learning are seen as part of a continuous fabric".[2] And "Lifelong education squarely recognizes that learning occurs throughout life."[3]

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1. Dewey, J. (1963): op. cit., p.51
2. Cropley, A.J. (1976): 'Some Psychological Reflections' in Dave, R.H. (1976): Foundations of Lifelong Education. London, Pergamon Press. p.209
3. Ibid. p.196

Similarly, Janne writes: "In Lifelong education, learning ...
becomes a normal, constant dimension of man's entire life."[1]
Not only are these writers describing lifelong learning,
they are arguably describing Dewey's view of growth.

In all these theoretical explanation, there appears
to be a common sense or common assertion and that is the
value of freedom of thought. The need for the promotion,
development of it in any situation where learning is to take
place cannot be over-emphasized.

On the face value, utilitarianism buttressed the theory
of liberalism. The underlying logic of utilitarian
liberalism is simple: man must be allowed to pursue freely
the pleasure he desires, because the pleasure itself is good
and it is only the individual who can know which pleasure
is good for him. Yet such a classical utilitarian logic
collided with Mill's 'qualitative' theory of pleasure.
In the theory, although pleasure was generally accepted as
good, some pleasures are qualitatively better than some others,
and it was simply incorrect to say that each individual
always knows which pleasure is better than another. As far
as high quality pleasures are concerned, an individual cannot
always be regarded as the best judge of his own well-being.

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1.   Janne, H. (1976): 'Theoretical Foundations of Lifelong
         Education'; in Dave, R.H. op. cit., p.129

Liberty thus lost an important ground for its general
justification.

In order to ensure the development of a nation's moral
character, Mill developed a normative theory of liberty on
the basis of the Humboldtian ideal of total man, "a complete
and consistent whole" whose essence was to be "the
individuality of power and development." Only when the
freedom of individuality is established, according to Mill,
could man choose his plan for himself, employ all his
faculties, and quit the apelike imitation of custom.[2]
Such a romantic claim for liberty clearly contradicted the
descriptive liberty claim of utilitarianism which grounded
itself on an individual's pursuit of pleasure. What is to
be noted,(and this is of great relevance in an attempt to
the process of liberal adult education)is not the contradict-
ion itself but the different objectives which caused Mill
on one occasion to negate and on another to affirm the
utility of liberty. More will be said about this conflicting
values when we come to discuss the process of adult
education. What has been done in this chapter is an
exposition of the philosophical basis of the aims and
objectives of adult education. We have tried to bring out
the contemporary significance of the concept of each theory
from some selected adult educators who both embody and
create their meaning.

1. Warnock, M. (1979)(ed.): John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism.
        Glasgow; William Collins.   p.186

2.   Ibid.

We may now want to justify the need for examining all
these models in a utilitarian aim of adult education.
Do the models help in promoting happiness, or are they
conditions necessary for the achievement of happiness ?
Perhaps we may want to say that their definitions give some
clues to what is meant by happiness when we come to apply
it as a programme. We may add too that they give a direction
especially when we come to measure the extent to which adult
education helps in promoting happiness. But importantly,
these models are based on established philosophies which
have been in practice for ages and as such give a prop to
our aim.

Humanist adult education, as we read on page 47 of this
research, is concerned with the dignity and rights of men.
The value of the human personality is important. This bears
similarily with Mill's assertion about human beings. Mill
believes that human beings are possessed of certain potential
for development; they are born into the world with faculties
and powers which grow and mature according to the opportunities
afforded them. Human nature, he affirms,

> ... is not a machine to be built after a model
> and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it,
> but a free which requires to grow and develop
> itself on all sides according to the tendency
> of the inward forces which make it a living thing.

Mill, J. S. (1910): op. cit.   p.127

Mill's affirmation, which is implied in humanistic adult
education finds expression in one of the aims of adult
education - the purpose of adult education is to help the
individual find meaning in life that is, help him/her discover
his/her potentials. Desires and feelings are part of the
raw material of human nature every person has possession of
and as much as possible, they must be encouraged to unfold
themselves. Thus we find in the theory of adult education
great emphasis being put on the learner's experience. As a
matter of fact, one great adult education thinker, Lindeman
precisely upholds the view that experience is the adult
learner's textbook. In teaching them, no particular
information is imposed upon them, but equipping them with
capability of modifying their own experience.

In like manner, liberal adult education is conceived
of, as a process in which the mind has to develop towards
knowledge and understanding - the search for truth.
Relating this to utilitarianism, is the goal of education.
The purpose of liberal education as stated by Mill in his
Inaugural lecture for the individual student, is 'the
strengthening and enlarging of his own intellect and character'
and the creation of 'capable and cultivated human beings' who
can bring light of general culture to illuminate the

Garforth, F. W. (ed.) 1971; op. cit. p.92

technicalities of a special pursuit. If this be so, liberal education is needed by everyone at least in a bid to help individuals find meaning in his life activity. This finds expression in some of the aims of adult education particularly when we say that adult education is aimed at helping the individual learners to become conscious of the various types of knowledge that are present in their own indigenous culture and traditions. So, when we say that in adult education, we should teach the students how to learn but not particular learning facts, we find Mill advising that the aim of liberal education should be to give the student such information and training as will enable him to seek truth for himself and form his own conclusions.

To attain this condition of existence requires the development of rational skills and enthusiasm for enquiry. Hence we find Lindeman stating that one of the goals of adult education is the cultivation of rational intelligence; he went on to say that the development of intelligence is the supreme reason for adult education. According to him, intelligence is needed not for personal living only, it is an indispensable tool for social living and social interaction. The value of social interaction according to the utilitarians is that it promotes improvement and increases the sum of happiness.

Jarvis, P. (ed.) (1987): Twentieth Century Thinkers in Adult Education. London, Croom Helm.

It may now be said that the aims of adult education are
not formulated out of mere assumed ideals. The aims are
based on existing philosophies which have been accepted as
ideals. The present exercise has been done first to establish
such a foundation, and two, to be assured that there exists
a paradigmn against which our programme can be compared.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction:

The meanings of life and the word which is called
'philosophical' are a product of two factors: one, inherited
religious and ethical meanings, the other, the sort of
investigation which may be called 'scientific', using this
word in its broadest sense. Though individual philosophers
hold different views in relation to the extent to which these
two factors entered into their systems, it is however the
presence of both, in some degree, that characterizes philosophy.

This notwithstanding, it is common to distinguish
between the two factors; the former factor belongs to the
traditional approach. This type of approach which is
predominantly normative and speculative in nature tries to
achieve some kind of total view of reality, to attain some
sort of intimate contact with the essence of things and
persons. The latter factor which is essentially analytical,
aims at taking a survey of our own understandings, examining
our own powers and seeing to what things they were adapted.
In Wittgenstein's expression as found in the Tractatus
'analytic philosophy aims at making thoughts clearer'.[1]

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1. Wittgenstein, L. (1922): Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus;
   London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hence we find analytical philosophers concerning themselves more with the meaning of statements instead of trying to find the truth or falsehood of such statements.

Sometimes, there can be no dividing line between speculative and analytic philosophy, for one and the same philosopher may practise philosophical analysis as well as philosophical speculation. Depending on the proportion between the roles which the two play in their thinking, philosophers may be arranged along a scale.

This chapter will be structured along this vein. In a sense that while attention will be paid to the methods of analytic philosophy, an attempt will be made to locate the extent of traditional philosophy in such a method. Since this study is concerned with educational setting, another task that will be ventured will be to locate the place of Analytic Philosophy of Education within the realm of analytic philosophy and relate this to conceptual and linguistic philosophical analysis.

3.1 The Rise of Analytical Philosophy:

Generation after generation of modern analytic philosophers have regarded themselves as philosophical revolutionaries wiping the slate clean of earlier philosophies and laying the foundation for something entirely new: a self-critical, strictly scientific philosophy. This belief could however be seen to be a flattering illusion because

philosophical analysis is nothing new, it can be traced back to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and reflections of an analytical character can be found in the work of nearly all the great philosophers. What has happened in modern philosophy is not the advent of something new, but the development and intensification of something which was always there. New realms of thought have been subjected to analysis, and new methods of analysis have been created. This new method is what analysts tagged as 'scientific'. The philosophies that have been inspired by scientific technique are power philosophies, and tend to regard everything non-human as mere raw materials. Ends are no longer considered, only the skillfulness of the process is valued.

Hegelian philosophy belongs to the new analytical approach but one finds that there is no clean break from the traditional approach.

Hegel is a theologian: his speculations were predominantly guided by practical instincts of the higher life of man, by the desire to restore the moral and religious basis of human existence, which a revolutionary scepticism had destroyed. His philosophical method, the dialectic, is a method of reconciliation. For him, there are no antagonisms which cannot be reconciled - there must always be a higher unity within which antagonistic tendencies will each find a place.

Thus, if realism and Science appear to be irreconciliably opposed, this can only be an appearance for, in reality, they must form part of a higher Unity.[1]

Thus it is stated that:

> The universe reveals the workings, the development, the realisation, the unfolding of a World spirit or Absolute idea ... the universe is not unlike an animate being that has a soul, desires, aims, intentions and goals. The universe is spiritual; it has directions; and the explanation of ordinary facts, human actions, historical changes and institutions may be grasped once we recognise how they are embedded in this cosmic organism, how they are directed by the cunning of the Absolute, how they play their part in the Universe's progressive realisation of the world spirit.[2]

Hegel's logic and his historical dialectic presupposes an underlying metaphysic. For Hegel, the whole is more real than its parts, and among wholes the more differentiated are more real than the less differentiated. The State is not only a rational whole, but also distinguishable from other wholes composed of non-rational and inanimate parts within the rational order of the whole by the fact that its parts are rational and animate. The State is therefore the highest reality that exists and so is divine. As the dialectical process of history continues, therefore, the syntheses that follow these, and antitheses become more and more complex and

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1. Passmore, J. (1957): A Hundred Years of Philosophy. London, Penguin Books.

2. Morton White (1955): The Age of Analysis. Houghton Mifflin Company, pp. 13-14.

accordingly come into greater and greater approximation with reality. Finally, absolute reality in the form of a synthesis that encapsulates the whole in all its complexity will emerge, which alone we shall be able to know without contradiction.

In contrast to Aristotelian logic, which holds that matter has either an attribute or its opposite at a given time, Hegel's "dialectical idealism" believes that there are in-between moments when it can be neither. This Hegelian metaphysics enjoyed the support of the religious, philosophical and evolutionist theories of his days.

Whereas, G. E. Moore, one of the founders of the so-called Cambridge School, represents a style of thought that is essentially different from Hegel's. In his analysis, Moore wanted to find definitions of the form. Where the right side (the analysans) is to be synonymous with the left side (the analysandum), but should at the same time possess a more refined gramatico-semantic structure. According to Moore's methodical theory, analysis consists in distinguishing the constituent parts of a complex content of thought, for example, a concept or proposition. On his view, successful analysis demands rigorously concentrated attention on the content, careful inspection of it.

Moore was primarily interested in analysing certain propositions which he took to be truths of 'common sense', truths that are indubitable and known by every man, along with

analysis of concepts involved in such propositions. To give
an analysis of a concept, Moore suggests, is to discover
some concept which is the same as the concept being analysed,
but which can be expressed in a different way, by referring
to the concepts which were not explicitly mentioned in the
expressions used to refer to the original concept. An
example may make this explanation clearer. Male Sibling is
a correct analysis of brother; the two concepts mentioned
in the expression 'male sibling' are not mentioned in 'brother'.
As far as Moore is concerned, conceptual analysis should
always be done in relation to other concepts in order to
clarify the target concept better.

Betrand Russell's philosophy, on the other hand, moves
in scientific atmosphere. Philosophy for him is continuous
with social, psychological, physical and mathematical
investigation. His views about philosophy should begin with
an analysis of propositions. Russell contends that all
propositions can be reduced to the subject-predicate form,
that is, their relations are reducible to properties of the
terms between which they held. He defines a proposition
as an indicative sentence that asserts or denies something,
in other words, a proposition is a symbol not a fact, there
can be true or false propositions. According to him,
propositions fall into two classes - atomic and molecular.

An atomic proposition asserts that a certain thing
has a certain quality or that certain things have a certain
relation; it can be further said of atomic propositions that,
they mirror reality. For example, this book is red, this
is a cow with a pair of horns or that 2 + 5 is the same thing
as 7. All molecular propositions on the other hand can be
expressed as truth functions of atomic propositions that is,
their truth or falsity is wholly determined by the truth or
falsity of the atomic propositions which make them up;
for example, 'if it is Deoti's, it is the red book'. The
atomic propositions that make up this molecular proposition
are: 'The name written on the book is Deoti and the colour
of her book is red'.

Analysis, so far, can be said to imply a re-description
in other terms; the relation of one concept to another or
simply the use of propositions. Hence critics of the method
suggest that what is achieved might be no more than a set
of ideologically based prescriptions for the use of
educational terms[1]. However, a general claim made by those
who apply linguistic and conceptual analysis to education
is that they are trying to clarify and understand what is

1.   Kirkwood, C. (1973): 'The Concept of Community'; in
      Adult Education, Vol.51, No.3, p.147.

meant in educational discurse, by examining the ways in which words are used, and by charting what is often referred to as their 'logic'.[1]   This leads us to an explanation of conceptual and linguistic analysis.

3.2   What is Conceptual Analysis ?

Although a number of approaches are covered by this title, conceptual analysis is usually described as a 'second order' activity because it is concerned with language; the medium through which first order statements and questions about practice and policy are expressed, rather than first order statements and questions themselves. Instead of considering what should be taught, how we should teach or how adult education should be organised and similar questions, conceptual analysts are interested in the meaning and logical force of words such as 'teach' or what is entailed when the term 'adult education' is used. It is the idea of 'teaching' and the idea of 'adult education' which is the area of concern and a legitimate field of study. But such second order issues are not wholly distinct from first order problems, because if we believe as a result of analysis that 'teaching' is a set of activities of a certain kind carried out with certain intentions in mind, then what is done by teachers when they believe themselves to be 'teaching'

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1.   Lawson, K. H. (1982): Analysis and Ideology: Conceptual
Essays on the Education of Adults. Dept. of
Education, University of Nottingham, p.3 .

must be influenced by what that term is taken to mean.
Similarly, it is difficult to see how we can tackle first
order questions about how adult education should be organised,
except by drawing upon our understanding of what is meant by
the term 'adult education'. Values built into that concept
and revealed by analysis are likely to influence and underpin
judgements about the manner in which adult education should
be conducted.

In <u>linguistic</u> analysis which by definition is concerned
with words, empirical factors are excluded. At best, it is
possible to collect examples in speech and writing of the ways
in which words are used. We can reflect upon usage and chart
what we think are central and those that are peripheral.
We can categorise strong senses and weak senses of terms as
when say, that it is a weak sense of 'education' to claim
that 'getting drunk was an education', compared with, say,
'attending courses' is nearer to the central meaning of
education.

As earlier remarked, there are lots of approaches to
conceptual analysis and the following are a selected few
of such approaches.

3.2.1 <u>Techniques of Analysis</u>:

The methods of conceptual analysis varies; it all depends
on the nature of the question on hand. Some of these methods
are: <u>isolation of conceptual questions</u>; it is not only

important to isolate the questions of concept from other considerations, but to deal with them first: because considerations of fact and morality cannot be relevantly applied at all until one has worked out just what they are supposed to be applied to.

Usually philosophical questions do not have any single, clear-cut solutions particularly when it comes to questions pertaining to moral philosophy. Conditional answers are normally given in order to illustrate the applicability of a particular concept to various possible instances.

There are times when philosophical questions are difficult to explain linguistically, one of the best ways a philosopher can employ to tackle the question is to pick a model case. Take for instance, a child who stole meat from his mother's pot of soup, was caught and beaten. While this is an illustration of the concept of punishment, in a contrary manner, the concept of justice can be explained. If, for example, two children (two siblings) stole from their mother's pot of soup, and only one of them is beaten, it can be said that the one beaten has been unjustly treated. There are however the borderline cases. Suppose two children had two pieces of meat kept somewhere, one of them had stolen his piece and the other has not, it was his legitimate share. A rat comes along and ate up both pieces of meat. It would not be right to say that both boys deserve the punishment

of being denied their pieces of meat, it is only the former
that deserves such a remark. The point of all these cases
is to elucidate the nature of the concept by continually
facing ourselves with different cases which lie on the
border line of the concept.

But when situations within the immediate environment are
not sufficient to draw out our point in analysis, imaginary
inventions can be embarked upon. Ordinarily, eggs are quite
distinguishable from fruits like mangoes, apples, oranges
and so on. However, we want to find out the essential
criteria for the concept so we tried to imagine fruits that
are plucked from trees round in shape and has yellow yoke
inside instead of juice. Though we may not be able to name
this imagined fruit, we are contented to know that eggs are
oval in shape and they contain yellow yoke.

Since language is not used in a vacuum, care must be
taken when dealing with linguistic analysis. General concepts
are usually asked in everyday life, under the pressure of
particular circumstances. Hence we need to imagine, in the
case of any statement, who would likely make such a statement,
why he would most naturally make it and so forth.

Not all these approaches are equally useful in all cases.
The nature of the concept to be analysed as well as the
possible consequences of our analysis will decide what
particular approach or combinations of approaches we will use.

3.3 The Datum of Ordinary Language:

This brings us to the tradition of using ordinary language as the datum from which to judge the meaning of terms. Following Wittgenstein, it has become fashionable to claim that the meaning of a word is its use. But words are like tools in that they are selected for a particular job, and in deciding on the use of a word, we have to be careful about whether we are begging the question by claiming that its use is 'such and such' and that it should, therefore, be taken to mean ......, or whether we are looking at the ways it is actually used. This is to distinguish as Ryle[1] did, between 'use' and 'usage', but such a distinction does not help us to decide between 'correct' and 'incorrect' or between 'central' and 'peripheral' usage. A screwdriver has a use but it can be misused as a chisel. This type of situation and some other defects are what the analytic critics have against analytic philosophy.

Popper, in his critique of the analytic methodology expressed that the business of both science and philosophy is the search for truth, not the search for meanings. Meanings are interesting when they are embedded in correct accounts of the world. In replacing the analytic method with his philosophic method, he says:

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1.   Ryle, G. (1953): 'Ordinary Language' in The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXII; pp.167- 86.

> One should never quarrel about words, and never
> get involved in questions of terminology. One
> should always keep away from discussing concepts.
> What we are really interested in, our real problems,
> or in other words, problems of theories, and their
> truth. [1]

Analytic philosophers themselves are conscious of the
deficiences in its process and so, when analytic philosophy
of education was to be launched, care was taken to overcome
these deficiences. In education, thus the analytic method
went through some revolution. Scheffler outlined the new
analytic programmes in terms of:

(a)   a greater sophistication as regards language, and
       the interpenetration of language and inquiry;

(b)   an attempt to follow the modern example of the
       sciences in empirical spirit, in rigour, in attention
       to detail, in respect for alternatives, and in
       objectivity of method;   and

(c)   the use of the techniques of symbolic logic
       brought to full development in the previous
       fifty years. [2]

In sum, the intention was to bring to the study of education
a "union of scientific spirit and logical method applied
towards clarification of basic ideas." [3]

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1.   Popper, K. (1972): Objective Knowledge. Oxford,
          Clarendon Press;   p.310.

2.   Scheffler, I. (1954): 'Toward an Analytic Philosophy of
          Education'; in Scheffler, I. (1973) Reason and
          Teaching. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

3.   Ibid. p.10

The horizons of analytic philosophy had been set by the
early Wittgenstein; Philosophy was to leave everything as
it is; it was to explain the world rather than to try to
change it. It would therefore, have no truck with ideology.
Its interest would be in second order questions; it is
concerned with reflective questions about scientific,
religious, moral and other first order activities.

    This type of programme, according to Raywid's amounts
to the decontextualising of philosophy. She thus distinguishes
two problems related to this strategy. One, in Dewey's
words is that:

> When the context is suppressed ....
> elements become absolute, for they have no
> limiting conditions. Results of inquiry
> valid within specifiable limits of context are
> ipso facto converted into sweeping metaphysical
> doctrine.[1]

The other, in Raywid expression, is that 'conceptual analysis
serves up a kind of atomism ... by denying empirical
connection in the establishment of a concept."[2]
With the recontextualizing of philosophical debate, the
context is what is pertinent. For a recontextualized philosophy
it is within a particular spatio-temporal, or historical

1.   Dewey, J. 'Content and Thought' in Bernstein, R.J. (ed.)
          (1960): On Experience, Nature and Freedom;
          New York, Liberal Arts Press. p.96

2.   Raywid, A. 'More Criticism of Analytic Philosophy of
          Education' in Bernstein, R.J. (1960): Ibid. p.26

situation that we define our concepts and choose the issues
we want to discuss; it is by referring to and being related
continuously to the context of their employment that concepts
avoid atomism or taking on a quasi-metaphysical status.

In the course of this research therefore, we shall
employ both the traditional and the contemporary analytic
methods of research. The reason for this choice is that an
exclusive concern with tasks of analysis is attended by
serious dangers, unless we make an investigation of those
metaphysical, religious, ethical presuppositions which
underlie the value-judgements that are made in education
particularly adult education.

3.4 A Concept of Adult Education:

The concept of adult education is not separate from the
concept of education in general. To understand the nature
and purpose of adult education, it is necessary and a
sufficient condition to understand the nature and purpose
of education in general. What appears to be at variance is
concerned with the normative issues which arise in adult
education.[1]

The concept of 'education' is broad and inclusive as
well as complex; it embraces a large number of other concepts

1. Adult education has its own peculiar normative issues
   which differs from those of general education.
   Please see pp.117 - 120 below.

such as teaching, schooling, instructing, aims and **values.**
Especially significant in such concepts as education is their
value content – the values which, whether their presence is
clearly acknowledged, tacitly assumed or simply not noticed,
powerfully influence our outlook and our actions. Education
is concerned with the 'worthwhile', therefore we might look
at what is identified as worthwhile. In the case of adult
education, its worthwhileness revolves round its peculiar
value and purpose. To this end, an attempt will be made to
analyse what education means in the context of an adult
setting.

In much of American writing, 'adult education' is used
as to include all education (planned learning) done by adults.
Thus the great survey carried out by the National Opinion
Research Centre in 1963 lumped together in one enormous
miscellany such disparate things as literacy classes,
postgraduate courses, driving instruction, Bible study,
technical training, dancing, tuition and University extension
courses. The connotation given to 'adult' here is a purely
chronological one; it describes all the education which done
at a particular time of life. This presents us with so large
and various a collection of activities that, there is not
much that the educationist can say about the whole though
he may have much to say about any one of its parts.

But 'adult' has a qualitative as well as a **quantitative**
meaning and/can be used in a narrower sense to describe a
adult education
particular kind of education, not just education which is
done at a particular time of life. In this sense, to be an
adult is to have reached a certain stage of development and
to have attained social status. The salient characteristics
of this stage of development and this social status are very
simple and very obvious.

An adult, as well as being over twenty, is:

(a)   a free man, no longer under tutelage, able (within
the law) to do what he likes and to make his own
judgements and choices;

(b)   a mature man with some experience of life, whose
personality, attitudes and social roles are becoming
fixed, though they may not be irrevocably fixed;

(c)   a full citizen (and in many cases, a parent and the
head of a household) with all the rights and duties
of a citizen (and perhaps those of a parent and
householder). [1]

So, by 'adult education' as it shall be conceptualized
in this research is meant education - planned processes of
learning which is not only undertaken by people over twenty

1.   Wiltshire, R. (1966): 'The Nature and Uses of Adult
Education' in The Spirit and the Form.
Dept. of Adult Education, University of
Nottingham; p.137 .

is culturally determined / but which, in its content, organisation and
conduct is relevant to and to some extent, determined by
these characteristics of adulthood. Excluded are, casual
learning that is incidental to other activities, recreational
activities in which there is no commitment to learn even
though these may take place in an educational institution,
education done under compulsion and education that belongs
to the period of tutelage and preparation for occupation.

3.4.1 Education for Individuation:

    Earlier stages of education are mostly concerned to a
considerable extent, with two tasks. First socialisation
and second, preparation for occupation. We all have to learn
the language, habits, attitudes and skills that will
enable us to live as an accepted and normal member of the
society into which we happen to be born; we have to learn to
be English or Yoruba or Igbo, and this task of socialisation
takes up a greater part of the earliest stages of our
education. We all have to learn too, how to earn our living
in that society; we have to acquire the knowledge and skills
that will enable us to earn a living by producing goods and
services that society wants and will pay for, and this
preparation for work takes up a great part of the later
that is, secondary and tertiary stages of our education.

    But adult education comes at a stage of life when these
tasks of socialisation and of preparation for occupation are

more or less completed; the adult is, as earlier said, a
mature, responsible and free citizen. If in this phase
of life education starts up again, its tasks will be a different
one. Accordint to Wiltshire,[1] educational tasks will not be
that of socialisation, nor will it be vocational training
but rather something which may perhaps be described as
individuation, which he defines as "self discovery and self
development voluntarily undertaken". He claimed that
'individuation' is a significant and dominant aim in adult
education and it determines curriculum, organisation and
method.

By choosing to learn something voluntarily, the learner
is demonstrating that for him it is worthwhile, and decisions
are intentional. There are personal criteria of some kind
relevant to the decisions. Each individual is in effect
working out his own list of educational criteria and his own
concept of education, and we have what might be called an
individualistic view of education. It is a view that would
fit in with the spirit of adult education, and there is a
real sense in which adult education is pluralistic. The
values and objectives subscribed to by individuals are more
likely to be shared with other members of a sub-group than
individually conceived, because none of us is isolated
completely from socially constructed value systems but it

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1. Wiltshire, A.   in Rogers, A. (1976) op. cit., p.139

would be logically possible for some unique personal
collection of values and ideas to be regarded as a
personalised concept of education.

Like education, the word individual also requires
analysis because our understanding and interpretation of
concepts do influence our thinking, our planning and our
experience of the world around us; it is important therefore
to attempt some clarification of its content.

To be individual for example,   somebody whose ways of
life are quite different from others, the way he reasons, or
                would
dresses /distinguish   him from the rest of his associates;
or for somebody to be an individual (noun), is to be separate,
apart from others. In this sense, the word can be used of
both animate and inanimate objects - books, bricks, and
beetles,as well as human beings. Each of these is distinct
from every other, physically discrete; it occupies an
environment which, because spatially unique, is at least
to that extent minimally different from the environment
of every object. As applied to human beings, 'individual'
signifies a separatedness which is more than merely spatial;
it carries also a sense of psychological separatedness,
of being a distinct centre of consciousness which includes
awareness of one's self and of one's otherness, a distinct
personality as construed by psychologists is not possessed
by objects.

To be an individual is to be separate, unique and to
possess a potential for response and development; in addition
is the capacity for choice and self-determination.

All organisms respond to appropriate stimuli; but only in
human beings is response a deliberate choosing. Not that
it is always so, for in many situations we respond automatically
through habit or instinct; but it can be, and often is, a
considered weighing up of pros and cons in an attempt to
sort out problems and make a choice independently of what
others advise or do. Such choosing is characteristic of
human individuality, so that the greater the tendency to
think of the person choosing as an individual.[1] The
foregoing analysis is a descriptive account of the concept,
it is only partially informative and as such not a complete
practical guide. It leaves unanswered such questions - what
degree of self-determination to permit ? Choice of what ?
No doubt, these are value questions which lead us from the
factual to the normative.

3.4.2 A Normative Aspect of Adult Education

Adult education, according to the above proposed
rationale, is that activity concerned to assist adults in
their quest for a sense of control in their own lives,
within their interpersonal relationships, and with regard to
the social forms and structures within which they live.
Assisting adults to develop a sense of autonomous control
in their lives is not to be equated with an atomistic
isolation; rather, such a sense of control is realized

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1. Garforth, F.W. (1985): Aims, Values and Education.
   Hull, Christygate Press.

in the creation and re-negotiation of personal relationships
and in the sphere of socio-political behaviour, as well as
in the realm of intellectual exploration, judgement and
discrimination.

In adult education, it is proposed that all involved
assist each other to identify the external sources and
internalized assumptions framing their conduct, and to be
ready to assess. Such critical awareness will involve a
realization of the contextual, provisional and relative
nature of supposed "truth", public knowledge and personal
belief. When there is a separation between adults'
aspirations and the socially transmitted codes, values
frameworks and belief systems which are instrumental to their
behaviours, then, with the aid of autonomous reflection,
received assumptions, that is, assumptions which, after
careful consideration, are seen to be irrelevant are jettisoned.
Endemic to this abandonment of assumptions perceived as
irrelevant and inauthentic will be the transformation of
individual and collective circumstances. Such a transformation
will be manifest in the re-negotiation of personal relationships,
in the attempt to re-create the conditions of work so as to
imbue these with some sense of personal significance, and
in an engagement in the alteration of social forms.

Adult education, then, is concerned with facilitating
adult learning of a particular kind. It is distinguished

from adult training, in which a set of previously defined
skills, knowledge and behaviours are transmitted to trainees
in a manner previously defined by the trainer. In training,
the emphasis is on acquiring and demonstrating the previously
defined skills, knowledge and behaviours in as correct a
manner as possible. For a training course to be regarded
as an example of adult education, it would have to have at
its curricular and pedagogic heart a willingness to consider
alternatives.

In adult education, however, the internal change in
consciousness which results from participation in teaching-
learning transactions has at its heart the fact of critical
reflectivity. A central feature of adult learning explained
by Brookfield is that the adults concerned come to appreciate
the contextual and contingent nature of public and private
knowledge. They realize that the belief systems, value
frameworks and behavioural prescriptions informing their
conduct are culturally constructed, not divinely ordained.

Endemic to this cognitive and affective change is the
awareness that the world is not composed of fixed and
unchallengeable givens of beliefs and conduct, but that
it is malleable and open to continuous re-creation.[1]
Following from this awareness is the realization that
individual circumstances can consciously be altered and that
adults can, in concert with others, engage in a collective

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1. Brookfield, S. (1985): 'A Critical Definition of Adult
   Education'. in Adult Education Quarterly,
   Vol.36, No.1. Fall. pp.44-49.

changing of cultural norms. Developing in adults a sense
of their personal power and self-worth is thus seen as a
fundamental underpinning to this concept of adult education.

So far, we have been concerned with the individualistic
aspects of adult education, but it should be noted that the
normal individual is not an isolate and what he does is in
most cases influenced by, and influences in turn, his relations
with others. Thus it can be said of adult education that it
has absolute as well as instrumental value, that it is good
in itself as well as a means of gaining other goods.

3.4.3 A Concept of Adult Education in the Nigerian Context:

From the background of a recontextualized view of
education emerges an important consequence for the way in
which we come to define the concept itself. Thus, within
this paradigm, the appropriate question to ask is not the
generic one, 'what is adult education?', but the contextual-
ised one; 'what ought adult education to mean given
conditions X ?', in other words, given the Nigerian condition
what ought adult education to mean ?

To give an answer to this type of question would involve
taking a cursory look at the state of affairs of Nigeria from
her political, religious and historical perspective. The
type of answer would thus be either descriptive or prescriptive
in nature, depending on who is answering the question.

The politician is likely to give a prescriptive meaning of adult education if he is trying to include the programme of adult education in his campaign manifesto. While an educator is likely to give the descriptive meaning of adult education in its truth perspective if his ambition is to modify the programme.

The Nigerian National Policy on Education states that adult and non-formal education consists of functional literacy, remedial, continuing, vocational, aesthetic, cultural and civic education for youths and adults outside the formal School system.[1]

The Policy immediately goes on to state the objectives of adult education some of which are:

(i) "to provide functional and remedial education for those young people who prematurely dropped out of formal School system;

(ii) to provide further education for different categories of completers of the formal education system in order to improve their basic knowledge and skills;

(iii) to give the adult citizens of the country necessary aesthetic, cultural and civic education for public enlightenment."

The first aim might be interpreted as an ambition to provide equality of educational opportunity for every Nigerian, while

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1. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981): National Policy on Education (Revised). Federal Government Press.

it could be said of the second / that it is an aspiration of providing

what Mill in his inaugural lecture named   an instrument

for directing the use of professional knowledge and for

bringing the light of general culture to illuminate the

technicalities of a special pursuit;[1] and the third aim

strives at the attainment of a knowledge of public

participation, an ideal knowledge needed in a democratic

setting. Though these are aims, they could also be

interpreted as what adult education means in the Nigerian

context.

But are they really the meaning of adult education

in the Nigerian context? Is it possible to achieve equal

share of educational opportunity in a country where some

areas are marked as   educationally disadvantaged, and

such areas are given priority over and above the so-called

'privileged' areas? Is equal educational opportunity

compatible with this type of reverse discrimination ?

Ideally, adult education should involve no selection,

no entrance examination and no termination of education at

any point, save when the educand wants to take a rest or

wants no more. The participation of all citizens in

democratic decision making transcends the dictation of

content of education from above, it requires a type of

free and unhindered ordering of knowledge. It is the

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1. Garforth, F.W. (1971): John Stuart Mill on Education.
   Columbia, Teachers College Press.

dictates of society that should form the basis of the type
of knowledge needed in an adult educational setting.

Whereas the meaning of adult education in Nigeria now
is still loose and vague, for the aims as stated are not
directed to the dictates of our Society as at present,
transitional preparation preoccupies the minds of the ruled
and the ruling classes, the rural and the urban citizens.
The ambition is now to move from this poverty obsession
situation to a situation of positive value. Preoccupation
to 'build a nation where peace and justice shall reign',
in the words of the Nigerian National Anthem.

The foregoing is an exposition of what philosophical
method is all about. In the course of this research, we
shall make use of this method by first of all picking out
major concepts, and then analysing them in order to understand
the principles by which their uses are determined.
Thereafter, some crucial themes will be subjected to critical
analysis so as to eliminate psuedo-problems that are likely
to arise at the practice and implementation stages.
Finally, we will take a synthesis of all the positive ideas
highlighted in the process of our critical analysis of concepts
and issues of the topic and draw them together.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF UTILITARIANISM

Introduction:

In this chapter, we shall concentrate on the analysis
of the concepts of utilitarianism. This will be done
in relation to other key concepts with a view to
establishing conditions for its realization, standards
to be used in its evaluation and its relative value. We
shall then examine these in relation to ideal characteristics
of the adult - the springboard from which adult education's
aims arise. This exploration will assist us in our
evolving a reconstructed theory of happiness in Chapter Five.

4.1 What is Happiness?

The word happiness is basic to utilitarianism hence
it is necessary to review the various claims ascribed to
statements about what happiness is. It is doubtful whether
we can sufficiently put into words the feelings that we
experience when we feel happy, and, by the same token,
it is unlikely that we shall ever know whether the
experiences of two people who are happy are similar or
identical, and if so, in what respect? For example, one
man may find happiness in solitary pursuits and private

pleasures, while for another, all cannot be well if he is far from noisy company - 'the madding crowd', or confined to his own resources. Again, some see happiness to lie in material success of a very obvious kind, while for others, it lies rather in contentment with the bare necessities of life or even in ascetic withdrawal from the world.

According to Erich Fromm, a very common view of happiness nowadays is that it consists in 'the pleasure of unrestricted consumption, push-button power and laziness'.[1] While Grice holds that for a large number of people the recipe is "marry a pretty girl who can cook; have some children, hold a job - it is not critically important what job - as well as the next man; earn as much as I can; own my own house and car; engage in recreations and entertainments to taste; love my neighbour with some fraction of my enthusiasm for myself."[2]

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1.   Fromm, E. (1956): The Sane Society. Routledge & Kegan
         Paul, p.201.

2.   Grice, G. R. (1967): The Grounds of Moral Judgement.
         C.U.P., p.165.

Whereas, Greenberg proposes that happiness is an on-going series of instantaneous feelings which exist only in the present and identifies the source of the feelings involved with "a reaction of physical stimulus (which) creates a force which joins other forces impinging on a person".[1] But Smart and Williams wrote that "Happy is a word which is mainly descriptive (tied to the concepts of contentment and enjoyment) but which is also partly evaluative. It is because Mill approves of the "higher" pleasures ... then he approves of the more simple and brutish pleasures, that apart from consequences and side effects, he can pronounce the man who enjoys the pleasures of philosophical discourse as 'more happy' than the man who gets pleasure from push pin or beer drinking".[2]

Happiness, however, is something more than contentment. Mill recognised this when he wanted to call less worthy form of happiness mere contentment. He wrote: "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and deprivation of pleasure".[3]

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1. Greenberg, A. (1965): "Communication on the Concept of Happiness". Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, Vol.16, p.186.

2. Smart and Williams (1973): "Utilitarianism — For and Against". in J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics. Cambridge, p.22

3. Mill, J.S. (1957): Utilitarianism (first published in 1861) U.S.A., The Liberal Arts Press, p.10 .

There is an assertion that no concept has been discussed
more frequently in connection with efforts to understand
human happiness than the concept of pleasure. Along with
enjoyment and satisfaction, pleasure has often been either
identified with or made to serve as a crucial ingredient
of happiness in most utilitarian and empiricist oriented
accounts of the nature of happiness.

It will also be noted that there is a strong association
of pleasure and happiness which ranges across the spectrum
of philosophical treatment of happiness. Does happiness
then consist of pleasure ?

But the happy life is said to be the completely
satisfying life. And this again suggests that happiness
is more nearly to be identified with satisfaction than with
pleasure. The difference then between pleasure on the one
hand, and satisfaction and happiness on the other, may be
explained by the following example.

A man may enjoy his work but yet not be happy in his
work or, find satisfaction in it. The man may be a
professional fisherman; he may enjoy catching fishes, take
delight in the variety of species, shape and sizes and make
good sale, but he may feel that after all, catching fishes is
not a satisfying way to spend one's life; for, after all,
it is only a menial/skilled job. Anybody could be a

fisherman; he would have <u>preferred</u> to be doing something else!
Now to say that fishing is only a menial job is to assign
it a certain place among human activities, to show what
kind of value it has for him as a human activity. That is,
it is to pass a value judgement. Thus, while it is true
that a man will not find an activity satisfying unless he
can, in general, take pleasure in the activity, satisfaction
requires, in addition to pleasure, that a man should believe
the activity to be in some way valuable or worth his while.
The right aptitude for a job is another condition necessary
if a man is to find an activity satisfying. Thus, the above
given conditions explain why men differ in the activities
which they find satisfying, and why satisfaction is different
from pleasure.

There is no consensus as to what pleasure is. To some,
it is some kind of sensation and feeling while others object
to this view. Ryle's view is that pleasure is a particular
form of heeding or attending to the activity enjoyed.
Perry's definition of enjoyment tends to support this view;
for "enjoyment is a non-evaluative, non-conative pre-attitude
toward some actual object for what it is in itself, which
object is a present doing, undergoing, or experiencing on
the part of the subject".[2]

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1. Ryle, G. . (1967): 'The Concept of Pleasure'.
   The Hague quoted in D.W. Brook (1973): 'Recent Work in
   Utilitarianism". American Philosophical Quarterly,
   Vol.10, No.4, October, p.241.
2. Perry, D.L. quoted in D. W. Brook (1973) Ibid.

Aristotle's proposition is that:

> Pleasure is an experience of the soul
> (conscious self) and each individual finds
> pleasure in that of which he is said to be
> fond; e.g. a horse gives pleasure to one
> who is fond of horses .[1]

Pleasure from these points of view has some value implications;
and it is a cognitive based activity.

However, R.P. Sylvester[2] takes pleasures to be a kind of
sensation and feeling, / and he argues that it is difficult to
see how any judgement over felt pleasures can be made.
Feelings, according to him, are whatever they are. They are
felt, he remarked. They come upon us and vanish. The
ephemeral and perishing nature of a pleasant sensation is
perhaps its most prominent feature. Pleasures, as they
occur, have no content. They have no additional meaning.
Content and meaning come about and /are recognised when the
feelings, whatever they are, are spoken about; that is to
say, when they are categorised. One may experience a surge
of pleasure upon hearing the voice of one's favourite musician.

But there is no assurance that the next time
one hears the piece, one will be feeling the same again.
There is the possibility of boredom, of wrong environment or
lack of attention. Also, one may have a shock of pleasure
upon seeing a longed for son, walk into the room.

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1. J.A.K. Thomson (1983) (transl.) The Ethics of Aristotle:
    The Nicomachnean Ethics. England, Penguin Books.

2. R.P. Sylvester (1958) "Pleasure: Higher and Lower".
    Ethics. Vol. LXVII, No.4, July. pp.129-137

But another time, one may feel the pain of anxiety. Pleasure viewed this way can be given to people. Clark, for example, says that pleasure can be given in various ways; by sending flowers or sweets, satisfying whims and fancies, paying compliments, and arranging treats. She denied, however, that such things give automatic pleasure. A bunch of red roses may revive bitter memories and a visit to the theatre may be spoiled by a bad play but then, these are the ways in which attempts to give pleasure are made and which are more often than not successful.[1]

There are, however, objections to Utilitarianism, and a common one is that of maximising the total or the average net happiness while failing to take enough account of the separateness of persons.[2] A similar objection is that of John Rawls[3] who claims that the utilitarian approach extends to society as a whole the principle of rational prudence for one person. This approach can be described to be that of an impartial sympathetic spectator who imaginatively identifies with each and every member of Society, thus conflicting all their desires with one experience, which in turn makes it possible to treat the internal ordering of the community as though it were much the same problem as that of maximising

1. Clark, P.M. (1954): 'Some Difficulties in Utilitarianism' Philosophy; Vol.29

2. Hart, H.L.A. (1938): 'Between Utility and Rights'. in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 198-222.

3. Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice, Cambridge; Mass., Harvard University Press.

an individual's desired satisfaction. Thus, it allows a society to balance the satisfaction and dissatisfactions, the gains and losses of different individuals as if they together formed one individual seeking the greatest balance of satisfaction.

The problem is that a society is not like a person. Adopting this approach amounts to treating the different identities of persons as if they were of no more importance, for the ordering of society, than the different stages of an individual's life are for its prudent ordering. But a society is composed of distinct persons, each with a life to lead, a point of view, and so on. As distinct systems of ends, persons cannot simply be cashed out as just so many containers for valuable experiences, since the boundaries between individuals are of more than merely derivative importance and indeed define the very object of moral concern.

The purpose of this simple analysis is to explain what
or psychological
is meant by happiness in the emotional/ sense. This type of happiness   needs no   evaluation, for Mill himself regards emotion or sensation as lower happiness. The higher 'happiness' has to do with cognition and as such is to be preferred.

4.2 What is meant by 'Utility' ?

The view underlying traditional Utilitarianism was that the only things good in themselves, intrinsically good, good per se, are certain experienced goods, a certain state of consciousness. These were frequently summed up as pleasure or happiness, by which was usually also intended the absence of its contrary state of consciousness, usually referred to as pain. The concept of experienced good might be extended beyond pleasure to include such things as knowledge. Bentham, for example, says that the word 'utility' means "that property in an object where it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness." And, lest it seems that he has more than one standard afoot, he immediately reduces all the others to pleasure by saying that all of them "come to the same thing".[1] In another place, he also mentions 'security' in a content which seems to say that happiness equals pleasure plus security. And, on the negative side, he adds that it includes whatever tends to avert or diminish mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness.

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1. Bentham, J. The Principles of Morals and Legislation; Chapter 1, iii.

2. _____ Ibid. Chapter III, i.

Likewise, Mill, objecting to critics who opposed utility to pleasure, says that far from being opposed, they are the same. He then goes on to subsume beauty, amusement, the agreeable and the ornamental under pleasure as species of it.[1]

To tolerate the odour or sight of the droppings from livestocks for example, because of their utility as cheap fertilizers would be mistaken if applied to the word as it occurs in the ethical doctrine of Utilitarianism, for this is neither beautiful nor is it amusing. On this theory, whatever (aside from pleasure itself) is good is so either because it is directly pleasurable or because it is a means to something else which is. Consequently, whatever is indirectly good is not something which can be properly contrasted with utility, for that concept is intended to be taken broadly enough to include them all. Whatever is good instrumentally, be it object, action, institution, custom, or law, is so because of its tendency to increase pleasure (experienced goodness) and/or decrease pain — and this is exactly what is meant by calling it utilitarian and saying that it promotes utility.

4.2 What is Utilitarianism ?

The preceding discussion on the meaning of the word 'utility' no doubt provides a basis for the task ahead.

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1. Piest, O. (ed.) (1957): Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill; U.S.A., The Liberal Arts Press Inc., p.9

Bentham explains:

> By the principle of utility is meant that
> principle which approves or disapproves of every
> action whatever, according to the tendency which
> it appears to have to augment or diminish the
> happiness of the party whose interest is in question".[1]

Mill calls utilitarianism by the name 'the greatest happiness
principle' and says it is the creed "that actions are right
in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness
is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness,
pain and the privation of pleasure.[2]

In a more modern version, Pickard-Cambridge states:

> The right act is that act which on the most
> careful possible review of all relevant factors
> may most reasonably be expected to bring the
> greatest good about.[3]

The doctrine can thus be summed up very simply: Maximise
happiness.

A few points need to be made in the clarification of this
concept. The first is that the doctrine intended is definitely
not a selfish one. Happiness is happiness, and since it is a
good per se, it is just as good in one place as in another.

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1. Bentham, J. op. cit., Chapter I, ii.

2. Piest, O. (ed.) (1957) op. cit. page 10

3. Pickard-Cambridge, W.A. (1932) 'Two Problems about Duty'
   in MIND Vol. 41, p.340 .

So, as the utilitarians explicitly insist, the happiness to be maximised is that of the human community taken as a whole — sometimes even all 'Sentient creation'. Utilitarianism justifies and praises self-sacrifice but only on the condition that it is for the sake of someone else's greater happiness.[1]

So happiness — unhappiness (or as is usually put, pleasure-pain) is viewed as a continuum, usually linear, centering around some neutral point. Here, then, arises the hedonic calculus. The doctrine when elucidated is not merely the injunction to produce as much happiness as possible but rather to produce the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness — that is, pleasure over pain. Just as a state of more happiness (pleasure) is preferable to one of less, so is a state of less unhappiness (pain) preferable to one of more, and so also is the neutral state better than either of the latter two and worse than either of the former alternatives. Further, since it is the total of various quantities which one is to consider, a given quantity of unhappiness (pain) may be morally neutral; or overcome by an equal or greater quantity of happiness (pleasure). So, to determine the relative desirability of any given state of affairs, add up the various quantities of unhappiness (Pain) present throughout the community, and subtract this total from the corresponding total

1. Piest, O. (ed.) (1957); op. cit., p.21

of happiness (pleasure); the higher the net result lies on the happiness - unhappiness continuum the better. Having thus clarified the concept further, we can now elaborate the doctrine's statement as maximising the balance of happiness over unhappiness.

4.3 Negative Utilitarianism:

Negative Utilitarianism, which may never have actually been defended by anyone, is the doctrine that one's duty is to minimize unhappiness on the whole. The significant difference between this doctrine and the theory as it has been stated above is that there is no reference here to increasing happiness. Increasing happiness may well be recognised as good, but it is not a duty. Happiness, as a positive quantity, does not enter into one's calculations; there is no balancing of happiness with unhappiness, no concern with the net result.

This theory has, however, one consequence which alone is sufficient immediately to render it untenable.[1] Since any conceivable animal life will include some suffering, and since this theory holds that the sole aim of morals is to rid the world of suffering, it would follow that one should, if he could do so instantly and painlessly, destroy all sentient creation. With the extirpation of beings which can suffer, suffering itself would also vanish. Even if it could not be

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1. Smart, R.N. (1958): "Negative Utilitarianism", Mind, Vol.67, p.542.

done quite painlessly, it is at least quite plausible that the cumulative total of the minor pains and unhappiness of a life time would probably be greater than that of a quick though violent death. So, on this view, murder, mass murder — all would be a moral duty and a benefit to the 'victims'. But surely no moral theory is viable which has as a consequence the elimination of the moral community.

In an attempt to mollify this consequence, Acton[1] has argued that eliminating suffering is not the same as reducing it or as arriving at the least amount of avoidable suffering for all. His version is however misleading because it lacks qualification. The least amount of suffering is zero, and to reduce suffering to its least amount is to eliminate it. Obviously, what he seems to have in mind though not articulated, is some qualification of some form such as 'the least amount consistent with .....' But what might this 'with' be? Could it be 'Human life?' or 'human life of some particular sort ?' The first is clearly inadequate. It is doubtful that the second could be stated in a way which avoids a reference to happiness as a positive quantity and is at the same time both clear and plausible. Nor does any other plausible alternative suggest itself.

1. Acton, H.B. (1963): 'Negative Utilitarianism', Proceedings, The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol.37, p.83

4.4 Utilitarianism, Motivation and Moral Worth:

Brandt[1] points out that Utilitarianism is indefensible as a theory of moral blameworthiness, for this depends not merely upon consequences produced but rather upon other factors such as whether the agent sincerely believed he was doing his duty, the degree of temptation, whether his act was impulsive, compulsive, provoked, or not. It certainly is true that producing consequences is not the whole of ethics. Consider, for example, these alternative actions: On the one hand, a man does something to help his friend; on the other, the friends acts on his own behalf, producing the same consequences. The former, an altruistic act, would seem to have a moral worth which the latter lacks. Brown considers this to be a fatal objection to Utilitarianism, arguing that on this theory it would

> make no difference to our judgement of the moral value of an act... whether the agent acted rationally or irrationally, with good intentions or bad ones, while he was well and conscious or ill and unaware of what he was doing.[2]

Now, Utilitarianism may perhaps be intended as (as including) a theory of moral value. It may be intended to imply the claim that the moral worth is the action's instrumental

1. Brandt, R.B. (1963): "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianis" in Morality and the Language of Conduct; ed. Casteneda and Nakhnikan, Wayne State University Press; p.109

2. Brown, S.M. Jr. (1952): "Duty and the Production of Good". Philosophical Review, Vol.61, p.299

value. If so, then Brown's criticisms would be fatal to it. However, Utilitarianism need not be intended as a complete moral theory. In particular, it need not be intended to imply a theory of moral worth. Remember Mill's comment in this context, "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent."[1]

In such hands as Mill's, the theory is intended only as a theory of rightness and duty and as such is not concerned with the intrinsic value of actions. Hence, for such theories, Brown's criticism fails. The moral value of an act may well depend upon something other than consequences while yet its being a duty or not depends upon that alone. So, Utilitarianism is not necessarily committed to denying the distinction frequently made between a right and a good act. Nor is it committed to denying that a good act has a moral worth as something distinct from the consequences of the particular act.

There are at least two possible explanations of intrinsic moral value which are consistent with a Utilitarian theory of duty. The first is that an action has intrinsic value by virtue of its being a kind of action which usually produces good results. In this case, the value of the action is not completely independent of results, but it is independent of the results of the particular action which is enough.

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1. Mill, op. cit., ch. ii, p.24 footnote.

The second would say that a good action shines in the reflected glory of a morally good motive and derives its non-instrumental worth therefrom.

The failure to distinguish these two different issues, duty and moral worth, mars many critiques of Utilitarianism, as can be seen in the following two examples. Consider first this exchange between Kaplan and Smart. Kaplan[1] objects to Utilitarianism; that, it is a tool better suited to philosophical or political speculation than to individual practical life on the ground that even if calculations would show that one should follow certain rules (keep one's promises, tell the truth, even then it seems that it would be morally preferable for the action to be done with spontaneity, morally preferable that the action flow from some Aristotelian 'firm character' rather than out of any sort of calculations about total happiness.

Smart's reply to Kaplan is concerned solely by showing that spontaneity has a place also in the Utilitarian's life.[2] The reasons which Smart cites in support of his contention that the Utilitarians need not calculate every time are, first, that there is no need to do so since moral rules serve as empirical generalizations telling us what it is

1. Kaplan, M.A. (1959-60): "Some Problems of the Extreme Position". Ethics, Vol.70, p.228.
2. Smart, J.J.C. (1960-61): "Extreme Utilitarianism: A Reply to M. A. Kaplan". Ethics, Vol.71, p.133

usually right to do, and, secondly, that it would be inutile
to do so since the advantages of calculation would frequently
outweigh the disadvantages. But Smart's reply seems to be the
worst possible. He has saved a place for spontaneity all
right, but in doing so, he has missed the point of Kaplan's
objection and has stated Utilitarianism in precisely that form
to which this objection is most applicable. Kaplan has insisted
(correctly) that spontaneity in certain acts has a moral beauty
which is independent of the results of the particular act, and
Smart's reply leaves him stuck with the contention that even
this spontaneity is of value only in so far it increases the
total happiness produced. However, both Kaplan's objection and
Smart's reply appear to overlook the distinction under discussion
here. Even though Smart's reply amounts to little more than a
misunderstanding, Kaplan's objection could be turned by pointing
out that although much can be said about the motivation of the
act and the character of the agent, this is not the province of
Utilitarianism. It is quite consistent with Utilitarianism as
a theory of rightness and duty that spontaneity in the
performance of duty has an additional moral worth.

As a second instance, consider an example of Ewing's.[1]
A ship sinks, and the life saving facilities remaining will
carry to safety either A or B but not both. Further, it is clear

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1. Ewing, A.C. (1962): Ethics. London: The English
      Universities Press Ltd., p.45 .

that B's survival rather than A's will be most conducive to the future production of human happiness, due, perhaps, to some special talent or ability of B's. (This qualification needs to be introduced explicitly, for without it a Utilitarian doctrine would not **arise** at all. There would be merely an instance of self sacrifice opposed to an instance of selfishness, which the Utilitarian is quite as free as anyone to praise and blame accordingly.) Now the alternative actions considered are first, A's sacrificing his life for B, and second, B's shoving A out of the life boat. Ewing's contention is that a Utilitarian has no reason to prefer one to the other since the consequence are the same in both cases, whereas in fact, the first is noble and the second base. But let us not be swayed by the moral horror of this terribly cruel situation. A choice <u>must</u> be made. Further, it is given that, <u>clearly</u>, B's survival will yield the most human happiness. On what other basis could a decision be made ? Simply as humans, they have equally the right to live. Can it not be plausibly argued that B is the one who <u>should</u> survive ?

Now certainly the first alternative gives the Utilitarian no difficulty. In addition to being in accord with duty, A's action is noble and he deserves praise for his sacrifice. But neither does the second alternative bring Utilitarianism to grief. B has brought about the situation which should exist, and in doing so, has done what he should. The question which

remains concerns B's motive in this case. If he has saved his
own life out of recognition of his duty to the community (there
is no argument here that this is likely) then he is rather
to be pitied for the choice he has had to make and the memory
he will doubtless carry with him than be blamed for making it.
If, on the other hand, his action was merely selfish, then it
is quite as open to a Utilitarian as to anyone else to call it
what it was and to censure it accordingly. Ewing argues:

> The very most the Utilitarian could maintain
> with the least show of plausibility would be
> that the action of B was excusable or not
> blameworthy, he could not possibly maintain that
> it was positively admirable, yet we should all
> admit that the action of A which had practically
> the same effects was not just excusable but
> positively admirable. Utilitarianism cannot account
> for this difference. [1]

Indeed it cannot, but then it need never have been conceived
as an account of moral worth.

In discussing this example, I have assumed that B, in
pushing A out of the boat, was employing the only method
available to save his life. The moral value question has
thereby been narrowed to that of his motive. The moral value
of means employed and the possibility of something of moral
value besides happiness in the results produced are different
issues and will be discussed later.

4.5 Utilitarianism as a Definition of Ethical Terms:

It is not clear that any Utilitarians has proposed his
doctrine as an explanation of the meaning of ethical terms.

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1. Ewing, _Ethics._ p.46

Perhaps the clearest case could be made against Bentham, who,
in a section entitled "Ought, ought not, right or wrong,
how to be understood", says:

> When thus interpreted, the words _ought_, and
> _right_ and _wrong_, and others of that stamp,
> have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none. [1]

Obviously, the principle of utility is proposed as the
standard of right and wrong. In Bentham's words, it is

> that principle which states the greatest
> happiness of all those whose interest is in
> question as being the right and proper, and [2]
> universally desirable end of human action.

However, it might be argued that, if 'right' _means_ something
like 'conducive to the general happiness', then the central
principle of Bentham's ethics, that an action is right if and
only if it is conducive to the general happiness, actually
says nothing more than that an action is conducive to the
general happiness, which, though doubtless true, is not very
illuminating. As Sidwick so succintly sums it up, under a
slightly different interpretation,

> the proposition that it is conducive to general
> happiness to take general happiness as an end of
> action, though not exactly a tautology, can hardly
> serve as the fundamental principle of a moral system. [3]

G. E. Moore does, in _Principia Ethica_, define 'right' as
'productive of the greatest good'. However, since he adamantly

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1. Bentham, _op. cit._, Chp. 1, x.
2. _Ibid._, chap. 1, n.2 .
3. Sidwick, H. (1962): _The Methods of Ethics_. London,
   Macmillan & Co. Ltd., p.26a .

denies that 'good' can be defined in any way at all, what this definition amounts to is but the explication of the (claimed) relation between these two ethical terms. Further, in his second book on the subject, Ethics, he seems to give up altogether the earlier opinion that he could define even 'right' and now argues only that the criterion, the reason, for an act's being right is its utility, and since the criterion of rightness is a different thing from rightness itself, this is a different issue.[1]

Ross argues that most attempted definitions of 'right', including the Utilitarian one, fail simply because it is plain on reflection that "this is not what we mean by right, even if it be a true statement about what is right."[2] Brown also, in a similar vein, agrees that Utilitarianism cannot define 'good', because these terms have their distinct meanings. He points out that other philosophers deny the synonyms of 'good', and 'productive of the greatest happiness', and insists that for the Utilitarians to assert their synonym is arbitrary and dogmatic. He argues that if the statement 'whatever maximises happiness is good' were really analytic, then there would be no disagreement - just as there is no argument about the synonym of 'married' and 'wed'.[3]

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1. For a quite complete discussion of Moore's shift in position on this topic see W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, (Oxford: University Press, 1961), pp. 9-11.

2. Ross, Ibid., p.9.

3. Brown, op. cit., p.305.

These considerations would seem fatal to any claim that Utilitarianism is a correct account of the meaning of these ethical terms as they are commonly employed. It does seem true that this simply is not what most people mean when they use these words. However, another possibility remains. Perhaps Utilitarianism could be interpreted as being (as including) a linguistic recommendation to the effect that 'right', be defined in these terms. This proposal would seem to come to grief, however, over the appropriate version of Moore's open question argument. As Brown argues, continuing in the above context, assuming this synonym, the Utilitarian can neither explain the questions in which we ask for reasons, nor can he give us any such reasons.

Granted that X is happiness maximising, the question 'Why is X right?' would not be a legitimate request for information but only a display of linguistic inadequacy on the part of the questionner. And beyond this impossibility of intelligible phrasing of such a request lies the further impossibility of answering it. How could one who adopted such a definition then argue in support of his principle that a right act is one which maximises happiness? What reason could he give to support this central claim that one should (an ethical term) so act? He could not turn round again and cite happiness maximization as support for this principle for in Brown's words:

> the reason why anything is what it is cannot be
> provided in any phrase that is precisely synonymous
> with some other word for the thing. If 'good
> maximizing' <u>means</u> 'dutiful' then 'good maximizing'
> cannot be the reason why a given act is dutiful."[1]

To pursue this question much further would open up the whole topic of the <u>Naturalistic Fallacy</u> and lead us too far afield. However, before leaving it, perhaps it would be worthwhile to mention the replies that have been made by two Utilitarians. Mill, without explicitly raising the question of the meanings of ethical terms, states that the principle of utility is the 'first principle' of morals, and like all first principles, all those principles upon which proof is ultimately based, it is not susceptible to proof. He went on to explain that one cannot strictly prove that the end of right action, or of commended activity in general, is happiness. One cannot prove any ultimate end.

An ultimate end is that by reference to which we prove the propriety of adopting subordinate ends or particular rules. The same kind of thing is true in matters of theory. Proof of the truth of statements depends upon reference to certain ultimate criteria, which are not themselves capable of proof but are accepted through some other procedure than proof. Mill believes that the ultimate criteria, in the case of theoretical proof, are truths received from the experience of the senses and of feeling. He holds

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1. Brown, S.M. Jr. (1952): <u>op. cit.</u>, p.301

that the acceptance of ultimate criteria for practical activity
is likewise a matter of experience, in this case, the
experience of desire.

We can prove that hard drinking is bad, that is,
it must be avoided, by showing that it is harmful to health;
and that exercise is good, by showing that it is conducive to
health. But we cannot prove that health is good. All we can
say is that human beings desire to be healthy. The ultimate
end of criterion of human action is what human beings desire,
or 'happiness'. This cannot be proved, but it can be explained;
and the explanation may be called, in a wide sense of the word,
a 'proof' in that it helps us to accept the view proposed.
Mill's 'proof' consists:

    (a) in explaining his view; and
    (b) in trying to meet objections to it.

And this is exactly what he has done in chapter iv of
Utilitarianism. He presented considerations which he believes
are sufficient to lead his readers to accept the principle
as the first principle of ethics.[1]

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1. Without belabouring this point further here, I refer
the reader to the very cogent arguments to be found in
E.W. Hall, "The Proof of Utility in Bentham and Mill"
Ethics, vol.60 (1949-50), p.1. See also: R.H. Popkin,
"A note on the Proof" in Mill, Ethics, vol.61 (1950-51),
p.66 and S. Moser, "Comments on Mill's Arguments for
Utilitarianism" Inquiry, vol.6 (1963) p.308 .

A similar move is without question made by Harrod.[1]
He would meet the Naturalistic Fallacy head on. To the
objection that if 'good' is defined as 'happiness maximising'
then one can give no reason why one should maximise happiness,
that the statement 'whatever maximises happiness is good'
becomes a tautology, Harrod agrees as true. Indeed, he
continues, one can give no reason why one should maximise
happiness. But this is not peculiar, for it is beyond the power
of reason to prescribe ends. Reason can determine means to
ends and the consistency of different ends, but when it comes
to choosing ends, this lies altogether beyond the scope and
capacity of reason. Ultimate ends are a matter of pure choice;
there is no ultimate reason for doing or praising anything.
To the opposing view he would attach the label, 'The
Rationalistic Fallacy'.

4.6 Utilitarianism and Moral Reasoning:

One objection which has frequently been raised against
Utilitarianism is that it does not conform with ordinary
moral reasoning. Brown in highlighting this objection
considers a situation in which it is necessary to lie to
save a friend from death comments:

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1. R. F. Harrod: "Utilitarianism Revised"; Mind, Vol.45
(1936), p.137.

> We do not calculate consequences ...
> And if a man, under such circumstances,
> were to make these calculations, we should
> judge him to be immoral. [1]

To this objection, Smart remarked that one has only
to read the newspaper correspondence about capital punishment
to realize that the ordinary moral reasoning is in part made
up of supersititious elements, of morally bad elements, and
of logically confused elements. He warned moral philosophers
not to yield to the untutored and undisciplined opinion of
the man in the street. "Surely, it is more likely that
ordinary men are confused here. Philosophers should be able
to examine the question more rationally."[2] Harrod, in like
manner argued that the moral opinions of the ordinary man
contains "many elements of dogmatism. Survivals of the
past, and prejudices due to the accidents of history",[3] and
further that most men are neither aware of nor greatly
concerned over the lack of clarity in their thought on
such matters.

Also, to the objection that one does not calculate,
one just obeys, Mabbot replies that it is true that most
people obey rules without ever considering their justification

1. Brown, S. M. (1952): op. cit., p.304

2. Smart, J.J.C. (1956): "Extreme and Restricted
        Utilitarianism". Philosophical Quarterly , Vol.6
        p.346

3. Harrod, R.F. (1936):"Utilitarian Revised". Mind, Vol.45,
        p.137 .

but points out that, similarly, most factual beliefs are held on no better basis than authority.[1] This certainly does not mean that authority is their sole justification. Life is too short to go around justifying in full every factual belief, and the same is true of actions. What is needed is some method of justification to rely on in those situations where justification is needed, as, for example, when a belief or the morality of an action is seriously challenged.

It is not that Utilitarianism has been presented by its proponents as an account of the moral reasoning process of the ordinary man. It is rather that those who raise this objection appear to be using 'ordinary moral reasoning' as a sort of moral template upon/which moral theories must fit or fall. Now, if a theory, moral or otherwise, be completely out of touch with what men believe that it never succeeds in attracting adherents, then one would have to admit this as an argument against it, no doubt, but it is a very different thing from this to adduce ordinary moral reasoning as though it were a court of last resort from which there is no appeal, as though any divergence of a moral theory from ordinary moral reasoning is eo ipso conclusively fatal to the theory.

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1.   Mabbott, J. D. (1953): 'Moral Rules'; Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol.39, p.97.

If ordinary moral reasoning, (a species, one supposes,) of common sense, were that authoritative, there would be very little of either need or place for moral theory.

And in any case, it may not be an objection to Utilitarianism to point out that people do not ordinarily stop to calculate consequences. This fact of human behaviour might be explained in a number of ways. Hume, for instance, would explain it as habit.[1] That we act in this way shows the influence of education; we have been trained not to reflect. (Hume adds that is probably to an advantage.)

But the truth of this or any other psychological theory claimed as an account of this element of human behaviour is in any case not germane. Regardless of how it is that we have come to act in this way, the moral philosopher can still raise some questions such as: Is acting this way very justified ? And if so, then by what ? Is it morally correct to do at all this thing which we do habitually ? And if it is, then by what ? What makes it so ? Thus, mere divergence from ordinary moral reasoning does not flaw a theory, and, in particular, Utilitarianism, with its claim

1.   Hume, D. (1777): Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles of Morals; Int. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Sec. III, Pt. ii.

that consequences are what <u>justifies</u> an action, is not
detected by the fact that we do not ordinarily stop to
calculate them. It is no news to say that the reason why
one does a given act may be different from the reason which
justifies its being done.·

4.7 <u>Measurement of Utility</u>:

Whatever content utilitarians give the measurement of
utility, they almost without exception agree that morality
requires its <u>maximization</u>. Since virtually all our actions
affect the utility of more than one person, it must be
possible to calculate the total net utility to all affected
that is produced by each alternative action open to us in some
situation (or at least possible to order the alternative actions
in terms of total net utility) in order to select that action
that will maximise utility. There will, of course, be
practical difficulties in making such calculations. These,would
generally center around the difficultyin gathering and the
uncertainty of the necessary information regarding consequences.
Such difficulties affect any interesting moral theory, though
they are particularly acute for/teleological maximising theory.
More important and perplexing, however, is how the necessary
calculations can, even in principle, be made and whether the
logical foundations necessary to the intelligibility of these
calculations exist.

Unfortunately, very little attention has been paid to these problems by moral philosophers. Most discussions of utilitarianism in books and journals of late simply assume that it is possible to determine in any situation what is required by utility - maximization, and then go on to consider whether this always coincides with what is required by morality. Precisely, _what_ utility measures, and in turn how it can be measured, depends on which notion of the sort discussed in Chapter One, the theory is formulated with, as well as how that notion is constructed.

For example, if the theory is in terms of happiness in its long term sense, then some measurement of level of happiness and correlation of properties of particular actions with their effects on long term happiness will be required. Or, if the theory is in terms of satisfaction of wants, desires, or preferences, then there must be some means of determining and aggregating such satisfactions.

Furthermore, there is the problem of the possibility of actually applying any sort of calculus to such a thing as happiness. Utilitarianism requires the balancing, in calculation, of a greater quantity of happiness against a

lesser, or of a quantity of happiness against a quantity of
unhappiness. But is happiness a sort of thing capable of
being weighed or measured, or is the quantitative idom but
a pretence ?[1] It seems doubtful that happiness is susceptible
to being checked by weight.

Pickard-Cambridge in his defence counters that
Utilitarianism is at least no worse off in this respect than
a theory which involves choice from amongst competing
Prima facie duties.[2]

It surely is no more difficult, he argues, to compare
a small happiness widely distributed with a larger one more
narrowly distributed than it is to weigh the stringency of
such totally disparate prima facie obligations as, for
example, the keeping of a promise and the reparation of an
injury. This appears to be a partial solution.

There is, at least one point on which Utilitarianism
must agree; Bentham certainly, and almost as clearly Mill
and Moore, conceived happiness as occurring in discrete units
which could be bunched together and counted. Just as said
by Aristotle:

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1. As is argued by Duncan-Jones, A. (1957): "Utilitarianism
   and Rules". Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.7; p.364

2. Pickard-Cambridge (1932): op. cit., pp. 333-334.

> Our account of this Science will be adequate
> if it achieves such clarity as the subject-matter
> allows; for the same degree of precision is not
> to be expected in all discussions ... We must be
> satisfied with a broad outline of the truth ... for
> it is a mark of the trained mind never to expect
> more precision in the treatment of any subject than
> the nature of that subject permits. [1]

It should also be added that Utilitarianism does not require
that every moral question have a single determinate answer.

As regards the other issue relating to quantitative
judgements, certainly we can make measurable arbitration of
some kind about happiness. It is clearly more productive
of happiness to feed a man than to beat him. Prosperity as
opposed to depression unquestionably a time of greater
happiness on the whole.

Attempts have been made so far to find a proof of
utility, for we cannot know the validity of a thing until
it has been proved; likewise we have tried to find a means
of measuring utilitarianism as it is believed that will
provide a kind of a priori knowledge. Attempt will now be
made to locate such rules that have to be kept in order not to
violate the utilitarian doctrine.

4.8 Rule and Act Utilitarianism:

Utilitarianism, as we have it so far, says that what
one should do in any given case is that act which will

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1.   Thompson, J.A.K. (transl.) (1976): The Ethics of
            Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics.
            Penguin Books; pp. 64-65.

maximise the net balance of happiness over unhappiness.
Be that as it is, ethics is an eminently practical discipline.
While engaged in the study of morals, one should note the
fact that its theories must be suitable for practical use
in real life. It is on their ability to function adequately
and properly in this role that they are finally to be judged.
How then, is a Utilitarian going to solve a practical problem ?
Apparently when faced with a moral choice, he will be required
to perform calculations to see if any, and if so, which of the
alternatives open to him will produce the most happiness.

Unfortunately, it is not all situations that allow for
calculations to be made. Take an example; When a child
toddles out into the street or when a non-swimmer falls
overboard something must be done at once. It might be replied
that there is no need for calculation in cases like these,
for the consequences of one of the alternatives is manifest,
and that one is a disaster. But the prevention of this
disaster would not likely be the only consequences of the act,
nor would the disaster itself be the only consequence of
doing something else. So, a calculation would seem to be
required, for our theory states that the best consequences
are what is required, and how can one be sure without
calculating that this course of action would be the best
in the long run, all things considered. A successful moral

agent must have some way of carrying with him general
principles to govern his action in such emergency situation.
Without some provision of this sort, Utilitarianism becomes
impractical.

Calculations may be uncalled for especially in a
situation where it is impossible for one to foresee all
the consequences of one's action. Even in the absence of an
emergency, the actual application of the utilitarian calculus
would seem to be impossible, for how can one total up the
quantity of happiness produced when the consequences of
one's act stretch possibly into the future, far beyond one's
capacity to determine now what they will be. It would seem
that even in the more usual situations there would be no
theoretical end to possible calculations. So, it appears
that Utilitarianism must yield to the exigencies of actual
moral life, that it must find a way to make its claim that
consequences are what justify an action compatible with the
manifest need for the functioning of general principles in
the control of conduct, specifically, that it must avoid the
necessity for calculations to be made at every step.

However, it seems that there are situations in which
individual calculations, even if done correctly, would yield
non-optimistic if not disastrous results. This is brought
out in an exchange between Kaplan and Smart.[1]

1.   Kaplan, M. A. (1959-60): "Some Problems of the Extreme
        Utilitarian Position"; Ethics, Vol.70, p.228

Kaplan distinguishes two different kinds of relationships.
Specific instrumental relationships are those in which the
people have only one thing in common - their goal. Direct
calculation is admitted to be possibly advantageous in such
cases. As an example, he suggests sailors and their usually
correct almanac. It is perfectly all right to recalculate
at any time, for here there is a strict achievement criterion,
reaching port. The other kind of relationship, a diffuse
relationship, exists where there is no single common purpose
or achievement criterion. It is such cases as these in which
calculations in individual cases may well be harmful.
Marriage is offered as an example of a relationship. One
important to humans, which requires diffuse, non-instrumental
attitudes if it is to achieve its purpose. The point is not
that it would be useless to act contrary to a general rule in
a particular case, this would still be consistent with Act
Utilitarianism. The point is rather that the calculation
itself would be useless, for it would be adverse to the
marriage relationship which is much more important than the
advantages of individual exceptions to the associated rules.

Smart, J.J.C. (1960-61): "Extreme Utilitarianism: A Reply
        to M.A. Kaplan", Ethics. Vol.71, p.133

Kaplan, M.A. (1960-61): "Restricted Utilitarianism".
        Ethics, Vol.71, p.301 (A Rejoinder to Smart's
        reply).

So the rules should be followed, at least, Kaplan adds, until it becomes clear that continuing the marriage is undesirable. Likewise, the rules of Society often perform the function of stabilizing certain relationships and are validated by their consequences. If such rules did not exist, the specific instrumental attitude toward individual actions might become optimal, but this would be a generally less desirable situation.

As an example of a case where calculations does not produce desirable results, he offers the case of lawn watering in a time of water scarcity. Suppose that during hot weather, there is an edict that no water must be used for watering gardens. I have a garden and I reason that most people are sure to obey the edict, and that as the amount of water that I use will be by itself negligible, no harm will be done if I use the water secretly. So, I do use the water, thus producing some lovely flowers which give happiness to various people. But by the same reasoning, so should everyone. Thus the result of everyone's reasoning correctly on Act Utilitarian grounds is the worse possible. Even if one unselfishly desires to maximise happiness, he should act selfishly in such situations, for the private would outweigh the negligible loss to the community.

The consequences of everyone's applying - correctly - the Act Utilitarian principle in such situations is no doubt undesirable if not disastrous. Kaplan concludes that in such

cases the rules must be followed and breaches punished, but
that even then, society will not be secured until the rules
become internalized and individuals no longer desire to
break them even to secure a particular advantage. To avoid the
disadvantage of generally lawless behaviour, he concludes,
it is desirable that some rules must be followed automatically
all without calculating.

4.9 Freedom and Happiness:

Happiness, as stated in chapter iv of Utilitarianism,
is a collection   of intrinsically desirable goods,
a collection that could easily include liberty along with all
the other things it includes. Thus, some elements of happiness
are "associated with being human"; they are "the permanent
aspects" or "essential elements of human happiness".[1]
Secondly, there are those elements which are acquired
requisites for one's own happiness , such as Virtue, fame,
or power,[2] and the desirability of these acquired elements
is controlled by those goods "requisite for the happiness of
man as a creature of elevated faculties".[3] And finally,
happiness involves choosing one's plan to achieve "a harmonious
ordering and arrangement of the elements of a personality
fully developed in its capabilities and powers".[4]

1. Berger, F.R. (1984): Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The
      Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill.
      Berkeley, University of California Press; pp. 38-40.
2. Piest, O. (ed.) (1957) op. cit., p.6
3. Berger, F.R. (1984) op. cit., p.41
4. _____ Ibid. p.42

Therefore, Mill's conception of happiness is partly
determinate and partially open, and the doctrine of higher
pleasures is fundamental to the account Mill advances.

Berger argues that Mill's theory of value includes
freedom and security among the essential elements of human
happiness. First, Berger argues that Mill's account of the
higher pleasure establishes the paramount value of liberty.
According to Berger, Mill argues "that some pleasures are more
crucial to happiness, and thus more valuable."[1] Mill claims
that a "love of liberty and personal independence" is tied to
"a sense of dignity"[2] that explains competent judges'
preferences; and Mill also claims this sense of dignity
is possessed by all humans. On this basis, then, Berger
concludes that among the "essentials of human happiness, are
the constituents and requirements for an individual's sense
of being his or her own person, of developing one's life as
one chooses - a sense of freedom, power, excitement, and so on."[3]

Secondly, because Mill says "security is the most indispen-
sable of all necessaries, after physical nutrient"[4], Berger
concludes that "security (and perhaps the sense of it)"[5]

1. Berger, Ibid. p.38
2. Piest, O. (1957) op. cit., p.6
3. Berger, F.R. (1984) op. cit., pp.40-41, 231.
4. Piest, O. (1957) op. cit., ch.v, p.25
5. Berger, F.R. (1984) op. cit., p.41.

is also an essential of human happiness. This suggestion
Berger is making is that freedom and security, like
physical **nutrient** are to be understood as essential to
happiness in that they are basically necessary conditions
for experiencing the higher pleasures and human happiness.

In like manner, Gray's treatment of Mill considers the
relationships between happiness and freedom. Substituting
'autonomy' for Mill's term, 'individuality', Gray claims
that for Mill, an autonomous agent engages "in rational
deliberation on the alternatives open to him", exercises
unimpaired all the normal capacities and powers of a rational
chooser,"[1] and "his actions express principles and policies
which he has himself ratified by a process of critical
reflection".[2] Since "autonomy could be abridged both by
the interference of others" and by intrapersonal failings",[3]
freedom is closely tied to Mill's conception of autonomy.

If higher pleasures are treated not as states of mind, but
as kinds of activity of forms of life, then they are closely
tied to autonomy because mankind's distinctive, elevated
faculties are exercised only in making an autonomous choice.
But the mental pleasures are supremely valuable because
they are conceptually necessary ingredients of human happiness.

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1. Gray, J. (1983): _Mill on Liberty: A Defence._ London,
   Routledge and Kegan Paul. p.72
2. _Ibid._ p.55
3. _Ibid._ p.72

Therefore, Liberty is of paramount value because it is closely tied to autonomy, which itself is valuable because of its close connection with the higher pleasures essential to human happiness.

Mill's analysis of happiness establishes that the mental pleasures are markedly superior to other pleasures. But their pursuit requires certain social conditions: liberty and security. Liberty is valuable because it is necessary for autonomy, and latter is valuable because it is connected with the higher pleasures. Understood in terms of the reliability of established expectations, security too, is valuable: it is an important prerequisite for autonomous choice, especially choosing one's plan of life.

The above explanation of the connection between happiness, freedom, liberty and autonomy are **fundamental** concepts on which this research work rotates. The three values among other values in adult education, that is, freedom, liberty and autonomy deserve special emphasis and as such, the rest of this Chapter will be devoted to their concepts and analysis.

4.10 What Autonomy Is:

'Autonomy' was originally from a compound Greek work (autos-nomos). It meant making one's own laws and was used chiefly in a political context to describe cities or States which governed themselves,

in contrast to colonies or dependencies governed from elsewhere. But the word is also used nowadays in a more personal sense to describe people governing themselves' as individual human being; holding their own opinions, making their own decisions and generally managing their own affairs. In this sense, being an autonomous person means being independent and self-determining, master of one's fate and Captain of one's soul. Its opposite is being dependent and passive, a mere puppet controlled by someone else.

This broad, and general meaning encompasses a number of ambiguities. Personal autonomy may be thought of either as a _right_ - in this sense, we speak of being 'granted' it or 'deprived' of it by others - or as an ability to exercise that right and to manage one's own affairs as when a child is said to be 'not yet' autonomous. Moreover, that ability may be conceived as an actual competence in self-management to be exercised or enjoyed or as one that is merely potential or latent to be enhanced or developed. The last of these senses is especially common in talk about education, though the others are regularly employed also.

4.10.1   Some Objections:

But are any of these senses really meaningful ? Objections are often levelled against the whole idea of personal autonomy, suggesting in effect that it is an

empty fiction, a fanciful notion which has no application
in the real world.

These objections can be grouped roughly into three main
kinds. The first derives from the fact that every individual
depends on society. Sociologists and psychologists alike
have shown that each of us necessarily relies on our
association with other people for both our mental and our
physical well-being. From our relationships with others and
from our membership of social groupings, we derive a vital
sense of personality and individual identity, as well as
our language and our fundamental beliefs, values and world view.

Consequently, the notion that any one of us could
make a truly independent decision is an absurdity; in order
to conceive ourselves and our situation we use ideas which
are generated and defined by others, and in order to act
effectively we rely on conventions and institutions which
are established and maintained by Society. A second line
of argument derives from psychoanalytic theory. Freud[1] and
his followers have made us   recognise that much of our
conscious behaviour is stamped by unconscious forces, many
of which result from our very early experience. Therefore,
we can never be sure that we are really in command of

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1.   Freud, S. (1914): The Psychopathology of Everyday Life;
         London, Penguin Books.

ourselves in the way that the idea of autonomy seems to imply.

The third kind of reason for doubting whether we can ever be truly autonomous derives from philosophical theories of determinism. These usually start from the premise that every event must have a cause. An uncaused event would simply be unintelligible, it is thought, for usually we come to understand an otherwise mysterious occurrence by finding out why it happened. Since human actions are events, they must have causes too; and so in fact we commonly express our sense of understanding someone's behaviour; that is, discerning the causes of their conduct. That is why when we feel that we really understand someone's behaviour, it often seems predictable, or inevitable, 'just what we expected'. But if their actions can be predicted, they appear not to be autonomous, for a person who really could not have done otherwise cannot properly be said to have chosen freely to act in the way he/she did.

All the objections reviewed above imply that no one can truly be said to be autonomous (in an absolute sense). A contrary argument is offered by Ragg[1] who contends that everyone is autonomous. He draws a distinction between 'acting' and merely 'behaving', between doing things consciously

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1. Ragg, N.M. (1977): People not Cases. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.66.

and deliberately, on the one hand, and on the other, not really 'doing' them at all but just moving unthinkingly; for example, through instinct or automatism. He then points out that all action (in his sense) involves conscious decision and is to that extent self-determined, and that therefore everyone who is not a mindless automaton is autonomous. Clearly, this argument too threatens to deprive the idea of autonomy of all practical relevance, but once again, the threat is more apparent than real. For Ragg also admits the everyday practical difference between acting on one's own initiative and / someone else's commands - he just prefers to describe it as a difference in degree of "rationality" rather than "self-determination".[1] From Ragg's argument, one can conclude that the meaning of autonomy is vague and ambiguous and that the many arguments about it come close to being purely verbal disputes.

    Irrespective of all theoretical objections, autonomy remains a real, familiar and important notion. Though simply described, it is not always so easily understood; hence there is need to make its meaning clear.

4.11 The Concept of Autonomy:

    Autonomy has much to do with the exercise of choice. One demonstrates one's essence as a self-directing being by

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1. Ragg, N. M. (1977): Ibid.

choosing - not just selecting, (for selection can be done
mindlessly), whereas choice is done deliberately and with
due thought. Thus as Dearden[1] observes, personal autonomy is
manifest and experienced daily in a wide range of mental
activities like "choosing", deciding, deliberating, reflecting,
planning and judging".

Secondly, when one chooses deliberately one is conscious
that it is really one who is choosing. One acknowledges one's
choice as being in character or what some writers call
'authentic'. It reveals what Kaufman calls 'core' self,
that is, "that constellation of relatively deeply rooted,
important disposition, knowledge of which helps us to anticipate
explains (a person's) actions over a relatively extended
stretch of his total behaviour".[2] The autonomous man is the
one who, in Rouseau's phrase: "is obedient to a law that he
prescribes to himself",[3] whose life has a consistency that
derives from a coherent set of beliefs, values, and principles,
by which his actions are governed. Moreover, these are not
supplied to him ready made as are those of the heteronomous
man: they are his, because the outcome of a
still-continuing   process   of   criticism

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1. Dearden, R.F. (1975): 'Autonomy and Education': in R.F.
        Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (eds.)
        Education and Reason. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul;
        p.71 .

2. Kaufman, A.S. (1973): 'Comments on Frankena's "The Concept
        of Education Today". in Doyle, J.F. (ed.)
        Educational Judgement. - Papers in the Philosophy of
        Education; London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.48.

3. Benn, S.I. (1976-7): Quoting Rousseau in 'Freedom,
        Autonomy and the Concept of a Person'; Proceedings
        of the Aristotelian Society. p.124 .

and re-evaluation. The autonomous man is not merely capable
of considering reasons, he does consider them; and he acts
on them. What is meant here is that to be autonomous, one
must have reasons for acting, and be capable of second thoughts
in the light of new reasons; It is not to have a capacity for
conjuring criteria out of nowhere.

To say that choice and rational criticism are necessary
for autonomy is not to suggest that we choose or would choose,
our principles as we choose our bags and shoes. It is rather
that we discover our principles changing as we discover
reasons for setting old ones aside as empty that once we
thought serious and weighty. The critical junctures in our
lives occur when we discover that a principle or attitude
that we had taken to be constitutive of our characters, as
making certain kinds of action unthinkable has been eroded
by our acceptance alongside it of others that now seem basic.
We discover experientially what considerations really matter
to us, or, what amounts to the same thing, who we really are.
Such discoveries are possible only to the extent that we are
autonomous.

Gewirth[1] rightly points out that this very strong link
between the concept of autonomy and the ideal of rational and
deliberate behaviour is one reason why 'autonomous' is

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1. Gewirth, A. (1975): 'Morality and Autonomy in Education'.
   in Doyle, op. cit.

generally used as a term of approbation.

One might be surprised that the idea of autonomy should **attract** attention from theorists of adult education; after all, autonomy is a simple and familiar notion. Why should it be deemed so important ? The answer is to be found not so much in the idea of autonomy itself as in its close logical relationships with other important concepts. Attempt will now be made to consider some of these briefly in order to show how they affect our understanding of what autonomy implies.

Maturity and Adulthood:

Since the capacity for autonomous behaviour develops during childhood and adolescence and is deliberately fostered in the course of one's schooling, it naturally has close conceptual links also with the notion of "being grown up" and mature. Some theorists indeed treat it as the very essence of maturity. Knowles, for example, declares that "the point at which he psychologically becomes adult".[1] But this is to overstate the case. We all accept, surely, that people can and should be 'adult' in other ways besides self-direction; in sensitivity and tact for instance, in wisdom and insight, in emotional depth, moral judgement and personal commitment.

Yet even if autonomy is only one element in being adult it is undeniably a very important one for several reasons.

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1. Knowles, M.S. (1973): The Adult Learner - A Neglected Species. Huston, Gulf Publishing Co., p.45.

The terms 'adult' and 'mature' (which are being treated as more or less synonymous), have a complex set of meanings. In the first place, they are evaluative. No single set of personal characteristics qualifies as the universal and objective pattern of adulthood. Hostler[1] argued that each culture has its own beliefs about what mature people should be like, and those beliefs change continually. To designate particular attributes or behaviours as 'adult' is therefore to commend them, to say that these rather than some others should be aimed at in personal development. Presently, personal autonomy is widely accepted as one of the most significant characteristics of maturity; but it has not always been so, and, of course there are many other cultures today in which attributes like obedience and conformity are valued much more than self-direction and independence.

In the second place, 'adult' or 'mature' can be used either to attribute certain characteristics to a person or to accord a particular status to him. The status of being an adult carries with it a wide range of legal and moral rights and duties, chief among which are a fundamental obligation to share in the tasks and responsibilities of society, together with a right to share in its decisions, a right to consult with

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1. Hostler, J. (1986): Student Autonomy in Adult Classes. Manchester Monographs. The Centre for Adult and Higher Education, p.11 .

others, a right to ignore advice, and so on. The characteristics
of adulthood are supposed somehow to correspond to these.
The legal right to vote, for instance, is granted by any
democratic society to those presumed (by virtue of their age)
to be able to exercise it sensibly. But this is not true of
all cases. Many who are adult in years and in law sometimes
think and behave in ways which are far from being adult in
character. Thus the term 'adult' is ambiguous in exactly the
same way as 'autonomy' itself, which was shown earlier to
denote either right or an ability. The right of self-direction
is one of the most fundamental of those accorded by many
societies in granting someone the status of adulthood, but the
ability to exercise that right sensibly may be lacking or
limited.

4.13 Education for Maturation:

The idea of autonomy is linked also with that of
respecting someone as a person. This notion has come to be
very widely accepted as a guiding principle in all the
helping professions. It is somewhat vague, admittedly, and
different theorists interpret it in rather different ways,
but the majority would probably agree with the analysis of
Downie and Telfer that: "to respect a person ... is to respect
him for those features which make him what he is as a person

and which, when developed constitute his flourishing".[1]
In other words, it is not to respect him for his peculiar
achievements or abilities - for being him, so to speak - but
simply for being a human person.

The principle of 'respect for persons' means that one
must be concerned above all, to preserve and enhance people's
autonomy, albeit although with many other attributes of
human personality. Hostler[2] explains that in practice this
means allowing and encouraging people to run their own lives
as far as possible instead of making all the key decisions
for them.

4.13.1 Equality:

The principle of respect for persons, itself relying on
the notion of autonomy, supports in turn the even more
fundamental principle of the equality of all human beings.
As a political and ethical slogan, this sometimes encounters
the objection that people are manifestly not equal, that some
are clever or more talented or stronger than others - and
of course, we do differ very much in these respects. But
being equal does not necessarily mean being alike; rather,

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1.   Downie, R.S. & Telfer, E. (1969): Respect for Persons.
           London, George Allen & Unwin; p.15.

2.   Hostler, J. (1986): Student Autonomy in Adult Classes;
           Manchester Monographs, The Centre for Adult
           Education; p.11.

it means having the same and degree of importance despite the differences between us. Because of this, our belief in equality depends very much on the idea of autonomy. Since essentially it amounts to the conviction that "all ... have the same status as choosers and creators of value", as Wilson puts it. All are presumed capable of self-direction towards their chosen goals, and therefore all are to be accorded equal (negative) liberty for self expression, equal access to the means of self-development and so on.

Thus one can see that the idea of autonomy, though relatively simple in itself, is at the very centre of a large family of important concepts. It is linked with equality and so informs political and social thought; with respect for persons through which it influences moral and ethical thinking; and with adulthood too, hence it has come to dominate the theory of education in general and of adult education in particular.

14.4   Freedom/Liberty:

Evidently, personal autonomy presupposes freedom in some sense, for one cannot be directing oneself if one is obliged to do whatever other people want. But like autonomy itself, freedom is a vague and ambiguous notion which, according to

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1.   Wilson, J. (1975): 'Self-determination and human equality' in McDermott, F.E. (ed.) Self-determination in Social Work; Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.205

Berlin,[1] has "more than two hundred senses". Concentration however, will be on two particular senses which have become prominent in social philosophy, and which particularly finds expression within the context of educational thought.

There occurs repeatedly in educational writing and statement, or at least the implication, that there is something essentially paradoxical in the concept of freedom. This apparent paradox takes two forms: in one, it consists in the contrast between 'negative' and 'positive' freedom; in the other, in the opposition between freedom and limitation. The following quotations illustrate this:-

(a)   ... the idea of freedom is susceptible of a
        number of interpretations. A preliminary approach
        would include the distinction between negative and
        positive freedom; freedom from and freedom for ...
        Negative freedom is an indispensable condition for
        positive freedom".[2]

        ... there are two distinct elements in freedom:
        (a) freedom from frustration or inhibition; and
        (b) freedom for achievement or fulfilment.

        And freedom-from is a precondition of freedom-for. [3]

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1.   Berlin, I. (1969): 'Two Concepts of Liberty'; in
           Berlin: Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford;
           Oxford University Press. p.121

2.   Curtis, S.J. (1958): Introduction to the Philosophy of
           Education. University Tutorial Press, p.122

3.   Jeffreys, M.V.C. (1955): Beyond Neutrality. Pitman;
           p.24.

(b)   Freedom means discipline, because we must order
our own selves so that our forces work together
and not in conflict ... And freedom means dedication,
because, if our personal resources are to be
released with their full effective power, we must
be living for something beyond ourselves ... We must
in fact lead committed lives. There is no escape
from this paradox."[1]

"All the higher freedoms of the human being imply
the initial restriction and discipline essential
to the process of becoming 'free' to exercise the
required skill. [2]

In its first form, freedom contains within itself both

negative and positive elements, in its second form from the

conjunction of prima facie incompatibles, freedom and restraint,

freedom and necessity. Thus Garforth[3] provided a set of six

interpretative schemes for him to be able to show how the

concept of freedom is used and applied to education.

According to him, the basic element in the scheme is the urge

of the individual human being, an organic creature, to growth,

expansion of activity, the actualisation of his potentials.

'Self-expression', 'self-realisation', 'conative impulse',

'life-force' are other names for this urge he remarked.

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1.   Jeffreys, M.V.C. (1955): op. cit., p.31

2.   Bantock, G. H. (1952): Freedom and Authority in Education.
                Faber, p.67.

3.   Garforth, F.W. (1962): 'The "Paradox of Freedom";
                Studies in Education. Hull, University of
                Hull; July.

For the purpose of his analysis, however, he called the urge
horme, hormic impulse or hormic energy following Percy Nunn.
He went on to explain that this hormic energy requires for
its activity two sets of conditions: one is negative – the
absence of restraint; the other is positive – the presence
of factors without which its activity is either impossible
or stunted. For example, a child may have strong musical
ability to develop and actualise which he needs both the
absence of restraint, for instance in the form of parental
authority, ill-health or his own disinclination and also
positive conditions in the form of a piano, spare time,
instruction and so on.

Given these conditions, the hormic impulse is able to
develop and express itself. When the hormic impulse is freed
from restraint and also given the positive conditions needed
for its activity, choice determines the direction or area of
that activity. A note of clarification is needed here:
it is not simply the case that choice begins to operate only
when the conditions for activity are provided. In fact,
choice helps to decide those conditions; for what restraints
must be removed and what positive factors provided depends
on the purposes envisaged, on the direction already selected
for activity. Moreover, choice is itself partly determined
by the need to accommodate itself in particular cases to

limitations which cannot be removed and to the inevitable absence of opportunity. There is thus no straight-forward logical or chronological order of dependence - negative conditions, positive conditions, choice - so much as complex of mutual relations to the total character of which is given by choice.

The fifth item in the scheme is the fulfilment of the hormic impulse in effective activity within the area chosen, the actualisation of potentiality. At this stage, the musically gifted child has found expression for his talent. When this happens, there is a feeling of liberation, of power released, of spontaniety and well-being and this is the sixth and final item in the scheme.

Conjoined with the idea of freedom and liberty is the thought of power, opportunity or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respects, as he wills. There are however, two things which are paradoxical and conflicting in the interpretations of the concepts of liberty. These are sometimes called the 'negative' and the positive notions of liberty.

The notion of negative liberty is explained as consisting in being let alone, not being interfered with, and positive liberty consists in being self-determining, master of one's

destiny, determining what happens to one. With negative

liberty the key contrast is interference, the central political

notion related to it, that of protecting negative liberty

against interferences. With positive liberty the contrasts

relate not only to interferences against which we are to be

protected, but also to lacks, obstacles, frustrations,

impediments to our choices and actions, and which need to be

removed and aids and facilities provided in order to enlarge

the individual's liberty. With negative liberty, all coercion

of the individual involves a total loss of liberty in the long

as well as in the short run. With positive liberty, coercion,

as in compulsory education, compulsory medical treatment of

certain kinds, temporarily lessens freedom but it may enlarge

it, so that the coerced person in the long run enjoys greater

freedom than he would, without the coercion.

Most of the time, negative liberty is explained in a

negative way as consisting in being free from interferences,

in being let alone. There is something paradoxical and

unsatisfactory about any attempt to explain a political value

or any goal (educational for example) as an absence of some

kind. An absence can be a good, for instance, an absence of

ill-health is a good, namely, the good of health. However,

it seems not to be possible to explain negative liberty along

such lines without either rendering it as not a concept of

liberty or identifying it with positive liberty, the liberty to

make and act on the basis of one's decisions; to be self-determining, and master of one's destiny although it is true that weaker or stronger accounts of self-determination can be offered.

The negative characterization of negative liberty, to avoid identifying negative with positive liberty one must explain it in terms of being let alone, where an individual who is let alone, whether he be in a coma, paralysed, or completely impotent because of natural or economic factors, is said to be fully free. The victim of a stroke or an accident who is paralysed so that he can neither speak nor move but who is conscious, and who with treatment and care could regain some of his powers, if let alone to die enjoys complete negative liberty.

Positive liberty, with its stress on the removal of obstacles, hindrances, impediments, and the provision of aids, facilities, is claimed to involve the absurdity that our lack of wings and such like, constitutes a lack or want of freedom, as the possession of wings and other attributes would enlarge our range of action. This has led some exponents of positive liberty to stress the removal only of human caused and/or humanly planned impediments and obstacles. Another sense of the notion in which positive liberty is used is that the word liberty consists in the attainment of self-mastery, or, in other words, the release from the domination of adverse influences. This 'slavery' from which men liberate themselves

is variously described to include slavery to nature, to 'unbriddled passions', to 'irrational impulses', or simply to one's 'lower nature'.[1] Positive liberty is then identified with 'self-realisation', 'self-fulfilment', or an awakening into a conscious state of rationality. The fact that it is contended that such a state can often be attained only by the interference of other 'rational' persons who liberate their fellow beings from their 'irrationality' brings this interpretation of liberty into open and striking conflict with liberty in the 'negative' sense.

For Garforth,[2] there is no conflict between negative and positive liberty. What appears to be paradoxical he said, arose partly from linguistic confusion, partly from misunderstanding. The linguistic confusion, he explained, consists in the extension of the meaning of 'freedom' from its primary sense of 'freedom from' to meanings which do not properly belong to it - in particular, 'freedom for' which is not freedom at all but an expression of purpose-cum-value, and fulfilment. The misunderstanding consists in our failure to recognise first, that we are seriously misled by linguistic unclarity into the formation of

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1. West, E. G. (1965): 'Liberty and Education: John Stuart Mill's Dilemma'. in Philosophy, Vol. XL, No. 40, p.129 .

2. Garforth, F.W. (1962) op. cit., p.299 .

pseudo-problems, second, that limitation, commitment, restraint
and discipline are not negations of freedom but either
synonymous with it (restraint = 'freedom from') or co-conditions
with it for the achievement of fulfilment.

He concluded that three principal conditions must be
observed whenever freedom is to be examined for practical
purposes. First, there must be acceptance of the limitations
imposed by environment and by the individual's innate capacity;
second, some possibilities of hormic activity must be rejected
in favour of others and kept in restraint; third, there must
be training and exercise of the faculties in the direction of
the chosen activity. He briefly summarised these as:

"(i) obedience to necessity,
(ii) commitment and restraints,
(iii) training and self-discipline."

Thus it can be said of freedom that one becomes free
not simply by aiming at it, and throwing off restriction but
by being educated into some other goals within a situation of
minimum interference.[1] Furthermore, both positive and
negative interpretations find the ground in Mill's works.
What is neglected in both interpretations, however, is the
theoretical relationship between the descriptive concepts of
liberty and utility, on the one hand, and their normative

1. Garforth, F.W. (1962): op. cit., p. 299.
2. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism ed. Mary Warnock (1979)
        Glasgow; William & Collins, p. 195.

concepts, on the other. Normatively, individual liberty was
justifiable only when it promoted individual development,
while in the concept of utility was contained an imperative
that the individual must be led to noble and high-quality
pleasures. Referred to these normative concepts the importance
of individual liberty shrinks, because it is only to the extent
that it promised individual development that it could be
justified.

If liberty was to be viewed simply as part of the
doctrine of laissez-faire and did not, in fact, promise
development, Mill could not accept it. Therefore, when he
declared the principle of liberty to be a sanctuary of self-
regarding activities which should be exempted from any kind
of public intervention, he did not mean that the individual
should be free to make a choice which might harm his own
character. Mill's intent was, rather, to protect the individual
from the sway of malicious custom and vulgar opinions of the
majority. Particularly what concerned him was the protection
of minority opinions, the excellence of which could be easily
ignored by the ignorant mass. "Genius" he wrote, "can only
breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom (emphasis original).
He went on to add: "Persons of genius ... are, and are always
likely to be, a small minority". In a condition of liberty
the otherwise fragile seeds of wisdom would break their
nutshells in the minds of the enlightened minority, to grow and

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1. Mill, J. S. (1910): op. cit., p.133

ultimately to spread and take root among the masses.

The two imperatives - that is, the imperative for the individual to have liberty and the imperative that he develops his own character - reflecting respectively the liberty concept and the utility concept, were essentially irreconciliable. An individual, though he was theoretically free as far as his action was self-regarding, was not free to downgrade his character because, if he did so, it would be contrary to the principle of utility. For the majority of the population, therefore, individual liberty was permissible only with a proviso that they should either improve their own character (thus increasing the general utility of Society) or listen to the wise opinions of the instructed minority.

Without the commitment of a free spirit to improve the character of a nation, liberty would be rather destructive than constructive. This, in fact, was Mill's justification for reserving some exceptional cases from which liberty could be withdrawn. For example, children, who were not yet mature enough to judge aptly their own business, should not have the same liberty as their parents. The same logic was also applied to some of the adult population. Being an adult was not sufficient reason for an individual to assume a full right to his liberty. Before assuming the right, he/she had to prove the maturity of his/her mental faculties; otherwise, his/her liberty would only harm the general utility of Society.

With this explanations, it is not difficult any longer to press for adult education along the lines of negative and positive liberty.

1.15   Utilitarianism and Education:

We now turn to a more direct consideration of the preceding theory in relation to education as a whole. An attempt will be made to work out and integrate this into the aims of education in general and adult education in particular.

Barrow in his book, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education argues that happiness is supreme. This can be inferred from the following quoted passages:

(a)   the notion of justice presupposes the
      principle of happiness.

(b)   the principle of happiness is the only
      principle that commands universal assent and
      therefore does not need proof. ... It must
      be accepted as the supreme principle because
      enmeshment, and hence happiness, is the only
      thing that all men necessarily desire, and
      hence is the only thing that all men can
      accept as morally desirable; and in lieu of
      any formal proof to establish the validity
      of any principle, we must accept the
      universal agreement of mankind.

He went further to subsume other qualities under happiness

thus declaring

      that equality should be interpreted as a
      distributive principle, a formal principle
      that takes its substance from the principle of

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1.   Barrow, R. (1975): Plato, Utilitarianism and Education.
     London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. 93.

happiness and that the principle of freedom
is merely another formal procedural principle
that has to be interpreted in the light of
happiness.

Thereafter he went on to clarify his concept of happiness.
His analysis concludes that "happiness involves a relation
between two variables, the person and his circumstances."[1]
For an individual to be happy, he has to be enmeshed in his
circumstances. This is not, of course, to say that there can
be a specific list of circumstances necessary for happiness
to obtain nor can a specific type of character be delineated
as a necessary condition of happiness. Notice that there is
nothing logically odd in saying "X is poor and happy" nor in
saying "X is unkind, a hypocrite, and is happy".

Some people who are rich are happy; some unhappy. Some
other people in circumstance A are happy and some are not;
they prefer circumstance B, while those in B prefer A and D.
This shows that there are no necessary or sufficient
conditions about the person or his circumstances. To say
"X is happy" tells us something about "X", but it does not
automatically tell us anything about "X's" character unless
we know something about the circumstances he is in.
Is 'X' clever? Stupid? We do not know. 'X is happy' only
tells us that there is relationship between 'X' and his
circumstances, whatever they are, in which he finds himself

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1. Barrow, R. (1975): op. cit., p.14
   Ibid. p.53.

of such a sort that he is satisfied. Notice that to say

'X' is happy and he is dissatisfied with his lot' involves

one in a semantic contradiction. A person attempting to

get out of a situation is not happy in that situation.

There is something in it, that does not satisfy him and being

in it makes him unhappy. If he stays and claims that he is

happy, then it could be either that he has altered his

desires or the circumstances have altered for him.

> There are ... some necessary conditions
> for attributing happiness and they are
> the absence of certain conflicting attitudes
> to one's situation such as frustration,
> loneliness, agitation, depression, annoyance
> ... or, more generally, misery.[1]

To be happy is to be devoid of such feelings which are

indicative of situation that ought not to be for a person.

Such feelings diminish one's relationship with his situation,

which is also to say that one's happiness is thereby

diminished. When one's relationship with one's situation

is increased such that one is almost 'at one' with it, then

it may be said that he is happy. In Barrow's expression,

"The individual is happy when he feels that he enmeshes with

his surrounding or situation".[2] Hence "happiness is the

feeling that arises out of and is dependent upon enmeshment".[3]

More clearly, "A person is enmeshed with his surroundings"

means "... that he is in such a relation to his situation

that the demands of that situation are willingly met, and

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1. Barrow, R. (1975): op. cit., p. 54.
2. Ibid. p.62
3. Ibid. p.62

the restrictions of that situation are not irksome".[1]

A man is enmeshed with his job "if all aspects of his person

that relate to the job that is, his ability, interest,

enthusiasm, are suited to the job, and given the opportunity

to find fulfilment".[2] .To promote happiness, we "... correlate

the aspiration, attitudes, attitudes, beliefs, desires ... of

the individual with the demands and the ethos of the

circumstances in which he finds himself".   More pointedly,

Barrow describes the manner thus:

> The obvious way to aim at the creation of a
> happy state, is to bring children up so that
> there is this correlation between individual
> and situation. ... In particular, given that
> there are different kinds of functions to be
> performed in Society it would be important
> that the individual's character should be
> adapted to meet the specific role or situation
> which, for whatever reason, he is in fact
> going to face; ...

So far as happiness is the aim, the development of the

individual should follow a course that relates the man to

the way of life he will lead ... the individual should

have attitudes, tastes and characteristics that suit the

overall manner of the life he is expected to lead. ...

If the individual is destined to live a life in which

there will be very little formal guidance or structuring

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1. Barrow, R. (1975) op. cit., p.63

2. Ibid.   p. 63.

from external pressures, he will need to have the kind of
character that welcomes making decisions, taking responsi-
bilities and acting on his own initiative. If he is
destined to live for the most part circumscribed by various
pressures, then he needs, if he is to be happy, to find
such direction acceptable.

Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to be against
'happiness', the question to ask, then, is whether or not
there is good reason to promote happiness. Barrow attempts
to establish that there are good reasons by showing that
all men necessarily pursue enmeshment, hence, happiness.
But this is not to say that, therefore, the principles of
happiness should override any other proposed moral principle,
or else one falls into the naturalistic fallacy. He then
suggests that the State can maximise happiness by exercising
control over the individual and the situation he is in.

In Barrow's mind, educators are left with three basic
tasks:

Barrow, R. (1975) op. cit., p. 64.

Ibid. p.65.

(a)   to produce sociable and happy citizens;

(b)   to train all children from an early age to adopt
       the norms of Society;

(c)   to determine the exact nature of education for the
       child based upon the child's aptitude and the
       demands of Society.

Though Barrow is concerned with child education, his views

well relate to adult education.

We have no doubt been engaged in a thorough philosophical

discuss of happiness and this may appear to be too theoretical

and perhaps not actually called for in a thesis that is

looking at aims and objectives of adult education.   The

purpose for such an exercise are two fold; firstly, adult

education is a new discipline of academic study and, according

to Akinpelu[1], it is just developing its own crops of concepts

which are needed in any field of study so as to ease its

research and develop into a full-fledged academic discipline.

This is what is attempted in this chapter, a concept of

happiness in the context of adult education.   Secondly, we are

making use of the instrument of philosophy to establish a

proper understanding of our main concern - that is, Utilitarianism

Akinpelu, J. A. (1968): Introduction to Philosophy of
    Adult Education. Ibadan External Studies Programme,
    Department of Adult Education, University of Ibadan.

After a thorough examination, we can now claim to have established a solid foundation upon which to build the applied study of philosophy of adult education.

The next chapter is a critical examination of the types of Utilitarianism in adult education.

CHAPTER FIVE

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF TYPES OF UTILITARIANISM IN CURRENT ADULT EDUCATION FORMS

5.0 Introduction:

The fathers of utilitarianism thought of it principally as a system of social and political decision, as offering a criterion and basis of judgement of legislators and administrators. This is recognizably a different matter from utilitarianism as a system of personal morality, but it is hard for a number of important reasons to keep the two things ultimately apart, and to stop the spirit of utilitarianism, firmly established in one, from moving into the other. If individual decisions on personal matters are made on a utilitarian basis, then those citizens will both direct the s same outlook on to their views about what should be done in the public sphere, and also expect the legislature and the executive to make its decisions in the spirit.

Indeed, a utilitarian is likely to think that the case for public utilitarianism is even stronger than that for private. For one thing, the decisions of government affect more persons, in the main, than private decisions. But, more than that, he is likely to feel that there is something in the nature of modern government which requires the utilitarian spirit.

Private citizens might legitimately, if regrettably, have
religious beliefs or counter-utilitarian ideals, but
government in a secular state must be secular, and must use
a system of decision which is minimally committed beyond its
intrinsic commitment to the welfare of its citizens. Thus
utilitarianism can be seen almost as built into a contract
of government.

Thus Brenda Evan's message to adult educators is that
they should try to understand the policy process better
in order to participate more fully in it on behalf of adult
learning. She went on to explain that the incremental nature
of policy making in modern societies means that adult
educators must act politically in order to be effective.
Acting politically however,she expands, purports acting with
a sense of self-identity as a policy community and as a
pressure group in pursuit of aims which are recognisable as
aims in the current climate of politics. In this chapter,
we shall not only be concerned with the critique of the forms
of adult education alone, we shall also be concerned with
that of utilitarian doctrine.

5.1 General Objections to Utilitarianism:

It has been objected that utilitarianism is excessively
puritanical. For example, Brown, argues that since every
act is productive of good or evil, every act becomes a moral

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1.   Evans, B.   (1987): Radical Adult Education: A Political
        Critique. London, Croom Helm Series, Consultant's
        Introduction.

issue.[1] Singer phrases this objection in some similar words
when he says:

> One major objection to this principle
> (of utility) is that, if consistently adhered to,
> it would lead to moral fanaticism; to the idea
> that no action is indifferent or trivial,
> that every occasion is momentous .

If this objection is to be held on to, the situation would
probably be a serious one, because, not every occasion is
momentous. Moral reasons do not seem pertinent to such
questions as whether to have fried or boiled yam for breakfast.
To what extent, then, does Utilitarianism have moral fanaticism
as a consequence ? We shall try to discuss the topic by
considering what is meant by saying that a question is not a
moral question, or a given issue is not a moral issue.

First, one point must be clarified, a point which it may
be helpful to express in these terms: While many particular
actions (and some kinds of action, in general) are morally
indifferent, no action of any kind is morally irrelevant.
The latter is intended to mean that no human action lies
beyond the bounds within which morality is applicable,
that there is no kind of act which whatever the circumstances

1. Brown, S.M. Jr. (1952): 'Duty and the Production of Good';
      Philosophical Review, Vol.61, p.299 .

2. Singer, M.C. (1961): Generalization in Ethics; New York,
      Alfred A. Knopf. p.184

would   be impossible as the subject of a moral judgement.

     There is nothing that a human being can do but that it is
conceivable that an act of this kind might be preferred under
conditions which would make it susceptible to moral evaluation.
Let us consider this example, 'Sex is not a moral matter'.
The truth or falsity of this we will not try to decide here,
but take it that if it is to have even a chance of being true
it cannot be interpreted as saying that it is impossible for
any act involving sexual indulgence to be wrong. So to say
that an   issue is not a moral issue cannot mean, at least,
that the act or kind of act referred to is morally irrelevant
in the sense just explained. To say that an issue is not a
moral issue is to say rather that it is morally indifferent,
that morality makes no demand for either its performance or
its ommission, or that there is no moral preference for any
one of the (relevant) alternatives over any of the others.
It is in this sense that eating boiled yam for breakfast
(under most circumstances) is correctly said to be 'not a
moral matter'.

     Coming back to the objection to Utilitarianism under
consideration here, if it is that on this theory no action
is morally irrelevant, then the objection can be overlooked,
for this is true and hence no objection. Consequently, the
objection must be that on a Utilitarian theory no action can

be morally indifferent. Thus, if true, would mean that the
application of the principle of utility would yield an
unequivocal and determinate preference in every case. But
this could be true only if it is also true that every possible
situation must contain precisely one alternative which
produces more happiness than any other. Until per impossible,
this last be adequately demonstrated, this form of the
objection may be dismissed as well. Utilitarianism does not
try to tell me what to take for breakfast.

    The second line of objection centres around the inability
of Utilitarianism to account for justice. A Utilitarian has
no reason to recognize any moral difference between any two
alternative distribution which yield the same total quantity
of happiness; Consequently, he is unable to provide an account
of moral desert, which is considered to be 'a fatal defect
by many moral philosophers. To adapt an example from the
case of Moremi in Ile-Ife (I suppose this is a mere fable);
but we were told that a wicked god demanded from Ile-Ife
people a young boy for sacrifice, failing which the whole
boys in the community would perish. One needs to imagine the
number of young boys that would be lost if no volunteer
emerged. Moremi, probably weighed the net balance of boys
that would be saved if only one is given up, decided to give
her only son to appease this angry god. Utilitarianism, as a

consequentialist theory of ethics identifies certain states
of affairs as good states of affairs especially if the
rightness or goodness of actions (or of other subjects of
moral judgement) consists in their positive productive
relationship to these state of affairs.

Rawls, in his objection to issues such as this, contends
that "each person possess an inviolability founded on justice
that even the welfare of Society as a whole cannot override".
Justice, according to him, does not allow that the sacrifices
imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages
enjoyed by many. But Utilitarianism would not raise eyebrows
if punishment of a scape-goat or the persecution of the
disliked people would in fact serve to maximise happiness,
then such actions would be enjoined by the principle of utility.

Thus justice and fairness become rules of thumb, along
with other moral rules, to be given up whenever happiness
can be maximized by breaking them. Both Utilitarianism and
justice as fairness are concerned with consequences, i.e. ends;
what is at variance is their methods of calculation.
Utilitarianism is consistent with the aggregate number of
happy ends while justice as fairness would not care what the
ends become but that the rules must be strictly adhered to.

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1.   Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice. U.S.A.,
      Harvard University Press. p.3 .

In education and particularly adult education, the role experience plays when it comes to decision making cannot be over-emphasized. The strict reliance on rule would therefore not be compatible with the nature of adult education. Decision-taking at all levels tends to be political in nature and there is always that tendency to want to refer to the consequences of similar decision taken in times past in order to be able to assess the likely result. When thus he talks of political adult education, there is cause to determine the limits of rules when it comes to taking decision.

5.2 The Case of Political Education:

Political participation is a characteristic right and duty of adulthood, and teaching people how to make the most of it is no different in principle from teaching them parenthood or home management: one is still helping them to meet the demands of adult life. Often, indeed, political education has the same practical bias as other forms of instrumental work, and aims to enable people to perform specific political tasks. The idea of teaching the masses to be able to vote wisely is one of the aims of political education. This originated in the mid-nineteenth century, when the British Constitution was still far from being even outwardly democratic.

The radicals and reformers of the day wanted political power to be distributed more widely, and

pressed for universal suffrage; they realised, however, that the vote is an instrument which can be used for good or ill; and so they also wanted to prevent people from misusing any power they might get. Education appeared to many of them to be the most effective safeguard. Mill[1], for example, maintained that 'universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement' because he thought that if only people understood fully the issues they were called upon to decide, they would not vote for rash or harmful policies.

He was actually advocating the extension of elementary schooling, but it was not long before his argument was adopted by adult educators to press for the expansion of their own work. At the turn of the century, for instance, Mansbridge[2] rested his case for the fledging Worker's Education Association on the identical claim that education for the voters 'will inevitably bring about right and sound action on municipal, national affairs'. More recently, when the referendum on Britain's entry to the European Community was imminent, the same hope led many adult educators to arrange courses in order

1. Mill, J.S. (1910): Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government (edited by H. B. Acton) Dent., Everyman's Library; p.280

2. Mansbridge, A. (1944): 'Cooperation, Trade Unionism and University extension' in Clark, L. (ed.) The Kingdom of the Mind — Essays and Addresses of Albert Mansbridge. London, Dent & Sons, p.2 .

to explain the issues involved in that decision. The idea
behind the launching of MAMSER in Nigeria is closely related
to the above. Nigeria is preparing for its Third Republic
and everything is being done by the government to make sure
that the masses are carried along with the policies of the
government. Hence, there are mass mobilization rallies here
and there, a form of mass teaching for the dissemination of
information.

The WEA has recently offered a useful summary of objectives
for political education. These are "the encouragement of
active participation in society, the raising of political
consciousness and the development of the skills necessary to
take in the determination of public policy."[1] While Hoggart
evaluates political education as "an essential part of the
curriculum of adult education, and considers it likely to
lead to activism rather than quiescence".[2]

This kind of aim however restricts the curriculum of
adult education. It only justifies knowledge which is useful
for making political decisions, therefore, it prescribes only
the Study of Economics, Law, Sociology and the like. This
limitation of knowledge has been deplored by many other

1. WEA National Meeting, 15 December 1984. WEA News;
      Spring 1985).
2. ACACE, (1973): Political Education for Adults.
      Introduction.

adult educators,[1] and have made various efforts to overcome it. For example, Ridley suggests that groups such as the unemployed could gain skills, could learn about their welfare rights from adult political education. This instrumental approach he argues, is more likely to gain public funding because of its tangibility, and its avoidance of mass education based on vague appeals to educating for democracy.

He rejects the claim that knowledge is power, since power flows from socio-economic status. Ridley's conclusion is that in an administered society, it is best to assist such groups as tenants, residents' associations, and social security claimants to raise their skills and knowledge within existing arrangement.

There are problems, however, with the group oriented approach to political education. Are all groups to receive political advice? If they are not to be offered advice, then, on what ideological basis is the selection of groups to occur? Further group pluralism is barely the radical approach that some advocates of political education imagine. The group approach can be parochial unless the educator moves out from where members find themselves to offer a wider and more theoretical political education.

1.   Morris, C. (1963): The idea of Adult Education.
            (1st Mansbridge Memorial Lecture). Leeds University
            Press.

    Arguments in contribution to political Education by
    Ridley, F. quoted by Evan Brenda (1987) op. cit., p.29.

Finally, groups in the community can best be served by the decentralisation of bureautic power rather than by a token strengthening of their skills.

A reasonable way to extend the curriculum of political education is that done by Crick and Porter - the adoption of a broader aim. They developed their notion of political literacy. They mean this to cover not only exercising one's vote but also understanding the nature of political behaviour and of the political process. And they broaden the idea still further by defining the subject-matter of politics as not merely the acquisition and use of power in government but, as the creative concilliation of differing interests, whether those interests primarily are material or moral. This interpretation means that almost any situation in which we try to resolve a dispute can be extended to embrace any subject which might cast some light on how we do it.

Up to now, this aim of teaching political literacy has been advocated mainly for schools, but there is no inherent reason to prevent it from being pursued in adult classes too. Wright[2] in fact maintains that it is more suited to adult since they have practical experience of political activity

1. Crick, B. and Porter, A. (eds.)(1978): Political education and political literacy - the report of the Hansard Society. London, Longman; p.4 .

2. Wright, A. (1980): 'A Political Literacy Campaign ? Adult Education, Vol. 53, No.1, (May).

and therefore are more likely to perceive political relevance
in subjects which traditionally have not been thought to
possess it. It could be added that, unlike children, they
are also in a position to put their learning to use.
For Crick and Porter[1] declare that political education should
not merely aim at better understanding but should also excite
a productivity to action, and adults, as enfranchised citizens,
have one obvious means of action already to hand.

Is Political Adult Education Possible ?

Paterson's argument seems to suggest some doubt as to
even the feasibility in theory of the aim of promoting political
criticism. As for its practicability, adult educators themselves
have created some confusion and impediment simply because
they find it difficult to agree as to the purpose of political
criticism. For instance, Mansbridge stressed that it
would generate political wisdom, so that 'support for the
Workers' Educational Association was seen as a sound political
investment against extremism'[2] whereas, Fowler[3] in arguing
that people should be taught to adapt to changes in Society,

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1. Crick, B. and Porter, A. (eds.) op. cit., p.41

2. Fieldhouse, R. (1977): The Workers' Educational Association -
   Aims and Achievements 1903-1977. Syracuse
   University (publication in Continuing education).

3. Fowler, G. T. (1979): 'The Functions and impact of the ACACE
   and of administrative and organisational change';
   Elsdon, K.T. (ed)(1979) New Direction - Adult
   Education in the context of continuing education;
   being the proceedings of a Conference ... Dept. of
   Education and Science, London.

protests that it is not a question of whether these changes are desirable or otherwise, rather, it is that they are apparently inevitable. In other words, Fowler tacitly assumes that it is always better to accept social change than to resist it. Thus, Paterson[1] argues that adult education can only criticise society effectively if it is completely impartial, and therefore he maintains that it should have no commitment to any political or social values at all and should be concerned with 'the development of persons' alone. But such neutrality is quite impossible to achieve. Even Paterson himself does not achieve it for he endorses Schefler's[2] view that 'the notion that education is an instrument for the realisation of social goals ... harbours the greatest conceivable danger to the ideal of a free and rational goal which adult education should help us to attain. As Lawson[3] points out, ideals about how people should develop as individuals necessarily imply other ideals about how they should live in company with each other. Inevitably, therefore, to encourage personal development is also to help to create a particular kind of society.

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1. Paterson, R.W.K. (1979): Values, Education and the Adult. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. p.256

2. Ibid. p.255

3. Lawson, K. H. (1970): op. cit., p.169

This is one reason why Dewey declared that "what a society is, it is, by and large, as a product of education' (quoted by Skilbeck).[1] One needs to add, however, that what education is, is equally a product of Society.

Society thus fashion education just as much as education shapes society. The two exist in symbiosis, mutually reinforcing and moulding each other. The peculiar intimacy of their relationship limits the extent to which people can be taught to be critical. O'Sullivan,[2] therefore offers an assessment of the possibilities of political adult education

> the most I feel that can be hoped for is that
> students will come to appreciate the social
> location of their beliefs and values, and come
> to some realisation of how their consciousness
> has been formed.

It may seem a modest aim, but it is quite difficult enough to achieve, and at least it suffices to escape the charge of indoctrination. So, while some adult educators profess to teach social criticism and political involvement, many others are helping to promote moderation and conformity.

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1. Skilbeck, M. (ed.) (1970): John Dewey (Education Thinkers) London, Collier, Macmillan; p.163

2. O'Sullivan, D. (1980): 'Socialisation, Social Change and Ideology in Adult Education'. in Adult Education, Vol.52, No.5 (January).

Feminism and Adult Education: The Nigerian Situation.

In recent years, the role of women has surpassed the traditional profiles of motherhood, wife and caretaker of the home. Their role has penetrated different facets of the national economy. In times past, women were more or less discriminated against as regards participation in economic activities, such as full-time agricultural activity, commercial and industrial ventures etc. There were slim opportunities for women education. They were treated as minors or, according to Akinpelu,[1] belongs to the 'disadvantaged' group; and are regarded as inferior or helpers to men. The women in the past therefore had no confidence in themselves.

Right now, things are changing and the role of women in the Nigerian Society is no exception. Many of them according to Mrs. Rasaki,[2] are finding themselves in the position of bread-winners in addition to their other family and societal problems. There is need therefore for women to form themselves into educational groups where they will be opportuned to exchange useful ideas that will create awareness amongst them.

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1. Akinpelu, J.A. (1988): 'Mobilizing the Grassroots and the Unserved'; Paper presented at the N.N.C.A.E/ A.A.L.A.E. West African Sub-Regional Management Development Training Workshop, held at the University of Ibadan, February 14 -,24.

2. Report of the Launching of "Better Life for Rural Women" in Ogun State at Asero Stadium, Abeokuta on Thursday 25th February, 1988.
   Mrs. Rasaki is the Chairperson of the Lagos State Better Life for Rural Women programme. This programme is a kind of Women's Liberation Movement aimed at the improvement of the lot of Nigerian women.

Earlier, a three-day Workshop was organised in Abuja
in September 1987 aiming among other things, at mobilising
the rural women to participate more effectively and efficiently
in the nation's drive to ensure a qualitative and more
meaningful life **for** them. Generally, some of the aims of the
Better Life for Rural Women are:

(a)   "To promote the interest of women in social, economic
      and industrial development and to ensure that they are
      not relegated to the background in these areas;

(b)   to improve the home life and the general status of
      women in the State."

In order to achieve these and other aims, provision for loan
to start small scale business has been made through the
establishment of the 'Peoples Bank' in the States and Loan
through Cooperative Societies are made so as to encourage
small scale industries.

There is also the Nigerian Association of Women in
Business and some of its aims are:-

(a)   'To stimulate and encourage women to take an interest,
      and actively participate in the various development
      activities within and outside their environment;

(b)   to instil into Society, through Women folk, a high
      standard of ethics and economic discipline conducive
      to the realisation of a more productive and
      self-sufficient economy.

There are other women programmes such as National Council for
Women Development. They all tend to emphasize the changing
role of the Nigerian women both as a home manager and as a
social, economical and political developer. Unfortunately,
these programmes are not achieving the desired results because
it has been found out in various States that there are still
high illiteracy rate among women; insufficient enlightenment
programmes.

The need for adult literacy programme, therefore cannot
be over-emphasized. These women need to be able to read and
write in order to be able to understand the plans of government.
Since however, from the point of view of a woman writer, this
idea of emancipation and participation of women in the affairs
of the State has emanated from the men folk, they may not
expect a huge success. Perhaps if more women are involved in
the programme, some of these impediments might be removed.
The suggestion is that women should be given more freedom to
shape their own lives.

The African man sees himself as a God-made lord over the
woman and programmes such as this may likely change the
so-called God-made status of the woman. Though no one is
doubting the good gesture of the male folk, it will perhaps
be more advantageous for women to be more independent to
organise and set their own objectives. By so doing, they
will be able to allocate values to their success.

5.3 Adults and the Need for School:

Utilitarians pay a high price for assuming that happiness must be subjectively defined by each individual, an assumption that frees them of the need to defend an objective conception of the good. How is society to prepare children and adults for the pursuit of their own self-defined happiness? In the case of children, they cannot themselves determine the particular ends of education, nor in maximising their present happiness a reasonable utilitarian standard for education if only because the rest of their life is likely to be much longer than their childhood. While for adults, education is to help them in their attainment of personal fulfilment.

We live in a world of change; so what will make people happy in future is largely indeterminate. To make matters more complicated still, education itself significantly shapes how individuals will define happiness. In order to provide a guidance, utilitarians need to find a standard that is not tied to a particular conception of the good life and that is not derived from the circular argument that initial education goes a long way to determine the happiness of subsequent ones. Thus, the major problems that utilitarians face in determining the purpose of education generally stems from Benthamite utilitarianism and his specific recommendation for educating individuals.

Benthamite utilitarianism takes the preference of individuals as given and regards attempts to maximise satisfaction of those preferences as 'good'. 'Push pin is as good as peotry; so long as the satisfaction a person derives from each is equal and each contributes equally to the happiness of others. As J.J.C. Smart points out, the latter condition will almost certainly mean in practice that poetry will be a better activity than pushpin, because poetry will add to the happiness of others more than pushpin will. Even critics of utilitarianism recognise that happiness, broadly interpreted, is a minimally controversial good in that it accommodates almost all conceptions of the good life. Very few people want to lead an unhappy or unsatisfying life .

Utilitarianism maintains a neutral position among conceptions of the good life, asking people only to recognise the equal claims of all others to lead a happy life as they define it. Bentham therefore listed secondary ends, which he assumed were constitutive of every individual's happiness. Education ought to supply learners with the means to:

"(a) avoiding inordinate sensuality (and its mischevious consequences);

(b) securing profit-yielding employment;

(c) securing admission into 'good company' from which the previous advantage could also be obtained;

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1. Smart, J. J. C. (1973) in Smart and Williams. op. cit., p.24

(d) avoiding annui and the 'pain of mental vacuity';

(e) gaining a proportionable share of general respect".

Surveying Bentham's list, we discover that each secondary end is problematic. Either it is not clearly derivable from happiness as an ultimate end, nor sufficiently neutral among conceptions of the good life, or as indeterminate an educational goal as happiness itself.

Even if self defined happiness may not after all end up in absolute happiness, what about the other ideals which people believe constitute happiness. These ideals are argued, to be means that can lead to human happiness and as such have been aimed at in education in various ways. Eminent educational thinkers have viewed these ideals the right of everyone and as such should not be denied anyone. For instance, liberty in form of speech, religion, marriage, of the individual as a whole should be the prerogative of a normal, just society. But does liberty at the end of it all give all that it promised in form of happiness ?

Before we can attempt to answer this question, we shall take a look at some forms of adult education and determine the extent to which it tries to justify happiness as an adult educational goal on the one hand, and how best it is attainable on the other.

5.4 Liberal Adult Education:

The essence of liberal education is learning which is valued for its own sake. Consequently, it tends to aim exclusively at promoting personal development, for philosophers have always argued that most things are valued only because they contribute in one way or another towards the living of a fully human life, which alone is claimed to have intrinsic worth. Thus Lawson asserts that education should be undertaken 'because man is judged to be important and a more developed man is thought most important of all'.

Although essentially quite simple, the notion of liberal education has generated over the years a multitude of theoretical confusion and obscenities. The main reason for this is probably that the idea of personal develop-ment is itself fundamentally unclear.

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1. Bentham, J. (1843): Chrestomathia Vol.8, p.8 quoted
        in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.) (1988):
        Utilitarianism and Beyond. New York, Cambridge
        University Press; p.264.

2. Lawson, K.H. (1970): The Concept of 'purpose';
        Adult Education, Vol.43, No.3, Sept., p.169.

Kohlberg and Meyer[1] show that educators actually
employ several different models to explain it, and these
are neither logically consistent with each other nor
always appropriate for the task. Most of them derive
ultimately from the philosophy of Aristotle,[2] who was
the first thinker to conceive the process of growth as
involving the progressive realisation of potential.
He postulated that every living organism is "potentially
all those things which it will be of itself if nothing
external hinders it", and thus he was enabled to understand
the cause of its development as a general emergence of
qualities which, so to speak, had been hidden in it all
the time. His idea has ever since dominated a universal
thought. It survives virtually unchanged in modern
psychology for instance.

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1. Kohlberg, L. and Meyer, R. (1972): Development as the
     aim of education; in _Harvard Educational Review_,
     Vol.42, No.4, November.

2. Aristotle, (1941): _Metaphysics_ transl. by W.D. Ross
     op. cit., 1049a 13.

Maslow asserts that each of us is born with an "essential inner nature" of inherited instincts, characteristics and abilities. Like Aristotle, he thinks that they exist potentially within us, and so he goes on to explain the course of healthy psychological development as consisting in their progressive 'actualisation'.

This kind of theory is obviously the source of the contemporary gospel of 'self-realisation' which asserts that psychic health requires the complete fulfilment of all one's potentials. It maintains that one should live so as "to be that self which one truly is", to borrow Soren Kierkegaard's words[2] It has become a popular doctrine in recent years and is now widely held by educators as well as by psychotherapists. But it invites serious intellectual objection unless it is formulated with care.

One fundamental weakness which is pointed out by Peters[3] is the tacit assumption that one's self always deserves to be realised, and is never better suppressed instead. In another guise, this is just the ancient belief that 'all potential is for good'. Thus Maslow's theory assumes that there is an

1. Maslow, A.H. (1968): Toward a Psychology of Being. (2nd edition); New York, Van Nostrand, p.190

2. ____ quoted by Rogers, C.R. (1961): On Becoming a Person - A Therapist's View of Psychotheraphy; London, Constable. p.166

3. Peters, R. S. (1966): op. cit., p.56

innate urge to develop. Echoing Aristotle's words, he says
that one's potential self has a dynamic force of its own,
pressing always for open uninhibited expression. In
educational theory, this truth has generated a popular
analogy with horticulture. The teacher is now commonly
likened to a gardener because, it is thought, his task is
to foster growth in human beings which, like that in plants,
is naturally disposed to occur. Up to a point, this metaphor
is helpful and illuminating, but it has unfortunate
implications if it is exaggerated, as Dearden explains.
The more the natural 'dynamic' of the pupil's growth is
emphasised, the less call there is for the teacher to
encourage it, and thus he is reduced to a 'gardener' of the
most minimal sort - in fact, to little more than a sympathetic
bystander and observer of his students' development.

Criticisms such as these have led many psychologists
and educators to propound a modified and more sophisticated
version of the theory. In effect, they have rejected the
implication of Kierkegaard's words, that each of us has just
one 'true self which we either realise or not. Instead, they
maintain that we inherit so many talents and characteristics
that each of us is potentially many selves, as it were.

Dearden, R.F. (1975): 'Autonomy and Education'. in Dearden et al., (eds)
Education and the Development of Reason. London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul; p.65 .

In the course of our development, we therefore have to decide
which attributes are to be encouraged and allowed to flourish
and which are to be ignored or suppressed, thereby fashioning
ourselves into one kind of person or another. Growth involves
not only the realisation but also the choice of our potential.

Frankl[1] accordingly stresses that it presents us with
the 'challenge to responsibility'. It is not a purely
automatic process, evolving in a pre-determined direction;
it has to be guided and shaped by us, and therefore we
necessarily become responsible for the course it takes. Many
people do in fact bear in mind an ideal of the sort of person
they are trying to become, which they use both to guide and
to judge their daily living. Those who do not are nevertheless
likely to be working towards such a goal unconsciously. For,
as Aristotle explains, we only conceive a process as growth,
rather than as mere purposeless change, when we see it to be
aiming at a target.

In relation to human development, such a goal usually
takes the form of an image of the ideally mature person, a
pattern of the perfect human being. In the past, such a
paradigm was handed down in art, or in religion; today,

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1. Frankl, U. E. (1978): 'Beyond Self-Actualisation and
       self-expression' in Frankl: Psychotheraphy and
       Existentialism - Selected Papers in Logotheraphy;
       Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. p.53

suggests Glasser,[1] it is more likely to be promulgated by the media and by advertising. However purveyed, it is fundamentally important for understanding the function of education. As Kallen[2] says "adulthood, even if determinate biologically, is culturally a variable ... Images of it are collective ideals which the societies committed to those ideals strive to have their young embody.

A crucial point to note however, in this, is that there are many images of adulthood. The cultural history of mankind records a host of them, and even in the western world today there are several competing patterns of maturity. The fact that we have to make a choice between them means that liberal education, like instrumental education, can never be wholly neutral. Every attempt to foster someone's development presumes that one ideal or another has been judged worth developing towards. This is yet another reason why the teacher cannot rightly be portrayed as a gardener who merely cooperates with an automatic process of growth. Either he approves the paradigm of adulthood which his pupil wants to emulate, in which case he shares the responsibility of choosing it, or he tries to supplement it with another ideal

1. Glasser, R. (1973): 'Leisure and the Search for a Satisfying
        Identity; in Smith, M. et al., (eds)(1973): Leisure
        and Society in Britain. London, Allen Lane. p.60

2. Kallen, H.M. (1962): Philosophical Issues in Adult
        Education. Springfield, Charles Thomas; p.38

of maturity, and then his own commitment to a particular
set of values is even more manifest.

5.5 Education for Freedom:

The utilitarians uphold that liberty is a necessary
condition for the individual's pursuit of happiness. However,
Russell noted in a lecture on J.S. Mill that "there is one
sphere in which the advocate of liberty is confronted with
peculiar difficulties: I mean the sphere of education".[1]
The question that readily comes to mind is whether freedom
provides a better standard than happiness by which to determine
what and how to teach individuals.

It could be seen that some of Bentham's secondary goals
for education are more compatible with an education designed
to prepare children for freedom than with one designed for
happiness. By preparing everyone through education for
profit-yielding employment, we are providing individuals with
the background conditions for free choice in a society that
attaches a price to most valued goods. And if admission to
good company facilitates access to many valued goods, then
education directed at securing such access will also increase
a child's future freedom. In fact, these secondary goals
seem more reasonably connected to the end of future freedom
than to that of future happiness.

1. Russell, B. (1955): John Stuart Mill: Oxford;
   Oxford University Press, p.56.

Securing profit-yielding employment and admission into good company is no more consistent with the greatest happiness principle. Surely, many types of employment that are not often profit-yielding, artistic vocations, for example - can be pleasure yielding, perhaps even moreso than jobs in business. But if an individual has no independent source of income, then income-producing employment is likely to be essential to living a minimally happy life. Once one accepts the prevailing economic reality - that only independently wealthy individuals can afford to be educated to pursue non-income producing vocations then Bentham's educational goal seems to follow. Similarly, if admission into good company provides a ticket to gainful employment, then from a utilitarian perspective, an education that enables individuals to enter into good company may be sufficiently neutral among concepts of life.

5.6 The Content of Education: Vocational or Theoretical ?

Utilitarianism is usually commended on the grounds that it supplies one standard, the common currency of happiness by which all goods can be ranked. Educating children to be capable of finding profit-yielding employment in their society places very different demands upon schooling than does the goal of educating children to think beyond the established forms of life and thereby freeing them from the tyranny of

the present. The advocate of liberty can embrace both goals
in his theory. But, without some priority rule, the theory
will be inadequate to determine educational practice in a
non-ideal Society. The imperfections in our economic and
political institutions as well as scarcity of time and
resources demand that we choose between an education instrumental
to finding employment and what is commonly called a liberal
education.

The job of equipping learners for profit-yielding
employment seem to place very specific demands upon schools;
that they teach technical skills to future technicians,
secretarial skills to future secretaries, teaching skills
to future teachers, and so on and so forth. But even Bentham
did not give priority to teaching more practical subjects
because they prepared people for specific occupations, but
because he believed that applied Sciences (for example) were
easier to learn than pure Science. One can see that Bentham
upholds his interest for the higher knowledge in all its
ramifications. Only if one believed that learners particularly
children were destined for particular vocations and that
educators could discern their predestinations would the goal
of vocational training be this simple to implement educationally.
Otherwise, elementary, secondary and perhaps even higher
education must be broad enough to allow children themselves
to determine their future vocational plans.

As regards adults, due to the fact that vocations keep changing as a result of economic upheavals, such specific vocational training might not produce the desired results. If equality of opportunity includes the right to choose and not only the right to be selected on grounds of merit, then even the demands on education sufficiently extensive to expose children to many types of intellectual skills, or skills and knowledge general enough to be useful in many professions.

The resolution of this dilemma, if there is one, does not depend upon a determination of which function is more important: expanding the minds or the job opportunities of individuals. Perhaps more vocational education for the less-advantaged would provide them with more job opportunities than they now have. For when we argue for equalising economic opportunity, we are not arguing simply that all learners should be prepared for some job, but that all should be given an education that prepares them for choosing a satisfying job that is not wasteful of their talents. This is one reason why even if a highly-specialised education is a pre-condition for certain occupations, it should be chosen by, rather than imposed upon, learners.

So much for the learners. The educators too have a role to play in whatever form of educational setting they might find themselves. The nature, purpose and status of adult

education are all causes of concern; as they are determinant
factors in judging the success or failure of both students'
and practitioners' objectives very often, in taking decisions
as to how to go about their work, they often ask themselves
questions of values.

The issue of value decision is very crucial in the
course of this work for the following reasons:
As will be noted in the introduction, it was stated that
attempt will be made to formulate aims which will be
suitable to adult education programmes irrespective of race
or religion, though Paterson[1] thinks this may be an
impossible task because according to him, educational values
are reflections of moral, religious and political stance.
The concept of value therefore needs to be clarified for
not until we know the meaning of value, it may not be wise
to make value decisions.

5.7 The Concept of Value:

The importance in human experience of values and value
judgements has long been recognised. The Greek pre-Socratic
philosophers were well aware of it; so too were their
contemporaries in other civilizations. In the fourth
century B.C., Plato's Republic presented a choice between

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1. Paterson, R.W.K. (1964-5): 'Values in Adult Education'.
        Rewley House Papers, Vol.iv, No.3 .

a society based on what he regarded as permanent and
unchanging values - the forms of Goodness, Truth, Justice,
and the rest - and a Society dedicated to the passing whims
of self-gratification. The same awareness of the importance
of values in ordinary life persists even up to the twentieth
century; by the very logic of his position, writes Bentock,[1]
"... the educator is inevitably involved in the world of
values"; and Peters[2]: "Education necessarily involves the
initiation of children into what is thought to be valuable".[2]

Whether explicitly recognised or not, values have always
been powerfully and decisively operative both in societies
and in the lives of individuals. The word value is used to
indicate that something is regarded as having worth, as
attracting choice or preference. To value something is to
regard it as choiceworthy, and it is fundamental to the whole
concept of value that human beings choose, prefer, commit
themselves to what they judge desirable, valuable, worth
having or experiencing; fundamental indeed, so it would seem,
to life itself and its higher levels, and a distinguishing
feature of the human species. Choice, however, implies
free will and a rejection of the view that all decision is

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1. Bantock, G. H. (1965): Education and Values. Faber, p.12

2. Peters, R.S. (1966): Ethics and Education. George, Allen
    and Unwin, p.75

determined by environmental conditioning   or by a person's psycho-physiological make-up. The centrality of free choice in the concept of the value emphasises human responsibility for the choice itself and for the consequences that follow from it. Values do not simply have to be accepted or perpetuated in unbroken succession from generation to generation.

An important characteristic of values is that they carry with them an implication of consequences; and this is done by a deductive implication by normal rules of inference. Commitment to a particular value, such as affluence or personal worth, carries by implication to further values and these again to others, so that a whole pattern of commitment is built up from the original value. For instance, if affluence is taken to mean a state of copious material goods, it seems to imply that material goods are desirable; that enjoyment of them is superior to other kinds of enjoyment; that the acquisition of them should be a primary human purpose; and that the possession of material goods is a principal criterion for assessing the worth of individuals. All these are further value decisions which can reasonably be inferred from the original commitment to affluence.

Yet another characteristic of value is their relativity. This does not mean, as is often supposed, that there are not firm principles of right and wrong or that moral decision

depends wholly on circumstances, or that it can be purely

egocentric and without reference to other individuals or to

Society. What it does mean is that value commitment is not

immutable but is related to individual and social needs and

circumstances; new values can be introduced into a pattern of

commitment or the emphasis in an existing pattern changed.

In this circumstance, one might want to know if there

are no absolute values, that is, values that are choiceworthy

and independent of time, place and circumstance. The Norwood

Report of 1943 has this to say:

> Education cannot stop short of recognising
> the ideals of truth and beauty and goodness as
> final and binding for all times and in all places,
> as ultimate values ... Education from its own nature
> must be ultimately concerned with values which are [1]
> independent of time of particular environment, ...

and in the same vein, Jeffreys claims that

> the history of human thought suggests that
> man will always recognise the need for ultimate
> values which are timeless in the sense that
> they provide standards by which changes of manners,
> customs, beliefs can be judged, and in the light of
> which the future can be planned. [2]

Peters also writes of "ultimate values"[3] which it is a

function of education to transmit: truth, rationality and

concern for others, he would include among them. In a world

of rapid change and moral uncertainty it is comforting,

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1. Norwood Report of 1943 on Curriculum and Examinations in
    Secondary Schools; London, HMSO, p.viii
2. Garforth, F.W. (1985): Aims, Values and Education. Hull,
        Christygate Press. p.61
3. Peters, R.S. (1966): Ethics and Education. London,
        George, Allen and Unwin. p.29

no doubt, to believe in 'absolute' values like truth,
Beauty and Goodness; they give a sense of stability and
of direction.

It is true that there are certain ethical and aesthetic
concepts like justice, right, goodness, beauty, which are
common to virtually all societies; but the content of each
of these concepts may vary so widely as to produce quite
incompatible judgement and actions. It is also true that
some values, because they have long been tested in experience
and have regularly satisfied such criteria as human need and
social cohesion, have now acquired an apparent permanence.
They have become widely accepted as providing rules for the
conduct of life and are vested with an authority, almost
a sanctity, which gives them a powerful normative and
emotional force; among these are happiness, freedom and equality.

Agreement on such basic values is so widespread
that it has sometimes been assumed that mankind is moving
slowly, although with many digressions and much conflict,
towards universal ethical agreement. Wilson,[1] for instance,
argues that knowledge and experience have already brought a
large measure of agreement on ethical principles, and that
in the end we can hope for universal consent about at least
the most fundamental values. "It seems ... that the

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1.   Wilson, J. (1961): Reason and Morals. O.U.P., p.152

evidence for the likelihood of eventual unanimity is overwhelming: and what is especially significant, it all points the same way. We have not yet met a case where we have had proper experience and yet failed to agree". The implications of this view irrespective of the fact that one accepts it or not, is that values are experimental - tentative groupings, guides to further exploration of experience rather than fixed goals. In the same vein, Dewey writes: "Honesty, industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth, and learning, are not goods to be possessed, as they would be if expressed fixed ends to be attained. They are directions of change in the quality of experience. Growth itself is the only moral 'end'."

To this objection could be raised that if growth is the 'only moral end', there arises the problem of what kind or quality of growth is desirable or choiceworthy. Furthermore, the danger of a belief in 'absolute' values is that it is liable to fossilise our thinking about values, makes us less open-minded, more resistant to change and less inclined to attempt to effect it. Whereas, the present world situation requires that we should be prepared for change in values, that we should seek and encourage different expressions of traditional values, that we should strike a balance between

1. Dewey, J. (1948): Reconstruction in Philosophy. Beacon Press, p.177 .

conservatism and experiment. If we are committed to
absolute values, we may likely find this task very difficult.

We have seen from the above analysis, suggestion that
value choices are not wholly dependent on circumstances or
the whim of the person making them, then one might want to
ask the question as to how value choices are justified.
Take for instance, suppose I commit myself to belief in the
worth of persons or to happiness, tolerance or any other
value, how do I justify this commitment. In other words,
what is the justification for the choice of happiness as the
goal of adult education as is the case with this researcher ?
There are three main classes of answer to this question.

5.7.1 Intuitionism:

First, some philosophers have argued that values are
perceived intuitively; that happiness is choiceworthy is
not something that can be justified by strict logical
argument; we see it to be so, we know it by a kind of direct
mental perception, that human beings are valuable in themselves
is something which is obvious to any normal person who takes
the trouble to look around him and reflect honestly to what
he observes - and if he does not see it, if it is not obvious,
then we must encourage him to look more carefully, more
extensively and more reflectively. Intuitionism holds very
strongly that terms like 'good' and 'ought' do not stand for

observable qualities or relations and that moral judgements
are not inferences from any form of empirical generalization.

This process of seeing has been interpreted in terms
of two distinct sorts of models, both of which attempt to
ground moral knowledge on some kind of indubitable and
self-evident propositions. The first type of theory assumes
that terms like 'good' designate some sort of property that
is grasped by a reflective mind. Moore, for example, held
that good refers to a simple non-natural unanalysable
property. That it is not subject to discovery by the use
of the senses or by the ordinary process of introspection
makes it to be non-natural. Yet, it is only when observable
qualities are present can it be discerned. There is something
peculiar with seeing of this type; it goes beyond ordinary
gazing; it involves some sort of intellectual process.
A second type of theory is that which is held by Ross that
moral duties are founded upon a limited number of basic
prima facie obligations such as that promises ought to be
kept, which are known intuitively.

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1. Moore, G. E. (1903): Principia Ethica. Cambridge University
      Press.

2. Ross, D. (1930): The Right and the Good. Oxford,
      The Clarendon Press.

5.7.2 Naturalism:

A second class with a number of important variants comes under the general heading of 'naturalism'; that is to say, justification of value judgements is sought by reference to facts about the natural world or about human nature. For instance, utilitarians have argued that "happiness is universally desired and is therefore desirable"; conversely, pain is universally shunned and is therefore evil; these are facts of human nature which they claim, have value implications. Others have appealed to man's distinctive rationality and argued that those activities are most worthwhile which give most scope for the exercise of reason; Peters is one of those. Others again have pointed to man's sociality; the fact that he (man) requires society, community, in order to be human, whatever promotes community and harmonious interpersonal relationships is deemed to be valuable.

Dewey, a pragmatist held that the test of values is in their consequences - facts or events in the natural world; if these latter are 'good' (however this is interpreted, but especially in the sense of promoting human development and the enrichment of experience) then values which produce them are choiceworthy.

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1. Mill, J. S. (1910): op. cit.

5.7.3 Emotivism:

The third class, one variant of which has had much support in the present time, is that value-choices are not so much rational judgements as expressions of feeling or attitude sometimes we use language to express or evince our feelings and attitudes and we sometimes do so in order to influence the feelings and attitudes of others. Thus people may be brought to share our emotions and attitudes by the use of emotive language so that the expressive and persuasive uses of words are intimately bound up together. The approach as is argued by Stevenson and Ayer is in terms like 'good' have meaning by expressing how people feel and by getting others to feel in the same way.

Stevenson's $\underset{analysis\ of}{\underline{/}}$ "This is good" as "I approve this"; do so as well is an illustrative example. The argument is that not all words have meaning to moral terms in ways which brought out what was distinctive of them. Thus, to commit oneself to happiness or freedom is not to relate oneself in some way to something objectively existing - a value embodied either in a culture or in 'reality' - but to say something indirectly about one's own emotional condition, namely: 'I like, approve

1. Ayer, A. J. (1936): Language, Truth and Logic. London, Gollancz.

2. Stevenson, C.L. (1944): Ethics and Language. Newhaven, Yale University Press.

of, commend, esteem happiness or freedom'. And this is all the justification it is possible to give - my approval of it.

There are objections to all three of these attempts at justification. Intuitionism relies too much on personal vision and has about it, therefore, a certain air of arbitrariness; when two such visions disagree as they do, how does one decide between them ? What evidence can one adduce, what tests apply to show that one is better than the other ? There seems no satisfactory answer to this. It is much the same with emotivism: if value judgements are merely expressions of feelings or attitude , then I have as much right to mine as the next man to his; the question 'which is better'? does not arise, for they are both of equal status. The objection to naturalism is no less cogent.

                                     facts about
To argue from /human nature or the world around us to values, from what is or is valued, is logically invalid; to have an 'ought' in the conclusion there must be an 'ought' in the premises. For example, Mill's argument quoted above, from the fact that happiness is desired to the conclusion that it ought to be desired would be more valid if it runs thus: all men desire happiness; what all men desire is something that ought to be pursued. But the second stage in the argument is not fact at all; it is itself a value judgement requiring justification.

It seems that there is no logically compelling argument by which values and value choices can be justified. About some, it is certainly possible to achieve a fair measure of agreement. Most normal human beings prefer happiness to misery, though there could be disagreement about what constitutes happiness; within a particular culture (say in a democratic setting) there is the possibility of agreement about the value of freedom though there will be differences of view about their meaning and practical application.

Religion too, is a means to conformity in value judgements - most Christians agree that 'love' is enjoined upon them by the teaching of Jesus though once again, the interpretation of 'Love' into practical terms constitutes a source of endless argument. Human nature, human experience, cultural tradition and religious doctrine are important guides but not final authorities in value judgements; there remains (concluded Garforth), always an element of faith, of personal commitment, and the possibility of experiment and change.

5.8 Values in Adult Education:

Paterson suggested that there are no special 'adult educational values' but that given someone's beliefs about

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1. Garforth, F. W. (1985): op. cit., p.66
2. Paterson, R.W.K. (1964-5): "Values in Adult Education". Rewley House Papers, Vol.IV, No.3 .

man's cosmic situation, and given his beliefs about the
nature of knowledge, of Society and of the place of education
in it. We have already been given his adult educational
values. He went on to explain that in order to understand
the nature and purpose of adult education, it is a necessary
and sufficient condition to understand the nature and purpose
of education in general. The fact that the aims of adult
education are simply the aims of all education however, does
not mean that teaching methods, administrative arrangements
should be the same; if the aims are to be realized, in special
circumstances of adult education, they need to be modified
accordingly. Like Garforth, he too opined that adult
education values are nothing but our religious, moral, social
and other general values restated within the adult educational
setting. He then went ahead to show how his notion is likely
to work out in a particular case by presenting in outline
fashion, the 'adult educational' value-position that might be
associated with a particular world view.

A metaphysical frame of reference would see human
beings as inhabitants of a trackless world without signs,
which to the inhabitants respond to their call for intrinsic
meaning. If reality is significant, it is the inhabitants
who must 'invent' its significance. While epistemological
frame of reference stresses the significant reality as being
inverted by human beings, it follows that their knowledge of

the world cannot be dissociated from what they are in themselves and what they make of themselves. Knowledge is a total response of the person who knows; it is personally involved experience; it is knowledge as lived. Yet, for moral frame of reference, human beings are absolutely incommensurable with one another, for no two human beings inhabit the same 'world'. There can therefore be no 'communion' of human beings. But there can be communication between them, in the sense that one can witness the free self-expression of the reality which is 'another', and one can exhibit his own reality in return. This is the only way in which one man can help another to attain 'authenticity' as a person, that is, to accept absolute responsibility for everything one has made of oneself.

From these, he gave examples of derivative value-systems. These are:

(a)   Social Resistance must be offered to all the social forces which threaten to engulf personal identity or to reduce individual responsibility. The mass man lost in the anonymity of the crowd, has forfeited his spontaneity and thereby his humanity.

(b)   Aesthetic. Since not only one's own identity, but significant reality itself, is an 'invention', an artefact, artistic creativity is the archetype of free human activity. The crucial function of art is to construct a personality meaningful reality and to communicate this reality, despite its essential 'inwardness, to others who are engaged in the same project.

(c) Educational. Education is a process of self-refinement by means of interpersonal communication.
The individual is educated by witnessing the free
self-manifestation of his fellows particularly his
mature fellows. The chief aim of education is to
develop 'authenticity', to lead individuals to
acknowledge their sole responsibility for their personal
character and identity, and in this the educator must
respect the inviolable sanctity of the pupil's nature.
He must stimulate and disclose, not inculcate or direct.
To this end, impersonal, factual studies are essentially
irrelevant. The vital role in education belongs to
the critical and reflective studies, which foster an
urgent and committed self-questioning .[1]

This simple profile, he believes, may serve to illustrate
some of the ways in which the value-judgements of an adult
educationist are derived from his basic world views.
Now   back   to questions of the value and purpose of the
education of adults. We should try to see such questions as
'open questions' of adult education, in the sense that they
needed and deserve continual restatement, and any answers
we give to them must be tentative and open to constant review.
We say this because of the controversy between those who
regard adult education as an essentially educational project
and those who regard it as an exercise in community development
or as a form of Social Service.

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1.   Paterson, R.W.K. (1964-5) op. cit., pp.49-50.

CHAPTER SIX

UTILITARIANISM AS AN AIM OF
ADULT EDUCATION

6.1 Introduction:

We have so far in the course of this research attempted a conceptual analysis of the term Utilitarianism, and have found that Utilitarianism means "happiness and the absence of pain". We have further discovered that happiness is so involving that it does not constitute itself as a straight goal to be aimed at. Though it could be claimed to be a dominant end, it is, however, an end which includes the attainment of other ends. It is these other ends that we shall concern ourselves with in this chapter. The rationale for this adventure is the faith that these other ends are capable of serving as focus for the purposes of evaluation at the end of any particular adult education programme. We hope that this will provide an answer to our question of the possibility of breaking down happiness into units of learning.

We shall therefore take a theory of happiness which is believed to be specific, attainable and measurable.

6.2 A Theory of Happiness:

What are the ideals of happiness ? What is the
definition of happiness? What is the foundation of happiness?
Answers to these questions constitute a theory of happiness.

Ideals of Happiness:

There are at least three well-known philosophical
accounts of happiness or ideals of the happy life. These
are set out by Von Wright.[1] He calls the first of these
'Epicurean ideals', according to which happiness consists
in having (as opposed to doing) certain things that give
one pleasure. For example, one might have pleasure from
having certain possessions, or from being well thought of,
or from globe trotting. Happiness for such an individual
consists, then in getting sufficient pleasure by having
enough of these pleasure-producing things; on this view,
the objects to be aimed at would be pleasure-producing things.
We do not however see this as a perfect ideal of happiness
because there will be some people who would not be happy
receiving this type of passive pleasures. We may only look
upon it as just one way of attaining happiness, which will
work for some people but not for all people.

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1. Wright, Von (1963): The Varieties of Goodness.
    Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. p.41

The second kind of ideal of the happy life is one that is found in the writings of utilitarians, in which happiness depends upon the satisfaction of desires. "Happiness, on such a view, is essentially contentedness - an equilibrium between needs and wants on the one hand and satisfaction on the other".[1] On this view happiness is having one's wants, either most of them, or perhaps one's important wants fulfilled. There is however, a sub-class of this kind of happiness known as the ascetic ideal. According to the ascetic ideal, one should minimize one's wants so as to maximize the chance of satisfaction and thus happiness. The aim on this utilitarian view would be the fulfilment of as many as possible of one's needs and wants. That one has suppressed some desires in order to avoid frustration - a situation which we know leads to unhappiness does not guarantee absolute happiness. To avoid unhappiness is not the same as to be happy.

The third type of ideal of happiness given by Wright is that found in Aristotle in which happiness is thought to come from the pleasure that one takes in certain things or activities - especially those that involve capacities that one has made an effort to develop. For example, one may enjoy playing 'ayo' game or wrestling; and the better one is at these activities, the more one enjoys doing them;

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1. Wright, Von (1963): op. cit., p.93

and the happier one is. The ambition on this view would be opportunity to develop and exercise these capacities as much as one desired.

These three ideals, that is, having what gives pleasure, having a favourable balance between needs and wants and their fulfilment and engaging in enjoyed activities, do not, if taken as separate ideals give an adequate account of happiness. Rather, the three put together would constitute a complete ideal of happiness.

Happiness Defined:

Happiness will thus be defined in terms of wants and satisfaction. A man will be unhappy if he cannot get what he wants, as such, 'happiness' is the name we give to what a man wants when we consider the objects of his desire not severally, but collectively. Getting what one wants is not only a necessary condition of happiness but also a sufficient condition. Happiness is thus conceived of as the satisfaction of desire or pleasure. But what do we mean by satisfaction, and what are those things if there are, that can arouse our desire for wanting something? There appears to be some confusion in this question. Are we suggesting what we want or that when we have decided on what we want, then go ahead to find a means of satisfying them? Or are they both the same thing? We would perhaps say that they are two different issues. Though in treating them as separate issues, we may

not be able to avoid ideas running into each other. We shall
take them as split issues, though not considering the issue
of sequence.

Thus we shall attempt to answer the question of what we
mean by 'Satisfaction'. We shall elucidate this meaning by
breaking down into three component parts, what a satisfying
activity is.

Being Satisfied with Something:

'Being satisfied' has an object, although a very general
one which is person relative. The central idea is 'being
satisfied with' something, and we shall try to explain this
notion. The idea of being satisfied with something implies
that one's hopes, expectations, requirements, demands, etc.
are involved. If a man says that he is satisfied with his
accomplishments, he implies that what he has accomplished
does not fall short of his hopes and expectations, with the
goals which he has explicitly or implicitly set himself.
                    can
Thus, one/be satisfied or dissatisfied with one's job, one's
marriage, one's lots in life. It would seem in addition that
one could even be satisfied or dissatisfied with such things
as the national or world situation, so long as one sees
oneself bound up with these. It is difficult, however, to
see how one could be satisfied or dissatisfied with some
state of affairs which does not directly affect one

When one is satisfied with something, one need not be satisfied with every aspect of it. One need only be satisfied with most of it, or with the important aspects of it, so that on the whole, one's satisfaction with something sufficiently outweighs the dissatisfaction with it. Whether one is satisfied with something can be determined by seeing whether one feels satisfied with it. The feeling of satisfaction needs some clarification here. To say that one feels satisfied with one's job means that one feels satisfied because one judges that the object of some expectation connected with one's job is realized, and that one gets or expects to get is or will be worthwhile. One thus feels satisfied with something only if one gets a feeling of enjoyment caused by his judging that the object of some expectation has been realized. We may conclude that happiness is a matter of getting whatever it is that one wants and finding it worthwhile when one gets it.

Now let us see how happiness can be defined in terms of wants. To want something is to desire it. We may want to know as to how we come about our various desires. These can be aroused psychologically, intellectually, and socially. Thirst or hunger, for example, may lead to our desire for water or food. Thus our desire for water or food will be

satisfied as soon as we get what we want. However, a bottle
of Pepsi-Cola, which is equally liquid in nature may meet
our desire, but it will not satisfy it in the way water will.
So, for a desire to be satisfied, that which is desired must
be compatible with the nature of need. Food, for example,
is desired by a hungry person and not a thirsty one.

We may however have a desire, but not a will to satisfy
it. If one has a desire for intellectual pursuit, but
because one is a jolly fellow, and the meriments of the
society keeps inviting one to parties, to such an extent that
one finds it difficult to sit in one's library to do some
academic work, such invitations may obstruct one's will to
satisfy one's intellectual desire. That one has not enough
strong will to detach oneself from one's friends is a great
impediment to one's desire; that one has not been able to do
what one wants in life therefore makes one feel unhappy.
So, it is not only enough to have a desire, but there must be
a will strong enough to enable one to be able to satisfy
such a desire.

There is need however, to make a clarification between
these three words: that is, want, desire and need. When we
say that we want something, the reason may be because such a
thing appeals to us. Such an appeal is always very frivolous,
arising out of a state of luxury. For example, one may want
a pair of blue shoes. But if one says that one desires a pair
of blue shoes, it means that a pair which is perhaps not as
expensive as the blue pair has been given to such a person.

Desire is a kind of reward for stewardship. I desire a
better treatment means that the treatment given to me falls
short of my expectation. Again, these are not as weighty as
need. I need blue shoes will perhaps mean that no other
colour of shoes will meet the condition for which that

particular pair of shoes is called for.

Need is a kind of compulsion and always objective in nature. We may want to interprete need as frivolous, luxury, appeal; desire as reward, expectation and treatment that is related to one's status; and need as compulsory, necessary, rational demand which is objectively demanded.

But it may not be enough to only have a desire and will to be able to satisfy one's wants. Other conditions such as aptitude, opportunity, privilege, need to be met. Though these other conditions may be situations beyond the control of an individual, yet because they could cause some obstruction to the satisfaction of one's needs, it is important they be removed.

So, the saying that a happy person is that person who gets what he wants in life is true to the extent that the three conditions we have just enumerated are met.

We find a practical expression of method of attaining satisfaction in Mill's account of happiness in his proof of utilitarianism. Mill understood happiness or well-being in terms of harmonious satisfaction of the desires of the individual. His conception of well-being is his conviction that man is a social as well as an intellectual animal, and that a large part of his happiness depends upon the satis-faction of his social impulses and other regarding sentiments. To know this, he suggested, involves enlightenment, if men sufficiently understand themselves, and are not distracted by false conceptions of the human situation. Mill thus opined that enlightenment would necessitate the provision of liberty. He went on to give his reason for this.

According to him, the primary social factor in modern life which blocks the way of individual and collective well-being is the widespread interference of institutions, formal and

informal, with individual self-development. For him, liberty is both a means and an end, a condition of the general welfare and an intrinsic component of personal happiness. He is very specific about his type of liberty and these are, freedom of thought, freedom to choose one's vocation and freedom of association and speech.

What then are we to understand by the claim that adult education is aimed at the promotion of the learner's happiness? If educators are to aim at promoting the good of their learners, their work is two-fold; partly a matter of enlarging understanding and partly to do with shaping disposition to behave in certain ways. The learner has to understand in general terms, what his well-being consists in. He has to see himself as an animal with such and such an array of natural desires and to appreciate the way in which these desires may take different forms owing to cultural influences and new desires of all kinds be built up out of them.

It will be recalled that Hostler emphasised three fundamental aims in adult education. These are: 'autonomy' which, according to him, prescribes the student's right to choose the classes he will attend. Autonomy in turn implies individuality, which enjoins that he should develop in a unique way.

Hostler, (1981): op. cit., p.56

And it also entails equality in his relationship with the tutor, whereby both of them develop through the process of learning together. This type of equality no doubt, falls within the ideology of radical humanism. And such humanism is explicit in many adult educators' writings, such as Rogers, Knowles and Jarvis. One of the most significant of all adult educators to adopt this position and to pursue it to its logical conclusion is Paulo Freire and his work will be discussed in this chapter.

One of the main aims of adult educators who have adopted a humanistic position is the development of the self of the learner and at the heart of Knowles' theory of andragogy lies the idea of the <u>self</u> of the learner. We shall therefore take an analysis of the self and this will lead to a discussion of the learning cycle in which learning is viewed as a process of reflection upon experiences rather than memorisation of data.

So far we have been concerned with the utilitarian aims of adult education. We have tried to bring out the elements of happiness that can be incorporated in an adult education programme. These elements can further be developed in the curriculum process. Thus, happiness can become a part of the curricula activity of the adult education programme. The formulation of aims are for the achievement of particular target. If care is not taken, the target which is aimed at may not be attained. That 'care' is the means, the process

or method by which the target is attained. A good aim can
therefore be spoilt or prolonged by bad means.

Therefore, when we say that we are aiming at something,
it might be right to ask why, the answer to such a question
may further lead to a further question how. To aim at
something is to have a good reason, whether psychological or
sociological. The success of a good reason depends heavily
on a good approach (method). It follows therefore that a
good aim plus a good method leads to a good end. It does not
follow however that a good aim tantamounts a good method.
The two activities though related are not the same.
Clarification of aim is a necessary though not sufficient
condition for the establishment of methodology. It is like
policy and implementation. As such, our next task will be
the clarification of adult education methods.

6.3   Methods of Teaching:

Education is often regarded, in some way, as the
transmission of knowledge. But implicit in this type of
definition is an extremely limited teaching methodology.
This methodology is reflected in the idea that teaching is
a one-way communication process and that education is merely

the communication of knowledge that should be acquired and reproduced. However, there are a variety of other approaches to teaching which Jarvis[1] outlined. These methods are classified within a framework of three broad types: didactic, Socratic and facilitative. Below is a brief discussion of each type.

Didactic Methods: Didactic approaches to teaching generally assume a one-way communication approach and that a selection of culture should, for a variety of reasons, be transmitted to the students to learn. This knowledge is usually taught by the lecture, or some other similar mode of instruction. Indeed, there is a sense in which the education versus training debate can be placed within this context. Training, it is assumed, emphasizes the learner's dependence and education is viewed as creating a much more autonomous individual.

Didacticism signifies a form of education from above in which the learner is regarded as an empty receptacle that needs to be filled with the knowledge and wisdom that emanate from the teacher. This approach does imply a concept of man that is to be moulded by external forces, so that it is not surprising that Bourdieu and Passeron[2] claim that 'all

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1. Jarvis, P. (1983): Adult and Continuing Education: Theory and Practice. London, Croom Helm, pp. 120 - 9.

2. Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.C. (1977): Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. London, Sage Publications.

pedagogic action is objectively symbolic violence insofar
as it is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary
power'. Hence, in the process of teaching, the social
relationships of the wider society are reproduced and the
knowledge to be learned is presented to the learner.
Bourdieu and Passeron are also as clearly concerned about
the curriculum content as about the method whereby the content
is presented but they are mentioned here simply because their
approach emphasizes the method. However, they proceed to
point out that such pedagogic action presupposes an authority
to impose such symbolic violence upon individuals, authority
which reinforces the arbitrary power which establishes it
and which it conceals.

It might be claimed that this form of analysis is valid
for initial education but it is not true for the education of
adults because the learners are voluntarily present and that
outside of the context of the classroom, some of the learners
may be in higher positions in the social hierarchy than the
teacher so that education is not reproducing the social
situation. However, this argument does not hold good, since
in the context of the teaching and learning, didacticism does
reproduce a hierarchial relationship and the fact that some
of the learners may forego their status within such a
relationship merely serves to reinforce the validity of

such a hierarchical structure. That the learner is not always compelled to attend adult and continuing education classes hardly alters the fact that the learner may be prepared to have his self moulded by agencies other than himself in a manner that some might view as symbolic violence.

Didacticism is, therefore, a technique of control insofar as the method by which the content presented is authoritative and often authoritarian. Frequently, the learner is expected to reproduce it but rarely is he given the opportunity to debate it. In some liberal adult education classes, debate often follows a didactic presentation, and in these instances, it is clear that Bourdieu's and Passeron's claim would be less valid, but then it might also be that ultimately this teaching method may not be totally didactic. Overall, didacticism that allows for no debate and expects the memorization and reproduction of knowledge presented in a form of education from above is nothing but a means to mould the individual to fit into the structure of the wider society.

Socratic Approaches: Unlike the previous technique in which learners are required only to memorize what is presented to them from above, this approach encourages the human process of learning. Socratic teaching methods are sometimes employed in adult and continuing education. In this approach, the

teacher either takes the students through a prepared, logical
sequence of questions or the teacher responds to the students'
response with further questions, so that the onus is always
on the learners to formulate their reply to the teacher.
One outcome of this process may be that the students reach a new
position in logical knowledge from that which they had reached previously.

Alternatively,   the teacher may have so
controlled the process that the outcome of the teaching and
learning process is that the students are left with the
culturally accepted knowledge and that since it appeared to
be arrived at in a democratic manner, it may be accepted and
acted upon more readily by the group as a whole; Since
Lewin and his associates discovered that where the participants
had helped to set group goals, they would more likely be
committed to the outcome. In this instance, therefore, while
an impression of democracy is given, the outcome may merely
be a more effective method of control than didactic teaching
and, as such, it remains a form of education from above.

However, the fact that in this instance, students are
given the opportunity to reach their own conclusions actually
does create a situation in which a more explicitly reflective
learning process is encouraged. In this instance, the agent
is less constrained by social pressures than he is when he

Lewin and his Associates cited in Jarvis, P. (1985):
The Sociology of Adult and Continuing Education; London,
Froom Helm.

is merely required to memorise and to reproduce that which
he has been presented. Hence the possibility of the learners
reaching conclusions other than those held by the teacher must
exist and, provided that there are no other methods of control
such as examinations, therefore, the teacher may be seen to
be embarking upon an educational process of equals.

Facilitative Methods: In this approach, the educator of
adults creates a situation in which learning may occur.
He may, for instance, seek to create an awareness of a special
learning need in the student; endeavour to confront a student
or students, with a problem requiring a solution; provide
the student(s) with an experience and encourage reflection
upon it. In all of these instances, an outcome of the activity
should be that learning has occurred, but the teacher's role
has not been to control the learning outcome but to facilitate
the learning process.

Hence, the potentiality exists in such a situation
for the learning outcomes to be totally different from those
which the teacher had perhaps anticipated. This reflects
the earlier discussion on behavioural and expressive
objectives; for in facilitative teaching, the only possible
form of objectives that the teacher may legitimately have
is expressive, for the learning outcome should in no way be
controlled by the teacher. Thus, the education of equals
appears when this teaching method is employed. Even so,

it might be objected that the teacher is in a position to manipulate the environment, so that the learning outcomes are still under the teacher's control. Such a possibility must always exist though it might be claimed that this is an abuse of the teacher's office. As Dewey, writing about education of children claims:

> It is possible, of course, to abuse the office, and to force the activity of the young into channels which express the teacher's purpose rather than that of the pupils. But the way to avoid this danger is not for the adult to withdraw entirely.

The way is, first, for the teacher to be intelligently aware of the capacities, needs, and past experience of those under instruction made to develop into a plan and project by means of the further suggestions contributed and organized into a whole by the members of the group. The plan, in other words, is a cooperative enterprise, not a dictation.

While Dewey's terminology may not be that which an educator of adults might use, the sentiments are those of which he might approve. We shall now take an analysis of the word 'self'.

Dewey, J. (1938): Experience and Education. London, Collier-Macmillan Publishers. pp. 71 - 72.

The Self:

The strategy-based radicals are in various ways concerned with the humanity of the learner. Rogers,[1] for instance, focusses upon both the self of the learner and the achievement of freedom. Yet Rogers, like others of this school, spends little time on the constraints of the social structure on the self; this is a point to which further references will be made below. Knowles, locates his first major difference between andragogy and pedagogy in the concept of the learner, claiming that:

> ... something dramatic happens to their self
> concepts when people define themselves as adults.
> They begin to see their normal role in life
> no longer as being full-time learners. They see
> themselves increasingly as producers or doers.
> Their chief sources of self-fulfilment are now
> their performances as workers, spouses, parents,
> and citizens .[2]

The development of the person is clearly central to this perspective but the above quotation raises a number of questions that require further examination.

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1. Rogers, C.R. (1969): Freedom to Learn. Columbus, Charles E. Ohio Merrill Publishing Co.

2. Knowles, M.S. (1980) The Modern Practice of Adult Education. Chicago Association Press, (Revised ed.) p.45 .

Knowles focuses upon the self concept of the learner but produces no evidence to substantiate his claim that adults see themselves as self-directed, even though he acknowledges that children may also be self-directed and he accuses Society of preventing this occurring. Nevertheless, he makes no reference to the thorough discussion of the self that various social interactionists and phenomenologists have undertaken. For instance, Mead[1] argues that the self is the product of interaction between the individual and, initially, significant others. In this early socialization process, a body of knowledge, meaning and experience acquired by individuals becomes detached from the immediate experience of the individual and assumes an independence. This detachment leads to an individuation of consciousness which permits the construction of schemes of meaning which allow for the individual to interact with himself as an objective reality in a 'I — ME' dialogue. Hence, he argues that both reason and the self-consciousness emerge in an individual as a result of interaction with others.

Two questions immediately demand discussion here: is not the conception that the self is a creation of social interaction a confirmation that man is created by Society,

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1. Mead, G.H. (1938): Mind, Self and Society. University of Chicago Press.

and, therefore, evidence that there is only one sociology?
And, secondly, is Knowles correct when he claims that
something dramatic happens to the self concept when people
define themselves as adults?

Mead was aware of the issue of the Social Self and he
discussed, but rightly rejected, the possibility that the
Self is an independent entity. However, is the assertion
that the self is a social evidence that man is merely the
product of the social group into which he is born? This is
a view that was prevalent in Sociology during a stage in its
development but it is not one that / favour with Sociologists.
now finds

Wrong,[1]   drawing on the work of Freud, sought
to show that this resulted in an over-socialized conception
of man and one that is false to experience. Hence, the
problem is to explain how an independent Self can emerge in
an individual since it is the product of Society. In a
pluralist society, the individual will be exposed to several
different interpretations of any reality, especially over a
period of time, so that in order to understand that reality
the individual has to decide upon which of the interpretations,
if any, to accept and espouse. The more that the individual
is able to reflect and decide from alternatives, the more
likely he is able to emerge as a self-directed person.

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1.   Wrong, D.H. (1961): 'The Oversocialized Conception of
         Man in Modern Sociology'; American Sociological
         Review, Vol. 26.

Not all people achieve the same degree of independence and
self-direction and initial education, with its traditional
didactic methods, with the exception of primary education,
may not encourage the process. Reisman[1] showed that while
some adults are 'inner directed', others are 'tradition
directed' and even 'other directed'. Hence, it is suggested
that since the self is a social construct, some individuals
do not acquire as high a degree of self-direction as others
during their socialization and initial education. Such
self-direction does not, therefore, emerge with adulthood:
for some, it occurs early in their lives and for others,
it may not appear until much later, if at all. Indeed,
other directed individuals may have what is known as 'Protean
Self' described by Sennett.

> As a belief that one's personality is always
> undergoing fundamental changes, or is capable
> of doing so. There is no core of 'innate' human
> nature or fixed social condition that defines it.
> It is a Self so immanent in the world that it is
> a creature of immediate appearance and sensations.
> This selfhood puts an immense premium on 'direct'
> experiences with other people; it detests reserves
> or masks behind which other people are felt to lurk,

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1. Reisman, D. (1950): 'The Lonely Crowd: A Study of
   Changing American Character'. quoted in
   Jarvis, P. (1985): op. cit.

> because in being distant, they seem to be
> inauthentic, not taking the immediate moment
> of human contact as an absolute .[1]

There is a sense in which some forms of adult education, especially in its affective form, seek to remove the barriers that prevent self-disclosure and endeavour to facilitate a community feeling in which the participants reveal themselves to each other. Sennett regards self 'disclosure of one's feelings to others' in an attempt to create Gemeinschaft as something destructive to the participants since advanced industrial societies demand individuals who do not necessarily seek to share their feelings and certainly do not need to do so. This inner-direction or self-direction may be a condition of social maturity in such a society, but this is not necessarily to be equated with adulthood in the manner that Knowles implies.

Whenever self-direction begins it does not, however, imply the strategy-based humanistic aim of seeking to ensure the development of the self in the teaching and learning transaction. It merely points to the fact that adults are at different levels of self-development and independence when they embark upon a learning project and that adult educators may need to diagnose the degree of individual development if they are to employ facilitative methods of teaching and learning.

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1. Sennett, R. (1980): 'Destructive Gemeinschaft' quoted in Jarvis, P. (1985): op. cit., p.101

   Ibid. p.102

The third point in the quotation from Knowles that requires examination is his assumption that the chief source of adults' fulfilment is their performance as workers, spouses, etc. The assumption here is that adulthood will result in a social conformity and that in performing socially prescribed roles, the individual discovers self-fulfilment. The implications of this position are implicitly conservative and that the social structures exercise no constraint upon the individual. No consideration is given to the fact that for many able persons, the constraints of the social structure do inhibit their self-fulfilment.

Indeed, it is very difficult for those lower in the social hierarchy to be socially mobile upwards and to obtain the type of employment that is intrinsically satisfying, so that individuals are not all totally free agents in the way that liberal adult education assumes. While a person may be free to think, he may be constrained from acting by the structures of Society. This is where one finds it difficult to see the reality of Paulo Freire's method of liberation. He espoused that the oppressed should free themselves from the shackles of the oppressors. There is need therefore to examine his teaching strategy with a view to assessing its possibility of achieving a true liberation of thought and action.

The Teaching Strategy of Paulo Freire:

Any examination of the works of Freire would reveal
that at the heart of his approach is a strategy-based
radicalism, based upon a humanism that stems from his concern
for human beings. Indeed, it is his ideological background
in a radical Christian-Marxism that makes his theory and
practice so unique and important to any understanding of the
education of adults.

From the outset of his literacy programme, Freire's
aims were clear: they were to help people learn rather than
memorize, using the medium of literacy to create a critical
consciousness. He explains it thus:

> If learning to read and write is to constitute
> an act of knowing, the learners must assume
> from the beginning, the role of creative subjects.
> It is not a matter of memorizing and repeating
> given syllables, words and phrases, but rather,
> of reflecting critically on the project of
> reading and writing itself, and on the profound
> significance of language. [1]

In his writings, he describes fully the types of
learning strategies to which the students were exposed,
including:working from their own level of experience, active
projects and group discussion. The educator is a member of
the group rather than its leader and his task may be that of

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1.   Freire, P. (1972): Cultural Action for Freedom;
         Harmondsworth. Penguin, p.29 .

problem poser rather than problem solver. Hence, the
learners are encouraged to generate their own meanings and
to realize that there is a difference between appearance
and meaning so that they are encouraged to analyse the
influence of the dominant culture upon the social reality
that they experience. Liberation begins when they realize
that apparently objective knowledge is ideological. The
process of reflection is, according to Freire, one of the
characteristics of man himself and problem solving is an
element in the development of the humanity of the learner.

> Problem-posing education affirms man as being
> in the process of becoming – as unfinished,
> uncompleted beings in and with a likewise
> unfinished reality. Indeed, in contrast to other
> animals who are unfinished but not historical,
> men know themselves to be unfinished; they are
> aware of their incompleteness. In this incompleteness
> and this awareness lie the very roots of education
> as an exclusively human manifestation. The
> unfinished character of reality necessitate that
> education be an on-going reality. [1]

It is through problem solving that individuals become
conscious of the world in which they live and by which they
can be freed from the process of conditioning. In the act
of learning, individuals become potential agents, freed to

1. Freire, P. (1972): Pedagogy of the Oppressed;
   Harmondsworth, Penguin . pp. 56-57.

act upon the world. Through the process of learning, man
becomes conscious of reality and the process of conscienti-
zation is at the heart of Freire's thinking. It is defined
as "the process in which men, not as recipients, but as
knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the
socio-cultural reality which shapes their lives and of their
capacity to transform that reality".[1] The process of
transforming the world is for him a process of humanizing
it, so that the end product of the process of reflection and
action is one in helping to create a world where individuals
may be more truly human. It is a utopian ideal but he
himself claims that unless education is utopian, either the
future has lost its meaning for men or men are afraid to
risk living in the future as creative human beings. Hence,
man is involved in a struggle against the oppressive and
dehumanizing structures of the world in a "precarious
adventure of transforming and recreating the world."

Among the strengths of Freire's position are that:
it combines theory with practice; it locates education within
the wider socio-political process; it places the individual
within the context of a sociological framework within which
contemporary sociological theorizing is seen to be relevant;

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1.   Freire, P. (1972): op. cit.,   p.51
      Ibid. p.72 .

it combines Christianity, humanism and Marxism in a radical humanist, ideological position that is quite unique within educational theory and it can be right to say, it is utopian.

The aim of Freire's pedagogy is to assist the oppressed unveil this world of oppression and to commit themselves to its transformation. When this ideal society has been achieved, its techniques should belong to all people ensuring the permanent process of liberation. Here lies a major weakness in Freire's thinking since it assumes/that an egalitarian society will be achieved - an assumption that, thereafter, will require permanent liberating forces to prevent the structures of society being reformed with another dominating elite. In addition, he appears to assume that those of the masses who have been educated will become revolutionary and this could open him to the criticism that he is actually using education to produce revolutionaries. This, however, depends on the motive of the educator and the educand.

Oppression does not /necessarily relate to slavery; the aim of education in a utilitarian sense has to do with collective activity that will produce more happiness. The liberation of the mind, the freedom of thought advocated for, by the utilitarian is for the purpose of attaining cross fertilization of opinion towards the solution of a problem. While the aim may be different, the pedagogy of Freire no doubt, is good enough for the process of adult education.

Andragogical Approach:

So far, we have been examining the various methods that can be applied in the education of adults without making reference to a particular approach. It will be interesting to know that all the above methods can be applied to children/ conventional education as well. That is, to say, that the approach to any method determines the extent to which such a method is workable. In order to effectively achieve our objectives when we use any of the methods, the andragogical approach will be more suitable to adult learners. Andragogy is an approach to education for adults which constitutes an alternative to the pedagogic approach. Andragogy can be defined as an approach i.e. the total embodiment and expression of a philosophy of education for adults. This approach is aimed at, enabling people to become aware that they should be the originators of their own thinking and feeling."[1]

The theory of andragogy stems from a distinctive set of assumptions about the nature of adults, adult development, learning, knowledge, teaching and education.

M. Knowles, a renowned adult educator whom many people acknowledge as the originator of the andragogical approach, based his idea on at least four crucial assumptions

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1. Allman, P. and Mackie, K.J. (1981): Towards a Developmental Theory of Andragogy; Monograph 9. University of Nottingham, Department of Adult Education, p.2 .

about the characteristics of adult learners. He believed
that these assumptions are quite different from those of
child learners on which traditional pedagogy is based.
These assumptions are:

(1)   that the adult learner's self-concept moves
      from one of being a dependent personality
      toward one of being a self-directing human
      being;

(2)   that he accumulates a growing reservoir of
experience that becomes an increasing resource
      for learning;

(3)   that his readiness to learn becomes oriented
      increasingly to the developmental tasks of his
      social roles; and

(4)   that his time perspective changes from one of
      postponed application of knowledge to immediacy
      of application, and accordingly his orientation
      towards learning shifts from one of subject-
      centeredness to one of problem-centeredness."[1]

Knowles' basic assumption have further been expatiated
by Allman and Mackie.[2] According to these writers, andragogy
is a theoretical approach to the education of adults, which
is underpinned by the following set of assumptions:-

1.   Human beings are Social beings, which means that
     their nature derives from their interactions or
     transactions within their social and historical
     contexts; therefore, whilst contributing towards
     the creation of self, society and history, they are,

1.   Knowles, M. 'An Emerging Technology for Adult Learning';
          in Tight, M. (1983): Adult Learning and Education.
          England, Croom Helm.

2.   Ibid.

in turn, influenced by what they and others have
created, i.e. the entire context.

2. An adult person who is thinking, learning and
    critically reflecting is a more adequate social being.

3. The potential for continuing development of thought,
    feeling and self during adulthood entails qualitative
    change in thinking and thought structures which
    distinguishes the adult's development of various
    forms of competent thinking from that of the child
    or adolescent.

4. Creative and critical thinking rather than the
    uncritical reception of other's thinking is
    preferable because these modes of thinking foster
    the full development of the adult.

5. Creative and critical thinking are most appropriately
    fostered by a combination of group and individual
    self-directed learning.

6. A continuing re-integration of the cognitive and
    the affective domains is an essential ingredient
    for effective adult learning.

7. Knowledge can be seen as both an open system and
    closed system. When it is seen as an open system,
    it is something to which the learner can add or which
    can be altered by critical thought. Even when perceived
    as a closed system it is something which can be used
    by the learner to solve problems or to create new systems.

8. Learning involves thinking, discovery, enquiry
    critical reflection and creative response.

9. Education is not about transmission, but rather,
    it is about selection, synthesis, discovery and
    dialogue.

Allman, P. and Mackie, J. (198): op. cit. pp. 36-37

This broadening of the approach arose as a result of some critical statements about andragogy. To those critics, Knowles' formulation of the approach is nothing but an extension of the progressive pedagogy. The reason why andragogy goes beyond and even contradicts pedagogy is that an appropriate theory of andragogy derives from all the above distinct set of assumptions about the nature of adults, adult development, learning, knowledge, teaching and education. To apply the pedagogical approach to the education of adults is to ignore the difference between cognitive development during youth and that which is possible during adulthood.

We have argued that happiness means the satisfaction of desires. The choice of desire, thus becomes a determinant factor to satisfaction. Therefore, if an adult is taught to choose achievable desires, he has somehow been taught to be happy. Achievable desires consists in one's capability, aptitude and opportunity, a specific aim of adult education should therefore be to teach the adult to discover his capability, aptitude and where to get these developed.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, we shall address ourselves to two main assignments. The first one will be to briefly give a resume of the contents of the previous chapters so as to highlight the cogent areas of profound concern in this work. The second one will be the consideration of the implications of the findings of this research for the various sectors of the Society that have a stake in adult education. These include teacher training institutions, adults of all categories, and all our well placed philanthropists. It also has great implications for policy makers and all employment agencies. We cannot continue to pay lip services to the need for adult education; the situation has arisen that demands very urgent action and this should be done in earnest by all concerned.

Summary of Research:

The question of aims and objectives is very crucial in any activity - be it long or short term, in the sense that they serve as focal point and at the same time, as measurer of our endeavours. It is for this reason that

270.

careful consideration has to be made when aims are about to

be formulated. At both the planning and implementation stages,

aims must be clearly stated so that everyone involved in its

course is able to contribute meaningfully to its success.

It is perceived that aims in adult education are prescriptively

stated, and this contradicts one of the criteria of adult

education that, adult education should be situationally

relevant and related to the learner.

Since happiness is an emotional state, all sentient beings

aspire to be with nature; we made effort to examine the concept

philosophically in the early chapters of this work. Such an

examination has included the various uses of the concept as well

as the possible interpretations of such uses. Our analysis

reveals that freedom of thought, autonomous decision making

and self effort are important elements for human happiness.

These elements are later found to be the accepted

characteristics of a normal adult. As such, the development

of these characteristics in a manner accepted by the

utilitarian doctrine tantamounts to developing in the adult

through education, the happy state.

Furthermore, we developed a theory of happiness which

makes man the chooser of his well-being and therefore the

promoter/developer of his ideal happy environment.

This is a situation that can be reached not only after the individual has been able to realise his potential, but can as well take an autonomous decision to choose between alternatives. This, however, requires an exposure to efficient teaching. The adult teaching is a process which enables learners to be in control of their thinking. It involves learning and thinking with others who are learning and thinking. There is no doubt that the adult is a social being whose nature results from his interactions with his social context.

In addition, adults have important trait - the potential to undergo changes in their thinking throughout their entire life span. For this, they are able to develop continuously, and take control over their thinking. To be able to attain this educational ideal and remain in it for life calls for proper instruction and motivation.

Apart from the adult making efforts to attain his self-fulfilling prophecies, other determinant agents contribute immensely in making them achievable. Such agents are employees of all types, higher institutions of learning, philanthropists, policy makers, government agencies who are in charge of financing and providing for adult education. We shall now examine the contribution of these bodies in making a success of adult education activities.

The Role of Government Agencies:

The ideology of adult education is based upon needs, access and provision.[1] These three situations call for government assistance and direction. When we talk in terms of needs in adult education, we are usually referring to basic needs and community needs. Basic needs have been clearly enumerated by Maslow; these are food, safety, love and self esteem. Food is obviously the strongest of the four, and will affect others if it is lacking. Maslow says that self-esteem is more important than the esteem of others. But there is a critical rider to his identification of these four basic needs. It is that the pre-condition for the satisfaction of these basic needs is the free use of cognitive capacities

as a set of adjustive tools which serve to satisfy those basic needs.

But, "the need for safety, belonging, love-relations and respect can be satisfied only by other people i.e. from outside the person." Now to Community needs. Community needs refers to the well-being of the general citizens by government

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1. Griffin, C. (1984): op. cit.

2. Maslow, A. H. (1970): Motivation and Personality.
   Harper Row. Page 54.

to ensure peace, better productivity, freedom to the extent
that the structure of Society is preserved. Continuing
education is the only means through which adults can be
helped to find more meaning in life, gain some sense of
security, self-respect and independent significance.

The government therefore has an obligation to make sure
that education is a continuous process. The present situation
which makes very meagre allowance for adult education should
be reviewed. Employers should be mandated to set aside
special budget for re-training of their staff. At present,
in this country, there is no particular place set aside for
adult education classes and the National policy does not even
make provision for adult educators. Rather, the policy
says that philanthropists should come and to offer help
in adult education classes free-of-charge. All these
situation make adult education to be a meaningless and
not too serious/activity. Firstly, there should be strict
regulations about where adult education classes should be held.

In view of our target clientele i.e. farmers and
market women in relation to literacy classes, government
could hire some stalls right in the market places, so that
when these women come to sell their items, they do not have
to walk too far to attend classes. Such classes should not

be handled just by anyone who can read and write, but by
someone who had gone through a teacher training institution
and he/she must be a full-time government employee.

The Role of the Universities
Patricularly Department of Education:

Presently, only a handful of our Universities have
departmentsof Adult Education and it is only students who
belong to such departments that are exposed to courses in
adult education. Again, this situation should be reviewed.
All our education students should be exposed to, at least
the theory and practice of teaching adults and this course
will even make them better pedagogical teachers.

Universities have a great part to play in promoting
the culture of continuing education in this country. More
courses and professions than hitherto should be run on
part-time basis for mature students who cannot afford to
go on full-time studies. It should be realised that education
means money, such mature students should be given some
allowances to augment their expenses on books and travels.

Education as is known, is for the development of the
mind. There are some people whose interest in education
is not for employment but for self-actualization. As such,
Universities should review their entry qualifications as
regards mature students. They should not be made to go
through the rigour of Joint Matriculation Examinations or

General Certificate Examinations.

From time to time, Seminars and Conferences should be organized for serving teachers thus providing them the opportunity of up-dating their knowledge and of learning new research outcomes.

Role of Philanthropists:

The enthusiasm of well-meaning Nigerians should not be dampened by taking their activities for granted. One of the criteria of adult education is that its activity must be educational in nature. As such, the policy makers should coordinate the efforts of these philanthropists so as to make it meaningful and purposeful and, as much as possible, give them a guideline as to what should be done. This coordination would better be the burden of the Department of Adult and Continuing Education of each State Ministry of Education. This Department will also ensure that the aims and objectives of adult education policies fall in line with the overall aims and objectives of the nation.

The Adult Learners:

Many of our adults Clientele are not accorded the necessary recognition that will enable them perform their proper roles in the Society. Many government policies are passed down to them without actually giving them the opportunity to discuss and have full understanding of such

policies. This type of situation further aggravates their ignorance. More enlightening programmes should be embarked upon now especially at this transition periods. It is a truism that the MAMSER, the DFFRI are some forms of enlightenment programmes by the government and they have been doing a lot. There are still more to be done. It is not just enough for them to tell the adults their rights and the functions of government. The adults in our society too needs to be able to partake in policy matters. As such, a form of library should be built in each Local Government, stuffed with books but particularly newspapers both of this country and of other countries.

Also, some form of educative programmes like the 'head start' programme of the United States of America can be organised. This programme is a sort of formal school learning organised so as to help parents understand what their children are learning in school. Political education/awareness could be so taught theoretically. Thereafter MAMSER will organise discussion groups when they come to meet these people in their various communities.

Moreover, the type of fanfair associated with Better Life for Rural Women Programme should be discarded. There is no doubt that as an innovation, the programme needs to be publicised, but there is a limit to which such publicity

should be made. The programme appears to be superficial
now; it becomes deep only at the level of educational
involvement. Better Life Centres should be built all over
the place where these women will be exposed to both the
practical and theoretical aspects of their trades. Specific
knowledge should be highlighted; such as our indigenous
vocations, mother-craft, and we must not lose sight of our
simple literacy programmes.

Implications for Curriculum Planners:

Here, we shall examine the role of the Curriculum planners.
Adult learners, no doubt are likely to have a strong sense
of what they wish to learn; and learning contracts are an
obvious way of dealing with that requirement. The problem
now is, how does a single teacher or curriculum planner
manoeuvre a programme that will meet the needs of the many
individuals in the class. Difficult as the case appears
to be, planning should be made in such a way as to meet
individual learning programmes. This means that the content
of what is to be learnt should be person centered and not
institutional centered. For the learner to choose his course
of study, he should first ask himself this question: 'what
will I be able to do at the end of this study which I could
not do before ?' Whatever appeals to him are what he needs

to know as a person. As such, provision for the curriculum
should be as rich as the number of problems facing a
particular society. These problems should be identified
and clarified and they will in turn be the bases of the
curriculum planning. One important objective to note in the
content of the curriculum of the adult learner is that the
learning programme focuses on critical thinking, critical
awareness, on problem-solving and the application of knowledge.
This involves familiarising students with assimilation,
analysis and synthesis of materials - facts, ideas,
hypotheses - in such a way that they are better able to solve
problems, arising in quite different circumstances.
This is in conformity with the ideology of adult education
which stipulates that the adult should develop towards an
identity of values and characteristics which he has chosen
for himself, not one which we have prescribed for him.
He knows what his personal ideal is, and he knows how he can
best reach it, and therefore he is best placed to judge
how far his learning has helped or hindered his development.
In this way, the learner can develop a sense of autonomy.

Adult Facilitators Role:

The role of the facilitator becomes imperative at the
point when the adult finds himself in the learning environment.

We have found that amongst the characteristics of the adult is his autonomy. It is through autonomy that he can attain his self-realisation, social progress, pleasure, some sense of morality and the human status. The facilitator has to design some form of teaching that will encourage and promote these traits. First, he has to develop in his students a sense of independent learning. This can be done through group discussions, group projects, or even study circles. In all cases, the Facilitator should avoid the imposition of his own ideas. However, the need for the traditional type of learning cannot be ruled out in adult classes. This is because, the sense of autonomy is derived from some traditional forms and meaning of knowledge such as those stated by Hirst and Phenix. Therefore whether the Facilitator is concerned with cultural or vocational education, the need for an amalgamation of the general knowledge cannot be over-emphasized if the learner is to come out as a chooser. All that is important is that the teacher should maintain a democratic control of the class activity as well as a collegial authority.

Adult Education in Society:

The need to create an educative society cannot be over-emphasized. This has to do with the power of literacy which Freire saw as a means of liberating the oppressed from the oppressors. Mill too, placed a great premium on education, though for him, he saw it as a means to attaining happiness. He believed in the educability of all human beings and this meant that men, women and children are susceptible to influences which assist their growth towards goals which are deemed worthwhile, be it happiness, freedom or what have you. Education should therefore not be seen as the privilege of a few, but as the right and the obligation of all. The value to be derived from a situation such as this is active participation in decision making by all concerned.

There is no gainsaying the fact that participation in social and political life is necessary for a positive conception of individual happiness and psychological well-being. In order to make participation effective, there is need to establish a clear channel of communication. Again, the importance of education/literacy is here established. But the education that is needed has to be continuous. This is because of the technological changes taking place every day.

For Nigeria to attain a Utilitarian Society, a Society that cares for the well-being of her citizens, that preserves the 'human right' of her citizens, the creation of a learning Society becomes

paramount. By 'learning Society' is meant a Society designed
to be supportive of individual lifelong education. If the
society is to be a continuous learning one, it has to be
conscious about education in its total sense; that is,
conscious of the educational relevance and potential of its
institutions and also of the general environment. By this
is meant the way of life of its citizens and such a society
must make up her mind to maximise her resources in these
respects to the utmost. It is a Society which follows Dewey's
advise to look to all its institutions not merely for their
efficiency and productivity but also, and more especially,
for their educative potential.

The educative instrumentality of the society is convenient
fiction whose only reality lies in the individual persons who
are considered as constituting, as it were, its members.
It follows that the interest of the community is the sum of
the interests of the several persons who compose it. If the
Society is so important in the promotion/attainment of the
individual happiness, then it is important that education
should not be the confines of schools, Colleges, or
Universities — though these are important institutions where
educative influence is concentrated and focused on clearly
formulated goals.

Garforth, F.W. (1971): op. cit. p.10

The home, places of work, recreation centres, villages, farms, are all potent educators. If this be so, education in the utilitarian sense means a switch of focus from the teacher in the classroom. It points to an education of involvement, of participation, or experiment, of activity rather than passivity. Such an education requires freedom such that will allow the learner to choose the direction of his interests and energies, establish his own interaction with the environment. The idea of the learning Society sounds good, such a community will ease the flow of information, quick and clear information gives direction to what is expected of the individual, and an ability to be able to perform to the progress of one's community is an achievement that carries a moral and religious sanction - 'to make the world a better place than I met it'. This is an achievement and achievements are immediate means to happiness.

The Utilitarian morality does recognize in all human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others - it is an altruistic theory - and so recommends education, which it claims to have power over human character as an instrument to establish in the mind of every individual an association between his own happiness and the good of the whole.

If therefore this work generates the desired attitudinal change, it means that Nigerians generally and, in particular the adult group who hold positions of power and, who are affluent would take it as both their civic and

and ethical duty to sacrifice their time, wealth, position, intellect to alleviate the sufferings of their fellow country men. Again, if this becomes the aim of everyone, corruption, selfishness vandalism, robbery of all sorts will soon become a phenomena of the past. This is what utilitarianism is about - the improvement of mankind. Thus disciplines of Adult and Philosophy of Education would have contributed a lot to learning in this country if the suggestions put forward in this research gets to the arm of government that deals with planning and implementing of educational policies.

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