REBELLION AND DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE

RWANDAN CRISIS

BY

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CERTIFICATION

I certify that this dissertation entitled: ***Rebellion and Diplomacy in International Politics in the Context of the Rwandan Crisis*** was carried out by **OKECHUKWU GROUPSON - PAUL UC,** Matric No.104609 in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, and is in conformity with the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political Science, University of Ibadan.

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DEDICATION

This work is affectionately dedicated, with immense thanks, to God for a successful endeavour. Also, I dedicate it to my ever-loving wife, Mrs Prisca Chinyere Okechukwu and our children, Emmanuella Kamsiyorchukwu Kinsella, Daniella Chimnaechelum Chimdimma Prisca and Chukwumdubem Groupson – Emmanuel. Finally, I solemnly dedicate this work to the over one million Rwandans who were exterminated during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADFL – CZ	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
APC	All People's Congress Party, Sierra-Leone
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier (a war instrument)
APROSOMA	*La Association Pour la Promotion Sociale De la Masse*
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCDI	Bank of Commercial and Industrial Development
CDF	Civil Defence Force
CNN	Cable Network News of America
COMESA	Community of East African States Association
CRC	Citizens' Right Congress of Liberia
DIA	Defence Intelligence Agency
DPRO	Department of Peacekeeping Operation (UN)
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
E-IMET	Enhanced International Military Education and Training of America
FDD	Forces for the Defence of Democracy of Burundi
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
GACACA	Traditional Mode of Conflict Resolution and Judiciary System in Rwanda
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus Cum Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan
LDF	Liberia Defence Force
LPC	Liberia People's Congress
LURD	The Liberian United Reconciliation and Democracy

MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MNC	Movement du Nationale de Congolese
PMLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPRI	Military Professional Incorporated America
MRND	Movement for Revolutionary National Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Europe
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group, Africa
NPRP	National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
NRA	National Resistance Army
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
NUR	National University of Rwanda
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PARMEHUTU	Party for the Movement of the Emancipation of the Hutu Race, Rwanda.
PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
RANU	Rwandaise Alliance for National Unity
RUF	Revolutionary United Front, Sierra Leone
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM	Radio et Television Libre de Mile-Collin
SADA	Southern African Development Association
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement, Sudan
SPLA	Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistant Mission in Rwanda
ULIMO-J	United Liberia Movement of Johnson
ULIMO-K	United Liberian Movement for Koromah
UNAR	Union de Nationale du Rwanda
UNHRC	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
NUTIA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission for Uganda and Rwanda

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ABSTRACT

Rebellion and diplomacy have played considerable roles in international politics in the   last two decades. Both phenomena, however, have failed to resolve many crises and conflict of interests that have plagued the African continent. Studies have been done on the causes and effects of these conflicts. However, substantial attention has not been paid to the centrality of diplomacy in the conflict processes. By drawing the contours of successes and failures of diplomacy, this study investigated the consequences, challenges and effects of diplomacy in the Rwandan conflict, one of the deadliest conflicts in Africa.

The study utilized both primary and secondary data. Survey method, in-depth interviews and Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) were utilized to source primary data. These include: 146 unstructured key informant interviews with 14 academic staff of the National University of Rwanda (NUR), two staffers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), four journalists, four members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), seven members of the Association of Widows and Victims of Genocide amongst Women (AVEGA), 14 genocide site guides, nine Gacaca members and four war crime prisoners. Eleven FGDs involving undergraduate and postgraduate students of NUR were also conducted. Secondary data were drawn from library and archival documents. The study employed a descriptive and content analysis approach.

Ethics of humanitarian intervention was a major factor that made decisive action slow, or impossible in emergency situations by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Similar provisions in the OAU charter principles made the organisation incapable of effectively dealing with ethno-chauvinistic conflicts. Focus Groups Discussions emphasized competing and incompatible goals and exercise of state power as sources of many conflicts in Africa. Rebel movements emerged where democratic processes failed, leading to civil wars and genocides. The growing number of these crises, conflicts and civil wars therefore, led to the increasing demand for new conflict resolutions, transformations, and post-conflict reconciliatory initiatives that require direct intervention beyond the purview of the O.A.U charter. Such interventions require defining, acceptable and workable power sharing arrangements. In the specific case of Rwanda, these requirements were complicated by neo-colonial manipulations, inciting ethnic hatred and genocide. Thus, the failures of African and international diplomacy were central to the occurrence of genocide and its devastating effects in Rwanda. These failures were repeated in the post-conflict reconstruction process, where political intrigues and diplomatic inconsistencies in the workings of ICTR prolonged the process of healing and reconciliation amongst the people.

The Rwandan case revealed how rebellion could degenerate into genocide in a divided society, where leadership is overwhelmed by sectarian struggles. Effective diplomacy will require a larger regional framework of conflict management that affords the opportunity for quick intervention. African leaders within the framework of African Union (AU) should encourage their peers to respect the sanctity of human life, and its centrality to development and governance, by creating an effective mechanism for solving conflicts in Africa. The proposed AU standby force needs to be established and strengthened, to encourage diplomatic methods of negotiation and compromise in order to prevent a quick recourse to violence by opposition forces.

Word Count: 485
Keywords: Rebellion, Diplomacy, Ethnic hatred, Conflict resolution, Genocide, Small State

<div align="center">**CHAPTER ONE**</div>

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins with the general background and statement of the research problem, research objectives, significance of the study, theoretical framework of analysis, scope and methods of study, among others. It dwells mostly on the factors responsible for the outbreak of conflicts in Africa. The chapter avers that frustration, deprivation and age-long subjugation can make people, groups and individuals aggressively inclined in their actions and expressions. It explains that while conflict is inevitable and a necessary evil in every human society, not all conflicts are desirable, even when the eventual outcome is.

1:1   GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Since the 1970s, Africa has witnessed many of the world's most deadly conflicts. At a point in time, there were wars in seven African states namely, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 lives were lost either directly through battlefield clashes or indirectly through war-induced famine and diseases (Berry, 1995:48).

In the last two decades, conflicts and wars in Africa have been fought primarily within states by rebels and national armies, with the victims being predominantly civilians and vulnerable groups in the society. These rebels, militia groups and state armies use various acts of terror such as rape, looting, and massacre as part of their war and military strategies. It is a situation characterised by mass killings and ethnic cleansing, which the actors regarded as the inevitable consequences of war, rebellion and conflict (Rupesinghe, 1998).

The conventional wisdom is that the Cold War was characterised by a new generation of conflicts: internally rather than internationally driven; and, by ethnic and communal differences, rather than by political ideology. These have been accomplished with unprecedented levels of brutality in Africa. The continent of Africa has had its own numerous problems, which included rebellion, political instability, religious fanaticism, economic recession, mass poverty and civil wars (Lund, 1996:4-6). All these have led to large scale refugee over-flow, and international migration.

The Burundi and Liberia civil wars took between 100,000 and 500,000 lives each (Gott, 1998). From 1995 onwards, there were ongoing wars in Angola,   Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Sudan, among others. Several other countries that were prone to severe crises or civil cum political instability, at one time or the other were Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo and Congo DR (then known as Zaire). In some other countries, however, low-level ethnic and political conflicts remained contained in such countries as Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. According to Stedman (2004:237), as at 1996, an estimated 19 major internal conflicts were fought worldwide. Added to this are a further 42 lower intensity wars and 74 lethal violent political conflicts experienced in different parts of the world within this period. A close review of the period under study clearly shows that Africa, with 13 conflicts at home, is ranked amongst the highest in the number of distribution of the world's conflicts and crises. Berridge (1997) observed that these crises were escalated by foreign friends or foes alike, who, in the midst of such crisis, usually concealed their real intentions and hid under the canopy of providing assistance in terms of funds and advice, to pursue their national or selfish interests.

Rebellion is not new to sub-Saharan Africa. Arney (1997) asserted that many of the nationalist movements that achieved independence from colonial rule in the late 1950s and early 1960s had their roots in violent revolts. These included the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya, the revolt spearheaded by the Nyabingi cult of South-Western Uganda, the Chilembwe revolt in Nyansaland, and the Gusii rebellion in Kenya. Historically, other notable rebellions in Africa before the modern day rebellions were the Sudanese Mahdiya revolt between 1880 and 1890, the Zulu disturbances in Natal, between 1905 and 1909, the Maji Maji revolt in Tanzania between 1905 and 1907 and the Congo rebellion of 1964(Rotberg, 1971). In the post-independence era, wars and rebellions have lingered on for more than three decades in many African states.   Most of these conflicts were attributed to the proliferation of weapons on the continent after the end of the Cold War. Old conflicts had been revived and new ones ignited, owing to greed and stagnation (Buckley, 1997). In the case of Rwanda, the conflict which later degenerated into genocide in 1994 had been an age - long ethno-political feud that could be traced to the 1895

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conflict between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. This began from the period of colonization up to the build - up of mutual extermination in 1994.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Rwandan conflict, an established age long feud, was as a result of colonization, which spanned several decades. It was an outburst of colonial imposition of indirect rule on people who share a common culture and language.

Thus, Melvern (2000:6-8) revealed that the Europeans who came to Rwanda in 1894 met a unique race of people: the Batwas, Bahutus, and Batutsis, who shared the same culture, heritage, language, identity and belief. They also inter- married and lived as one people. However, the divide and rule policy of the Germans and the Belgians who later took over the territory from the Germans, in 1923, as a mandate/trusteeship territory of the League/UN, sowed the seed of discord between the two groups. The policy of divide and rule was a scheme that was meant to maintain an exploitative strategy, which destroyed the feelings of oneness amongst the people.

According to Keane (1996:16) the Tutsis who were in the minority were seen as suitable partners, perfect in the exploitation of Rwanda, owing to their cooperation, intelligence, willingness and compliance. Their behaviour was adjudged the best among the three ethnic groups of Rwanda, as they were also ready and more interested in preserving the privilege and material wealth than in any question of national identity. The Tutsis were given extended powers over the lives of the Hutu. Being the favourite of the colonial rulers, the Tutsis, who had served the Belgian colonial purpose well, looked forward to independence as potential rulers of the future independent Rwanda. Tutsi domination had been propped up by Belgians' support (Nyankanzi, 1998:7-13).Given the large size of the Hutu population of about 85%, it was clear that a free and fair election would mean the end of Tutsi rule. Thus, Hutus constituted an easy majority of the largely Tutsi-dominated National Rwandaise Union (UNAR).

Under Belgian preferential treatment for the Tutsis, the Hutus, according to Keane (1996), were not only a downgraded peasantry, but also a sub class of citizens, who were only good at working for the Tutsis. An early Belgian scholar, Speke (1950) described the

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Hutus as "creatures with souls, sad and passive, ignoring all thoughts for tomorrow". These were people who regarded their Tutsi overlords as demi-gods'. The Belgian policy and public utterances by colonial authorities portrayed the Hutu peasant majority as being in no way suitable partners in the exploitation of Rwanda. By contrast, the Tutsis, with their elitist background, were a minority who had every interest in keeping the country under their dominion. Thus, with the imposition of forced labour the Belgians saw the Tutsis as perfect partners in the exploitation of the populace who were mostly Hutu.

Politics, in post-independence Rwanda, became "a violent zero-sum game in which the winner took all" (Keane, 1996:23). However, virtually all those who controlled the state before 1959 were Tutsi kings, chiefs, the sub-chiefs, among others. This situation inflamed ethnic consciousness in Rwanda. To overturn this trend of marginalization, an appeal for Hutu solidarity became, for Hutu leaders, the most effective rallying point for revolutionary activities. In the struggle for power in Rwanda between the traditional monarch (the Tutsi led king), who was abandoned by both the colonial power and its former ally and was defeated. The Hutu ethnic majority used their size to mobilize and manipulate ethnic identity as a salient tool of protesting against suppression and oppression, thereby making the Rwandan polity more highly tensed and complex. The Tutsi before now dominated the government and was overthron after the murber of Umwami Rudahigwa-KingMutara III, in a Burundi hospital on 3rd November, 1959.

The King was allegedly murdered by a Belgian medical doctor's poisonous injection (Nyankanzi, 1998:8). In the midst of this confusion, PARMEHUTU – the Party for the Movement of the Emancipation of the Hutus, led a rebellion against the Tutsi government in what was called the Social Revolution. Tutsis were killed in their thousands, with over 700,000 of them forced into exile. This heinous act was repeated in 1963 and 1973 respectively (*Gizosi Jenoside Magazine*, 2004:12-14). At that period, the emerging Hutu political elite appealed for a common Hutu-ness among the underprivileged to challenge the indigenous leadership, compete for the vacant seats and redress historical injustices. They were also indoctrinated into seeing the Tutsis as the root of all their problems. Thus, throughout this period, the ethnic confrontation between the Hutus and Tutsis did not only persist but continued to escalate with many Tutsis killed or expelled from Rwanda.

Although, the Hutus could and apparently did distinguish themselves among the Tutsis of different types and attitudes, the fact had remained that the chiefs and other African agents of the state were seen as exploiters, and they were virtually all Tutsis. It is this condition that made the appeal for ethnic solidarity potent, as a class appeal would have been less effective. It is true that the colonial policies gave the Hutus an inferior status to the extent that even the poor Tutsis did not experience quite the same form of discrimination, frustration and depression; as did those classified as Hutus (Keane, 1996:18) and (Mamdani, 2001:46), but the same colonial reversion of policies did not equally asked them to kill their neighbours as a way of perpetual vengeance to the political impasse and disagreement.Thus, it is the continuity of the act that helped to sow age-long hatred, which became the catalyst for the 1994 genocide taken by the Hutu to exterminate the Tutsis.

1.3   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The following are the objectives of the study:

To investigate the Rwandan crisis and the role of international diplomacy in its management;

1.   To explain the causes of the crisis and the series of interventions recorded;

2.   To examine the factors that made preventive diplomacy impossible in the Rwandan crisis and proffer new insights into how to encourage that in future.

3.   To evaluates the general implications of the possible failure of International diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis; and

4.   To examine the basis for the disparity and treatment of Small States' in the International system.

1.4   RESEARCH QUESTIONS

i.   How effective was diplomacy in resolving the Rwandan conflict?

ii.   What theoretical forces contributed to the festering crisis?

iii.   Why was rebellion an option to the Rwandan crisis?

iv.   What are the envisaged implications of the Gacaca mode of conflict resolutions to the justice system and the reconciliation process of the new Rwandan government?

v.   What effort is being made to ensure a more inclusive Rwanda?

vi.   How can peace, democracy and development be sustained in Rwanda within the contextof diplomacy?

vii.   Why was the kind of diplomacy in Rwanda part of the problem that allowed crime against humanity to be made possible?

viii.   What is the basis for the treatment of Small States' in the International System?

ix.   What are the general implications of the failed International Diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis?

1.5   SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is significant for various reasons. It provides the context to understand how inter-ethnic frictions could snowball into genocide. In the same vein, the likelihood of the Rwandan crisis replicating itself in many African states remains a focus of further analysis. The issue of consistent and continuous rebellion in African politics and governance deserves a thorough review within the context of the different forms and kinds of governance and diplomacy in practice. The thorough examination of the place of diplomacy will not only help in creating new grounds for conflict management, it will also enhance the quality of governance in the contemporary era.

The choice of the Rwandan crisis as our focus amongst all other conflicts in the Great Lakes Region is as result of the fact that the Rwandan crisis stimulated several other crises in the region. Since 1959, the exiled Rwandan (Tutsi) refugees have always been ready tools of violence within and outside the region. Practical examples are the Ugandan war of 1986, the Burundi crisis of 1991, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) civil war between 1996 to 1997. Between 1959 and the late 1990s, Rwandan refugees created Africa's largest refugee problem. Adisa (1996:11) posits that this movement of refugees from Rwanda into the neighbouring states which had been coping with influx of refugees into the Great Lakes Region of East and Central African states had also ignited several inter-ethnic hostilities within Rwanda for more than three decades. Thus, if the root causes of conflict are nipped in the bud, peace in that region would not only be considerably assured but also the diplomatic resolutions and efforts against all contending forces in that region will be considered successful.

Significantly, Rwanda also plays a central role in the politics of the Great Lakes Region following a common history based on the co-existence between agriculturalists and pastoralists. Prior to state formations and development of the region under several divided lineages and extended family cleavages, the Kitara, Kintu, Rihindu and Rwanda were connected. Connection in this respect means that the multi-ethnic nature of the region and the confluence of cultural traditions are interconnected and merged into a general history of the region. Owing to this singular relationship, Rwanda shares the most interesting legacy of history in the region. This is because the people who speak Banyarwanda, which means people who speak the language of Rwanda "Kinyanwanda" are spread all over Rwanda, Uganda, DR Congo, Tanzania and Burundi, thereby making any little problems to have a spillover effect on all. It is this interconnectedness that had also helped in many respects to accentuate the complexities of the Rwandan crisis and that of the Great Lakes Region problems. This is to the extent that a problem or conflict in one state usually affects the other member states of the region.

We posit in this study, that the levity in the treatment of the 1959, 1963, 1973 and 1990 crises led to the 1994 conflict. This study is of the view that adherence to early warnings on crises must be taken seriously, not only in the Great Lakes Region but also in other parts of Africa with similar socio political and cultural issues that can cause political, social and economic instability.

This study closes the gap in literatures on the issues of preventive measures to conflicts, and diplomatic policy lapses inherent in the UN Security Council/African Union interventions mechanism.

1:6 HYPOTHESES

The following are the working hypotheses of this study:

i.   That ethnicization of political power helped to deepen ethnic hatred in Rwanda.

ii.   That diplomatic initiatives in terms of complex exigencies were largely motivated by national interests.

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iii.   That the lapses inherent in the international diplomatic order, especially as was in the case of Rwanda, largely accounted for the occurrence of genocide.

iv.   That the disparity in the treatment of Small States' in the International diplomacy might have provided the contour that led to the abandonment of Rwanda in the 1994 war/genocide.

1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research used both primary and secondary data. The primary data was sourced through in-depth interview method where oral interview were conducted. The interviews were based on unstructured questions. The choice of the unstructured method is based on its flexibility: it allows cordial relationship and interaction between the investigator and the people. Those interviewed included the survivors of the Rwandan war/genocide, especially members of the AVEGA – a women's group made up of people living with HIV/AIDS, contracted during the genocide; orphans, local NGOs such as Duhozanye Save, Association Kemit, Clinque Juridique, Association Chandelle, KCTS group and Cenx of Children's League and several prison inmates. Staff of international agencies such as the International Red Cross Society, the UNHCR and the UN that provided skeletal services in some of the refugee camps at Byumba, Kajemba, Butare and Ruhengeri were also interviewed.

Interviews were also conducted with selected members of the academia at the National University of Rwanda, members of peace and conflicts resolution management centre at Rectorate in Butare and Kigali. International journalists, ICTR staff, lawyers, mediators, and genocide sites' attendants were also interviewed. These genocide sites included those at Murambi, Gikongoro, Nyamata Bugesera, Gizosi memorial centre in Kigali, National University genocide site in Butare, Bisesero genocide site in Kibuye, Nyarubuye genocide site in Kibungo, Ntarama genocide site in Bugesera and Rusatira genocide site in Butare.

Five focus group discussions were held with undergraduate students of political science and public administration and six FDGs composed of masters and higher degree students of the same department and some law students were held also. The secondary

sources of data collection comprise materials from the World Wide Web and archival library methods. Documents were sourced from several libraries located in Butare, Gitarama, Kigali, Gisenyi and Byumba. Artifacts and weapons at the National Museum at Karubanda were also inspected. All these provided invaluable information on Rwandan culture, customs and legends.

1.7.1. Study Location and Sites

The study was undertaken in Rwanda. At Rwanda, the researcher conducted inquiry at Murambi in Ginkongoro, Karubanda, Rusatira and the National University of Rwanda in Butare,Nyamata andNtarama in Bugesera,Nyarubuye andByumba in Kajemba.

1.7.2. Study Population

The study covers the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa population. It examines their age − long feud and the issue of power struggle and leadership problems. It also discusses the kind of diplomacy played within these periods.

1.7.3. Sample and Sampling Produre

The researcher visited the study location in Rwanda.The researcher interviewed fourteen (14) academic staff of the National University of Rwanda (NUR), two staffers of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), four journalist, four members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), seven members of the Association of Widows and Victims of Genocide amongst Women (AVEGA), fourteen (14) genocide site guides, nine Gacaca members and four prisoners.

1.7.4 Focus Group Discussion

The fous group discussion was conducted amongst the students of the National University of Rwanda. This was made up of M.Sc. and MPA students of the Political Science and Public Administration and the undergraduate students of the same department and the Department of Law. The study group discussions were carried out in six(6) and five (5) sections of Seven (7) and Eight (8) groups respectively in each sitting amongst the

above mentioned. In selecting the Focus Group Discussion the followings are however considered:

i.   participants mustbe member of the study group;

ii.   Participants must be member of neighbouring group to the study group;

iii.   Participants must be male and female between the ages of 18 and 70 years;

iv.   Participants must have participated in at least one of the encounter involving the study group; and

v.   If not, participants must have witnessed at least two of such incidents.

1.8.   SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study covers the period from 1959 to 1994, with emphasis on the Rwandan crisis that culminated in the genocide of 1994. Rwanda is one of the countries of the Great Lakes Region found in the East African sub-region of the continent. Rwanda is an landlocked state with many hills and mountains ranges that deny the people the much needed arable land for farming.

1.9 LIMITATION OF STUDY

One of the challenges of this study is the inability of the researcher to have unhindered access to most of the war and genocide survivors. There was also the inability of the researcher to confirm some of the stories and past events about Rwanda due to the fact that most of the old and elderly men were dead as a result of the 1994 war and genocide.

Secondly, most of the literatures used were recent and produced after the genocide in 1994, whereas the Rwandan crisis had been on for about a century. This is due to the fact that indigenous materials that could have served as sources of information were destroyed during the war.

Furthermore, because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, the information elicited from the classroom FGDs was not as deeply-rooted as those obtained through

interviews. The element of suspicion and fear amongst the FGDs was noticeable. Despite these limitations, the study was able to fulfill the set objectives.

1.10. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The work is divided into six chapters.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Chapter one examines the general background and statement of the research problem, research objective, significance of study, theoretical framework of analysis, scope and methods of the study. Four (4) hypotheses were adopted as a guide to the research endeavour.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURES

This chapter focuses on the review of related scholarly literatures. It is sub-divided into three segments for easy comprehension and coherence.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS

Chapter three examines the origin and causes of the crisis in Rwanda. It also explains how the people moved from social group to ethnic identity which later affected their social relations and co-existence. Poor leadership, poverty and bad economy leading to crisis, were also examined. The activities of different rebel groups that arouse at separate stages were considered.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ANALYSIS OF THE DIPLOMACY OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS

This Chapter considers the role of diplomacy in the Rwandan politics and government before the war and genocide. The interplay of national interests' diplomacy is also evaluated. The chapter also analyzes the role of humanitarian intervention and diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis. African diplomacy in Rwanda is also considered.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE INTERFACE OF GENOCIDE AND DIPLOMACY IN TH ERWANDAN CRISIS

Chapter five looks at the implications and effects of rebellion in the Rwandan crisis. The roles of the UN, OAU/AU and other nations were discussed under the kind of diplomacy that was displayed after the war and genocide in Rwanda. The place of small states diplomacy in the international system and the treatment of small states that do not belong to any of the world's power blocs, strategic interest as observed in the Rwandan crisis was also examied. The roles of ethnic groups and the diplomacy of ICTR and Gacaca are duly examined.

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Chapter six discusses the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

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CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURES

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the review of related scholarly literatures. It is subdivided into three segments for easy comprehension and coherence. It examines diplomacy, its role and manner of application in international conflicts. It also examines in detail how frustration, deprivation, neglect, abandonment, aggressive tendencies, suppression and depression cause conflicts with the attendant diplomatic intrigues. It views incompetence, greed and corruption in leadership in the midst of weak diplomacy as some of the major problems facilitating conflicts in Africa.

Diplomacy combined with politics of ethnicity is employed by several leaders to cause disaffection among their citizens while appropriating the wealth of the land in connivance with cronies and allies. In the aspect of diplomacy and conflict in Africa, there is a systematic idea of violence hinged on power struggle and power sharing amongst nationals. This could be seen emanating from the betrayal of trust and lack of understanding between the rulers and followers. This also led to the fractionalization of the conflict with several rebel or militia groups emerging out of the crisis. The resultant power struggle being war of who dominates which is determined on the battlefield against contradictory diplomacy.

The Great Lakes Region conflicts, which has spanned several decades has made the region an African nightmare. Central to this history of upheavals are the Bayanmulenge Tutsi, Bakiga, Barundi and Bayankoles tribes. The conflicts in this region has not only affected Rwanda greatly but had propped up a danger signal that had kept the African politics, its stability and diplomacy on the check. Premised on this, the three segments that will be examined are:

- ❖ Diplomacy

- ❖ Diplomacy and conflicts: a global overview;

- ❖ Diplomacy and conflicts in Africa.

2:1 DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy has been defined in different ways by different people. Hamilton (1996:1-2) defines diplomacy as the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals or accredited agents. It is a process that is sometimes regarded as a necessary evil and at other times with a deep respect. Accepting this observation, Lund (1996) reiterated that diplomacy had played a more significant role in human affairs in the present than ever. Although as old as mankind, diplomacy according to Richard and Hamilton (1996) had made the necessity for organized dialogue in an era when the relative certainties of a bipolar states system have so recently given way to a disorderly, confused multipolarity, as witnessed in the frenetic pace of contemporary diplomatic activities.

In another dimension, diplomacy according to Wolton (1954:12) is an honest person (an ambassador) sent to lie abroad for the good of his or her country. To McDermott (1976), diplomacy is concerned with the management of international relations. This is because diplomacy deals with tact, skill and cunning to achieve a set of goals. In the practice of diplomacy, these three aforementioned factors are utilized exhaustively depending on the national interest of the actor. Thus, its application in the old was seen as a necessary evil because then, it was agreed that it was better to hear the message than to kill the messenger. This acceptance in the classical Greek philosophical doctrine, gave rise to the first tenet of diplomacy which is the principle of diplomatic immunity.

According to Alken (2005:3) the political scheming and intrigues are well sustained in the political disagreement and agreement when the level of diplomacy employed becomes successful; meaning that diplomacy helps to bring systematic skill to apply on the negotiations or dialoguing of issues in most political spheres. Strang (in Hamilton, 1996: 3) observes that in a world where war is everybody's tragedy and everybody's nightmare, diplomacy is everybody's business. Consequent upon the collapse of long – established hegemonies and the re-emergence of long neglected enmities, the art of diplomacy has placed a high premium on the work of those skilled mediators, negotiators and representatives.

In support of this, Calhammer (1999:16) opines that diplomacy is a game about social interaction amongst actors for the interest of the state. State: a-sum zero – sum,

town-based, strategy war game that is played by actors, each taking its own role. Therefore, in collating the views of the scholars above, particularly in the assertion of Wolton, in terms of practice of diplomacy as observed in the Ancient Byzantine empire, Hamilton (1996:15-17) reveales:

> that in the late tenth Century, during the visit of envoys of Prince Vladimir of Russia to Byzantine, they seemed to behold amid wreaths of incense and the radiance of candle young men, wonderfully arrayed, floating in the air above the heads of the priests and singing in triumph, "Holy, Holy, Holy is the eternal

In explaining the motion on the air to the envoy:

> the Emperor noted that if you were not ignorant of the Christain mysteries, you would know that the Angels of God themselves come down from heaven to celebrate the office with our priest.

It is comparatively easy to understand what an irresistible effect this would likely have and did have, on the visiting dignitaries and those who might have had the intention of attacking or engaging the empire in war and how it was achieved because of this diplomacy at work. In another instance, the Byzantine Emperor in carrying out her state functions, especially on the issue of foreign relations, had in Code 515, empowered and ordered the Emperor to lie and to violate his oath if it was necessary to do so for the well-being of the empire. This implies that in diplomacy, if it means to tell a lie to save the state, one should not hesistate to do so (Hamilton, 1996).

Agreeing with the above contention, Stinnett (2005:26) reiterated that diplomacy has a chequered history. It is the practice of verbal discussion with the intent to influence, transmit a position or negotiate on a given issue or situation for a mutually acceptable outcome. Diplomacy is an art because it requires a unique mixture of empathy, persuasion, bluster, cajoling, amongst other things (Goldberg, 2005:6). Diplomacy has traditionally been a method of conducting inter-state relations, involving discussion and dialogue between heads of state or their representatives in order to advance national interests. In the words of Brahm (2005) diplomacy, broadly speaking, involves efforts to keep channels of communication open between different sides in a dispute in the hope that tension can be diffused and violence averted. Agreeing with all the aforementioned views about diplomacy, Shultz (2005) aptly noted that in modern diplomacy, that there are many complicated roles and intrigues

withwhich intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations are involved in. However, the globalization of communication and transportationhas helped to open up new avenues for the conduct of diplomacy, thereby helping new participants gets involved. This is because diplomacy is to do and say the nastiest thing in the nicest way (Goldberg, 2005).

Emanating from the various definitions of diplomacy given above, several types of diplomacy, include economic diplomacy, multitrack diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, panda diplomacy, ping pong diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, small state diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, appeasement diplomacy amongst others.

There are also processes through which diplomacy works. These according to Zartman (2007), include negotiation, mediation, reconciliation, reporting and representation which help to quicken the workings of diplomacy. Meanwhile, against the conditions of the events that informed the topic under study, beginning from 1990 to 1994, that is, from the period of the build-up of the crisis to the period of conflict escalation in Rwanda, scholars have argued in respect of the application of any of the three – preventive diplomacy, small state diplomacy and coercive diplomacy. As they affect the Rwandan crisis on the success or failure of the practice, taking into cognisance the fact that diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiation among representatives of groups or states towards peace-making and mutual acceptance of solutions to the common challenge. Premised on this, the work in consideration of the Rwandan crisis, will examine the above-mentioned three diplomacy types to further the course of the literatures of this study.

a. Preventive Diplomacy

In this sub-section, scholars were critical of what preventive diplomacy is, what constitutes it, how it is applied and where, if possible, had it been successfully utilized or otherwise. Thus, Calhill (2000:37) observed that the essence of preventive diplomacy is not only to employ tact during dialogue among the conflicting parties but the act of employing persuasion to stop conflicts or wars before they start or escalate. This according to him, is because lives are more saved and protected than when the battle or conflict escalates to destroy more than imagined. According to (2007) preventive diplomacy focuses on negotiation as practiced in different issue areas, in the

belief that if only the differences as well as similarities among issues are recognized, can the efforts benefit all concerned. He situated his arguments basically on the process of preventing conflict from happening and not simply on the outcome but the way in which tools are and can be used to achieve outcome.

Agreeing with the scholar's assertions as above, Lund (1996:11) argue that preventive diplomacy is the international movement toward responding to early warnings of conflict and attempting preventive measures before it escalates to severely violent levels. To him, this includes knowing the root cause of the conflict and the use of dialogue to solve differences before any escalation. He further posits that more systematic measures of global preventive regime should be applied to include one that draws on the strengths of the individual states, the United Nations, regional organizations and NGOs, among others. Accepting the emphasis on preventive diplomacy and its measures to conflict prevention and possible escalation, Touval (1996) queries the reasons for the failure of diplomatic attempts to prevent war and maintain a unified Yugoslavia instead of allowing its disintegration. He believes that preventive diplomacy lacks clarity and credibility owing to the lapses in the former. Disagreeing with Touval, Cohen (1997:23-39) argues that cross-cultural differences have significant effects on preventing crisis and diplomatic negotiations. Yugoslavia was an example of failed diplomacy because there was failure to understand and appreciate these differences. These differences were instrumental, with serious consequences on the process to attain preventive measures in the former, which was never realised. Meaning that, for preventive diplomacy not to lack clarity and purpose, then the content, process and style of negotiation must go hand in hand with the cultural differences.

However, with regards to the Rwandan crisis, Lund (1996) contends that one of the major reasons why preventive diplomacy was somehow ignored in the 1990s was due to the complexity of the problems and the multiplicity of conflicts going on at the same time. Even then, since the end of the cold war and the end of the Rwandan crisis, the international community, through international institutions, has been focusing on preventive diplomacy and check on arms proliferation in conflict zones, given the fact that the Rwandan crisis caught everybody napping.

Against the backdrop of the above notion and with the event catching everybody unawares, Dallaire (2003) disagreed and argued that preventive diplomacy was the best method needed to avert the Rwandan holocaust but it was not there. To him, the failure could be located in the lack of the major characteristics of preventive diplomacy, such as adhering to early warnings that the risk of conflict existed, the causes and the nature of the potential conflict being identified and the consent of the parties within the jurisdiction to which preventive action is to be taken. This stems from the fact that the prevention, control and resolution of a conflict is like the prevention, control and curing of a disease. If treatment is prescribed at the wrong moment in the evolution of a disease, the patient's condition does not improve and the credibility of both the treatment and the physician who prescribed it is compromised.

Supporting Dallaire's analogy, Nye (2008) posits that the element of timing is also crucial. The potential conflict should be ripe for the proposed preventive action. This assumption, in both conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, is that intractable conflicts are easier to avoid before they happen rather than being fixed once they have occurred. There is a great deal of truth in this assumption, although some conflicts are likely to be unavoidable. A fundamental assumption of constructive confrontation is that the destructive nature of conflicts is largely avoidable. Thus, an incremental approach to preventive diplomacy must be encouraged.

In view of the reasoning that preventive diplomacy is usually used in the international arena and that it refers to efforts of outside nations or groups of nations collaborating to prevent the escalation of conflicts between or within other nations, Perry (2001) has argued that conflict prevention is the best approach to managing conflicts. To Groff and Smoker (2005:78), preventive diplomacy is the action to prevent disputes from arising among parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. These preventive measures include early warning, fact – finding, early deployment to demilitarized zones and confidence-building measures. Accepting the assertions above, Ghali (2002) noted that preventive diplomacy has had a long and instrumental role in international relations. World leaders and foreign policy experts have recognisd it as one of the most powerful alternatives to armed conflict as it is essential in averting globally catastrophic wars and other forms of violence.

However, while the view of Ghali above may be accepted, what happened in Rwanda and its abandonment by the world community in the first one hundred days of the conflict remain antithetical to the above and a poser yet to be addressed by those responsible for protecting lives then. Moreover, while the UN role in the first hundred days was generally criticized and condemned, Hobert (2008) also extolled the role of the UN and the use of preventive diplomacy by her peace-keeping mission in Macedonia between 1995 and 1999. He noted that it was the first time the UN would adopt such a measure.

Reychler (2000) disagrees with the argument that preventive diplomacy was absent in Rwanda. He notes that track one of the preventive diplomacy process was duly applied at Arusha, Tanzania. In the field of preventive diplomacy, track one which is the formal negotiation between official representatives of the parties involved was carried out until the breakdown of peace in April 1994.

However, Nye (2008), reasoning from the Reychler standpoint, argued that if track one of preventive diplomacy was applied in Rwanda and it failed, then, should one accept the fact that the lapses may be located on small states diplomacy incapacitation?

b. Small State Diplomacy

According to Shultz (2005:43), the issue of small state diplomacy could be viewed from two angles: one, the small states are always at the receiving end of every event in the international system, whether positively or negatively motivated. This is one of the reasons why small states diplomacy has been receiving an increasing attention in international relations in recent times. Two, small states lack developments that are determined beyond their borders such as climate change, water, security and shifts in global economy; hence, it is through diplomacy that they can address their desires to attain expected goals, as it is obvious that with the absence of these factors the small states have strong incentives to support international cooperations.

Corgan (2008) argues that when a small state takes up a task that is above its strength, even if that small state were to devote its entire diplomatic service to the project, only half the required task could be completed. This is the sort of problem that any small state faces in dealing with global politics. In another vein, Clark (1999:25)

posits that small states could not have the impact that the great powers do have; they could not do more than mere service. Given the right circumstances, they could prevail against far larger powers and could even have palpable influence on the world stage. In support of this notion (Corgan, 2008) further notes that the more adept small states manage to join bodies, regional or global, and manoeuvre to promote their interests within frameworks established by and for larger powers, the more they are reckoned with in terms of needs and stress. This means that, in modern times, some small states, notably Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and Finland, amongst others had shown how a focused and well – informed diplomacy could produce remarkable results, especially when vital economies or security are involved in the interactions.

In addition to the above view, Sperling (1999:17) avers that when a small state is in trouble, the urge to help such a state is quickened when it is realized that such a state belongs to the same alliance with the great powers. The hope of rescue depends on how cooperative the small state is to global issues. Citing a recent instance, Corgan (2002) noted that the general response to the Kuwait invasion in 1991 was successful because of Kuwait's relationship with global and powerful countries in the comity of nations. He further noted that small states cannot work miracles in a globalised world still dominated by great powers. What has given small states their occasional successes against the agendas of larger states is the concentration of thier limited resources in the most critical arenas, the ability to focus on key goals and an exquisite sense of when to act.

Henrikson (2006) notes that small states are viable and active partners within the international community. A common characteristic of small states in the thrust and nature of their diplomacy, which puts high premium on persuasion and consensus building rather than power play in the conduct of international relations. In the view of Payne (2004:63) small states are highly dependent on development beyond their own borders. For example, in the environmental field, small states are highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of natural disasters. On security, small states are quickly and deeply affected by regional and global conflicts and instabilities, ranging from small arms trafficking, ethnic violence, and annihilations to the impact of kidnapping and terrorism. It is these factors that make small states natural supporters of international cooperation. Diplomacy is the main vehicle which gives small states a voice in the global arena to ensure that common goals, issues and problems are properly addressed

for large and small, developed and developing countries alike. In examing the condition of things in Africa, most especially in Eastern Africa, Annan (2004) is of the view that the places inhabited by peoples of the small states are the frontline zone where, in concentrated form, many of the main problems of environment and development are unfolding. Nations, large and small, have equal rights. For small states, the actual realization of equality increasingly may depend on the well organized and active diplomacy of theirs in relation to others, whether large or otherwise.

In this regard, Otennu (1998) aptly states that one of the problems of Rwanda in the dark days of her trouble was the limited resources at her disposal. This was among the reasons why Rwanda could not conduct effective diplomacy that posed a great challenge to her in the days leading to the genocide, a factor which made her fall an easy prey to the several kinds of diplomacy that were dictated from outside. Accepting this assertion, Dallaire (2003) still went ahead to query the great powers; saying, should we agree that the previous cooperative nature of small states diplomacy has been eroded by the heated competition in an increasingly globalised world, thereby making vulnerable states like Rwanda to be abandoned and betrayed in the days of the war/genocide in her domain or should we accept the exacerbated differences amongst small states as a reason for not attending to the Rwandan crisis? This is because while increasing competition is resulting in the successful growth of some small states which exercise effective multilateralism and creativity; and perhaps, somewhat unconventional economic policies, others seem to be left behind, Rwanda inclusive.

Against the backdrop of the fact that Rwanda was among the small states left behind in her days of trouble due to its incapacitation and inability to fend for itself, could it be agreed that this abandonment might have compelled her, owing to different interests, to yield to some element of coercive diplomacy as observed amongst querreling parties to the Rwandan crisis? And, how could a small state like Rwanda employ diplomacy to help build stability which is vital for her own existence when there were several interests attached to the political conflict?

c. Coercive Diplomacy

Going by the manner through which preventive diplomacy and small states diplomacy were examined in the preceding sub-sections, it is imperative for us to consider the act of coercive fact that coercive diplomacy has something to do with the

issue or approach which had been employed in the process leading to the Rwandan war/genocide. In the course of this review, scholars, apart from offering definitions, also went ahead to explain to what extent such could be employed in conflict situations. Thus, emphasis is also placed on the conflict between the Rwandan government and the opposition towards achieving or failing to achieve their aspirations.

According to (2000), coercive diplomacy is the attempt to get achieving their aspiration a target, a state, a group within a state or non-state actor – to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force. Coercive diplomacy presupposes the use of threat or military force to achieve political objectives. Thus, Otennu (1998:99), in agreeing with the above-held view noted that coercive diplomacy is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force. If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion as adopted by RPF against the Rwandan government in the 1990s, it is employed in an exemplary manner, in the form of quite limited military action, to demonstrate a resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action, if necessary.

In support of the above contention, Byman (2008) asserted that coercive diplomacy is a political diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force and if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discreet and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favourable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation. In the same vein, Waxman (2008) defined coercive diplomacy as getting the adversary to act in a certain way via anything short of the use of brute force. The adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence, but choose not to exercise it. George (1994), while agreeing with all the contentions on coercive diplomacy, aptly posited that coercive diplomacy seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal; second, it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken and third, it may persuade an adversary to make fundamental changes in its government. He further stated that when constructing a coercive diplomactic strategy, policy makers must consider certain variables of what to

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demand from the opponent, whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand(s), whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand(s).

Art and Cronin (2003) observe that in the 1990 - 1991 Gulf war, the USA applied coercive diplomacy but it failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to exit Kuwait and the result was the use of total force on the former. Another instance of coercive diplomacy was the Cuban missile crisis between the USA and the former USSR in 1962 in which Kennedy used coercive diplomacy to blockade the USSR Naval passage until the withdrawal of the missiles by the USSR, which was achieved instead of using total force against the USSR.

Otennu (1998) states that in Rwanda the RPF used coercive diplomacy from its military base at the Uganda/Rwanda border, to compel Habyarimana to accept negotiation as a way out of the Rwandan quagmire. Anyidoho (1998:2-3) posits that a guerrilla force of the RPF using limited force invaded Rwanda in 1990 after several years of persuading the government of Habyarimana to change policies on the treatment of the exiled and returnees, a plea that fell on deaf ears, thereby resulting in the RPF invasion of the country.

2:2. DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICTS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW

In this section, the literature review will be examined from two different perspectives rebellion and governance as well as diplomacy and governance. There will equally be sub-sections on each of the two angles to facilitate a quick and proper understanding of the points being made.

2:2.1. Rebellion and Governance

In general terms, human management is essential but at the same time very hard to manage under the context of governance. It is argued that the essence of governance is to do for the people what they cannot do for themselves (Nigro and Nigro, 1973). It is evidenced that the absence of or nonexistence of basic amenities such as water, road, electricity and so on might lead the state to a head on collision with the masses. This is a pointer to the fact that several governments strive to achieve to better the life of its citizenry, but where government fails or neglects its citizens and their problems, there

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remains the possibility of insurrection. Gurr (1974:3) avers that men do rebel; and to rebel according to him, is to refuse allegiance to or forcefully oppose an established, government or any ruling authority. He went further to observe that this is a phenomenon, which happen in a society or people who are long subjugated, deprived, oppressed, and or made to pass through frustration.

In support of this view, Pruitt and Rubin (1986:14) assert that conflict, especially rebellion, occurs wherever there is perceived divergence of interests or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously. In another dimension, (Gurr, 1974) state that men have rebelled against their rulers for millennia, and during those millennia many discerning observers have offered careful explanation on why they did so in particular and general instances. Hefurther noted that institutions, persons, and policies of rulers have inspired the violent reactions of their nominal subjects throughout the history of organized political life. In a cited instance, (Gurr, 1974:3-4) referred to the history of European states and empires, spanning over twenty-four centuries, with an average of only four peaceful years for each year of violent disturbances, just as it is in modern nations where between 1961 and 1968 some forms of violent civil conflicts reportedly occurred in 114 of the world's 121 larger nations and colonies. He further notes that ten of the world's thirteen most deadly conflicts in the past 160 years have been civil wars and rebellions.

Anatol (1970) opines that conflict is a theme that has occupied the thinking of man more than any other; hence, an enormous destruction of human lives usually follows every crisis. In the same vein, Luard (1992:45) observes that more often than not, the individuals who influence or determine the actions of states do so on the basis of social context, but do at times go out of the way to benefit themselves not the state. Hence, whether or not conflict within a state occurred, it was increasingly understood as it is necessarily dependent on the character of the institutions within which they had also organized themselves. Disagreeing with Luard, Waltz (1979:36) aptly notes that most conflicts are due to the nature of man's proud, power-crazy, irrational and vicious behavioural dispositions.

Going by the arguments of the scholars refered to above, it is easy to conclude that most conflicts within states are man-made. It is also pertinent to argue, according to Lata (1998:1-5), that most conflicts are the outcome of an existing imbalance of

social-economic status, religious, cultural, racial and gender differentiations within the context of scarce resources amongst the contesting units. This is a proof that conflits and problems surrounding power acquisition in the contemporary era had been sought and acquired. When this happens, the loser and the dissatisfied often resort to acts of rebellion. Buckley (1997:2), in observation of this, noted that it is likely that this is how people who are dissatisfied with their government are now going to solve their problems through rebellion. Besides, according to Laue (1981:14-17), conflict could be an escalated natural competition be it in an election, quest to govern the people and, or between two or more parties contesting for scarce resources, with expressed grievances, power and prestige. Premised on the above contentions, we shall look at conflict from the following perspectives:

(i) Orderly Conflict

Conflict or rebellion in many parts of the world had existed as an inevitable and necessary evil. It is thus reasonable to agree with the contention of Campbell (1996), who opined that no conflict could be solved without first understanding the root and the factors that engendered the issue. This is because conflict is usually born out of greed and jealousy, emanating from interpersonal, through intra-group to inter-group to intra-national and to international and so on. Gurr (1974:4), notes that conflict is the fundamental source of both innovation and destruction in human affairs, especially as it brings change at times and at some other times pains. Thus, conflict could equally be accepted to be orderly. Patchen (1988:11), in his view, observed that conflict is often useful as a way of forming artificial boundaries since nations have fought and died in defence of borders formerly regarded as only colonially imposed. Deutsch (1973:23) reiterated that conflicts have served many positive purposes such as preventing stagnation and stimulating interest and curiosity. They are the means through which problems can be aired and solutions sought. Conflicts are the root of change at the personal, group, national and international levels. In another inference, Gurr (1974), noted that political conflicts or rebellions could increase the sum total of the satisfaction of members of the society, especially if violence and its immediate effects are intrinsically valued more than the material and human resources it consumes. Violence should serve as a popularly approved regulatory function as it did for the American vigilante movement. This is because intense political violence may, in the

longrun, pay off either by stimulating rulers to increase outputs or by restructuring society in such a way that total satisfaction is substantially increased.

Newton – Standard (2000:47), in accepting the above view, posited that there is orderliness in conflicts, especially when the aims of the oppressed is achieved as a result of rebellion. She explained this while narrating the cause of Bacon's rebellion of 1676 against Sir William Berkeley of Virginia:

> *The governor, he was now-grown old in years term, reigning, sternad selfish as he had become, bending his wil only to the wishes of those he fonds of. Every inch a gallant soldier, every inch a gentleman, yet haughty, usympathetic and unlovable, narrow in mind and in heart, clinging desperately to oldworld tradition in a new country, eager to form tradition of his own, struggling blindly to rain the people under him to a habit of unquestioning obedience and submission to the powers that be, however arbitrary and oppressive…*

She further noted that in the Bacon rebellion, both the poor whites and blacks were united with a sense of purpose and direction. This was a great fear of the ruling class as the rebellion hastened the transition and reformation of the society (ibid). Recounting the gains of orderliness in conflict, Gurr (1974) posited that the great American revolution of 1776 against the British colonialists and the benefits of independence to the society gave the country the upper hand in all its endeavours to this day. Orderliness in conflicts enables the people to regain, and retain, amongst others, their freedom (Keen, 2000:25-27). In a similar vein and on the African soil (Rotberg 1971) observed that for sustaining opposition to foreign occupations and deprivation, rebels from Abushiri, Arabs of coastal Tanzania, the Yaos on Lake Malawi, among others, fought to resist and reject what they anticipated and perceived. They rebelled to reclaim their lost liberty and spiritual freedom, to reassert individual and collective dignity and to reform their society.

(ii) Disorderly Conflicts

It is generally acceptable that conflict could both be orderly and disorderly. Laue (1990) in explaining this further noted that parties in conflict believe they have incompatible goals and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over, or destroy one another. Struggle over power and scarce resources are at the heart of conflicts.

Gurr (1974:8-10) opined that it is likely that high level of violence destroy more than they create, at least in the short run. This is because destructive behaviour may be explained by referring to another fundamental feature of the human organism, which is that when men are exposed to obnoxious stimuli which they cannot avoid or overcome, they have an innate disposition to strike out at the sources of such negative phenomena. Striking out may or may not reduce the frustration, but it seems to be an inherently satisfying response to the tension created by frustration (ibid). In furtherance to this, Laue (1981) noted that disorderly conflicts consume men and goods; it seldomly enhances them, because not all conflicts produce positive results. Zartman (1988) aptly noted that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, especially in governance. Keen (2000:25) posits that most leaders and the policies the implement are the cause of several conflicts. It is either they want to retain the status quo and deprive others, or that they abhor any questioning of their rule. Berdal et al (2000:72) classified violence into top-down violence and bottom-up violence. The former, he noted, are the agenda leaders and entrepreneurs who mobilize people to cause large-scale violence for political or economic reasons which is similar to orderliness in conflict, with the use of coercion to get recruits. Fasching (2004), using Auschwitz as an illustration avers that one key lesson to be learned by reflecting on Auschwitz is the power of techno-bureaucratic rationality to undermine our capacity for ethical reflection and action which opens up the possibility of mass murder as a rational act.

Moryer (2001:23), contends that top-down violence, which creates a great deal of disorderliness in conflict is what several leaders and their surrogates employ when it is obvious that they are no longer needed. These destructive groups employ propaganda, seditions statements and ethnic hatred to demonize their opponents in order to cause large scale violent. Identifying the manner of action of these demonized followers, Markusen (2004:25-26) noted that the most important being that, both Auschwitz and Hiroshima entailed the systematic, planned, deliberate and indiscriminate slaughter of masses of innocent human beings.

Berdal et al (2000) posits that top-down violence is the worst type of conflicts, because apart from the conflict being disorderly, it nurtures a great deal of animosity and instills inherent hatred amongst the executors against the victims both human or non-human.

(iii) Conditions in Conflict Zones

Several times, the masses, citizens and vulnerable groups in conflict are made to pass through untold hardships in their struggle to survive, defend themselves, and or escape the pogroms mostly arising from a crisis.

Thus, Jewish, Armenian, Cambodian, Bosnian and Rwandan citizens were faced with certainty in their separate struggles to either survive the act of man's inhumanity to man or become silent victims. They suffered several untold pains, hardships, traumas and psychological stresses.

Neuffer (2002:18) reveals that the average child, woman and the helpless in Stupni Do and Ahmici of Bosnia died while looking for where to hide. To some, however, their wounds were filled with maggots and flies sucking sores as the bullets and mortars rained like heaven open to shower water. In Bosnia, the men, women and children of Srebrenica Zvornik, Prijedor, among others were forced out of their homes, wailing and crying for help only to suffer because of their faith.

Goldhagen (1988), in giving an account of the role of ordinary Germans during the Holocaust, reveals that these people were not different from Hitler; for, they identified their Jewish neighbours to the Nazis and betrayed those that escaped to their custody. They fully participated in the program against the Jews.

Maylnarrds (1997:38) observes that the Santebals (security police) in Cambodia helped Pol Pot to eliminate at will anybody not deemed fit to live or had threatened his government. Destexhe (1995:64) identified the magnitude of the suffering of the common people in a state in conflict and states that the young Turks in 1915 were a bunch of insane, inhuman killers who stripped their Armenian victims naked to murder them.

With regards to Rwanda, Melvern (2000) opined that one pertinent thing about states in conflict, either for intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, inter-political, intra-political and or intra-ideological reasons, is that the organizers seem to be the best protagonists and at the same time, the best antagonists toward arriving at their expected goal simply because the kind of antics they employed towards arriving at their goals are best known to them. In a similar manner, she noted that the citizens: either the vulnerable, the

weak, the victims or the agents of execution, live in a hysteria of confusion, delusion, blindfolding and contradictions until after the game is over.

Adelman et al (1999:17) in support of the view of Keane described above, aptly noted that the situation of the fleeing people of Rwanda, that is, the refugees were neither rosy nor palatable at the Luwero triangle. Rwandan refugees were also persecuted and accused encroaching on the land of the indigenes of the areas that they fed to. They were destitute and according to Adisa, (1996: 25-27), the building up of refugees into Tanzania was very dramatic. Starting from April 1994, refugees began to arrive in large numbers at Kagera with no provisions, no foodstuffs or medicines: there was no capacity to respond to their needs.

To ascertain the plight of refugees in their hiding place, Melvern (2000:27) explained that during the Obote's and Amin's regimes, the Rwandan refugees had been persecuted, which propelled them to help Museveni, a natural ally. The refugees, in their country of exile, suffered the terror of the ruler. In 1982, when a crisis occurred in the border area between Rwanda and Uganda, many young Rwandans, rather than remaining powerless and persecuted refugees, joined the ranks of the NRA. When Uganda fell to Museveni, his army consisted of many Rwandan – Tutsi, who were mostly the sons of the exiled refugee fighters and who were about 3,000. Berkeley (2001) noted that from the Congo DR side of the fleeing militia, at Goma camp, the Hutus – both the ex-soldiers and the Interahamwes - turned enemies to themselves. They started internal cleansing. There were accusations and counter-accusations of inaction. There were blames and regrets by victims. There was killing of those who were not committed to the course. According to the *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (1995: 5) some who were forced to flee by threats of physical violence into Goma in Zaire camp, on volcanic rock, which offered virtually no trees for firewood, no shelter and no water and without any possibility of making latrines, helped to endanger the people's lives. It is this extremely poor sanitary condition that contributed to the ensuing cholera and dysentery that killed over 500,000 people.

(iv)   Social Conditions in Conflict Zones

According to scholars, the plight of the people of Rwanda, both those inside and those outside - the exiled, was that the hatred, killings and quarrelsomeness as observed amongst them was informed by several factors apart from ethnic hatred that

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was the crowning discord. Melvern (2004) states that the fall in currency contributed to inflation and a decrease in real earning. There were large increases in the prices of fuel and essential commodities. State enterprises were pushed into bankruptcy as health and education services collapsed. The incidence of severe child malnutrition increased dramatically as did the number of recorded cases of malaria, cholera, dysentery epidemic, among others (Melvern,2004: 41).

While accepting the above contention as part of the problem of Rwanda, Adelman et al (1999:88-89) also observed that even to those fleeing to Uganda faced a number of challenges as the Ugandans detested them. Apart from this, Prunnier (1997) observed that even when the crisis was on, there was also, of course, an element of material interest in the killings, even in the countryside. The killers looted household belongings and slaughtered cattle. Meat became very cheap and grand feasts were held, as if in celebration of the massacres. He went on to state that there was also, nevertheless, a strong element of social envy in the killings the rural areas, this could work at a very simple level. In the vivid words of a survivor, the people whose children had to walk barefooted to school killed the people who could buy shoes for theirs.

Waal (1995: 165-166) of the African Rights, in confirming the impoverished and materialistic nature of the killers, observed that the belongings – handbags, suitcases, watches, and clothes of victims were shared. Some were saved on giving out their belongings.

In another view, Keane (1996) observed that there was madness at work. They killed and stole everything. They wanted to be like the rich, like the government as people kill the head of the household and take what he owned. They did not hide their poverty, even while killing and looting.

Kass (1998:18) in another revelation aptly stated that even before the war and genocide, occurred, things were not in order. There existed a great difference in the family structure that used to support the child. Vanessa (1999:2) has also noted the travails of Rwandan children, especially those living or working on the street, those living in institutions and those who lived in homes without any adults.

(v)   Propanganda in Conflict

The role of propaganda in conflict, either internal or external, can never be over emphasized because it helps to shape or reshape the velocity or tenacity of conflict. Propaganda, like rumour or gossip, is more dangerous than war in itself.

According to Berkeley, propaganda in conflicts is a veritable tool for demonising victims or opponents. Hitler used propaganda machinery to exploit his fellow German annihilators saying that the liberation of a people was needed more than an economic policy, even more than industry. If a people were to become free, they need pride and willpower, defiance, hate and once again hate... In his own explanation, Power (2003) asserted that Hitler accompanied his analogy with a saying that a Jew had to be put to death whoever he was not for having been caught carrying a weapon or for having joined a resistance movement, but simply because he was a Jew.

Goldhagen (1988: 54) noted that the executioners attested to it that it was not only the order received to carry out his work but the information emanating from radio wave spurred him to know and accept that the Jews were an inferior race and deserved not to exist side by side with the Aryan race. Winter (1992), in considering the Armenian case, observed that the Turks saw the Armenians as pigs. "The populist should note that Pigs are filthy, dirty and are forbidden to exist side by side with human race. The only smelling thing that must not eat nor drink with you, near you, or come to you, are the pigs – the Armenians."

About the Rwandan conflicts and propaganda, Waal (1995) aptly notes that the extremists disseminated hate messages and undermined the public confidence in negotiations to end the war and to establish the political future based on the principle of power sharing. To this end, they claimed that the RPF was planning to wipe out the Hutus, thereby urging Hutus to strike the Tutsis first. Melvern (2000:15) believes that the group used ethnic hatred to increase its power and was determined to resist democracy. The propagandists zealously held the view that the struggle in Rwanda was not political but a tribal conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The Tutsis were invaders; they were naturalized immigrants trying to impose their will on the others. Moreover, all Tutsis were christened dictatorial, proud, cruel, arrogant, clever and sneaky.

Cooper (1998:139-140), in reviewing the velocity of propaganda in the Rwandan crisis, is of the view that there was a misleading representation of the history of the settlement of the region. The Hutu propagandists insisted that the Tutsis intended to take control of Rwanda once again, and that they would do so by a massive slaughter of the Hutus. However, (Keane 1996) argued that for several years prior to the war and genocide, Hutus were exposed to an on- going and virulent campaign of anti – Tutsi brainwashing.

In support of this assertion, Prunnier (1997:9) reiterated that to the peasants with a long folk memory of post-Tutsi misrule, the warning and the increasing hysterical propaganda had a powerful effect. Tens of thousands became infected and adopted anti-Tutsi psychosis; they were convinced through the newspaper, radio and the frequent public speeches of Habyarimana's closest supporters that the Tutsis were going to turn them into beasts of the field once again.

To Chalk (1999: 94-95), the discrimination of hate propaganda, which included spreading ethnic hatred and inciting ethnocide and genocide, began in earnest in 1990 with newspaper and magazine articles aimed at convincing Hutu, intellectuals and other literate members of the population that their lives were in danger from inside and outside Rwanda by Tutsi infiltration and Hutu supporters of democracy.

2:2.2. Diplomacy and Governance

As already stated in the preceding section and in the background to this study the growing number of conflicts in the world had taken different political and economic undertones in recent times. However, the most problematic aspect of these conflicts or rebellions is that it had, in some respect, been internationalized, and recognised, owing to several reasons and interests of both participants and actors alike. It is the kind of diplomacy that is brought to bear on the system that actually helps directly or indirectly to encourage, influence or even mar the intentions or desires of the actors. For several conflicts, and especially that of Rwanda, this might have been easy to heal, despite its tragic memories but for the involvement of outside interests, which made it escalate to the genocide stage.

Melvern (2004), stated that there was also evidence of a more sinister dimension to the Rwanda crisis – diplomatic intrigues. There were those who were all

too aware and involved in the situation in Rwanda and who nevertheless failed to take action. Instead, they helped in escalating the whole crisis. There are others who helped conceal the reality of what was taking place. In support of the these observations Kagame (1997) aptly agreed by saying that "we were fighting to give negotiation a chance and up against a power which refused any chance for democracy, but by its presence and support, the French army prolonged the conflict." Melvern (2004:12) contended that the international community which passed laws fifty years ago, with the specific mandate of ensuring that crime against humanity was never again perpetrated, not only failed to prevent it from happening in Rwanda but, by pumping in funds intended to help the Rwandan economy, actually helped to create the conditions that made it possible. Uvin (1998:20), in his view, noted that the whole of the international community contributed to the Rwandan crisis. The United Nations and many of its agencies, independent aid groups, and two of the most powerful international institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) might have indirectly aided the act.

Melvern (2000:41) asserted that the rate at which conflicts were internationalized in the world has become a source of worry. Many conflicts that occurred in states were, however, portrayed as something very different; a senseless civil war, a tribal conflict in which an old conflict and bitter rivalry led to an almost primitive savagery. For instance, Rwanda was portrayed as a democratic country ruled by the majority, even when Habyarimana was clever, devious, double–dealing and brutal. None had more dramatic effects then than that of the role of France which backed the dictatorship of Juvenal Habyarimana for a very long time. France slowly replaced Belgium as the foremost foreign ally with financial and military aid which Belgium could not provide.

Mildlarsky (1998:172) aptly noted that the cases of China and Iran, which sold weapons and supported the Sudanese government of Umar AL-Bashir against the SPLA and the people of Western Darfur explains the kind of state involvement in the internal affairs of other states, not minding the implications. Burkina Faso, Cote d'ivorie, and Libya provided military assistance to Charles Taylor's NPFL force in Liberia against General Samuel Doe in the early 1990s; Portugal and Russia supplied military hardware to the Angolan government after civil war resumed in 1992 against the UNITA leader; the late Jonas Savimbi, and Uganda also hosted representatives of

seven different rebel groups in Africa and supplied arms and equipped the RPF of Rwanda and SPLA of Sudan, among others (Reno, 2000:43-59).

In 1997, the Human Rights Watch Arms Project revealed that the Ugandan Army provided heavy weapons, including artillery, a steady stream of ammunition, food, logistics and shared intelligence with the RPF against the Rwandan government. Melvern (2004:35) noted that in the wake of the crisis in Rwanda, that is, the RPF invasion on October 1st, 1990, troops were sent from the DR Congo, Belgium and France to provide back up for Habyarimana against the invading opponents.

With specific emphasis on the Rwanda crisis, Guest (2004:18) narrated how the RPF offensive was portrayed as an invasion by a neighbouring state, (Uganda). It was considered to be a part of a larger post-cold war attack by British agents, whose eyes were on the French interests in Africa. Meaning that, abandoning Habyarimana would have been high treason, tantamount to handing Rwanda over to English speaking rebels. In addition to this fact, Melvern (2004:203) also noted that there were policy makers in France who believed that they were supporting a majority rule, the Hutus, against a minority, the Tutsis, in Rwanda. For them, this justified calling Rwanda democratic. Majority rule legitimized French military and diplomatic support for the regime.

Melvern (2000:19) aptly stated that to accept the involvement of France in the Rwandan crisis was admitted to be the invitation of Habyarimana government, which had feared that the Tutsi were going to re-establish the monarchical system in the North with the invasion of RPF.

Considering the high incidence of internationalization of the Rwandan crisis, Harff (2004) stated that France was a principal source of arms for the Rwandan government. The Rwandan Minister of Defence confirmed that a French bank, Credit Lyonnais had guaranteed a sum of US$6m arms deal between Rwanda and the government of Egypt and China that involved the transfer of heavy artillery, mortars and AK 47 automatic rifles.

Goose and Smith (2004:124 -151) postulate that the post-cold war era saw a profit motive replace East-West rivalry as the main stimulus behind weapons sales. Rwanda, a tiny African country plagued by ethnic, nationalist and regional strife.

Vasquez (2004:23) in examining the exacerbated nature of globalizing conflicts as analysed above affirm that many participants (states) which helped in internationalizing conflicts within states always do so thinking that apart from their individual gains, they are helping the states in conflict to stabilize not knowing that they are indirectly destroying the state in conflict as in the case of Rwanda, where the roles of France, Egypt, South Africa, Uganda and DR Congo were not only devious and demonizing but inhuman for a man to arm his fellow to take lives he could not create.

On this conception, Shyaka (2005) postulates that there are active alliances between negative forces operating in neigbouring countries and some actors and foreign governments. Some external actors are maintaining conflict-generating perceptions on the Rwanda society. Minar et al (1996:18), accentuate the contention of Shyaka in comparison to elsewhere on the globe stressing that the actors are the same in many conflict zones. If not so, he validates his judgement by illustrating that the ferocity of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the fury of the saturation bombing of Chechnya's Gronzy might seem unprecedented.

In accepting the general absurdity and overall contentions made on the issue of internationalization of conflicts by outside states in respect of the Rwandan crisis, Adelman et al (1999:82) observed that of all the foreign forces that have been implicated of interference and of general abetting in the creation and development of extremism in Rwanda, France is identified as a country that propped up the dictatorial regime of Habyarimana. It directly trained extremists and, in some instances, French troops were accused of being directly involved in the ferocious and incessant killing of the citizens of Rwanda. France, therefore, has a moral and legal responsibility to the crisis.

(i)   Response to Conflicts

There are overwhelming controversies on how states should respond to conflicts. Such arguments are based on the varying and differing manners of how state respond to varieties of conflict situations. These arguments, which were diplomatically sustained are based on the degree of State acknowledgement of conflict and how they failed to act in conflict zones to stop the killings by making frenzy excuses and so on.

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Generally speaking, every conflict personal or group, intra or inter, among others usually attracts reactions, supports, sympathizers and beneficiaries. To this end, despite the kind of killings in the Rwanda crisis, some states while acknowledging the existence of conflict in Rwanda however did not agree with the magnitude of its volatility, less the need to intervene in a somewhat ethnic issue. Against this dismay and foot-dragging, Friedman (1995) notes that it is futile, making attempts to extinguish any ethnic conflict when it is raging at full force. This is because the tribal impulse for survival and revenge in such a situation is like a political blowtorch. No amount of rational argument can tone it down and if you try to smoothen it with your own body, or army, it will burn a hole right through you.

While this may be the basic reason for the West not intervening in the Rwanda crisis in 1994, Alusala (2004) expresses a contrary view, nothing that it is unfair for the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and its officials to have kept quiet since they were aware of the flooding of streets with weapons but could not cope with or monitor the scale of illicit arms trading.

Correspondingly, Brown (2004: 10) aptly notes that two weeks after the massacre of the Tutsis began in Rwanda in April 1994, General Romeo Dallaire, the UNAMIR Commander, insisted that he could end the carnage if given 5,000 – 8,000 additional troops but the UN Security Council responded by cutting Dallaire's force of 2,500 to 270 men. This announcement clearly reinforces Alusala's view and it questions the stand and negligence of the UN. The Human Rights Watch (1995) complements the avowal, arguing that if Dallaire had received additional troops, and materials – say 5,000 experienced soldiers, the war/genocide would have ended even in the later weeks. This is so because the operation of the genocide was highly centralized. Stopping the killings in Kigali would have quickly quelled violence elsewhere in the country. Ferroggario (2001) in this respect noted that despite overwhelming evidence of killings and knowledge as to the perpetrators, the United States officials decided against taking a leading role in confronting the slaughters in Rwanda, Rather, they confined themselves to public statements, diplomatic demarches, initiatives for a ceasefire and attempt to contact both the interim government perpetrating the killings and the RPF. However, the United States did use its influence at the UN, to discourage a robust UN response.

On a disparate view, Carrison (in Dallaire 2004) combatively argues against UN acknowledgement and failure to act, however criticized the UN for lack of leadership, military capacity, coordination and discipline during the Rwandan ethnic conflict of 1994. Against the reasons for acknowledging crisis, and the inaction toward the Rwandan war/genocide as purported by the West, Valentino (2004) logically notes that to prevent this mass killing, a quick response should focus on the disarmament and removal from power, such leaders and small groups that are responsible for instigating and organizing the killings. The basic attempt to go in and stop mass killing, should be paramount to all concerned.

In furtherance to this argument, Prunnier (1997) reiterates that though observers in the West acknowledged the existence of conflict in Rwanda, many however, are made to believe that it was merely a tribal conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis since they were not aware of the immense devastation and carnage. On this misinformation, Gourevitch (1998) recounted one reaction from the West which said, Hutus killed Tutsis, then Tutsis killed Hutus. If that was really all there was to it, then no wonder we could not be bothered about it.

Explaining the antecedents of the above comment, Dallaire (2003) rightly condemns the American leadership which includes the Pentagon in projecting itself as the world policeman one day and a recluse the next. Before the Rwandan war/genocide and Civil War broke out, former President Clinton acknowledged the existence of a conflict in Rwanda and said at the General Assembly of the UN that the US would intervene if only it was in her self-interest. Totten (2004) validates the above contention, affirming that the international community's reaction to the planning and perpetration of the Rwandan war/genocide was nothing short of the egregious. Tragically, the Rwandan crisis proved the hollowness of the international community's declaration and the often repeated promises of "never-again."

Complementing these assertions, Cohen (2004) notes that the current wimpish approach to the Rwandan crisis was destructive and in the long run, will affect the credibility of the American policy on conflict resolution. In his own contribution, Adelman (1999:132) posits that an important factor to consider in apportioning blame in the Rwandan crisis is the fact that the responsibility was in some cases direct but in

others indirect. The responsibility can be assessed not only by what one did, but also in terms of what one failed to do.

Ronayne (2001:34) who argues against the Clinton's administrative standpoint complements the above conception, stating that even as the genocidal nature of the killings became clear as early as the end of April 1994, the Clinton administration instructed its spokespersons not to describe the situation in Rwanda as …'genocide'. In a more confrontational tone, Melvern (2004), observes that it was a shocking indictment not just of the UN Security Council, but even more so of governments and individuals who could have prevented what was happening but chose not to do so. Melvern's anger is visible as he directs his tirades on the combination of revelations about the scale and intensity of killing, the complicity of Western nations, the failure to intervene and the suppression of information about what was actually happening.

Linden (1996:54) supports this allegation, stressing that instead of acting after watching the act, the withdrawal of the bulk of the UN forces became the UN's priority, coupled with the failure of the Security Council to reinforce them and acknowledge that crime against humanity was taking place. Detesting this cynical attitude of the role of the states in conflicts, Huttenbach (2004) observes that acknowledging crime is one thing and reacting to stop it is another. If the early warning had been taken seriously, the event, the rhetorics and killings would not have been the case in Rwanda. Wendt (1995), who complements the above records, argues forcefully that if it was possible to change the prevailing structures or the nature of world politics, then it would be irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuated the destructive Old Order, especially if the welfare of the future generation was taken into cognisance.

(ii)   Negligence in Conflict Zone

Against the several calls for help, the outpour of cries in conflict, the beckoning for people, individuals, persons, groups, states and the international community to intervene in the conflict, it is pertinently evident that some who should have saved life, indeed, did turn their back to allow the death toll to rise astronomically during the Rwandan crisis. Due to several arguments about the inaction of the world community and the UN during the crisis. Dallaire (2004) has rightly noted that since the UN

commenced peacekeeping operations in 1956, it has quite honestly learned very little from its mistakes and from the volumes of constructive criticisms which have been presented by the force commanders for almost forty years.

Brown (2004) aptly stated that those who had high hopes in the early 1990s for the international community's conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution capabilities were miffed by the international community's inability to prevent, stop, or resolve most of the violent internal conflicts that raged on in the early to mid 1990s, noticeably, the Rwanda crisis. Dallaire (2004) further saw the absolute tragedy of the situation in Rwanda as a slight on the UN and its undoings in the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings due to the errors, problems and bureaucratic impotence inherent within the system.

Linden (1996) noted that the most tragic of all, however, was the inactivity of the UN and its failure to meet expectations, including those of the citizens of Rwanda. After the arrival of UNAMIR, there were high hopes, but those hopes were badly shattered. Even after the Belgian withdrawal of troops and the continuation of the massacre, the UN did not deem it fit to stop it.

Ferroggario (2001:26) observed that as the killings intensified, the international community deserted Rwanda. The Western nations landed troops in Rwanda and Burundi in the first week only to evacuate their citizens and in so doing, left Rwandan as in the pool of their own blood. Complementing the assertion above. Gourevitch (1995: 91-92) aptly opined that reason failed in Rwanda and this was why so many people were massacred. While detesting the inaction of the international community, Melvern (2004) reiterated that there was evidence that points not just to negligence, but also to complicity. What happened in Rwanda showed that despite the existence of an organization like the UN, the genocide still occurred.

Against the indifference to the cries in the Rwanda crisis, Totten (2004) noted that the international community in the same year (1994) regretted all their inaction and negligent attitude as one of the officials of the UN, Razin, stated that "all of us deeply regret it, for example, not heeding the information in the January 11[th]1994 cable from Dallaire ….Yes we failed". In the same manner, Melvern (2000:132) quoted Bill Clinton as saying, 'all over the world, there were people like me sitting in the office, day after day, not fully appreciating the depth and speed with which you were being

engulfed by this unimaginable terror. The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear the shame of responsibility for this tragedy. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name, genocide. Never again must we be shy in the face of the evidence".

With reference to the Rwandan crisis, Linden (1996) observed that while the UN could not respond with any action on the ground, the OAU, at least, attempted to act more decisively. It was a step ahead of the UN in its analysis and its public statements. However, division among the African countries did not allow for any real intervention. Many were shy or unable to provide troops or even contribute to the funding of any quick intervention force.

Kuperman (2001) explains that most of the African states are not only lame economically, but lack the wherewithal to intervene in other countries' problems. Berry (1995):43) explains further: 'Who will help Rwanda? Who? Is it the same South Africa which sold arms to the Hutu government to kill their Tutsi brothers? Or is it Egypt which Boutros Ghali helped in instigating the extremists against the armless Tutsis'? African is terribly incapacitated to respond to the cry of their neighbours. They are like dogs sucking the wounds of wounded dogs so that they would never heal. Weitz (1995:11-15), notes that it is only in the West African region that a nation like Nigeria would take it upon herself to sponsor and supply troops to conflict zones and quell it without looking back.

The Human Rights Watch (1995:66) asserted that the UN inaction and abandonment of the unarmed civilians at the UN – security post in Rwanda showed the level and extent of unpreparedness of the body. The Security Council, only Nigeria opposed the withdrawal of troops and pressed for the saving of the innocent civilians.

Adelman (1999:82) aptly states that of all the foreign forces that have been implicated in the creation and development of extremism in Rwanda, France has particularly been identified as a country that propped up the dictatorship regime of Habyarimana. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project (1995:83) in agreeing with the views of the scholar above, confirmed the action of France in supporting the Hutu extremists' activities by saying that the French were also involved in instructing the militia and the regular army in the use of some of the arms they brought during the conflict, while the extremist militia and government troops hunted down their

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perceived enemies. The French troops interrogated those captured just before they met their deaths.

Against this backdrop of French involvement, Minow (1998:32) observed that the French created an operation zone, even in some areas where there was no single French citizen living there, only to advance the argument that the French military presence could be explained by their need to protect their nationals in Rwanda; whereas, they were busy sheltering the extremists and killers of the innocent. Keane (1996: 186) noted that just as the world lacked the will to stop the slaughter when it could, so the French also lacked the determination to pressurize Congo DR government so that the perpetrators and soldiers were denied protection. Thus, the camps in Goma were described as humanitarian heavens for the killers who were by the French.

2:3.   DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

Africa, has experienced a magnitude of problems arising from conflicts, which were mostly centred on power struggle and state governance. These problems arose from issues like land claims, boundary disputes, ethnic dominance, political succession, marginalization, discrimination, suppression, wealth acquisition and resource control, and have become not only a grave impediment but a challenge to the continent. Most of these conflicts were made possible by the degree of diplomatic intrigues that enhanced their existence to the detriment of Africa. Against these predicaments and many others, Charmers (in Rotberg, 1971) observed that revolution occurs when social systems experience total disequilibrium. As part of this process, government experiences a power deflation sharply reducing their ability to cope with an armed challenge to their exercise of power.

Rahankah (1982) and Gurr (1974) noted that to rebel is to refuse allegiance to, and forcefully oppose an established government of any ruling authority. This is a syndrome which exactly fitted the needs of Africans, during and after the era of colonization, due to the antecedents of the indigenous Africans and their refusal to accept or acknowledge the imposition tendencies of the erstwhile colonial rulers.

Rotberg (1971) recounted the sequence of rebellion in East and Southern Africa where the Maji Maji of Tanzania, the Nyabingi of Uganda, the Mumbo of Kenya, the Simba of Congo, the Chilembwe of Malawi, Gusii of Kenya, Mau Mau of Kenya, the

Shona and Ndebele of Rodesia, Hereros of Namibia, Mhwana lesand Leushina of Zambia, amongst others, had rebelled at one time or the other. Robinson (1998:15) notes that these rebellions in Africa were revivalistic and had latent expressive, mystical and non – secular goals as important as those which were manifested at the more obvious levels of instrumental aggression. She went further to state in dismay that although none of them succeeded in permanently reversing the fate of the Africans or their indigenous rules, they are rightfully important components of the heritage of many African peoples and states.

Cromwell (1999:50) has reiterated that the Ashanti rebellion in the Gold Coast and that of Bai Bureh of Sierra-Leone had a great impacts on West African states politics towards the colonialists, because it provided a foreshadowing of the rise of nationalism in these parts of Africa.

(i)   Instances of African rebellion

Rebellion was one of the enabling factors that facilitated independence for most African states during the colonial era. As already noted, rebellion against perceived injustice continued even into the post-independence era, as the spirit of divide and rule, greed and quest for power, among others, became an attendant feature many years after independence in many African countries. It is imperative, therefore, to understand that within this period, several African states had experienced more revolts than ever, against and within themselves. The entire continent became a beehive of struggle for the spoils of the state and power.

MacCarthy (1997:27) has noted that one of the causes of the social upheaval was the attempt by many African leaders decided to recolonise their people the second time after independence. They institutionalized the colonial principle of divide and rule, drove away their compatriots and fellow independent agitators and the land was defaced into another status and back to the status quo.

Claude (1998:9-14) posits that many African leaders became blind on the way forward and settled to plunder the motherland to the detriment of the impoverished and the running refugees. Wars and military coup d'etats became rampant in several parts of the African continent.

Bank (1996) contends that many dissatisfied individuals and people decided to settle scores and change the situation by initiating revolts.

ANGOLA

Simpson (2005) posits that Angola, a former Portuguese colony, had an age-long struggle against both the colonial powers and within itself after independence. The three main contenders for the control of the country were the MPLA of Agostino Neto, an ally of Portuguese and USSR; the UNITA rebel, led by Jonas Savimbi and supported by America and former apartheid South Africa; and, the National Front for the Liberation of Angolan (FNLA) rebel led by Robert Holden and which was sponsored by the British. Crossed (1997:43) explains further that the war was encouraged by the cold war struggle among America, USSR and their allies.

Kagan (2005:27) observes that control of power, diamond and oil at the small town of Cabinda became central to the conflict, which stalled the sociopolitical development of Angola.

SUDAN

With regards to the Sudan, Fitzzle (1994:534) noted that Sudan had witnessed a series of rebellions, especially between the North and the South. The Southern rebels were also factionalized between the Christians and the Animists. Morgan (2005:4-8) further asserts that the SPLA, a rebel group that had been fighting a guerilla warfare against the government in the North was also one of the several rebel groups in Southern Sudan. Clappord (1994:12-18) has noted that most of the southern and western parts of the country has become desolate because of the war.

Massimo (2003:4) observed that the contemporary Sudan-Darfur conflict developed because of the recent polarization of the Arab and African identities associated with a new form of external intrusion and internal violence. Colin (2004:11) believes that identity formation in Darfur, often being associated with violence and external engagement, was central to the prevailing conflict. Events in Sudan – Darfur have many historic precursors. De Waal (2004:13) strongly noted that this was due to the fact that the historical exploration of the marginalisation of Darfur was fundamental when analysing the background to the current political conflict and its cataclysms. This is due to an outburst occasioned by the neglect of the East – West axis of Sudanese

identities that was arguably as important as the North – South axis thus redeeming the neglect of Darfur as a separate and important locus for state formation in Sudan, paralleling and competing with the Nile valley. In the struggle were the JEM, SLM, SLA, and the JANJAWEED, amongst others.

UGANDA

Uganda, according to William (1997:67), had experienced two successful rebellions. One was a rebel-led invasion to wrest power from the incumbent. In 1966, Milton Appollo Obote successfully led a revolution against the government in which he served as Prime Minister for many years and later installed himself President. Kasfit (2000:71) observed that though Amin's regime needed to be changed, it was not Milton Appollo Obote whom Ugandans who invaded Uganda with the assistance of Tanzanian forces that was needed for the change. His regime was notorious for its ineptitude, corruption and mismanagement. The *Europa* (1999:356) in its own assertion noted that the several incidents of poor administration from 1980 upward in Uganda, led to the many rebel incursions into government. The continual attack on the government by the Holy Spirit (later re-named Lord Resistance Army) rebel group in the North and the National Resistance Army (NRA) of General Yoweri Katagu Museveni rebels in the Southern part weakened the country.

Thompson (2003:1-4) opined that the 1986 Museveni - led insurgency against Obote was not only successful, but that Yoweri Museveni succeeded in liberating Uganda from the rule of two brutal dictators. Lubwama (1999:18) while supporting the above assertion stated that Obote oppressed the people through political persecution, distortion and neglect, but Museveni had brought democracy and its meaning closer to the people without tribal or ethnic agenda.

LIBERIA

In 1989 a rebel group crossed to Liberia from Cote'd' Ivoire to begin offensive against the then President Samuel Doe. The rebellion was factionalized due to ethnic and political cleavages. Charles Taylor who led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was more prominent among other factional rebel leaders. Charles Taylor was a veritable instrument of destruction and an avenging tool of Felix H. Boughie, the then President of Cote d'voire and an–in-law of the late President Tolbert's family. Tolbert

was killed by Samuel Doe. Sequel to an agreement, Charles Taylor, a dissatisfied and dismissed critic of the Doe's administration was chosen to revenge Boughie with the aid of another son-in-Law, Blaise Campore of Burkina Faso. Taylor was, therefore, equipped with weapons with the aid of other allies such as Libya, some disgruntled elements from Sierra-Leone, among others to overthrow the Doe's administration. It was this arms build-up and other factors that made the whole struggle a complex and unending conflict.

Mark (1998:41) opines that the major reason for the Liberian rebellion and the subsequent war was the brutal dictatorship of Samuel Doe. This, coupled with an underlying ethnic hatred, corrupt administration and the suffering and deprivation which the people experience, among others, encouraged the rebellion. Bolton (1996:52) in counting the number of rebel groups, asserted that the Liberian rebellion which involved such rebel groups: the NPFL rebel, the INPFL rebel, LNC rebel, ULIMO-J rebel, ULIMO-K rebel, LPC rebel, CRC rebel, LDF rebel, AFL rebel, the CDF rebel among others, existed due to their individual aims and the continued aid supply from outside interests who never wanted the conflict to come to an end.

CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Congo DR (formerly Zaire) according to Vesperini (1998) is not new to conflicts and rebellions. Congo DR witnessed a great rebellion in May 1997 led by Laurent Kabila, who was not new to the Congolese political upheavals and rebellions. He was a former lieutenant to the late Gaston Soumialot-led rebellion in 1964. The present rebellion, according to Vesperini, started in 1996 from the Eastern (Zaire) Congo DR when the then President Mobutu Sese Seko decided to use the race card to prop up his regime by expelling the Banyamulenge Tutsi from Eastern Zaire under the excuse that they were foreigners. Hence, the oppositions and the Tutsi's invitation of their brothers from Rwanda and Uganda for help also precipitated the rebellion agenda.

Contending further on the reasons, Otunnu (2000:30) added that with the backing of Rwanda, Uganda and external influence – the United States, among others, Mobutu's soldiers were unpaid, unfed and demoralized; thus the collapse of the army and the enhancement of the rebellion momentum.

In support of this statement, Wilson (1997:23-30) aptly noted that the people of Zaire were relieved after years of oppression under Mobutu. On the restoration of peace to Zaire, he further stated that all would depend on how long Kabila would be able to laugh with his allies and interest groups in the conflict.

However, against the backdrop of the betrayal of trust and agreement by Laurent Kabila, Luddenm (1998) quickly noted that the second Congo DR rebellion after a year and three months was against Laurent Kabila who had alienated all potential foreign investors including Washington in relation to his foreign policy was meant to pay her back in her own coins. Kabila's offence amongst others, was that he had decided to make new friends in China and Cuba by following their model of economic development. This was also to remind allies that he was once a good student of the late Gaston Soumialot – one time rebel leader of Congo DR and a Mao-Marxist. By this, he further stated that all economic indicators including mineral production were down coupled with the fall in the prices of raw minerals which badly hurt the country's export revenue.

Agreeing with the notions enunciated above, Grant (1996) reiterated that the discontented force made of elements of ADFL ousted Mobutu's army generals, the dismissed Banyamulenge Tutsi, the Rwandan troops, mercenaries from South African apartheid regime – backed by Washington and Paris sought to remove Kabila and anything Kabila.

SIERRA- LEONE

The Sierra Leonean civil war started when Foady Sankoh, a Temine by tribe led a dissatisfied rebel group against the military and civilian government in Freetown at separate periods respectively. Sankoh was the most disgruntled, greedy, and destructive and over –ambitious rebel leader ever witnessed along the coastal shores of Africa.

In his assertion, Carver (1997) contended that the major cause of the Sierra-Leonean rebellion and war was the precarious position of the economy that was purely based upon serial and wanton exploitation of the available mineral resources by the incumbent rulers. These mineral resources were regarded an essential lubricant in a system of patronage-based politics.

Alao (1998:42) while tracing the genesis of the problem in reference to the assertion above, aptly reiterated that the All Peoples Congress (APC), the ruling party, misruled Sierra Leone from 1967 to 1978. In 1978, under its one-party state rule, Siaka Stevens and his successor, Joseph Momoh, displayed a general dissatisfaction with the polity. McJohnson (2001:12) opined that the rebellion in Sierra-Leone was meant to end the three decades of one – party misrule, corruption in government and to ensure that the ordinary people benefit from the mineral wealth, fight against the prevailing general abject poverty, thereby improving life expectancy.

(ii) African Diplomacy

The art of military intervention to aid one side; peace enforcement, to impose a settlement on the warring parties; humanitarian intervention, to ameliorate the effects of war; mediation, to bring conflict to a negotiated end; preventive diplomacy, to keep incipient conflict from becoming violent; and regional institution-building, to manage conflicts, amongst others, had all evolved and existed in some of the many conflicts in African states. Out of all these, however, preventive diplomacy attempts to resolve conflicts before they become violent. Preventive diplomacy depends on early warnings, effective responses and mobilization. Thus, Stedman (1995:14-20) argued that preventive action could be cheap and risk-free, if the conflicting parties are willing to listen to reason for peaceful co-existence.. If the parties in question are not willing to be persuaded however, then preventive measures will have to be more forceful: external military intervention, can involve significant risks and cost.

In resolving some of the growing crises and conflicts on the continent African nations have employed different initiatives by way of diplomatic efforts, especially against most of the cited instances under African rebellion. Apart from the Congo rebellion in the 1960s, none among the old African conflicts attracted peaceful means of settlement as the colonialists wasted no time in crushing them with strong firing power. Scholars have drawn two parallel inferences that are mostly used in African conflict resolution. One aspect is peace enforcement and peacekeeping measures which are both diplomatic initiatives of resolving problems. The other aspect is an outright involvement of states in conflict based on national interest which, in some respects, helps to escalate the crisis. Moreover, by virtue of independence, every member state is entitled to equal treatment before the United Nations. Consequently, two cardinal

principles are considered here: The United Nations principle on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as adopted by the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) charter principle as affecting Africa, according to Turner (2005:4-5) includes:

- *Respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual states.*

- *Non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.*

- *Peaceful settlement of all disputes…*

Turner (2005) and Alusala (2004) have argued that it was the several flaws in the charter principles itself that encouraged many of the conflicts on the continent. Meaning that it was also due to these lapses that the new African Union and its charter principles were reframed to read:

- *From collective sovereignty to collective security*

- *being different to indifference.*

- *Principle of non-interference to the right to interference…*

Against the backdrop of the above Organisation of African Unity's (now AU) Charter principle on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, Gott (1998), explains that Africans had in one way or the other adopted such a scheme towards conflict resolution, but have in most cases moved from peace enforcement to peacekeeping.

Dallaire (2004) avers that the UN peacekeeping had been the same all over, the same problem, the same shortfall, the same politics and the same result except in Sierra-Leone where it took over from ECOMOG and peace had been embraced. In Somalia, it failed; in Rwanda, it failed; and, in Angola it also failed. The institution of regional organization in Africa like ECOMOG, in terms of peace-making, is commendable. It could bravely confront a crisis, subdue it, and make peace.

Carver (1997:88) posits that the OAU's charter principle of non – interference did scare neighbours from inquiring in another neighbour's problems. Commending the consistent role of ECOMOG in conflict resolutions in West Africa, Keen (in Mats, 2004:33) asserted that it was very reliable and effective, providing strong and enduring hope to many in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its role in Liberia and Sierra-Leone made all the difference as it made nonsense of the OAU's non-interference principle.

Accepting the views of Keen, Dallaire (2004) argued that it was because the sub-regional organisation knew that there were reasons to intervene by peace enforcement to save lives, to give hope to the hopeless and the homeless, and to provide security to the defenceless, unlike the UN and others, who go as peacekeepers when the destruction and devastation must have been concluded in crisis zones.

However, in examining the role of diplomacy in conflict zones, Gott (1998) asserts that the Nigerian and British invasion of Sierra-Leone by way of peace enforcement had little to do with "*rescuing* nationals." The initial undisclosed aim was to destroy the existing internal peace accord signed years before, and to crush finally the nine-year old rebellion of Foday Sankoh. Peace enforcement rather than the later option of peacekeeping, was the best to stop the Sankoh inhuman-butchery and also to save the drifting into oblivion of the government of Tijan Kabbah.

Carver (1997:34) opines that Nigeria's option to intervene in Liberia in 1990 and later in Sierra-Leone was vital. Moreover, he contended that in 1993, Nigeria signed a military pact with Sierra-Leone and, with both being ex-British colonies, made it possible for Nigeria to intervene in Sierra Leone. Thus, peace enforcement and peacekeeping in the area mentioned proved an alignment, which lasted and remained intact during the war.

Decrying the weakness of other African sub-regional bodies like ECA, COMESA, and SARDA against the enormous and escalating crises in the regions, Power (2003) postulates that African conflicts does not need peacekeeping. But immediate peace enforcement.

Gundry (1998:12) has argued that at times it is a state's interest that stimulates the will to intervene in a course. He identified the Sudanese conflict in which several initiatives have failed due to the direct involvement of states such as Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and their backers – the USA, China, Russia and Arab nations of the Middle-East, with no peaceful settlement as an example of such.

Despite these weaknesses and several shortfalls, Power (2003) highlights some of the measures taken towards bringing an end to most of the African crises. That is, right from the Lome Accord, Yamoussoukro IV Accord, Akosombo Accord and Abuja Accord which saw to the end of the Liberian conflict; then the Nairobi 1 and 2

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Accords, and Abuja Agreement which dealt with the Sudanese crisis; the Lusaka, Pretoria and Abuja Accords on the Congo DR conflict; the Lusaka Accord for the Angolan crisis and the Lome Accord, Cottonu Accord and Accra Accord that handled the Sierra-Leone crisis, all have initiated and ensured total peace in Africa, despite the threatening odds.

(iii)   The Great Lakes Region Conflict

The Great Lakes Region is located between the East and Central Africa. The region is unique because of the presence of massive lakes such as Lake Tanganyika, Lake Victoria, Lake Aidor and Lake Kivu, with the famous Nile River running through the states. The states of Congo DR, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi and Tanzania are inter-intersected by these lakes and the Nile Basin.

Shyaka (2004:24) asserts that the Great Lakes Region of Africa is today held hostage by bloody and violent conflicts, most of which have been internationalized, simply because the conditions required for the local peace are not necessarily compatible with the geographical calculations of foreign powers. Against the backdrop of the views expressed above, Nyankanzi (1998:101) observed that due to the growing political problems in the region in the 1950s, the Tutsis-owned Rwanda Nationale Union (UNAR) in alliance with Patrice Lumumba's Movement for Nationale Congolese (MNC) made the colonialists differ in their quest for independence. This was the socialist leftist ideology that instigated Belgium to cause ethnic disaffection between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority.

The Great Lakes Region's conflict has affected all – Rwandans, Burundians, Ugandans, DR Congolese and Tanzanians. This region represents extreme cases of the failure of traditional African institutions to adapt to the extraordinary and swift changes of modern Africa. Accepting this observation, Adisa (1996:317) noted that the plight of strangers in distress had begun to give way to suspicion and resentment and increased the danger of political instability in the Great Lakes Region.

Nyankanzi (1998) notes that the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990 involved Uganda and Congo DR (Zaire) which was invited by their separate allies – the Tutsis and the Hutus – for support. He further reiterated that the 1996 rebellion in the Congo

DR, which had inflamed the entire region of Great Lakes, had its roots in the 1994 Rwandan war/genocide. After three months of inter-ethnic civil war in Rwanda, more than one million Hutu ethnic groups, including the former Interahamwe militias, among others, found themselves in the Congo DR refugee camp to the warm embrace of Mobutu who had been overwhelmed by the tension arising from his strained relationship with the Banyamulenge Tutsi population over discrimination.

On the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, Pitcsh (2002:20) noted that poverty, which is itself a cause of conflict, unequal wealth distribution, impoverishment and relative deprivation with other factors like social divisions, regionalism, jealousy, competition for resources, injustices and human denials, all combined to encourage the crisis in the region.

Madsen (2001:7) contends that Rwandan and Ugandan troops were trained at the Rwandan border town of Cyangugu and Gisenyi from where they joined ADFL – CZ rebels through the eastern Zaire jungles for weeks before the invasion of Zaire (Congo DR) in 1996. To confirm the observation above, the UN report (2001) on the Great Lakes conflicts stated that there was ample evidence that allies aided and abetted this systematic pillaging by the Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces.

Kathi (2002:7) of Human Rights Watch describes the training programme for the RPF and Ugandan soldiers as killers training killers. He further revealed that the ADFL – CZ, to promote its war efforts, received US$ 3.5 million dollars from Citibank, New York, a bank responsible for blood-diamonds, blood-timber money, blood-oil money and armed rebellion funding in Africa. Talbot (2001) noted that while the alliance dislodged the Hutu Interahamwe of Rwanda and the FDD militia of Burundi in the Eastern Congo DR, their advancement to Kinshasa also created fear, leading to the collapse of the unpaid Mobutu army in the entire country as the alliance soon swept across the country to install Laurent Kabila in power in 1997. The CNN in 2001 noted that about 1.7 million people had died due to the Great Lakes conflict. The war had recorded over 200,000 wounded casualties, coupled with the instability and the ensuing geopolitical conflict that resulted thereof. Since 1996 to date, the region, apart from knowing no peace, lives and exists on crises.

Buckley (1997) concedes that the Great Lakes rebellion was a powerful and ubiquitous menace throughout sub-Saharan Africa. It claims tens of thousands of souls

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annually, turning millions into refugees and often leaving countries bereft of civil and political order. Shyaka (2004) asserts that this region happens to be a place where international efforts to resolve conflicts have proved inconclusive due to several hidden interests which have continually influenced the spate of violence. He went further to reiterate that for more than a decade now, the Great Lakes Region has increasingly been contending with the issue of security and peace, due to the conflicts that are varied in nature: some being intra-state and identity based while others are transnational.

(iv) The Rwandan Crisis

According to Nyankanzi (1998:7-8), the first recorded rebellion in Rwanda occurred between 1910 and 1912 when the Northern Hutu of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi rebelled against the Germans and the Tutsi-led southern Rwandan government. The cause of the rebellion was mainly centred on the prevailing oppression, slavery and inequality.

Supporting this assertion, Munyenkaka (in ibid) argued that the major cause of the rebellion in sum, was considered to be the bitterness towards both the Tutsis and the southern Hutus over their subjugation enslavement and oppression.

Melvern (2000) contends that the next major rebellion in Rwanda started in 1957 as the Hutus called for liberty of expression and an end to ethnic discrimination, a key ideological ingredient of emerging Hutu revolution as they saw Rwanda being overrun by the Tutsi. In support of this revelation, Nyankanzi (1998) observed that Gregory Kanyibanda who later became the first independent President of Rwanda, led the rebellion; thereby, instituting Hutu rule in Rwanda. Melvern is of the opinion that this rebellion though successful, it marked the beginning of the many problems of Rwanda.

According to Ngijol (1998:19-42), violence in Rwanda is not new. It did occur, but one pertinent thing about it is that it had always been between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Supporting the assertion, Nyankanzi (1998:3-7) has noted that violence in Rwanda was rife but that of 1957 and others after it emanated from the resultant effects of the sown seeds of discord planted by the Belgian officials, a traceable fact that was on the issue of Tutsis domination of the Hutus.

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Pitsch (2002:21) believes that poverty, unequal distribution of wealth and impoverishment and relative deprivation regionalism, jealousy, subjugation, competition for resources, injustice, human destruction, among others were accepted as the major cause of ethnic violence in Rwanda. Keane (1996: 12) notes that apart from power acquisition which is seen as the main cause of conflicts in Rwanda, many Hutus did not know the importance of farm crops, and cattle herds, which the Tutsis acquired and which made them wealthy. Muhutamiana (2001:15-17) reveals that the cause of the Rwandan ethnic violence is found in two separate paradigms, which in themselves aggravated the violent conflict. On this, he noted that for the few educated Hutus, deprivation, marginalisation from everything and long-based exploitation were the causes of unhappiness; while to the illiterate peasant Hutus, over exploitation, subjugation, heavy force labour and enslavement, which were considered too heavy on them from their Tutsi neighbours were the major causes of the ethnic violence. Nyankanzi (1998:10) submit that poverty and misrule were central to the Rwandan ethnic violence.

Inter-Ethnic Reprisals

Apart from ethnic violence being a consistent and prevalent issue in Rwanda since 1957, inter-ethnic reprisal is another factor that had mitigated most of the conflicts within and between Rwanda and her neighbouring state of Burundi, former colony of the Belgians with similarities in ethnic origin, culture, and dialectics but with significant differences in the area of governance as the majority Hutus ruled over Rwanda and the minority Tutsis in turn ruled Burundi.

Meiser (1998) observes that there has been mass ethnic killings in Burundi and its neighbour, Rwanda for more than a decade. The killing in one country precipitates killings in the other. Their ethnic bond is always broken by uncountable records of violence even when they wish to remain as one people.

Tracing the history of the inter-ethnic reprisal, Nyankanzi (1998:5-8) opines that in Burundi where their distant cousins (Tutsi) held power, Tutsis were welcomed after being expelled from Uganda and Rwanda following the 1959 Belgian-assisted Tutsi massacre in Rwanda and the subsequent Hutu control of the country. Nyankanz, also notes that the unexpected assassination of President Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993 and the subsequent inter-ethnic strife in Burundi became a catalyst for Rwanda as

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President Habyarimana abandoned the politics of reconciliation in favour of the politics of Hutunization.

Melvern (2000:97) observed that because Rwanda and Burundi were administered as a joint colonial territory, and because there was violence between Hutus and Tutsis in both countries, the destinies of the two countries were often linked. Talbot (2001:45) noted that Burundi was indirectly involved in the Congolese war as it supported the – Tutsi-led army. This is because the FDD militia rebels of Burundi who were based in Eastern Congo were sympathetic to their brothers in Goma and Bukavu.

Nyankanzi (1998:11-23) postulates that the Hutus, upon the call to go and kill to avenge the death of President Ndadaye, in Burundi, responded by arming themselves with machetes, spears, clubs and knives. They combed every house and village, hacking down every Tutsi in sight. The same system, in a more rehearsed form, was used by Rwanda – Hutus against the Tutsis during the 1994 war/genocide.

2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of analysis adopted for this study is "Conflict Theory". Conflict, according to Boulding (1962:1), is an activity that is found almost everywhere in the world of man. Amongst all the categories of conflicts, political conflict seems to be the most devastating and destructive both in idea and action. Dahl (1987) asserted that conflicts arise as a result of many factors including struggle for power and privileges and differences in social status. Such social status determinants as economic class, income, wealth, position and occupation count. Other factors like differences in education, ideology, religion, language, region, family origins, amongst others also breed conflicts. In essence, conflict is a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of others (Boulding 1962:1-12). According to Coser (1967:42-54) conflict occurs among individuals, groups and organizational interests. When it happens, it can lead to a clash among actors, thus resulting in death, owing to its violent nature.

Laue (1990:17-18) posits that conflict is a natural and inevitable part of all human social relationships. It is the escalated and natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige. Parties in conflict believe

they have incompatible goals and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over, injure or destroy one another. He went further to state that conflict could escalate to a psychopathology, social disorder and war. Conflict is a social phenomenon, and is multi-faceted. There are some which are very beneficial while others are destructive.

Scimecca (1990:30-33), observes that the theory of conflict explains human behaviour in terms of self-interest and the perpetuation of the social order by the organized coercion of certain groups over other groups. He states also that although political conflict takes several different forms, what is crucial for understanding social behavior is the degree to which people are in positions to control others and how this is related to the accumulation of wealth, power and status that arouse conflicts, amongst them.

However, to Stragner (1967:15-23), conflict is an unfortunate but basic characteristic of human nature. She upheld that conflict leads to violence which attracts attention where all civil methods fail. To her, conflict occurs over means to achieve goals. It is inherent in human condition. She concluded by saying that every major advancement in an individual, group and societal civilization has resulted from conflict and we certainly agree that bloodshed and destruction have followed from many conflicts.

Deutsch (1990:38-49), argues that conflict could be positive. Thus, he noted that conflict has many positive functions; it prevents stagnation, it stimulates interest and curiosity. It is the medium through which problems can be aired and solutions arrived at. It is the root of personal and social change. Conflict is also often part of the process of testing and assessing oneself (individual, group, nation state and the international system) for corporate improvement. He further noted that conflicts engender systemic innovations and compel new management techniques.

Banks (1996:439) contends that conflict is both inevitable and necessary. It is inevitable because both people and groups have basic needs expressed in the society through competing values, clashing in order to provide the catalyst for development. Without this, life would hardly be worthwhile in terms of change and progress. He submitted that conflict could be functional, but that its functional benefits could sometimes be accompanied by dysfunctional costs: hostility, rigidity, violence and destruction.

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Thus, it is imperative to agree with Ekoko (1996:441) who asserted that the causes of conflicts in Africa are multifaceted; that the frequency and regularity are extremely high; that no sub-region in the continent is free of major conflict, and that as a result, the level of insecurity, instability and chaos is also abnormally high in Africa. The crisis in Rwanda fell within intra-state conflict, occasioned by the mode of governance, ethnic dominance, ethnic witch-hunting, scapegoating, social subjugation and fear of the unknown. The Rwandan crisis from its inception, had always been a top – down political violence strategy. This means that it is always those in leadership position who usually plan it and spread it down to the executors (the common people on the street). Thus, Berdal (2000:25) noted that the entire crisis against the Tutsis had followed the same undertone, as they were seen as the common enemies.

Apart from the ethnic basis of the conflict, group interest and the drive for value retention were also seen to have contributed in modulating the different stages or dimensions that the conflict took, ending in a genocidal situation. This value retention and differing interest invariably led to abysmal violence that had not only contributed to the spread of rebellion in Africa but had also caused many indigenes to see survival as an unattainable goal (Gurr, 1974).

Keith (1946:105-109) opines that man is born of a competitive spirit; that man is, by nature, competitive, combative, ambitious, jealous, envious and vengeful. He further noted the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for integrity, which often reaches such extremity of decision-making, with the resultant effects leading to the use of force, violence, conflict, war among others.

Consequently, incompatible goals, apart from the acts of frustration and deprivation, generate conflicts in several ways. This becomes clear when examined from sequential scenes of events in the case study and the numerous other conflicts that had bedeviled Africa. A question to be asked is, can the incompatibility of goals which is seen as natural and inevitable reasons for most conflicts mean that Africa and Rwanda, especially, may never get out of conflicts or that conflicts cannot be dislodged, or curtailed to the barest minimum. The first step to putting an end to conflict is to find its root cause. The second is to allow the parties in the conflict to see reason for dialogue, by disagreeing to agree, and then to make peace. In making peace, of course, each must be ready to relinquish certain or some parts of the contending

factors while at the same time, agreeing to accept the views and feelings of others who must also reciprocate accordingly.

The third is that when the root causes of the crises are found, and an agreement is reached through dialogue, the conflict must take the root cause of the crisis seriously. This is to guarantee a successful and peaceful end of the conflict which when not properly managed, can escalate.

Against the several contentions of scholars above, it is reasonable to submit that it is the outburst of the long years of endured pains, deprivation and frustration, with deep-seated hatred among the people that caused the consistent crisis in Rwanda up till the 1994 war and genocide.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF CRISES IN RWANDA

3:0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the origin of the Rwandan crisis. It explains the causes of rebellion cum crisis in Rwanda and traces the genesis of all the conflicts to colonial administrative deficiency, the imposition of indirect rule as far back as 1894 and the imposition of forced labour on a people and social groups that were once harmoniously united. This ugly development prompted ethnicization in politics in all facets of the society as deception, brainwashing and misplaced administrative priorities helped to enthrone minority social group leadership over the majority social group. All these are central to the establishment of the root cause of the Rwandan crisis. Also, frustration, deprivation and subjugation which characterised the chain of forced labour under the Tutsi oligarchy made the outburst of the people a volatile aggression, leading to the enthroning of majority rule instead of minority misrule.

This work, mindful of the role of inequality in governance, examines these factors extensively. A brief history of the Tutsi, the Hutu and the Twa is evaluated. The record of ethnic rebellion and the crisis in Rwanda leading to genocide in 1994, as caused by leadership problem and poor economy, is also discussed. The activities of the rebel groups in Rwanda, which formed the catalyst for the 1994 genocide, were noted to be different in both execution and planning. The people were seen to have put ethnicity before religious faith, thereby encouraging deep-seated ethnic conflicts in the Rwandan government and politics.

3.1 ORIGIN OF RWANDA

Rwanda is a small East African country. It is located between the international boundaries, demarcating the Eastern and the Central African states in a horizontal stroke of line. It lies vertical like a shred of pieces of rag on top of the sister state Burundi, with a nose-dive, deep into the Kivu Lake. Both Rwanda and Burundi are a consequence of colonial partition. The countries in that region are called East African states with several things in common. Rwanda is surrounded by several Lakes and river without any passing through it. Such lakes include Lake Tangayinka, Lake Edward,

Lake Bulera, Lake Victoria, Lake Kivu, Lake Rweru, Lake Cychoha, Lake Mutanda, Lake Bunyonyi, Lake Ruhondo, Lake Muhazi, among others. There is also the River Akagera. All exist around it, thereby making it a member of the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Taking a look at Rwanda from the geographical spectrum, outside its own enclave, say from Katuna - the border town with Uganda in the North East; Goma - the border town with Congo DR in the North West; Butahana - the border town with Burundi in the South West and Ngara - at the Vantage of the Akagera River in the border town with Tanzania in the South East, Rwanda is surrounded and found in the midst of scattered hills, both small and big with high rising hills and mountains. Thus, Melvern (2000:57) noted that Rwanda is "a land of a thousand hills with a few exploitable natural resources that were of little interest to the outside world".

The evergreen vegetation with a good humid and temperate weather that is always between 25^0 c to 28^0 c, favours the land that is located at the bottom of the hilly slopes of the mountains. Crops such as tea, coffee, bananas, leguminous plants and fruits are grown there while cattle, goats and sheep, among other livestock's are reared at subsistence level. There is arable land at the sides and bottom of these mountains and there is often heavy rainfall, which easily washes crops away. All the cities and towns are interlocked by several hills; even roads are constructed on the sides and tops of these mountains with big slopes, deep valleys and dangerous sharp bends lying by the side.

However, away from these observations, several stories have been told about the Rwandan ancestral origin. Some hold the view that the pre-colonial Rwanda remains largely a mystery while another group note that Rwandan history could be recalled only in poems and in myths. In yet another contention, Makki (1995:238) postulated that the origin of Rwanda was an act of God who created three sons with different responsibilities. Kass (1998:18), in another instance, contended that both Hutus and Tutsis are migrants who came to settle with the original inhabitants of the land - the Abatwas, whom they later dominated in terms of population and wealth. The last groups, most especially the European explorers like Speke cited by Lema (1993:43) had argued that only the Tutsis are pastoralists who migrated from Ethiopia

and from further north (Middle East). In all, they came to dominate the Twas and the Hutus for several years despite their low population.

Meanwhile, Nyankanzi (1998:7) noted that Rwanda is made up of "three social – cultural groups' of the Abahutus, Abatutsis and Abatwas.   Amongst these social groups, ethnic identity was not pronounced because they are a unique and extraordinary people. They live side by side, intermarrying and speaking the same language – Kinyawanda. These social groups share the same religious belief, worship one ancestor – Imana, and tell the same ancestral folklores and legends. They were said to be one people, and a unique one for that matter (Melvern, 2000:8-9). This informed Nyankanzi (1998) who noted that the idea of ethnic consciousness was not recognized nor in existence among the early Rwandaise.

The Umwami dynasty of the Tutsi extraction ruled the Kingdom of Rwanda for many years and was also the patron of that land. With a network of *abaganwa* and *abatware,* the Umwami issued orders and commands throughout the land.

The symbiotic level of existence shows that each layer of the hierarchy was linked in a relationship of mutual dependence based on reciprocal arrangements regarding goods and services. There was an institution of Ubuhake which involves contractual service whereby a more powerful person provides protection in exchange for work from a weaker person. The social mobility was open to all. Most often, the patron was Tutsi. In this strictly controlled society, Hutu who obeyed orders generally headed the neighbourhoods while above this level was the Tutsi King - Umwami and his army. According to Gasan (2005), the above situation symbolizes oneness amongst the three stages of Rwandan life history as displayed in the garden analysis at Gizosi memorial centre in Kigali. This stage clearly indicates that Rwanda was unified prior to the colonial epoch.

Melvern (2000:3-4) further noted that the Umwami ruled the kingdom in a unique aristocratic structure, a feudal type of governance with many vassals. He divided the kingdom into provinces, districts, hills and neighbourhoods. He appointed two high chiefs who helped to administer the province. Each chief was assigned a portfolio – either to be in charge of agriculture or cattle, and to collect cattle taxes. In the same vein, there was a chief for the hill who was in charge of land holding, taxation and grazing rights.

The Umwami controlled a class of nobility called Imfura. There was a non-formal educational institution, hospitals, churches or modern government in existence. Because of this kind of ruling arrangement, the Umwami was highly applauded and appreciated by the European explorers when they eventually arrived to rule Rwanda from 1894 upward.

3.2 RWANDA UNDER COLONIAL RULE

According to *Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara* (1997), Rwanda, a mountainous kingdom in the heart of Africa, was described by early European travelers as 'a tropical Switzerland or the pearl of Africa'. Rwanda,a small country, landlocked and remote, was poor and overwhelmingly reliant on agriculture.   According to Melvern (2000:10), the kingdom was shut off from the world until 4th May, 1894 when the first European, a German, Count Gustav Adolf Von Gotzen arrived Rwanda. Although at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) Rwanda was already allocated to the Germans, unknown to the Rwandaise themselves, but it was not until the visit of the Count Von Gotzen in 1894 after being made Governor of the German East Africa, of which Rwanda was part and parcel that king Rwabugiri, who was then the Uwmami received him after a little resistance. The German colonialists, however, appreciated the kind of local governance and order put in place. This system was basically feudal, with an aristocratic and vassal system in the kingdom. The king, Uwmami Kigeri Rwabugiri was allowed to continue with his reign over the land.

Furthermore, with this kind of cooperation and smooth administration that the Germans met on ground and complemented, the Tutsis were favoured for political offices. They were further allowed to rule the land; even when it was obvious that they, the Tutsi minority, were ruling over the majority. The Germans also favoured them in acquiring knowledge by making them attend school to learn the art of governance. The children of the noble, Nyankanzi (1998) revealed, were sent to foreign schools and made to learn the ways of the colonial masters while other children were to follow the servitude line of their parents. The nobility cut across both the Tutsis' and the Hutus' wealthy ones.

Still on governance, Melvern (2000:13) noted that the Germans ruled Rwanda through this existing power structure of the Uwmami and his social group members (Abaganwa) while the German helmsman, Count Von Gotzen, believed that his

country's policy must be to support the chiefs in such a manner that they would be convinced that their own salvation and that of their supporters depended on their faithfulness to the Germans.

To show how faithful and loyal the colonized were, the Uwmami, with the backing of the German authority, adopted a stringent leadership style with ruthlessness and disdain. High exploitation and slavery became rife in the land. To this end, ethnic consciousness was seen creeping into the land of the once peaceful, co-habited and mutually unified people of Rwanda.

To reciprocate the gesture, the Germans, in 1910 and 1912 respectively, backed the Umwami to subdue the northern rebellion of the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Hutu people who protested the expansionist tendencies of the Germans. (Melvern, 2004:123). Commenting on this development and the growing opposition, Mamdani (2001:41-47) noted that the Northern Hutus were seen as a set of disgruntled, crude, disloyal and rebellious people. The Germans, in reacting to this kind of behaviour, however, decided to entrust every act of governance into the hands of the Tutsis and rated them a superior race. The rating was seen as quite different from the common order of natives, as the Tutsis were likened to the German Aryan race.

Following this conception, the Germans, insisting on Tutsis' political and cultural superiority over others in Central Africa, contended that it was possible that the Tutsis might have come from somewhere else. Thus, in further admiration of the Tutsis, Melvern (2004) noted that the Germans, in their submission had argued that the Tutsis were peculiar savage Negroes because of their looks, and the kind of high level of political and religious sophistication they portrayed. With the elevation of the Tutsis, the Hutus were granted second class citizenship, despite being in the majority.

This development, however, opened the gate for ethnicity, which was established with the principle of divide and rule. Gasana (2005) described the entrenchment of the principle of divide and rule as a process meant to enhance the ultimate exploitation and appropriation of the people's land without any opposition. The Germans' imposition of indirect rule, recognition of one ethnic group as being superior, and the cyclical exploitation of the land using one ethnic group against the others, probably might have formed the bedrock of all enmity amongst the social groups in Rwanda. The Germans, in further support of their actions above, Melvern

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(2000:10-14) aptly asserted, believed that the Watutsis were well established since ancient times, referencing their intelligence and capability.

Credit to the Tutsis, the Germans were well respected and appreciated in the land throughout their Germans' occupation of Rwanda. With the Germans handing Rwanda over to the Belgians as a mandate of the League of Nations after the First World War, a new beginning was marked with a new system of interaction under a new master in a master-servant relationship. The Belgians in their administration of the state met exactly what the German confessed of the Hutus, Tutsis, and the Twas. They, in this regard, strengthened the political diplomacy of divide and rule already in existence. They also appreciated the loyalty of the Tutsis and encouraged their role in the exploitation of the land, a factor that created political power struggle in Rwanda over the imposition of the minority on the majority. Prior to the German colonization of their country, Rwandan people knew nothing about inequality, ethnicity, superiority of one race to the other, or the differences in either genetic or character make up. All the Germans wanted was to keep the country divided in line with their intentions. The Belgians, in strengthening this policy, also encouraged ethnic tension with a deep-seated ethnic hatred. This ethnic hatred was sharply promoted with the use of forced labour and denial in order to exploit the people of Rwanda – a plot they made even while foreseeing alteration among the ethnic groups in the nearest future.

It was the promotion of this situation of greed and the foster of extreme servitude and poverty to the detriment of the majority that aggravated the tempo of instability and unhealthy rivalry amongst the people.

3.3   RWANDA: FROM   MANDATE   TERRITORY   STATUS   TO   TRUSTEESHIP TERRITORY STATUS

In respect of the role of the Germans in the First World War of 1914, Minear (1996:53-55) observed that a covenant of the League of Nations, under Article 23 (3) stripped Germany and other recalcitrant states that joined in plunging the world into the holocaust of all their colonies in Africa and other parts of the world.   Then, under the 1918 Treaty of Versailles, and in the article noted above, Rwanda and Burundi colonies of the imperial German in East Africa were given to Belgium as mandate territories. The covenant of the League, based on the stage of the development of the people of the areas mandated that the territories be treated fairly in humane conditions of labour, just

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treatment for the native inhabitants and prevention and control of diseases among others.

Against their pledge to the League to continue where the German policy stopped, Nyankanzi (1998) revealed that the Belgians re-introduced favouritism to the Rwandan – Tutsis by giving them preference, granting them special access to education and jobs. As a result of this situation, the Hutus felt victimized by double colonization, as against the hope that the Belgians had come to correct the misdeed of the Germans. Instead, they strengthend the same policy. The Belgians, in response to this outcry, gradually changed the inherited German Indirect Rule system to Direct Rule System, a decision which the League of Nations neither questioned nor corrected.

By 1923, the Belgians had assumed full control of the entire territory of Rwanda. With special emphasis on Rwanda, the Belgian administrators eroded the power of the Rwanda king and violated the covenant of the League's mandate on supervisory role. Subsequently, the king was obliged to be assisted by the Belgian representatives of the colonial resident. At the same time, the king was forbidden to appoint regional chiefs and barred from many duties. In 1931, this development saw King Umwami Mussinga, who opposed the colonial policies and system of administration, being deposed. The Belgians, who were more interested in who would support them without questioning their policy of forced labour and extreme exploitation, enthroned Mutara Rudahigwa III, one of the pliant sons of Umwami Mussinga. Unlike his grandfathers and father, (Umwami Rwabugirir and Umwami Mussinga) Umwami Mutara Rudahigwa was a willing partner and a tool in the hands of the Belgians and the Catholic Church missionaries.

Available records indicate that it was during the reign of Mutara Rudahigwa III that the Belgians transformed the Tutsi ruling oligarchy into paid colonial agents. Owing to the loyalty of the ruling house and the cooperative attitude of the people in not pressurising or questioning the colonial masters, the Rwandans' land was nicknamed *Urwamda raw Bikiramariya,* meaning Virgin Mary's Rwanda.

Consequent upon the slavish nature of King Rudahigwa Mutara III who never challenged the Belgians and their harsh policies, coupled with the growing romance and engagements between them, he earned himself the nickname, "King of the Whites". Thus, Melvern (2000:10) added that the King now wore western suits, drove

himself in the whiteman's car and became a new convert into the whiteman's way of worship. In addition to this was the conversion to Christianity of the people and some of the King's aides in 1943. One of the policies that the Belgians made as part of their rule was to subject the people to Roman Catholic Church doctrine.

With this development, the society was divided into chiefdoms with the colonialists involving themselves in the running of local affairs. Money was introduced and education was solely reserved for the sons of the chiefs. To justify the structure of their policies, civil service within the Rwandan bureaucracies was established to comprise only the Tutsi oligarchy. Due to the harsh and forced labour policy of the Belgians, many of the citizens, especially the Hutu peasants, fled in their thousands into Uganda and Tanzania to become migrant labourers.

Anyidoho (1998:1-4), in this regard, argued that the Belgians' colonial administrators who had completely abandoned the German policies for Rwanda and operated contrary to against the mandate status of the League of Nations, introduced an extreme form of governance that was never properly checked. Earlier on, the Belgians had consolidated this misrule in 1933 when they introduced census and ethnic classification that was misguided by structural appearance and assumption (Nyankanzi, 1998:8). These decisions were not only completely counter-productive but erroneous as they were seen to have aided in causing more destructive effects in the 1990s. Notable among these policies was the swapping of social identity by merely looking at a person's physique and appearance. This wrong policy saw everyone who was tall, skinny, and with a long nose categorised as a Tutsi. This did not only create discrimination among the people, it also destroyed the state system. People of average height, short and with broader chest were categorised as Hutus. The dwarfs were called Twas.

These ideas were also complemented by those from the Northern part of the country who were classified as Tutsis because of their riches and resources such as money, cattle, sheep and goats. The Belgians' administration did not only mock and flout the tenet of the League of Nations with this kind of attitude, it also showed the weakness of the League and its inability to monitor the activities and events in the mandate territory - Rwanda.

However, with the coming into being in 1945 of the United Nations Charter, which replaced the League of Nations, all the states under mandate territory were transferred to the Trusteeship territory status of the UN. The United Nations, under its trusteeship system, monitored the situations in Rwanda for a certain period, as it once again handed things over to Belgium. The areas considered most vital during the period were leadership, social welfare, human rights, development, economic status and so on, as Rwanda was expected to develop on the same line with other trusteeship colonies.

Under small states status, Rwanda was probably of little importance in the eyes of the international community as everything was left in the hands of the Belgians to manage. Thus, the UN intermittently visited Rwanda as a way of encouraging the people and, at the same time, creating a sense of belonging amongst the people while heavily relying on the reports sent to her by France about a country run by Belgium. Although the Belgians were the colonial master under the trusteeship commission, the influence of France was steadily and readily noted to be affecting the political environment of the country for reasons probably known to them, while the Belgians, in trying to consolidate and control the colony, introduced hard policies which included forced labour, ethnicity, census and deep-seated seed of discord amongst the people of Rwanda.

3.4   RWANDA: FROM SOCIAL GROUPS TO ETHNIC IDENTITY

Premised on the kind of ethnic identity that was obviously instituted and made very pronounced in Rwanda in the late twenties and early thirties of the twentieth century, thereby prompting the society to move from social group to ethnic group, it suffices to explain that the negative role of these identified ethnic groups in the Rwandan enterprises had been the bane of Rwandan peace efforts.

According to Berkley (1998), Rwandans, from the history of existence, are a people of the same class, living in groups, not separately designed for companionship; a social group of the Muhutus, Umututsi and Mutwas, who spoke one language, had one culture, practised one religion and whose god's names end with 'Imana', meaning 'people having the inclination of the spiritual or supreme being inclination'. Their social relationship was far better than what ethnic ideology and ethnic chanting brought thereafter. This had even been the case amongst the Rwandans before the break of history (Mamdani, 2001:20-24).

Thus, if the composition of the society before the coming of Europeans as Melvern (2000:7) also noted was anything to go by, then, the kingdom of Rwanda under the 'Umwami', where the people were unique living side by side, intermarrying, sharing the same ancestral folklores and never discriminating amongst themselves, they must therefore be reckoned with as a special race of people. As the situation also raises questions with regard to why and for what reasons did the Europeans give in to the idea of changing this social group to ethnic groups.

Besides, to justify the strong tie amongst the social groups, Gasana (2005) in the first garden – pool analysis located at the Gizosi genocide center, states the element of Rwandan unification as people of the same origin, same language and same history without any kind of division amongst them before the advent of colonialism, and to what they were "…we called our country, our people and our culture" to illustrate the level of bond among them.

The garden contains several things, ranging from good environment, good vegetation, waterfall, fine plantation, cash crops, fruits and so on housed in serenity and security. The degree of oneness and saturation of the garden with all kinds of good things of life, which made the people live in comfort and never wish that they should be interrupted explains the level of socialization and brotherliness among the early Rwandaise. Their idea of Imana as the Supreme Being after whom many of them took their names, and the belief that Umwami is his great messenger on earth that must be respected, also explains how they held in high esteem their religion and spirituality (Mamdani 2001:53-57).

Thus, they are a refined kind of social groups whose identities were never in doubt. The level of coherence among them shows that everyone belonged to the same clan. This implies that the concerned persons of Rwanda were of the same ancestor called Kanyarwanda. Although analysts and scholars had argued that there were differences amongst the groups, the differences, prior to this time, were never based on wealth or class or amongst the rich and the poor; after all, there were Hutus and Tutsis in the same class. Tutsi pastoralists were as poor as their Hutu (farmers) - neighbours. Hence, to say that something else threatened this social relationship more than the coming of the Europeans – Germans/Belgians was a deceptive statement and a misnomer. It was the latter who created ethnic identity amongst these groups.

To answer the questions on why the social groups were abolished and replaced by the institution of ethnic identity, Otunnu (1999:4-5) noted that pre-colonial alliances and conflicts were greatly exacerbated during the European colonial rule in Rwanda. Evidently, too, this was because in their desire to govern the people unchallenged, they encouraged ethnic alliance, especially between the Tutsis and the Hutus of Rwanda. This alliance blurred ethnic differences between the Tutsis and the Hutus in the scheme of things. They also increased conflicts and confrontations between members of these two group; thereby, bringing to an end the joy found amongst them when they were social groups.

The principle of divide and rule as entrenched by the Germans and fortified by the Belgians gave birth to what was known as the allegory of ethnicity in Rwanda. In this respect Otunnu, (1999:78) further observed that:

> *The Europeans (Germans) using the principle of localized governance (indirect rule), they found unique amongst the people, forced themselves on the people. Using the Royals on the throne (Tutsi oligarchy) they administered the society without hitches… This policy led to loss of fertile land to cash crop production, food scarcity, and conflict over the unevenly distributed and scarce land, and antagonism entered Rwanda.*

Consequent on the above policy, the second garden – pool analysis indicates the different locations, symbolizing a long way through which ethnic dissension, seeds of discord and hatred had been infused into the people. The water channels in its implication showed how the people in grief and deprivation scattered within the Lakes region in search of means of livelihood and away from insecurity that was never pronounced since creation. The garden also had a star-like shape representing how the Rwandan society attained its division.

In the above analysis, Nyankanzi (1998:7-8) noted that ethnic consciousness that was never in existence is now part of the people. Social mobility was no longer open to all. The idea that a Muhutu could be mistaken for an Umututsi and vice-versa was no longer attainable. Indoctrination had taken the centre stage against the wishes of some of the people. Likewise, the idea of one race being superior to the others had infused division among the people, just as the reasons that only the children of the noble (Tutsi oligarchy) were allowed to acquire education. It is this combined forces

that made ethnicity and ethnic consciousness a stronger totem in the period under study.

However, with the establishment of the ethnic grouping leading to change in behaviour and character, it suffices this study to succinctly examine each as follows.

THE HUTU

According to Rwandan legend and folklore, the Abahutus or Umuhutus and Gahutus, whichever one, as they are called, is one amongst the three children of Umwami, a remote divine personality who was said to be the first king on the earth. Umwami was said to be the chief messenger of Imana, the creator of the earth. History had it that he designed a test for his three children as a way of testing their intelligence, strength and ability. After providing them with a churn of milk, the Abahutus was said to have split his own milk, an action that then placed him under the command of his younger brother – the Abatutsi (Melvern, 2000:7).

The Hutus are naturally short, dark-skinned and docile Bantu–like–people (structure). The name, Hutu, means a subject or servant that was given the faculty of disobedience and labour by Imana. This is a suggestive statement which designates one destined to serve the other (Mamdani, 2001:42).

Consequently, the Hutus are made to till the soil (farm). The Hutus were once a social group with others. They are about 84% of the Rwandan population. The Hutus have been differently described by scholars and, as Keane (1996:11-12) puts it, in this respect the Hutus were mainly peasant farmers most of whose culture the Tutsis had dominated. He argued that not all the Hutu vassals were exploited, although there evolved a dangerous sense of second-class citizenship amongst the Hutus. Supporting this notion is the economic status and realities which was the factor that kept the majority of the Hutus in a subordinating position, no matter what their aspirations were. However, in a contrary view, Adisa (1996:14) noted that the early Hutus were organized under the leadership of lineage heads or chiefs as they co-existed with the Twa. The Hutus were organized into small states, comprising different lineages under a ruling lineage headed by Umwami. This statement, a subject of disputation, was, however, never substantiated with regards to who actually controlled the Umwami dynasty that was strongly linked to the Tutsi race.

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An example of this kind is what Mamdani (2001:60-66) explained to be a distorted fact when he noted that after some time the Hutus were identified with the group master, especially as the Tutsis frequently migrated from one region of Rwanda to another with their Hutu clients and servants. In other words, the Hutu clients simply adopted the clan identity of their Tutsi patron, indicating that due to economic condition, the Hutus derived joy in serving Tutsis and the Tutsi patrons who, in return, protected them and gave them cattle as a Tutsi clan.

The contention that the Hutus are known for agriculture was also debunked by Mamdani (2001:51) who argued that such reasoning was no longer sustainable in the light of recent research. The scholar's contention remained disputed since he equally agreed that the Hutus were given the faculty of disobedience and labour by their creator. Research also noted that the Hutus, Tutsis and the Twas all struggled for farmland.

From another angle, the Gahutus, according to Melvern (2000:8-9), were in the vast majority and were predominantly peasants who cultivated the soil and resembled most of the people living in the neighbouring countries of Uganda and Tanzania with typical Bantu features-shorter and broader. According to Shyaka (2004:11), this does not mean any sense of belonging, which was invariably unchanging; the Hutus and other groups in Rwanda swore allegiance to the same Monarch, Umwami, shared the same culture, language (Kinyarwanda) and lived together in the same territory from time immemorial.

While one may ponder on the above reiterations once again, it is obvious that the contention above is very clear about the origin of the Hutus and others. Even when there was a sense of belonging to the Hutus clan or others before the advent of colonialism, it is imperative to equally note that such identity was never on disparity or superiority but in the belief that everyone belonged to the same clan which implies that the concerned persons in this direction were of the same origin, that is, sons of the same ancestral father called Kanyarwanda.

The Hutus, in another breath were described by the colonial exploiters as 'creatures with souls sad, passive, ignoring all thought for the morrow; thus, making for what they passed through and experienced under subjugation (Keane 1996:16) This is because they resisted the latter from balkanizing Rwanda. Even as peasant majority,

they were never suitable partners in the exploitation of Rwanda. They are a people who see their Tutsi overlords as demi–gods. They were also men who believed that anything like free vote would mean the end of Tutsi rule as manifested in the 1961 general elections in Rwanda.

On assuming power in the sixties, the Hutus saw the opportunities to reclaim, reinstate and re–establish themselves in power; hence, every leader that emerged amongst them tended to maintain the same status quo. This also helped to prolong the nursed hatred against their neighbour – the Tutsis.

The above postulations, this work does not come to terms with all the stated views about the Hutus, since their history and that of the Tutsis are shrouded with hazy record. The second deduction is that the Hutus and Tutsis who are involved in the conflict in contemporary Rwandan society have constituted neither races, tribes nor ethnic groups. The conflicts have been more politically based than anthropologically based as it would be best to allow the record to be put straight by the people of Rwanda themselves.

TUTSI

The word, "Tutsi", simply means rich in cattle; and it is often used to refer to the younger brother to Gahutu. According to Melvern (2000), Rwandan legendary paradigm informs that the Tutsis are mainly one clan of cattle herders who succeeded in dominating much of the affair of what is now known as Rwanda. Tutsi is said to have been given the faculty of anger from Imana (God) on request at the time of creation.

They are also known to be very intelligent, skilled and manipulative. It was the ability of the Tutsi to keep his own churn of milk intact when he was tested by his father that earned him the dominance over others. Although none of the brothers held that against him, as the centuries passed by, this clan consolidated power as it ruled over others. The Tutsi clan enjoyed the same culture, custom and traditions with others. The Tutsis nobility that dominated the center of Rwandan politics stresses the importance of physical stature. On this, the Tutsis claimed that their tallness, thinness, angular feature, aquiline facial features, and so on were synonymous with superiority.

The Tutsis' privilege made others to be seen as sub-human, especially those who tilled the soil (Keane 1996:13).

The Tutsis were about 14% of the Rwandan population before the 1994 crisis. Today, such record has fallen between 6 and 7 % as the general population has also gone down drastically. What separated the Tutsis and others then was primarily a matter of occupation and wealth, because they owned large herds of cattle.

Owing to several unconfirmed reports about Rwandan legend and history, historians and anthropologists had been accused of distorting the history of Rwanda to the detriment of the Tutsis. Thus, there is no consensus of opinions on the origins of this division of clans in the Rwandan history. The idea of distinction between the Hutus and Tutsis was said to have originated from the English and colonial explorers. The same English explorers who postulated the Hamitic theory did so to favour the Tutsis and claimed that it was due to the former's peculiar traits that they are deemed admirable. They opine that the Tutsis originated from the Horn of Africa, notably Ethiopia, migrating south and gradually achieving dominance over the other two groups. It was this view that led to the assertion that the Tutsis were a superior race-a lethal interpretation of history and one that would seriously affect the views and the attitudes of Europeans (Prunnier, 1995:12-14).

Speke (1950:43-47), in his view, noted that the Tutsis were a superior race and quite different from the common order of natives. From the postulation of this contention, it became widely believed that so superior were the Tutsis that they must have come from somewhere else. It was impossible, the argument went on, that savage negroes could have attained such a high level of political and religious sophistication. The Tutsis were believed to have been closely related to the noble Europeans. They also asserted that this race was so superior and too fine to be common Negroes. Their tallness and thinner noses made them different. Although they had intelligence and a refinement of feelings which was rare amongst primitive people, it was their astuteness that placed them above others (Melvern 2000:8).

The traits of the Tutsis, coupled with the degree of cooperation found among them by the colonial explorers and the colonialists, attracted special interest to them. This was exemplified in the observation of Keane (1996:13) who contended that the early colonialists believed in and fostered the myth of the Tutsis as black Aryans-men

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who are not too dissimilar to Europeans, and nobler than the savage who could be trusted to carry out the orders of the white men. This brought about the notion of Tutsis as proto–Europeans.

There is no evidence about where the Tutsis' clan came from. Adisa (1996:14-15) noted that the pastoralists migrating southward into the Great Lakes Region came after the Hutus. These Nilotic cattlemen, known as the Tutsis, came into the region between the 11th and 15th centuries but they soon emerged as a privileged class in Great Lakes Region. There was the process of peaceful infiltration, peaceful co-existence by conquest through direct Tutsi military rule. This notion, which, however, was contrary to the Rwandan legend and history, is in tandem with the explanation of the colonial explorers who believed that the Tutsis bear resemblance with the Europeans. The European explorers' observation was based on physical appearance. They were aided and abetted by the former ruling class who led the Europeans to all manner of humiliating follies, simply because they wanted an ally or surrogate native in order to exploit the host. In furtherance to this, Gunther, a Western scholar (1954:36) noted that:

> *the Tutsis are not Negroes, though they may be jet black A Hamitic or Nilotic people, they were pastoral nomads and cattlemen who came down from the North… they were proud, sophisticated and not particularly energetic. Several times we saw Watutsis Lords sitting on bicycles and being pushed by their vassals No anthropologist has ever explained why the Watutsis are so tall. Possibly, diet has something to do with it. In any case, tallness is the symbol of the racial exclusiveness and pure blood.*

The assertion above is another inference raised about the Tutsi race. This is because the elements that divided Rwanda before now, Belgium and France, by contrast, had seen the Tutsis as of elitist background. Although they were in the minority as a people, the Tutsi were seen as viable tools in the perfect partnership and exploitation of Rwanda, a situation meant to keep the country in its existing state for their selfish interest (Keane, 1996:16). Toward the exploitation of Rwanda, the Tutsis were willing and showed that they were more interested in the preservation of privileged and material wealth than in any question of national identity. It was based on this cooperation that the Germans and later the Belgians gave the Tutsi overlord powers over the lives of the people and the land.

According to Nyankanzi (1998:11), other ethnic groups feared the domineering influence of the Tutsis. Consequently, making the crisis that followed was seen as the only available option and final solution to the consistent threat of the common enemy – the Tutsis.

THE TWAS

The Twas or pygmies, according to history, were said to be the first inhabitants of Rwanda. They are about one percent of the population of Rwanda. They were described as mainly hunter-gatherers. The Twas subsisted on what they could gather in the field and forest. The tribes, Twas, which otherwise means useless human, are tool makers. The Twas were given the faculty of gluttony which they gladly embraced by the creator, (Melvern, 2000:7-8).

The Twas, due to their height, are not given due recognition. Both the Hutus and the Tutsis see the Twas as a sub-human. They, on their own, did not involve themselves in any act of governance. They lived their normal life, thriving on what nature had bestowed on them.

Thus, on a visit to the post-genocide Rwanda, precisely at Gatuna in Byumba province, the researcher saw the Twas whom he mistook for a group of teenagers or children. They were seen struggling with their bicycles with one hand and loads with the other. Some were equally carrying little kids. Unknown to the researcher, the children they were carrying or cuddling were theirs. They were very smallish dwarfs and some less with big heads. On their stature, the research assistant, Casmir Nsethiasesera from Makarere University disagreed with the researcher's notion that there was high rate of teenage pregnancies, promiscuity and, or early marriage syndrome in this part of the world a. He argued that most of the petite women that were either carrying pregnancies or carrying babies were mature in age and were pygmies. The men and women were about one inch tall; some were even half an inch tall.

These dwarfish people were the Twas, the original inhabitants of Rwanda aforetime time. Looking at them, one could see the act of hewing and gathering on their faces. They seemed to exert more energy and do more tedious work than other clans. As our car passed by their long chain of trekkers like marching soldier - ants,

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their faces were covered in with hardship. They were also seen in a row walking up a ring formed mountain with sharp and deep – slopes by the roadsides, just as some of them were seen pushing up their luxury bicycles with their loads while others trekked.

The men and women were alike in shape and size, with oblong and big heads, big noses, broad chests and shoulder–short arms, all fitted into their small bodies. The Twas believed that they were unique species.

However, Halsey (1999:58) had argued in favour of the Twas as people so long neglected. She also corroborated the fact that these people, the pygmies, were not recognized or even seen as a people in the country. They were neither involved nor included in the scheme of things in Rwanda, but they were happy to be Twas.

3.5   THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY IN RWANDA

Political instability in African states is mostly traceable to social inequality, social deprivation, social injustice, social decimation, general frustration, and so on. Thus, Neuffer (2002:132) argued that most of the crises and instability in African politics and government are carry-overs of these impediments that have persistently led to many of the unfolding problems.

Evidence to these contentions existed in the years that the Umwami Rwabugiri ruled Rwanda. An available record explains that the kind of leadership under the Umwami was centred on patron–client-feudalism relationship. It is this kind of governance that gave way to indirect rule of the colonial masters. Its existence also encouraged the whitemen in their early encounter with the indigenous people.

It appears as if, the Tutsis nobility and seeming superiority to others was already in existence before the advent of colonialism. The colonial masters only formalised the system to create room for exploitation. The type of exploitation in place then in Rwanda was not as demanding and destructive when compared to the colonial type. The Tutsi Umwamis were an established dynasty where only the elite and those who paid allegiance to the nobility were favoured. What the colonial masters, especially the Belgians did in governance was to help widen the gap in the society, thereby engendering division.

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The Hutus and the less privileged Tutsis had to work hard on the farm of the Tutsi nobles by tilling the soil, feeding the cattle, attending to house chores, and other menial tasks for many years before they could be upgraded to the nobility status with a gift of cow or bull (Melvern, 2000:8-9). The number of cattle owned by a man indicated how rich or wealthy he was in the land. A Hutu was a Hutu for life. Hutus were in effect told that their mission in life was to toil and serve in perpetuity (Keane, 1996:16-17).

The implication of this is that the degrading position that the Tutsi nobles made of the non ruling class was one of the reasons why there was the subservient status of the Hutus and the less privileged Tutsis who to were subjected to forced labour and all kinds of discrimination and frustration.

To make it official, the Umwami established what was known as Ubuhake system where each layer of the hierarchy was linked in a relationship of mutual dependence based on a reciprocal arrangement regarding funds, food, goods and services. This is a contractual service in which a more powerful person – the Tutsi noble could provide protection in exchange for work done by lesser and weaker persons. This, Adisa (1996:16) noted turned the Hutus into and subjection and socio-economic and political client of the Tutsis.

This patron–clientism, according to Kass (1998:18), was meant to favour the Tutsis while the client lived on patronage from the master, just as it existed in the classical medieval period of the Lord and the serf, patrician and plebeian of the master – servant relations of inequality.

On this level of inequality in the social structure, Melvern (2000:9) noted that many of the Hutus changed their identity to Tutsi lineage in order to survive and retain noble positions after being settled by their Tutsi lord. The injustice to the Hutus and the disadvantage Tutsis however, encouraged an outright challenge of the Tutsi oligarchy against continual exploitation. It was also noticed that it was this kind of exploitation that helped, nonetheless, in raising the questions that made for conflict escalation a reality in many African states where inequality and injustice had held sway to. Agreeing to this assertion in respect of Rwanda, Adisa (1996:16-18) noted that it was such that prompted the growth in ethnic Hutu solidarity among the people and the establishment of a clear model of ethnic Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy.

Umwami Ruduhigwa, the Mutara III, was said to have been the most greedy and most corrupt Tutsi king ever. This was due to his open declaration as the king, even when his father was still alive. He so much adored the position and prestige that went with it. Despite the weak reasons for which Umwami Musinga, his father, was sent on exile to Congo, the Mutara III, he embraced Western culture and people. He sold out his people, wore the Whiteman's suits, and drove himself in the whiteman's car. He also made forced labour customary with strict enforcement and allowed the use of money and education only to the son of the noble.

Keane (1996:18) analytically argued that what had existed before the advent of the Europeans was a continuity of what the colonial masters came to strengthen in their quest for African wealth as earlier mentioned. This is because there existed already a system where the Tutsi nobility was ruling and the peasant Hutus and Twas were toiling. The present predicaments were, however, due to the greediness of Umwami Rudahigwa and his Tutsi elite who willingly and compliantly succumbed to the colonial masters, an act they initiated in order to acquire more wealth without any affront to their desires. It would suffice to say that they preferred the preservation of privileges and material wealth to any question of national identity going by their several actions.

Against this kind of inequality and exploitation in Rwanda as perpetrated by the Tutsi ruling class and supported by the Belgian colonialists for more than four decades, the reverse was the case, and the fate of the Tutsis from the early 1960s to 1990s was in the hands of the Hutus. The establishment of Hutu power following the reversal of the policy in 1959 by the Belgians also saw the Tutsis at the receiving end as it encouraged the escalation of ethnic tension and ethnic conflict in the country and the regions.

However, in the assessment of the phases of governance under both the Tutsi and Hutu regimes of political inequalities, the Rwandan people were divided and never favoured. The first phase of inequality in government under the Tutsi tutelage was said to have been mild and considerate due to the openness to the attainment of the nobility status, but the second phase which saw the Hutu-led government from 1959 to 1994 enthroned, ushered in an era of more ethnic disparity, division and the institutionalization of ethnicity, a factor which helped to promote instability and fierce

intimidation, violence and killings that were motivated by hatred among the people of the society.

To sustain the policy goal of those regimes, a network of cells was established with most influential Hutus made responsible to checkmate for the people. This, however, prompted a new wave of violence and persecution of the minority Tutsis and moderate Hutu race, owing to the general disagreement, disregard and mark of disrespect to the Hutu power policies (Nyankanzi 1998:9).

This persecution, which became endemic and a catalyst to political instability, according to Adisa (1996:21), followed a successive period of crises, especially from 1959-1961, 1963-1964, 1973,1990s and so on. The escalation and increasing refugees' crisis caused by the violence made the United Nations to order that Rwanda should accede to independence by February 1962, a process that was to hasten the return of the refugees and an end to the hostility. Commenting on this unwholesome situation, Neuffer (2002:62) asserted that the period witnessed a grave food and water shortage and a precarious situation that was occasioned by high level of inequality. This acute shortage led to the death of many refugees at an average of fifty people per day. This, shortage became a major contributory factor in addition to the neglect and abysmal deprivation that enhanced the conflict in the land.

Power (2003:18), in this correction, argued that the regime of Habyarimana represented a practice of extreme type of "the end justifies the means" concept. This was because apart from employing such strategy inequality, injustice, revenge and destruction of oppositions and human lives at will were part of the policies of the government.

On the Kayibanda and Habyarimana manner of scores with the opposition, it was noted that both recorded the most horrible and systematic enthnicization policies against the people of Rwanda. In the same vein, Keane (1996:24-25) noted that the government of both Kayibanda and Habyarimana who were operating behind the scene to cause ethnic bloodletting, discrimination and scapegoatism made the Hutu- led regime to be feared. The situation that identified the former is mentioned in phases of regimes in Rwanda, and it is a catalyst to ethnic tension and characteristic of conflicts prompted by ethnicization that was embedded in inequality and instability.

However, with the presence of the colonial officials and the Roman Catholic Church missionary in Rwanda who actually planted the separatist doctrine through the teachings of the Hamitic ideology theory in education, as well as the reservation of many positions for the children of the noble, the root of ethnicity and division was decisively established in the country.

The foregoing also explains that inequality in governance under Kayibanda and Habyarimana did not only help to plunder the system into a failed state, and away from the international interest, but the regime's policies became a disheartening catalyst for ethnicization in Rwanda up to the period of the 1994 crisis, probably because of the fear of the opposition or the desire to avenge the past. Thus, the colonialists, the church (Roman Catholic) and the Rwandans, whose roles in perpetrating inequality and injustice were made possible as extensively examined above.

3:6. LEADERSHIP PROBLEM, POOR ECONOMY AND THE RWANDANCRISIS: AN ANALYSIS

Leadership, as many critics argue, is one of the major problems of the African states. Ideally, leadership, a concept of leading people aright, is in conflict in Africa. This is against the facts that follow what the people deem as right leaders and wrong leaders which, in turn, affects their existence in Africa. Leadership is a social process; it is a relational issue in which one party attempts by all means to influence the behavior of others in a normal situation without recourse to threat or violence. A good leader, according to Ailbe (2003:16-17), seeks to secure true compliance, with emphasis on the willingness of the subjects. Except that is done, the leadership would never function smoothly. A leader attempts to bring a long-term change in the people's attitude. At times, the people might copy his/her lifestyle. Thus, leadership, in this parlance, is related to motivation, effective interpersonal behavior in the process of communication, but not domineering. Besides, it involves the effective process of delegation, among others.

The statements above speak of an ideal context in a society where there is social civility. Thus, it is argued that a great deal of tasks await a leader from whom much is expected. A metaphorical phrase in support of this notion is the sentiment that "uneasy lies the head that wears the crown", which, in the African context holds. However,

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since the departure of the colonial rule, it is the other way round. To many Africans leadership means that uneasy lies the head of the populace that experiences the terror of the dictator, as exemplified by Bokassa, Idi Amin, Mobutu, Habyarimana, Doe, Abacha, Eyadema, Biya, to mention but a few. This is because the people had been serving the leaders, instead of the leaders serving the people. This is a contradiction that Kalu (1994:4) queried, saying 'do we call them leaders or rulers in our context? With a mixture of both phrases, the nomenclature does not differentiate who leads, rules or governs the people in Africa, but a mere symbolic gesture that is used to becloud innocence while decimating their abilities and labours combined (Otunnu, 2001:68). This paradigm about African leadership was probably among the factors that encouraged all kinds of persons wanting to be at the helms of affairs at all cost, the result of which is always the plunging of states into crises.

From the foregoing analyses, one factor indicating that the African states in general have been short-changed to work against their future is bad leadership. This, in effect, is a peculiar issue showing that past African leaders and their supporters did not only fail because of the phenomenon of incapability but due to a stubborn reluctance that the banished leaders seek to mythicize their indifference to the people's plight by imposing curative measures which bear no relevance to the burning issues of the times. As amphibians who are African in geography but European in appetite, they change guards in a pantomime show of hypocrisy and bad faith, often by either military coups or elections(Kalu, 1994:16).

Agreeing with Kalu's description of the African leaders and their characterization, Alusala (2005:102), chronicled African leadership problem as that rooted in history, ill-formed geographical and state unit with domestic, regional and international dimension relating to their colonial history that were marked by corruption, nepotism and patronage politics. Using recent events under Africa's nascent democratic state of Nigeria as an excellent example, Okwara (2007:14) aptly noted that the Olusegun Obasanjo's regime is not only an example of a bad ruler but one which never respected the rule of law. The eight years of the regime was eight years of recklessness. It was a near decade of gross disrespect of court orders and injunctions. The President's day-to-day activities and utterances demonstrated an example of a man and a ruler bigger than the nation, a ruler who had come to be served and not to serve the regime was mercilessly corrupt.

It is this kind of power and dirtiness as observed that might have led to the first and second Hutu government of Kayibanda and Habyarimana in Rwanda. The rulers' actions, obviously, plunged the country into an endless racial war between the Tutsis and Hutus of Rwanda. Bayart et al. (1998:6) revealed that the people of Rwanda were recolonized into a profit system instead of national unity. This was seen in the enthronement of ethnic nationality, police state, a one-party state system, among others. With the criminalization of the state system setting in, most of the African leaders were probably uninterested in any form of legitimacy; instead, they simply plundered resources of their countries and exploited illicit opportunities to enrich themselves. Several African leaders, Bugingo (2005) noted, placed their legitimacy on political systems driven by patronage and marked by dispensing patrimony that enabled the recycling of the elite and the use of state resources for consolidation of power through unproductive investment in social and political network. He was quick to note that Rwanda happened to be one of the few African countries, since independence, where one-party state leadership was highly established by corrupt and incompetent leaders who set the people against one another. It was this lopsidedness that encouraged the Tutsis and the Hutus to engage in vengeful bloodletting to enhance disequilibrium in the system, as self-styled leaders would want to remain in power.

Farrakhan (1993:11), in this respect, reasoned that the basic failure of the OAU to address any of the Africa's growing problems such as poverty, unemployment, governance, among others, had helped in making Africans everywhere and anywhere to be looked down upon as slaves. The reason for this designation is that African leaders never think like freed people but always lacking initiatives and ending up acting sheepishly.

Otieno (2000:3), in reference to this contention, asserted that the Rwanda problem was essentially that of leadership and the institutions around it. Just like everywhere else in Africa, Rwandans, prior to the events of 1994, were hostages to their own bad government.

Mamdani (2004:71), in another perspective, aptly stated that the Rwanda leadership system was in a mess probably a creation in recent times, of what her allies and aiders had made of her history that was written by the hand and ink of the West. This is because instead of the leaders building Rwanda, they had ended up making

Rwanda what it is today. The reinforcement of the notions of ethnicity which led to an upsurge of tribal conflicts at the seat of governance had helped to expose the lapses of the OAU working principles. These thoughts made many to be more ethnic-conscious with loss of confidence and trust in any leader that was not from their ethnic nationality, not minding whether or not the leader meant well for the people. Therefore, when these thoughts were weighed and related to the holistic build-up of what the Rwandan society experienced in economic term (Gross Domestic Product) the negative impact simultaneously explains the basis of the crisis. This is due to the setting in of frustration, deprivation and negligence of the generality of the people which followed thereafter.

The glaring fact is that the economy since independence had been totally dependent on several problems in the country's developmental stages. The existing problem in Rwanda rendered the state incapable of doing anything without looking outside for help. The system became so dependent that it had to seek the approval of any enabling policies from outside. This incapacitation was probably due to the low level of the primacy of material conditions of existence, as there was no production, no factory, no home-made items and so on. Habyarimana's reliance on what Mitterand was able to offer further enslaved the Rwandans, thereby leading to a high poverty rate. It was this causal factor that tormented the land and eventually destroyed its expectations against the wishes of the people. It also explains the situation that was probably noted to have supposedly seen Rwanda as having being programmed only to consume what she does not produce while doubling the producer's usage in her purchases. On this note, Lukarsala (2002:22-24) in a lamentable tone asked some pertinent questions: How then can her (Rwandan) political economy *not* fail? How can she not reject her own efforts to external? How could she not be termed perpetual recipients while others donate to her? How can she not live in instability when she lacks initiative? How can such not continue when all her leaders are of the same foreign-sponsored, bred and controlled? How can her political economy not fail when she lacks visionary leaders, and when none of her leaders would wish to die for others?

The sentiments expressed above, however, showed that under economic status, the Rwandan economy probably lacks financial base, productive capacity, manpower ability, among others things. This is found in the single negativism which made her remain perpetually poor while the conflicts and crises persisted. The persistence of this

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upheaval was also found in the tempo of frustration, deprivation and aggression among the races. It was this violent nature of the conflict that also kept aid relief and people away from the state in the period. Commenting on these predicaments, Garrighi (2002:23) succinctly reiterated that the Rwandan economic crisis of the early 1960s to 1970s has been the root of many economic failures in the country. The Rwandan tragedy, as it is called, portrayed a lot of deficiencies as seen in the kind of political economy and misplaced priority both before and after the tragedy.

Chossudavsky (1999:120), in the same manner, asserted that the evolution of the post-colonial economic systems played a decisive role in the development of the Rwanda conflicts. This is because according to Ake 1(994:7), the colonial state and its economy were inherited rather than transformed. And because most of the nationalist leaders regarded the state as the instrument of their own will, they privatized and exploited it for economic gain and used it oppressively to acquire absolute power. More importantly was that the political economy of the Rwanda people even after independence has not become a reasoning presence, but remained a formidable threat to everybody except the few who control it. This is probably because of the degree of frustration, deprivation, neglect and intense antagonism among the people.

Another impediment was the failure of the leaders to implement national developmental plans with proper diversification of the growing economy. This is a reason noted as being responsible for Rwanda's experience of a great deal of problems in diversifying her economy. Coffee is heavily relied on by many of the East African states with Rwanda inclusive. With all running a mono-economy, the events of 1970s and the unprecedented recession dealt disastrously with their economies. This predicament, however, enhanced Rwanda conspicuous consumption attitude. With this, the level of poverty remained high. The rural economy, based on coffee and banana, became fragile and marked by acute demographic pressure with land fragmentation, soil erosion, abandonment and so on. This, once again, encouraged the degree of aggressive tendencies and dissatisfaction against the state system by the depressed and frustrated people.

As a result of these, poverty became one of the major threats to Rwanda's stability as everyone, mostly the deprived, looked for food by asking the corrupt leaders questions, with the resultant effect being that in a state where the masses could

no longer bear hardships and pains, coupled with leadership problems, they resorted to violence to relieve frustration and depression. It is, therefore, probably this corrupt nature of Habyarimana leadership handicaps and deception in governance that turned the people against one another. A particular reference is where the Hutus see the Tutsis as the bane of all their progress and success, a view that agrees with Wingard's (2004:32) who noted that poverty gives rise to unrest. Dependence on single resources creates necessary and unnecessary competitions, thereby prompting failed systems which also provide the moral platform that causes civil wars, as was the case of the Rwandan situation in 1994.

Given the paucity of resources in Rwanda, and lack of capacity – building, the country, in the midst of distorted, destroyed and faceless political economy, was made to suffer serious constraints to the extent that the level of poverty and other problems made it possible for Rwandans to see crisis as part and parcel of the state system. This was probably because it was an issue created by the leaders themselves. This attitude might also have contributed to denying the people the idea of poverty reduction despite great efforts made to create an enabling environment for economic growth through foreign aid donors' incentives. Poor leadership style in Rwanda from 1962 down to 1973 and extending to the 1990s with its chequered history of poor economy and complexity of its crisis might have led to the prolongation of the Rwandan crisis. This situation which went on unabated, probably made many see the crisis as the African greatest nightmare in the presence of many conflicts that were bedeviling the continent at the same period. As a result of this, many were long dead even before the war/genocide itself due to the impacts of hunger, frustration, deprivation and depression on the people.

3:7 SEEDS OF DISCORD AND REBELLION IN RWANDA

The several causes of unpleasant situation in Rwanda in the latter days of the colonial rule were traceable to the Belgians' style of administration. The Belgians met already existing ancient established institutions as handed over to them by the defeated Germans. Because of the problem of administering new colony, the Belgians would prefer to maintain what had been handed over to them rather than incurring unwanted expenses, as the cost would be a burden on the home government. This, therefore, allowed for the contradiction of the principle of indirect rule in Rwanda. Under the

Umwami-led oligarchy, the new colonial master (Belgium) unequivocally favoured the Tutsis.

Their preference for the Tutsis over the majority Hutus whose souls were said to be sad and always in opposition was because the former never opposed their policy but became a veritable tool of exploitation (Keane 1996). Another factor for the preference was that the Tutsis were known to have been in the minority and the custodians of the ancient institution of the Umwami dynasty over Rwanda. Although the Tutsis' several contacts and interactions with Western explorers might equally have afforded them the opportunity of the gains and preference, all indications and interpretations agreed that they were the only available instrument to the exploitation of the native. The Tutsi oligarchy was accepted and recognized by the Belgians and the missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church. They were equally appreciated with the acknowledgement as *"Europeans in Blackman skin, Aryan race, or super human and high intelligence species'',* among others. These entire accolades were published to acknowledge them (Tutsis) and with a view towards a perfect march to the exploitation of Rwanda.

Knowing what they wanted in Rwanda, the colonialists made all frantic efforts to ensure that they used the minority to suppress the majority and; of course, with the resultant effect invariably acting as a contributor to the eventual setting of the country ablaze in the 1959 revolution. Muhuyankaka (1998:38-46) contended that "election and selection were done in favour of the Tutsi elite; in census, people were automatically counted and classified as Tutsi provided that they were rich and could do the masters' bidding. To strengthen this project,the right to education, which made the division in the society become more pronounced, was reserved for the children of the elite. It is this heightened situation, plus the observation of Melvern (2000:11), who also noted that cattle seemed to be the pivot in an extremely complicated series of civil contracts and political relationships that enlarged the gap and promoted the growing animosity. These and many other incidents marked the joyful days of Tutsis and colonial masters' relationship and, at the same time, created deep enmity among the Rwandan people.

However, upon the advent of African nationalist and state agitations for independence and decolonization, things took a new dimension in many African states with the Rwanda-held Tutsi regime not being an exception. Eventually, Rwandans

were inspired by what was going on in Congo DR, Kenya, Sudan, Ghana, and so on but with several interpretations. First, their own intention was wrongfully termed ideological agitation on the leftist side. Secondly, the Belgian economy that depended heavily on taxations from her colonies, Rwanda inclusive, was never ready, to grant independence to any. Thirdly, the Hutus' agitation for majority rule and the United Nations reports on reconciliation were not in their favour. In reaction to this, the Belgians, as earlier mentioned, misconstrued the demand and the behavior as ideological betrayal of trust. This was in spite of the fact that the only party in Rwanda, UNAR, was highly dominated by the Tutsis, who were also highly favoured as the possible successor to the throne after the colonial departure (Mamdani, 2001:116-125).

 However, against this present development, Rotberg (1971:91) asserted that the Belgians saw the sin of the Tutsi elite, the Rwandan nationalists and the newly found UNAR party as having undermined Belgian–Western ideological background and confirmed the suspicion about the Tutsi leadership's unfaithfulness.   Following this development, the Belgian government, with its missionary agents, turned to reverse their policy on the Tutsi – minority leadership. To accentuate this plan, the Belgian Christian Democrats Party in governance, with the support of the missionary, masterminded the need to put the records straight once and for all.

Analysing the move towards realising this goal with heightened political undertone, Mamdani (2001) posited that the Hutu ethnic group wasted no time in forming their own political party called the Party du Movement Et de'l Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU). Consequent upon this and with deepened antagonism between the Tutsis and the Hutus on one hand and another between the Tutsis and the Belgian authorities on the other, the Belgians were prepared and had resolved to correct their mistakes. It is this resolution to make amends about the past and damn the outcome of their action that propelled them to emancipate the Hutu majority.   The Belgians formalised this action when they publicly addressed the people with the following incitement:

> that the Hutu should understand that there were mistakes in the
> past, because they are in the majority ethnic group and ought
> to rule; that the long injustice, deprivation,marginalization an
> d inequality among others visited on them by both the Belgian

> *government, missionary and the Tutsi Oligarchy should be forgiven; let the past be put aside; stand up now and claim what belong to you.*
> *(Mamdani,2001:10310; (Nyankanzi,1998:8-9).*

It is this event which eventually turned things against the Tutsi-led oligarchy government in Rwanda thereafter. The statement above did not only confirm the assertion made earlier on by the Belgians that the Hutu government in the future would be favoured, but it also explained the level of inconsistency on the part of the colonial masters. The action, in many quarters, was seen as doing the right thing at the wrong time. This, invariably, portrayed them in a bad light, as they are seen as people who could keep relationship as long as they continued to gain; and destroy the same system when they lose out or their antics are exposed. This kind of twin-track Western diplomacy as noted in Rwanda probably accounts for the eventual state devastation.

To further compound the Tutsis predicaments, the Belgians, in retraction, faulted assiduously their Hamitic ideology of the Tutsis and admitted that the Tutsis might not have been their brothers. This is because from their outlook and revelations of research, they are migrants from the North, notably Ethiopia (Muhuyankaka, 1998:67).These statements of deception, disaffection differentiations, among others, were later manifested in the social revolution of the Hutu peasants against the Tutsi oligarchy that went with ethnic cleansing the same year. The evil action of the recent development against the Tutsis, however, became a contradiction when we consider the role of the Church, which was said to have promoted the Tutsis to the position of supreme humans, but later downgraded them, denied them and saw them as opportunists and usurpers who claimed what never belonged to them. They eventually facilitated the giving of the upper hand to the Hutu extremists to slaughter the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus. Consequent upon this development, it becomes obvious that there were some misgivings that now turned against the heralded people. The situation also affected all the benefits and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Tutsis. There was even coupled with the suspicion about the death of the Tutsi Umwami Rudahigwa. The Umwami, according to information, was poisoned through a Belgian medical doctor's injection, alleged to be antibiotic injection for allergic reaction (Nyankanzi 1998:8). This timely course of events also informed a long period of planned vengeance that was all along waiting for an opportunity.

Based on this incident, the Hutus overthrew the Tutsi authorities by attacking and burning Tutsi homes, killing Tutsis on sight with machetes, clubs, spears, and weapons loaned from the Belgians who only watched while the carnage went on. The aftermath of the revolution saw Tutsis in large numbers fleeing the country. On the 11th of November 1959, and with the end of the rebellion, the Belgians replaced immediately the Tutsi chiefs with their Hutu counterparts.

However, 700,000 Tutsis went into exile in Uganda, Congo DR (Zaire), Tanzania, Burundi, among others, thereby setting the stage for the Hutus to fully assume authority in Rwanda. To consolidate his position in power, Kayibanda became authoritarian and secretive. He controlled in totality all appointments and nominations from the highest to the lowest levels of positions.

While Kayibanda used his kinsmen to administer the state as he wished, other Hutu elements felt marginalized even after independence in 1962. The Hutus soon became divided amongst themselves into moderate and extremist Hutus respectively. This schism among the Hutus, however, polarized the society against the common cause as the exiled Tutsis and their children in refugee camps struggled to return to Rwanda. The government, under their Tutsi brothers in Burundi, also encouraged their aspiration as the high level of hatred ensured that any quarrel or killing of Hutus in Burundi always sparked off reprisal against the Tutsis still remaining in Rwanda and vice-versa (Nyankanzi 1998:37-39). This factor prompted the idea of the Hutus in power to always ensure that the Tutsis were kept at arm's length. The understanding of the research also is that it was probably the manner of frustration and the growing ethnicization that led to the publication of what was called the Bahutu Ten Commandments, which state inter alia:

> *Hutus must know that the Tutsi wife, whoever she may be is serving the Tutsi ethnic group interest. In consequence, any Hutu who does the following is a traitor: acquire a Tutsi wife acquire a Tutsi mistress acquire a Tutsi secretary or dependent. All Hutus must know that our Bahutu-Kaze daughters are more worthy and more conscious in their role of women, spouses, mothers and they are not more beautiful, good secretaries and more sincere. Bahutu-Kaze be vigilant and bid your husbands, brothers and sons to come to their senses. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority (Gasana 2005).*

However, despite this exhortation of ethnic unity and solidarity among the Hutus in confronting the Tutsis, in 1973, General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, overthrew Gregory Kayibanda to assume power. He promised making amendment to the existing social inequality and disparity between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Obviously, the promise was never attended to as he went ahead to propagate the policies of his predecessor. This was probably due to the deepened ethnic divide within the country. It might have also been a political statement meant to appeal to the divided society towards supporting his regime as the only instrument left to weld the country together again. This development was welcomed by many of the exiled Tutsis who had hoped for a new dawn, but prayed never to return unless the otherwise happened. The otherwise, which was both positive and negative, according to the argument, did not take long to reveal itself. Shunning the positive angle that might have tackled the endemic ethnic problem, Habyarimana displayed the gravity of his hatred for the Tutsis as his alliance with General Idi Amin of Uganda was meant to persecute the exiled Tutsis in Lowenro Triangle in Uganda. The young exiled Tutsis fought back through the favour obtained from Yoweri Museveni's ascension to power in 1986. This restoration of hope, though was a turn of events in Rwanda, it was also seen as the beginning of the unending conflict up till 1994. This is because the hope of returning was probably a measure meant to appreciate the Tutsis for their role in aiding him to power. On the other hand, it was termed a political betrayal by France, Congo DR and Rwanda against the Ugandan government, an allegation that the Ugandan government never refuted nor denied till the period of crisis escalation in 1994.

To show how realistic the move was, the Rwanda Patriotic Union was formed and its military arm was called the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Fred Ruyema. The armed wing was nurtured to fight the cause of leading the people (Tutsis) back to their fatherland. The RPF leader was assisted by General Paul Kagame, and both men were poised to lead RPF and the Tutsis back to Rwanda with the support of Museveni.

The rebellion and rebel activities consistently gave Juvenal Habyarimana and his Akazu government sleepless nights and jitters. Beginning from 1990, the RPF's first invasion of Rwanda recorded unsuccessful attempts with the death of the leader, General Fred Ruyema. The fearless RPF lost the battle as Habyarimana gathered support from France, Congo DR, and others to drive the rebels back to Uganda. After the death of their leader, the RPF with a determined intention chose General Paul

Kagame as the new leader. General Paul Kagame in a continued, but fearless incursion into Rwanda in 1993 seized Ruhengeri and Gisenyi from the government force (Otunnu, 1999:20).

Following the frequent RPF attacks and threats to the government of Habyarimana, the Akazu, in a reprisal made sure that the Tutsis within Rwanda pay for it; an action the Human Rights Watch Africa (1995) and Amnesty International (1998) frowned upon as an ill-act. This was just as the innocent within Rwanda were killed for the action of the rebels. The repeated Tutsi confrontation with the government extended the crisis from October 1990 through January 1991, February 1991, March 1992, August 1992, January 1993 and February 1994 to the period of war/genocide in April in 1994. None of the massacres constituted spontaneous outbreak of violence. To explain the action and readiness of the government against the Tutsis, Hassan Ngeze of the *Kangura* Newspaper in January 1994 wrote according to Waal (1995:148-149):

> *Say to the inyenzi (cockroaches) that if they lift up their heads again, it will no longer be necessary to go fight the enemy in the bush we will start by eliminating the internal enemy…… they will disappear…*

And from the RTLM, Kantano Habimana and other propagandists of the Hutu extremist government also came the assertion:

> *Hutu listeners, telephone and establish the hideout of Tutsis. Search house – to- house Do not slow the pace of the work. The graves of the Tutsi are only half full. Call volunteers to help fill up these graves. Look in cupboards, under beds, in ceilings and every possible corner where the enemy might be hiding. The cockroaches and the snakes must be exterminated…*

Despite all odds, this incitement was fulfilled in the 1994 war/genocide between the Hutus and Tutsis.

However, after about forty – five years of the sowing of the seeds of discord that destabilized Rwanda, the Belgian Prime Minister on April 10th 2004, admitted complicity. He maintained that his country was sorry for the trauma and psychological pains and problems that they had caused the people of the small Eastern African state of Rwanda. The statement reiterated the unfortunate role of the Belgians in the

impasse, and how she had engineered a revolution of both human annihilation and property destruction with a pledge of never again (*Genoside Magazine*, 2004).

Premised on this promises, Power (2003) noted that all depended on the rate of interference inside and outside Rwandan walls. It also reminded of how formidable the task of ensuring that justice was done in Rwanda, without which there can be peace or reconciliation.

This follows the fact that the seeds of discord sown by the Belgians between the Hutus and the Tutsis had made the former see the latter as exploiters, slave masters, traitors and marked enemies who should not be associated with. Evidence, however, hinged on this development, shows that it was this kind of antagonism and forces that propelled and engineered the Hutus of the late 1950s and the 1990s to want to destroy any Tutsi on sight. Muhuyankaka (2003:62), in his view, noted that the seeds of discord are like the act of brainwashing or indoctrination, stimulating the spirit of hate, as it was observed in the actions of the warring ethnic groups. The deepened ethnicization that went with unquenchable hatred was seen outplaying itself in the Hutus action in the Rwandan crisis against the helpless Tutsis to justify the end of all hate incitements and messages emanating from the seeds of discord (Melvern, 2000:34).

The indoctrination and its poisonous concepts which sprang and expanded from generation to generation, however, probably made the Rwanda conflict and rebellion a unique focus of study. This is because while the Hutus in Rwanda assumed position and power in both government and hamlets, the Rwanda – Tutsis, especially their children, born in exile in Uganda and Burundi, were equally indoctrinated to hate the Hutus. It is this passion and inborn hatred that probably played itself out in the entire crisis. This, as Otunnu (1999:49) also puts it, is because the Hutus had stolen their birthright of leadership and mastering of properties in Rwanda through the aid of the French and Belgians, while to the Hutu children, the result is that 'we will not allow them to further enslave and subjugate us.'

However, whichever way one looks at the whole issue, the Belgian leadership's admission of the crime committed by her country long ago and the call for peace between the two groups settles all problems and probably may be the panacea to ending all elements of discord among the Rwandans.

3:8   ETHNICIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN RWANDA

In this section, the first hypothesis which states inter alia: *that ethnicization of political power helped to deepen ethnic hatred in Rwanda*, will be examined, taking cognizance of the fact that the politics of power struggle in Rwanda had been a driving force encouraging ethnic hatred amongst the Hutus and Tutsis. This is because the long years of Tutsi rule in Rwanda, which spanned over 105 years might have been a factor that created the age-long disaffection and sentiments. Both positive and negative feelings among the people were observed as having influenced most of the interactions and dealings within the country. The period of colonial intervention in government called "indirect rule system" foisted on the people using divide and rule system might have equally been another factor used to promote ethnicity as our investigation revealed. From 1894 to 1959 when the history of the area came into the limelight, the Tutsis were the custodians of the Umwami dynasty. Even as a minority social group, they were encouraged in all ramifications in the appropriation of the land. They were about 14% while the Hutus and Twas were 85% and 1% respectively. This implies that the majority who felt dispossessed and disempowered might have been under subjection and subjugation for centuries. This also informed suggested that the frustration and deprivation which led to restiveness and struggle for political freedom in Rwanda were an age – long practice. In addition to this, the dynamic nature of the modern world and the demand for justice in the midst of grave injustice, corruption, inequality, misplaced priorities, amongst others, might have catalysed the revenge process where peaceful resolution had failed. This is a projection that the Hutus, in their predicaments, wasted no time to seek answers as they pressed on for recognition.

To be critical of the facts, the Tutsis held on to power for long. They were noted to have made a mess of the Rwandan personality, culture, custom and politics. The Umwami, under Rudahigwa, the King Mutara III, who connived with the colonialists to exploit and defraud the people with heavy taxations and an established forced labour system was fingered as the root cause (Melvern, 2000). To make matters worse, every forced labourer's wages paid to the king ended in his pocket as he enjoyed superfluous aggrandizement with his stooges – the oligarch, to the detriment of the people. It is this series of abuse of power and neglect that helped to reduce the personality of Umwami and his official status as worth nothing before the subjects. It

also led to the removal of his power and the appointment of chiefs by the Belgian government.

The level of degradation and wants might have contributed to making every average Rwandan, especially the Hutus, impoverished. Against these backdrop of deplorable conditions, many probably were forced to cross-border for labour migration to the neigbouring countries. Only the noble and the elite enjoyed great affluence and respect. As the Hutus and the sub-human Twas grumbled so were the less-privileged Tutsis despised, despite their pride. The critics of the Umwami's actions believed that the divine power of the Umwami had been desecrated. This is sequel to the fact that his position asUmwami could not even, in any way, argue cases on behalf of his subjects. Instead, he was intermittently taking actions against both the Hutus and the marginalised Tutsis.

On the relationship between the Tutsi and the Belgians, the colonialists openly affirmed that they had found the Watutsi established since ancient times and would endeavour to respect their predicaments (Keane, 1996:8). It was this preferential treatment of the Tutsis against the Hutu majority that formed the basis of Hutu rebellion and all other notions of revenge and retaliations that accompanied the sufferings of the Tutsis thereafter. Evidence available shows that the Belgian rule had contradictory consequences for the Tutsis on one hand, as it branded them as non-indigenous and, on the other hand, it considered the Tutsis privileged by a double move that affected all the strata of the Tutsis.

However, the structure of the government in Rwanda indicated that the Tutsi-led Umwami administration was divine and traditional, as the law stipulated that all Rwandaise, irrespective of social or ethnic group are supposed to be subjected to his rule (Nyankanzi, 1998:38).Though considered divine and sacred, the regime of Mutara III was singled out for its infamy, given the desecrations it committed. The Tutsi oligarchy used the power invested in them differently as ethnic cleansing, mass killing and, or, annihilation was never promoted. Forced labour and deprivation were obviously noticed as affecting both the Hutus and the lowly-placed Tutsis as the state ordered. The kind of patron-client relationship ensured that the ascendancy to the Tutsi oligarchy or noble class was open and purely determined by hardwork and degree of wealth acquisition. A clear opposition to the regime was in the making as evidenced in

the implementation of the government policies. For instance, in 1910 and 1912, some incidents occurred and people resisted the bad policy of the government backed by the Germans. The Northern region of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi was reprimanded for rebelling against the Umwami policies (Melvern, 2000:21). Suffice it to say that the Tutsi oligarchy and its administration, though probably exhibited some kinds of deficiency due to the excruciating pains of poverty that affected the people then, this did not compel it to employ ethnicism as a cardinal programme of its regime.

Contrary to the above evaluation, the structures of the two Hutu-led governments of Gregory Kayibanda and Juvenal Habyarimana were close and secretive as noted by Ngiol (1998). This process drastically affected the lifestyle of the people years afterward. The use of kinsmen and Akazu – kitchen cabinets, and secret groups respectively, made the governments to be much reserved but destructive towards any detractors. The building up of a policy based on ethnic separation deepened ethnicization and ethnic identification which, according to Mamdani (1998:60), is the contradictory nature of the cultural and political development of the country from inception. This is because the polarization into antagonistic political identities helped them to shape a tragic future. The institutionalization of ethnic revenge, scapegoating and the politics of payback syndrome explains the kind of horrible things that took place in Rwanda then. The major reasons for these actions, Watters (1999:26) postulated, were that for long the Hutus had suffered in the hands of the Tutsis, whereas they were in the majority and supposed to rule; that the Tutsis had desecrated the Rwandan tradition and culture and there were in-built fear of Tutsis returning to power, which means the reinstating of exploitative tendencies and re–enslavement of the people. These thoughts, though probably might have explained some of the pertinent reasons, the major action had been against both oppositions, irrespective of race, just as Mamdani (1998:87) argued that the Hutu government, informed of the past experience, practiced the politics of exclusion, marginalization and total destruction of the remnant Tutsi race and moderate Hutus inside Rwanda.

Following these accumulated grievances, frustration, deprivation and political power struggle, the Tutsi Oligarchy Rule was termed 'imposition' on the people, a factor that, with substantial evidence, aggravated the 1959 social revolution under the watchful eyes of the Belgians who perpetrated the Hutu ascendency. The support

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enjoyed after the Tutsis was overthrown by the Hutus were also a remarkable pointer to the end of misrule of the Tutsi oligarchy and the extremist hold on power.

On the whole, the result of the subsequent communal – directed election in favour of the Hutus turned out to be the beginning and the end of exile for many Tutsis and their leaders. The 1961 election, with the help of the Belgians, was won by Gregoire Kayibanda. Reports had it that the election was marred by intimidation, rigging and violence against the opposition. All these were carried out to achieve two things: one, to consolidate the power transfer from the Tutsis to Hutus and; two, to finally humiliate the Tutsi oligarchy from long-years of misrule.The stage was probably set for the Hutus to assume power completely and put all the past behind them. Meanwhile, the United Nations Trusteeship Commission, seeing the level of distrust and degeneration in the country, advised the government of Kayibanda to reconcile all the parties. Kayibanda did not only fail to take heed of the advice, but his government went ahead to abolish the monarchy system, nurtured a National Guard of about 3000 Hutu men for internal security in each of the nine prefectures. On this, Melvern (2000:12) noted that the actions of Kayibanda did not only explain growing vengeance, but were a pointer to the Tutsis and the apologists of the Umwami reign that their time was up.

In consolidation of his reign, Kayibanda turned Rwanda into a police state where all traveling within and outside the country were checked with due permission granted or otherwise. This also probably helped to thicken and strengthen racism and ethnic hostility among the different ethnic groups. Consequent upon this antagonism, the Tutsis within, their kinsmen and the exiled ones in Burundi and Uganda in a solidarity and support of one cause in 1963 invaded Rwanda. Kass (1998:16) revealed that though the National Guard of Kayibanda and the Gendarme helped to quell the rebellion, it marked the beginning of the several incursions into Rwanda from outside by the Tutsis against the Hutu-led government. In reaction to this, the order by the government to eliminate internal opposition with the murder of prominent political opponents did not only mark the end of the role of the Tutsis in public life, but it marked the second Tutsis pogrom. The incident, apart from sending wrong signals to the Rwandan polity, probably exposed the evil of the enthronement of ethnic cleansing and ethnicism in every confrontation. That this was shocking to the Western world, who wondered why people that shared the same history, culture and language would

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kill each other in such a manner, explained the importation of ethnicization in Rwandan politics and government. The whole incident marked the most horrible and systematic extermination of a people since the Second World War, all owing to an act of ethnic hatred and deepened ethnicization. Additionally, the processes and procedures used in the planning and killings of the 1963 ethnicization drive were seen re-enacted in the 1994 war/genocide. It is this similarity that actually made the whole action not only a government planned operation against the minority but a nursed intention against the Tutsis. The photograph below, as shown in the appendix-3 (number 8) shows the training of the Interahamwe militia in their camp at Gissenyi. They were members of the group that was used to carry out the acts of the Tutsis pogrom in 1994 against the initial usage of the Gendarmes by the Kayibanda regime in 1963. The weapons displayed also in number 9 of the appendix-3 below also replicate some of the ones and types used in all the conflicts.

Though similarity, exists in the security arrangements of the self – defence group and National Guard of Gregory Kayibanda and that of Juvenal Habyarimana, Interahamwe militia, the differences could only be located in the manner the Hutu extremists kept records of every Tutsi and their addresses in the latter regime. Although this group of extremists did not target only the Tutsis; it was also after the Hutus who were in the opposition, indicating that the governments might have combined tyranny and ethnicization in politicking towards the destruction of the common enemy.

Juvenal Habyarimana, who later overthrew Kayibanda, did not only ignore the policies of his predecessor but utilized a kitchen cabinet called Akazu. He, strengthend the duties of the Interahamwe militia, the gendarme, the police and the National Army to checkmate the common enemy-the Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Politics of exclusion was introduced, ensuring that the non – Hutus were never allowed to attend or be part of the executive council meeting of the government. Despite these lapses in the polity and the problems already created by the one-party statesystem in Rwanda, the world may have been fooled to believe that Rwanda was under a democratic rule simply because the majority ethnic group, the Hutus, was in power. This misconception that the French and Belgians supported to the last days of the war and genocide was the singular factor that might have encouraged the

importation of ethnicization in to governance. At this period, political power was also employed to abuse the citizenry under the watchful eyes of an awful diplomacy. This level of political decadence and failed democracy in Rwanda was arguably observed in the words of Francois Mittrennd, the former French President who according to Melvern (2000:12-16), noted that 'what matters was that the majority were in power in Rwanda, afterall killings are not a new thing to be worried about'. This kind of costly statement from a French statesman could be part of the insinuation that helped to plung Rwanda into a deep ethnic crisis, resulting in ethnicization. To support this bad policy of the government, the state-owned media and other private radio stations owned by the Hutu elite helped in promoting hate propaganda.

These instances and records of killings show that the governments of Kayibanda and Habyarimana were similar but differed only in the number of people killed. This is because while over 480,000 people were killed between 1959 and 1963 under Kayibanda, over a million, eight hundred thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus were equally killed under Habyarimana regime from 1973 to 1994. Premised on the kind of ethnicization in governance under Kayibanda and Habyarimana, coupled with the astronomical records of killings which made the atrocities to be called genocide, it is evident from the displayed photographs below that vengeance and deep-seated hatred characterised the events of the period.

To explain the import of the word "genocide" as mentioned above, Lemkin (2004:62)noted that 'it signifies the destruction of an ethnic group based on a coordinated plan, aimed at total extermination to be put into effect against individuals chosen as victims, purely, simply and exclusively because they were members of the target group'. This, therefore, explains the fact that ethnic cleansing/ethnicization of politics can prop up the act of genocide when employed against a particular sect or ethnic group. If different reasons could be found among the two governments mentioned above to have indulged in targeting members of the opposition without using ethnic divides, then the above explanations bearing semblance to genocide would not have applied. This is simply a policy because ethnic cleansing of politic begets genocide and it was a policy employed by the Hutu ethnic group and its allies from 1959 to 1994.

This also implies that the structure of the two Hutu-led governments of Kayibanda and Habyarimana, arguably, had a similar agenda. Their policies and intentions were probably borne out of inherent against the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus. The deepened ethnic cleansing makes the whole idea of doing away with the enemies a vital project and a tool of vengeances. Hence, the record of the repeated acts of ethnicization occurred in 1959, 1962, 1963, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and that of April 1994 were probably actions made possible through a premeditated intention against the common enemies. It is this reasonable evidence in our analysis that establishes the justification of our research hypothesis – that ethnicization of political power helps to deepen ethnic hatred in Rwandan politics and government.

Besides, the structures of the perpetrators' governments were seen to have engineered the concept of ethnicization of political power with a deepened ethnic hatred employed as a payback symbol. The issue of the hate messages did not only compel most killers to go on killing their victims as a process of ethnicization, but its alignment with and order from the ruling government made it possible. This implies that the Rwandan pogrom of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus was systematically planned from the first one in 1959 to the last one in 1994. They were carried out in a similar manner and with the characteristic supports from the same allies.

It is evident that before the unfortunate events in Rwanda, the Hutus and Tutsis were indifferent and peculiar, thus making one wonder why people who spoke the same language, shared the same culture, custom, relics, legends and religion could engage in such a heinous crime against each other. The factor that could have engineered this act was, however, found in the adoption of ethnicization in governance.

Thus, it is correct to agree with Finkielkcrant (2004:18) that the factor that mitigated the Rwandan crisis are of two elemental concepts: ethnic hatred and the intrigues of men in government. For the latter, he noted that there were men who desirous of covering their atrocities, strengthened their greed for power and wealth by consciouly eliminating any opposition in sight, thereby, making the assertion of Dallaire (2003:41) who posited that Satan became incarnate in the person who represented nothing less than an allegory for the devil to destroy men, women, children, the aged and the pregnant mothers a reality. The same notion was buttressed by Nyankanzi (1998:1) who agreed that the outcome of long-dated hatred, violence and

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struggle for position in the state promoted execution of policies that resulted in the death of a substantial portion of a group – the Tutsis and moderate Hutus through the adoption of politics of ethnicization.

In addition to the validated hypotheses above, as analysed with the instances, it suffices to state that most of the killings were made possible by deep-seated hatred, acts motivated by greed, power struggle and inherent inferiority complex and the fear of the unknown and so on by the contending parties. Although ethnicization was seen as the main policy thrust of the government in dealing with the common enemies, one other factor that enhanced the speedy execution and actualization of this vengeful policies was the role of the allies, which did not only help to demonize the killers to see ethnic cleansing as the bastion of their struggle and solution but acted as an enabling force and ember to their cause.

Analytically, if the evidence as cited above shows that ethnicization was at one time or the other employed by the separate regimes of the different ethnic groups that had ruled Rwanda, it then implies that our hypothesis as stated, is hereby validated and justified.

3:9. REBEL ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA

Rebellion in Rwanda, going by records, evolved in two separate stages: one was created as a result of imposition of minority rule over the majority by the colonial masters. The other emanated from the majority rule that was a leadership of vengeance against the minority. But from whatever angle one tends to look at the actions of both the Hutu and Tutsi over the rebellion in and crisis Rwanda, the answer boils down to the contention of Gurr (1974: ix) that men had rebelled against their rulers for millennia,… due to the fact that the government, according to Nigro and Nigro (1974: 58) had failed to translate to the people the essence of government. The essence of government is the ability of the government to do for the people those things that they could not do for themselves, such as the act of providing pipe-borne water, electricity, road and other social amenities that the group or people lacked or were dissatisfied with the incumbent and desire a change and or that the greater policies of the administration might be anti-people and anti-society; that the institutions, persons and policies of rulers have helped to incure the wrath of their nominal subjects throughout the history of organised political life (Gurr, 1974: 3).

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In view of this, the events of the Rwandan rebellion could be examined from two separate angles of Hutu rebellion and Tutsi rebellion. These occurred at different periods and were encouraged by relative deprivation, frustration, subjugation, depression, poverty, among others. It was the persistence of the damage and healing that might have probably remained unattended to that aroused the 1994 war/genocide.

Hutu Rebel Activities

The Hutus are about 85% of the Rwandan population and according to Melvern (2000: 8), there is no consensus among historians or anthropologists on the origins of these divisions so crucial to the Rwandan history. However, the early Europeans – Germans, in 1894 met the Hutus working on the Tutsis farm and looking after their (Tutsi) cattle. Keane (1996: 12), in his view, noted that in the pre-colonial Rwanda society – Tutsis nobility and ownership of large herds of cattle allowed and drew vast members of the Hutus into the web of clientelism. That is, a Hutu peasant would be given a cow in return for which he would make himself available for work on the land of his patron… and this reduced them to second class citizens in a land where they were the majority. This probably suggests that poverty and lack might have led to the present status of the Hutus as second class citizens. Meanwhile, it is this Tutsis' wealth and nobility that might have probably given them the upper hand over others to establish a leadership that its nobility was not only open but linked to a relationship of mutual dependence based on reciprocal arrangement regarding goods and services (Melvern, 2000: 9).

As naratedly, Nyankanzi (1998:31) between 1885 and 1886 Rwanda fell under the German sphere of influence at the Berlin conference and the Germans established their military command and ruled the land under the indirect system. In 1894, the actual German contact with Rwanda was made and probably changed the whole arrangement, as the colonial masters ruled through the existing power structure of the Tutsi Umwami, King Rwabugiri. In analysing this line of action, the German policies stipulated to support for the chiefs in such a manner that it would also want to be convinced that the Rwandan salvation and that of their supporters depended on their faithfulness to the Germans (Melvern, 2000: 9). In the same vein, Mamdani (2001: 34) noted that under the existing rule, the Tutsi kingship remained sacred for the entire Rwandans, while both the Tutsi chief and Hutu chief on the hills ruled their subjects in

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allegiance to the monarch. Thus, in colonial Rwanda, there was a leadership system that was a mixture of direct and indirect rule, against which the people never grumbled until later days.

Later on, Melvern (2000: 9) reiterated that with the German expansionist tendency in the Northern Rwanda in 1910, the Hutus rebelled against the German policy and refused the progress of the expansionism meant to covet all their land. The Tutsi monarch and his army were terribly resisted, thereby propping up the need for the Germans to help the Umwami in crushing the rebellion in Ruhengeri province. Keane (1996: 17) also observed that the revolts in the early part of the century were mercilessly subdued by the Germans and their Tutsi allies, an action which resulted in distrust and alignment between the king and the subjects on one side, and the king and the colonialists on the other. Thus, the forces binding the Rwandans gradually eroded away.

In 1912, the Germans, who had favoured expansionism, once again helped the Tutsi monarch to subjugate the areas of the North – Ruhengeri and Gissenyi. This second rebellion against the Hutus was for their total acceptance of the German rule and its policies against the established system in the land. The current situation did not only raise questions on social issues with regard to relations, but pointed to the fact that the Hutus' loyalty had waned owing to the Umwami political romance with the colonial masters and their allies (Mamdani, 2001: 56). This is because before now there was no difference or normal difference between Hutus and Tutsis, though there might have been distinct political tendencies, which might be common between the governed and the government.

However, after the First World War, the Western provinces of German East Africa, Rwanda and Burundi were given to Belgium as the League of Nations mandate territories (Melvern, 2000). Belgium, in assuming power in Rwanda, agreed to uphold the system of governance in place while exercising a little modification. It is this modification that also angered the Hutus who now saw the Tutsis as their common enemies. The behaviour and character of the Hutus in this scenario might have also suggested to the Belgians who described them as "creatures with souls sad and passive, ignoring all thought for the morrow", as a people who they could in any way deal with.

Hence, the Belgians recognised the Tutsis as perfect partnership for the exploitation of Rwanda (Keane, 1996: 16).

Then, despite the Hutus' complaint over the misrule they suffered under double colonization by the Belgians and the Tutsi oligarchy, which the League of Nations did nothing; the Hutus were further suppressed when Belgium introduced forced labour and the use of identity card (I.D. card) aimed at creating ethnic division among the people. The Belgians changed the indirect rule to direct rule and social inequality was enthroned. It was the culmination of this kind of treatment that resulted in the 1957 revolt that was also checkmated by the Belgians and the Tutsi oligarchy under the United Nations trusteeship commission.

It is noteworthy that it was the process of party formation and the struggle for independence that actually exposed the Tutsis as a people who could not be trusted by the Belgians. It is the latter's desire to form a political party aligning to the socialist or communist ideology, coupled with the reason that the level of misrule and decimation amongst the people had got to an alarming rate that created the distrust, a factor which also divided the Catholic priests' support for the Tutsis in Rwanda, thereby paving the way for the Hutu emancipation. Following this situation, in 1959, the Hutus revolted against the Tutsi oligarchy. This was probably in connivance with the Belgians who felt betrayed by that singular act of the Tutsis. The revolution, nicknamed "Social Revolution," was carried out to dislodge and do away with the Tutsi oligarch and everything *Tutsinization*. The revolt started at Burundi Hospital where the Umwami was injected with a poisonous drug by a Belgian medical doctor. In support of the revolt in Rwanda, the Belgians reversed their policy to enthrone the Hutu in power. According to *Gizosi Jenocide Magazine* (2004), this was the beginning and probably the factor that laid the foundation for all manner of killings and rebellions in Rwanda down to the 1994 crisis.

The Hutu's records of rebellions, though meant to change the status quo and correct the level of injustice in the land, could equally be held as the background or tap root of all other rebellions that had come forth in Rwanda, down to the 1994 RPF rebel encounter with the government of General Habyarimana in the midst of the war/genocide that included the overthrow of Hutu government.

Tutsi Rebel Activities

The only time there was early rebellion among the Tutsis or its leadership (the oligarch) in Rwanda was when Umwami Musinga vehemently refused and disagreed with the Belgian administration when the colonial master accused him (Musinga) of rebelling against a constituted authority, and for which in November, 1931 he was deposed. The problem started when the idea of the Belgians imposing forced labour on the people was opposed by the Umwami. The second was the Umwami's refusal to accept total colonization of the Belgians as they reduced the power of his office. In 1923, they removed his judicial power and, in 1926, he was forbidden the right to appoint chiefs at all levels. It was the Umwami's reaction to all these redefining of the power of the chiefs and the streamlining of the local government activities without proper information that caused him his throne (Melvern, 2000: 10) and (Mamdani, 2001: 90).

The Tutsis, having been brutally expelled from the social and political scene of Rwanda, tried to stage a comeback. This probably informed their invasion of Rwanda in 1963. This rebellion against the Hutu powerful government was carried out with over six hundred troops. But, on December 21st 1963, they were intercepted at Kanzenze Bridge on the River Nyabarungo, about 12 miles to Kigali by the ruling government (Melvern, 2000: 17). The resultant effect of these failed actions was the killing of over 5,000 Tutsis living inside Rwanda by the Kayibanda-led government (Otunnu, 1999: 7–8). These were unnoticed pogroms that affected not only the rebellious invaders, but also the innocent and quiet ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda, which can be likened to the 1959 pogroms of social revolution (Nyankanzi, 1998: 31).

Despite the elements of planned annihilation linking the killings in 1959 and 1963 to genocide, the 1973 Tutsi rebellion did not either differentiate records, as the exiled Tutsis, weary and tired of living like slaves in another man's land, wanted to go home. This was also probably as a result of the kind of maltreatment they were subjected to by the Obote and Amin governments of Uganda (Otunnu, 1999). At the same time in Rwanda, Major J. Habyarimana was in charge of the nationwide anti-Tutsi campaign, and was not happy with the way the government, led by the Southern Hutus of Kayibanda, was not doing enough to keep the Tutsis down. This probably explains his position on the assumption of power in July 1973, when he vowed to end the 1959

national revolution against the Tutsis through moral revolution (Melvern, 2000: 22) and (Mamdani, 2001: 138).

It is informative, according to Davies (1952: 487), that a revolutionary state of mind requires the continued, and even habitual, but dynamic expectation of greater opportunity to satisfy the basic needs of the people. This happens to be one of the reasons why the Tutsis in Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania seized every opportunity to demand the right of the exiled to return home with their position specified. The Hutu extremists, seeing this plot and request as a sinister ploy, again accused the Tutsis inside Rwanda of conspiracy and complicity to destabilize the country and carried out another unnoticed pogroms (Nyankanzi, 1998: 31). In translating his idea of moral revolution into reality, Habyarimana employed discrimination and scapegoating as a weapon (Keane, 1996: 21 – 22) but the Tutsis, probably not deterred by the event playing itself out in Rwanda in 1979 under the Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association (RRWF), changed into Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU), a political body meant to pursue the hope of the refugees towards returning to Rwanda. The body operated in exile, opposing the divisive politics of Hutu nationalism in Rwanda. The changing of its name to Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987 made it to be more dedicated to the course. This is because it became more active, half political party and half paramilitary group (Melvern, 2000: 26), (Nyankanzi, 1998: 9), (Mamdani, 2001: 36 – 39), and (Keane, 1996: 23).

The RPF with enormous experience in guerrilla warfare, was officially launched in 1988. The members of the RPF had in 1986 helped National Resistance Army (NRA) of Yoweri Museveni of Uganda to ascend the throne by driving into exile Milton Obote and his regime. Members of the RPF included all the children of exiled Rwanda Tutsis, those born in exile, those sympathising with the Tutsis' cause and all the Rwandan opposition seeking change (Hutus, Tutsis and Twas) in their homeland.

The RPF, apart from calling on the Habyariman government to respect the right of the exiled and returnees, also made several appeals to the United Nations and the OAU, but received inconclusive answers. Thus, in October 1990, the RPF invaded and rebelled against the government of the Hutu extremists in Rwanda. Unfortunately, the Rwandan Army, with immediate help from France and DR Congo's-Mobuto Sese Seko, countered the invasion, leading to the failure of RPF (Melvern, 2000: 28 – 29).

Besides, the RPF, now under General Paul Kagame, pressed for democratization of Rwanda, with all parties to the crisis inclusive. However, opposed to the idea of power sharing or democratic government away from the autocratic and totalitarian system of government already in Rwanda, the Hutus apprehension that the Tutsis might be coming to re-colonise them was the fear and the main reason for the refusal. Thus, with the UN involvement in 1993, the Tutsi – RPF were allowed to keep about 6000 of her troops near the Rwandan border with Uganda. This was also after over 3,000 Tutsis were killed at Ruhengeri by the Hutu extremists. These were also to allow for the Arusha peace accord to go on unhindered. But the Hutus were unhappy that the Tutsis had won what otherwise they could not achieve on the battlefield through the Arusha Peace Accord power sharing, vowed never to allow the Tutsis taste power again. There was also the probability that this might have explained the reason for the extremists shooting down the plane of the President to divert attention, and also to possibly forestall the Arusha peace accord agreement and the take-off of the transitional government.

The April 6, 1994 event might have recorded the killing of over 1,200,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, it prepared the ground for all invasions by the RPF (Keane, 1996). This is because while the extremists, Interahamwe, Gendarmerie, the Army and other agents and allies were busy annihilating the common enemies inside Rwanda, the common enemies outside, seized the opportunity to invade, rebel and seize power from the Hutus. The civil war profoundly changed all those who took part in it. This is because the RPF went into it as an army of liberation and came out of it as an army of occupation (Mamdani, 2001: 185).

However, in looking at the events that led to the action of the separate rebel groups, (Hutu rebels and Tutsi rebels) at different periods in Rwanda, it is pertinent to admit that it is the dynamics of the rebellions that created the different avenues that exposed the bad regimes of both the Tutsi rule and Hutu reign. This is because the activities of the rebels were able to pinpoint the existing hollowness in the different governments, owing to the precedence that brought them to power. Their activities also agree with Davies' (1952: 53) that social change and revolution, generally, postulated that political violence is a consequence of decreasing responsiveness to social structure, beliefs and norms, all being the objective of change. This was consistently stated by the Hutus during the period of the oligarchy, as one of the reasons they were agitating for

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majority rule, while the Tutsis, on the other hand, seeing what they were passing through in a foreign land, seldom asked for the position of the returnees in the Rwandan project.

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THE ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMACY OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS

4:0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the role of diplomacy and rebel incursion in African politics and government. It exposes how Rwandan economies and politics were based on avenue for decay. This decay of the system was noted to have encouraged state collapse, cyclical underdevelopment, incessant rebellions and conflicts. The second hypothesis is examined, mindful of the degree of the role of diplomacy as backed by the national interests of the states discussed. There was also an analytical explanation of our main thrust, which states that in the midst of weak diplomacy, conflicts, crises and rebellions with severe implications do take place. The work observes that most crises which start as insurgence, gain international recognition and support to become full-blown rebellions or war through the aid of international diplomacy. This was noted to have made Rwandan internal crises to become internationalized. Prevalent also was the view that diplomacy is mostly played with the intent of making gains in the long run from the host and, where such is not attainable, the host or victims are abandoned to their fate as was in the case of the 1994 Rwandan crisis. This section examines the role of diplomacy of each actor before the war/genocide in Rwanda. These lapses, which were noted to have led to the abandonment of the people as displayed by the international community's inaction during the period of the conflict, were premeditated before the genocide days and squarely traceable to an inherent problem. This problem, the study noted, is found in the build-up to the factors that informed the level of international conspiracy and the failure of international diplomacy in Rwanda.

4:1 DIPLOMACY OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS

In this section, emphasis will be placed on the kind of diplomacy displayed by the United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, Congo DR and others before the period leading to the Rwandan war/genocide in 1994.

(i) The United Nations

The role of the UN in Rwanda under the trusteeship territory commission status dates back to 1945 when the new international organisation replaced the defunt

League of Nations' mandate territory status as earlier stated in Chapter Three of this study. The inconsistency of the UN monitoring team of the events in Rwanda, even up to the period around independence in 1961, was noted to be the harbinger that encouraged a long-lasting lapse that followed the body's treatment of the several Rwandan cases with negligence. Those factors agreed to be the focal point of existence of Rwanda, like developments in areas like, economic, social welfare, human right, leadership, and others were poorly handled, as Rwanda itself was poorly developed.

According to Melvern (2000:16) every UN visit to Rwanda was stage – managed, unknown to the United Nations which may not have cared to hear from the other side except those that complained of ill-treatment. It was probably this insensitivity to the sufferings of the people that fuelled the internal tension, unrest and long spate of violence that followed every political situation. Moreover, the enthronement of democratic rule after much persuasion and the expulsion of the Belgians from Rwanda in 1962 by the UN came only after a long period of criticism of the UN activities in the tiny East African state, especially as regards the Organisation's failure to do something about saving the country from extinction - a notion that was attributed to the element of small states status and lack of cooperation amongst the super powers as the UN, indeed, was noted to be doing nothing about the lapses noticed in Rwanda. All these, coupled with the unwholesome activities of the Belgians, helped in fanning the embers of violence in Rwanda (Ghali, 1996:7-9). The UN diplomacy in Rwanda was not only lacking preventive measures to dissuade violence but was noted to have started on a wrong footing, thereby dragging on to pave the way for the sad events that followed in 1994.

According to Melvern (2000:11), against the backdrop of unpleasant situation of things in Rwanda, the UN set up a committee to investigate the living conditions of the people. The UN report, apart from stating that Rwanda was full of instability occasioned by poor governance, also inferred that Rwanda was densely populated, with poor and difficult land, inadequate soil and monumental erosion, all about which complaint were lodged with the strange ruling feudal regime but with no positive response coming therefrom. Instead, poverty and death were ignored by the affluent, and the Belgians enthroned extremely complicated rule with political relationships where the pre-eminence of man over the cow was far from being established, and with the UN remaining indifferent.

Critical of the Belgians' rule in Rwanda, the UN report further stated that lack of education in Rwanda was very obvious. The general ill–treatment of the average Hutu men who were subjected to forced labour, whipped and discriminated against, was noted with dismay (Ghali, 1996:8-9). Against all odds, however, the Belgians were commended for allowing some elements of democratic institution in place (Melvern, 2000:12); even when the UN never did anything towards solving the highlighted problems.

The UN, after being pessimistic about Belgium's leading role in the land with some little hope for a rapprochement between the races, however, asked her to accelerate efforts at emancipating the deprived, as it was not happy with the development of things. Against the nature of the report and the following development, Mamdani (2001: 47) contended that the Belgians were never happy with the Tutsis over the formation of parties on communist platform and saw it as a slight on them, coupled with the political derision that irritated the entire colonialists. In another reaction, Turner (2005) noted that the Tutsis' action had left the Belgians with much suspicion of how ungrateful the Tutsi oligarchy was after an age-long relationship, thereby thwarting their proposed pro-Belgian African power. But a separate factor that smeared the Belgians was what Minear et al (1996:53-55) observed as the growing negativism of the Rwandans towards Belgium, which saw them as not yet ripe for independence. But just as the Belgians could not let the colony understand their predicament about the non-availability of funds to make for independence, so also the Belgians did not agree with the Rwandan action as being informed by the climate of independence going among the African states at the period. These separate misunderstandings, however, led to a clash of interest, suspicion and betrayal that later turned out to be the main reason behind the reversal of policy. The UN in its role failed to maintain the same tempo of consistency in making sure that the Belgians facilitate the move towards independence of Rwanda. Even with these glaring lapses, the UN never bothered again until unrest, tension and instability took the centre stage once more.

Following this development and other shortfalls of the Tutsi oligarchy, the Belgians did not only reverse their policy of majority rule but also created instability so that they could hold on to power unchallenged, unknown to them that this singular act was going to be their major undoing. Besides, their inability to weigh what might be

the turn of event ridiculed their position on trusteeship, an issue they neglected while taking such a decision. The United Nations monitoring group, according to Ghali (1996:7-9), noted that based on the information supplied to it, the activities of the Belgians were not satisfactory, but seen as fanning of violence. Moreover, even with the observation the UN did nothing about the lapses noticed in Rwanda, neither did it attend to them – a classic case of negligence.

Although the United Nations consultation with the International Trusteeship Commission on the Rwanda crisis and what made the body refuse to act for long over the Belgians and Tutsi oligarchy misrule in Rwanda until in the mid-1950s beat everyone's imagination. Although the UN ordered the immediate withdrawal of the Belgians forces and the institutionalization of a true system of governance towards independence of Rwanda in Resolution 1413 (XIV) of 1959, the process and manner of carrying this out were not spelt out which, again, afforded the Belgians the opportunity to instigate one ethnic group against the other. Moreover, the urgency and effectiveness of the order was never monitored or queried by the UN. The Belgians, instead, spent an additional two years to implement the programme while the same problems were still prevalent. While the Belgians partially adhered to this instruction, although not without creating more contradiction and confusion, especially in trying to favour the Hutus by accusing the Umwami of refusal to cooperate with the provisional organs of the resolution, the UN, on its own, never investigated such an allegation. The Umwami, apart from being cut off from the exercise of his official functions, which was then entrusted to an Interim Council by the Belgians, was also adjudged incapable of playing the role of a constitutional monarchy. He was punished without any consultation with the UN. This, therefore, polarized the society and made the long enslaved Hutus see an average Tutsis as a common enemy (Ghali, 1996:9-10). The UN again refused to call the Belgians to order for flouting the document of the resolution for reasons best known to the body, a situation which also made the people of Rwanda see the UN as awful and unserious in attending to their problems. It was this verdict of negligence against the UN that informed the conclusion of the Rwandas that the global body was never for their interests; hence, the increase in the level of instability.

Furthermore, with several conflicts and violence trailing the issue of leadership, land, wealth, agricultural produce and education, among others, the Rwandan situation was heading for disaster. Following the UN indecisive stand, Buggingo (2005) and

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Shallamba (2005) noted that the United Nations was confused and lost in the Rwandan politics, simply because the UN diplomacy was filled with several contradictions and compromises. A compromised diplomacy is worse than poison and destruction (Keane, 1996:22).

Consequently, there was a new cycle of ethnic conflict and violence after independence, to which the UN turned deaf ears. Rwanda, from 1962 to 1967, witnessed a high concentration of refugee over-flow owing to the degree of instability. According to Adisa (1996:18), an estimated 550,000 people mostly Tutsis, were in refugee camps in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. This is against the record of over 250,000 that were killed in the second Tutsi pogrom (Nyankanzi 1998:9), a case the UN monitors and the Belgians were said to have full knowledge about, but failed to caution, condemn or even investigate as its outcome was a threat to the peace initiative of the international body for the parties.

Against the background of the UN refusal to react or even condemn the act or otherwise, it was only the UNHCR which assisted the refugees in countries of their asylum and settlement (Melvern, 2000:223). In relation to the view of Shyaka (2004:21-25) indigenous scholars like Buggingo, Nsethitimana and Mboneyesgi, among others, noted the dismal attitude and activities of the UN which involved regarding Rwanda as a small state, with no cooperation in international relations and, therefore, deserving no attention. Another group of scholars led by Prunnier (1997), Melvern (2004), Gourevitch (1995), Barneth (1995), Neuffer (2002), Destexche (1995) among others, in support of Power (2003), asserted that the UN did not shut, its door to the situation in Rwanda, but was doing little as less priority and less concern were given to a small state diplomacy as Rwanda, an allegation that was never debunked by the UN. The UN, however, stated that due to the tension of the cold war and the events in the Middle East at that period, it could not attend to the numerous problems, just as it was believed that the Rwandan internal conflict could be settled by the OAU and its neighbours (Ghali, 1996:49). These allegations of negligence in the crisis in Rwanda were not hidden as the UN became more negligent in the later incident in Rwanda, amongst which were the failures of Belgium and France to implement the UN delegated function on Rwanda. It is this failure by the duo and the UN to appraise issues that saw the military in 1973 overrunning the country in a coup d'etat.

Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu and a good student of the French, overthrew the government of Gregory Kayibanda in 1973. He promised to restore peace, which never saw the light of the day. The UN, on its own, under the de jure recognition, accepted the regime as a way forward. Many scholars like Ntayinbangi (1974:13), Colbaltica (1976:16), Mutanlabe (1977:82), amongst others, querried the rational for the UN statesment of accepting a military option as a way forward, much especially for a country that was already devastated by ethnic chauvinism and upheavals. Under the cold war tension and politics of containment, the UN was dumbfounded to the observation and to what Melvern (2004:34) noted as avoidance of taking sides to the disfavor of the French interest since Habyarimana coup was said to have been sponsored by the French. This unmitigated silence, once again, allowed Rwanda to boil, with the UN negligence and non-interference.

Following the growing crisis and the Tutsis consistent confrontation with the Rwandan authority in the late 1980s, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded in exile in Uganda. The emergence of RPF and its attack on Rwanda from Uganda in the 1990s, however, saw the OAU, the regional government, and the international community engaging the parties in the crisis in a talk at Arusha, Tanzania without any criticism or question from the UN on the basis of the incursion, even as the UN claimed to be an observer at the talk. At the same time, the stage was also set for the United Nations to play a greater role of initiating efforts to bring peace to the region through negotiations with the parties, but it never did for a reason best known to her.

Yet, again in 1993, due to increasing incidents of human rights violations, killings and insecurity in Rwanda and in the region, the United Nations became directly involved by creating the Security Council Observer Mission called United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda – Rwanda (UNOMUR), under Resolution 846 (1993). But, according to Melvern (2000:82-87), the UNOMUR under the UN Security Council instruction, failed to go to the troubled spot, but rather stayed at Kabale in Uganda, even when RPF accused the government of Rwanda of complicity in a massacre of more than 300 Tutsis in the North - West of Rwanda. This development also led to the suspension of the Arusha talk and the greater blame for this was placed at the doosteps of the UN.

Additionally, against the adamancy of the UN when the Arusha peace talks resumed on 16 March 1993, the body resolved not to participate fully as a negotiator which, many critics and analysts like Melvern (2000) and Power (1997), noted as a betrayal of trust by a body meant to protect and save lives, in lieu of the charter principle. This singular act made the peace talk look more unrealistic and unreliable, as Power (1997) and Destexche (1995) aptly opined that for the UN participating in the peace deal as an observer instead of being the major initiator and negotiator indicated how unserious the body had been on the Rwandan crisis right from the onset. The quoted analysts above further emphasized that the UN's non-chalant attitude and kind of diplomacy, even under the Security Council Resolution 812 (1993), was unbecoming of the attitude of an international body founded primarily to maintain peace. This is sequel to the fact that the body, under the above-mentioned Resolution, had investigated and identified the problems of all the parties in the Rwandan crisis, pronounced them unsatisfactory, even if it had failed to put things aright. The UN was found wanting in the manner by which she kept silent over the role of France which was violating the Security Council Resolution 846 (1993) (Melvern 2000:24-28), just as Destexche (1995:34) blamed the UN's role of trying to pave the way for an unhealthy competition in the Rwandan conflict.

In the heat of tension, under the UN Security Council Resolution 872 (1993), the UNOMUR was changed to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) without any change in role in the course of peace-deal in the Rwandan crisis. Meanwhile, after several delays and indecisions on whether to provide UNAMIR with logistics or not, another major problem faced by the body was the failure of her members to meet and decide on the mission's commencement date. This is because in any event, the average time for the UN to deploy peacekeeping operation, was about six months. Although in reacting to that contradiction Nyankanzi (1998:21) had argued that it was because the UN had no programme for ending the Rwandan crisis, the fact remains that it was the body that set the time frame, date and commencement of operation rather than looking elsewhere for instruction. Another hindrance to peace, Melvern (2000:33-36) noted, was the failure of the individual states which were not keen on committing troops to Rwanda crisis. This is simply because the UN was not clear on its mandate in Rwanda and what should have been the fate of her soldiers' safety.

Being critical of the UN lip service to the Rwandan crisis, Melvern (2004:16) further asserted that there was more of UN interest in Liberia, Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Georgia, amongst others, than in Rwanda, a small state with nothing to offer. These sharply noted reasons for criticizing the UN on the Rwanda crisis, seemed to confirm the accusation leveled against the body earlier. It also went the extra mile to explain the negligent nature of the French role in arming the government force and aiding the arrest as well as killing of the opposition member. According to Dallaire (2003:10), the UN had a low priority for the mission, even when it was involved in the Arusha peace negotiation. This, again, confirms the less priority and indifferent stance of the UN on the Rwandan crisis from the onset and, at the same time, agreeing with the contention of Buggingo (2005) and others who noted that Rwanda was never of any importance to the UN as it was less worried about what happened to her. Could Rwanda be seen as a small state with no cooperation in international relations or was she a nuisance to any of the super powers? In view of this observation, it is probably not clear why the UN had been perpetually sitting on the fence at the beginning of every crisis. Then, one is also moved to question her responsibility and integrity as the only body having the will power to sue for peace globally but had tenaciously shied away from this course. General Romeo Dallaire, in an interview with Melvern (2000:83), had vehemently inferred that he was never adequately briefed about the realities in Rwanda. According to him, if he had known about the disturbing and degrading human rights reports then, he would have insisted on a large force. Thus, in regretting the abandonment and the subsequent contradictions, Dallaire (2003) lamented:

> *You sort of wonder when you look back at the whole thing, whether or not we were set up; whether or not the UN and myself fell into something that was beyond our ability to manage. The UN strong powers seemed to be divided than United. Seemed to have preferred to bury many than saving lives; Seemed to have had more preference on the economic than souls, they traded lives for political reasons, they abandoned us, and we helplessly, abandoned the people.*

The above confession of Dallaire, though sounds contradictory, tends to accept that the UN as a body, concerning the Rwandan crisis, was in a big dilemma and probably did not know what to tell the people whose trust the body had betrayed.

On the role of the UN before the war/genocide in Rwanda, Linden (1995:46) observed that the UN Secretary General, Ghali's actions were suspect as there was a clear indication of a possible betrayal. This is due to the failure of the Secretary General to bring the telegram of January 11th 1994 (see appendix 2 below) to the notice of the Security Council, whereas Ghali and his staff asserted that they laid the matter, if not the document itself, before the Security Council the following day. The possibility of this assertion not being true was also noted as a summary of such should have been made as usual for such a measure. The subsequent treatment of the document suggests that someone might have regarded it as potentially damaging, hence, the nonchalant and ineffectual actions (HRW, 1998:32) and (FIDH, 1995:102). To authenticate the lapses of the UN on the telegram from General Dallaire, Igbal (1998:17) argued that the Secretariat did not give the telegram the importance it deserved. This is because from the outset the arrival of the UN had created hope for many, but the hope was badly shattered when it failed grossly to meet the expectation of the people owing to the way the UN treated the UNAMIR position in Rwanda.

The UN diplomacy was noted to have depleted when the new Special Representative to Secretary General (SRSG) Shaharyar Kahn failed to criticise the activities of the Interim National Government over the whole period; instead, they concentrated all their efforts on obtaining a ceasefire between RPF and the Rwandan Army, even when the RPF refused to negotiate until the killing stopped. The UN effort, without mentioning or condemning the massacres, was incomplete and futile. Thus, Linden (1995:36) accused the UN of not being confident enough to condemn outright the massacres, which might have given moral support to the few who tried to stop the killings and a moral leadership role to the UN. But this never came to pass. This also shows a clear evident that there was a premeditated intention of the UN to ignore the Rwandan conflict, no matter the form or direction it was coming from.

The attitude of the UN towards the period of the build-up to the conflict was not encouraging because after the all-important telegram was received by the Secretary General, the following idea of prohibiting General Dallaire from not acting militarily smacks of insincerity and irresponsibility considering the degree of destruction going on with the grave danger it portended for the world and the future Rwanda. What the Secretary General did instead, was to seek to move Habyarimana through talk, being his own idea, rather than that of his Special Representative and that of other foreign

diplomats combined with threats of taking the matter to the Security Council if Habyarimana should remain intransigent.

The most unfortunate thing, as argued by Power (1998:86), was that on January 13, 1994, Ghali set a goal of getting Habyarimana to halt the preparations for violence within 48 hours and did not follow up the demand, but waited until 10th February, 1994 to take the matter to the Security Council, despite the various indications much earlier that the Rwandan President did not intend to cooperate. Sequel to this situation and even with the above lapses, the mild statement issued by the UN Security Council without any contemplation on the way forward on the matter on 17th February, 1994 and expressing concern over the situation, only reinforced the impression about the UN's timidity and indifference in the face of the preparation for the slaughter which might have been averted. (see code cable MIR 409 Feb. 24 1994). Another area where the UN diplomacy in Rwanda crisis was flawed was on what was observed by Kamukama (1999:61-70) that the UN discussion was leading to nowhere since Ghali refused to encourage the Security Council to strengthen the mandate of UNAMIR because he believed that it would be futile to propose a change that the U.S.A was sure of opposing. Yet, despite this impression, the UN failed to admit the reality and facts of the conflict. This is because while the auguries of disaster started to multiply, Ghali, the UN Secretary General, kept on with the usual practice of the UN bureaucracy. He seemed to be doing his best to avoid any open confrontation with the powerful members of the Security Council on the issue of lapses thereby, possibly, implicating some of the super powers in the UN Security Council as the main architect and possible promoter of the Rwanda crisis.

These identified lapses encouraged the UN withdrawal of the bulk of its troops and the failure of the Security Council to reinforce them and acknowledge the fact that genocide was taking place in Rwanda in the period under study. The result of these lapses include the loss of lives of thousands that were killed, which might be recorded as one of the most culpable and tragic of the UN's many mistakes on interventions (Linden, 1995:61). Arising from the above reasoning, there is a strong probability that there was international conspiracy and failure of diplomacy in Rwanda. This is because the kind of intervention in Rwanda which came before the war/genocide and withdrawn only to be later returned after the war/genocide shows that the kind of diplomacy applied in Rwanda by both the UN and the international community was

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laced with possible contradictions meted out to a small state whose cooperation was not secured at the level of international relations with the outside world.

The level of diplomatic interplay among the UN, SRSG and the people of Rwanda, according to Anyidoho (1998:11) created a wide gap. This gap in relationship was to be exploited by the warring factions during the war/genocide, which probably made the people (the opposing sides) to accuse the UN of bias. About this observation, Keane (1996:37) argued that while the UN and the Security Council in New York were polarized and taking sides, with the exception of Nigeria, the UN and UNAMIR in Rwanda were seen to have been considerably compromised, thereby agreeing with the view of Anyidoho (1998:11) that certain events led to the various political elements in Rwanda to suspect the SRSG and the force commander of bias. On the part of Dr Booh-Booh, he undoubtedly accepted an invitation to the village of Habyarimana before the latter's death during the Easter of 1994 while on the part of General Dallaire; it was wrong of him to have accepted the invitation of some politicians who were RPF sympathisers. The decision to honour both invitations by the persons involved was not viewed kindly by the warring parties, much especially as there was a tensed political situation already existing among the parties to the Arusha Peace Agreement. The lack of neutrality of the delegates to the peace talk on the conflict shows that there was an element of compromised diplomacy. Under normal circumstances, acceptance of an invitation from your hosts is a positive gesture which should be viewed favourably, but in the case of the situation in Rwanda before 6th April 1994, such a response was seen as partisan. The unfortunate events thereafter reflected adversely on the intention of the UN, the mission and the period of the war/genocide. The interplay of such overture to the dictate of international diplomacy in Rwanda explicates compromised diplomacy since it ought to have been avoided by the characters in the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The emerging facts against the role of the UN, collectively, might have bordered on failure, inaction, negligence, compromised diplomacy and lack of interest in the Rwandan crisis. This is because the probable deduction from the degree of the lapses calls for criticism as 75% of the cited cases confirms inaction, neglect and wilful abandonment which, reasonably, may lead to questioning the shabby role of the UN diplomacy and all the manner of intrigues the body was involved in regarding the Rwandan crisis. Was the veto interest of France more important than the prevention of

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catastrophies that were plaguing Rwanda before the genocide? The presence of negativism and reluctance in such an unimaginable circumstance helped to demonstrate the manner of treatment Rwanda was faced with in the period under analysis. The instances above, on one hand, also stand to confirm or answer the earlier questions of whether Rwanda's lack of natural mineral resources such as diamond, gold and timber had propelled that kind of treatment, thereby making it different from other conflict zones. From another perspective to this crisis, evidence available indicates that Rwanda was caught between two opposite interests and at a period when the demise of the cold war was under observation between France/China interests in Rwanda and the British/American interests on the other (parties) and the country. On the side of non-availability of resources that could attract international attention with economic power of bargaining or what Berdal (2000:46) called economy of war agenda that needed the procurement of arms to be expended in Rwanda, the country was naked and cash-strapped as all donor funds were frozen. This was because the role of France and Egypt in the matter as against the pretentious role of the British deals with Uganda/RPF, among others, helped to give the crisis a defined character of a winner takes all.

Under preventive diplomacy, the actions of the UN, to some extent, were unsatisfactory as these happened to be one of the factors that contributed to the development of the conflict which was allowed to escalate without any effort to limit its expansion. This research, however, would be agreeing with the criticism made by Melvern (2004) and Power (2003) on the role of the UN boss, Ghali, in the Rwandan crisis for which they faulted his work as a one-sided account. It would also be arguing that the work's lack of clarity of purpose and actions might have been the reason behind Ghali's failure in citing the instances where UN inaction in the resolution of the crisis was obvious as variously identified by scholars referred to above. The view of this research is stemmed from the argument that if Ghali had no plan against any intentional policy or sympathy to allow the use of the weapons as noted, that as a diplomat and statesman, what would have been his option was to have ordered the stoppage of the killings, no matter whose interest was at stake. On the other hand, one may equally argue that he was acting in a different capacity as the UN scribe, which should make things easier, but with a higher diplomacy since all decisions were not his alone

On the conclusion by the critics earlier mentioned, that international conspiracy and a premeditated act against Rwandans should be fingered in the conflict, this research may not completely agree on the stand as the general submission did not justify their action or inaction in the whole situation. This study, therefore, presumes that Rwanda's fate probably coincided with the entire situations under states' foreign policy and international political lapses at the period. Even then, the UN, its scribe and the agents could have heeded the early warning. This might be one of the areas they fell short of their official functions from the onset; more so, as the UNAMIR force commander had earlier sent an early warning signal on the 11th of January 1994 to the UN and the Security Council. The early warning signals informed them about the movement of arms, exchange of arms, the plan of the protagonists against the opposition, amongst others. Also, the belief that the UN intervention was already defeated before the war and killings itself might be true or otherwise, since the UN, in her capacity, failed to protect those she ought to have. In addition, the whereabouts of some of her informants who were noted to have disappeared at the peak of the killings remains a mystery. The question of what manner of intervention, therefore, became a hard puzzle to explain as the UN diplomacy slipped off and fell short of expectations. This is because it would have been better if there had been no intervention at all, rather than intervening in the mission and failed to carry out the required responsibilities as observed in the UN inaction and failed diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis.

Still, some questions need to be considered: Is it because Rwanda's case was hard owing to the enormity of human destruction under one hundred days? What about other crisis zones? These are great posers; after all, many were at hand to estimate the level of carnage as occurred in Liberia (1990 – 2003) Sierra Leone (1992 – 2000), Angola (1972 – 2004), and Sudan 1966 to date, among others.

The main point of the argument is that the United Nations might have differed in treating African states crises with urgency, tact and seriousness as required, or as some have postulated, but another factor that many failed to underscore in this is that, the UN has principles of rule of engagement that do not differ from extent pretence for a particular party in a crisis or otherwise. This implies that African problems seem to have been on the unattractive side of the United Nations options in conflict management. Meanwhile, the fact remains that most of the African conflicts follow a particular trend of destruction that recognizes no peacekeeper from the beginning. This

might be one of the reasons for the delay in the intervention. This, therefore, might have availed the body the reasons for the unconcerned attitude of forgetting the pains of the sufferers – the Rwandan people in particular and Africans in general. Indeed, there are differences in global treatment of cases. Conflicts are treated based on their pedigree, just as African conflicts might be different from those of other parts of the world, the UN and its agencies' consideration and treatment might also differ. The rumour of strings being attached in every case cannot be ruled out where the African states cannot or are seen not able to meet up or fulfill such expectations as conditions for interventions. Also, the element of politicization in African problems and conflicts by big wigs of the international community may not equally be ruled out, since in every conflict there are those favoured and those who may feel disfavoured. However, whichever way one looks at it, the African man on the street, who suffers or who becomes the vessel of destruction in the struggle bears the greatest brunt, as was in the case of Rwanda in1994.

(ii) The OAU/AU in Rwanda

The role of OAU/AU in the Rwandan crisis is very difficult to understand due to the dual posture of the organisation on one hand and what seemed to be the weakness of its charter principle in attending to African conflicts on the other. This is because, according to Adelman (1999:110), OAU had been aware of the Rwandan crisis way back to its formative stage in 1964. Agreeing with this observation, Otennu (1999:38) noted that when the issue came up at the Lagos Conference in March 1964, Uganda, through her Minister of Information Nekyon had complained of the lack of will and assistance by the international community and the OAU's ability to adequately take up the responsibility of assisting the refugees, or even providing alternative measures to combat the growing hostility since Uganda did not have and had no alternative other than to send some of the refugees away. The OAU's decision on this was inconclusive and abandoned. It was, however, evident that this early neglect and nonchalant attitude of the OAU made the growing base and tension of the crisis deep-rooted. The tendency of these actions, probably informed the characters to the conflict to advance their cause further irrespective of resistances and oppositions that were overwhelming and far – reaching. On the other hand, the OAU's silence might boil down to the fact that the body, being in its formative stage had no basis or means to help the fleeing refugees, whereas it was equally to have kept quiet on an action that portended danger with loss

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of hope of many of the refugees who only thought of ways to help themselves (African Research Bulletin: 1964:37). In the same vein, the OAU's kind of diplomacy, according to Tekle (1999:111) was diplomatically dismal in all African conflict resolutions reflecting the structural weakness of the body. She, however, admitted that the OAU was designed to remain a stillborn because of the weakness of the post-colonial African states. An aspect of this abysmal diplomacy was the flawed decision of the OAU in 1980, which recommended that any states which were in a position to take up peacekeeping efforts in any of the warring states should do so on their own expense and in accordance with conditions to be determined by the council. From all indications, this decision did not only contribute to scaring everyone away from a sister state experiencing conflict, but it went a long way in promoting the notion and belief that those in conflict could go on with wanton killing unabated.

Another precautionary decision of the OAU/AU that baffled everyone was the pretentiousness that the United Nations Security Council would be requested to assist the OAU in the event of failure of the body to raise the necessary funds to curtail any conflict in Africa, which seemed like a predetermined move for ensuring failure by all means (see OAU 1767: viii: 27). The statement equally exposed the kind of poor capacity and poor initiative of the OAU. This is made clearer when the UN and the international community abandoned Rwanda in 1994 and the OAU could not do anything other than to watch the carnage escalate. Although she later requested logistics and equipment to help to step in at the period of the conflict this looks like an after thought. The request was, however, granted after much delay but the member states on their own were afraid of losing any peacekeeper either, thereby showing that the OAU diplomacy in African conflicts and Rwanda in particular was riddled with pretence of ideas that never saw the light of the day. It is also worthy of note that if such a step as mentioned above continue to be followed, the tendency that any delay could impact on the morale of the troops and jeopardise the whole operation is very clear and reasonable.

Also, it is on record that in 1992 the OAU created a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution of disputes in the hope that prevention of conflicts would guide the minds of members, but the idea which was sweet and smooth on the paper. In practice, it could not materialise in any of the events that followed. The Rwandan crisis, among all the crises during that period, delicately exposed and

displayed another aspect of the weaknesses and ineptitudes of the OAU owing to the shortfall in the measures towards conflict resolution.

To enhance her diplomacy, the OAU demanded free hands to take initiatives regarding the affairs of her member states in internal conflicts and to engage in dialogue with parties to such conflicts with a view to bringing them to a common understanding. The unfortunate thing is that there were lingering doubts about the ability of OAU in conflict prevention. The Rwandan crisis clearly exposed the lack of qualitative change in the role of the body as expected. The OAU's diplomacy, however, failed to prove those who doubted its inability wrong. Instead it maintained a silent inactive tone. The near unanimity on the OAU's potential role in peacemaking and the lack of consensus on its peacekeeping and preventive role, as well as its usual method of begging for help from outside confirm that the OAU had never changed, but had complications and contradictions of failed ideals. It is these contradictions that might have put the OAU, with no particular focus on what immediate action was to be taken in the Rwanda crisis, especially when the UN and the international community pulled out and abandoned the victims, in a quandary.

Although according to OAU/CM/1747 LVII 1993:9, the main reason for the idea failure was because the OAU combined peacekeeping and peacemaking together whereas the fact remains that the OAU could not achieve anything with this. Its failure was glaring but her policymakers refused to admit it. Moreover, it might also mean that if the OAU had limited itself to peacemaking it could be reasonably understood since it lacked the necessary funds to meet up with the high cost of such a venture. The adoption above was not only above her strength, but it helped to make a mess of the Rwandan crisis, as the number of casualties was far more than the fleeing, wounded and the rescued altogether.

On the contradictions mentioned above, Tekle (1999:116) observed that there was a big contradiction in the OAU itself, which made the Rwanda crisis and several others a possible issue. This conclusion stems from the outdated principles which have not only been difficulties of the body, but the operational difficulties, particularly in manpower and finance. Another contradiction of the OAU diplomacy, though over flogged among the old, is the one concerning non-interference couched as a constitutional issue because the OAU itself never adhered strictly to the clause. Among

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the foregoing abundant responsibilities, an instance to this effect is where it said that intervention might be more easily accepted only when there was a total breakdown of law and order, which it failed to carry out in Rwanda in April 1994. Another is what was contained in the OAU/CM/1710 (XVI) Rev 1:12, where it states that intervention may be possible and justified where a spillover of human suffering is experienced by neighbouring states on humanitarian grounds as well as on the need to restore law and order. In this regard, Adisa (1996), Prunnier (1996), Power (1996) and Melvern (2000) revealed that the OAU, again failed to show this in the Rwandan crisis, even when the in-flow of refugees to Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Congo DR had become a great problem to the neighbouring states to tackle.

As Turner (2005) had earlier identified of poor payment of dues by member states of the OAU, Tekle (1999:118), in complementary the observation, also noted that the African funding for OAU was not available and that the OAU did not have enough money to finance military operations, specifically during the Rwandan crisis of 1994. In addition, the OAU only played an active and creative role in its traditional involvement in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, both of which failed in Rwanda. This is against the general failure of OAU which was hinged on its inability to accept or even own up that it could meet the growing demands of African crisis expectations, other than accepting or keeping mute, only to do nothing when it ought to have acted.

The contradictions inherent in the charter principle as noted above also informed Turner's (2005) argument that this might have made the kind of diplomacy in practice in Africa to be tailored towards divisionist tendency among the states. This division amongst the states stemmed from a wide range of issues which made many to adopt survival instinct, a tendency that also allowed the Rwandan war/genocide to be blamed on the OAU for doing nothing, even when the UN and the international community refused to intervene. The helpless nature of the OAU which was seeking arms, logistics and equipment to counter the warring parties against the growing number of killings made the African organisation's diplomacy a mere chimera and fiasco.

Arising from the general overview of the OAU/AU diplomacy in the events before the war/genocide in Rwanda as enunciated above, the OAU, in other

engagements before the peak of the crisis was also exposed to have failed to perform its roles, especially as a body meant to consult with the UN Security Council on how to restore peace in Rwanda, help the displaced persons and how to enhance the chances of those willing to return home. But the OAU could not live up to these expectations due to logistics and other needs of the refugees and the displaced persons (Mamdani, 1998:49).

Analytically, the ineptitude of OAU was readily seen in the manner it handled every conflict in the continent. This is due largely to the body's approach to external organisation for providing logistics support to maintain its own peacekeepers. This kind of diplomacy of always looking for fund or begging for help also shows the degree of incapacitation and inadequacies of the OAU. Melvern (2004:18) also submitted that the action of the OAU as noted in the Chad conflict, SADR conflict, Liberian conflict, Sierra-Leone conflict, Angola conflict and Sudan conflict, amongst, others were transported to the Rwandan crisis with no equivocation. This implied, the taking of such a stand by OAU during the Rwandan crisis of 1994 exemplified the kind of weak diplomacy inherent in African politics and government.

To express this displeasure further, Yaker (1998:16-27) criticised the kind of diplomacy employed by OAU in Rwanda and other states in conflict as only good at making innocuous plans and policies whose poor implementation was a major headache as its failure means a lot Africans. He blamed the failure of OAU in not meeting up with many of its challenges that allowed for arms proliferation and wars, as seen in Rwanda, on poor charter principles and inadequacies. This is because, according to Prunier (1996:23) a week to the war/genocide in Rwanda, grenades, small arms and weapons were being exchanged for avocado peas and food items on the street of Kigali. The OAU Peace and Security Council at this period never monitored or do anything, but were seen to have been incapacitated due to its lack of capacity to enforce successful peace-keeping, or install peace enforcement mechanism that could curtail or contain conflict and its menace in the continent.

However, for its role in peacemaking, OAU was commended for the Arusha Peace Talk, though the body was seen as making most of the moves for peace without any corresponding measures or materials to back them up, which is where the lack of logistics, incapacitation, finance and the execution of the project ran into hitches. For

instance, the OAU initiated the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) with troop from Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe given the mandate to monitor the cease-fire and situation of things in Rwanda, with the full support of the UN Security Council. But, one shortcoming of the development was that the troops were not located inside Rwanda but at the border with Uganda – Kabale/Katuna, which also made the development uncoordinated. This is because in the midst of hostilities in the northern part of the country, the NMOG was cut off, thereby making the OAU's action unrecognised while it also caused total interruption of comprehensive negotiation between the warring parties.

Fortman (1994:53-55) who agrees with the existence of the above lapses, posited that this also made the OAU to be caught unawares in the wake of the massacres in Rwanda. This is in spite of all the warnings and information from different quarters that preparation was in top gear towards hostilities and that the government and its agencies had been highly implicated. The inactivity or rather inadequate or misdirected kind of activity continued for several weeks after the massacres, which makes scholars like Guichaoua (1995:54) argue that lack of diplomacy or intervention in the Rwanda war/genocide of 1994 might have been due to the successful disinformation campaign by the perpetrators of the massacres, partly as a result of the fatigue after the Somalia debacle. The OAU, though attempted to act, the division amongst the African states did not allow for any real intervention. This is because the OAU soldiers were on ground but were not given any approval and sufficient equipment and transport facilities which might have saved lives.

Thus, scholars in this respect believed that conflicts in Africa last longer than necessary because of the lapses inherent in African diplomacy, as well as due to the perception in international diplomacy that intervening in African conflicts is like going to submit oneself for sacrifice in the African jungle. This, according to De Waal (1996), might have been one of the major reasons that scared many – both the international community and people of African descents from intervening in the one hundred days of the Rwandan crisis.

However, whatever opinion anyone holds borders on the individual's reasoning according to (Watson, 1990:46). This is because what should occupy the minds of thinkers is what made the OAU unable to monitor, control and, or sanction its members

who aided conflicts, except all these are not parts of OAU diplomacy. With regard to this notion and the characters that made the Rwandan crisis possible, directly or indirectly, the OAU was once again blamed for not cautioning or sanctioning the role of Yoweri Museveni of Uganda in the 1990 Rwanda Patriotic Association (RPA) invasion, simply because Yoweri Museveni was out of the country at the period of the attack. Watson (1990:46-51) disagreed with the excuses as the RPA/NRA might have been mobilized by Museveni before embarking on his journey since his absence could only save his direct involvement and OAU criticism, he argued. Reasoning along the same line African Confidential (1990:4-6) noted that prior to the invasion, Museveni attempted to stem anti-regime and anti-Rwandan sentiments in the country, which helped to propped up the timing of the invasion. The focus, then, should have been on how to control and disguise the exodus and impending invasion, but the OAU was adamant. It is also important to disguise these activities since they violated the OAU charter at the time when Museveni held the chairmanship of the OAU. Seeing Uganda playing double game of allowing the RPA to build their expeditionary army while professing friendship with the neighbour also explains the early weakness of the OAU diplomacy in treating matters. This is because it is obvious that Museveni, being the OAU chairman, aiding RPA and professing good relation with Habyarimana is like one being a judge and a defendant in his own case, especially since the OAU as a body could not condemn the action in a more decisive way (Otunnu, 1999:39).

According to Power (1996:40), the OAU's failure to caution Mobutu Sese Seko of Congo DR was also one of the ills noted to have divided the African organisation. This is because, with this division, and coupled with the continental body's lack of focus, the regional bodies in Eastern Africa – ECA and COMESA were also divided. With Mobutu, Habyarimana and Arap Moi of Kenya being on one side; Burundi, Somalia, and Tanzania were on the other side while Uganda and Ethiopia were apparently neutral. Thus, Mobutu seeing himself as the domineering factor helped in escalating the conflict as Congo DR's action boosted the Habyarimana alliance and action by making sure that the Arusha Peace Accord was not convened. And even if it was, the necessary studs planted must ensure its failure by deliberately slow and prolonged interactions. The OAU was informed of this development but it claimed to be investigating the allegations until at the tail end of the dialogue when it noted that the dilly-dallying and foot dragging were premeditated. The OAU did react as expected

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by other parties in the conflict peacemaking like the European Union (EU) and Canada that was an observer, but it was too late. The kind of diplomacy employed had been caged with several bricks that could not allow any hollow. Thus, it was argued that the war/genocide took everyone by surprise whereas it was a long planed act that many were involved in and many states aided. This is in addition to the weakness in OAU diplomacy that acted in part to make it impossible not to even save lives.

(iii) The Belgian

Before the advent of Belgium, the people of Rwanda were ruled through indirect system. The Belgians, however, restructured the policy that they inherited to include forceful economic ideology of exploitation and accumulation that was tied to forced labour and the conversion of indigenous properties to government-owned, especially land and plantations. The essence of this, Minear et al (1996:29-31) noted, was to improve the impoverished status of Brussels home government in terms of revenue from taxes and incomes that were meager.

With the existing system of exploitation and the disaffection already created amongst the people of Rwanda, the Belgians further sowed seeds of discord. The spread of these seeds of discord was so pervasive that it affected the perception of every Rwandan, making them see the next person in the opposite social group as an arch-enemy. The social groups were, thus, turned into ethnic groups. This was done to afford the Belgians the opportunity to exploit the land unhindered, while the groups went on quarrelling amongst themselves. The social groups that were turned into ethnic groups included the Tutsis, Hutus and Twas. The sowed seeds of hatred, like a whirlwind, became ravaging and posing a great threat to their existence as violence, quarrel and instability became common place in the society. The Belgian government, instead of initiating plans toward development, introduced a strange feeling of fear and deep-seated animosity amongst the people, a characteristic that pitched the ethnic groups against one another for many years.

Amongst the Belgians' methods of exploiting the people was the use of the minority Tutsi Oligarch to exploit the land for more than three decades, a situation in which other ethnic groups like the Hutus, lowly-place Tutsis and the Twas were reduced to slave, even when the Hutus were in majority. However, with the desire for self-determination, following the turn of events in Africa then, the Tutsi ruler

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demanded independence using a socialist platform. The demand, though received by the Belgians, raised issues about the plantform being used. The idea of employing a socialist platform by the Tutsi oligarchy was considered an affront on the capitalist course in the enclave, and against what the Belgian government at Brussel stood for. The diplomatic imports of such an action suggest betrayal and ingratitude according to Belgian apologist, Nestherimana (1997:34). To the Tutsi oligarchy's consternation, they were only asking for independence. Almost certainly, they did not know its effect or the difference between capitalism and socialism ideology and why they were in contest then. Sequel to the situation, the Belgians' reversal of policies was upheld, going from minority rule to majority rule in 1959 to punish the Tutsis. But, in doing so, the process failed to put many things aright. Some of these things include the place of the minority in the midsts of such antics of revenge and retaliation schemism against the Tutsis for deflecting and abandoning exploitative tendency as agreed earlier on. The other reason inherent and probably pertinent was the manner of the Belgian diplomacy which, according to Turner (2005), was the way the Belgians were trying to treat decolonization of her colonies like that of the French role in Cameroon, Gabon, Cote d'ivorie, among others. This is the idea of imposing pro-Belgian nationalists who were ill-prepared and untrained as leaders, and who succeeded in plunging the state of Rwanda into several contradiction and unabated crises.

Added to the problem on ground in Rwanda was the several shortfalls in the Belgian agenda towards governance, particularly in her colonies like Rwanda, which allowed other interest groups, such as France to meddle in her colonies affairs. France, Power (1998:13) noted, was one of the most prominent and fastidious players who came into it to help, but ended up exposing the weaknesses of the Belgians. It is pertinent, then, to state that it is the mixture of these two concepts of assimilation and divide and rule that dislocated and distorted the whole process of governance in the state of Rwanda. This factor did not only become a hindrance to development, it created more problems and confusion in the longrun, as never expected in Rwanda. On the implications of such policies and the diplomatic lapses, Melvern (2000:17) argued that it was the confusion and inconsistency of the Belgians' administrators, evidenced in their inability to handle many of the problems untreated and exacerbated to the precarious tendencies of the later years of conflict and destruction that exposed the level of incompetence and failed policies of the Belgians in Rwanda.

The pertinent fact about these analyses and the observed trend of events regarding the role of Belgian diplomacy in Rwanda, however, exposed the degree of the Belgians' non-performance. It also exposed the antics toward aid to misrule; aid to creating instability, and the inability to manage what was entrusted to Belgium. It was the combination of all these and probably with elements of hypocrisy in the Belgian policies, which adversely impacted on their diplomacy, thereby affecting the Rwandan society. In view of the above analysis, it is quite apt to suggest that the whole scenario agrees with the merit of our hypothesis as stated earlier. It shows that Rwanda experienced several predicaments, losses and awful destruction in her quest for nationhood. The inter-ethnic contradictions and differences imported into her polity by the Belgian political diplomacy help in creating disaffection, separatism and devastation of the state which largely accounted for the occurrence of war/genocide. From all indications, the research places the degree of contradictions and escalation of the Rwandan crisis at the doorsteps of the Belgian weak administrative system. The role of the Belgians in treating the several cases of internal upheavals in Rwanda places her in a confused state of not knowing what to do at every event, thereby helping to encourage internal and external squabbles and quarrelsomeness among the parties in the Rwandan enterprise.

(iv) The French

Perhaps the weakness, poverty and lack of proper administrative policies of the Belgians made the French interference in her administration in the former's colonies obvious. Acting as a factor to blend these shortfalls was the lingual linkage existing between both countries. It made the Belgians disregard the import of the French encroachment which later turned out to be an impediment. It also paved the way for the French, who not only came in to help, but tactically hijacked the colony of Rwanda from the Belgians at the period of Juvenal Habyarimana. The fact that they failed to treat it as comprehensively as one of their own raises questions - a reason which largely accounts for the flaws and inadequacies that might have encouraged the degree of intense criticism and confrontations with the government of the Hutu power in Kigali. This, they argued, was probably due to the level of poverty and nakedness of a land that lacked wealth and mineral resources, in addition to an appalling environment. Given what informed the French notion, the people generally disagreed and saw the former's actions as destructive and promoting violence. More to these issues was the

problems of land tenure and leadership quagmire which otherwise had threatened human existence and which the French were not in any position or ready to be involved or helped in improving, thereby portraying her relationship in a different angle. Thus, the French, from observation, were only interested in favouring whoever they could help or be a willing tool in their aggrandizement and project of exploitation. And opposition to this kind of venture was not only an enmity to wards France and Francois Mitterand - the manor lord, but also an enemy to their nurtured friend and ally - Juvenal Habyarimana. Thus, the French and their agents did not know that they were using Habyarimana to destroy Rwanda as they equally helped in entrenching anything and everything unproductive in Rwanda toward the stability of the society as opined by Pierre (2000:24).

Although loans and aids were sourced through the French and perhaps successfully got, almost all the loans went the way they came and are still counted as odious debts of the Rwandan nation. Habyarimana, Mitterrand and the givers of such loans probably denied the people the hopes for development as they did not only reinvest them outside the state, but all the debts combined had become parts of the indices that place Rwanda as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). Rwanda, thus, became a highly indebted poor country whose economy was placed in the hands of expatriates and visionless technocrats who only determined her fate based on their interest and that of allies interests, a game the French smoothened while teleguiding Rwanda with such a huge debt. A despicable implication of this perpetual dependency probably agrees with the position their action had caused Rwanda and her people.

Granted the fact that the French might have been interested in what was good and beneficial to Rwanda even in the period of the crisis, it is pertinent to note that the Rwandan citizenry were coldly abandoned even as the government was on a wild goose chase to satisfy the allies. This same attitude might have equally explained the position of France which was never in support of the Hutu regime negotiating any peace deal with the RPF, not to talk of sharing power in the government as raised during the Arusha peace talk. Therefore, with the glaring impacts of the activities of both the father and the son from France on the lopsided Rwandan economy, and on the streets of Rwanda, the backing of the despotic government of Habyarimana was seriously against any talk with the opposition at Arusha. French troops, on the other hand, were used in preventing any return of Tutsis while, at the same time, ensuring the

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clamping down on anti-Habyarimana within the country. The evidence that French probably helped Habyarimana in procuring arms that were used for the war/killing of the Rwandan people in the 1990s was made possible by the long - term relation between the parties. It was this same cunning and intrigue used by the French that the also helped in keeping the UN Security Council divided and confused during the war and genocide in 1994. To a large extent, this was made possible through misinformation on the true situation of things in Rwanda.

Analysts like Keane (1996), Power (1998), and Melvern (2000), among others, observed that it was the French insensitivity to the betrayal of trust by General Habyarimana in trying to negotiate sharing of power with the Anglo-Saxon – RPF elements that might have occasioned his elimination by the Hutu elements on the 6th of April, 1994. In agreeing with this notion, HRAW (1996:78) noted that the particles of the missile used in bringing down the President's plane showed, according to the bio-nuclear physicist's report, that it was the same missile sold to the Rwandan Army by the French that was used. This further explains the degree of the tragic role and the stance of the French diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis. France was probably implicated also for encouraging the activities of the Interahamwe rebels at Goma, Bukavu, Kivu and Ituri where they had made several incursions into Rwanda, even after many years of the war and genocide.

In another instance, according to an eye-witness, Narcisse - Nkusi (2005), the operation "Turquoise" that was instituted by the French at Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, apart from being there, was in Rwanda to protect Mitterrand Farm and Estates in the above-mentioned places. At the same time, it helped the kinsmen of Habyarimana from the same province to escape the RPF assault into Congo DR. This was against the goal of the operation as the second coming of the French was basically to protect the remaining helpless Tutsis against further killings in the genocide. Also in line with this objective, most of the Tutsis who ran to them for help and protection were probably handed over to the fleeing Interahamwes for execution.

Despite the several activities of the French in Rwanda, which were probably seen as unhealthy and totally criticized by observers, the country had bluntly refused to publicly apologise to the world and the Rwandan people for their role in the war/genocide. This also might have explained the degree of her deep involvement on

which, regrettablly, she would not want to face any disgrace. Coupled with this is her pride and probably pretentious but nurtured animosity against the Anglo-Saxon – RPF government currently in power in Rwanda. Moreover, the French would not want to descend so low as to have anything to do with the current government concerning asking for forgiveness, not to talk of regretting any ungodly past role. The French diplomacy in Rwanda, prior to the war, was probably adjudged unhealthy, biased, unprogressive and discouraging due to its failure to enthrone true democracy and popular governance, which was one of her undoings. This was due squarely to the fact that she saw democracy as a government of the majority ethnic group in power in Rwanda, a factor that did dent her image as a frontline state simply because she believed that the majority ethnic tribes were in firm control of government, which was not supposed to be. Using ethnicity and ethnic majority as a yardstick for true governance and people-oriented government was another unfavourable mistake of the French. That the nature of the French national interests contributed immencely to crippling the Rwandan economy with obvious caricature, probably explains the intrigue and its role in helping to obtain the staggering debts. France was a major player in every incurred debts of immeasurable magnitude of Rwanda. An excellent example was that which occurred while the Arusha Peace Talk was going on in 1993. France, through her company, DYL Investment, obtained a loan of US$12 million used in procuring arms for Rwanda and delivering same through Office General de l' Air (OGA) and East Africa Cargo transport. Consequent upon all these loans and debts, Rwanda ended up as a HIPC nation that was left to wallow in abject penury. With Rwandan living on borrowed resources, borrowed time and borrowed produce from other states, it is evident that the citizens might end up struggling to share the available meager wealth with agents and exploiters. It was this condition that eventually formed part of the factor that encouraged all manner of crises arising from frustration, deprivation, subjugation and deep-seated hunger and anger, leading to the ugly incident of April, 1994.

v. Congo DR (Zaire)

The government of Mobutu provided overt support to the Rwanda government under Habyarimana. There was communal solidarity which had become an everyday occurrence and reflected a consolidation of the socio-economic structure and ethnic cohesion that could not survive the action of the extremist Hutus. Their relationship,

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which engendered Mobutu's support for the Hutu in the 1990s led to the war and genocide.

There was an accord between Habyarimana and Mobutu who claimed to be a guarantor of peace in the region in 1979. There was Communaute Economique des pays des Grands lac (CPGL) formed by the Great Lakes Region states under the chairmanship of Mobutu in 1985. It was more of a political or symbolic arrangement than an economic one. It claimed to prevent military confrontations between member countries and stood for non-interference in the internal affairs of each of the members by any other members. There was also a common security accord signed by both countries in 1985. This bordered on sharing security information, military cooperation and the interdiction of opposition movements in each other's territory.

In reaction to the opposition of the Banyemulenge – Tutsi in the eastern Congo DR, Mobutu was said to have hated anything Tutsi with passion; thus, Tutsi in Zaire themselves became targets of violent attacks and ethnic cleansing. The second accord above also justified the reason why the Hutu could find refuge in Zaire after the genocide in 1994. According to Braeckman (1994:172), Mobutu was noted to have supported, counselled and aided Habyarimana during the crisis. At times, he mediated and consulted for decisions to be taken in Rwanda by the government. In 1990, he sent elite troops to quell the Tutsi rebellion. The Congo DR troops were an effective fighting force in the 1990 battle with the RPF, while they were assisting the Rwandan government under Habyarimana.

Premised on this, Zaire maintained a good relation with the Rwandan Interim Government throughout the crisis and allowed it and its supporters after the RPF's victory to settle in Zaire. Zaire and, particularly Mobutu himself, reaped both diplomatic and economic benefits from the French as well as the UN intervention in Rwanda.

4:2. NATIONAL INTERESTS, DIPLOMACY AND THE RWANDAN CRISIS

The second hypothesis, which states inter alia: *that diplomatic initiatives in terms of complex exigencies are largely motivated by national interest,* will be evaluated in this section, as the crisis in Rwanda is probably seen to have followed a particular

structural build-up from the role of the following states as engineered by their national interests under diplomatic interactions. Thses states are France, Belgium, Egypt, Uganda, America, Britain, Congo DR, among others, starting from Gregory Kayibanda's to Juvenal Habyarimana's regimes respectively. Unarguably, the political interest and activities of these states had, at one time or the other, helped to shape and form the trajectory that modulated the Rwandan crisis as these national interests, which were seen to be the totality of states value, combined with other unforeseen elements, not only to become the conditions of the state build-up to violence and hates, but also as a portrait of war makers and state makers in a coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurship (Reno 2000:43). In this regard also, Melvern (2000: 24) rightly observed that the Rwandan violent divisions might have been easier to heal, and its tragic history somewhat different had it not been for the involvement of outside forces. Thus, to justify the above stated hypothesis, the following analysis could explain further:

i.   French Involvement

The French came into Rwanda in 1975 after the seizure of power by Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana from Gregory Kayibanda earlier on in 1973. The French presence in Rwanda was more dramatic in effect than others, for without France, the dictatorship of Juvenal Habyarimana would never have lasted long as it did (Melvern, 2000:24). This is because France had particularly been identified as a country that propped up the dictatorship regime of Habyarimana, (Kakwenzire et al, 1999: 82). In the desire to establish their presence in Rwanda, France logistically supported the extremist army of the regime, directly trained extremists, and in some instances, her troops were accused of being directly involved in the maltreatment and killing of the citizens of Rwanda (Rwandise Review, 1993: 4 – 7).

France was not the official colonial power in Rwanda, but her presence and influence grew through her Catholic missionaries in the country. These missionaries greatly impacted the making of the official colonial policies in Rwanda. Eventually, French became the national language in Rwanda, and Rwanda, therefore, became part of Francophone Africa. In view of the reason that France shares a symbolic relation with her colonies, the relationship between her and Rwanda was never different as she (Rwanda) was provided with military assistance, financial aid and other assistance,

which made Rwanda fall under her direct influence. Darnton (1994:1-2) critically regards this relationship as a "Faustian bargain". This is because, in the process, the French technocrats probably ran the state enterprises and companies, traded mainly with the mother country and signed a military assistance pact.

France consolidated this when she propped up the Rwandan economy and gave her African Franc, which is supported by the French treasury. This implies that France's interest in Rwanda was established and sustained with the level of exchange and interaction among the leaders. Evidence of this was seen in the wake of Tutsi (RPF) incursion in 1988 and 1990 which made the French rush in combat troops, mortars and artillery to help the government of Habyarimana. Jean-Christopher Mitterrand, the son of the French President was the business director of his father's coffee plantation at Gissenyi and Ruhengeri, which also made Paris see Rwanda as part of francophone Africa under threat from the encroachment of the English – speaking nations in the North and East, that is, Uganda and Tanzania, that were against French interests in Africa (Keane, 1996: 26 – 27).

In the same vein, Melvern (2000: 30 – 31) noted that amongst the French conservatives, intelligence and army circles the RPF was an anathema; hence, to have abandoned Habyarimana would have been a high treason, tantamount to handing Rwanda over to English – speaking rebels. The French military, Uganda was nick-named "Tutsi land". France also believed that what Museveni wanted was a Tutsi empire, which must be resisted. To thwart this intention, a policy maker in France believed that they were supporting a majority, the Hutus, against a minority, the Tutsis and this is why the French made the declaration that Rwanda was under democratic rule. And this probably also instilled in them that a majority identified along ethnic line did not seem to matter majority rule legitimatized French military and diplomatic support for the regime (Melvern, 2000: 30). Against the foregoing, a number of questions readily come to mind: Why did Habyarimana abandon his initial policy of removing ethnic barriers? Why had his government after signing the treaty with France changed focus and organisational structure of governance? Why did the new diplomatic policy or romance with France centre on what Paris and his regime might gain? Had France influence not impacted negatively to prolong the resolution of the crisis? Was France policy in Rwanda not one of the factors that created the complex

and complicated processes towards a peaceful settlement of the age – long feud in Rwanda?

In an attempt to answer these questions, which also draw inference from the stated hypothesis above, it is shown that Habyarimana abandonment of the initial policy of ending ethnic barrier was not only borne out of fear of the unknown, but also drawn from the warning and advice of the French that accepting the Tutsis back fully might mean re-establishing the Tutsi monarchy, and the domination of the Tutsis again. Thus, with the stationing of a French troop at Gissenyi and Ruhengeri, his home town, his estate and that of Mitterrand were to be protected against the opposition. The creation of the Interahamwe Militia and the use of scapegoating in governance, meant to protect and checkmate both Tutsi and Hutu opponents, were also to scare away and deter any opposition. This was actualised when the French funded and supplied Habyarimana regime with the necessary weapons and machinery to sustain the government. The same French might have informed him of the tact to be used in following the UN and the Arusha peace accord processes, while the genocide was being planned. According to Keane (1996: 24), Habyarimana might have been able to ride the tiger and survive, had the weight of international pressure and the RPF's growing military strength not forced him to compromise, even when the French had vehemently assured him of the safety of his government. It is also noteworthy to affirm that another factor that might have adduced for the shifting of the take-off of the transition government of power sharing arrangement by Habyarimana was the assurance given to him by the French President whose family close ties with him had led to the latter's promise of boosting and protecting their respective economic interests (Kakwenzire, 1999: 83).

Therefore, with the foregoing, that the French diplomatic initiative in the Rwandan crisis was largely motivated by her national interest in part was evidently confirmed by the manner it coherently teleguided the government of Habyarimana. This was also seen in her continued training of the regime's force in Central Africa and France, arming the extremists in the wake of the crisis and indirect combat on the side of the government in the days of the war/genocide. All these point to the fact that France bears a degree of moral and legal responsibility for the extremists' massacres that befell the country in 1994, owing to the high drive of her national interest.

In view of this analysis, it is probably correct to say that our hypothesis is not only validated, but justified going by the degree of involvement of France, the delay tactics employed by her to exploit the Rwandan economy, the double standard that she was putting up at every UN inquiry, among others.

ii.   Belgium's Involvement

Rwanda was handed over to Belgium by the League of Nations as a mandate territory in 1923 after the Germans had left. The Germans colonised Rwanda in 1894, but as a result of their defeat in the First World War and the subsequent formation of the League of Nations, all her colonies, with Rwanda inclusive, under the mandate commission of the League were transferred to Belgium in 1923.

The Belgians on assuming control, however, retained the German indirect rule system with modification. Keane (1996: 16) observed that the Belgians imposed the writ of the Germans because of the kind of cooperation they got from the Tutsi overlords. The Belgians also extended the powers of the Tutsis over the lives of the Hutus. This was probably to allow them the full opportunity to exploit the land unquestioned. In retaining the German writ, the Belgians created a deep-seated ethnicity amongst the social groups in Rwanda. The minority Tutsis were then given power to exploit their neighbour, the Hutus. The Belgians claimed that the Tutsis were a special people, intelligent and could be likened to the Hermitic ideology, meaning that the Tutsis were white men in blackman's skin.

To probably augment their income at home, the Belgians who had earlier accepted the German indirect rule gradually changed it to direct rule (Melvern, 2000: 10). To avoid any criticism of their action, they also eroded the power of the King by asking him to report to the colonial representative daily. The Belgians, afraid of the King and the growing opposition, deposed him in 1930. The Belgians, in looking for who would be a good instrument for the exploitation of Rwanda, found favour in one of the pliant sons of the deposed King, Rudahingwa. Due to the manner the Belgians used him to exploit the people, imposing forced labour and maltreating the Hutus, Rudahingwa was known as the King of the white (Melvern, 2000: 10-12). In this regard, Kakwenzire (1999: 87) argued that owing to the role played by the Belgians, the social political and economic policies of Rwanda were largely shaped to their taste. The substitution of indirect rule for direct rule; the adoption of the policy of ethnic

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identity cards, forced labour, and tax to augment the shortfalls in Brussels; and the act of putting the Tutsis first before others for easy and perfect exploitation were all created by the Belgian colonial authorities to improve on their national interests. He went further to reveal that the ethnicization of politics and the polarization of Rwandan society into two camps of Batutsi and Bahutu was the handiwork of the Belgians.

However, things went sour between Belgium and the Tutsis, whom the belgians had earlier seen as a perfect partner in the exploitation of Rwanda when, in 1959, the Tutsis demanded independence for Rwanda under socialist ideology. This became the turning point in the Rwandan political history as the Belgians, in reaction to the action of the Tutsi-led oligarchy, reversed their policy against the Tutsi rule after due consultation with the home government under the Christian Democratic Party. To show how bad the Tutsis' action was felt in Brussels and Kigali, the Belgian administrators inspired the Hutus to stand up and take what rightly belonged to them. Rutayisire (1995: 5) observed that the Belgians, in their role in the 1959 Hutu social revolution where thousands of Tutsis were massacred, supported the Hutu against the Tutsis by using both the ground and air unit of the Belgian armed forces. Kakwenzire (1999: 87) noted that the Belgian contradictory and opportunistic policies started the mass bloodletting in Rwanda. Their legacy continued in the post – colonial Rwanda owing to the sowing of the seeds of animosity in the country. Melvern (2000: 14) argued that the creation of anti-Belgian UNAR, which was pro-monarchist led in part, led to the development that saw to the end of Tutsi rule since the Party's ideology was opposed to Belgium's national interests. She further revealed that the Belgians portrayed the violence as a racial problem involving Hutu and Tutsi, but this was not accepted as true as the Belgian administrator, Guy Logiest immediately began to replace Tutsi chiefs with Hutus.

The evidence that the Belgian national interest was central to the political and economic structure of the Rwandan government was further exposed when, in 1959, the Belgian administrator announced that in the future, the Hutus would be favoured and allowed to coordinate things in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000: 14 – 16). The implication of this was that under capitalist orientation, every comprador – or – petty bourgeois was taken seriously until the day such became useless to his masters. The Tutsi oligarchy's role in the scheme of things was seen not to have favoured the capitalist

idea of the Belgians in the latter days, and this led to the reversal of policy and the effects of fake imposition and sowing seeds of discord.

Undoubtedly, the issues of contradiction in policy decisions of the Belgians, the double standard of her policy reversal and the imposition of forced labour and exploitative tendencies by the Belgians against the people of Rwanda all show that it was her national interest dictates that influenced the structural foundation of the kind of government in place from 1923 to 1961 in Rwanda. The killing of the King, who was seen to have betrayed the capitalist concept of the end justifying the means, also implies that the rule of the game had been threatened. This structural defect also created the complexity, contradictions and complications that saw to the post – independent war/genocide in Rwanda. The stated hypothesis above, following the cited instances amongst the numerous events in Rwanda, also attests to the fact that the national interest of the Belgians, which was not hidden, was central to the crisis in Rwanda.

iii. **Egypt's Involvement**

Egypt, a North African state, became involved in the Rwandan crisis through bilateral relations and diplomatic intrigues. These intrigues were rooted in helping the tiny East African country to extend and expand its internal problems, after the initial refusal to sell arms to it until, according to Melvern (2000: 31), the government was desperate for other suppliers despite the fact that Rwanda relied on France. Two weeks after the RPF invasion in October 1990, the Rwandan Ambassador to Egypt, Celestin Kabanda was noted to have gone to a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo with the Minister, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, owing to the fact that for seven years Egypt had refused to sell arms to Rwanda and now there was added urgency. During the meeting, Ghali promised to confer with the Egyptian government on Rwanda's behalf since Egypt was understood to produce cheap weaponry for sale. Buying weapons from Egypt, with her low production costs, showed a competitive advantage.

In view of the engagement, Ghali promised and assured Rwanda that he would personally deal with the request. It was this pledge that saw the first arms contract between Rwanda and Egypt signed on 28th October, 1990 (Melvern, 2000). In this regard, Rwanda bought arms worth US$5.889 million from Egypt. The weapons purchased included 60,000 grenades, some two million rounds of ammunition, 18,000

mortar bombs, both 82mm and 120mm, 4,200 assault rifles, rockets and rocket launchers (Human Rights Arms Watch, 1995: 17).

However, another diplomatic intrigue was employed by Egypt in the delivery of the weapons as the first consignment of the weapons was described as relief materials to Rwanda, with two field ambulances from President Hosni Mubarak. Perhaps this action was meant to display the element of hocus–pocus always linked to diplomatic intrigues. Though the arms deal was kept secret, Boutros-Boutros Ghali was officially written to by Casmir Bizimungu, the Rwandan Foreign Minister, thanking him for the facilitation of the arms deal (Melvern, 2000: 32 – 33).

Besides, a year later, when Boutros-Ghali was selected as the Secretary General of the United Nations, there was another letter/telegram of congratulations from Casmir Bizimungu who had unforgettable memories of their frank and profitable collaboration, reinforcing the friendship between their two countries (Prunier, 1997: 14). How could Egypt, an African state very conversant with African protracted conflict status and its trajectory on the continent claim ignorance of the Rwanda internal political structure leading to a crisis, only for the diplomatic interaction established in the course of the sale of arms, turn round to be the tonic needed by the Habyarimana regime to execute its negative agenda. According to Prunier (1997), this relationship, in addition to some other factors that helped in boosting the quantity of arms in Kigali, seems to have been at the root of the build – up to the genocide project by the government and its agents. In confirming this, Melvern (2000:323) reported the interview with Boutros-Ghali over the arms sales to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. In the interview, Boutros-Ghali admitted presiding over the UN's inaction in Rwanda, describing his role as the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs as that of a catalyst since it was his job to help boost his country's foreign earnings through the sale of the weapons produced by the country and that he would have helped any other country in need of arms from Egypt (Melvern, 2000:33). Thus, with Rwanda spending over US$216 million of international funding meant for national development to prepare for the genocide project, it is imperative to conclude that Egypt's involvement through the sales of arms to Rwanda, coupled with Boutros'Ghali backing, simply explains that the national interest of the country was never hidden, but might not have been put first in encouraging the Rwandan crisis. This analysis, with the cited instance of diplomatic interactions and relations, however, agreed with our raised hypothesis above that

national interests of states may have created the complex exigencies that enlarged the Rwandan crisis to a greater proportion.

iv.   Ugandan's Involvement

Uganda's involvement in the Rwandan crisis dates back to 1959 when the first Tutsi pogrom took place. Uganda is a neighbouring country found in the North-East of Rwanda. With both countries having formal and informal interaction, Uganda became a great player in the Rwandan political crisis in her bid to accommodate fleeing refugees, while sympathising with the victims of annihilations. Playing the role of good neighbours, wanting to protect and shelter the people in need, Uganda was probably enmeshed in a diplomatic logjam with the Hutu government in Rwanda due to her major stake in the Rwandan project. Again, as noted earlier, the Tutsis were found in Burundi, Congo DR, Tanzania and Uganda, and it might interest one to know that over 90% of the exiled Tutsis since 1959 lived in Uganda. Thus, Uganda was nicknamed "Tutsi land" by the French and Belgians (Melvern, 2000: 30). The period of social revolution in Rwanda, over 700,000 Tutsis took refuge in Uganda (Gizosi Jenoside Magazine, 2004). This staggering population did not only become a source of worry, but disturbed Obote's and Amin's governments and neighbours (Adisa,1996:12-16). Consequent on their disturbance, the refugees were forced to settle at Luwero triangle, a wilderness, where strange animals, reptiles and diseases afflicted the people.

According to Prunier (1997), the Tutsis were welcomed by Uganda mainly because of their ethnic relations with the people of Southern Uganda, the Ankoles and Buganda under the Rwandan complex in Western Uganda. The Rwandans were the subject of prejudice, discrimination and sometimes persecutions. During the reigns of Obote and Amin, the Rwandan refugees were not accorded full rights of settlement (Melvern, 2000: 25). This might not only be due to their large population, but because of what might be seen as ethnic alliance with the opposition. And so, they were badly treated and humiliated under the above- named regimes. In 1985, however, there was a turning point in their lives as Milton Obote ordered the removal of non-skilled foreigners from public employment and with a census taken to that effect. There were fears that the Rwandans might be expelled (Melvern, 2000: 26 – 27). Otunnu (1999: 31), with regards to this situation, observed that the fear of being expelled by Obote after having been refused the right to return to their homeland by Habyarimana,

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however, encouraged the exiled Rwandans to rally round Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) rebels, amongst all other odds, against the regime of Obote. Thus, in January 25, 1986 the NRA, supported by the exiled Rwandan citizens, ousted the incumbent government of Milton Obote as the first insurgent movement effectively to take power from an incumbent African leadership (Melvern, 2000: 27) and (Otunnu, 1999). The operation against Obote was embarked upon with a massive military recruitment campaign that was drawn from friendly areas in Western and Southern Uganda comprising about 200,000 soldiers from the exiled Rwandans. This action, Keane (1996) noted, was seen from the Tutsis angle as the enlistment of the refugees into NRA for future armed struggle in Rwanda.

Thus, in order to protect the regime Rwandans in the NRA participated in the counter – insurgencies in Acholi, Teso, Lango, Kasese, West Nile and Ginger. The refugees viewed these operations as the most practical military training they could acquire for future armed struggles in Rwanda (Otunnu, 1999: 32). Following the victory of Museveni, the Rwandan refugee officers' domination of the Ugandan army was acknowledged and rewarded with high positions. Museveni, however, re-enacted the settlement and employment decrees to accommodate the Rwandan refugees. This idea also formed the basis for the establishment of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF/RPA) in 1988 in Kampala toward the return of the refugees to their country of origin.

However, due to the resentment felt by some Ugandan army officers that the Rwandan soldiers were superior to theirs and that they had taken over all the sensitive posts including the Deputy Commander – in – Chief and Deputy Minister of Defence, Museveni, while reshuffling the military positions, asked the Rwandans in NRA to be removed with the intension of compensating them. This spurred General Fred Rwigyema to stage the 1990 October 1st RPA/RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda. In that invasion, they took their weapons and supplies from the Ugandan armoury. Museveni's government's denial of aiding the Rwandan rebels army remaindered a cock – and – bull's story before the international observers. This was justifiable going by the report which the international observers chose not to believe. Uganda was probably the supplier of the heavy weapons (artillery, stream of ammunition (e.t.c.), food and logistics used by the RPF, as the two armies shared the same intelligence services (Melvern, 2000: 28 – 29). In that invasion, it was estimated that over 7,000

RPF, mostly Tutsi troops, crossed the border from Uganda to Ruhengeri and Gissenyi in Rwanda, where they suffered heavy casualties from the Rwandan Army that was backed by France, Belgium, Congo DR, Kenya, among others (Prunier, 1995).

Although Museveni and other Ugandans blamed the failed 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the RPF on the disobedience of the RPF leaders, his government did not relent in encouraging them in the subsequent operations. This made him (Yoweri Museveni) to promptly insist that Ugandan's involvement in the Rwandan crisis was to be seen only in terms of her tirelessness to persuade the RPA and Rwandan government to resolve their dispute peacefully, and not to the contrary as believed by the international community (Otunnu, 1999: 45). However, contrary to this reason, Melvern (2000: 29) noted that Museveni's backing of the exiled RPF to return by way of invasion against all other means was not only to pay them back for good done to him in the 1986 overthrow of Obote, but also to cut corners against the long processes of the international community and the United Nations intermediaries. Regarding this development, analysts like Keane (1996), Prunier (1995) and Destexhe (1995) had come to share one opinion that between 1988 and 1994 the likelihood of the RPF and the Ugandan government sharing one common national interest could not be ruled out due to the level of closeness, interaction, sharing, and caring for the sorrows and gains of each other. The scholars above also disagreed with the view of Otunnu (1999: 45) who outlined the stand of the Ugandan government's condemnation of the 1990 invasion as meaning that the government of Uganda was not aware of the refugees' intention to invade Rwanda. The Ugandan President informed his Rwandan counterpart as soon as dissension was detected in the NRA and stated that there would be no assistance for the attackers from the Ugandan side and that those who came back would be arrested, charged and tried in accordance with their status and so on. The scholars above are of the view that what Uganda displayed in the wake of the invasion was the normal diplomatic intrigues employed by states to exonerate themselves from their shortcoming as partner in crime.

However in whichever manner the facts surrounding the Ugandan support for the RPF were concealed or revealed, the events that followed the 1994 RPF movement from Uganda to Rwanda toward the take-off of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TNGU) before the outbreak of the war and genocide, summarize the involvement of Uganda in the Rwandan crisis. This is because the weapons and

logistics used by the RPF towards their advancement and camping at Ruhengeri were made available by Uganda (Melvern, 2000: 189). Another notable observation by Melvern (2000) and Prunier (1995) was that Uganda probably might have helped the RPF to procure arms from Britain as a guarantor while the war lasted.

In view of these observations, revelations and analyses, it is possible to argue that Uganda, while promoting her national interests in the course of the Rwandan crisis, was playing double standard. Moreover, the complexity that existed during the conflict/crisis might have, in one part, encouraged the contradictions and the poor handling of the settlement of the crisis. Secondly, the Ugandan government's adoption of the intrigue of hocus-pocus also underlines the kind of secretiveness and the national interest agenda in the Rwandan project. Thirdly, apart from Uganda's national interests in Rwanda, probably representing the Anglo-Saxon policies in the sub-Saharan Africa, Uganda seems to be more at home in making sure that such interests were jealously protected; hence, the reasons why the role of her national interests were seen to have been the most compelling factor that largely motivated the Rwandan crisis. Therefore, on this examination of the role and involvement of Uganda in the Rwandan crisis, the stated hypothesis above are justifiably considered to have merit, going by the copious analyses, explanations and illustration earlier given.

v. Congo DR. (Zaire's) involvement

Amongst other interests noted in the structural build-up to the Rwandan crisis was the role of DR Congo (formerly Zaire) under Mobutu Sese Seko. With both being under Belgium's tutelage, the relationship between Mobutu and Habyarimana grew in leaps and bounds, much especially as Mobutu encouraged Habyarimana to toe authoritarian tendencies in governance. According to Power (1996), both became close allies when, in the wake of the 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda, Mobutu supplied over twenty (20,000) thousand soldiers, with heavy weapons to help Habyarimana defeat the invaders. Mobutu again supplied weapons and logistics to the Habyarimana government in January 1993 for the suppression of the Tutsi ethnic group uprising in Ruhengeri. Mamdani (2001: 114) observed that in an attempt to put an end to the Tutsi insurgency and rebellion at the Eastern Congo, Mobutu made a law meant to send the ethnic Tutsi – Banyamulenges back to Rwanda in order to end their disturbances and opposition. Mobutu's interest and desire to deal with the ethnic Tutsi once and for all

was borne out of hatred and irritation at how Belgium's decision on accomodating them as part of Congo DR was achieved. Mobutu argued that the Tutsis inside Rwanda, those outside it and those found in the Eastern Congo constituted a nuisance and that the only answer to their menace was for Habyarimana to join hands with him in sending them to the extreme of Kiv Valley (Kakwenzire, 1999: 4). Kamukama (1993: 22) and Watson (1991: 4) argued that Mobutu's hatred for the Tutsis was as a result of their continual opposition to his treacherous and totalitarian rule, which he never wanted. Hence, his role and behaviour towards the Tutsis also encouraged Habyarimana to believe that the Tutsis were evil-minded species that deserved to be checkmated from all angles and possibly scapegoated.

In addition, Mobutu, according to Got (1995:13), supported the Hutu extremists and the Interahamwe in the 1994 war/genocide against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Apart from supplying arms and necessary logistics for their annihilation, he also offered the genocidaires a base at the North – East of Congo and Bukavu where they lived in a safe haven. Mobutu and the French equally joined hands to re-arm and feed the fleeing Interahamwe militia rebels and the Rwandan soldiers that the RPF had chased out of the country. The Interahamwe militias and the FCCD of Burundi also attacked and killed over 250,000 Banyamulenge Tutsis in the Eastern Congo DR when they were expelled by the RPF in 1994 (Keane, 1996: 38).

In view of the past misdeeds of Mobutu, the post – genocide period and the crisis in his domain against the Bayanmulenge Tutsis certainly signalled payback time. This was because his strange relationship with Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Museveni of Uganda was still fresh in their minds. This made it easy for the RPF government in Rwanda, Uganda's government under Museveni and Burundi's government, under Tutsi military rule form a coalition (ADFL –CZ) with the Bayanmulenge Tutsis and the remainder of Kabila group which succeeded in driving Mobutu out of Kinshasa in December 1997, to enthrone the government of Kabila. Thenational interests of Congo DR did not only dominate and determine what happened in the Great Lakes Region, Mobutu's power in the Region had contained and curtailed every other interest in the area. With Mobutu in control, Congo DR was able to appropriate all the spheres favourable to his government until the allies abandoned him. According to Kamukama (1999), it was in the bid of Habyarimana to emulate and dominate others as Mobutu

had done in Congo DR that actually inspired the exiled refugees to return home, thereby giving birth to all the incursions into Rwanda by the RPF rebels.

However, other variable in the Rwandan crisis that were not pronounced but which might have been partially ignored due to the small state status of the Rwandan state could be analysed under the roles and involvements of America and Britain.

vi. America's Involvement

America's seeming indifference and inaction regarding the Rwandan crisis was probably due to the fact that there was nothing to gain in Rwanda; hence, she never paid any remarkable attention to the uglysituation of things in Rwanda. But America was to re-kindle its long – standing interest in the Great Lakes Region after discovering that it could favourably compete with France which was fast losing its grip of long – standing domination of the region. Analysts likeCarver (1997), Got (1995) and Alusala (2005) had observed that the people of the region seemed to have been fed up with the French role and involvement in all kinds of crises in the region and would prefer a new ally. Damning the consequences of capitilizing on the dwindling fortunes of France in the region, America became more interested in taking over control of the region from France (Madsen, 2001:16)

vii. Britain's involvement

The British, fully in control of Uganda, also used Yoweri Museveni as a penetrating and stabilizing force, as a new domineering actor in the region. The RPF, being an Ugandan baby and a British – nursed interest to establish itself in the region, also helped in the follow-up to the end of the Hutu power extremist reign in Rwanda in 1994. According to Otunnu (1999: 86) Uganda bought arms and ammunition from Britain and U.S.A and, in turn, supplied same to RPF. It was these arms that were used in executing the war against the Hutu power extremists in 1994. According to Watson (1991:37), the British had long hoped to establish Anglo-Saxon presence that could checkmate the activities of the states in the Great Lakes Region unhindered. Thus, right from the time of the founding of NRA and the enthronement of Museveni, the British had been focusing on the stakes in the region. The British also talked Museveni into accepting and accommodating the Rwandan refugees who later formed the RPF since their role in the 1986 overthrow of Obote was overwhelming. The education and

motivation of the refugees were done in Uganda under British supervision, with the belief that one day, they would return to their home country. This was the British prime agenda (Chalks, 1999: 93).

Generally, in analysing the diverse diplomatic roles and the involvements of states in the structural build – up to the Rwandan crisis as examined above, it was obvious that national interests of the discussed states were central to the factors that encouraged and exacerbated the Rwandan crisis, despite the different manners adopted by the states.

It is the complex exigencies that greatly motivated, to a large extent, the tempo and conditions that arouse the 1994 war/genocide.

The Tutsi dominated RPF, banking on the supplies, logistics and supports of the Uganda/British/American contacts were able to utilize the opportunity to chase out the Hutu power extremists in 1994. On the other hand, the Habyarimana Hutu power extremist government, which depended heavily on the coalition of French/Belgium/Egypt/Congo DR in making sure that the RPF was resisted and not allowed in the Rwandan project, appropriated and exploited the land to their benefit. It was their engrossed flagrant perpetration of exploitation of Rwanda that might have made them to be unaware of the aggressive tendencies and approaches of the attacking RPF.

In view of the examination and analysis that followed, the hypothesis stated earlier was possibly validated and justified, owing to enormous instances that underlined the assertion that the role of national interests of states were central to the Rwandan crisis, structural build-up, and conditions that made the explosion and escalation of the conflict itself in 1994 possible.

4:3. AFRICAN DIPLOMACY IN RWANDA

This section, in continuation in relation to the role of OAU/AU already discussed above, is meant to throw more light on the wider perspective of the kind, how and why the body's diplomacy was not adjudged any better, especially in the build-up to the peak of the crisis in Rwanda.

In the wake of the struggle and on attainment of independence, African leaders formed a new inter-African organization called the Organization of African Unity

(OAU).   No fewer than six cardinal charter principles were approved at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 1963. They read inter alia:

i.   The sovereign parity of member states.

ii.   The respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual states.

iii.   Peaceful settlement of all disputes.

iv.   Condemnation of political assassinations and of subversive activities on the part of one state to the detriment of a neighbour.

v.   Dedication to the courses of total emancipation of those African territories which are not yet independent.

vi.   A policy of non-alignment with international blocs.

The above stated chapter in its full interpretations means that there should be:

_   non-interference in another states' affairs, unless invited by the very state in question;

_   all states should be different to the happenings within a state;

_   there is no collective security and sovereignty amongst states;

_   no high command and;

_   no taking sides with the international blocs like the west or east blocs and so on.

The reason for the stated Charter Principles was that Africa, at that period, needed one common front where it could stand to project the black man's view, a front where the African problem could be jointly and coherently tackled, a front where the black man's burden could be treated with ease. Then, as a people just emerging from colonial dictates, with poverty all over the continent, the need for an institution or organization that could complement the aspiration of the people of the continent was very important. It was not long before the establishment of the organization, with several impediments and problems becoming its major challenges.

Thus, critics in noting this shortfall in the performance of the OAU, have argued that the only thing the Charter Principles was able to implement was that it saw to the total emancipation of those African territories which were not yet independent.

Such states included Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Besides, the organization was instrumental to the ending of apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994 (Mutiso 1999:31). However, analysts noted that the organization was bedeviled with several loopholes and problems that were in part created by the Charter Principles itself, which was characterized by severe contradictions. Instead of attending to this inherent problem, it was the personal interests of the heads of state that mattered, which further dashed the hopes of common Africans. Poverty and leadership failure in governance gave rise to several internal upheavals and instabilities. The unsavoury role of the poor members of the body, in conjunction with noted incompetence among the political class, enhanced a terrible political development on the continent. The negativism inherent in its principle of non-interference, difference, non-collective sovereignty, lack of one high command, among others, made the organization and its members not only to be helpless but to consistently seek outside help in every crisis.Thus, for instance, there was the necessity to beckon Britain for help in the wake of the 1964 armies' mutinies in - Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. This did not only display the hollowness of the continental body, but it explained its level of incapacitation. The same manner of response was found in its poor capacity to handle any problem affecting its member states. Notable among other available examples was the polarization of the Nigerian civil war of 1967 – 1970 by Britain, France and Russia, owing to the inaction of the OAU as a body. The role of Cuba, Britain, Russia and America in the Angolan crisis of 1975 also exposed the body as not fit to exist. More reasons also abound for the negative impacts of the body in the American British and Nigerian involvement in the Rhodesia crisis, over which the organization was directionless and helpless in handling. The United Nations, France's, Russian's, American's, China's, Morocco's and Egypt's involvements in the Zaire crisis of 1964 – 65 also saw six different rebellious groups emerging in Zaire, with the OAU being confused on what to do. A situation that simply showed an awful failure of the body. The contradictory role of the body in other crises as happened across Africa makes the ignoble role it put up in the course of the Rwandan crisis unsurprising. It was this inaction and lack of capacity of the OAU that made it appear to be doing something about the events that preceded the Rwandan conflict, whereas as discussed above, the OAU and her member states failed to live up to expectations.

One of the major problems of the organisation was its inability to mobilize any effective military force for the realization of some of its main aims. To this end, Okigbo (1992:86) noted that lack of force with which to embark on a full-scale military confrontation, inexperienced military forces, bad leadership style and problems of logistics, weak political and economic means, all contributed to defeating the aims of the body. Added to this observation of ineptitude, according to Alusala (2005:120), was the problem of political instability, widespread coups d'etat and unrests in many states, scrambling (partly by internal and external interests) and struggle for the spoils of the state. This is the kind of situation Rwanda fell to when it was expected that the problem created by the 1959 revolution would have been settled before any military incursion. It was this attendant problem that later gave birth to the act of rebellion in Rwandan politics and government, thereby making the inefficiency of OAU a cause to worry about on the issue of African political governance.

Just as mentioned above, according to Turner (2005), OAU's major problem was also the issue of several unfulfilled financial pledges made by its members. This also contributed to the body sourcing for fund to counter the Rwandan carnage at the onset. This shortcoming also hindered any meaningful achievement toward promoting African stability and peace as the general level of performance and achievement was seen to have fallen below the expectations of the people. It was this same problem that made the impact of OAU never felt in the period of the war/genocide in Rwanda as the helpless body could not afford the logistics and arms to counter the carnage. The body was more helpless than the Rwandan people, as summarized of its diplomatic role by Mills and Oppentieimer (2002:90-105) who noted that: *the OAU is consumed by the African challenges that*

> *are complex ones, rooted in history and defined by ill – framed ideology that are sometimes dysfunctional geographic and state units, with domestic, regional and international dimensions relating both to its colonial history and to the nature of the continent's transition to independence, marked by the growth of corruption, nepotism, populist re distribution and patronage politics. This is reflected in the continent's, economic decline as well as its political, instructional and diplomatic failures.*

They were being critical of OAU's decision in 1978 and 1992 as the body, before then, had insisted on the principle "that Africa states must resolve their differences peacefully so as not to offer others the excuse to intervene." This saw a foretold event

in the Great Lakes Region in general and Rwanda in particular as seen later that was an African falsehood when considering what happened between OAU, Africa and Rwanda in 1994. From 1990 to 1994, under the growing Rwandan crisis, the OAU and the regional body, the (Community of East African States Association (COMESA) did nothing to avert the impending catastrophies in Rwanda. The failure of the body at the period with the utmost decision to abandon Rwandans to their fate was negligence, abject poverty, coupled with African states connivance with the international community to betray the people of Rwanda. The resultant effects of that crisis, instead, consumed nearly over one million two hundred and fifty thousand lives.

Considering all the foregoing, many analysts argued that the OAU had failed the people of the continent, and that many states might have decided to call it quits with their in their membership of the organization owing to the kind of diplomacy in place. This issue of abandonment or quitting arose when its poor diplomatic role, not only in Rwanda, but also in Somalia, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, among others, is re-examined in relation to its achievements. In assessing the general shortcoming observed in OAU's performance, leading to the growing fears and instabilities, Ngandodidi (2003:11) noted that the body was a toothless bulldog. Battling helplessly with unending conflicts, poverty, leadership tussles and killings in crisis zones, the OAU was blamed for having achieved less and therefore considered a failed body. It is also evident, according to Contemporary Conflicts Journal, 2003 that within this period, destructive conflicts had turned Africa, the most diverse of all the continents in the world, into a continent unable to turn its trends of diversity into opportunities for development.

Thus, Alusala (2005:125) aptly opined that the scourge of war has been particularly destructive in Africa. This has led to massive refugee migration, profligate consumption of resources, infrastructure destruction, food insecurity and extreme poverty as witnessed in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Burundi, Sudan, Angola and Congo DR, among others. This also explains the fact that Africans need a functional political system that could be the key to Africa's well-being.Dompere (2006:213-214) further contended that the political system should define the path through which political unity could be achieved and managed. It must point to creating conditions of efficient establishment of stable structure of intra – African political relationships in terms of state socio-political behavior on how such state's political relations could

bring about a continental government where the central decision-making power is vested in the federated states. The scholar refered to above further reiterated that the sustainable solutions to Africa's problems required Africans' creativity and independent thinking, a view that must not be subjected to deceptive technical help from the imperial predators who were the major sources of socio-political tensions on our continent, (Dompere, 2006:215).

The reasoning above, therefore, led to the clamour for a new political institution for Africa, or an outright overhauling of the then OAU as a body. A new political institution, in this parlance, implies that the OAU needed to be changed. A new dawn for Africa, and not just a working piece of paper was needed; a body that must assist in uncovering the root causes of violent conflicts such as state failure, illegitimate government through rebellion, corruption, repression of democracy and democratic rights and freedom. On these rights and freedom, Dompere (2006:218) further asserted that the conditions for a stable political African Union and its integration at all levels must be drawn from freedom, justice and order, given the conditions of African nationalism.

That OAU failed in Rwanda is indisputable and this is quite significant, especially as people are still craving for good leadership, participatory economy, developed technology, amongst others. The discussion on the role of OAU in Rwanda before the war/genocide clearly shows wilful abandonment and neglect, which was generally blamed on the international community. The OAU, with its member states, has a great share in allowing what happened in Rwanda to have taken place in the first instance. The highlighted facts in the section above is also a pointer to the kind of theorising that the OAU was fond of, even when one of its members' house was on fire. The degree of inadequacies noted within the OAU framework made many sympathise with African states in conflict and political dilemma because the body lacked the expected wherewithal to overcome most of these pressing challenges. The major lapses of the OAU in Rwanda was not the issue of not responding, but the problem of pretending to have enough of the required means of solving the problems and also pretending that all was well, whereas nothing was moving and people were suffering or dying of one epidemic or the other.

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This implies that to overcome the inadequacies of OAU, a new organization that would be more representative, proactive and willing to promote economic development, political stability, democracy and human rights and so on should be established. Towards this aspiration, the African Union was conceived and established in July 2002.

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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DIPLOMACY OF GENOCIDE IN THE RWANDAN CRISIS

5:0 INTRODUCTION

Chapter five examines the interplay of genocide and diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis. This is against the backdrop of the fact that within one hundred days in 1994 over one million two hundred and fifty thousand ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus were annihilated by the Hutu extremist government while the UN agents and the international community looked on. In this process, the issue of treatment of small state like Rwanda was examined and pinged on its lack of oil, natural resources, wealth, and lack of strategic importance to any power bloc. The implication that Rwanda was less important and contributes nothing to the world in terms of cooperation. This chapter investigate the kind of diplomacy in place after the genocide, especially in trying to reconcile the Rwandan people through the process of healing and forgiveness that came in different dimensions. At the same time, the work examines the implications of rebellion by revisiting the process and manner through which diplomacy encouraged the course of the consistent occurrence possible in the midst of long years of ethnic antagonism and political power struggles between the Hutus and Tutsis. The chapter also discusses the several attempts made by African diplomacy to intervene, which was made impossible by general incapacitations and inadequacies of the OAU/AU from the beginning to the end of the Rwandan crisis. The handling of selected cases by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) towards promoting justice and reconciliation in Rwanda is also discussed. The establishment of the Gacaca traditional mode of judicial system, which was meant to assist the ICTR, is evaluated. The chapter further examines the intrigues of the Rwandan crisis through the testing of third and the fourth hypotheses of the study.

5:1   THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REBELLION IN RWANDA

Rwandan history is replete with rebellion (Ngijol, 1998:15). Several rebellions have occurred in the history of the country. Firstly, the Hutus – Tutsis –inter-ethnic conflict which had in several respects polarised government, no matter how little, had always degenerated into major violence.

Gurr (1974:9) noted that "men have rebelled against their rulers for millennia…the institutions, persons and policies of rulers have inspired the violent wrath of their nominal subjects throughout the history of organized political life…." This aptly applies to the case of Rwanda. It is a truism that humans have a capacity for, but not a need for aggression. This is informed by the fact that there are patterns of social circumstances in which humans exercise that capacity of collective aggression. Collective aggression displayed by people can be traced to the betrayal of the essence of government, that is government's inability to meet the need of its citizens especially what the citizens cannot do for themselves. In the case of Rwanda, the government, instead of providing for the people, engaged in exploiting, subjugating and even decimating the populace, thereby pushing the oppressed to rebel against what they perceive as oppression, dehumanization and other heinous policies of the state and its machinery.

The antecedent of the Rwandan crisis is traceable to the colonial epoch and how the two ethnic groups had been positioned in government. Nyankanzi (1998) observed that from 1910 to 1993, rebellion and struggle for power amongst the Hutus and Tutsis became intense because it was the group that controlled the state that automatically controlled the economy disbursed the wealth of the state. However, in expatiating more on the adduced factors leading to several rebellions in Rwanda, Pitsch (2002) aptly asserted that poverty and unequal distribution of wealth and relative deprivation deepened social division, regionalism, jealousy, subjugation and competition for resources. Muhutamiana (2001), in this respect, noted that the rate of deprivation, marginalization, denial and long practice of exploitation perpetrated by both the Tutsi oligarchy and the Hutus at their separate period in government show, with a great implication, an unending unhappiness amongst the ethnic groups.

In general terms, poverty and misplaced priority, emanating from bad leadership, ignited the Rwandan rebellions. This study buttresses the established view

that people have the natural propensity to rebel against bad policies, frustration, deprivation, cyclical exploitation, marginalization and against those who hold power and deliberately refuse to provide the basic infrastructural needs of the people.

Reasoning along the same line, it is imperative to state that there might have been long years of denial and oppression of the people by the leaders, both the Tutsi oligarchy and Hutu regimes alike, thereby arousing rebellion by the masses. The regimes, instead of governing the people properly, resorted with absolute determination to avenge the bad treatment meted out to its own people at separate periods by the rulers who preferred holding on to power at the detriment of the people. The two dynasties (Tutsis and Hutus) rulerships were not in any way favourable to the average Rwandan who suffered the pains in exile or slavery at home in order to survive. Although Nyankanzi (1998:8) noted that the Tutsis oligarchy reign had a little openness to some extent, there was high oppression, suffering and forced labour, which could be considered as the bedrock of all exploitations in the land. Thismight have also informed the nature of the Hutu-Akazu reign of Habyarimana who employed the extreme forms of divide and rule policy to victimised the opposition. This policy implies the use of hysterical propaganda to incite the Hutus against the Tutsi ethnic group at every criticism cyclical of the former's style of governance by the latter, thereby creating avenue for vengeance whose implications kept the society divided and unstable.

There is a consensus that bad leadership had been the bane of peace and unity in Rwanda. It suffices to reiterate that it was the predilection of the leaders, especially Habyarimana, to keep and maintain fat foreign accounts and associates abroad that engendered issues of deprivation, denial, and marginalisation to the detriment of the people. To contain the opposition and criticism, scapegoating and wanton violence were entrenched to polarise the society, leading to a chaotic and unstable Rwanda. To retain power, the colonial masters instigated and allowed acrimony and antagonism amongst the people, resulting in a state of instability. Yet, another factor that encouraged rebellion in Rwanda was the manner in which the leaders probably allowed their foreign friends - the Belgians and the French to appropriate the scarce land to the detriment of the people. This interface of diplomacy encouraging rebellion shows that diplomacy, in itself, had not in any way helped to curb the conflict in Rwanda. This is because it was in reacting to the opposition's stand against the single act of satisfying

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the foreigners with the available wealth by the leaders at different periods that led to either the brutalisation or terrorising of the people, thereby resulting in the issues raised above.

In furthering Ngijol (1998) view on rebellion in Rwanda, Melvern (2000) observed that the 1910 and 1912 rebellions against the Tutsi oligarchy were attributed to misrule. The Hutus led the revolution that questioned the imposed bad leadership style that was backed by the instituted indirect rule system. Although the implication of that rebellion was the crushing of the people by the combined team of the German forces and the oligarchy power, it marked the beginning of all struggles against bad leadership in the land. In this context, also, the application of diplomacy to ward off opposition against challenging the authority further explains the in-depth role of diplomatic interface in the Rwandan crisis.

On the 1957 rebellion, Mamdani (2001:1034) wrote against the establishment of the idea of Hutu emancipation and the quest for the decentralization of the party system. This was in order to accommodate every willing citizen that was opposed to the oligarchy that caused the Hutus to rebel against the Tutsis and Belgian leadership. The revolt was brought to a halt by the Belgian army which probably saw the Tutsis as the most cherished ethnic group to work with in exploiting the land. The implication of the Hutus revolt, apart from the large number of deaths recorded, was felt in the total alienation of the Hutu race from the scheme of things, especially governance. It was the outcome of this which, in turn, formed the basis of their complaint to the UN in the same year for total emancipation.

The 1959 revolution, Minear et al (1996:13) observed, was nicknamed the "Social Revolution" by the Hutu majority and it was against the Tutsi oligarchy's long years of misrule. Although this was against the plan nursed by the Hutus, it was propably because they were overwhelmingly inspired by the actions and statement of the Belgian Christian Democratic Party and the colonial representative against the Tutsis' double standard. The Tutsis in their decision had embraced socialism overnight while demanding independence, unknown to them that there were great differences between the capitalist ideology and the socialist ideology. It was this stand that stirred up the Belgian officials' action to punish the Tutsis by backing the majority Hutu's emancipation and power change. The socialist ideology, which was against capitalist

tenets, irritated the Belgians. The idea of granting Rwanda independence also meant an end to their exploitation of the people. The punishment for the Tutsis' action, even with the success of the Hutus' revolution, was to destroy that unique atmosphere that they had enjoyed for many years by turning their intention to continually rule Rwanda into misery. The immediate result of the revolution against the Tutsis was that they suffered great pogrom and were exiled from their former subjects. These former subjects, impoverished under Tutsis' misrule for a long time, vehemently argued that it was time to pay back their former master, implying that the Tutsis and moderate Hutus suffered from 1959 to 1994, despite the diplomatic interface which also saw half of the ethnic group lived in exile and are alienated from the existing government until July, 1994.

Against the intent of rebellion which was geared towards changes, either positive or negative in a polity, the Rwandan situation probably might be viewed from the same angle or differently. Away from that position also abound several implications such as existed in the same crisis; victims and oppositions were totally suppressed; the fears of oppositions ascendancy to power possibly informed the use of vengeance to cause great destructions of lives and properties; there was an immense division of the society; there was payback time projecting deep-seated animosity, over-frustration and deprivation; thus, beclouding any genuine intentions towards moving the country forward. Moreover, general denial used to checkmate opposing ethnic groups in Rwanda between 1963 and 1994 also stirred up fear of uncertainty which goes with implications of rebellion. This was also probably why the government of Habyarimana employed scapegoating, kidnapping, extreme suppression of the opposition, among others, to scale down the fear, while dealing with the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus.

Another example of the implication of rebellion is that states whose existence or government is rooted in rebellion or violence tend to experience several problems. This notion, apart from agreeing with our central theme which states "that in the midst of weak diplomacy to prevent crisis, conflict/rebellion of different kinds do take place", This also applies to the Rwandan situation of 1959 to 1994. It was the combination of these factors leading to the period of inaction and abandonment by the outside world (UN, USA and Britain who were probably scared and would not want to lose any of their personnel like in the Belgian experience) that played itself out in the 1994 Rwandan crisis.

Due to the character of the rebellion in Rwanda, the use of conventional system in the struggle and the employment of diplomacy, which enhances conflict resolution, was encouraged. This probably also scared and discouraged any help from outside in the period of the war/genocide, as the volatility and the destructiveness, backed with the use of modern weaponry and warfare, made the conflict a consistent and unabated one. Moreover, apart from the politics within being uninteresting to the outside world, the kind of diplomacy covering the shortfall of the state coupled with the neglect and its uninteresting nature, shredded the atrocities of the aristocratic rule whose exposure was what the world later saw as war/genocide.

However, a further implication includes the reason that the Rwandan crisis portrayed the country as a collapsed state. Secondly, the negative report emanating from Rwanda at the end of the crisis had continually kept people and investors away from Rwanda against the backdrop of the fact that conflict and instability are not favourable to any kind of investment, tourism and even exchange programs.

The long years of instability had not only nurtured the youths, the aged and other people on grievance, vengeance and premeditated aggression, but had also imbued them with a perpetual spirit of animosity and hatred whenever they remember the past. The Rwandan economy suffered during the period and which it may not easily recover from the lopsidedness and quagmire that brought about economic fluctuation, recession, depreciation and general depression. The rebellion might have also created poorer people as was entrenched by the actions of the leaders' misrule in the land.

Psychologically, the number of the traumatised, mentally derailed, socially deluded and maladjusted individuals who were parts of the implications of rebellion and violence were not only on the increase each day, but more cases were emerging than expected. Such trends led to the wanton destruction of the national psyche and the high incidence of social decimation, which exposesthe Rwandan society to a grave danger in the future.

The state's indebtedness might equally be on the increase, as it remains a recipient nation, with several odious debts and HIPC status.These tends to make its political economy uninteresting. It is also on record that incessant instability, rebellion, deplorable conditions which outside diplomacy may have aided or helped to sustain to their own advantage, among others, might have considerably led to the number of

human rights abuses, denial of education, lack of social amenities and decrease in life expectancy. All these, of course, may not be unrelated to the Rwandan situation as, to some extent; they form part of the components of the existing interface between rebellion and diplomacy. Mostly affected in this situation might be child education and increase in infant mortality rate, a factor that probably shows that many children were subjected to parenthoods and many orphans' breadwinners, due to the untold hardship and sufferings arising from the war/genocide.

On the implications of the rebellion in Rwanda, another striking emphasis is the view of the discussants who, for what they called over-aged (between 36 and 44 years) enrolment and stigmisation, the education standard and system amongst the students still in the university for first degree (due to the prolonged instability and war expanding from 1963 to 1994) are not only apalling, but explain a situation that does not speak well of them and the society. Indeed, it hinders the development of a naked state like Rwanda.

The group further argued that the implications of the age-long Rwandan crisis had not only denied them (Rwandans) of several things in terms of competition and comparison with other students outside Rwanda and around Africa, but also downgraded them so much that they looked like big fools when they inquire to know certain things at their level and age.

It is obvious that the rebellion in Rwanda brought about several changes and, at the same time, encouraged several destructions and devastations, which had become a source of much worry today in Rwanda.

5.2   AN ASSESSMENT OF DIPLOMACY IN RWANDA

In this section, the third hypothesis which states inter alia: "*that the lapses inherent in the international diplomatic order, especially as was the case of Rwanda, largely accounted for the occurrence of genocide"* shall be considered while taking cognisance of the fact that Rwanda, historically and officially, started interaction with the outside world as far back as 1894. This relationship was centered on colonisation, civilisation, exploitation of indigenous people, amongst others. A classic example was the allotment of the country to Germany nine years earlier at the Berlin Conference in

1884/85. The relationship which was probably a master – servant one developed until the later days of the Belgian/France diplomatic relationship.

The relationship with the German then probably was more of creating awareness, learning, enlightenment, helping toward development and civilization and so on. Unlike the type of relationship with the Belgian/French, the relationship was comparatively filled with diplomatic intrigues, power usurpation and power struggle, often characterised by betrayal, among others. This probably informed the later days' contest, counter-actions and instability in Rwanda. The major challenges and effects of the role of the German relationship with the indigenes were the 1910 and 1912 Tutsi oligarchy – Germans' dislodgement of the Hutus rebellion. Other uprising and disturbance dislodgement were due to the disobedience to the policy of the Umwami headship. The people saw the Umwami as pseudo-rulers under the German indirect rule system of exploitations; hence they opposed some of his policies.

However, against the backdrop of struggle for nationhood which was intensified later on in Rwanda from 1920 to 1960s, the country was said to have experienced a drastic change in its political development and diplomatic intercourse. This was probably due to the line followed in its quest for self-determination. These changes and their agendas, however, created great animosity between the two ethnic groups. Following the response from the colonialists who saw it as an affront and, as noted in the foregoing analysis, Belgium decided to change rulership from Tutsi oligarchy to Hutu power. Though the Belgians deemed the affront as an embarrassing situation, which supposedly compelled it to act as quickly as possible to punish the oligarchy with the later days' decision, it was also unknown to it that it was equally ridiculing itself before the international observers/United Nations.

In view of our present hypothesis and the nature of the diplomatic interface with genocide, which portrayed the former as being domineering and a leading mobiliser of the tempo of the Rwandan crisis, the following are examined under some sub-headings.

(a) The Role of the United Nations Diplomacy in Rwanda

Under the United Nations Charter, as discussed earlier and as inherent in the principle of International Trusteeship Commission, Rwanda was inherited from the League of Nations after the body's demise. The UN role in Rwanda and other trusteeship territories was applauded at the early period of colonisation and decolonisation but the development that followed afterward exemplified neglect and

abandonment (Melvern, 2000). This, probably, was equally noted in the significance of the body's duties which were meant to cater for the states in question under the Trusteeship Commission. The UN, particularly in the case of Rwanda, probably felt indifferent as it failed to monitor strictly or question the manner things were being done immediately after the UN's sacking of the Belgian military force in 1961 (Nyankanzi, 1998). However, in running Rwanda, the UN relied on France which it mandated to update the body intermittently. Thus, when crisis arose, the information that France sent was treated with kid gloves; and this might have equally helped to compound the problem of the state in question during the crisis of 1994. Thus, analysts such as Gourevitch (1998), Gundry (1998), Keane (1996) and Walker (2005) argued that the UN's reliance on only the information being sent to it by France whose interest was very clear in the Rwandan government and politics was one of its undoings, and which messed up the idea and the peace process itself. The idea of relying on one-sided information in treating a complex case like the Rwandan crisis might be said, to some extent, to show how unserious and unprepared the UN was in solving the Rwandan problem (Power, 2003).

The above reasons stemmed from the fact that the government of Habyarimana, despite being adjudged a despot, was not checkmated by the UN but, instead, urged to follow democratic tenets while ensuring stability. Another phenomenon that was unclear is what was known as the ploy forming the trajectory base of instability, as Habyarimana could not be trusted with the manner the government was being run. That the UN saw the Rwandan case as nothing but a mere ethnic disagreement that could easily be settled signifies the body's manner of value and situational judgment as being bad.Itsdecision in this context was, therefore, nothing but a misplaced priority. This lukewarm attitude demonstrated by UN may not be unconnected with its involvement in crisisridden states ofSomalia, Bosnia, Liberia and Sierra-Leone. And it considered it insignificant to attend to ethnic disagreements or small – states whose diplomacy and cooperation in the international relations with bigger powers are not significant (Doyle, 1997). Moreover, the Rwandan case may be different in some respects, while in several spheres classified as crisis zone. This might have also informed the UN's nonchalance since Rwanda had no mineral resources or wealth to attract any foreign investors or the UN to monitor its exploration, if compared with the above – mentioned states. The absence of these attractions might have made the UN to be unconcerned and uncaring

to the plight of the Rwandans.   At the peak of the war/genocide in Rwanda, the UN Peacekeeping Department and the Security Council ordered the UNAMIR not to intervene.This confirms the earlier notion that the UN preventive measure was completely absent in the course of the Rwandan crisis. Moreover, even if it was not so, one is forced to wonder what happened to the several reports sent to the United Nations in respect of Rwanda, even when they were doctored to indicate inter-ethnic hostility. The research agrees with Power's (1996), that the UN acknowledgement and acceptance might have been hinged on the information of a majority rule as informed by France and its allies. The UN general neglect of the Rwandan crisis at the early stage probably also confirms the kind of stand it took in only watching the carnage at the period of the war/genocide of 1994.   The confusions, contradictions and frustrations created by the UN, France and other players in the international community, by any means, helped in incubating the enormity and magnitude of the crisis that came thereafter. Also, the UN's failure to investigate the French atrocities, interest and role in Rwanda, as affecting the general societies of the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas probably raised questions of international complicity, despite all complaints made by the opposition against what they suffered during the crisis.

At the beginning and the peak of the crisis, the United Nations did not deem it fit to task its peacekeepers to save lives, even when UNAMIR demanded to do so. The UN's inaction and turning down of the demands of the peacekeepers' request was also another undoing of the body in the Rwandan crisis. Instead, it turned round to reduce the number of troops and military observers from 2,500 peacekeepers to 270 observers against the advice and strong objection of the African group at the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement and most of the NGOs operating in Rwanda (Tekle, 1999). This did not only demonise the peace agents, but went ahead to make them only witnesses to the crime against humanity as opposed to being peacekeepers in Rwanda. This singular act probably explains the intrigues and complexities in the nature of the UN policies and international diplomacy. It equally shows that when the body intends to aid or destroy an unwanted race through its permanent members' veto power, it wastes no time in achieving that desire. In this respect and the manner of behaviour, it suffices to explain the measure of rot and dent associated with the world body on critical issues like killing those it is supposed to protect.

Doyle (1997) noted that the UN turned its back on the Rwandans to lick their own wounds and eat their own flesh just as Power (2003:18) opined that the UN's inaction might have been due to a premeditated act that ended up in "never again", the world's most unfulfilled promise. To Keane (1996:22), the UN stooped so low to seeing Rwanda degenerate into a theatre of deaths, acountry of corpses, orphans and terrible abuses. This would not have been the case had the global body not boasted and pronounced "never again" as far as war/genocide was concerned before the Rwandan experience where the spirit withered and the devil came down in the form of a human being to feast on innocent bloods. The observed lapses in the UN diplomacy as inherent in the Rwandan situation also helped to create the conditions leading to ethnic struggle and war. Melvern (2004:19) noted that the UN's delays and indecision on what was going on in Rwanda was a negative signal, a wrong approach to a sensitive issue whose handling had betrayed the hope reposed in the body. The failure of the international body was probably a sign compelling people everywhere, and Rwanda in particular, never to wholly trust and hold in high esteem the UN whenever a case comes up. Not only did the UN and its agencies renege on this, they went ahead to commit acts tantamount to complicity in the Rwanda war/genocide, an indication of typical UN's policies and roles in conflict situations.

A more problematic factor which seemed to have encouraged the situation was the ignoring of the text message from General Romeo Dallaire to the UN Security Council peacekeeping unit. The poor handling of this sensitive issue shows the insincerity and manipulation involved in the handling of cases of small countries diplomacy status by the UN. This also probably indicates the degree of the implications of the several kinds of diplomacy on the Rwandan crisis. Against the notion that the Rwandan crisis was minor compared to several other conflicts that the UN was then facing at the time, it is pertinent to note that one intricate fact about the whole scenario is that no conflict is minor or major. This is because of its propensity to escalate, as it turned out in the Rwandan case. Thus, the UN is supposed to see every conflict or crisis as delicate and treat them in like manner since it is very obvious that it was the UN's underrating of the Rwandan crisis that probably deceived all, given the level of alertness, sense of judgment and intervention that followed the catastrophy. Such negligence led to the war/genocide in Rwanda.

At the end of the war/genocide, the UN, having regretted its actions in the first one hundred days of the crisis, following its general criticism from humanitarian and human rights organisations, returned to Rwanda. Many questions were raised as to what the body had come back to do. Such questions include: Did the UN agents come to pick the corpses? Were they there to help bury the dead in mass graves?

The UN diplomacy in Rwanda did not, however, change a bit as some of the hiccups, if not all that occurred during the pre-conflict still existed. Among these were the UN Security Council's individual state veto of non- acceptance and acknowledgment of genocide in Rwanda. The UN was unable to mobilise its members to provide troops to the UNAMIR II because offears that the participating states might nurse against unfriendly treatment from the host community justlike what the UNAMIR I experienced, especially in transporting their soldiers after their demobilisation. The OAU member states were the only ones willing to provide troops, if only the UN foot the bill. Then, with the unpleasant news coming out from Rwanda, many states were also skeptical about their troops going to there.

The UNAMIR II, in taking over the state of affairs after the genocide, did not dissuade the state of Rwanda from dividing the population into categories, which might have, probably made any process of healing and reconciliation an unforgettable situation. These five categories are the returnees, the refugees, victims, survivors and perpetrators. Then, among the refugees, there were also the group classified as the pre-genocide refugees (Tutsi) and the post-genocide refugees (Hutu). By such indications the UN and NGOs had created another disparity as the terminology, according to Mamdani (1998:276-277), was found in the UN and the NGOs circles, and such sentiments still invoke division among the populace, which equally might make the process of healing impossible.

The UN under UNAMIR II did send assistance to states receiving refugees from Rwanda, which is commendable, coupled with the effort of the body in writing to Mobutu Sese Seko to beef up security in Rwandan refugee camps that were located in Zaire. The effort of the UN in tasking the Human Rights group to step up the deployment to the field of Human Rights officer was also applauded (Ghali, 1996:413,438-442).Notwithstanding these efforts and commendations, the UN failed to adequately checkmate the activities of Mobutu and France. Power (1996) and Keane

(1996) observed that the UN, through the human rights groups, was aware of the kind of treatment and reception accorded to RGF, Gendamaires, and Interahamwe militias, how they were re-armed in the camp and used to sack the Banyemulenge Tutsis at the Eastern Congo without any reaction or criticism. Melvern (2000:108) argued that the UN was informed of some killings of over 600 people who showed their desire to return to Rwanda after the war by the Interahamwe at Ituri, coupled with the over 5,000 among the fleeing group who died of cholera and other nutritional diseases at Bukavu. The UN's silence and claim to be doing something when nothing was happening still shows lapses in its diplomacy.

On security, the UNAMIR troops had been considerably reduced, leaving only the GHANBATT (Ghana Battalion) to remain after majority of the other countries involved had long pulled out. Situations that even the survivors and victims might feel unsafe or abandoned to the mercy of the killers were still there. Perhaps, it was the backing of the Ghanaian government at home that had kept the soldiers in Rwanda instead of the troops turning their back on the people of Rwanda.TheForce Commander (Gen Dallaire) could only see in them (Ghananian troops) a demonstration of sufficient courage and determination to continue with their mission, a reason the UN failed to acknowledge (Dallaire, 2003:74). Even with this explosive and dangerous situation, the Ghanaian troops did not consider pulling out as a wise decision; instead, they stood up to their professional callings, believing that they were simply following the footsteps of those who had gone before them to protect fellow Africans in need.Thecost of their stay was, however, never settled by UN (Anyidoho, 1998).

Against some elements of hypocrisy that dictated UN diplomacy even after the war/genocide in Rwanda, the Ghana Battalion under UNAMIR was caught between two opposing challenges: one, acting as troops on UN duty whose colleagues had left the battlefield, two, acting as a contigent of OAU/AU whose operation must be to protect a fellow African state in conflict, even with less logistics and equipment due to the UN diplomacy policy, excuses and inadequacies and the need to be steadfast in their function. This might also be one of the reasons that informed their decision to stay on against all odds. The unconcerned attitude of the UN diplomacy was obvious, as the residual force's sufferings and lack of welfare were not only blamed on the body, but seen as neglecting a people's welfare even when they were there on its account.

According to Anyidoho (1998:55), the UN diplomacy at the tail end to the war/genocide was never encouraging. An instance of this was that while the UNAMIR remained and the new UNAMIR II, established on weak mandate, poorly equipped and insufficiently funded, the tendency that it will suffer the same maligned administration which may eventually destroyed it was very glaring. On this kind of diplomacy after the war/genocide, several questions were posed by the research: What were running through the minds of decision makers in New York? Did they look at the Rwandan situation as a distant misery and, therefore, could not empathise about? Was it because the operation was in a typical developing country (small state diplomacy) or more pointedly on the Dark Continent?

The role of the UN at the end of the genocide made the survivors and victims dislike the residual force of UNAMIR. To the Hutus, the force was too inclined towards the RPF, aiding and abetting them in the CND long before the civil war. And to the Tutsis, the UN abandoned them at the time of need. Instead of strengthening the force to prevent what happened, the UN chose to reduce the mission to a mere shadow of itself. They therefore saw no need to retain such a force or even the UN presence in Rwanda because they were incapable of performing a mediation role in a civil war/genocide originating from deep-rooted hatred. Thus, its troops were simply abandoned by those that established them and locked between the RGF and RPF.

In furtherance to this kind of diplomacy after the war/genocide, the activities of UN in establishing the ICTR further exposed a great hollow and shortcoming in the UN, especially in carrying out its responsibilities unhindered.

(b) The Role of OAU/AU Diplomacy in Rwanda

In view of the fact that the role of OAU/AU and African diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis had earlier been discussed in the preceding chapter and section, this section will concentrate on Africa's attempts at intervening after the war/genocide days in Rwanda and how Africa's diplomacy could still not, in any way, help the people of Rwanda.

In relation to this, Keane (1996) observed that the journey into Rwanda was about following the lines of blood and history; about sleeping with the smell of death, fear and hatred; about exhaustion and losses and tears and, in some strange ways, even love

because this is a country of deaths, deserted and with winds of stinking human decay. To him and many other commentators, Rwanda belonged to a nightmarish zone where the capacity to understand much of the events was closed to the outsiders while at the same time helps nothing to be achieved. It was a country of corpses and orphans and terrible abysses where the spirit withered. Anyidoho (1998:27) noted that though the news of RPF's victory had been heard, the only troops on ground, (the Ghanaian contigent) could not help matters or even attend to their own problem as the UN's inaction and departure left them in a dilemma to which OAU's assistance was slim. This implies that, apart from the UN efforts, the OAU lacks and shortfalls greatly affected the only troop (Ghana Battlion) on ground.

After the genocide that was encouraged by the international community's weak diplomacy had taken place in Rwanda, there were some fearful pictures of mounds of dead bodies coming out of Kigali. The general consensus among those watching the pictures and those who had taken them was that Rwanda was a madhouse, a primitive torture chamber where rival tribes were busy settling ancient scores (Keane, 1996:6). But to the immediate neighbours, the Africans, this might have been settled if nipped in the bud, as the spillover effects might be devastating to the next victim. Thus, against the backdrop of the hiccups that had caused the Rwandan crisis, leading to the pulling-out of all the UNAMIR contigents except the Ghanbatt and the problems unattended to, the question is: Will the OAU, on its own, be able to solve once and for all, the inter and intra state crises of its member states? Did the OAU have the appropriate organisational and financial base as well as the will to resolve the Rwandan crisis?

The odds facing the African continent on the Rwandan crisis were best settled with the OAU's attempt to intervene by first calling for a ceasefire. In line with this, the body, on its own part, orgainsed a ceasefire talk at Arusha, Tanzania where the Rwandan Government Force (RGF), the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tanzanian Government Representative and the SRSG, Dr. Booh – Booh, all met to finetune the possible solutions to the Rwandan crisis. At the talk, the RPF representatives refused to recognise the RGF delegation just as they did not also recognise the Interim Government. However, in the course of events the RGF delegates did not show up as everyone waited in vain and the OAU never bothered to find out why until a much later date.

The OAU, however, went ahead to form a Ceasefire Committee, which comprised mostly of military men representing different groups without allowing deep involvement of members of the warring parties. This sheer neglect by OAU later became one of the undoings of the body when it was expected that each party ought to have respected the ceasefire agreement. The OAU also organised two other meetings on the ceasefire issue. The issue that was prominent on the meetings was to know why the RGF had failed to attend the Arusha ceasefire talk. The RGF delegation, in attendance at one of the meetings, however, demanded that the RPF should be made to go back to the status quo before April, 6th. The OAU's silence was, however, seen from a different angle by Anyidoho (1998:53). He argued that the war was still going on and a ceasefire could not commence by asking a force that was progressing well in its advance to withdraw: it was an unacceptable thing to propose to any military leader. On this, and against the inability of Arusha Peace committee to convince the RGF delegates, everyone left the venue disappointed. The Kenya President's meeting with the Secretary General of the OAU and the SRSG on the matter also yielded no fruitful result.

While the OAU was making frantic efforts to see that the war was brought to an end, the body itself was facing a great problem of how to manage the ceasefire if it eventually came since all the international forces had pulled out and the remnant (UNAMIR) lacked the necessary manpower, logistics and equipment to get involve in such a gigantic venture (Anyidoho, 1998:53-55).

According to Tekle (1999:125-126), the next OAU meeting at Pretoria produced a consensus that there was an urgent need for both assistance and provision of security for those whose lives were being threatened by the conflict but this was faced with the failure of troops to be deployed in time to stop the genocide. The OAU, in collaboration with NGOs and UNHCR, also made *in situ* assessment of the refugees' conditions in Tanzania and Burundi. But while the aim was to find out how the OAU could be of assistance in the search for a lasting solution to the problem, nothing concrete came out of the endeavour.

At the end of the genocide and the assumption of office by the new Rwandan Government under the RPF, the OAU Secretary General sent a representative to Kigali for the initial three-month period to closely monitor developments and to provide the

necessary information for OAU's action regarding the reactivation of the peace process in Rwanda.

Meanwhile, the RPF government had attempted to constitute a government which, to a large extent, would take cognizance of the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement, with the MRND and CDR being exempted from being part of the government and, thus, aceepting genocide as the reason for excluding them (see OAU, CM/1861(LXI) 1995:2-3). The OAU, with its inadequacies on the whole, was favourably, though in some instances, critically disposed toward the new government. The body applauded the new government's position on reconciliation and castigated the military and political leaders of the former government for their intransigence.

The OAU, in appreciating the fact that its fears were solved by the existence of the RPF government in Rwanda and that the war had come to an end, appealed to the international community to assist the new government in concrete terms in its efforts to establish or reactivate the institutions of the state and administrative structures. The OAU diplomacy, at this juncture, was probably not commendable, because of its incapacity, means that without the efforts of the RPF in tackling battle, nothing would have been done to save lives, or even enthrone peace in Rwanda.

Going by this kind of diplomacy paraded by the African states in the OAU/AU, before and after the war/genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and other ones still existing in manyAfrican states, for which the then OAU was found culpable due to inadequacies and general ineptitude, the African Union (AU), a new international organisation comprising all but one African country as its members was founded. Founded in July 2002, the AU is the principal organisation for the promotion of economic integration, political stability, conflict resolution and unity in Africa. Boene (2005:6) asserted that this represents the new architecture of Pan – Africanism – "the idea that people of African descent share common bonds and must unite to overcome common challenges". The AU has 53 member states with the determination to tackle the enormous African insecurity problem, mend fences, fix lapses inherent in the former OAU and attend to the political and economic problems of the continent.

In view of this numerous problems confronting the newly born union, the body, in accepting its existence as an act of faith and circumstance, first of all, went

ahead to restructure its charter principles under the Peace and Security Council. These involved shifting from:

i.   non – interference to interference in state matters, especially conflicts or political power struggle;

ii. difference in state affairs - to indifference in state problems;

iii. non –collective security and sovereignty amongst African statesto collective security and sovereignty of states; and

iv. absence of one High Command to the existence of one African High Command (standby force) and so on.

   This new agenda and approach probably might have been informed by the fact that the former OAU and its exercise of duty had not only failed the people, but had also hopelessly accommodated different kinds of diplomacy and practice that were of no value to Africans. Its inadequacies, ranging from inability to curtail violence, inability to encourage good governance and poor initiatives, among others, had also, in many respects, allowed bad leaders and rebellion to triumph over the wishes of the people. This thereby made the continent and its people to look big – empty inside and purposeless outside in the comity of nations. Added to this, according to Alusala (2005:121), a panel of the wise, which was a body that advises the council on issues relating to the maintenance and promotion of peace was needed in Africa. A continental early warning system meant to facilitate anticipation and prevention of conflicts should also be established. Besides, an African Standby Force (ASF) – a body of multi-disciplinary military and civilian contingents for rapid deployment against any rebellion or conflict was needed. Furthermore, a special fund to provide the financial resources for its activities would help to make things easy in Africa. The essence of this was to make sure that what happened in Rwanda is never allowed to repeat itself in any part of Africa. If there had been something of such in place, the Rwandan crisis would have been tackled without looking up to the UN for any help. The absence of one high command might have played a definite role to avert the failure of African diplomacy in Rwanda. Also worthy of note is the fact that there was no strong body or state that was openly willing to coordinate affairs against the inaction and incapacitated

nature of African member states of the OAU on the Rwandan crisis among the states that made up COMESA.

Thus, the need for the new African organization like the AU was not only cogent, but long expected. Premised on the above intentions, the AU was out to coherently tackle, with good response and support from member nations, the new African diplomatic intercourse, a factor which may eventually change the face of African degrading political sphere. This includes reinventing African international politics from the distorted, suspicious and antagonistic ideology that made a mess of the then OAU, a philosophy that also helped in plunging many states into "dog-eat-dog" attitude, in which everyone saw others as a readily available prey in the survival of the fittest struggle. The AU's intention in Sudan - Darfur, Togo, Cote D'voire, Somaliland, Burundi, the Great Lakes Region, among others, eventually put an end to the activities or idea of looking outside for help against the incapacitation of the African states before now. Although this sounds unique and laudable, in reality, everything may still depend on the sincerity of the present crop of leaders in Africa and their successors in question, coupled with the element of sustainability. Concertedly, it is by this means that several rebel struggles in the continent will fizzle out, and many who nurse such an ambition will jettison their heinous agendas, making way for peace and social civility to blossom.

Analytically, the level of African several rebellions and the engendered would reduce at the end of the first decade of this new millennium. And this is quite feasible, if only African states are not swayed by the politics of foreign aids and interest groups which, at every stage, throws up a particular face of the dice in the name of policy to entice them of self- doing to their own polity. It is this selfish goal, backed by self-interest, that probably makes the African states go cap in hand to align themselves so as not to be left behind in the scheme of things. The African international politics vis-à-vis relationship amongst the member states and the outside world, however, has much to do, especially to sustain the inspiring and new AU ideological concept since it stands to be the basis for African unity that is more proactive, effective and resourceful for a stronger continental development and cooperation in the midst of several opportunities and natural endowments.

(C) The role of Nations

The discussions below are about the nations whose diplomacy after the war/genocide in Rwanda still made impacts directly or indirectly on the lives of the people.

Belgium's Diplomacy

Belgium's political diplomacy and activities in Rwanda before the war/genocide did much to influence and encourage deep-seated ethnicity and the internal struggle amongst the ethnic groups, which largely accounted for the events of 1994. As observed above, its roles were somehow different after the war.

Thus, based on the killing of ten Belgian soldiers guarding the late Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, at the start of the crisis, the Belgians pulled out and never returned. Apart from not returning to Rwanda after the war/genocide, the government of Belgium, on the 10th of April, 2004 participated in the ten years' anniversary of the war/genocide.

On the issue of peace and reconciliation as stated above, Verhofstadt (2005) on behalf of his fellow countrymen and as the Prime Minister of Belgium, on April 10, 2004, apologised to the whole world and the people of Rwanda in particular over the role of his country from 1923 to 1961, as having been the cause and architect of the Rwandan quagmire. He further noted that:

> *It is not history that is to blame. It is man who is to blame… We caused it, I and my fellow statesmen, our policies, our actions, and our intentions caused it. We are to be blamed for all that happened in Rwanda.*

What probably informed this apology might have been the kind of role played by the Belgian government that was seen as the architect of the acrimony in Rwanda. Moreover, the kind of international criticism and caricatures that the Belgian government were being subjected to in the international fora concerning its degrading diplomatic and political roles in Rwanda would have informed the above position.

Evidently, Belgium's position, expressed by the Prime Minister, was to take responsibility for its calpability in the Rwandan genocide.

France's Diplomacy

After the war/genocide in Rwanda in 1994 up to the present, precisely November 2009, President Nicolas Sakorzy, on behalf of his countrymen, apologised to Rwandans for the French role in Rwanda in the days of war/genocide. The French disposition before now, had been that of overriding pride, and did not, probably, follow its counterparts' in the exploitation of Rwanda. To say the least, instead, it deliberately avoided same for a reason best known to it. However, the acceptance of guilt and responsibility for its role did not only project a new disposition hinged on ever-lasting peace and reconciliation, perhaps it was also the need for complete reconciliation that compelled Sakorzy to take a giant stride in sueing for peace among people. Sakorzy (2009) noted that France, under Fransico Mitterand and his immediate predecessor neither accepted any blame nor agreed that genocide was committed in Rwanda. Therefore, he, Sakorzy, is apologizing to the people of Rwanda that it was a great mistake of misdirected priority of previous administrations. According to him, France was deeply sorry for what happened in Rwanda.

Although the apology came pretty late, it reminds all of the thirty-five years of France's involvement in the political affairs of Rwanda, showing her tremendous records of activities, both negative and positive. France's diplomatic role probably contributed to the near collapse of Rwanda. As fallout of these inadequacies, over 64% of the Rwandan population in the period under discourse had gone into exile, slavery or in search of greener pasture in the neighbouring states, a situation that probably explained the degree of negative role of the French relationship to Rwanda. This analysis does not imply that there were no gains or achievements facilitated in Rwanda by both the people and the colonial masters. The research, itself, was mindful of distortion and destruction in the period, compared to the detrimental role and what analysts call "French lips service provision" (Forges, 1999). An analysis of the French diplomatic role also reveals that an average Rwandan might have been affected greatly, especially during the periods of French interference in the polity. Thus, one may probably argue that it might have been in the quest for the retention of the already established status quo that the French vowed never to allow power to be shared between the Anglo-Saxon – RPF and the Habyarimana - Francophone government.

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Thus, going by the situation of things in Rwanda – with no help, no protection, no progress and no peace – what might also be said to have been the reason for the kind of policies that France encouraged the government of Habyarimana to embarrk upon? Rwanda, in the context of this condition, lost the greater percentage of its present and future potentials to the intrigues of international diplomacy, which also explains the French role and support for the war/genocide in Rwanda. This may be interpreted to imply that the failure of the international diplomacy in Rwanda was probably bolstered by the French politics of retaining the status quo and the antics of doing away with the main opposition - Tutsis. The other factor, however, was the way the international community received France's advice concerning the crisis in Rwanda. This also suggests that it was this kind of diplomacy that promoted and largely accounted for the occurrence of war/genocide in 1994. Therefore, in the interface between rebellion and diplomacy, the role of the French and the absence of positive diplomacy that could have helped in preventing the situations as witnessed was not made possible, thus leading to the negative and weak diplomacy that encouraged violence and war, among others, in the period.

America's Diplomacy

After the war/genocide in Rwanda in 1994, America accepted that genocide was committed in Rwanda, even though it had deliberately failed to acknowledge this same fact in the heat of the crisis. Melvern (2000:132) argued that Clinton's decision to travel to Rwanda to see things for himself was probably borne out of his apprehension over his re-election bid which was being threatened, especially with regard to America's unsavoury role in wilfully turning away from its responsbility. Ongetting to Rwanda, Clinton regretted sitting tight in his office while the genocide was being perpetrated. Eventhe whole world did not try to save lives in the one hundred days that the crisis lasted. In what he called "never again", Power (1996:) noted that it was the world's most painful promise that was never fulfilled. Notwithstanding, America's failure to intervene promptly, Clinton, in translating his assurance of "never again will the world witness such a horror" provided funds to encourage and assist in the rehabilitation of Rwanda. This translated gesture led to the establishment of Gizosi Genocide Centre with over fifteen other centres scattered all over the provinces. Today, the genocide sites are doubling as tourist centres and memorabilia's. They are also there to remind the people of what happened in their land at a particular time in history.

In addition, Clinton's government encouraged the opening up of Rwanda for businesses, investments technological advancement and total industrialization.

However, besides economic industrialization and technological development, retaining American hegemony in the world was of paramount importance. Being a major player in the international community politics for peace initiatives, America's position in the Rwandan crisis was vital. Besides, as a third party member in the Arusha Peace Accord on the Rwandan crisis, about which America was not particularly pushful of the processes of its peace deal, resulted in a painful outcome. America was not a signatory to the several of the United Nations Conventions, amongst which the Genocide Convention of 1949 was, which equally explained its stand in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Thus, America might be right in keeping off since it did not know what constituted genocide and not being signatory to the convention of the subject matter. It is this position that might have explained its kind of diplomatic role in the Rwandan crisis, which was negatively felt during the crisis. It was also America's absence that might have been exploited by the genocidaires to cause havoc with their manner of killings during the crisis. This absence, however, was deemed as central to the failure of international diplomacy in Rwanda. This is because America was informed of the war/genocide and the killing of the Tutsis and moderate Hutu ethnic group, but it subtly refused to acknowledge it as such. America failed to react, relying so much on the information the Security Council got from France. On America's negligence and refusal to act decisively, Melvern (2004:25) noted that America refused to finance a quick intervention force to stop the war/genocide due to the fact that Rwanda was not in her sphere of influence.Theneglect of the early warning signals from UNAMIR Force Commander, one of the undoings of the UN Security Council, was a major contributory factor that fueled the Rwandan crisis. Instead, what was debated was who would be financially responsible for logistics and transport of America's going in to facilitate the end of the war/genocide if there was willingness to intervene. Additionally, beefing up UNAMIR became a priority issue rather than considering how to put an end to the ongoing conflict. Manyanalysts of the Rwandan war argued that issues became complicated with America stepping down for France to take charge of the Rwanda crisis. America's stepping aside was despite the fact that it had vested interest in protecting Rwandan – Habyarimana government/Mitterand Estates.

Wendt (1995:17),viewing it from a peculiar perspective, noted that America's coming into Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region after the war/genocide was not only meant to obliterate the shame and stigma of failed diplomatic roles, but it was also done to establish its interest in the region. This is because, to some extent, America deliberately allowed France to destroy itself after having outlived its usefulness with the kind of jaundiced policies it employed in Rwanda, Congo DR and the Great Lakes Region as a whole, a conclusion whose features and facts probably explained the kind and manner of politics that the international community played with human lives, especially when they were of no importance to them or because the case is not within their sphere of interest.

However, from whichever way one looks at the arguments and counter-arguments, whether in terms of reasons, mistakes and, or sheer neglect, one may not be able to place or attribute America's hard decision to stay away from Rwanda in 1994 to any pedigree other than the failure of international diplomacy which America and the developed countries are noted for. Its turning over a new leaf after the war/genocide still boils down to America's failure to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the United States was determined to maintain its moral leadership in international affairs. This is because its refusal to take the lead in raising global moral standards by combating crises might have led to the failure of international diplomacy in Rwanda. It was this same refusal that might have mitigated the consequential effects of the killing of the minority ethnic Tutsi group and the moderate Hutu sympathisers without any intervention in 1994.

Power (2003:14) noted that the failure of international diplomacy in Rwanda under the American hegemonywas always a repetition of the issue of "never again" that barely worked. The excuse given for not intervening during the one hundred days of the killings makes the UN, an international body meant to solve and protect lives, an unreliable and untrustworthy one .The failure to authorise the deployment of a multinational UN force to stop the war/genocide was noted and considered a huge sense of complicity in the crime against humanity. This is because America's failure to intervene did not only help to advance the killings, but it also encouraged the interface of weak diplomacy over the reasons for the crisis and the factors that brought about the situations, and the result that largely accounted for the occurrence of the war/genocide in the period under investigation.

(iv) Role of Ethnic Group Diplomacy

With respect to the reasons that led to the escalation of the Rwandan war/genocide in 1994, the people of Rwanda, especially the Hutu-led government, the internal opposition RPF, and the external forces all had a hand in the failure of diplomacy in Rwanda. With particular reference to the Arusha Peace Accord and the Arusha Ceasefire Agreement Talk, the several ploys to hinder its existence and implementation and the manner in which the parties allowed their personal, and or group interests to override the essence of the agreements in Tanzania might have contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The kind of diplomacy displayed by the two Hutu-led governments prior to 1994 was adjudged different, demeaning, and probably not people – oriented, compared to the openness in the Tutsi oligarchy before then. The introduction of deep-seated ethnicisation in governance was extended and explored to its fullness with the use of scapegoating as a measure of checkmating the enemies and their sympathisers alike, which also informed the kind of government that was in place. This antagonism might have also allowed for the employment of overzealous tendencies towards the internal struggle that was seen as a genuine cause amongst the parties. Thus, these available options ensured total uncontrollable situations, which each party had suspiciously seen in the other as a great ploy in the failure of the Arusha Peace Accord and thereafter.

THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD AND ARUSHA CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT TALK   DIPLOMACY

Against the background of existing crisis, rebellion and diplomatic intrigues that characterised the Rwandan conflict, beginning from 1959 to the 1990s, the deal for peace talk towards ending the crisis started in July 1992 at Arusha, Tanzania. However, apart from the warring factions, which comprised the Rwandan Hutu-led government, the internal political opposition parties, and the main opposition – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), there were others who observed the act under the third party status. These countries are Senegal, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, America, France and Belgium, with the likes of Canada, Netherland and European Union only monitoring the events.

According to Melvern (2000:54-58), Mamdani (2001:210-215), Anyidoho (1998:3-5) Adelman (1999:118-122), it took 13 months of dialogue to reach an agreement in signing the peace agreement due to differences and deliberate delay by the concerned parties, a deliberate intrigue that did not only hamper the peace process, but also seen as one of the barriers in the hope for peace in Rwanda. Following the ceasefire which was accepted by the parties, the proper negotiation towards peace was reached on 4th August, 1993. This agreement, otherwise called the "Arusha Peace Accord", includes:

i.   There shall be power sharing within the framework of a broad-based Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) whose modalities for the formation include:

      a.   Presidency

      b.   Cabinet – RPF to have 5 out of 21 ministers

      c.   Transitional Assembly – RPF to have 11 to 70 parliamentarians

      d.   Judiciary

ii.   There shall be the setting up of a Transitional Institution.

iii.   Commitment of the parties to provide adequate security and protection to displaced persons, which also included the deployment of RPF Battalion to protect RPF political leaders; and the integration of the Gendarmere into the National Defence Force.

iv.   Disengagement, disarmament, demobilisation and re-training of military personnel and the re-integration into the army of the RPF soldiers to include 40% of the army, and 50% of the officers' corps. Therefore, with this arrangement, the RPF was expected to control the army while the Rwanda Hutu-led government and other parties were to provide and control other ministries. In addition,

i.   There shall be a programme to protect the expatriates

ii.   There shall be repatriation of refugees and settlement of displaced persons.

iii.   There shall be assistance in ensuring a secure atmosphere for elections towards democraticrule.

iv.   There shall be commitment of the parties to a negotiated settlement within the framework of the Arusha peace process.

v.   There shall be consolidation of the cease-fire agreement on the basis of the N'sele cease-fire agreement.

vi.   There shall be withdrawal of foreign troops and their replacement by a Neutral International Force organized under the auspices of the OAU now (AU).

vii.   There shall be cessation of Negative Radio and Newspaper Campaign against each other.

viii.   There shall be the holding of a joint meeting on the buffer zone between the parties under the Neutral Military Monitoring Group (NMOG).

With the signing of the Peace Accord by the parties to the crisis, and in line with the principles stated above and as agreed upon, several factors, however, were seen to have been partly responsible for the undoing of the ''Agreed Documents''. These includes;

a.   The delay in establishing the TGNU, thereby resulting in insecurity and upsurge in violence.

b.   There was the inability of the political leaders to reach an agreement on representatives in the interim institution, which continually installed the peace process and, at the same time, allowed the political and security situation to deteriorate steadily with the assassination of political leaders.

c.   There was a parallel diplomatic initiative being pursued by the international community on one hand, and the regional body on the other, which eventually posed danger to the peace deal.

d.   The power sharing agreement excluded the CDR extremists from taking any seat in the parliament, thereby implying that there might have been reasons to agree with the fact that the document was signed stillborn.

e.   The provision that recognized the rights of the returning refugees was negated, thereby precipitating restiveness and insecurity.

f.   The failure of the first and second coalition governments following the Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyarnye's open criticism of the President accused of being resistant to settlement was also another problem that delayed the take-off of the TGNU. Added to this was the President's reaction to the criticism as he outrightly dismissed Dismas Nsengiyarnye and appointed Agatha Uwilingiyimana as Prime Minister. The appointment, however, created two factions in the Movement for Democratic Revolution (MDR). The two factions, one of which supported Hutu power – called the "Power" and the other, which sympathised with RPF called the "Moderate", helped to endanger the tenets of the Arusha Peace Accord.

Furthermore, with the latest facts acting as a ploy against the need for peace in Rwanda, the Hutu leadership and their media arguably convinced the populace that the opposition had, in fact, sold out the nation to RPF. They further noted, according to Mamdani (2001:212), that the RPF had won at the conference table what it had yet to win on the battlefield. These arguments also implied that all the gains of the Hutu Revolution of 1959, particularly the returning of land to the tillers and powers to the Hutus, were now in imminent danger. The Hutus' stand also went a long way in agreeing with the early assertion of Longman (1993:35) who argued that the Arusha Peace Talk was doomed from the outset because the opposition parties sympathized with the RPF, a situation that was later discredited by a large portion of the population.

However, another argument that tends to disagree with the aforementioned is that of those who saw the scenario as a calculated ploy by the extremists to see to the failure of the Arusha Peace Accord. As the then OAU scribe noted, the RPF invasion was not an act of aggression by a neighbouring state as RGF argued, but an attempt by the children of the exiled refugees trying to return home; that the internal opposition was supporting RPF because the people wanted peace and saw to it that all that was agreed upon at Arusha was as fair as possible to all concerned. To drive this point home, Gillet (1997:193) noted that all that could be done was done at Arusha. The trouble stemmed not from the accord itself but from the fact that Habyarimana and his allies did not want it to work and did everything possible to prevent a successful implementation of the agreement.

Another noticeable fact is that which informed the notion of how someone who was capable of encouraging crisis could suddenly turn a democrat. Hence, against the President's plan, the extremists' plan and the steadfastness of the OAU and other members party to the Peace Accord, a meeting to assess the situation in both Burundi and Rwanda, towards resolving the crisis was summoned by Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda in April 1994. On returning to their countries, the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents met their deaths, thereby unfolding the end and collapse of the Arusha Peace Accord leading to a total war/genocide between the Rwanda Government Force (RGF)/Interahamwe/Gendermare on one hand and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) on the other.

On the Arusha Ceasefire Agreement talk, which did not yield any result, the RGF's demand that the RPF which was already winning the battle should be made to return to its former position was seen as uncalled for by both the OAU/AU group and SRSG of the UNAMIR.These positions made none of the groups in the conflict shift grounds which would have allowed peace to return to Rwanda. Although the RPF representatives had earlier on refused to recognize the RGF delegates at the resumption of the talk, they were prevailed upon to accept their presence. It is, however, this kind of foot dragging and delay tactics diplomacy by each group that substantially helped to encourage the war/genocide to extend beyond one hundred days.

(vi) Ethnic Group Interest

The common complaint among the indigenes over the abandonment of Rwanda may have stemmed from the kind of relationship maintained by the people among themselves, neighbours and the outside world, which might also have explained the reasons why most African states kept off in the period of the conflict. An issue that was greatly encouraged by the leadership style under Habyarimana, who shut its door to the continental issues, except those of Congo, Burundi and Egypt that were in support of its policies probably formed the trajectory of the manner of abandonment accorded it in the period of the crisis. This action also seemed to have been supported by the then OAU's charter principle of non-interference. Moreover, there was the probability that the hostile nature of the people in treating cases concerning foreigners/neighbours might have made it impossible for foreign journalists to stay behind and report the true situation of things in the country during the crisis. The Rwandan crisis also exposed to

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many African states how foreign game plans, mostly political interest, could divide a society. This was seen in the manner many states felt with the role of the French which they saw as all-in-all against their independent affairs and aspirations.

The most terrible thing about the implications of failed diplomacy in Rwanda is that disunity and factionalization of the political system, as earlier noted, might have played a decisive role against the common cause. The common complaint among the indigenes was that when one is abandoned to one's own fate with no hope of survival and nowhere to turn to, but allowed to face a situation where everybody is suspicious of others, it then becomes the worst kind of life. This is because, according to Alex (2005), it is terrible for one to continue to hide or run away from one's country in the name of nothing, or belief in a particular senseless cause that was all self – imposed – a suffering that might know no end.

Another point is the general implication that modulated failed diplomacy in Rwanda. This point centred on the policy attitude and level of awareness, coupled with the compulsive avenue for decay. Past negative reports, as observed among the people, might have equally modulated the event of 1994. This derives from the fact that most of Rwanda's neighbours, except those that benefitted from its problems, saw Rwanda as a war – monger and hindered a crisis prone dependent state, and would not want to associate themselves with her problems.

The above identified avenue for decay, occasioned by over – dependence on foreign powers, especially in terms of financial aids, had helped to hinder Rwandans' effort at developing themselves. This also probably made the people become short-sighted and slow in developmental efforts. Added to all these were economically modulated depression, political instability, general failure, disappointment, and even the refusal of the benefactor or mentor to help when it mattered most. Lack of assertiveness among the people placed the country in the hands of foreign powers like a beggar or slave willing to do his master's bidding. This helplessness was noticed in Rwanda when all the aids given to it were frozen by the donor nations at the peak of the crisis in 1993/94, the fallout of which – the stress, the hardship and pains – catalysed the war/genocide.

In justifying the fact that failed diplomacy in Rwanda was also noticed among the people and in their ways of life it can be said that failed diplomacy was a

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contributory factor that enhanced and encouraged the 1994 crisis. This is noted in the degree of states involvement, roles of the actors and the parts played by the indigenous elites in the period under investigation. It is also easy to decipher the validity and stand of our hypothesis, as stated above to be a tripartite cause of events between the UN, the allies and the indigenous actors. This validation implies that there might be truly a failed diplomacy in Rwanda. Following this is the resultant enormity of killings and maimings in the war days. This was not only considered in the analysis, consequent upon the historical antecedents and struggles for power and survival in the state in question, but also in outlining the different stages it passed through in attaining nationhood, consolidating the value of sovereignty, development and the quest for stability that turned out to negate every hope and aspiration of the people. This led to the unabated killings in 1994. It is evident in this respect of inference to draw an acceptable fact that the role of international diplomacy, as exemplified in all the cited instances, did much to disfavour Rwanda in every angle. The leaders' inability to encourage any improved system or development of the polity might have resulted in the unabated crisis. The failed diplomacy probably encouraged more losses, compared to the gains, if there was any substantial progress made in the period under consideration.

Moreover, diplomatic intrigues were seen having substantial grip on Rwanda, even up to the period of its collapse, probably due to the manner Habyarimana in his final days in office ran the affairs of the country. The interplay of power within and outside the state might have increased the level of contradictions and conflicts amongst the political elite, actors and the common people, thereby, confirming the basis and value of our hypothesis to its logical conclusion.

5:3. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND DIPLOMACY IN THE RWANDAN CRISIS

Evidence abounds that over one million two hundred and fifty thousand people were killed within one hundred days in Rwanda under the watchful eyes of the UN peacekeepers (UNAMIR) in the 1994 war/genocide and nothing was done. Also, the civil society, which was the vulnerable group, was the major victim of this high death toll, despite the call for help. The record available shows that many died in agony and pain that lasted for days, weeks, and months.Yet, there wasno help or

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response from either neighbours or the international community until many had been lowered in a shallow grave or washed away by flowing rivers to unknown destinations. The Jenoside Magazine (2004:8) in its report reveals that Rwanda witnessed a kind of severe human and material destruction that had placed her at an epic center in the history of African conflicts.

The research investigation revealed that there was absence of armed intervention, humanitarian intervention and inaction in the one hundred days of war/genocide in Rwanda. This total neglect and wanton destructions were emerging from Africa at a period when others were busy settling down to rebuild their nations after the end of the Cold War. This emerging incident was not only disheartening, but it also acted as a leverage to arouse the lingering question: why was the process of intervention, whether armed or otherwise not initiated with the required tact and urgency in the Rwandan situation in the period. Records available identifiy gradual development of the existing failure's weaknesses and abandonment of the people in conflict zones as being part of the enormous crisis of the period. Anotheris the factor that had played an ignoble role in escalating the magnitude of conflicts that trailed the 1990s up to the beginning of the new millennium as found in the unused weaponry of the demised Cold War, which was shifted to the African soil. Then, such questions as: Are there ethics in humanitarian intervention in conflicts, particularly when it concerns African states? Why was the African continent a dumping ground for all manner of intervention without the Rwandan crisis being put under control? Why had many nations, international agencies and groups alike played down the spate of killings in Rwanda without intervening? Did the people commit any particular sin that should warrant their total extermination before the intervention mechanism of the UN was applied? And why had the local (OAU/AU) groups, among others, failed to employ workable mechanisms to stop the continual killings? Did untimely intervention by states mean that they had something to achieve or gain from the ongoing conflicts? Or, could it be said that it was because the warring groups or states in particular had no oil well, no diamond, no gold and no uranium, and were therefore left to die in that manner? Where were the UN intervention mechanism and principles? Or, were they needless and time wasting in making peace on African soil? Or, was inaction a deliberate ploy to tell the Africans to reduce their staggering population? Finally, does this same measure of inaction apply globally in other conflicts or wars?

Although analysts may be divided in their view in this regard, just as different opinions on why the situations in treating conflicts in Africa and Rwanda in particular were different, the view held on ethics of humanitarian intervention, which sets out to assert reasons whether there was a universally accepted set standard of intervention or not also made the matter in respect of Rwanda too complex. Groom (2006:3), in advancing reasons on ethics of humanitarian intervention, noted that the Security Council of the United Nations has a provision in its principles on the need to intervene in a conflict or indisastrous situations to save lives. However, other continental bodies like OAU (AU) may not have entrenched same in their charters. As Coady (2004:5-14) had noted, an intentional act of one state or group of states or an international agency, among others, aimed at exercising overriding authority on what is normally the internal policies, or practices of another state or group of states that are detrimental to the peaceful existence of all within that state(s), whether the targeted state consents or not, ought to interven. In addition, there is the notion explains humanitarian action as an expression which refers to the primary motive to intervene and save lives that are in danger, be it those of indigenes or foreigners (HWR,1996:48). The primary motive, mostly moral, and backed by sympathy is made with reasons that constitute sufficient conditions for intervention, as noted by Griffithi-Fitton (2001:16). It was further observed that because it was the principle of considering the welfare and happiness of those in the conflict zone before one's own that informed the cause for action. Aligning with Griffithi-Fitton's (2001) view, Havel (2001:31) opined that 'we live in a new world in which all of us must begin to bear responsibility for everything that occurs. The protection of endangered populations in situations of armed conflict, therefore, becomes the basic responsibility of every citizen of the world". Going by this contention the research wondered why the view and acceptance of the notion that humanitarian intervention should be understood to mean variety of actions was not considered in the Rwandan case. Since the essence was to protect civilian population from grave human rights violations, it would no longer be a form of forceful international military actions alone. It is also meant to save lives, provide food aids, shelter and health care to those rendered hopeless by the evil carnage. As an effective entry point to solving the noted problems created by situations of grave human sufferings, the course of action ought to be voluntary. Workers in this respect probably need to rely on the current crisis situation to sue for peace. The motivation behind their efforts should be the obligation to protect, help and assist vulnerable populations with

particular attention to those suffering from grave human rights violations; owing to significant or total breakdown of authority, or due to conflict.

Therefore, from states, groups and or agencies involved in conflict zones, what is expected is an admixture of ethics and courage, which enables the workers to endure the sufferings around them, dare the risk and contend with the constraints put on their work. A closer look at the international act of military and non-military interventions informs that what both actions were for which, in essence, was to save lives from the grave danger of death. Therefore, the manner of these interventions, the motives, the standards by which the acts were accepted as a necessary evil; if men, women and children in the conflict zone or state must live, have life, happiness and the joy of existence, becomes the work and efforts of the humans involved in bringing this hope and expectations into reality.

However, the concept of accepted standards as enunciated above, which is in itself 'ethics' of one doing what they must do aright, whether or not by the state, whether the act is tantamount to violating the principle of state sovereignty or not, but means well to save lives in danger of death or violations, seeks to explain the rationale for the expression: 'ethics of humanitarian intervention is a necessary evil'. This does not negotiate any continent or sub-regions of the spherical world where such must be allowed or accepted. Hence, if the sentiments above is anything to go by, if it is universally accepted and, if it exists to mean well to all, irrespective of race, colour, sex and creed, in so far as it exists today, then it would be logical and acceptable to querry the methods that were used in the Rwandan crisis of 1994.

When the views above are reconsidered in relation to the Rwandan crisis, a great deal of explanations may be required to convincingly drive home any contrary views or reactions held. Moreover, many questions as to why states like the US, France, Britain and the UN mild response to the Rwandan crisis continues to boggle the mind of many. Such mild response seems to explain the rationale behind the lost of several lives in the 1994 Rwandan war/genocide. This colossal loss of lives might equally be hinged on a case of total abandonment, neglect and complicity. The complicity, Melvern (2004:46) noted, was displayed in the systematic killing of over one million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the extremist Hutu nationalist government of the late Juvenal Habyarimana within one hundred days in the presence of the UN peacekeepers

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[UNAMIR] in Kigali. This complicity was further deepend by the Belgian troops whose presence in almost every part of the country could not stop the genocide. The presence of the French army in Kigali, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, in addition to Ghanaian and Kenyan contigents among others, was not equally ignored. Over there in the UN Security Council headquarters in New York, Nigeria and Rwanda were the only non-permanent members representing Africa. Nigeria, without any veto power, was voiceless in the hands of the masters of political gimmicks such as France, which might have supported the Hutus against the Tutsis in Rwanda because of its interest in the conflict. And, "France had convincingly misinformed theUN Security Council that it was an ethnic issue between Tutsis and Hutus; that there was a democratic government in place" (Melvern 2000:11).

This, in line with what Dallaire (2003:24) the then UNAMIR Force Commander saw and affirmed, was an act of betrayal, naiveté, racism and unacceptable international politics. Evident in this inaction was the manner the certified text message and radio message sent to New York (as shown in the appendix 2) were treated with extreme levity. The text informed that all was aware that there was an ongoing war in Rwanda and that what was needed was an urgent response that could onlystop the killings.But, there was no such instruction forthcoming. Instead, the UN Security Council went ahead to reduce the number of the UN peacekeepers from the strength of 2500 to 270 personnel, an error probably made out of misinformation or the noted complicity chain. The Belgian nationals who were targeted by the extremists in the process were some of the soldiers on a supposedly peace-keeping mission. In the process and, out of annoyance, Belgium, after losing ten of its soldiers, backed out and left, while France, committed to retaining the statusquo and seeing the whole situation as a free field to operate, as Power, (1996:31) noted, continued arming and helping in arresting the Tutsis and controlled checkpoints against the common enemies. That was the prevalent order of events in Rwanda. France was propelled by the desire to protect an ally government from the dreaded opposition: the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus. Besides, allowing the defeat of an ally might imply the forfeiture of its interest in the country.Thus, the need to prevent any growing opposition was cogent and seen as a duty owed to the ally.

On the other hand, the OAU that was never forthcoming was helpless in all respects, thereby caring less about the death of over one million (1,250,000) people

within one hundred days. Member states of OAU on their own were also divided, as usual, on what should be done, as interests of divergent forms overtook every necessary action. Egypt, Apartheid South Africa and Mobutu - Congo DR amongst others had earlier supplied weapons and troops to the government of Habyarimana, thus necessitating, not intervening in the use of arms at that particular point in time. Ghanaian troops, left alone in Kigali under the UNAMIR, were helpless while Nigeria was left to wallow in its self delusion at the UN Security Council headquarters in New York. Meanwhile, COMESA, a regional body, was in total disarray and confusion as to which of the warring parties to support. Indeed, Africa completely abandoned and betrayed Rwandans when it mattered most, as no member country was willing to associate with Rwanda.

In analysing the fallout of this critical period in the Rwandan crisis, it would be apt to concur with the notion that the Rwandan crisis wasof neglect, naivete, betrayal, racism, abandonment and complicity.

To worsen the whole situation, food aid, drug and health care were almost nonexistent. All the intervening agencies, in defiance of their responsibilities, deserted the country, leaving the people to their fate.This still explains the theory of complicity, inaction, abandonment, and neglect. Therefore, against the observed high level of complicity by the United Nations in the handling of the Rwandan crisis of 1994 war/genocide, one would talk of a deliberate plan hatched by the two groups (the UN/International and OAU/AU states). In connection with this, the research accede to the belief that what was earlier recognised as inaction was borne out of the fact that Rwanda lacked much sought after attractions as oil wells, diamond or any other mineral resources. This might have informed the failure and lack of prompt intervention by the international community, as its agencies and other humanitarian groups feared intervening while the war/genocide in Rwanda rages on.

Another factor relating to inaction and abandonment could be seen from the French context or claim of ethnic misunderstanding as the root cause of the Rwandan crisis between the Hutus and Tutsis. This might also have been the reason that ensured the need to ignore the early warning signals from Gen Romeo Dallaire of UNAMIR. Another observable phenomenon that helped in encouraging the total abandonment and neglect might beurithe dreaded extremists. From whatever angle one looks at the whole

issue, be it neglect, abandonment or complicity in the Rwandan crisis, the International Community, the UN, and the world at large should probably be held accountable for not living up to expectations. This is so, especially for a country that had all along lived with rebellion, political struggle and political instability. These failures, whose effect was already known in the Rwandan context, portrayed the kind of politics that international diplomacy imposed on the helpless and poor nation (small state diplomacy status) that contributes nothing or seen as a nominal member to the development of the United Nations.

5:4. DIPLOMACY AND JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE RWANDAN CRISIS

The Rwandan crisis was an age-long feud between the Hutus, Tutsis and the Moderate Hutus. The crisis for years had been centred on power and economy. The effect had been a systematic and consistent killings and dislocations that affected the general society. These issues, however, make this study inconclusive, even when it tries to go the extra mile in reflecting on many of the cases which it might not be able to attend to. The justice system (both international and municipal) in this respect, comes under focus. Itis perhaps argued that during the period of the crisis, many minorities and majority but moderate citizens were helplessly killed, wounded and traumatized. Manyorphans and children are now household heads and breadwinners. And the question: where is justice that is supposed to be the antidote for civility? Can there be true reconciliation and peace in Rwanda in the absence of this factor?

On the issue of peace and reconciliation, however, in 2004, Verhofstadt (2005) on behalf of his fellow countrymen and as the Prime Minister of Belgium in April 10, 2004, apologised to the whole world and the people of Rwanda in particular on the sordid role of his country in the crisis from 1923 to 1961.

What informed this apology might not have been unconnected to the kind of role the Belgian government played, a role that was seen as the root cause of the acrimony in Rwanda on one hand and the kind of international criticism and caricatures that the Belgian government was subjected to on its degrading diplomatic and political roles in Rwanda, on the other hand.

Therefore, Belgium's acceptance of its failed responsibility and over the role it played in the Rwanda crisis was to save its face. However, the acceptance of guilt on what it failed to do, did not project a new platform for everlasting peace and reconciliation for the Rwandan people. It is this need for complete reconciliation that

might have propelled Rwandan nationals, the international community and the United Nations to opt for International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Thus, in this assessment, it is evident that in 100 day of the war/genocide between 500,000 to 1,250, 000 men, women and children were killed, all probably being victims of atrocities premeditated and predetermined. There might also be evidence from this study that such killings had never taken place in Africa before. The killings were committed with weapons like machetes, planks of wood, spears, spikes, clubs and other household items. These were combined with the use of modern weapons of war like guns, machine guns, grenades and land mines to make the killings faster. This was also probably to prosecute those responsible for the killings of the ethnic Tutsis and Moderate Hutus in the one hundred days. The existence of ICTR and its take-off, though was shaky and political in rising up to the challenges of the time (1994 upward), the essence was to see justice done, not the miscarriage of justice. The impatience of Rwandans towards the delay in the operation of ICTR informed their establishment of the local justice system – the Gacaca traditional mode of conflict resolution. This was basically to speed up the process towards reconciliation.With the operations of these two separate bodies being in different locations, different pedigrees and modus operandi, many analysts like Nyankanzi (1998:18) Power (2003:28), and Melvern (2004:47) argued that it was only after successful processes that the idea of reconciliation might be assured. Through a true reconciliation, Rwanda might be projected to attain unhindered and uninterrupted stability. In line with the above reasoning, the research shall briefly examine some of the challenges and prospects of the ICTR and the Gacaca system.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR)

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established to prosecute those found culpable in the crime against humanity in the 1994 war/genocide in Rwanda. The reason for this was informed by the request made by the Rwandan Government (reference: S/1994/1115) to the United Nations Security Council under chapter vii of the charter of the UN. With reference to the above request, the UN on November 8, 1994 under Resolution 955, adopted the Statute for the ICTR to cover violations, killings and abuses committed against the aforementioned people in the territory of Rwanda between 01 January 1994 to 31 December 1994 to be seating at

Arusha, Tanzania. To arrest the attention of the people of the world and possibly appeal to their conscience, the ICTR statute went further to inform that:

> *It was better than nothing; sure, justice will not bring anyone*
> *back to life, no judgment will erase the sufferings endured by*
> *those who sought to flee, who were trapped, who could feel*
> *the heat of the tortures, who were some time their neighbours,*
> *who could read in their eyes that lust for death, who could*
> *know the panic of the*
> *uncertainty,of the fate in store for them before they were killed*
> *at best, and at worst raped, tortured, discriminated against, di*
> *smembered, suffocated, burned or buried alive.Can a judge*
> *remedy that in part,*
> *perhaps? No more. It is too late anyway. Too late for the dead,*
> *too late for their surviving loved ones, too late for the whole*
> *world, and it could scarcely be otherwise, since in a case like*
> *this justice can only be clumsy, impotent in the image of men.*

Thus, armed with over thirty articles and statutes, the ICTR was commissioned to commence work. Remarkable in the workings of the ICTR were the huge activities that it had to contend with. This was coupled by the fact that the justice system in Rwanda failed during the period of war/genocide simply because the organizers engineered a killing campaign noticeable not for its horror, but for the scale and speed of the slaughter. These actions were probably mobilized through three separate but connected hierarchies of the armed forces; the political class and the administrative groups (Wendt, 1995). It was the escalation and magnitude of killings that led to several arrests and detentions of those responsible for the massacres. In addition to this situation, the degree of humanitarian crisis that was so deteriorating was an added problem to the complex issues at hand. The situation of human rights in Rwanda, coupled with the conditions under which the prisoners were held, was deplorable. This was characterized by overcrowding, inhuman and degrading treatment whose catastrophy might be worse than the war itself. Against this background the ICTR was established to address all cases covering government officials, militarymen, paramilitary groups and prominent players in the crime as this same area is also the part forming the first category. However, the court did not take off as planned in 1994 due to certain problems, amongst which, according to Resolution 978 of 27 February 1995, was the Security Council recognizing lack of cooperation, political intrigues and undue hindrances. This was not resolved until it sued for cooperation among states and the International Tribunal for Rwanda. Among other things, the appeal was to help in

arresting and detaining persons found within their territory against which there was sufficient evidence of involvement in the crime.

Following this development, the cases in the first category were found to be over twenty thousand (20,000) of the one hundred and twenty thousand (120,000) or more suspects involved. Another delay noted up till the middle of 1995 was that the ICTR was still against the commencement of investigating a number of individuals and groups who were suspected of being principally responsible for the crime.

In view of this, the workings of ICTR gradually became slow, with probably several political hitches, as it announced in May 1996 the several arrests so far made. Amongst these were Georges Anderson, Nderubumwe Rutuganda, Jean-Paul Akayesu, Clement Kayishema, Theoneste Bagasora, Hassan Ngeze, Sylvain Nsabimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and General Augustine Bizimungu. This list, amongst others, contained the names of some of the principal actors.

Meanwhile, despite the several arrests made, the trial was once again faced with a number of interruptions and undue court processes like interlocutory injunctions and issues of jurisdiction. The French prosecutor was found in the mesh of these unnecessary interferences. This was premeditated to make the ICTR a mockery of the judiciary and judicial processes. Rwandans, on the other hand, mostly the citizens, individuals, government officials and some international agencies had consistently criticized the ICTR for being inactive and politicized.Fromyet another perspective, it was seen as another joker of the international community whose decisions seemed to be against the interest of the Rwandans. Some of such criticisms were noted by Chandarata (2005) and Kigeriamana (2005) of Rwandan citizen, based in Kenya, who, in their explanations, blamed the UN and the members of the ICTR for not being sincere in many of the cases, as the defense counsels and prosecuting counsels had used case adjournments to make a mess of the integrity of the court. Rwakantaga (1999:15) asserted that there were no differences in the role of the UN and its agencies and the commission in the period of the war/genocide and in the present period of the perpetrators' trials. This is simply because even when there were enough evidence to prosecute suspects like Theoneste Bagosora, the ICTR, Belgium and UN were scheming to cover Bagosora's crimes against humanity. This allegation also hinged on explaining why there had been protracted trial of the accused from 1995 to 2009. The

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jailing of the accused in February 2009 was probably pinned on all the parties being placed in a tight corner with further excuse other than to allow justice have its course. Col Theoneste Bagosora's appeal had over stayed and probably would have rendered moribound the ICTR interventions had he not been jailed for life in February 2009.

Chantal (2010), in referring to this, had opined that it is unspeakable and unbelievable for the ICTR to tell the world that since 1998, when the first accused person was convicted up till now – first decade of the new millennium ending - 2009 only 31 cases had been concluded. There was the need that the cases should be transferred to Gacaca court, he had suggested and insisted.

This probably informed the degree of trust and reliance that the people had towards the Gacaca court compared to the ICTR.This is in several ways connected to the unnecessary discrepances and inconsistences associated with the latter.

However, of all the thirty-seven cases treated by the ICTR as at March, 2009, thirty-one cases of convicted persons with their appeals over-ruled were recorded. Although many still see this record as having fallen short of the expectations of the ICTR, what probably informed the delay and the low turn-out of convictions might be what the research noticed as a major challenge to world justice system. Despite the record of convictions as stated above, a notable challenge confronting the ICTR was that many of those listed in the wanted list were still hiding in countries such as Kenya, Belgium, France, Canada, Congo DR, Gabon, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Switzerland. Thus, with the reactions and counter-reactions on the workings of ICTR, Muna (2005) argued that they were actually slow with reasons. The ICTR was also seen as not only working against miscarriage of justice, but it had also been bedeviled by several anomalies and hardships. This was not created by the court itself, but it had existed to threaten the efficiency of the court in discharging its functions. Among these hardships was the issue of funding. Only the UN, out of scarcity, volunteered to fund the ICTR. That the over interference of the French international influence and diplomacy threatened the very existence of the court had become a great source of worry. Moreover, the international composition of the court, which only cut across Belgium, France, Britain, Canada, Netherland, stands to show the degree of marginalisation of African and continental interest in cases within its domain.The non-involvement of AU did not only portend danger for the African justice

system, but also formed one of the factors for the adoption of Gacaca judicial system in Rwanda.

Significantly, following all these is the controversy relating to the small nature of the ICTR staff strength as against numerous cases available for trial. Another complexity is the idea of ICTR sharing one chief prosecutor with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Balkan. This condition did not only compound the operation of ICTR, it also showed that there was no trust in appointing an African to handle the case;leaving one prosecutor to double for ICTR and ICTY. It was these contradictions and controversy that Forges (1998:139-182) observed as the protracted criticism and the antagonistic behaviour of the international media to the delay and the unforthcoming efforts of effecting the commencement of the trials because it was some sort of conspiracy, and that the UN set up the tribunal only salve its conscience and as a bargaining chip in the peace process.

Despite the noticeable challenges, the ICTR was noted to have maintained high profile integrity. Despite all impediments, the ICTR, while dissuading any form of miscarriage of justice, also effectively convicted over thirty-seven persons. It had continually sought its mandate and tenure extension to enable it to perform more creditably in seeing justice done in Rwanda.Itwas however, these defects, delays and controversies that led to the adoption of the native mode of justice system called the Gacaca. The prospects of the ICTR, apart from its procastination, therefore imply that despite the little achievement, the ICTR is determined to convict more offenders if the unnecessary interferences and shortage of funds are given due consideration by the United Nations. Such an action will not only promote its efforts, but might also give it the needed leverage to work efficiently and effectively.

(b)   Gacaca Justice System in Rwanda

Owing to the uprooted justice system in Rwanda during the period of the crisis, a traditional mode of justice system called "Gacaca" was introduced. Introduced by the government of National Unity to eradicate the culture of impunity, the Gacaca court, apart from involving in conflict resolution, was instituted on two important principles: One, to accounting for the specific aspects of the problem, that is, the categorization of penalties and infringements; being the procedure of guilty – plea. The second is on

punishing the guilty on the particular offence and also to speed up the justice system that had been delayed since the existence of ICTR.

However, against what the research considers contradictory and confusing about the establishment of Gacaca and its judicial procedure, the view on whether the people never trusted the establishment and working of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or what must have informed the establishment of traditional legal mode of justice. To unravel this mystery, the research revealed that the formation of Gacaca court was prompted by the impatience of the people, which was due to persistent procastination on the part of ICTR to take-off. In buttressing the foregoing, Mucyo (2000) aptly noted that the ICTR and Gacaca existed side by side but on different line of action (ase treatments), as there were categories of cases to be handled. Under the classifications, the first category of case was labelled ICTR case files as it affected highly placed government officials alleged to have encouraged the crisis, while the cases in groups 2, 3 and 4 were termed "the persons manipulated to commit crime" and were handled by the Gacaca system (Gacaca Manual, 2000).

Gacaca was an organic law of native Rwanda. It is unique in implementation and treatment of cases such as mystery complaints, disputes, and thefts among individuals and groups. It was invented by the early rulers of Rwanda under the Tutsi – oligarchy down to the period of the German occupation. It worked effectively but was criticised as crude and an uncivilised way of delivering justice. Such criticism resulted in its replacement with the modern judicial system. As a judicial system, Gacaca was last practiced in the late 19th century. Unlike today, where it is about murder, rape, arson and large-scale criminal activities, Gacaca of pre-1994 genocide was primarily concerned with settling disputes between cow owners and vegetable growers. Therefore, on its re-introduction, Turner (2005) wondered whether the Gacaca legal system will be able to handle the complex cases of Modern Rwanda with its multi-faceted crisis.

Resulting from several criticisms which informed the modification of the Gacaca legal system, the conduct was also redefinedto be a participatory judicial process. It provides a situation whereby the populace is given the chance to speak against those who committed crimes or atrocities against them or their relatives, so that the judge will punish the culprits. The author will confess and plead guilty after a witness has

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identified the (culprit) as having committed the offence. The victim is encouraged to forgive the culprit whom the government will in turn punish as laid down in the principles establishing the new system. These cases are treated in cells, sectors, districts and provinces and it is quite different from the state judicial system. On the composition of the Gacaca system, neighbourhoods are empowered to elect men and women of highly proven integrity as members. (Gacaca Manual, 2000:3).

However, apart from the reasons mentioned above, several reasons abound for the re-enactment of Gacaca in the present period. These, as noted in the period under study, were largely due to the use of sectarianism and ethnic segregation in governance in the 20th century. This act of top-down violence system as have been witnessed in the four decades of Hutu extremist regime also greatly informed the reason for Gacaca enactment. It was these killings, as earlier stated, that probably led to the complete uprooting of the justice system, especially during the 1994 war/genocide. It was with a view to bringing the people who committed these heinous crimes to justice that the Gacaca system was adopted.

Apart from the lapses of the ICTR noted earlier, another reason that might have brought about the idea of Gacaca was the large number of files related to the war/genocide, which the regular courts could not cope with (Mucyo, 2000:14-16). According to Walker (2005), the essence of the Gacaca Court did not only aim at punishing of infringements, but it was also for the purpose of re-establishing unity and social harmony. It was also meant to make ordinary citizens who had been manipulated to participate in the perpetration of crimes to return to a good way of life.Added to this is, perhaps what was identified as the main objectives of Gacaca, "to reveal the truth about what has happened; to speed up the judicial trials against the long delay, both by the uprooted justice system and the ICTR defects; and also to reinforce their unity (Mucyo, 2000:16). But the validity the justice system tend to project remains relative, as it is not all the citizens that approved of the system. Although when the initiators claimed that it was meant to uplift, act as relief and solve the problem of prison congestion and justice delay, the questions yet unanswered, despite the claim of quick justice delivery, are the issues, of validity, integrity and neutrality of the members who decide the fate of the accused.

On the socio-political context of Gacaca, Kimonyo (2000:1-2) argued that although the killings were organised extensively on two bases: the number of victims and the number of perpetrators, the different stages have shown evidence of its perpetrators and have done everything to involve a maximum number of citizens in order to show the world that everyone was guilty.Therefore, no one was innocent. Meanwhile, in the view of Minijust (2004:19) it is obvious that there was massive participation because the revelation from the over 120,000 presumed killers in prison was that it was usually when a prisoner confessed his guilt that he will also implicate several others; some of whom were already in prison or still at large. This buttresses the fact that the system was meant to reveal the truth about what happened and who did what. The system may equally be a projector to unity mostly because of its reconciliatory role.But the kind of relationship that will exist in the future between the relatives of victims and the freed perpetrators remainsunpredictable.

The Gacaca court was scheduled to operate between October 1, 1994 and December 1, 1994 (Gacaca Manual, 2000:21). The members of the assembly agreed upon the sitting of the Gacaca Court. This flexibility was aimed at ensuring that each member of the population adopt the timing of the court to his/her daily activities. In this regard, the research noted that Wednesday of every week was generally agreed upon in Rwanda as Gacaca Court day. The General Assembly on its own part meets at least once a month to evaluate the activities of the Gacaca Courts.

Apart from the first category of offences, the cases in categories 2, 3, and 4 were left for the Gacaca court while category one belonged to ICTR. The sentences ranged from deaths, 25years to life imprisonment if the accused did not want to plead guilty; 12 to 15 years imprisonment if they refuse to plead guilty until obvious evidence was brought against them during trial; 7 to 12 years imprisonment if the accused pleaded guilty well before the Gacaca Court of the cellule presented a list of perpetrators to the genocide. One peculiar thing about the third category is that owing to the nature of their offence, the sentences were always increased from 5 to 7 years, 3 to 5 years and from one to three years respectively if the accused was found guilty of the crime. The last category, which involved children between the ages of 7 to 14 years and 14 to 18 years, and who were seen as having been induced or drugged into committing genocide, were remanded in a rehabilitation home until they are of age to serve their sentences, which were almost the same with the third category above.

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Another inference about the uniqueness of Gacaca was that under the sentences and punishment status, the law prescribed a commutation of half of the sentence to work of public interest for the suspects who would have confessed and would have been sentenced to imprisonment (Gacaca Manual, 2000:120-132). This means that the prisoner would be freed after having served half of its sentence, while the remaining period would be used for works of public interest. However, the prisoner could make the choice either to do the said work or to serve his entire prison sentence.

The tenets of the Gacaca operational system were, nevertheless replete with several criticisms against its existence and modalities. This tended to authenticate the value basis of the system and to know whether or not it was meant to relieve the people who have been sentenced to years of imprisonment. There was also the need to see whether it was a total complication of the legal system, as the system appears meant solely to confuse the society.Inspite of the limitation of the Gacaca, it was still considered a workable tool in quick justice delievery. Thus, one may be compelled to say that whatever that might have formed the complication as mentioned above does not affect the efficient working of the system. Hence, the government, deeming it necessary to set up the Gacaca court owing to the enormity of the crime against over one million people in one hundred days, may be seen as having done something beneficial and profound in hastening quick justice delievery at the end, as it will promote homogeneity of the state of Rwanda in the long run.

On the issue of validity and integrity, some of the questions are: does the Gacaca mode of conflict resolution have any abysmal implications? How does the reconciliatory project of the government vis-à-vis the use of traditional mode of conflict resolution (the Gacaca system) faring in uniting the society? Buggingo (2005), in responding to these questions, asserted that Gacaca made everyone talk and find the truth. There are evidences to prove, and confessions to make on crime committed. Now, it is not the issue of anticipation but that of hearing the truth had been heard. There is no other way to such than to forgive, even when one is traumatized. So, Gacaca is a good symbol of peace. Mbonyinkebe (2005), in another view, asserts that Gacaca is potentially very important. It is important in many areas. One of the crusades is not that justice has to be done but have to be seen to be done. Gacaca is very visible.

Yet, Turner (2005), while being critical of the system, noted that Gacaca was good, but faults an aspect of the sentence (the lesser jail terms). This is because it will allow those who have finished serving their terms to quickly return to the street, thereby creating the idea that was mentioned as feeling of revenge. Although if forgiveness is from the depth of the heart, it is possible to be forgotten because true forgiveness goes beyond remembering vengeance and the issue of traumatization.

The discussants, in their view, were probably divided on the duration, both in the short term and longterm existence of Gacaca. In the argument that followed, 78.6% of discussants asserted that Gacaca acted as a relief to the victims, the traumatized and the deprived in the society in general. This is simply because it helps in getting rid of the perpetrators and off the street and society, as well as the anger that such might cause whenever they are seen around the neighbourhood. The remaining 21.4%, however, argued that Gacaca is out of fashion and might end up contradicting the ethics of modern judicial system, which may possibly complicate the national legal system and its tenet. The two arguments, while expressing facts from separate angles, might equally accept the reason that what Rwanda needs now is peace and stability, and not differences.

Against other responses which favoured the existence and working of the Gacaca system, was the warning that care must be taken to avoid it being hijacked by the political class. The general fear was that the political class will employ it for political scapegoating or vendetta was, however, not ruled out.But, away from these points, the research observed that the Gacaca system worked faster than the normal judicial processes. And this probably informed the level of acceptance on its manner of activities and findings of solution to all cases.Some of the injured persons had since accepted it, especially in addressing the course of justice in the land.

In view of the above analysis on the workings and existence of Gacaca, the probability level shows that over 85% of the Rwandan population are in support of the Gacaca activities. This is mostly in the area of speeding up justice by exposing the truth and trying to reconcile the people. It is this degree of success of the programme that could equally help in bridging the long years and gulf created by this uprooted justice system.

The import of this assertion is that while a true reconciliation may probably further the promotion of the unity of the country, the denial and derailment of the expectations from the judicial processes might not only portend danger for the future generations of Rwanda, but may aggravate the already existing problems, an implication that encouraged intra political struggle.

Thus, the people's commitmentto the participatory and innovative legal system known as Gacaca, against all odds, may encourage the issue of reconciliation of the Rwandan citizen towards forming an enabling statute for a stronger and strengthened state unity. This is a hope hinged on the fact that this might be a process towards the birth of the new Rwanda envisaged by all.

5.5. SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY AND THE RWANDAN CRISIS

The fourth hypothesis, which states: *that the disparity in the treatment of small states in the international diplomacy might have provided the contour that led to the abandonment of Rwanda in the 1994 war/genocide,* is examined based on the situations of things in Rwanda in 1994. Rwandan crisis and its interrelationship with the outside world within the context of the international system was a huge challenge to the international community, the United Nations and Africa in particular.Sufficeto state that there were alarming intrigues that allowed the events to snowball into unmanageable crisis. The intrigues and challenges, which are located on whether to intervene or not to intervene, to taking actions to stop the carnage or not to take action could, however, be found specifically on the treatment of small states in the international politics and governance. These adduced reasons that followed are solved using the stated questions in tackling the issue raised in the guided hypothesis. Such questions are: what is considered as the negative treatment of small states in the international politics, Rwanda inclusive? In relation to the Rwanda situation in 1994, is Rwanda considered as being of less importance in the international politics vis-à-vis the kind of treatment meted out to it in the period of war/genocide? Comparatively, under small states diplomacy, can Rwanda, Israel and Kuwait be equated in any positions in the context of international politics, or is there any difference? Could there be an element of international conspiracy to the Rwandan crisis? And presently, with the assistance of foreign aids, direct foreign investments, trade liberalization, neo-

democracy among others being pumped into Rwanda, all meant towards opening up of Rwandan for development; could this be part of the western world, international community and others ploy to appease Rwandans for what they suffered during the long years of neglect and abandonment leading to the 1994 war/genocide?

However, going by the questions raised and the guiding hypothesis in this section as stated above, the study, which had earlier adopted conflict theory in all of its analysis, may throw up another theory to examine these issues: "the power framework", specifically in addressing this section while not negating the value and the interplay of the conflict theory within the context.

Power framework, which is the ability to make one do whatever the other wants, even when there are dislikes or likes, accepted or not accepted, might be considered as one of the tool in the treatment of small states in the international system, since power is an important variable in all political equations. Thus, Machiavelli (1532) and Hobbs (1662) conceived politics in terms of power. They further argued that power is the key value through which all other values could be obtained.

In furthering the notions of power, Dahl (1953) argued that power is the capacity to change the probability of outcomes; while in yet another contention, Deutsch (1964) asserts that power is the ability to make things happen that would otherwise not have happened otherwise. He further argued that just as money is the generalized medium of economic interchanges, so does power serve as the generalized medium of interchanges between a government and its people, state and state, and among actors in the international system. This, therefore, confirms the fact that power functions as the currency of politics, be it national or international engagement.

The implication is that the interplay of power and its ability was not ruled out in the Rwandan crisis. There was a strong indicationof the existence of power intrigues.The intrigues and functions of power as displayed by the actors made the conflict unique in the annal of African history. Just as Lawson (1972) observed that power is an effort used to control the acts of others. Power, therefore, in many respects is the central concept that controls relationship, both at national and at international borders among players. A notion that has made this sections a very important study. This is because of its unrelenting investigations and explanations of the above hypothesis, which revealed that the concept of power was imported into the

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Rwandantussle for political power, either directly or indirectly among the national and international actors. Therefore, conflict theory, which is the study's main analytical framework, may equally be one of the fallouts of the power struggle among international actors, state actors, group and individual actors in the Rwandan crisis.

On the consideration of the issue of small states' diplomacy and has already had argued by scholars in the review of the related literature above, it is important to state some of the elemental make-up of small states vis-à-vis their place in the international system. According to Dokubo (2011) small states emerged during the Westphalia treaty of 1648. This was the period when they projected some degree of collective voice or vote to balance the dominance of the then super powers. Thereafter, and at the inception of the United Nations, they targeted much of their diplomatic activities on the UN for a for one vote per sovereign state. This was the rule that was in operation then. The essence of this move, according to Henrikson (2006:8), was because the greatest chance of safety and survival for small states lies in law, in institutions and especially in diplomacy.

However, in determining the strength and capability of small states in the present world order, opinions are divided on what constitute a small state and fears are nursed even when all still agrees on the hiccups to small states diplomacy. Henrikson (2006), in this respect, argued that a small state is one that cannot protect itself by its own efforts. Small states require allies or are to be allies. They might end-up joining a coalition so that they can or hope to contribute to the counter balancing of a threatening great power or to secure their safety by jumping on the bandwagon of the threatening power. In the same vein, Richard (1999:10) asserts that small states diplomacy are particularly affected by developments which are determined beyond their border given the fact that diplomacy is the main vehicle by which small states are able to ensure that their goals are addressed in the global arena. This also means that small states have strong incentives to support international cooperation, which also help to strengthen and smoothen their recognition in the international system. Although the limited resources at their disposal cannot effectively aid their diplomacy, which poses unique challenges to them, but with the entreaty of cooperation entered into with strongactors such intentions might be made visible (Wikipedia, 2007:14).

To Williams (1970:23), small states are pawns. They are not the knights, the bishops or the rooks in the international chess – but merely the pawns, counting for only one point each. He went further to argue that although they have little inherent strength of their own, they can sometimes hold positional advantages. To confirm this observation, Corgan (2008:7) noted that though small states do express worries over the magnitude of task it faces in contending with issues, both domestic and foreign, the big states will not. But the main worry borders on not having enough diplomats to meet the required needs of the small state, like skilled diplomats in service, simply because there are no enough people to go around. This unfortunate situation simply shows that fortunately, too, there are enough examples to show that though small states certainly cannot have the impact that the great powers do, they can do more than merely survive. On the positional advantages, Richard (1999) reiterated that small states under the right circumstances can prevail against far larger powers and can even have palpable influence on the world stage. A case in point is the role of Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Switzerland, and Vatican in dealing with the big states like the United States, Britain, France, United Nations, European Union and others in global politics. Anderson (1993:76), relying on the peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Vienna convention of 1962 had shown a wellspring of current small states system to which small states can join bodies or alliance to pursue their goals in the international system. He argued further that these small states can comprehensively manage and maneuver to promote their interests within a framework established by and for larger powers. This means that Rwanda, though being an impoverished small state, possess such opportunity.

Premised on the brief analogy above about small states, especially on the positional advantages (strategic importance) in the international system in relationship with big actors; and the differences noted between each other (small state to small state) vis-à-vis their influence in the global politics, which also informed the intention and stands of this section. This study will want to use the outcome of the analysis to posit its own contribution to literature on the treatment of small states in the international system. This will also form a reference point with regard to the examination of the case of Rwandan crisis in the 1994 war/genocide. In doing this, the research hereby takes our minds back to the drawn questions above and the raised hypothesis while examining the issue from two perspectives of the position and importance of Rwanda to the international system; and the comparison of Rwanda and

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the rest (Israel and Kuwait) preferably in the context of international system with regard to differences.

i.   The Position and or Importance of Rwanda in the International System

Agreeing with Schultz et al (2005) and Rana (1999), small states are viable and active partners within the context of international community. This is because, for a small state to succeed well in diplomacy, it must completely be a sovereign entity, not merely in the sense of having legal independence and international recognition, but in the full sense of national self-possession. Of course, one wonders whether Rwanda, in this sense, has self-possession. Although Rwanda since 1962 is a sovereign and independent state, and a non-veto member of UN Security Council in 1994, has the status of small state. Then, if that be the issue, the question that readily strikes one is: why is the treatment of small states like Rwanda in 1994 done with such disparity, given its status? What could be the basis or is it on the common characteristic that small states are not much relevant in the international system? And, could it be due tothe trust and nature of their diplomacy which tends to put them at a higher premium on persuasion and consensus building in the actors trying to listen to them even when it is distinct from power play in the conduct of international relations?

According to Dokubo (2011), in international politics, with respect to Rwanda, the big states swallow small states and the small states in turn eat worms. This is because the small states cannot work miracles in the globalized world that is still dominated by great powers.Butthey can study what has worked in the current world order for fellow Lilliputians. Furthermore, international constraints, domestic politics and foreign policy create uneasy change in small states (Fredrick, 2010:13). Shultz (2005:43) had argued that smallstates are always at the receiving end of every event in the international system, whether positively or negatively motivated, and that small states lack developments that are determined beyond their borders, especially when such a state lacks cooperation and does not contribute to the advancement of the international system. Rwanda, in 1994, was found wanting in this regard.Upholding this view, Nani (2011), Agwu (2011) and Agbu (2011) argued that Rwanda was less important, insignificant and extremely poor. Nani (2011) went further to argue that the low position of Rwanda in international politics might have encouraged the international community and the United Nations to probably allow the event that took

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place to happen. Rwanda could equally be predestined to be used as a test case in terms of power, economic and political gains since it was one of the major crisis after the cold war. It might as well be an avenue for realignment and the strengthening of the new power bloc, while seeing others as fading or failures. Agwu (2011), in another contention, noted that Rwanda, from all sense of purpose, is not viable in the international system. In fact, most African states are not in any way significant in the world politics. In a more critical emphasis, he contended that under the United Nations Charter, it is the responsibility of the body to protect the weak (Rwanda) state as stated in the right to responsibility in international peace and security as found in Articles 39, 40 and 41, which specifically preempts aggressive measure to deter an aggressor and restore the status quo. The less importance of Rwanda, as in lacking any strategic importance and cooperation in international politics and governance, should not have been the focal issue, as the state demanded urgent attention. Butthe world sat back and watched the perpetration of the 1994 havoc. The UN failed and abandoned the people of Rwanda to confirm what Dallaire (2003) posited as the devil incarnating in form of human being who came down from hell to feast on innocent blood.

However, Agbu (2011), looking at the Rwandan predicament from the power theory, argued that although Rwanda was less important, with negative positional status, which placed it in negative disproportionate power configuration in the international system. The most saddening thing was its lack of command and any form of influence with the major powers in the world. Hence, the intrigues of inaction and abandonment it suffered in 1994 were not far fetched. The less importance of Rwanda existed and manifested in the sense that at the heat of the crisis no major power could speak-up for it, but instead abandoned it. He noted that lack of strong godfather, lack of geopolitical power configuration and the impoverished status are some of the undoings of Rwanda in the 1994 war/genocide.

Arguing from the angle of international diplomacy, Adeleke (2011) noted that it is true that diplomacy is the main vehicle through which small states like Rwanda can voiced its predicament in the global arena, but Rwanda's lack of the necessary natural supporters for international cooperation had helped to put it in a disadvantaged position. It deprived Rwanda of any form of aids or actions from the international community in the days of trouble. He further argued that even when the peacekeepers were there in Kigali, Rwanda was closed, lacking many forms of interaction and

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exchange with the outside world, the visitors inclusive. He agreed with Nani (2011) that there was international conspiracy among the UN, USA, Belgium, France and the rest of the international community over the issues in Rwanda. This is because even when the UN peacekeepers' strength was reduced from 2700 troops to 250 men and moved to Kenya, UN trucks, vehicles, equipment and communication gadgets were left behind only for the invading RPF to use same to overrun the country against the Rwandan Armed forces and the Hutu government. This implies that the international community wanted what took place to actually happen.

It could be surmarised that there is disparity in the treatment of small states like Rwanda in the international system, especially in the period of its crisis in 1994.It was noted that some of the negating factors which provided the contour to that kind of treatment were due to lack of relevance in the power configuration of states that are less important and who contribute minimally to the advancement of the international system. These shortcomings enumerated above acted as factors that hindered the international community to give Rwanda the much attention it needed during its 1994 crisis. Coupled with this is the fact that national interest is the totality of states' values, just as power is the means to national end (Morgenthau, 1964). It is absurd for any state to invest where its interest is not protected.Hence, going by the preceding analogy, the research hypothesis adduced above could be said to have merit.

ii.   Comparison of Rwanda and the Rest (Israel And Kuwait) In International System

Comparatively, in looking at the Rwandan crisis and other small states like Israel and Kuwait amongst many others, vis-à-vis the kind of negative attention given to it in the days of its crisis in 1994 and the kinds meted out to others like Israel in the middle East conflict and Kuwait in the days of its invasion in 1991, this study, which tends to state the difference, also link the events to the staggering evidences on the disparity in the treatment of small states in the international system.

a) **ISRAEL**

According to Agbu (2011), in the treatment of small states like Israel, Rwanda and Kuwait, based on their position, importance and influence in the global politics, the state of Israel is overwhelmly above all others. Israel, though a small state, has power and influence over many states. It is of strategic importance to the United States and its

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allies. The Jewish lobby which is a strong force of the Israel descent in New York had made the country to see itself as the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) in the world. The Israeli geopolitical position is not only a threat to the Arab world, but also of strategic importance to the United States' interest in the Middle East. With the United States standing in for Israel as surety the UN in most cases is compelled to give Israel soft landing in every conflict with its Middle East neighbours. Thus, expressly agreeing with Nani (2011) that in the international politics, it is not the size of a state that matters, but the state's capability and strength, which mostly lies in the economic strenght, natural resources, strategic importance, military might and technological know-how. In all these Israel is strategically placed at an advantage. In the same continuum, Dokubo (2011) explained that apart from Israel being the western world strategic interest in the Middle East, it has a developed educational system with a profound link to the world as well as highly skilled diplomats that are technically advanced and sound. It is a country that can feed its people, technologically developed and a force to reckon with in the international system. To Adeleke (2011), Israel possesses the quality that makes it to be taken seriously in every actions and situation. It is this strength that avails it the opportunities.Though a small state, it is able to prevail on superior powers outside its domain. A fact, according to Dokubo (2011), afforded Israel the leverage. Despite the holocaust of the Second World War, Israel made the world to feel the pulse of their presence when they defy the international system to fight for their independence in 1948. Agwu (2011), confirming the value placed on Israel by the international community, noted that it is because the country has a strong force to negotiate its way out of any problem. Israel, apart from being a strategic partner of the United States, cannot be commonly treated in the international system as Rwanda was treated in 1994.

b) **KUWAIT**

Kuwait is a small state and could be likened to what Corgan (2008:18-19) argued as being given occasional successes against the agendas of larger states. The concentration of wealthy resources in most critical arena, the ability to focus on key goals, better knowledge of the issues than larger powers and an exquisite sense of when to act has enhanced its influence. To support the above assertion, he further reiterated that on the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991, which was a clear violation of international norms, the open aggression, though was dealt with under the aegis of the

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UN by the coalitions, Kuwait's appeal for help was successful because of its strategic economic importance to the Western and European nations.

Agwu (2011) complement the above notion by contending that Kuwait, which is located at the international strategic importance of the U.S's policy in the Middle East, is a small state whose oil and wealth has provided a viable link to world economy and politics. It is true that small states have limited range, and can rarely enter into large, complicated and strategic international power play (Williams, 1970), but Kuwait, during its problems in 1991 was favoured and rallied round against Iraq invasion because of its economic importance to the international community.

Collaborating this view, Agbu (2011) argued that it was because Kuwait was a strong ally to the western world; hence, ignoring it at that period was like giving a strong economic bloc away to a new comer and an intruder. He submitted that Kuwait, located in the geopolitical configuration of America in the Middle East, cannot be abandoned. Thus,the quick intervention of the international community during its invasion in 1991. Dokubo (2011), also noted that Kuwait oil well and wealth, which was a threat to its neighbours, aggravated the problem then. But its good will saved it from the hands of the late dictator, Saddam Hussein. It is the goodwill it enjoyed from the West that spur the kind of intervention that saved it from the Iraqi invasion. For Nani (2011) and Adeleke (2011), Kuwait oil and wealth attracted the western interest. Thus, the manner in which it was treated in the international system which differ greatly from the treatment meted out to Rwanda and mostly many other African states in crises.

c) RWANDA

According to Schultz (2005), a small state that is highly dependent on development beyond its border hardly survives in a period of crisis. This is because such a state is highly vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate change and natural disasters and other   internal problems. Thus, a small state like Rwanda was easily consumed by its own internal/int ernationalized problems. Adding to this observation, Fredrick (2010:16) noted that the foreign policy of such a small state like Rwanda is seen as a response to the constraints and politics of international system which, at times, may abandon it as was in the case of Rwanda in 1994.

Although the contention seemed to be disputed about, owing to the fact that the importance of such a state domestic politics is expected to determine its foreign policy, he quickly added that Rwanda's domestic policy is a make-up of what was imported from outside its domain. The implication is that both domestic and foreign policy of a small state can lead to its neglect and abandonment when it is not friendly at all. Doesser (2008:14), from another angle, argued that the government of a democratic small state seems to pay relatively equal attention to international and domestic political consideration when making their foreign policies, but in the case of Rwanda, the Habyarimana regime with the pretension of his allies like France, Belgium, Egypt and South Africa never thought of her domestic policy when certain decisions were taken only to appease the allies at the detriment of the nationals.

In view of the fact that the Rwanda predicaments were compounded by the role of the allies who also failed to save it in the days of trouble, Agbu (2011) argued that Rwanda, unlike Israel and Kuwait, has nobody to speak for it. Furthermore, being a natural forest country of trees, wilflife and interlocked – hilly state, which the possibility of help was ruled out such might have informed the event of 1994. This is because the international community realized that it did not do what it ought to do, especially when the conflict was fresh. The UN, which saw what was happening, instead of sending a strong reinforcement, came and reduced its peacekeepers, thereby encouraging the escalation of the conflict.

Agwu (2011) in furthering his assertion, added that it is because Rwanda is not strategic to any power configuration. It is a small country with no oil well, no diamond and of no importance in the international system compared to Israel or Kuwait. This means that it is not the size of the country but its importance that determines the kind of relationship and treatment it receives at the international fora. This means that Rwanda's poverty of mineral resources and other kinds of attraction made the interest of the international community in it to be limited, even when it had to contend with war/genocide in 1994.

Inferring from the above contentions and in the examinations of the adduced hypothesis in this section, the study utilises conflict theory to explain the political dynamism that led to the war/genocide in the general analysis and its interpretations, and the employment or consideration of the element of power relations informs that

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Rwanda was negatively treated by the international community in 1994. Rwanda, a small state that was inexperienced was left to experience the momentum of international power struggle in the emerging new international system. The power play of the international community which failed to intervene in the Rwandan crisis with the engendered intrigues and element of international conspiracy between America, British and their allies on one hand, and the French, Belgian and their allies on the other side, also helped to display the factors that had rendered the French politics and interest in East Africa impotent and irrelevant to this day. The factors in its lapses also left the Hutu government to annihilate both the Tutsis and moderate Hutus alike at the peak of the crisis. In the context of position and relevance in the international system, Rwanda was found wanting and missing. This might be because Rwanda could not employ diplomacy that could have helped it build the global stability vital for its own existence. Its position and status could also not influence the global process, which could would have helped to engender peace during the protracted years of conflict leading to the war/genocide of 1994. Rwanda could not be heard in the global scene given its limited human and financial resources, which have equally conferred it with the status of Highly Indebted Country (HIPC) at the mercy of the world money bags and donors. Cooper (2010:24) note that its failure was because it failed to navigate the ever changing rules of the game in international politics and diplomacy very well. Consequently, as a small state, it must learn to navigate well, despite being termed vulnerable actors in the international system.

Deriving from the above analysis, Rwanda is not in any way comparable to Israel in international politics given that it lacks the capacity and not in any way strategic in the power configuration of the world. Apart from that, in East Africa, Rwanda is not in any way found on the strategic important ladder of favourite states of the region to the super powers like America and the rest. The international community, in returning to Rwanda after the war/genocide, despite the despicable treatment meted out to the country, Agwu (2011) argued might have been motivated by guilty conscience over their inaction, coupled with the fact that they were part to the humanitarian declaration of 'never again'. On whether Rwanda was treated with great disparity as a small state, it was very obvious and glaring. So, their return might be to atone for their role in neglecting and abandoning the people. Their presence might equally be to encourage a

new strategy for rebuilding the state under new peace mechanism in international politics and diplomacy.

In submission, this investigation which utilises the suggestions of the adduced hypothesis, unfurls that Rwanda was treated with great disparity and disdain, compared to the manner other states like Israel and Kuwait were treated in the international system. The research also discovers that another factor that helped to compound the Rwandan case was the degree of incapacitation, poverty and non-availability of natural resources in the country. Rwanda, being a small state with no strategic value, also helped to encourage the degree of abandonment in the period of its crisis. This investigation and revelations, however, form part of the study's contribution to knowledge.

The international community that breached the Westphalia treaty of 1648 and Vienna convention of 1962 on the treatment of small state like Rwanda despite its predicaments in terms of size, wealth and impoverishment violated the UN responsibility article 40 and 41and the CAP 7 of the Humanitarian Articles. The element of international conspiracy and betrayal of Rwanda was not only placed before the US and France squarely, but the abandonment also caused the death of over one million lives under one hundred days. This examination, which combined the evaluations of both positional advantage and comparison of small states in explaining the disparity in treatment, justified and validated our adduced hypothesis. Thus, with regard to Rwanda, the international community displayed a great disparity through maltreatment and subsequent abandonment. The degree of international diplomacy and its intrigues provided the contour that led to the war/genocide, and the abandonment of Rwanda in 1994 mainly because of its general economic weakness limited resources and lack of cooperation in the international system.

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CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6:0. INTRODUCTION

Chapter Six comprises the findings, conclusion and suggestions of thestudy. In the findings, the investigations and deductions make reference to our four guided hypotheses authenticate their justifications and validation in the work. The minor errors noted in the inquiry were also admitted as a work for future discourse on Rwandan politics and government. It informs that African states' experiences through crisis situations as recorded and unrecorded stands out as warnings to states where the same or similar plan and procedure, as occurred in Rwanda, may be currently taking place. The Sudan-Darfur crisis and the Zarki-Ibim and Odi massacres in Nigeria should not be ignored as these may repeat themselves in the near future, if not checked.

In concluding this research, interest is placed on the research findings, while also recapitulating with utmost brevity what the work had discussed and analyzed in the five preceding chapters. Concerns here are four-fold. One, bringing out the main thrust of the work.Two, summarising the salient elements of the research.Three, attempting a closer view of the problem thrown up by the research undertaken. Four, offering suggestions on how to solve these problems.

6:1. RESEARCH SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Firstly, there was a complete absence of preventive diplomacy in Rwanda from the period of the build-up of the crisis to the time of its escalation in 1994, thereby placing the lapses and failure of international diplomacy at on the doorsteps of the UN the international community, OAU/AU and the indigenous groups.

Secondly, Rwanda was treated as a small state that had no cooperation in the international relations among powerful nations. This prompted the reason for some to see the Rwandan crisis as a minor inter-ethnic quarrel that could be resolved between concerned groups (the Hutus and Tutsis) under French supervision.Furthermore, due to the fact that Rwanda is a small state that had no oil well or wealth of any significance it of no any strategic interest to the western world and the international community. It

was therefore treated with a great indifference which led to the escalation of and the grave abandonment of the Rwandan people in the period that the war/genocide lasted.

Also, it is the above assertion that the study noted as the very weak diplomatic involvement of global bodies such as the United Nations and its agencies, the former Organisation of African Unity (now AU) and the regional blocs in Africa. This is partly due to the changes entrenched in each of the body's charters with regards to conflict resolution mechanism, non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes. The failure of diplomacy in Rwanda was traced to the inability of these bodies, especially the UN and the defunct OAU in addressing the enormous problems of African crises. It is this shortcoming that encouraged the absence of humanitarian intervention in the Rwandan conflict. The negative impression expressed by the international community over African problems lasting up to the end of the conflict in Rwandamay have also clearly explained the reason for the failure of international diplomacy in the country. Although diplomatic involvement of states in the Rwandan conflicts, which was purely motivated by their individual national interests, did not only lay down the basis that encouraged the role of failed diplomacy in Rwanda, it alsocreated the complexity in the effort to solve the problems. This kind of weak diplomacy, coupled with diplomatic abandonment meted on Rwanda by the outside world, helped in prolonging the Rwandan crisis, leading to war/genocide in 1994. Thus, in the process, over one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed within one hundred days. This finding, as noted above, underlines the basis of our second and third hypotheses which depended on the fact that the role of national interests and the lapses inherent in the international diplomatic order of states largely accounted for the occurrence of the levels of intra – political struggles within Rwanda. This was also a clear indication that in the midst of weak diplomacy, conflicts of different kinds do take place.Worst still, the kind of interaction and intercourse exhibited by the UN and the former OAU during the crisis leaves a lot to be desired. This explains the reasons that encouraged the struggle for political survival in Rwanda between 1959 and 1994 amongst the ethnic groups/parties to the conflicts. The hypotheses were validated and justified.

In addition, the research discovered that the main causes of the crisis in Rwanda were the struggle for and control of state power and the national economy. This attitude, thus, helped to extend support for the idea held by those who desired that the state should be divided along ethnic lines in order that none will dominate the others.

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Moreover, at the African front and in the context of weak diplomacy, the research observed that there were several rebellions and rebel cases in Africa. This might have propped up the several rebel cases in Rwanda, leading to genocide in 1994. The Rwandan case, whose end product was the 1994 war/genocide against the ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus, exemplifies the problematic and destructive nature of political power division within the country's political system.

Furthermore, it was observed that there were new initiatives to deal with cases like the Rwandan crisis within the AU Charter. To this end, the new African Union Charter principle seeks immediate intervention and the establishment of a high command. The standby force of this command is to intervene in crises and with a unique role of collective security and sovereignty. With this in place, every African anywhere is assured of security and protection. If such mechanism were in existence before the Rwandan crisis, it wouldn't have happened in the first place. This is what the Burundi and the Sudan-Darfur crises are currently benefiting from the new initiative.

In addition to the third research objective, the New AU course of action had underlined the basis for treating the lapses that had led to the failure of diplomacy in Rwanda in 1994. Preoccupied with its full implementation in recent conflicts in Africa, the probability that the AU is on testrun mission in the states mentioned above shows a clear drive to achieve the objective of the innovation.

Besides, the study observed that there was in existence a deep-rooted ethnicization in practice in Rwanda, which probably stirred up the crisis. This was also noted to have existed in all facets of the society, thereby helping to propagate ethnic hatred and sow seeds of discord. It turned out a situation that showed a greater advantage over the conscience and sub-consciousness of the people as the resultant effect were disaffection, hatred, retaliation, unforgiveness and ethnic killings that followed the Hutus and Tutsis confrontations. On this premise, the first hypothesis was once again not only validated and justified, but also helped in evaluating the consequential propensity and damage that ethnicization of political power could probably cause to a people who ignorantly absorbed, imbibed and adapted any form of unhealthy and misunderstood ideology. The ugly demerits of indirect rule as imposed in Rwanda by the colonialists to exploit the land was wrongfully imitated by the

indigenous leaders, who its resistance encouraged to indulge in power struggle within the polity. The research also noted that Rwanda's over dependence on foreign ideologies might have helped to promoted unhealthy political system. It also established that diplomatic associations that are exploitative and interest-based could be highly destructive for a developing nation, as this probably dictated the pace of most of the events in Rwanda. The effect of this is that it might encourage all sorts of policies and advisory services that are not tailored towards the broad interest of the country. Rwanda experienced some of these under its former colonial masters who contributed to the trajectory of events.

Crime against humanity was committed against the Tutsis social group and the moderate Hutu. The patterns and spates of killings from 1959 to the 1994 'final solution' were probably serial and uniform. It might have been well planned and properly executed by the government in power and its agencies. There were probably criminal use of the instruments, equipment and machines purported to have been imported for national development. These include hoes, machetes, sickle, digger, spears, clubs, axe and electronic-media gadgets. They might have been later diverted for the execution of the war/genocide agenda. The study also noted that the Rwandan crisis was central to the crisis and politics of the Great Lake Region. This is because the level of consistency and spiraling effects of the crisis on the region, with great devastation, explains the degree of dislocations and displacement of the people. Thus, the volatile nature of this conflict, coupled with ethnic cleavages and frosty relationships had informed the rising effects of years of instability in the region. This is due largely to ethnic migration, displacement and assertive dominance of the Tutsi race that was effected since 1959. All these findings, combined with the four raised hypotheses of the study, showed the elemental nature of the effects on the negative platform of conflict, deep-seated ethnicization in the polity, and the failure of international diplomacy as witnessed in the Rwandan crisis in 1994.

The study also noted, with great disappointment the role of states in terms of diplomacy of misrepresentation of events by manipulating information to the outside world on certain issues that affected the people. The characterization of governance in Rwanda as democracy, which, in reality, was a dictatorial-tyranny and quasi military-aristocraticy denied the inhabitants, the observers and the democratic society the truth about the state of affairs in Rwanda. This is a fact that helped in the long run to deceive

the whole world into believing in the existence of democracy, while the major ethnic group that held power was killing the citizens. The French description of the system as a majority rule and a mere conflict might have also helped allies distract the attention of the world from Rwanda. It was this misconception that kept the outside world from knowing the true state of things in Rwanda and from intervening in the one hundred days of killings.

Apart from bad leadership and corruption, another political mishap indentified was the use of scapegoating to settle all political scores in African politics and government. This might have as well informed the reckless abandonmentthat characterised the dictatorial rulership under Kayibanda and Habyarimana in Rwanda. It was the effects of this system failure, underdevelopment and general backwardness that probably encouraged incessant rebellion and conflicts in Africa (Rwanda inclusive). This lack of opening up in Rwanda, lack of awareness and not being in tune with reality combined with ignorance to modulate many of the events in Rwanda.

Furthermore, the research found out that the people had realized their mistakes and were trying to embrace reality. There is includes the spirit of oneness, non-ethnicity and Rwandan nationalism. This has helped to lay to rest the aged–long animosity, superiority and inferiority complexes, majority - minority questions and the rich ethnic – poor ethnic group contentions amongst the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas. This was a new development which inspired the government and the people agreed to change from dependency status to self-reliant nation.

Moreover, the study also observed that the people of Rwanda were impatient to see ICTR work efficiently, hence, the interference and the crave for a complementary body. The workings of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) that were still ongoing in the prosecution of the perpetrators of the crime against humanity were rather very slow. This also caused several delays in treating the numerous cases before the courts. The research is of the view that the prolongation of cases was not good for the reconciliation process. Even while the ICTR is also working against miscarriage of justice, it could speed up the process of peace if more attention and fund are provided to the judicial system. The research noted that it was because of such delay that Rwanda expressed its displeasure with the manner ICTR conducted its judicial procedures. The situation that led to the establishment of the Gacaca traditional mode

of justice system in 1996 was meant to speed up the judicial system, reveal the truth, eradicate the culture of impunity, reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity.

Finally, the other African countries where ethnic hatred/cleansing and genocide/war are gestating might learn a relevant lesson from the Rwandan crisis, that is, to have a change of mind about ethnic animosity. The Rwandan crisis, by all possible evaluation, had also shown that it is only Africans who can solve their own problems. It is only through Africans that Africa's peace can be attained.

6:2. SUMMARY

The purpose of this research has been to examine the factors of rebellion and diplomacy in international politics, using the Rwandan crisis (1959 to 1994) as a case study. This is viewed against the back drop of the fact that within the period under study, rebellion, crisis and unhealthy diplomatic intercourse had probably encouraged tension and crisis in the Rwandan political system. In the midst of these political power struggles were also attendant political killings that had been a major problem confronting the state of Rwanda prior to the 1994 war/genocide. This also acted as a potent force mostly against the vulnerable and hapless minority ethnic groups. Also, the Rwandan crisis was probably the source of instability with spill – over effects of tension and conflicts that acted as the main taproot against relative peace in the African Great Lakes Region and Africa in general. Like a general phenomenon, many of the African states at this period were enmeshed in continual and consistent struggles for state power; stretching from Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, Angola and Sierra Leone down to Rwanda with catastrophic resonances. Thus, Amnesty International (1996:47) noted that Africa became a great crisis zone with open wounds and scores of refugees. People who had fallen victims and were traumatized owing to killings, while majority cradle under poverty, epidemics and wanton peaceful chimera. A theme that runs through the entire research is rebellion, diplomacy, ethnic hatred, conflicts, killings, neglect and traumatisation, being results of the nature and the character of violence and crisis in Rwanda in the period under study.

Towards this end, four hypotheses were formulated. One, 'that ethnicization of political power helped to deepen ethnic hatred in Rwanda.' By this is meant that the politics of ethnicization in government helped to deepen ethnic hatred in Rwanda. As big as this factor was, it may have modulated and inspired the character of the ethnic

hatred between the Hutu ethnic group in power and the Tutsi ethnic group who were their former lords. The second hypothesis, 'that diplomatic initiatives in terms of complex exigencies were largely motivated by national interests was discussed with emphasis on the national interests of states like Belgium, France, Egypt, Congo DR, Uganda, Britain and the United States, among others, in Rwanda. The role of these states were also brought to the front burner as having aided in making the events in Rwanda to be more complex. The attitude of the actors also helped in rendering conflict within the state problematic. This notion was also justified following the cited cases in respect of the events that occurred in Rwanda in the period under study.

The third hypothesis states 'that lapses inherent in the international diplomatic order, especially as it was in the case of Rwanda, largely accounted for the occurrence of genocide'. This position was validated with reference to the degree of failed diplomacy in Rwanda in the period of war/genocide in 1994. At this period, the world, the UN, and Africa (symbolised by OAU/AU) in particular, abandoned Rwanda to its fate, a course that probably allowed the majority ethnic group led government and their militias to have killed over 1,250,000 men, women and children of the minority groups and the moderate sympathizers within one hundred days. The inaction of the UN and the international community comprising Britain, the United States France, China, Russia and African (OAU/AU) shocked the world. This, however, have equally justified not only the third hypothesis, but also the main thrust of the research, which argues that in the midst of weak diplomacy amongst states and actors conflicts and rebellions of several implications do take place.TheRwandan crisis, which led to war/genocide in 1994 was a good example.

The fourth hypothesis, ' that the disparity in the treatment of small states' in the international diplomacy might have provided the contour that led to the abandonment of Rwanda in the 1994 war/genocide', discusses the disparity in the treatment of small state like Rwanda in the international system. The study noted that small state such as Rwanda was ignored on thebasis that it was of less significance to the international community. Due to the fact that it has no oil well like other African countries, no mining field, it is not of any strategic importance to any of the world's power blocs for it to be remembered. Invariably it cannot contribute to the advancement of the international system nor influence any policy beyond the horizon of its political border. The hypothesis was also justified and validated.

The research employed descriptive case study, comparative method, focus group discussion (FGD), indepth interview method and analytical models in its primary evaluations. In conducting the research, as seen in Chapter one, there were the general background and statement of the problem, statement of the objective and theoretical framework.

In the course of this research, several related literatures, journals, magazines and newspapers were reviewed. All these formed the bases of the secondary sources of data collection in the research methodology. These processes also served as bases for the needed information that was adequate to form a satisfactory judgment towards the successful completion of the study. The study was, however, situated within the Conflict Theory.Based on this framework, the research noted the use of Top-Down and Bottom-Up models of conflict escalation and violence. This was duly appropriated by the ruling class in Rwanda in actualizing its goals and aspirations. It was also observed that the degree of frustration, deprivation, depression and neglect suffered by the common people aroused the level of aggression that created violent revolt and conflict in the country for many years.

Chapter Two, which is the literature review, discusses the role of diplomacy in conflict and diplomacy in African conflicts. Emphasis was also placed on reviewing orderliness and disorderliness in conflicts with the use of Top-Down and Bottom -Up syndrome, as adopted in the execution of several of the states policies by their leaders. The internationalization of conflict and use of negative propaganda was also viewed from different scholarly points of view. The internationalization of the crisis was, however, argued as one of the major factors that influenced the volatile nature of the Rwandan crisis. The positive and negativeroles of diplomacy were considered. The analytical deduction and disputations of scholars on the vital place of the UN, most especially in the rule of engagement and preventive diplomacy as supposedly applied in escalated conflict of this nature were examined. The shortcoming of the United Nations in Rwanda was considered as a great lapse by the body, which had disappointed many citizens in conflict zones.

The second sub-section looks at the role of diplomacy and conflicts from African perspectives. It emphasises that the African environment was not new to conflict and violent rebellions. This observation traced African rebellious nature to the period of

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forceful colonial occupation of the continent, exploitation and subjugation of the indigenous Africans. This was later reinforced by African politics through the influence of Multinational Corporation (MNC) and the neo-colonial principle of divide and rule, which corruptly entrenched the culture of greed and destructive mechanism among the surrogates and neo-colonial nationalists as the only means of attaining power and popularity.

This act was mostly noted among some disgruntled Africans against fellow Africans. This trend was notably observed in Liberia, Uganda, Sudan, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo DR, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Rwanda. Similarly, some scholars, who have examined the African initiative to conflicts resolution place their blames of the several African states' conflicts at the door step of the weak Organization of African Unity's Principles. However, the advent of the new African Union (AU) in 2002 was noted to have inspired hope in many respects, especially for those in troubled regions, as the reframed principles ushered in the acts of collective sovereignty and collective security, interest in African conflicts with the principle of interference. The AU initiation of a standby force reinforced to the African High Command and their readiness to tackle African problems with African initiatives.

The positions of scholars vary on the politics and armed conflicts going on in the Great Lakes Region. While some suggest a stronger Regional force, others opt for a separate national sovereignty for the countries in that region.Forexample, having a Tutsi state and Hutu state separately as a way of ending the crisis of the region. Another group of scholars, never agreed with both positions. They, instead, advocate a stronger union as a member of the Great Lakes Region towards solving their problems while harnessing the great potentials and investment opportunities with which the area is endowed to attain peace in the zone.

The literature review also examined the Rwandan crisis and the reasons for ethnic violence. Violence and rebellion were noted to have never been new to Rwanda. This reasoning is informed by the fact that every little conflict or quarrel always resulted in major conflicts. The genesis of rebellions which cut across the two major ethnic groups was traced to enslavement, frustration, deprivation, neglect, suppression and imposition. This might have begun from 1910, 1912, 1957, 1959, 1961,1963,1973,1990 and 1994. Poverty and forced labour were the major causes of

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the Rwandan rebellion. The foreign allies of the Belgian and French administrators might have encouraged the conflict escalation by the sowing of the seeds of discord.

In Chapter Three, the study was particularly concerned with the origin of Rwanda. It traced the reasons for the state crisis to the merging of the early kingdoms into a feudal state system, leading to the frustration and deprivation that finally aroused rebellion. However, the guided first hypothesis was carried out to justify the theory that ethnicization of political power helped to deepen ethnic hatred in Rwanda. Rwanda, arguably, is also a land of a thousand hills with few exploitable natural resources that are of little interest to the outside world. This was a factor that made Rwanda to be treated as a small state in the international space. Thus, it was revealed that from 1506 there was increasing unification of the kingdom, which was later threatened by an imposed governance of the Berlin Conference of 1885, which ceded the kingdom-Uwandi-Urundi to the German influence. However, the history before this period noted that the people probably existed as a social group. The Twas, Hutus and Tutsis, without any ethnic undertones or cleavages, were one people.

However, it was not until 1894 that the people of Rwanda came in contact with the German-Europeans. The Germans who met these unique people and their system of administration under the Umwami dynasty introduced indirect rule system. The Tutsi oligarchy, a hegemonic structure in terms of governance and position acquisitions, open an social mobility system. The ascendancy of the strata was based on wealth and influence. This made the Germans rate the Tutsis as superior race by likening them to the German Aryan race. Thus, it was argued that the German imposition of indirect rule, recognition of one ethnic group as being superior over the other, and with the encouragement of cyclical exploitation of the land using one group against the others, might have been the bedrock of all enmity amongst the social groups in Rwanda.

In line with this observation, Rwanda came under a mandate territory status of the League of Nations, supervised by Belgium in 1923 after the Germans had lost out in the First World War of 1914 to 1918. Belgium's rule, which did not change much from the German rule, however, introduced a system of ethnic identity cards which differentiated Hutus from Tutsis and Twas in order to consolidate their reign. This policy, however, laid the foundation for ethnicity in Rwanda, thereby destroying the

social group system. It was also the destruction of this arrangement that planted or imported the act of violence and crisis in Rwanda from then onward.

Following the United Nations replacement of the League of Nations after the Second World War in 1945, there was an automatic transfer of Belgian-Rwandan mandate to a United Nations trusteeship commission territory in 1945. With this, the Belgian administration in 1946 dedicated Rwanda to 'Christ the King' and favoured the Tutsis. This preferential treatment included granting them special access to jobs and education. This made the Hutus, who did not hide their heartfelt neglect and victimization through double colonization, speak against the injustice before the first UN Trusteeship council visiting mission in 1948.

Owing to the growing nationalistic movements among African states, the Rwandan people were not left out, as they consciously rallied round the Umwami Mutara Rudahigwa III in forming a political party called Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) in 1950. The party formation did not only spark off a keen competition, as the Hutus formed Party du Movement de I'emancipation of Hutu (PARMENHUTU) in 1957 to inscribe the origin the rivalry but also enhanced the tempo of ethnicity. The Belgians, however, critical of the situation, saw the act of the Tutsis as a betrayal of trust and mutual deal between them. This is because they had consistently sustained the minority leadership against majority oppositions. This fall-out led to the Belgian reversion of their policy to favour the Hutu majority. Moreover, what might have been a coincidental event was also the death of the Tutsi King at the same time (1959), which eventually sparked off the "social revolution" as it was called in Rwanda. While the death of the Umwami might have culminated in the historical struggle for political power between the Hutus and Tutsis on one side, the research is of the view that Belgium's recognition of the Hutu regime also added to the heightening of ethnic tension in Rwanda.

The research also identified the major reason why the monarchical system was abolished in 1961 as simply to avoid any ethnic group laying claim to ancestral privileges, rights and positions. Even with the Belgians favouring the Hutus and Rwanda becoming a republic the same year, the wave of violence against the Tutsis did not stop. There was mass exodus of people fleeing the country while numerous deaths were recorded.

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The situation of things was further aggravated when the Tutsis carried out a rebellion against the Hutu-led government in 1962 and 1963 with the Hutus reprisal killings of over 20,000 Tutsis in Rwanda. The research, however, noticed the entrenchment of inequality in governance by both ethnic group's regimes at separate times. This created a degree of ethnic disparity, division and institutionalization of revenge and ethnic hatred. The research noted that in analysing the situation of things in Rwanda, the role of the Roman Catholic Church might have helped in playing a diversionary role in escalating the problems. The action of the Roman Catholic Church might have equally created a great division in the society amongst the different ethnic groups. The study points to one of the facts that occasioned our reason for the thrust of the study as the sown seeds of discord which encouraged the diplomatic dictate, though weak, yet aided in engendering the social revolution and other several rebellions in Rwanda. This is simply because all diplomatic intercourses were at times geared towards an end. This is a condition which, if not checkmated, might make or mar the progress of the society.

The first hypothesis that guided the section of the studywas justified. The role of ethnic hatred that was noted as one of the most forceful factors dictating ethnic and social violence in Rwanda was never an exception. Ethnic violence, which might have become more destructive with the addition of the coercive instruments of the state was a factor responsible for the causes observed and verified in the Rwandan crisis.

The justification of these points in the midst of accumulated grievances, depression, deprivation and frustration might have encouraged the exertion of power, imposition, suppression and curtailing of the population growth which formed the bases for debasing the hated group by their common enemy.

In Chapter Four, the analysis of the Rwandan quagmire, amongst other factors that explained its failure, was viewed. The Chapter opened with the testing of the second hypothesis; giving a detailed explanation of how some of the named states used their national interests to teleguide, influence and encouraged the events in Rwanda, leading to war/genocide from 1959 to 1994. Also, in the testing of the third hypothesis, a comparative deduction of the incidence of rebellions in some selected African states (the most troubled spot in Africa) was identified. The reason arrived at was incessant struggle for state power and the consequences of rebellion. International

diplomacy was noted to have aided some to successful enthronement of government while in other places it might have resulted in killings, destruction and crimes against humanity. The situations in Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Congo DR, Burundi, Angola, Sudan and Rwanda were not far from these accentuated imbroglios. Against this background, analysts held the view that while power becomes the main goal of every state struggle in Africa, with warfare (either individuals or groups), that greed propelled by the presence of economic factors and commercial agenda in wars, was not so much a new phenomenon; but a familiar theme in the history of rebellion. Instances of these were noted in the war between General Doe and Charles Taylor, parties to the alliance in Congo DR Liberation and the Rwandan government against the RPF. The hypothesis constructed in confirmation agreed that almost all the governments formed in Africa might have been rooted in pro-ethnic interest. This therefore, confirms the agreement that there had never been true patriotism in African politics and government, as ethnic interest still overrides national interests. This has equally informed the reason why all democratic processes are still overwhelmed by ethnic political affilations.

The research examined the reasons why the former OAU could not attend to the numerous African problems. This apologetic ineptitude might have been located and blamed for its incapacitation and the adoption of some of its unconventional charter principles. This failed OAU diplomacy, which was not bad in the real sense of it, but might have been found ineffective in its implementation process, was one of the undoings of the body. Consideration was given to the new African Union (AU) whose new principles and actions had come to surpass those of the defunct OAU, relatively speaking. The AU, in the midst of crises, might have trailed a new dimension that seems to project Africa with a purpose. The AU showed a great senseof purpose when it dispatched the African Standby Force to intervene in the conflict in Sudan-Darfur crisis and Burundi conflict. The AU was able to dialogue out the SPLA and Karthoumn government's age-long conflict, the Togo political impasse brought about by the death of the president and the issue of successor in Cote d' Ivorie and the North-South leadership tussle there, among others. The AU had, among all other efforts, made peace and security a priority issue for the African people. This proactive measure, deemed as a good gesture and development, has intensified the African reform programme which seeks to set a new African political and economic agenda on good courses.

Chapter Five centred on the interface between rebellion and diplomacy, showing how diplomacy and its role had greatly affected the reasons for the rebellions in Rwanda and the events that came after the genocide. This was confirmed with the testing of the fourth hypothesis, as the disparity in the international diplomatic treatment of Rwanda, as a small state created a hugecontour that exposed the lapses inherent in international diplomatic engagement of states. These all combined toencourage the acts of war and genocide in Rwanda in the period under study.

Against this background, the implications of rebellion in Rwanda as encouraged by weak diplomacy and protracted poverty agrees with the major reasons why men rebel.The rebellion in Rwandan was due to neglect, frustration, subjugation, deprivations and social decimation, revealing government failure to provide the people's essential needs.The implication of these several instabilities seen in the government of Habyarimana, however, marked the enormity of the killings after his demise and during the war/genocide.Although using Top-down violence model to contain the opposition with a negative and hysteria drives of destructive propaganda exposed the government as having heated up the polity in the process of checkmating oppositions. The testing of the fourth hypothesis further argued that Belgium's main reason for changing its policy about Rwanda was largely because the UNAR - the Tutsi dominated political party had deflected to seek socialist ideology, an act identified as a slap and affront on Belgium's integrity and diplomacy.

The study further explained that the French involvement in the Rwandan project was as a result of Belgium's failure to perform its duties. The French, with several contradictions, might have been blamed for trying to extol its virtue while making a mess of Rwandan in her alliance with the dictatorial government of Habyarimana.

The French argument that the democracy in Rwanda was acceptable was because it was the rule of the major ethnic group was greatly opposed. Scholars, in examining this kind of democracy as obtained in Rwanda, Great Lake Region and some African states, argued that it was the major factor promoting violence. The intrigues in the French diplomacy in Rwanda contributed to a great extent in escalating the crisis.

Additionally, thestudy observed the appalling American diplomacy towards the Rwandan crisis as it (America)insisted on intervening in the Rwandan war/genocide

only on the condition that provision must be made for it in terms of transport and other logistics, which no one was ready to do.The research was also quick to consider the other side of American refusal and reasons against intervention as it wanted to allow France to finish making a mess of itself with the kind of policy it (France) had in the Great Lakes region. The work also noted the United Nations and its Security Council's numerous contributions to the failure of diplomacy in Rwanda. This became obvious where there was an early warning to which nothing was done. The UNAMIR Force Commander and his men, who were abandoned, ignored and treated with levity in time of danger also expressed displeasure at the absence of reinforcement, which shows to a great extent the level of nonchalant attitude of the body.Thisalso agreed with the view of Power (2003:37) that the UN's decision to stay away and watch the calamity of man killing his fellow man was a premeditated act that ended up in "never again", the world's most unfulfilled promise.

The role of the indigenous Rwandan towards the collapse of the Arusha Accord was also seen as a pointer to the failure of diplomacy in Rwanda. This is owing to their betrayal and breach of the Arusha Peace Accord. The violation of the held-in-trust policy statement between them and the mediators and the manner in which they (RPF and the Hutu Government) allowed their personal or group interests to over ride the pact to the agreement reached at Arusha led to the escalation of the conflict.

Evidence of failed diplomacy as discussed among states, actors and factors identified directly and indirectly played a role in the Rwandan crisis, as the failure or success of diplomacy attested to the notions contained in the fourth hypothesis. This was justified in the analysis of the lapses inherent in international diplomatic order, especially as was in the case of Rwanda, largely accounting for the occurrence of war/genocide in 1994. Failed diplomacy was seen as the main engine and lubricating fluid that led to the unabated killings of over 1,200,000 citizens of Rwanda.The study also examines the basis for the much criticized ICTR and case handling. The study noted that the ICTR was, from its inception, bedeviled by several problems, amongst which were scope, funding, composition, jurisdiction ground, prolonged delay of justice, international interference and sharing of one chief prosecutor with ICTY. The controversy that greatly impeeded its smooth take-off was those surrounding its duties and expediency. There was also the problem of it existing side by side with the Rwandan government established traditional system of justice (Gacaca) founded owing

to long delay by ICTR. The research noted that one of the most contested issues was the non-inclusion of death penalty in its principle of statute, which was one of the reasons that informed the creation of Gacaca. Another problem that the ICTR experienced was the issue of complication and delay of justice delivery due to diplomatic interplay caused by members of the UN and the Security Council in the appointment of prosecutors. This act was however termed a conspiracy against justice, but it was later solved. Besides, diplomatic intrigues acted as a hinderance in a way, as noticed inthe manner the UN /Security Council was dragging feet against the actual intervention that ought to manifest in the process preceding the start of ICTR.

With all these hitches, the importance of justice as a basis for establishing truth was revealed by the body and most of the defence counsels, with the intrigues of international diplomacy on the side of Frence/Belgium, marred the proceedings of the court. This was displayed amidst several problems. The work of the ICTR was very effective, as it dettered any idea of miscarriage of justice. The study also examined the tenets of the organic law of Rwanda – traditional system of justice, a practice that might have been forgotten by history, but which was, suddenly, exhumed and probably seen as the best method in treating the numerous cases of war/genocide. Gacaca is a community participating justice system. The Gacaca was mainly set up for two reasons: the long delays in establishing the ICTR and the need to speed up the clearing of the numerous pending cases, especially those considered too numerous for the ICTR to handle. This was probably based on the realisation that the Judiciary would be better off concentrating on criminal matters than being involved in war crime cases.

The Gacaca process exposed the accused to the victim and openly allowed the community to witness the confession of the suspect. At the same time, the accused might have the opportunity to plead for forgiveness according to the guilt –plea agreement. The essence of Gacaca was to eradicate the culture of impunity while rebuilding the social fabric that was torn apart. These issues were central to the spirit of reconciliation and social re-integration.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The basic deductions from this work have shown that Africa is a continent with an age-long crisis record. It is noticed that Africa's problems of political power

struggle had prolonged due to the role of manipulators and instigators who try to outplay each other based on self-interest. Added to this shortcoming is the disorganized regional organs such as ECA and COMESA in East Africa and the individual states who contributed in making the Rwandan crisis open to manipulations, promotion of violence and provision of weapons. Thus, from 1959 to 1994, a specific leadership problem located in ethnicity, ethnicization principle and ethnic hatred, coupled with impoverished state system, encouraged the conflict situation to last the period it did. The weak diplomacy witnessed within African states also made the Rwandan crisis unattended to.Therefore, this confirms the main thrust of the study, which argued that conflicts and rebellions of several implications did take place in Rwanda; causing the killings of the minority ethnic group and moderate sympathizers in high magnitude.

However, the following are the research recommendations. There is the need for states, international communities, organizations and other relevant bodies to endeavour to adopt the culture of responding to early warning signals that point to crisis. The UN Security Council should accept and respond promptly to the reports of their peacekeepers in mission areas. This action should be aided by a mechanism and team of conflict mediators who could interact with the warring parties in a cordial and free atmosphere to address the conflicting issues. The Security Council resolution 1013 (1995) should be strengthened to monitor and sanction without reservation those states, individuals and groups who still indulge in illegal arms deals. There is also the need for international assistance to state in fishing out these culprits. States should be advised to improve compliance with arms embargoes. Nation - states should equally be encouraged to introduce legislative measures in their national law to fight illegal arms deals and the possession of weapons of any kind, a factor central to the escalation of the Rwandan crisis.

The UN Security Council should also adopt preventive mechanisms like preventive diplomacy in treating and assessing all conflicts to avoid escalation. Also, the idea of treating any sovereign nation as a small state of no consequence occurred in Rwanda in 1994 by the powerful nations should be discouraged. Every state is important as they have the same status in the international system vis-a-vis Westphalia Peace treaty of 1648 and the Vienna Convention of 1962. The idea of treating small states with riches as important while treating those without riches like Rwanda with

disdain and abandonment in the period of crisisby the international community does not conform to international norms. It should, therefore, be discouraged.

In addition, the United Nations should employ reputable and seasoned diplomats/technocrats into the organization. This is to correct the mistakes of employing those who would put their municipal or personal interests first before the interest of the international community. This is to avoid such assertion as those described by Colin Keating as a bunch of diplomatic amateurs in the period of the Rwandan crisis in 1994.

The new African Union should be highly encouraged and its new principles should be adopted by all states for their own development and peaceful existence. The AU Standing Force should be strengthened and established in all the regions of Africa to enable peace to reign and, where it is impossible, quick intervention force can be deployed. The North, West and East African brigades of the Standby Force should be given more attention as the zones are more prone to crisis.

Moreover, some contending issues such as leadership problems, regime change, resource control and revenue sharing among others, which the citizens find hard to dialogue about, should be part of development management discourse in the settlement of all disputes for fairness and equity. It is important for all to accept that the flexibility of African countries will be more beneficial than their rigidity if success is to be attained in creating a unified African peaceful environment.

The existing conflict of interests in Rwanda can be ameliorated by creating a healthy competition, which might be a process of peace-building mechanism that will eventually end all conflict. The nature and causes of conflicts and the growing challenges could be appropriated to enthrone social civility.

The thesis also recommends that the idea of one group insisting that power must reside with it should be stopped in all entirety as such does not promote healthy co-existence. This implies that the notion that particular leadership must come from one side or particular ethnic group should not be attended to, but should be discouraged. Likewise, the idea of either tracing Tutsis' genealogy and ascribing privileged status to them or recalling the degraded and servitude state of the Hutus' past should be completely erased from the historical perspectives of Rwanda so that

peace and hermonies existence are maintained. The post-war power position should be characterized by a determination geared towards removing from the soil of Rwanda any *trace* of the conditions that could possibly lead to the repeat of the war.

Besides, since it has been argued that Rwanda is at historical*crossroads* due to the chequered history of killings and war, the present crop of leaders should be encouraged to re-engineer the society in a proper direction. It is evident that the state is faced with two clear options: those who might want the war to continue and those who want political reconciliation of the entity. The leaders, in rejectingthe victor – vanquished posture, should desire to redirect the state through peace and reconciliation.

This thesis is of the view that there should be an avenue where political justice and participatory democracy should serve as keys to state reforms. This is because it will entrench an institution of value rather than recognize majority or minority power blocs.

Considering the grievous nature of the role of the missionaries (especially the Roman Catholic Church priests and nuns) in the atrocities of the Rwanda genocide war/genocide governance should be separated from religion.

On economy, Rwanda as a nation divided by traditional past should engender a befitting economic policy. There should be policies that would remove those identities that are politics- based and replaced than those that are market-based. The leadership of the country must carry everybody along so that the factors projecting exploitation such as crude capitalist ideology and concept of master-clientelism ideology will not be allowed to recur and become re-established. In short, the political system needs total overhauling for a better system. This is because the political history of Rwanda was the main thing that enthroned a privileged few and the subsequent subjugation of the majority into slavery. Stable democratic tenets will not only negate any form of aristocratic or autocratic tendencies in governance, but might encourage a kind of political democracy that will carry the people along towards creating stability and making the divided people to forget their past. This will not only create stronger unity, it would engender a culture of oneness.The notion that some people are refugees, victims, returnees and perpetrators and so on need to be removed from the political agenda of the country to give all a sense of belonging. This is because a nation built on trusted integrity among the people is essential as against the notion of individual

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nation-state which tends to divide the people. The culture of quick dispensation of justice in ICTR has to be reviewed and enhanced to promote sincerity and urgency. The usual foot – dragging, protracted appeals and delay in justice delivery as occurred in ICTR procedure should equally be reviewed to enhance integrity and justice delivery.

Against the backdrop of the centrality of Rwanda to the political situation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, which had made it impossible for peace to reign in the region, there should be a conference of a sort among the states in the Great Lake's Region. It is evident that the crises in Bukavu, Kivu, Ituri, and Goma amongst others, are ripple effects of the Rwandan crisis which a serious dialogue on peace can help to ameliorate. The state of the Great Lakes Region, namely Congo DR, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania can come together to have one unique union with a common purpose. This can equally avail them the idea of harnessing the Great Lakes Region's numerous investment opportunities while attracting many African and foreign partners to the region. There should be the spirit of accommodation, acceptance, tolerance and reasoning among the neighbours of the Great Lakes Region. There should be a consensus of leadership ideology among the people of the Great Lakes region, and Rwanda in particular, towards solving any problems that might arise. When this ideology is allowed to manifest, the people become happier and tolerant. Then, the Tutsis, Hutus and Twas can form a stronger Rwandan state where everyone can co-exist as one people.

6.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

In view of the existing gap in knowledge hitherto, the study has made a number of contributions to knowledge. These include the following:

1. It has been shown that international diplomacy within the context of international system is based on national interest.

2. The study explains that the role of international diplomacy in Rwandan crisis was never encouraging and, therefore, assertswith respect to the treaty of Westphalia 1648 that equality of states and their sovereignty should be sacrosanct in the international system.

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3. The lessonof international diplomacyalso shows that for the avoidanceof future occurrence, emphasis should be on continued interplay of positive diplomacyin state system againstnegative implications.

4. The study has given a new insight into the nature of disparity in the treatment of small states in the international system, of which the Rwandan crisis was an example.   The study also posits that international diplomacy should not only be based on national interest of state.

5. Thatpositive diplomacy is seen as being more reliable in maintaining peace, stability and co-existence among people.

6. The study exposes the helplessness of African, especially when it comes to the idea of rallying support round a troubled state with the usual excuse of incapacitation. This is because people or persons can only be taken more serious taking an action to save life or solve a problem than always giving excuses or trying to dodge a particular respectively. African states (AU inclusive) should always endeavour to act or comment on a particular problem, rather than always displaying a lukewarm attitude or hiding under the excuse of no logistics, no capacity and no manpower.

7. The African (OAU) diplomacy had also contributed immensely in fanning several conflict escalations and its consequent carnage on the continent was also a pointer to the challenge for the new AU about need for change.

8. This work has enabled a detailed study of the Tutsis and the Hutus approach to issues and interrelationship, especially their attitudes to power and governance with regards to the conflicts that have resulted at the various times in the country.

9. The study has demonstrated that the resolution of ethnic crisis as happened in Rwanda and Burundi amongst the Hutus and Tutsis must be by positive and active involvement of all parties to the course of peace. Although alternative consideration of the partitioning of the ethnic groups into different states as well as the need for the continued relationship of their members across the border of the states as a possible panacea for the ending of such an aged long feud is possible if that is the only way that peace can return to the region.

10. The study has provided a number of recommendations and policy options aimed at resolving the problems emanating from the continued solidarity in ethnic crisis, particularly in Africa, and it has also improved the practice of conflict management and resolution on the continent.

11. The research has also advanced the study of comparative politics and governments in Africa especially amongst the people of the Great Lake Region and the rest of Africa.

6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The event in Rwanda, between 1959 to 1994 had, in no small measure, thrown-up several problems that might negatively or positively affect the country and its neighbours for years and to which all could not be treated in this thesis, hence, the followings as suggestion for further research are very necessary:

i. The first is the study of the situation in conflict zones without taking side, especially where there are majority and minority ethnic groups. This should be without any feeling of being victismised since the kind of diplomacy applied will eventually impact or probably determine the swinging of the pendulum.

ii. The study also needs to unravel the continual and repeated situation that had compelled the International Community to encourage disparity in the treatment of Small States and big states, even when the treaty of Westaphilia of 1648 and 1962 conferred on every state equal status and sovereignty.

iii. We also need more studies of the situation where the activities of the erstwhile colonial masters had encouraged ethnic division as a way of exploiting the land against the wish of the people of the locality.Since ethnic migration, dominance and power are the major problems igniting conflicts and crises in Africa. This is tied to the manner in which colonialists merged and swapped different ethnic groups without consideration for cultural differences.

iv. The study also inferred that more work need to be done in the area of evaluating the kind of state/region or continental organs (government, COMESA, ECA and AU) policies that will dissuade the issue of rebellion, conflict and coup d'etats in state systems in order to enhance Africa's

diplomacy, while playing down on the negative idea of incapacitation and poor logistics.

v.   It is also important that the study on the proper place for the treatment of the exiled and returnees in the geopolitical configuration of the Great Lake Region be revisited since the Rwandan migrant since 1959 formed the bulk of the region's refugees overflow, which had invariably affected Africa as a whole.

vi.   The new shift of the African Union (AU) away from the failed OAU incapacitation in addressing Africa's problems by Africans through looking up elsewhere for help needs further study in order to chart a new course.

vii.   The study is of the opinion that the issue of the Great Lake Region, its aged long conflicts and the Rwandan complex (those that speak the language of Kinyanwanda – as found in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and Congo DR) deserve further inquiry.

6.6 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the lessons drawn from the Rwandan crisis are very relevant for many African countries where ethnic hatred, killings and ethnic cleansing may be noted. It is a bad omen that the new AU charter principle holds the promise of bringing all the warring factions to sheathe their swords and resort to dialogue.

The Rwandan situation has shown that it is only Africans who can solve their problems. It is through Africa that African peace can be attained. It is also crucial to note that the Rwandan crisis, an admixture of several rebellions, conflicts and wars are among the numerous cases of state upheavals in Africa. This is occasioned when re-examining the topic, "Rebellion and Diplomacy in International Politics in the Context of the Rwandan crisis", all taking place in the midst of weak diplomacy that is either manipulated or exacerbated to keep the African sub-region in a perpetual conflict paradigm. Despite the fact that the Rwandan crisis was central to the several conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, its relevance, however, revolved the nucleus of what makes the Great Lakes Region politics in the past two decades Africa's most troubled region. This agrees with the fact that from 1959 to date any conflict or crisis in Rwanda poses a threat to Congo DR, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and even the entire Central and Eastern African sub-regions. This is not because of its tempo, casualty rate or destructive outcome, but due to its increasing international refugee overflow, arms

banditry and spill-over effects. The research, in conclusion, investigated the root cause of the crisis that was underpinned by the issue of power struggle between the ethnic groups of Tutsis, Hutus, and Twas. Hegemonic ascendancy of one ethnic group over the other was noted to be the bane of peaceful co-existence among the people. The erstwhile colonial masters (Belgium) did not only mistrust this characterization to a fault, when in the course of state administration made a reverse policy that not only negate the system but also had a costly implication that ended up pitching brothers against brothers. This open battle was due to an ethnic seed of discord. It was this animosity, awful deprivation, segregation, discrimination, revenge, among others, that helped in modulating the Tutsi pogrom of 1994.

The Rwandan experience is, however, a lesson for the African countries to learn from while the healing of the several wounds that the war/genocide had inflicted on the continent takes place. It is also imperative for Africanstates to allow the new peace initiative of African Union to be effectively implemented. And no matter the kind of odds it might face, efforts towards calling to order all the warring factions in the name of rebels on the African continent should be encouraged. It is also a lesson and, at the same time, a piece of advice to states that had been promoting bad policies to desist from such as their consequences have not in any way helped African peace and development.

The nature of African states' problems had shown that it is only Africans who can solve their problems themselves. Waiting for help from the outside world cannot put an end to African crises; hence, when it is Africans for Africans peace will be attained.

The interest of the world in Africa might be due to its enormous natural resources, just as it is important to note that diplomacy, either positive or negative, tends to dictate pace in an intense way, especially when we realize that capitalist ideals had conditioned people never to go to where there is no gain. And, in Africa, those things that arouse interest are natural resources like crude oil, diamond, gold, uranium, cobalt, zinc and platinum. This was why Rwanda, a small state, with the highest population density in black Africa of no strategic importance to any power bloc in the world lacking cooperation and exchange in the advancement of International System and with two-third of her people living below poverty level was abandoned to its fate

as the devil incarnates, and came down like human being to feed on innocent blood (Dallaire, 2003). This disparity in treatment and wilful abandonmentstands as a warning and a reference note for every African state that deals with the Western world, especially in terms of over-dependence. This is because the Western world's kind of diplomacy carries a twist of gain or loss.Criticalto note in the crisis in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region is the struggle for supremacy between France on one hand and America on the other. This situation also encouraged the persistence and degeneration of the crisis in that region to an unimaginable level. Interestingly enough, America might desire to be the new colonial partner of the states of the Great Lakes Region, given the many failures of France, even if she has not assumed the position yet.

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APPENDIX - 1   .

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Adeleke, AY   - Colonel, NA (member 242 Recce BN,NICON/NIBATT.

Contigent to Rwanda Crisis 1994; 4thJuly 2011.

Agbu, Osita   - Professor, NIIA Lagos (International Diplomat

and Research Fellow); 4th July 2011.

Agwu, Fred Aja - Professor, NIIA Lagos (International Diplomat

and Research Fellow); 4th July 2011.

Buggingo, E.   -   B. (Rectorate); 3rd and 4th February 2005.

Senior Lecturer, Deparment of Political Science and Public

Administration, National University of Rwanda.

Chautal, Aimable -   Butare, 4 March, 2005

 Director Clinque de Jurisdique Butare.

 Dokubo, Charles - Professor, NIIA Lagos (International Diplomat

and Research Fellow); 4th July 2011.

Gahananya, A.- Butare, 11 February 2005

Chief Librarian, National University of Rwanda, Butare.

Gasana, E.   -   Kigali 26 February, 2005

  Kigali 1st March, 2005
     Guide and attendant, Gizosi Genocide Centre Kigali.

Godeberthe, N. - Butare 10 February 2005

  - Taba-Butare 28 February 2005

       Senior officer REGISTRARIAT (Nkego @ yahoo.fr).

          National University of Rwanda.

Haba, S.-Butare, 8 February 2005

 Lecturer and Seminar coordinator Department. of Political Science

          and Public Administration, National University of Rwanda.

Kanahirimana, V.- Butare, 24th February 2005

          Civil Servant and victim of Genocide machete cuts.

Karemera, J. T.   -   Butare, 6 February,2005

          Guide, NUR Genocide centre

Karentagar, I. -   Gatuna, 31st January 2005.

290

Civil Servant at Imigration Office in Gatuna.

Kugarimaria, B.   -   Kigali, 16 February 2005

Citizen, Speaking as Twas' View Over the Crisis of Rwanda.

Kupechira, L. -   Butare, 24February 2005

A Staff of Association Kemit – a local NGO in Rwanda.

Leon, K. C.   -   Nairobi, 30th January 2005

A Rwandaise, at Marble Arch Hotel.

Mankondidi, E.   -   Butare (Rectorate), 26th February 2005

-        Butare (Rectorate), 4th March 2005
Librarian at Conflict Resolution Centre Library, Rectorate.

Murangira, E. -   Gikongoro, 20th February 2005

A Tutsi and a Guide, Murambi Genocide Centre.

Musafiri, I.- Kigali, 7 March 2005

Staff Ministry of Agriculture, Kakilu.

Mutulageria, H.   -   Kigali, 21 February 2005

ICTR Staff and Resource Person to Investigations.

Nani, AA   -   Colonel, NA (member 242 Recce BN,NICON/NIBATT.

Contigent to Rwanda Crisis 1994-1995; 4th July 2011.

Ntayireberga, G. -Kivu Lakes Resort Centre, 14 March 2005

A Repented Member of Interahamwe and an Apologist.

Nyiraberga, E. -   Butare, 2 February 2005

Lecturer, Sociology and Anthropology Dept NUR.

Olalekan,   A.   -   Kigali, March 15 2005

Pastor, Redeemed Christian Church of God BP 4041, Rwanda

(Nigerian).

Ruterana, L.   - Karubanda, Butare, 18th February 2005

- Motel de Gracia Butare, 19th February 2005

Director, Duhozanye Save – a Local NGO Taking Care of

Widows and the Traumatized Person.

Soambivura, N.-Kibungo, 5th March 2005

Guide and Victim of the Genocide, Kibungo Genocide Centre.

Sebahire D. M.- Butare, 8 February 2005

- Motel de Gracia Butare, 22 February, 2005

Professor and Senior Lecturer, Sociology and Anthropology Dept. NUR.

Turner, T.-Butare, 26th February 2005

- Butare, 27th February 2005

A Professor and Resource Fellow on African Diplomacy and Politics. Political Science and Public Administration Dept. NUR.

Vincent, A.   -   Kivu Lake Resort Centre, 28th January 2005

Walker, R.   -   Kigali, 3rd March 2005

Reporter, BBC Office at Urunana Health Unlimited – Unwchill Opposite Kigali National Stadium.

Wolokigara, J. A.   -   Taba Butare, 13th February 2005.

Senior Staff, ICRC/08418416/530712

Wnorokandi, E.   -   Kigali, 11 March, 2005

Coordinator Association Farge – a Local NGO.

AVEGA   -   Kigali, 23 February 2005

- Kigali, 3 March 2005

Widows, Member and Women Victims of genocide with HIV/AIDS

and Traumatized.

Focus Group Discussants   -   Butare, 11 February, 2005.

48 undergraduate students of NUR,

Discussing Rwandan Crisis and the place value

in African Politics in line with Research Investigations,

Research Methodology and Contribution to Inquiry.

Focus Group Discussants   -   Butare, 24 February, 2005

 40 Postgraduate and High Degree Students, Political Science and Public
                Administration Students; NUR. Evaluating the Rwandan Crisis in
Retrospect

Text of the January 11, 1994 Cable

94/422 1/2

2335Z

CNRI 12   REC'D

OUTGOING CODE CABLE   JAN 11 1994

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994   NIR 17

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO:MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE-212-963-9852 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT:REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT	
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	ROOM NO.2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

1.   FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT BY VERY VERY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OF MRND.

2.   HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAYS DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPED TO PROVOKE THE RPF BN TO ENGAGE (BEING FIRED UPON) THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTIES WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE PROVOKED AND IF BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA.

3.   INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION. RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.

4.   INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO STATED HE IS PAID RF150,000 PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO TRAIN INTERHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OF THE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.

5.   INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING

FOCUS WAS DISCIPLINE, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE COMBAT AND TACTICS.

6. PRINCIPAL AIM OF INTERHAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT KIGALI FROM RPF. SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI. HE SUSPECTS IT IS FOR THEIR EXTERMINATION. EXAMPLE HE GAVE WAS THAT IN 20 MINUTES HIS PERSONNEL COULD KILL UP TO 1000 TUTSIS.

7. INFORMANT STATES HE DISAGREES WITH ANTI-TUTSI EXTERMINATION. HE SUPPORTS OPPOSITION TO RPF BUT CANNOT SUPPORT KILLING OF INNOCENT PERSONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD PARTY\FACTION.

8. INFORMANT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOCATION OF MAJOR WEAPONS CACHE WITH AT LEAST 135 WEAPONS. HE ALREADY HAS DISTRIBUTED 110 WEAPONS INCLUDING 35 WITH AMMUNITION AND CAN GIVE US DETAILS OF THEIR LOCATION. TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE G3 AND AK47 PROVIDED BY RGF. HE WAS READY TO GO TO THE ARMS CACHE TONIGHT-IF WE GAVE HIM THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEE. HE REQUESTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY (HIS WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN) BE PLACED UNDER OUR PROTECTION.

9. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT 36 HOURS WITH A POSSIBLE H HR OF WEDNESDAY AT DAWN (LOCAL). INFORMANT STATES THAT HOSTILITIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK ENDS. VIOLENCE COULD TAKE PLACE DAY OF THE CEREMONIES OR THE DAY AFTER. THEREFORE WEDNESDAY WILL GIVE GREATEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND ALSO BE MOST TIMELY TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT INPUT TO ON-GOING POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INFORMANT BE GRANTED PROTECTION AND EVACUATED OUT OF RWANDA. THIS HQ DOES NOT HAVE PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND URGENTLY REQUESTS GUIDANCE. NO CONTACT HAS AS YET BEEN MADE TO ANY EMBASSY IN ORDER TO INQUIRE IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BY GRANTING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THEIR EMBASSY IN KIGALI BEFORE MOVING HIM AND HIS FAMILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

11. FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE MEETING WITH THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON TOMORROW MORNING IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CONSCIOUS OF ALL PARAMETERS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT. FORCE COMMANDER DOES HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS OF THE CHANGE OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS INFORMATION. RECCE OF ARMED CACHE AND DETAILED PLANNING OF RAID TO GO ON LATE TOMORROW. POSSIBILITY OF A TRAP NOT FULLY EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAINST THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON. FORCE COMMANDER TO INFORM SRSG FIRST THING IN MORNING TO ENSURE HIS SUPPORT.

13. PEUX CE QUE VEUX. ALLONS-Y.

The Radio Text message from Gen Romeo Dallaire to UN/Security Council/DPO New York on genocide being committed in Rwanda.

APPENDIX - 3

Above is the garden pool analysis, showing the original state of Rwanda with stability before colonial occupation

in 1894 and the picture below showing the uniqueness among the social groups of the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi prior to colonial rule - 1

Officials of the German colonial Representatives and the missionary priests welcomed by the Umwami Musinga to Rwanda in 1894. – 2.

In 1923, the Belgian officials and the church missionary society priests exchanging greeting with the Umwami Musinga. - 3.

The theory of Hamiitic ideology and superiority of race doctrine introduced by the priest above to Tutsi (students) children - 4.

Tutsi students exclusively favoured and taught science by the colonial teacher – 5.

The garden pool analysis showing division among the people of Rwanda planted by colonial indirect rule. -

Against the creation of ethnicity in Rwanda, ethnic groups clashed in 1933 to 1935 - 7.

Hutu Interahamwe militia on training preparing for the 1994 war/genocide at Ruhengeri - 8.

The weapons the Hutus consistently used against the Tutsis, both in 1959, 1963, 1973, 1994 and genocide - 9.

T he arrested Tutsis waiting to be killed and the killed ones in 1990 - 10.

The preserved bodies and gathered bones of those killed at Gizosi genocide centre at Kigali - 11.

The Researcher in midst of the preserved bodies at Murambi-Gikongoro genocide centre in February, 2005 - 12.

The preserved bodies of those slained at Nyamata, Bisesero genocide centre - 13.

The remains of those killed inside the Holy Family Catholic Church at Nyarubuye in Kibungo - 14.

Inside the mass graves at Murambi, Gizosi, and Ntarama genocide centres (each coffin contained 250 corps bones) as at February 2005 - 15.

Many under aged children become parents after the genocide in 1995 - 16.

The Gacaca sitting with perpetrators in pink cloth at the public hearing - 17.