

**PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE  
NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION'S INTER-  
VENTIONS IN ODI, BAYELSA STATE, NIGERIA**

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## ABSTRACT

Development interventions are aimed at promoting positive change, but they can equally have negative impact, especially in conflict-prone contexts. Whereas existing studies on Odi and the Niger Delta at large mainly focused on the history, environment, culture, conflict and security situations, the peace and conflict impact of Nigerian government's socio-economic interventions in the area have not been fully explored. This study, therefore, assessed the Niger Delta Development Commission's (NDDC) interventions, to determine their relationship with the Commission's mandate, strategies, and community needs; their interactions with the community; and their impact on the dynamics of peace and conflict in Odi, a community that has attracted many interventions after the 1999 massacre.

The study adopted the grounded theory and case study research designs. Primary and secondary data were collected through key informant and in-depth interviews, official documents and non-participant observation. Fifty-four key informant interviews were conducted with seven members of the Traditional Ruling Council and the Community Development Committee, six religious leaders, five women leaders, five Youth Council executives, 24 project beneficiaries, 12 NDDC staff, and five NDDC consultants. Forty-seven in-depth interviews were also held with six school teachers, ten politicians, and two law enforcement agents in Odi, five international/non-governmental organisations staff, six activists, and eight academics and professionals. The Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, the NDDC Act, and website contents were consulted. Non-participant observations were carried out at NDDC project sites in Odi. The data gathered were content analysed.

The NDDC integrated development strategy correlated with NDDC's mandate and people's needs. However, the Commission, in implementing its interventions, contravened some of its articulated guiding principles and policies like promoting good governance, transparency, participatory decision-making, and impact assessment. Also, inadequate community consultation caused dissonance in NDDC's and community's prioritisation of needs. Moreover, due to inadequate consideration for peace and conflict sensitivity, the interventions produced series of positive and negative impact on peace and conflict dynamics in Odi. Construction of roads and educational facilities, rural electrification and training in modern agricultural practices impacted positively on the structural causes of conflict. They brought federal government's presence to Odi; provided income for male youths employed as labourers and for construction materials' suppliers as well as capacity building in modern agricultural practices. However, the community perceived the NDDC interventions as resources and competed for in a socio-political environment characterised by pervasive corruption and bad governance. This provided sufficient conditions for spirals of negative consequences that ultimately reduced the overall effectiveness of the interventions. The negative impact included entrenching corruption in intervention cycle, power disequilibrium between NDDC and Odi community, oppression and division, and gender inequality, communal conflicts, and apathy.

The Niger Delta Development Commission's interventions, intended for positive change, also had many negative consequences in Odi because the Commission failed to mainstream peace and conflict sensitivity in the interventions. The NDDC should therefore adhere strictly to its guiding principles and policies as well as international

best practices in intervention programming in order to maximise the positive and minimise the negative impacts of its interventions.

**Keywords:** Peace and conflict impact assessment, intervention programme, Niger Delta Development Commission, Odi.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to thousands of individuals, groups, and communities in the Niger Delta region, all victims of the unintended negative impacts of various intervention initiatives and those giving their best to minimise the negative and maximise the positive impacts of interventions in the region.

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## **CERTIFICATION**

I certify that this work was carried out by Ademola Victor AKINYOADE, in Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan under my supervision.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfP	Aid for Peace
AIT	African Independent Television
Bhis	Black hole of Interactions
BIODEC	Bioresources Development Centre
C&P	Conception and Planning
CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework
CAQDAS	Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analyses Software
CAST	Community and Shell Together
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCR	Centre for Conflict Research
CDC	Community Development Committee
CEDAW	Conference on Eradication of All Forms of Violence Against Women
CEEDS	Community Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CID	Directorate for Commercial and Industrial Development
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CODESRIA	Council on Development and Social Research in Africa
CRD	Directorate of Community and Rural Development
CSA	Conflict Sensitive Approach
DAC-WID	Development Assistance Committee-Women in Development
DFID	Department for International Development

DnH/LCPP	Do no Harm/Local Capacity for Peace
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ERA/FOE	Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth
EU	European Union
FADAMA	Federal Agricultural Development and Management Agency
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
GAD	Gender and Development
GBAI	Gender Based Analysis of Intervention
GMOU	Global Memorandum of Understanding
GRIP	Gender Responsive Intervention Programming
GRP	Gender Responsive Programming
GT	Grounded Theory
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit International
HCDPs	Human Capacity Development Programmes
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune deficiency Syndrome
HQ	Headquarters
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICI	Intervention-Context Interaction
IDI	In-depth Interview
IDPs	Infrastructural Development Programmes

IDS	Integrated Development Strategy
INCORE	Institute for Conflict Resolution
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IT	Information Technology
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
IYM	Ijaw Youth Movement
KII	Key Informant Interview
LEEDS	Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
LGA	Local Government Area
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MOC	Multinational Oil Company
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MSEs	Medium and Small Scale Enterprises
MSTC	Making Sense of Turbulent Context
NCRFW	National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
ND	Niger Delta
NDDB	Niger Delta Development Board
NDR	Niger Delta Region
NDRMP	Niger Delta Regional Master Plan
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OMPADEC	Oil Mineral Producing and Development Company
OPC	Ooduaa People's Congress
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PCIT	Peace and Conflict Impact Theory
PCS	Peace and Conflict Sensitivity
PCSA	Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach
PCSC	Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity
PCSF	Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework
PDP	People's Democratic Party
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RCP	Resident Community People
SCA	Strategic Conflict Analysis
SEEDS	State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Company
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USAID	United States Aid for International Development
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WHO	World Health Organisation

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the study

In over two decades, there has been a growing realisation that development is essentially interconnected with conflict and peacebuilding. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's oft-quoted statement, "[t]here can be no peace without economic and social development, just as development is not possible in the absence of peace" (cited in McCandless, 2007b, p. 47) reflects thinking on this interconnectedness. Such thinking informed the emergence of the Peacebuilding and Development subfield in the field of Peace Studies (McCandless, 2007b). In the words of McCandless, "[s]cholarship, practice, policy-making, and programming in the area of peace-building and development have arisen in response to the compelling recognition that conflict and development are deeply intertwined, and consequently, so are the building of sustainable peace and human development." (2007b). Twenty-two of the twenty-four countries estimated by the UNDP as furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals are affected by conflicts (McCandless, 2007b). This further confirms the existence of some relationship between conflict and development. Since the tragic events in the Rwanda genocide, the international community became increasingly aware of the role of development intervention in conflict and peacebuilding as well as demand to make explicit the underlying assumptions concerning the effects of these interventions on peace and conflict (Paffenholz, 2005).

The interconnectedness of development interventions, conflict, and peace is more complicated in contexts characterised by conflicts —latent, open, or violent. For instance, the need to intervene in a conflict situation may require that developmental intervention be introduced in such settings, especially when indicators of underdevelopment or poverty are identified as part of the causes of the conflict. However, while such interventions aim at positively influencing a situation to bring about an improvement or forestall deterioration, there have been convincing arguments that they can

equally produce negative impact on the conflict situation. Indeed, interventions do not necessarily translate into peace in a conflict setting (Bush & Opp, 1999). Notable works in peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) reveal that intervention projects or programmes (in conflict settings) impact on the context of the intervention, and vice versa (Resource Pack 2004; Anderson 1999 & 2004; Bush 2003c and Bush 2009, Paffenholz, 2005). They have shown that each stage of an intervention project or programme, that is, conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation can impact and be affected by each element of the conflict area such as causes, actors, profile, and dynamics of the conflict. These interactions can have positive and/or negative impacts on both the stages of intervention and elements of the context of the intervention. Hence, first, interventions interact with its context and, second, the interaction can have both negative and positive impacts on the intervention and the context.

This potential of intervention to impact and be impacted by its context negatively and/or positively has been recognised by scholars, researchers and practitioners as early as the 1990s. In “A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones”. Working Paper No.1., The Peace building and Conflict reconstruction Program initiative and evaluation Unit., 1998’, Kenneth Bush submits that development interventions introduce new dynamics into the conflict environment. These dynamics can support or oppose conflict and/or peace. According to him, intervention has the potential to challenge traditional values or authority structures, disrupt gender, or other socially-determined roles, and raise the stakes of economic competition, creating “winners” and “losers.” He argues further that the politics of project siting, selection of beneficiaries and the whole process of project planning, implementation and monitoring has serious implications for peace and conflict dynamics in a community experiencing violent conflict. In other words, a well-conceived, innocently-executed development intervention can tilt the scale of events in favour of conflict in a given locale.

The mild outcome of this could be the strengthening of feelings of hatred, suspicion, prejudice, marginalisation, superiority, and inferiority among groups. A more serious outcome could be violent or armed conflict. Therefore, intervention in a context characterised by conflict is somewhat a risky venture, and Bush concludes, “[d]evelopment is inevitably conflictual, destabilising, and subversive because it challenges existing political, economic, and social power structures that stop individuals

and groups from attaining their full potentials” (Bush K. , Resource Kit, 2003a, p. 77). This is especially in conflict-prone regions. Nevertheless, a development intervention can also have peacebuilding impacts in an environment. This is possible when it diffuses inter-group tension through encouraging positive behaviours among groups. For instance, it may foster actions or projects that are inclusive of hostile groups. Alternatively, it may include actions that are exclusively building peace, that is, peacebuilding intervention (Bush K. , 1998).

Fischer and Wils observe that “[o]ver the last ten [now twenty] years, interest in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities has increased significantly. Relief and development organisations working in places of civil war have raised awareness of conflict-sensitive planning and are seeking to integrate peacebuilding activities into their work” (2003, p. 4). In consonance with this, Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005) note that over the last decade, there has been a growing realisation that humanitarian assistance sometimes feeds conflict rather than alleviate it.

Also, development aid sometimes exacerbates tensions. Several factors, scholars argue, influence the contributions an intervention will make to a given conflict situation (Akinyoade D. , 2010; 2011; Bush K. , 2009; Lange, 2004; Paffenholz, 2005; Anderson M. B., 1999). Some of the factors are the *peace and conflict sensitivity capacity of the intervening agency; how*’ the intervention agency does what it does (that is, operational procedure of its intervention programming) and external factors. The *capacity* of the intervening agency for peace and conflict sensitivity is a critical factor. This is because *how* an intervention is carried out will be significantly influenced by the *capacity* of the intervening agency or individual. How the intervening agency does what it does is also a critical factor. Bush (1999) argues that *how* an intervention is done is far more important than *what* is done in conflict settings. Some external factors also influence the impacts of intervention and its context on each other. External factors include the establishing authority, the policy framework, and the wider socio-political context in which the agency operates.

There has also been a growing interest to develop tools, methods or approaches to understand the relationship of intervention, peace, and conflict (2004, p. 1). The overriding intent is to maximise the positive and minimise the negative impacts of intervention and its conflict-prone context on each other. The most prominent of these

tools, methods or approaches are Kenneth Bush's *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment* (PCIA), Mary Anderson's *Do no Harm/Local Capacities for Peace Project*, Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff's *Conflict Sensitive Approaches* (CSA), and Thania Paffenholz's *Aid for Peace Approach*. (Schmelzle, 2005; Paffenholz, 2005). Other terminologies that have been used to describe similar approaches are: Conflict Impact Assessment; Conflict Sensitive Programming; Peace and Conflict Development Analysis; Conflict Impact Assessment System; Conflict Assessment; Conflict Risk Analysis; Strategic Conflict Assessment; Peace and Conflict Assessment Model (PCA); and Conflict Development Analysis; and Third Generation PCIA (Bush K. , 2005, p. 7; 2009, p. 5). The Strategic Conflict Assessment has been conducted on Nigeria by Nigeria's Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in collaboration with the Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and the World Bank. Some of these and similar approaches and/or methods are presented in Table 2.1 in the next chapter. Fifteen years into the introduction, development, use and adaptations of these approaches, the term *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment* (PCIA) has arguably emerged as the dominant or reference terminology for all approaches, methods and frameworks for pre-intervention assessment, during intervention and post-intervention measurement of peace and conflict impacts (Abitbol, 2013). Bush denotes these terminologies as essentially synonyms of his own PCIA (Bush K. , 2009, p. 5). PCIA can, therefore, be said to have become a generic or an umbrella term for assessing impacts with peace and conflict concerns, especially in conflict-prone contexts (The eventual dominance of the term PCIA might have been favoured by the popularity of a much older terminology in Environmental Studies—Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA]). The PCIA frameworks, therefore, seeks to assess potential or measure actual impacts (in peace and conflict terms) that intervention has had or will have in a conflict-prone context.

The Niger Delta Region (NDR) located in the southern part of Nigeria, with a long history of conflict, is conflict-prone. It comprises nine oil-producing states and is home to about 40 ethnic groups speaking 250 languages and dialects (*Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan*, 2006, henceforth, 'Master Plan', p.53.). Conflict in the resource-rich NDR has a long trajectory, predating Nigeria's independence. Causes of the conflict in the NDR are complex and interrelated. They include "...oil based en-



vironmental degradation, induced productivity losses and occupational disorientation, inadequate compensation for damages caused by oil industry, poor channels of communication by the oil companies, failed community development programmes...” (Ibaba, 2007, p. 1). In addition, feelings of neglect by the central government and marginalisation in mainstream national development, underdevelopment, bad governance, endemic poverty, systemic corruption, among others are other causes of conflicts that scholars have identified in the region. Except religious, all types of conflict — resource-based, psychological, environmental, and ethnic are present in the region (Albert, *The Niger Delta Conflict*, 2008). Principal actors in the conflict are the Niger Delta people (especially at the community level), the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), and multinational oil-producing companies. At some point, the Niger Delta (ND) conflict gradually became intractable, typified in various forms of violent conflict, armed conflicts, youth militancy, inter and intra communal conflicts, guerrilla warfare by militants against government forces, vandalism, hostage-taking among others. The ensuing culture of violence evolved into a war economy and proliferation of small and light weapons in the NDR. These have wide-ranging implications for the socio-economic life of individuals and communities in the region. In addition, at the national level, violence in the region disrupts oil production and thus affects national foreign exchange earnings.

The ND conflict situation is in its sixth decade. Each decade has its peculiar characteristics. The first decade (1960s) was largely a period of complacency with the prevailing illusion that development would automatically trickle down with oil-sector activities. This situation was possible due to a low level of education and widespread ignorance. The second decade (1970s) was characterised by passive resistance, as people began to ask questions. However, the general belief was that the existing institutional mechanisms were adequate to address the problems. Oil companies responded with mere tokenism in form of scholarship programmes, medical trips, and other palliatives. The third decade (1980s) witnessed improved education, an increase in population and greater masses’ awareness of their relative deplorable condition compared to other parts of the country. The tempo for the demand for a more equitable and transparent formula to the Niger Delta question was thus heightened. This perceived grievance increased the possibility of group mobilisation for collective action.

By the time the conflict entered its fourth decade in the 1990s, the patience of the people had not only thinned out but also exploded into strident agitations and protests of unprecedented proportions that shook the Nigerian nation. Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999 —the end of the fourth decade. Year 2000-2009 marked the fifth decade of conflict in the NDR. Agitation in the NDR continued throughout the first eight years of democratic rule in Nigeria. It assumed a new dimension of militancy during this period. It was characterised by armed confrontations between militant groups and the Nigerian Armed Forces, kidnapping of expatriate oil workers and, later, affluent Nigerians. In its sixth decade (and post-Amnesty Phase), violent conflict and militancy in the region subsided. Militants responded massively to the Federal Government granting amnesty in the second half of 2009. The amnesty was followed by a reintegration process (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2012).

Like conflict, intervention also has a long history in the Niger Delta Region (NDR). Intervention in this context refers to development aid, humanitarian assistance, or peacebuilding initiatives. Development intervention is a package of “[l]ong-term efforts aimed at bringing improvements in the economic, political, and social status, environmental stability and quality of life of the population especially the poor and the disadvantaged” (Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A Resource Pack, 2004, henceforth ‘Resource Pack’, p. 3). Humanitarian aid/assistance refers to “[a]ctivities designed to rapidly reduce human suffering in emergency situations, especially when local authorities are unable or unwilling to provide relief.” Peacebuilding interventions are “[m]easures designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of mediating conflict, as well as strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the creation of necessary conditions for sustained peace” (p. 3). Local and international actors have intervened at various times and levels of the NDR conflict. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), multinational oil companies (MOCs), and the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) have all intervened. Their interventions have been at the project, programme, or policy levels; at the level of the community or region and with diverse objectives such as aid (development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding), democracy, and good governance among others. FGN has the longest his-

tory of intervention in the NDR. Its various intervention strategies have included security responses, relief responses, political responses, and socio-economic responses (Isumonah A. V., 2003).

The socio-economic responses of the FGN involve setting up development agencies to cater for the needs of the region. The Balewa administration set up the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) 1960-1966. The Presidential Task Force was set up in 1980 by the 1979/1983 Shagari administration and was allocated 1.5% of the Federation Account to tackle developmental problems of the region (Master Plan 2006). In 1992, the Babangida administration established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) for the provision of infrastructure in the area. OMPADEC operated from 1992-1999. Through these establishments, the people of the NDR have suffered rising expectations, relative deprivation, and frustration. The result has been to engender more aggression and violent conflicts among the people (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2006). By the late 1990s, the Niger Delta had become a region where youths disrupted oil production and communities frequently engaged in destructive communal strife. This was the situation of things before the Federal Government established the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) by an Act of Parliament in 2000 as an intervention agency for the sustainable development and peacebuilding in the NDR. In the words of President Obasanjo, “[t]he Niger Delta Development Commission has the potential to offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic problems of the Niger Delta people.” (Master Plan 2006). The NDDC’s vision is to “offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region”. It has the mission “...to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful” (2006, p. 103).

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Literature in peace and development studies and, especially, in peace and conflict impact assessment has long argued for the existence of a relationship or nexus of development, conflict and peace. There are claims of the existence of mutual impacts (interactions) of intervention and its operational context and that these interactions have potentials to support conflict (by exacerbating conflict and/or undermining peace) or peace (by reducing conflict and/or building peace) in the context (Schmelzle, 2005; Bush, 1999; 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; Resource Pack). The potential of interventions to

impact (and be impacted by) its operational context negatively and/or positively suggests that the NDDC, in over a decade-long intervention in the region, could have exacerbated the conflict or built peace in the NDR. In other words, while the NDDC as an intervention agency might have a well-intended vision and mission, its interventions might have had/be having both negative and/or positive impacts on the ND contexts. On the other hand, the ND contexts might have impacted/be impacting on the NDDC interventions negatively or positively. The nature, dynamics, and implications of these potential/actual impacts of the NDDC interventions and the ND contexts have not been adequately/rigorously studied, using a PCIA approach (which has an overriding goal of minimising negative impacts and maximising positive impacts of an intervention in its operational context). PCIA involves mapping the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of intervention and its operational context with the aid of appropriate indicators. There is therefore the need to use the PCIA approach to assess the peace and conflict impacts of the NDDC interventions (projects and programmes) on the Niger Delta conflict situation. This will engender understanding the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and the NDR context and how to maximise the positive and minimise the negative impacts.

Such investigation is pertinent at this period because scientific knowledge on peace and conflict impact assessment has grown significantly since the establishment of the NDDC. The pre-NDDC government's intervention agencies earlier identified — NDDDB, Presidential Task Force, and OMPADEC— above were established in periods when research, scholarship and practice in peace and conflict impact assessment were in all practical sense non-existent. The periods were characterised by the assumption that development intervention would automatically lead to peace in the context of the intervention. Scholars and practitioners began to question this assumption in the early 1990s. Around late 1990s, when the NDDC was conceived by President Obasanjo, empirical evidence had emerged to reveal the fallacy of such assumption. Indeed, it has been realised that such interventions are never neutral in conflict or in contexts; rather, they have the potential to support either conflict or peace. Nonetheless, we are yet to apply the PCIA logic to the Commission's intervention in a rigorous academic study. For instance, existing works on the NDDC have not assessed its capacity for peace and conflict-sensitive intervention, which indicates the Commission's potential to maximise its positive and minimise its negative contributions in peace and conflict terms.

Also, while empirical works on gender issues in the Niger Delta exist (Aina, Adeyemi, Waziri, & Samuel, 2009), a gender-based assessment of the NDDC interventions and its implications for the operational context has not been adequately covered.

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

The overarching aim of the study is to map the interactions of the NDDC interventions and the NDR context with the view to understanding and explaining their nature, dynamics, and implications for peace and conflict dynamics in the region. Specific objectives include to:

1. determine the relationship between NDDC mandate and its intervention strategies as well as between the strategies and the needs of the Niger Delta people;
2. determine the extent to which peace and conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in the NDDC and its interventions;
3. assess the peace and conflict impacts of the NDDC interventions on Odi community context; and
4. explain the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and Odi community context.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

1. What is the relationship between the NDDC mandate and its intervention strategies; and between the strategies and the needs of the Niger Delta people?
2. To what extent is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in the NDDC and its interventions?
3. What are the peace and conflict impacts of the NDDC interventions on Odi context?
4. Why and how do the NDDC interventions and Odi community context interact?

### **1.5 Significance of Study**

Investigating the impacts of the relationship of the NDDC interventions and the NDR context has both scientific and policy relevance. In the context of scientific knowledge-production enterprise, the NDDC interventions and its operational context—the NDR—presents a good case for the application of the PCIA approach, that is, for empirically investigating its claims and arguments. Peace and conflict impact assessment makes ontological claims about the existence of such things as *interventions*

(developmental, humanitarian and peacebuilding), *intervention operational context*, ‘*interactions and impacts* (positive impact, negative impact, peacebuilding impact, and conflict impact). Justifying and knowing and understanding and explaining these ontological propositions is a purely scientific quest within the scope of empirical peace studies; indeed, it is one of the three epistemological branches of peace studies identified by Galtung (McCandless, 2007a).

However, since peace studies grapple with more complex situation of which empirical peace studies is only the beginning, this study moved from empirical peace studies to critical peace studies. Critical peace studies, “...based on criticism, taking explicit stands with respect to data and values with reference to the future particularly in terms of policy” (Galtung, 1996, pp. 6-9). Findings from the study will therefore enrich the literature and advance research in the area of impact assessment. Conceptions and propositions developed in this study are transferable to other settings towards understanding and explaining similar phenomena. By this, it connects the well-known need for development of concepts that cut across the peace and conflict impact assessment. The study helps in better conception and understanding the potential interactions of intervention and context. This may inform better intervention programming in conflict contexts, such that interventions will do more good and less harm.

The study is also worthwhile because it is policy-relevant. The NDDC is the Federal Government’s most comprehensive socio-economic and peacebuilding intervention in the NDR to date. It must therefore have contributed, in peace and conflict terms, to the NDR at the micro (individual and community) and meso (state or regional) levels. This study, due to its policy relevance, has normative value orientation for peace, social justice, and gender equity amongst other values to which the field of Peace and Conflict Studies is explicitly committed. Findings will shed light on the contributions of the NDDC to the NDR. This may inspire the review of the NDDC legal and policy framework by the Nigerian government to reflect sensitivity to peace, conflict and gender issues. The NDDC may also be inspired to adopt an institutional/operational policy that is sensitive to peace, conflict and gender. Similar intervention policies in the West Africa sub-region, the African continent and the world at large may draw from the findings and be adjusted to reflect such concerns. Actors — NGOs, CBOs, INGOs, MOCs and others— intervening in the NDR conflict and simi-


lar conflicts in Africa will be able to draw insights from the findings for intervention programming that build peace rather than exacerbate conflict.

## **1.6 The Study Area**

A detailed description of setting is important in a case study research, hence the need to describe the study area. This section therefore describes the geographic, political, social and cultural context of the study area. It includes information on the Niger Delta Region, Ijaw people and, specifically, on Odi community in Bayelsa State. It profiles cases of the Ijaw's involvement in conflicts, including Warri crisis and the oil conflicts in the Niger Delta. It then narrows down to profiling the 1999 Odi massacre. Profiling the study area in this manner is important to the study in order to understand Odi community as a context characterised by conflict and thus relevant in an endeavour to assess the impacts of intervention on the context and vice versa.

### **1.6.1 The Niger Delta Region**

The Niger Delta Region (NDR) is the delta of River Niger at the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean (Hogan, 2013). The NDR, the third largest body of wetlands in the world, is located in the southern part of Nigeria and home to about 40 ethnic groups speaking 250 languages and dialects (Master Plan, 2006). The ethnic groups are the Anang, Bekwarra, Bini, Efik, Ekpeye, Engenne, Etche, Ibeno, Ibiobio, Igbo, Ijaw, Ika-Igbo, Isoko, Itseriki, Obolo, Ogba, Okrikan, Oron, Ndoni, Nembe, Urhobo and Yoruba amongst others (Master Plan, 2006). They live in 13,329 settlements scattered across the region. Ninety-four per cent of the settlements have a population below 5,000 inhabitants; 99% of these settlements have populations below 20, 000 people (Master Plan, 2006). Based on their population sizes, less than one per cent—only 98 settlements—can be regarded as urban centres (Master Plan, 2006). Major urban centres include Aba, Akure, Asaba, Benin, Calabar, Ondo, Owerri, Port Harcourt, Umuahia, Uyo, Warri, and Yenagoa (Master Plan, 2006). Settlements in the region are predominantly small and scattered hamlets. They are largely rural communities in dispersed villages. A typical community comprises compounds, which are closely-spaced groups of small buildings housing 50 to 500 folks who are mostly farmers or fisher folks. Most of these communities lack basic amenities including power supply, safe water, medical facilities, adequate transportation and commercial facilities (Master Plan, 2006). Hence, the NDR people are predominantly rural dwellers with low standard of living.



**Plate 1. Niger Delta in the Context of Nigeria**

*Source: Ministry of Land and Survey: Ondo State, 2011.*




Currently, the NDR comprises nine states consisting of Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. Historically and cartographically, the Niger Delta comprises Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. Notably, there has been a distinction, in literature and public debates, between core/ecological Niger Delta and political Niger Delta, the latter being the creation of Obasanjo's administration, which included other oil-producing states in the current Niger Delta Region.

The unique ecology of the NDR makes physical development difficult as compared to the other parts of the country. Minority groups in the NDR had expressed fear of neglect and marginalisation before Nigeria's independence in 1960. Therefore, the need for a deliberate developmental plan for the region has been identified since then. After the discovery of oil in the 1950s, environmental degradation consequent on oil exploration activities and neglect by the multi-national oil companies and Nigerian government compounded the problem. This culminated in serious agitation by the people of the region (An overview of the instability is presented in section 2.1, while intervention efforts by different actors, especially, the Federal Government are presented in 2.2 of Chapter two)

### **1.6.2 The Ijaw People**

The term *Ijaw* is the anglicised version of *Ijo*, *Izon* or *Ejo*, a variation of *Ujo* or *Ojo*, the ancestor who gave the Ijo people their name, *Ijo*. With a population of about 14,000,000 people, it is the largest of the 40 ethnic groups in the Niger Delta Region and the fourth largest in Nigeria. The Ijo ethnic communities have lived in the Niger Delta for over seven, possibly, 10,000 years (Alagoa E. J., 2003). In 1500 AD, they were identified by Portuguese pilots as the largest ethnic group occupying all the coastal marshlands of the Nigerian coast from the Escravos to the Rio Real (Bonny/New Calabar) Rivers (Alagoa 2004:1 cited in Raji, forthcoming). The Ijo live in all parts of the Niger Delta, from the coast up to the point where the Niger River bifurcates into the Nun and Forcados Rivers as well as the many other tributary rivers of the Niger Delta from east to west (Alagoa E. J., 2003).

Like many traditional African nations, the Ijo live in clans, known locally as *Ibe*. An *Ibe* is headed by a chief priest who is provided with an office for the effective running of the clans (Raji, forthcoming). There was an early evolution of a centralised monarchy in the ancient commercial states of Nembe, Kalabari, Okrika, Bonny and Opobo where unified state authority was developed (Isumonah & Gaskia, 2001). Ijo



**Plate 2. Map of Nigeria Showing Bayelsa State**

*Source: Nigerian Geology Survey, 2015*

languages are grouped into Ijoid and the Benue-Congo branch of the Kwa-Congo sub-family of the Volta family of the Niger-Congo phylum of languages (Isumonah & Gaskia, 2001, pp. 25-26). The Ijoid languages are divided into two: the Defaka and Ijo. Defaka is a language spoken by relatively smaller people in Rivers while Ijo is a large language group spoken in Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Ondo states. Williamson (cited in Alagoa E. J., 1999) argues that the Ijo language did not originate from Edo, Yoruba or Igbo. Rather, it originated and had existed in the Niger Delta region for 7,000 years. Isumonah and Gaskia (2001) opine that the Ijo ethnic groups, Edo and Ibibio are the oldest indigenous inhabitants of the Niger Delta, owing to the fact that several Ijo communities in the western and eastern areas traced their roots back to central Ijo. In fact, Ijo traditions do not recall any place of origin outside the Niger Delta. The earliest ancestors, of whom little is known, are said to have “dropped from the sky” (that is to say that the Orus have divine origin). They were later joined by the Kumoni-Orus between about 400 CE and 650 CE (AD). The Kumoni-Orus first settled in the Nupe and Borgu regions, then the Ile-Ife region before moving to the Benin region via Nupe and Ife. Conclusively, Horton (cited in Alagoa E. J., 1999) suggests River Niger was the major route of early migration into the Niger Delta in the pre-Christian era.

In contemporary Nigeria, the Ijo population and political significance spread across 47 local government areas (LGAs) in Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Edo, Ondo and Akwa-Ibom states (Isumonah & Gaskia, 2001, p. 24). This makes the Ijo minorities in most of these states. However, the Ijo population is predominant in Bayelsa State where they occupy eight LGAs— Brass, Ekeremor, Kolokuma/Opokuma, Nembe, Ogbia, Sagbama, Southern Ijo, and Yenagoa of Bayelsa State (Alagoa E. J., 1999). The Ijo are found in Ese-Odo LGA in Ondo State; Warri South, Burutu, Bomadi and Patani local government areas (LGAs) of Delta State; and in 10 LGAs of Rivers State – Ogu-Bolo, Andoni, Opobo, Abua-Odual, Asari Toru, Akaku Toru, Degema, Okrika, Bonny and Ahoada West. The Ijo occupy Ovia South and Ovia North LGAs of Edo State; and Eastern-Obolo and Ibeno LGAs of Akwa Ibom State.

The geographical territory occupied by the Ijo is divided into three —eastern, central and western zones (Efere and Williamson, 1999 cited in Raji, forthcoming). The eastern zone, in Rivers and Akwa Ibom states, comprises Andoni including Ataba, NgaUnyeada, Eastern Obolo, Ibenu in Rivers and Akwa Ibom states; Bille (an

autonomous Kalabari-speaking community; Ibani (Bonny Kingdom); Kalabari; Nkoro, Okrika, and Opobo (also Ibani, and was created out of Bonny through the migration of one of the two Bonny ruling houses led by Jaja in 1869). The central zone (mostly in Bayelsa State) comprises Abua (Rivers State), Akassa (Akaha), Apoi, Bassan, Boma, Engenni (also in Rivers), Ekpetiama, Epie- Atisa, Gbaran, Iduwini, Kabowei, Kolo-kuma/Opokuma, Koluama, Nembe, Odual (located in Rivers State) Ogbia, Ogboin, Ogbobiri-mein, OkordiZarama, Biseni, Kou, Olodiana, Oporoma, Oyiakiri, Takakiri and Kumbo/Tungbo. The western zones are Akugbene- mein, Apoi (Ondo), Arogbo (Ondo), Egbema (Edo), Gbaramatu, Iduwini, IsabaKobowei, Kumbo, Ngbelebiri – Mein, Ogulagha, Obotebe, OgbeIjo, Ogbolubiri-mein, Okomu/GbaraunFumpagba, Olodiana, Oporoma, Seimbiri, Taraki and Tuomo (Efere and Williamson, 1999 cited in Raji, forthcoming). Notable Ijo organisations include the Ijaw National Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Ijaw Elders Forum, the Ijaw Youth Congress, Congress of the Niger Delta Youths, and the National Union of Izon-Ebe Students.

### **1.6.3 The Ijaw and Conflicts in the Niger Delta**

In tracing the origin of the Ijaw and conflicts in the Niger Delta, one needs to go back to the pre-colonial period. The first recorded contact of the Niger Delta with visitors from the outside world, specifically the Portuguese, was in 1471 (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014). The subsequent relationship that developed between both sides led to mutually-beneficial trade, exchanges which saw the Oba of Benin offer pepper, ivory and slaves in exchange for coral beads, textiles and other products from the European markets (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014). Slave Trade led to some breakdown of the inter-community trade relationships. However, the trade dwindled due to a more lucrative opportunity provided in the palm oil trade. The palm oil market boom coincided with the Industrial Revolution in Europe because there was a surge in the demand for factory machine lubricant. Also, secondary demand for palm oil-based products, for example soaps and margarine grew, increasing the demand for the natural oil due to growth in European wealth and population (Okonta & Oronto, 2001; Omoweh, 2005; Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014). However, with the growing oil trade, conflict soon ensued among Niger Delta middlemen. This was because the middlemen, who were from different tribes and regions, wanted a better share of the market. This gave the European better profit as they had better market advantage. This situation led to the first major conflict involving the Ijaw people over

resources in the Niger Delta (Okonta & Oronto, 2001; Omoweh, 2005; Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014).


Tensions rose to a point where the first major conflict occurred, the rebellion of King William Koko of Nembe, who from 1894-1895 resisted the Royal Niger Company's attempts to shut out the Nembe people from the lucrative trade in palm oil. This was a major event and is particularly noteworthy as it marks the feeling of imposition that the residents of the Niger Delta have felt since the 19th Century. (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2014)

In contemporary times, conflict in the NDR is rooted in the peculiar ecological and environmental problems, the condition of abject poverty under which most inhabitants of the Niger Delta live, perceived threats to claim to land by other groups alongside the concern over loss of control over their homeland and their own lives due to oil industry activities. These have caused and fuelled several conflicts in the Niger Delta Region. Conflicts in the region have not left out the Ijaw. Within the last two decades, the Ijaw have been involved in many ethnic and resource conflicts. Notable among them are the Ijaw-Itsekiri Conflict (the Warri Crisis) and the recurrent resource control or oil-related conflicts, which has become characteristic of the Niger Delta Region. The Warri Crisis started in March 1997 as an ethnic conflict between Ijaw and Itsekiri militants especially in Warri town. The remote cause is traceable to the age-old rivalry over the European trade, dating back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century, between the two groups. The rivalry was nurtured by retitling the Olu of Itsekiri as Olu of Warri by the Awolowo's Western Nigeria Government in 1952 (Human Rights Watch, 2003, pp. Vol. 15, No.18 (A)). It was an act which the other two main ethnic groups with aboriginal claims to Warri—the Ijaw and Urhobo—interpreted as an attempt to impose an Itsekiri rule over them. The immediate cause of the Warri Crisis was the relocation of the headquarters of the newly-created Warri South-West Local Government Council from Ogbe-Ijoh (in Ijaw area of Warri) to Ogidigben (in Itsekiri area of Warri). In the ensuing riots, hundreds died, and six Shell Nigeria installations were seized, leading to a drop in oil production (Manby, 1999). The LGA headquarters was later relocated to Ogbe-Ijo by the Delta State House of Assembly, bringing relative peace to the region. However, there has been recurrence of the Warri Crisis in 1998, 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2009. At the heart of the crises, which has pitched the indigenous ethnic groups against each other at different times is the question of ownership. This "...is not only unre-

solved to date but [is] at the root of all crisis affecting Warri city and its surrounding areas.” (Courson, 2007, p. 8)

Also, the Ijaw people have taken active part in the Niger Delta struggle for resource control. The highpoint of Ijaw’s involvement in the struggle is the All Ijaw Youths Conference in December 1998 culminating in the formation of Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM) and the issuing of the Kaiama Declaration. The IYM pledged “to struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice,” and planned a campaign —Operation Climate Change— of celebration, prayer, and direct action beginning on December 28, 1998. As the Ijaw Youth Movement mobilised for the campaign later in the month, the Nigerian troops occupied Bayelsa and Delta states with 10 to 15,000 troops and two warships. On December 30, 2,000 youths, dressed in black, singing and dancing were fired upon with machine guns and tear gas. Three protesters were killed and 25 others were arrested. Three more protesters were killed in a march demanding the release of those detained by the soldiers. The head of Yenagoa rebels was burned alive in his residence on December 28, 1998 (Ijaw Youth Movement, 1998; Ezeaku, 2006).

The military government declared a state of emergency throughout Bayelsa State. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed and meetings were banned. Military road-blocks, beatings of local residents and rape of women and girls at night were commonplace. Two Ijaw communities in Delta State —Opia and Ikivan- were attacked on January, 4, 1999 by 100 soldiers from the military base at Chevron’s Escravos facility. Other atrocities committed by the soldiers included shooting the traditional leader of Ikiyan, a seven-year-old girl and some others, setting villages ablaze, destruction of canoes and fishing equipment, livestock, churches and shrines. (Ijaw Youth Movement, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Ezeaku, 2006). In spite of these, Operation Climate Change continued, disrupting the nation’s oil supplies by turning off oil-pipe valves in Ijaw territory through much of 1999. In the context of the conflict between the Ijaw and the Federal Government of Nigeria, the civilian government under former president Olusegun Obasanjo ordered military action against Odi (Section 1.6.5). This incident has become historic in Odi (and Nigeria), to which a discourse on the community, such as this one, must make reference (Ijaw Youth Movement, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Ezeaku, 2006).



**Plate 3. Map of Bayelsa State showing Local Governments Areas**

Source: Nigerian Geology Survey, 2015

#### **1.6.4 Odi community**

Odi is a community in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA (with headquarters in Kaiama). It is located beside one of the tributary rivers of River Niger, bordered in the north by Odoni and Agbere, in the south by Sampou and Kaiama along the River Nun bank. Its western neighbours are Patani and Abari, while in the east is OkordiaZarama. Its built-up area is 3.85 km north-south and 2.6 km east-west (Google Earth Image, 2011). Odi has 27 communities (formerly referred to as compounds but rechristened *communities* for political reasons). It is divided into north and south parts. There are 13 communities in the north while the south has 14 communities. Communities in the north are Amakiriebi-ama, Amatus, Ebereze, Ede-ama, Ekpevama, Fisin, Ifidi, Keminanabo, Mamuagha, Osiakeme-ama, Ogien-ama, Payo, and Timbo-ama. The south comprises Ayakoro-ama, Bethlehem-ama, Bolou-ama, Burudani-ama, Ikiri-ama, Ineinfagha/Akangele-ama, Obimo, Oboribengha, Obuka-ama, Ofouwara/Gbagba-ama, Ogboloma, Sounbiri, Tamukunoun, Tonbere-ama (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011). The community has three wards.

There are four cardinal groups in Odi community. These are the Traditional Council, the Community Development Committee (CDC), the Youth Council, and the women's group. The Traditional Council is headed by His Highness, the Amananaowei (King) and has 27 chiefs representing each of the communities in Odi. Membership in the Traditional Council is by election. While the Amananaowei is elected for life, the chiefs are elected for three years. Upon the demise of the King, his first son acts as a regent for two years before election is conducted for the next King (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011). Membership of the Youth Council is open to any female and male youth age between 15 and 45 who has a maternal or paternal affiliation to the community. Interested individuals in this category register with a token fee to become a member. Any member can vie for elective post by campaigning and seeking vote through election. Elections are held every two years through the open or secret ballot system. The Youth Council is a vibrant and formidable organisation in the community, with well-articulated 12-point objectives covering almost every facet of community life (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011).


Divergent views between the Tradition Council and the Youth Council often lead to tension between the two groups. However, in Odi, the Youth Council usually defers to the Traditional Council on many occasions out of respect for the elders and in



order to “allow peace to reign”. The Women Group, headed by the Ereamini da-arū, comprises every community woman by default. The Ereamini da-arū is chosen by the women themselves to manage their affairs. The current Ereamini da-arū has been in office since the 1999 Odi Massacre (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011). The Community Development Committee is a group set up for the development of the community. It is supposed to be the community’s contact with any development initiative in the community. Each of the 10 members is elected democratically from communities. No community can have more than one member. The group is headed by a chairman. At the time of the fieldwork, the CDC was being reconstituted in Odi. It is a strong and viable structure for development in the Niger Delta (Source: Fieldwork interview, 2011).


### **1.6.5 Odi Massacre**

Much has been written about the Odi Massacre. It is profiled here to describe the social and political contexts of the study area and thereby fulfil one of the criteria for increasing external validity or transferability of the findings of this study (Tables 3.1 and 3.3). The massacre occurred within the context of the conflict between the Ijaw and the Federal Government; and between the Ijaw resident in Lagos and the militant Yoruba group —Odu’a People’s Congress (OPC) (Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth, 2002). The immediate cause of the conflict was the murder of seven policemen by hoodlums who were operating from Odi. These hoodlums were reported to be the political thugs employed by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to win the 1998 and early 1999 elections. Since their services were no longer needed by their benefactors after the elections, they became unemployed. They therefore took to terrorising residents of Yenagoa. Dislodged from their base in Yenagoa, they operated from Odi. On November 10, the Federal Government gave a 14-day ultimatum to the Bayelsa State government to arrest and prosecute the hoodlums or face imposition of a state of emergency on the state. However, on November 20, 1999, four days to the expiration of the ultimatum, soldiers surrounded Odi and neighbouring communities. According to the report of ERA/FOE, Nigeria, “by the time the military operation ended, 2,483 people, including women and children, lay dead. Many more were displaced, injured, and traumatised and an inestimable number of properties destroyed.” (2002, p. 6). Most of the community’s 60,000 inhabitants, who were not killed, were arrested, or fled into the forest.



**Plate 4. Map of Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA showing Odi**

*Source: Nigerian geology Survey, 2015*



**Plate 5. Google Earth Image of Built-up Area of Odi**

*Source: Fieldwork, Google Earth, 2011.*

At the time of the fieldwork —11 years after the massacre— Odi community had become a peaceful community. There were no open conflicts, however, as revealed by the study, low profile and latent dissatisfaction abound. Moreover, the massacre was a reference point in discussions with all the community people interviewed, hence the need to profile it here.

## **1.7 Scope of the Study**

The study assessed the interactions of the NDDC community development interventions —Infrastructural Development Projects (IDPs) and Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDPs) and Odi community context. The interventions included all the NDDC undertaken in the community between 2006 and 2011. These interventions generally fall within the NDDC Quick Impacts Projects (QIPs) and the early phase (years 1-5) of the implementation of the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. The study limited its investigation to how these interventions were programmed by the NDDC and its implications for the peace and conflict dynamics in the community. Specifically, it examined how each stage of the intervention impacted upon the context (that is, its elements such as conflict causes, actors, profile and dynamics of conflict in the community) and vice versa; and the consequences of these interactions on both the intervention and the community context. It assessed the Commission's capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity.

The interventions evaluated were:

### *Infrastructural Development Programmes*

1. Construction of roads, including the Odi-Trofani Road and Agberiyeye-Odoni to Sampo Road.
2. Pavement of the concrete link roads within the community.
3. Electrification of Odi (uncompleted at the time of the fieldwork).
4. Provision of science laboratory and construction of classrooms in public schools in Odi.
5. Replacement of community school converted to government school.
6. Rehabilitation of community guest house.

### *Human Capacity Development Programmes*

1. Agricultural support programme (training in aquaculture, mushroom, grasscutter rearing, beekeeping, and snail rearing).
2. Rice plantation.
3. Distribution of flying boats.
4. Training of youths on nonviolence.



**Plate 6. Researcher and an Elderly Respondent in Odi Community**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



**Plate 7. Researcher with Godwin Unumeri (Expert on PCIA and Niger Delta)**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



**Plate 8. Rural Electrification Project**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



**Plate 9. NDDC Water Project in Odi**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*





**Plate 10. Odi-Trofani Road**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



**Plate 11. Odi Internal Concrete Link Road by the Women's Leader's House**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*

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**Plate 12. Internal Concrete Link Road, Odi**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



**Plate 13. A Block of Six Classrooms at Government Secondary School, Odi**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



**Plate 14. Six-room Science Laboratory at Government Secondary School, Odi**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



**Plate 15. Staff Quarters at the Government Secondary School, Odi**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*

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**Plate 16. Bioresource Development Centre (BIODEC), Odi.**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*

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**Plate 17. Bioresource Development Centre (BIODEC), Odi**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*



## 1.8 Limitations of Study

The study was mainly limited by the frequent violence in the Niger Delta region. Incidents of road blockade, violent demonstrations, and armed confrontations delayed collection of data at some point in the research. Also, the 2011 sacking of the NDDC Board hindered access to information from NDDC staff as they were instructed not to “talk to anybody” about the Commission. The research had to be delayed until the members of staff were again willing to provide needed information. These limitations, however, did not in any way compromise the integrity of the data collection, analyses and findings.

## 1.9 Conceptual Discourse

**Community context:** This is a locality, a specific geographical, political or social environment where conflict exists. It is a conflict zone. It could be at micro, meso or macro levels, that is, it could be community, district/province, region, country, or transnational. A context comprises four elements —actors, causes, profile and dynamics— which confer on it its characteristic features.

**Actors:** These are individuals, groups, institutions who contribute to the conflict, who are affected by the conflict (positively or negatively) and/or involved in dealing with the conflict. Interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships with other actors differentiate actors from one another. Actors include external actors and community actors.

**Community actors:** These are resident and non-resident community members including individuals and groups. Resident community members are also referred to as the critical stakeholders in an intervention programme.

**Ward 12 constituency:** This is a unique set of actors in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA. It includes influential individuals such as politicians, the NDDC staff and other government officials who are non-resident indigenes of communities in the LGA but lobby for government assistance on behalf of their community.

**External actors:** These are people who originally are not constituent parts of the conflict but became involved mainly to intervene in conflict. They include the FGN, the NDDC —its board, management and staff— the NDDC contractors and consultants, I/NGOs, IGOs, and politicians from outside the community.

**Causes of conflict:** These are factors that contribute to people's grievances. They may be structural, proximate or triggers.

**Structural factors:** These are pervasive factors that have been built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and which may increase the likelihood of violence.

**Proximate factors:** They are those that make for an atmosphere conducive to violent conflict or its escalation.

**Triggers:** These are single acts, events, or their anticipation setting off or escalating violent conflict. They affect the timing of the onset of a violent conflict explaining why the conflict started at that moment and not why it started.

**Profile:** This is a brief characterisation of the context in which an intervention will be situated. It includes political, economic, socio-cultural context, emergent issues, and history of conflict.

**Dynamics:** This is the interaction between conflict causes, actors and profile, including current conflict trends, windows of opportunity and scenarios that can be developed from the analyses of the causes, actors and profile of conflict (The Resource Pack, 2004).

**Conflict situation:** This is a particular set of prevalent circumstances existing in a particular place at a particular time as a result of two or more parties disagreeing and acting in pursuit of perceived incompatible goals in the distribution of material or symbolic resources (Adapted from the Resource Pack, 2004). It is the prevalent conflict trend between/among parties to the conflict.

**Intervention:** This is a range of deliberate initiatives or activities, which aim at positively influencing a situation to bring about an improvement or to forestall deterioration. In conflict settings, these initiatives or activities aim to forestall exacerbation of the conflict and weakening of peace on one hand and reduce violent conflict behaviours and build peace on the other. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (in its broadest sense) are critical goals of intervention in settings characterised by violent conflict. Intervention has three main stages —planning (including conception), implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Intervention in this discourse refers to aid

interventions, that is, developmental and humanitarian; and peace intervention, that is, peacebuilding.

**Developmental interventions:** These are long-term efforts aimed at bringing improvements in the economic, political, and social status, environmental stability and quality of life of the population especially the poor and disadvantaged (The Resource Pack, 2004: 4).

**Humanitarian interventions:** These are activities designed to rapidly reduce human suffering in emergency situations, especially when local authorities are unable or unwilling to provide relief (The Resource Pack, 2004: 4).

**Peacebuilding interventions:** These are measures designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of mediating conflict, as well as strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the creation of necessary conditions for sustained peace (The Resource Pack, 2004: 5).

**Impacts:** This describes an interaction in terms of its contribution to exacerbating or mitigating violence or the potential for violence.

**Intervention-Context Interaction (ICI):** These are inevitable reciprocal and combined interactions between stages of intervention and elements of context. That is, each of the three stages of intervention programming relate, inevitably, with each of the four elements of the context. In a conflict situation, ICI could have negative or positive impact.

**Negative Impacts:** These refer to both conflict-supporting impacts and peace-undermining/destroying impacts of interactions.

**Positive Impacts:** These are impacts that support the dynamics and structures of peace (peacebuilding) and weaken the dynamics and structures of violent conflict.

**Planning:** This is the process through which certain problems are identified, their causal linkages analysed, and effective solutions developed. The result of this process is often embodied in a programme designed with predefined objectives, activities, implementation process and verifiable indicators of progress.

**Implementation:** This is the process of realising objectives by enacting the activities designed in the planning process – the operationalization of the proposal. Implementation involves regular progress reviews to make plans adjustable if necessary.

**Monitoring:** This is the regular process of examining a project's actual outputs and impacts. Carried out during the implementation phase, monitoring seeks to provide the project team with current information that will allow them assess progress in meeting project objectives, and to adjust implementation activities if necessary. Additionally, monitoring generates data that can be used for evaluation purposes.

**Evaluation:** This is a one-off assessment that typically takes place at the end of a project, although it can also be undertaken as a mid-project review. On the basis of systematically-applied objective criteria, it seeks to assess an on-going or completed project, its design, implementation and overall results in relation to its stated goals and objectives.

**Peace and conflict sensitivity:** This is the consciousness of the inevitable interaction between an intervention and its context and its implication for peace and conflict dynamics; and programming the intervention in a manner to maximise positive and minimise negative impacts. It involves mainstreaming peace and conflict concerns in the full intervention programming cycle —planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

**Peace and conflict sensitive planning:** Incorporating conflict analyses — causes, actors, profile, and dynamics into traditional programme conception and planning for the purpose of maximising positive and minimising negative impacts.

**Peace and conflict sensitive implementation:** Maximising positive and reducing negative impacts on the context as a goal of traditional implementation by closely scrutinizing the context through regular updating of the conflict analyses (The Resource Pack, 2004).

**Peace and conflict sensitive monitoring:** This is when an understanding of the elements of context is incorporated into traditional monitoring processes and activities. Its goal is to better understand the context and intervention and interactions between them to maximise the positive while reducing the negative impacts of the intervention on the peace and conflict dynamics. Peace and conflict sensitive monitoring may inform changes or adjustments to intervention activities (The Resource Pack, 2004).

**Peace and conflict sensitive evaluation:** It involves incorporating detailed understanding of the operating context in terms of historical, actual or potential conflict into traditional evaluation activities and processes. It seeks “...to understand the overall impact a given intervention has had on this context, and the context on the intervention” (Introduction to the Resource Pack, 2004: 4).

### **1.10 Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the study. It provided background information on peace and conflict impact assessment in conflict setting and presented the research problem, objectives, questions, and significance. It identified the study’s epistemology as empirical and critical peace studies. The study is clearly delimited in scope as covering all NDDC interventions from 2006 to 2011 in Odi community and it included six Infrastructural Development Projects and four Human Capacity Development Programmes. This study has relevance to theory, practice, policy, and it contributes to scientific knowledge in the area of peace and conflict impact assessment.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

In scientific research, the review of literature is done to acquire scientific perspective about the subject of investigation, identify gap in the literature, avoid re-inventing the wheel as well as conceptual and procedural problems among others. Categories of information covered in reviewing literature include information on the content of the research, theory, method and data analyses. This chapter presents a review of the extant literature in these core areas. It covers literature on the nature and trajectory of conflict in the Niger Delta Region in section 2.1 and peacebuilding efforts in the Niger Delta Region in 2.2. In section 2.3, it discusses theory verification and theory generation in scientific research and emphasises the need to generate theories of peace and conflict impact assessment. Section 2.4 presents the PCIA theoretical framework and section 2.5 presents a tabular summary review of 15 PCIA's and a detailed review of the four most prominent approaches in academic discourse. These include Bush's *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment*, Anderson's *Do no Harm/Local Capacities for Peace Programme*, Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff's *Conflict Sensitive Approaches* and Paffenholz's *Aid for Peace Approach*. The Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approaches—an integration and adaptation of the prominent approaches for the purpose of this study—is presented in section 2.6. Section 2.7 is a discourse on gender mainstreaming, introducing the gender dimension of this study. Section 2.8 discusses gaps in the literature on the Niger Delta and peace and conflict impact assessment that this study seeks to fill. The final Section 2.9 presents two conceptual frameworks used in this study—Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity Framework and the Gender-Based Analysis Framework.

#### 2.1 Conflicts in the Niger Delta

In *Trade and politics in the Niger Delta*” Kenneth Dike provides a historical background to the Niger Delta Crisis, documenting the economic and political developments in the region from 1830 to 1885. The work focuses on the nature of relationships

between the region's people and their African neighbours alongside the relationship between the Niger Delta peoples and the Europeans in the Gulf of Guinea. It argues that conflicts in the NDR predate Nigeria's independence as well as oil discovery and exploitation in the region (Dike, 1956). Resource control, as a feature of NDR conflicts, also predates independence and oil. In *Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo Relations and the European Presence 1884-1936*, Obaro Ikime (1969) also provides insight into the Niger Delta conflicts. Focusing on Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko ethnic groups, he contests that the primary cause of tension and violence among the ethnic groups was essentially the question of resource control. In addition, Ogbogbo (2004) explains that accumulated grievance consequent upon faulty management solutions over the years has contributed to the conflict. In the same light, Isumonah asserts: "the success of the Obasanjo administration's management model for Niger Delta conflicts will be determined by the extent of its accommodation of the concerns of the people of Niger Delta that in the first instance gave rise to them (Isumonah A. V., 2003, p. 223). Ogbogbo and Isumonah's views border on the quest of this study —an investigation into how *management solutions*' in form of interventions have contributed to the conflict situation. In its description of the Niger Delta region, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report supports their views as well as identifies other factors:

"...the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor and endemic conflict... for most people of the Delta, progress and hope, much less prosperity, remain out of reach." (United Nations Development Programme, 2006).

This situation has led to festering violence, organised crime and economic sabotage, kidnapping, agitation and pervasive tension in the Niger Delta. This, analysts declare, is rooted in the feeling of neglect and unfairness the region bears against the Nigerian state. It gave rise to regional or ethnic political movements, such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC); militant groups, such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); and the essentially criminal organisations, servicing politicians at the state level, such as the Icelanders/Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Outlaws, both of Rivers State (Cole, Mitchell, Ohlsen, Rinaldi, & Unumeri, 2008). In the region, "[c]urrent levels of violence, driven by criminality, impunity and corruption, are very high. The

immediate causes of violent conflict, while rooted in the issues noted above, can be very local and demand specific analysis” (Cole, Mitchell, Ohlsen, Rinaldi, & Unumeri, 2008, p. 4)

Seeking an intervention in the situation, the International Crisis Group reports 115 and 119 of August 3 and October 25, “The swamps of insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta unrest” and “Nigeria’s faltering Federal Experiment” espoused solutions to the Niger Delta crisis. The ICG calls for inputs from stakeholders —Nigeria’s Federal Government, state governments, energy companies, the US, the EU and EU member states with major oil interests in Nigeria (UK, France and Italy), the United Nations, and the wider international community. From the foregoing, conflict has a long history in the region. Alagoa (1999), in “The Ijaw Nation in the New Millennium”, observes that the Niger Delta conflict has been changing with time as the parties to the conflict —the antagonists and protagonists— also change with time. Also, attempts to stem the tides of the dynamic conflict are almost as old as the conflict itself.

## **2.2 Peacebuilding Efforts in the Niger Delta**

According to the IPCR, there are three categories of responses to conflict in Nigeria — tracks I, II and III, that is, governmental, non-government actors and civil society, and international responses (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002, p. 30). This is the pattern in the Niger Delta conflicts. Non-government actors and civil society have led peace campaigns and participated in cross-communal peace initiatives. Moreover, they have been involved in providing and coordinating relief, conducting studies of conflicts and organising workshops and various techniques of conflict resolution, and implementing peacebuilding initiatives. Transnational oil companies have also been supporting programmes to improve the conditions of host communities. This involves compensating them for environmental damage and instituting recruitment policies that favour indigenous people from host communities (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002, p. 33).

The Human Rights Watch, in its reports, provides some insights into the developmental interventions of the multinational oil companies (MOCs) in the Niger Delta. It reports that Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) claims to have an active community assistance programme (now community development programme) which as at 1996 spent about U.S \$36million to execute development projects based on the needs of the people and in agreement with their communities. Mobil claims to have



spent an average of U.S \$8million annually on community development projects between 1990 and 1997. Chevron Nigeria Limited reports that it spent approximately U.S. \$28 million on community development and other forms of assistance to its host communities (Human Rights Watch, 1999). For instance, some of the most recent initiatives by MOCs include Chevron's Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) and Shell's Communities and Shell Together (CAST) Project. However, initiatives by MOCs are usually focused on specific locales of the region, usually, their areas of oil-exploration activities. The involvement of international organisations in peacebuilding efforts has increased over the years. Notable among these are the Stakeholders of Peace Workshop and the Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria (including the NDR) jointly sponsored by the World Bank, DFID, UNDP, and USAID, (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002, p. 34). Further efforts to build peace in the Niger Delta have been highlighted by Albert (2001) in *Building Peace, Advancing Democracy: Experience with Third-Party Interventions in Nigeria's Conflict*. He draws attention to the fact that USAID/OTI in collaboration with several NGOs, intervened in more than a hundred social conflicts in different parts of Nigeria between April 1999 and September 2001, and many others in the Niger Delta (Albert, 2001a, p. 7).

On its own part, the Nigerian government has employed a mixture of measures to *build peace* in the region. Such peacebuilding measures range from *security responses* by the use of force to *relief responses* to victims of crisis. It also includes *political responses* by setting up panels of inquiry, creation of new administrative units, peace and security committees facilitating memorandum of understanding between oil companies and local communities as well as instituting and commissioning research. Finally, there are *socio-economic responses* that make development inputs through establishing such bodies as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, October 2002).

Isumonah (2003) observes that government interventions in the Niger Delta crisis explains that before the exploitation of oil began in the NDR, a colonial government commission of enquiry, the Willink's Commission of 1957/58, recognised its peculiar developmental challenges and recommended a developmental board. Consequently, subsequent administrations have set up various developmental agencies to ameliorate these problems. The Balewa administration set up the Niger Delta Devel-

opment Board (NDDB) by an Act of Parliament in 1961. The 1979/83 administration set up a Presidential Task Force (popularly known as the 1.5% Committee) in 1980 and 1.5% of the Federation Account was allocated to the committee to tackle the developmental problems of the region. In 1992, the Babangida administration established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) for provision of infrastructure in the area. Due largely to the failure of OMPADEC and the continued restiveness in the area, the Obasanjo administration established in 2000 the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).

Furthermore, Isumonah highlights minor remedial programmes of government in the area, including the establishment of a technical training institute to provide vocational training for school leavers of Bonny; mandating the Federal Ministry of Labour, Employment and Productivity to create 1,000 jobs in each of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states, under the pilot scheme of employment creation for the Niger Delta; also, a free school bus scheme was proposed for the area. In November 2000, the government rolled out a 12-point programme. This comprises the establishment of NDDC; achieving 2000 gas flaring by 2010; remediation and rehabilitation of impacted/spilled sites using state-of-the-art technology; conflict resolution/crisis management programmes; and community participation programme public/private partnership programme. In addition, the programme included integrated environmental management and development programme; provision of basic infrastructure such as water, electricity, and telephone; cottage/small-scale industries development/support programme, farmers' empowerment scheme, community health enhancement/promotion programme; and environmental programme.

The characteristic operations and outcome of government agencies in the region could be summed up in a review of the activities of the OMPADEC:

“...but what is clear is that OMPADEC suffered from lack of focus, inadequate and irregular funding, official profligacy, corruption, excessive political interference, lack of transparency and accountability, and high overhead expenditure. Most of its projects had little to do with poverty reduction and the vast majority of the people did not benefit from its activities. In brief, OMPADEC failed abjectly to abate discontent and restiveness in the Region.” (The Niger Delta Regional Master Plan: 57).

On the eve of the departure of the Obasanjo government which covered 1999-2007, hitherto Nigeria's longest period of democratic rule, Richard Dowden, the director of the Royal African Society, which promotes cooperation between Britain and African nations, observed that:

He (Olusegun Obasanjo) leaves bloody anarchy in the Niger Delta, which produces most of Nigeria's 2.5million bbl of oil a day and increasing volumes of gas. At least 1,000 people a year are killed in battles on land and sea between the 50-odd militias who fight the authorities as well as each other for opportunities to steal oil and kidnap oil workers for ransom" (Dowden, 2007).

Dowden's observation aptly captures the fact that successive Nigeria regimes efforts to *build peace* in the region have failed woefully and that the Niger Delta situation has become more complicated and dangerous. In a United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Newsom contends:

The situation in the delta remains fragile and will likely return either to intermittent conflict or full-blown insurgency within six to eighteen months if a "business as usual" approach is taken to interventions. (June 2011, p. 1)

### **2.3 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Frameworks**

A peace and conflict impact assessment mainstreams peace and conflict sensitivity into traditional assessment. In other words, it assesses a given programme or intervention with explicit bias for peace and conflict issues. As discussed in chapter one, various approaches, methods, frameworks and tools have been developed to map, assess, and evaluate the impacts of intervention in/on conflict settings. This section presents a summary of 15 of such approaches in Table 2.1 and reviews four prominent ones identified earlier in section 1.1.

**Table 2.1. A Summary of some Approaches/Methods/Frameworks for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Framework/ Organisation/ Field of activity/ Authors/Year of issue</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Potential Users</b>	<b>Assump-tions</b>	<b>Meth-odology</b>	<b>Resources</b>
1	Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) DFID; DEV* Jonathan Goodhand, Tony Vaux, Robert Walker January 2002	Country/ regional strategic planning, can also be applied to projects/ programmes	Re- gional, national, Local	DFID and partner bilateral / multilateral agencies desk officers	Combine political and economic dimensions; greed/grievance; structures and actors	Combi- nation of desk study and field consultations	Assessment team (5 people). Consultation meetings in-country
2	Benefits / harms handbook CARE;DEV/HA Paul O'Brien September 2001	Analysis, impact assessment and project (re)design	Local – mainly project level	NGO project managers, field staff	Focus on rights-based approach	Desk-based and field re- search and possible work- shop consultations	Varies – few hours in emergencies to more detailed workshops / consultations
3	Conflict Analy- sis Framework (CAF) World Bank; DEV; Per Wam & Shonali Sardesai October 2002	Country strategic planning	Na- tional, can also be adapted to (sub) re- gional	Multilateral organisation desk staff / plan- ners	Focus on socio- economic dimen- sions of conflict	Check- list; Desk studies, work- shops, stake- holder consulta- tions, consult- ants	Full CAF analysis resource inten- sive (workshops, consultations, consultants); but can be simpli- fied
4	Conflict analysis and response definition FEWER, WANEP & CCR; PB FEWER April 2001	Early warning, country strategic planning	Na- tional, local	Diplomats, donor desk officers, NGOs	Focus on conflict dynam- ics	On- going analysis by local civil so- ciety organisa- tions	Modest for desk study; more for training or workshops

<b>S/ N</b>	<b>Framework/ Organisation/ Field of activ- ity/ Authors/Year of issue</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Potential Users</b>	<b>Assump- tions</b>	<b>Meth- odology</b>	<b>Resources</b>
5	EC Checklist for root causes of conflict; European Commission(EC); DEV; EC 2001	Early warning, strategic and programme planning	National, regional	Multi- and bilateral donor desk officers, diplomatic actors	Focus on structural root causes of conflict	Checklist; external research capacity	Limited as mainly desk-based
6	Working with conflict: skills and strategies for action; Responding to conflict; PB Fisher et al.; 2000	Conflict analysis, programme planning	Local, national	Local and INGO staff, field and headquarters	Focus on understanding conflicts	Collection of tools for participatory conflict analysis	Limited depending on format (workshop, consultation meetings etc)
7	Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC): Analysis tools for humanitarian actors; World Vision; DEV / HA Stephen Jackson & Siobhan Calthrop January 2003	Conflict analysis, project planning	National, regional	NGO emergency response, development and advocacy staff	Focus on chronic political instability, dovetails with Do No Harm	Collection of tools, flexible application	Variable, depending on use of tools, desk study or consultations
8	Do No Harm / Local capacities for peace project; Collaborative for Development Action (CDA); Mary Anderson 2001	Conflict analysis, project monitoring and impact assessment	Local	Donor, NGO (international and local) staff	Focus on dividers and connectors in conflict	Workshop, integration into standard procedures	Limited, for workshop
9	Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (CPAF); Clingendael Institute; DEV/F Suzanne Ver-	Conflict analysis, country strategic planning	National, sectorial	Donor and embassy staff	Focus on indicators of internal conflict and state	External research capacity, workshops	Costs of preparing for and holding workshops, can include external

<b>S/ N</b>	<b>Framework/ Organisation/ Field of activ- ity/ Authors/Year of issue</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Potential Users</b>	<b>Assump- tions</b>	<b>Meth- odology</b>	<b>Resources</b>
	stegen, Luc van de Goor (together with Fund for Peace); Summer 2000				failure		consultant involvement
10	Early Warning and Preventive Measures - UN System Staff College (UNSSC); UNSSC 1999	Early warning, conflict analysis, design	National	UN staff (HQ and field), other donor agencies or NGOs	Focus on human security and human rights framework	Training/workshop Setting	Training materials, facilitation, workshop / training costs
11	Conflict assessment framework; USAID; DEV; Sharon Morris 7 Jan 2002	Conflict analysis, country and project planning	National	Donor desk officers, implementing partners, other US government officials	Broad scope, synthesis of other tools	Desk study, workshop, follow up integration into programming strategy	For desk study, in country visit and follow-up work
12	Conflict analysis for project planning and implementation; GTZ; DEV Manuela Leonhardt 2002asses	Conflict analysis, country and project planning	National, project	Donor, NGO desk officers, project managers	Broad scope, synthesis of other tools	Combination of desk study and empirical research, tools for participatory conflict analysis	Costs of organising workshops and consultation meetings
13	FAST methodology - Swiss Peace - DEV / FP Swisspeace, in collaboration	Early warning, risk assessments	National, can be sub-regional	Government ministries, development agencies, NGOs, international	Event data analysis (quantitative and	Field information collection, desk-	Resource intensive for maintaining local information

S/ N	Framework/ Organisation/ Field of activity/ Authors/Year of issue	Purpose	Level	Potential Users	Assump- tions	Meth- odology	Resources
	with VRA (Virtual Research Associates) 1999			organisations	qualita- tive)	based analysis	networks and specialist analysis network
15	Better Pro- gramming Ini- tiative - IFRC - HA IFRC 1998	Conflict assess- ment, training	Pro- gramm e; local, na- tional, re- gional	Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies, delegation and other staff	Focus on aid fostering long- term recon- ciliation and recovery	Analysis and Training	Depending on scope of assessment or length of train- ing

**Key**

Field of activity

DEV: Development

HA: Humanitarian Assistance

PB: Peacebuilding

FP: Foreign Policy

Source: Fieldwork, Adapted from Resource Pack, pp. 32-60

According to Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005, p. 12), "...all users and promoters of the various concepts and terminologies [Bush's 'PCIA-derivative labels'] have their own opinions" and probably biases as well. Nevertheless, in the words of Paffenholz, "all PCIA approaches do have in common the thorough analysis of the conflict situation and the formulation of recommendations for coping with the situation, e.g. for reducing possible negative effects of an intervention on violent conflict and for enhancing its contribution to peacebuilding" (2005, p. 51). The intent, therefore, is that interventions will build rather than weaken or destroy peace; and reduce rather than exacerbate conflict. The underlying assumptions of the approaches include:

- intervention in conflict situations is never neutral;

- intervention in a context has measurable impacts on the structures and dynamics of peace and conflict of the context;
- the structures and dynamics of peace and conflict of the context also have measurable impacts on the intervention;
- these impacts can either be negative, conflict-exacerbating impacts or positive, peacebuilding impacts;
- there is need for sensitivity to peace and conflict issues —structures, dynamics, and processes— to achieve positive impacts; and
- the capacity of the intervening agency to peace and conflict-sensitise its programmes has implications for the overall impacts on the conflict situation.

In spite of these common assumptions, there are key differences in the various PCIA approaches. These include the analysis process, the understanding of *impact*, level of intervention, purpose of PCIA, and level of actors addressed (Paffenholz, 2006). According to Paffenholz, first, these approaches vary in the systematic linking of analyses to implications for intervention. Second, they differ in their understanding of impacts. While few define impacts as outcomes, majority see impact as including immediate outcomes and longer-term effects. Third, majority of the approaches focus on the project level of development interventions; only a few are applicable to country programme and policy level. Fourth, only few of them are useful in multiple ways or can be integrated in entire programming cycle. Some are best used for project planning or mid-term assessments. Finally, while “...some are tailored for a specific group, such as local or international NGOs, donors, joint multi-donor interventions, etc.” (Paffenholz, 2006, p. 2) most are suitable for all kinds of actors. Four of the most prominent PCIA approaches —Kenneth Bush’s Hands-On PCIA, Mary Anderson’s Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace (DnH/LCPP), Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff’s Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA), and Thania Paffenholz’s ‘Aid for Peace Approach— are presented below.

### **2.3.1 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)**

Kenneth Bush coined the term *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment* (PCIA) in 1996 (Bush K. , 1998; 2005, p. 28; Paffenholz, 2005, p. 51). Bush submitted that he was inspired by the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in coining PCIA (Bush K. ,



2003a, p. 75; 2009, p. 8) as the coinage coincided with the golden age of EIA. Whatever inspired Bush, it could be argued that PCIA has become a reference term for assessing impacts with peace and conflict concerns. Since then, following conceptual discourses in impact assessment and building on experiences from applying it in various contexts, Bush has progressively evolved the term PCIA and attempted to make it more user-friendly. At different times, Bush has used Hands-on PCIA (Bush K. , 2003a; 2003c; 2005) and PCIA/Aid for Peace (Bush K. , 2009). Bush defines PCIA as "...a means of assessing the ways in which an intervention may affect, or has affected the dynamics of peace or conflict in a conflict-prone region" (2003, p. 77). PCIA is a process, "...and not an add-on or a single-use tool" (Bush 2003a, p. 77). It concerns itself with peacebuilding impact and conflict-creating impact. Peacebuilding impact refers to those factors that strengthen the chances for peace and decrease the chances that violent conflict will break out, continue, or start again. It consists of two parts, namely construction of structures of peace and de-construction of the structures of violence. Conflict-creating impact refers to those factors that increase the chances that conflict will be dealt with through the use of violence (Bush, 1998; Bush and Opp, 1999; Bush 2003). Impact here means actual effects of an intervention, intended and unintended on beneficiaries, and others beyond immediate project outputs.

PCIA assumes that development is inevitably conflictual. It has three inseparable components, including mapping, risk and opportunity assessment, and PCIA proper, rooted in a clear set of principles (Bush K. , 2009) discussed below. It is applicable in all stages of an intervention, including pre-project, in-project and post-project. At the pre-project stage, PCIA is used as a planning tool for project design and formulation. The objective at this stage is to anticipate future impacts and build-in conflict prevention and peacebuilding mechanisms. During project, it is used for performance monitoring and management tool with the objective of monitoring and implementing immediate impacts. At the post-project phase, it is used as a tool for strategic planning for future phases (Bush K. , 2009). Its objective at this stage is evaluation and institutional learning (Bush K. , 2003a, p. 79; Bush K. , 2009). Bush discusses seven guiding principles of PCIA. They are:

- PCIA is a process.
- PCIA helps us to understand the specific rather than the general.
- PCIA is not static.

- PCIA needs to be transparent, shared, and people-centred.
- Building peace includes *un-building* the structures of violence.
- Neither development nor peacebuilding on its own will magically create peace.
- Haste makes waste —PCIA take time.

The emphasis of PCIA/Aid for Peace is on process, responsiveness, and ownership, though the worksheets are mechanistic and onerous (Bush K. , 2009). As a process, Bush argues that PCIA is not a fix-all toolkit. Rather it must challenge and change the traditional way of working in conflict zones. It is less of what is being done but more of how it is being done. It makes us to “...see and to understand when, why, and how a particular factor, in particular situation is likely to contribute to peace, or violent conflict” (Bush 2003a, p. 79), thus helping us to understand the specific rather than the general. Moreover, PCIA is an ongoing and dynamic approach with pre-, in-, and post-intervention relevance. It emphasises core values of transparency and people ownership. The community people, men and women, boys and girls are the real experts in using PCIA. They are critical to conflict analyses and interpretation, selection and execution of projects, all issues involving decisions that will affect their lives. Otherwise, they will be disempowered. Hence, PCIA has an explicit orientation for people empowerment. In addition, peacebuilding must strategically include building the infrastructure for peace and *un-building* the structures of violence. The sixth principle of PCIA states that, in and of themselves, peacebuilding and development initiatives will not create peace. Sustainable peace requires efforts of various actors. And finally, PCIA requires adequate time to ensure dialogue, learning and capacity-building.

Although Bush’s PCIA is novel, it has few shortcomings for theory and practice. For instance, while the definition of peacebuilding impacts is robust, that of conflict-creating impact fails to fully capture the reality of unwanted negative impacts in context. He adequately defines peacebuilding impacts to include both constructing structures of peace (peacebuilding) and de-constructing structures of violence (*un-building* conflict). However, Bush inadequately defines *conflict-creating factors* which necessarily include peace weakening impacts and conflict-exacerbating impacts by implicitly limiting it to the latter. To avoid such conceptual confusion, this study uses the terms positive and negative impacts instead of peacebuilding and conflict-creating impact. Positive impacts include peacebuilding impacts and conflict-reducing impacts

(since they have positive effects on the conflict situation). Negative impacts include peace-weakening or peace-undermining impacts and conflict-exacerbating impacts (since they have negative effects on the conflict situation). Another shortcoming of Bush's PCIA has to do with conception of impacts as being instigated by the intervention. However, since both intervention and context interact to produce these impacts, impacts should have been conceptualised to reflect this reality (Akinyoade D. , 2011). This perspective, which sees impacts as joint-products of intervention and context or as by-product of the interactions of the two, is adopted in this study.

### **2.3.2 Do no Harm/Local Capacities for Peace Project (DNH/LCPP)**

Mary Anderson's book, *Do no Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — or War* (1999), popularised the *Do no Harm approach*. The book was written on the cumulative learning from the Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) —a collaborative effort of dozens of NGOs working in conflict zones. The LCPP involved hundreds of workers of NGOs and other assistance agencies brought together in 20 feedback workshops in explaining their works and analysing it to achieve better outcomes (Anderson M. B., 2004). In Anderson's words, the "...LCPP set out to consider how can international aid agencies (working in both humanitarian and development assistance) do the good they mean to do in conflict areas without, at the same time, having their aid feed into, exacerbate or prolong the conflicts. Further, how might such assistance be given so that, rather than having negative, conflict-worsening effects, it instead helps local people disengage from conflict and begin to establish the systems they need for dealing with the issues that underlie the conflict?" (2004, p. 3)

The book, *Do no Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — or War* is divided into three sections. The first covers the general nature of violent conflict and the impact of external aid as relative resource transfer and its associated implicit ethical messages. It also presents the DnH analytical framework for mapping a particular conflict setting for which aid is intended. Through a series of questions, the framework seeks to identify the *connectors* or *local capacities for peace* that bring cohesion in a society as well as *tension* or *dividers* that could push a society into or keep a society in conflict. The second section discusses five case studies —Tajikistan, Lebanon, Burundi, India and Somalia. Through these cases, Anderson identified the positive actions by aid agency staff in catalysing peace initiatives as well as actions by the communities in which con-

flict was rife, that showed a capacity to seek an end to the conflict. The third section summarises the main lessons learned from the first and second sections.

The DnH/LCPP approach is an initiative of the Collaborative for Development Action issued in 2001. It is a tool for micro-conflict analysis, project planning and programme quality, and impact assessment of programme on conflict. It is designed to be used by field staff of international or local NGOs, donor agencies (headquarters and field offices). Though primarily targeted at humanitarian organisations, agencies involved in development and peacebuilding interventions can use it (Resource Pack, 2004). The DnH/LCPP has the following conceptual assumptions:

1. Aid is not neutral in the midst of conflict.
2. Aid and how it is administered can cause harm or strengthen peace capacities in the midst of conflicted communities.
3. All aid programmes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health care, training, etc.) into a resource-scarce environment.
4. Where people are in conflict, these resources represent power and wealth and they become an element of the conflict.
5. Some people attempt to control and use aid resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side. If they are successful or if aid staff fail to recognise the impact of their programming decisions, aid can cause harm.
6. However, the transfer of resources and the manner in which staff conduct the programmes can strengthen local capacities for peace, build on connectors that bring communities together, and reduce the divisions and sources of tensions that can lead to destructive conflict (Resource Pack, 2004).

Hence, to do no harm and support local capacities for peace involves:

1. careful analysis of the context of conflict and the aid programme, examining how aid interacts with the conflict, and a willingness to create options and redesign programmes to improve its quality; and
2. careful reflection on staff conduct and organisational policies so that the 'implicit ethical messages' that are sent communicate congruent messages that strengthen local capacities for peace (Resource Pack, 2004).

The DNH/LCPP approach does not include explicit conflict and peace indicators. However, through a *community-based process of indicator development*, it can make many implicit indicators explicit. Such indicators could include:

1. A just distribution of resources;

2. Creating or strengthening networks of relationships across divisions;
3. Strengthening good governance;
4. The use of participatory processes for decision-making;
5. Supporting traditional or indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution; and
6. Reconciliation, inclusion of diversity of ethnic or religious groups, gender, or youth in programme activities and leadership structures (Resource Pack, 2004).

The LCPP has three important lessons for impact assessment. First, using various cases of assistance across different settings, the LCPP identified clear and repeated pattern of the interaction between intervention and conflict. Aid exacerbates conflict through the transfer of aid's resources and through "implicit ethical messages" (Anderson M. B., 1999). That is, there is a relative resource transfer as well as the implicit ethical messages that often come with aid (Wakhweya, No Date). Second, LCPP has discovered that conflicts are characterised by two forces—dividers and connectors. Dividers divide people within conflict areas from each other along the lines of subgroup identities while connectors are connecting people within conflicts to each other across divisional lines. Aid workers need to clearly understand these dynamics in order to avoid the harmful potentials of their work. Third, LCPP shows that the potentials of aid programme's impacts to either reinforce divisions or connectors are in the details of the programme. 'Programme decisions about whether to provide aid, where to work, when and for how long, who to hire locally, whom to target, the roles of international staff, how to deliver goods—these and other basic management decisions— all have effects on inter-group relationships in the areas where aid is provided (Anderson M. B., 2004, p. 4).

DnH/LCPP approach's most significant relevance to this study is seen in its conception and development of propositions, which makes its concepts very useful and applicable to other similar context. The concepts of "transfer of aid's resources", "implicit ethical message" "dividers" and "connectors" are easy to grasp. Thus, they are useful in explaining some of the observations in the study area. Furthermore, they are useful to theory development, which is part of the focus of this study. Moreover, it underscores the fact that "details of the programme" constitute areas of potential impacts on the conflict situation. This is consistent with the view taken in this study. In addition, the approach is also relevant because of its special applicability at the project level.

### 2.3.3 Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA)

The phrase *conflict-sensitive* or *conflict sensitivity* has been familiar in development practice since 1999 (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005). It could be traced largely to several literature and thinking on Bush's *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment*, Mary Anderson's *Do No Harm*, the writing of Jonathan Goodhand and macro-conflict assessment work undertaken by DFID, USAID, the World Bank and other donors. Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff's describe conflict sensitivity as

“... an awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, and of the likelihood of further conflict and its likely severity; and the capacity to work with all parties to reduce conflict and/or minimize the risk of further conflict. It involves understanding the operational context; understanding the interaction between an intervention and that context; the capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive ones.” (2004, p. 61).

The Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA) was a product of a two-year project on conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. The project was undertaken by a consortium of six southern and northern NGOs including Africa Peace Forum, Kenya; Centre for Conflict Resolution, Uganda; Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Sri Lanka as well as Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert, and Saferworld, all in the UK. Subsequently, the conceptual development of conflict sensitivity is captured in the publication *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A Resource Pack* published in 2004 to convey lessons learnt from the project. The approach was articulated by researchers-practitioners Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff who were involved in the project and developing the Resource Pack (Schmelzle, 2005). The CSA was designed to “...strengthen local capacities and improve the awareness and skill of project staff.” It was based on “...the need to sensitise organisations and individuals for the conflict-related consequences and ramifications of their work over the fixation on infinitely refining assessment tool kits...” (Schmelzle, 2005). Conflict sensitivity approaches comprises a set of principles to guide a wide range of intervention activities including development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding. At the project and programme levels, CSA aims at integrating conflict sensitivity at the planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation stages of the project cycle. A thorough and regularly-updated conflict analysis is the foundation of conflict-sensitive practice. It is to this base rock that all project planning, implemen-

tation, monitoring and evaluation are linked (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005).

Conflict-sensitive planning is integrating conflict analysis of the actors, causes, profile and dynamics in a given context —with the aim of ensuring that the project or programme does not inadvertently increase the likelihood of violent conflict, but rather serves to reduce potential or existing violent conflict. It is required in contexts characterised by conflicts along the conflict spectrum (from structural violence to violent conflict). It is applicable whether the project or programme is for humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, or development; or whether the intention is to address conflict directly or simply to avoid indirectly exacerbating tensions. Conflict-sensitive planning can be applied to both interventions that are defined through the conflict analysis, and to sensitising pre-defined interventions (Resource Pack, 2004). A conflict-sensitive (intervention) planning “...requires careful and detailed exploration of the potential impacts, direct and indirect, (a) of the proposed activities on the actors, causes, profile and dynamics relating to conflict or potential conflict within the context, and (b) of the actors, causes, profile and dynamics on the proposed activities.” (2004, p. 65). There are five key steps for conflict-sensitive planning: defining intervention objective; defining intervention process; developing indicators (conflict indicators, project indicators and interaction indicators); linking project to scenarios and preparing contingency plans; and designing project conclusion. Some of the challenges of conflict-sensitive planning is likely to encounter are relations with central and local authorities, managing information networks, and relations with donors.

Conflict sensitive implementation, in addition to traditional implementation, “...involves close scrutiny of the operational context through regularly updating the conflict analysis, linking this understanding of the context to the objective and process of achieving the activities, and adjusting these activities accordingly. It builds on the conflict analysis and planning processes” (2004, p. 73). Key elements of conflict-sensitive implementation are to:

1. sensitively **manage** the process of implementation (activities, staffing, information networks, finances, etc.);
2. regularly **monitor** the operational context and the interaction between the intervention and the context, using the indicators defined in the conflict analysis and planning stages; and

3. **adjust** the project in light of new information gathered through monitoring, focusing particularly on the objectives and process of implementation.

Often, conflict-sensitive implementation work is undertaken at the planning phase and through the conflict analysis. The following key steps build on this prior work and are employed to sensitise the implementation and management process, namely refer back to the conflict analysis; set up the project (prepare and/or assess plans of operation, negotiate project contract issues and sites, coordination, define security procedures); implement, monitor and adjust the project (implement and monitor, and adjust to the context and the interaction); conflict-sensitive project phase out. Challenges conflict-sensitive implementation may encounter include flexibility, learning lessons, and building and maintaining relationships.

Conflict-sensitive monitoring incorporates conflict analyses into traditional monitoring processes and activities, with the intention of gaining a better understanding of the context and the intervention as well as their interactions. It informs adjustments and changes to project or programme activities so that the intervention has the optimum positive impact on conflict dynamics (Resource Pack, 2004). Conflict-sensitive evaluation integrates a detailed understanding of actors, profile, causes and dynamics into traditional evaluation activities and processes. Thus, it is useful to understand the overall impact a given intervention has had on its context, and the context on the intervention. The evaluation can then be used to adjust subsequent phases of an on-going initiative, and/or provide lessons for future initiatives (Resource Pack, 2004).

Traditional monitoring and evaluation processes follow five key steps, including deciding when to monitor or evaluate; designing monitoring and evaluation process; collecting information; analysing information; and recommending and redesigning. However, there are four key issues in conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation process (2004, p. 86). First, like traditional monitoring and evaluation, conflict-sensitive monitoring, can also be an *extractive* process (as interviewers take information from respondents and offer little in direct return), or it can be more *transformative* (involving respondents in the process of indicator development and analysis, monitors and evaluators can help people understand their own place in – and possibly even their contribution to – a given context) with potentially-positive results, and attending risks.

Second, it involves conflict-sensitising all existing steps in the process, from the design to reporting and beyond. This requires additional resources. For instance, it needs organisational and institutional support for increased staff capacity development.



Also, it requires sufficient time to review and adjust existing tools and processes, as well as additional time to monitor or evaluate conflict and interaction indicators. Third, understanding the context as it is expressed at various different geographic scales is fundamental to understanding the context at the level of the intervention. Hence, conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation includes adequate attention to the profile, actors, causes and dynamics that function at micro, meso and macro levels. Finally, conflict sensitive monitoring and evaluation requires an understanding of *success* qualitatively, in terms of impact on peace and conflict dynamics, and not only quantitatively in terms of number of houses built, and participants attending a meeting. This requires an institutional willingness and ability to think differently about how it measures impact. A conflict-sensitive organisation will also want to place a high value on its projects' interactions with the contexts (2004, pp. 86-87).

The CSA has a number of strong points as a process for conflict-sensitising proposed and measuring the impact of a completed intervention. For instance, it promotes the use of indicators —perception-based and objective indicators— to capture the more intangible impacts of programming. For instance, whether a respondent feels more or less safe (perception-based indicator) compared to the recorded number of incidents of violence (objective indicator) (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005). Also, the CSA conceives impacts as results of interactions between stages of intervention and elements of the context.

Also, it includes elaborate procedures for incorporating-conflict analysis into the assessment process. A very strong point to its credit is its flexibility and robustness. However, for the purpose of this study, the CSA appears to lay too much emphasis on conflict. For instance, the nomenclature *conflict sensitivity* gives undue recognition to conflict and deemphasises peace. This may be taken as implying a tacit assumption that conflict reduction in context automatically leads to peacebuilding. This is in contrast to the *Do No Harm* approach which explicitly recognises the need to simultaneously work on reducing conflict and strengthening peace to maximise the positive impact of intervention in context.

#### **2.3.4 Aid for Peace Approach (AfP)**

Thania Paffenholz and Luc Reyhler's Aid for Peace (AfP) approach builds on and further develops the debate of PCIA. The AfP is a multi-purpose and multi-level process that facilitates the planning, assessment and evaluation of peacebuilding, development

as well as humanitarian aid interventions in situations of latent conflict, manifest violent conflict, or in the aftermath of violent conflict and war (Paffenholz, 2005; 2006). The AfP focuses on the needs for peacebuilding in a given context —country, region, or area— tailors the intervention’s objectives and activities to these needs through identifying their peacebuilding relevance and developing peace and conflict result chains and indicators for monitoring. The approach has four parts, including needs, relevance, risks and effects. Part 1 involves analysis of the peacebuilding needs in a context —country, area or region. Part 2 assesses the peacebuilding relevance of the intervention. Part 3 assesses or anticipates expected or manifest effects of the conflict on the intervention activities (conflict risks). Part 4 assesses or anticipates expected or manifest effects of the intervention on the conflict dynamics and the peacebuilding process (peace and conflict outcomes and impact) (Paffenholz, 2006).

The AfP has three modules and seven steps. Three separate modules are developed for planning (Module 1), assessment (Module 2) and evaluation (Module 3) purposes from the four-part basic model. Part 1 is applied to all modules and, subsequently, different tools and processes are applied within the various modules. Integration of the AfP approach involves seven cumulative steps. The first step is preparation, which involves tailoring of the AfP process, including clarification of the module to be applied, developing terms of reference, team-building and preparation for implementing the Aid for Peace process. Steps 2 and 3 involve the identification of the peacebuilding needs, including analysing peace, conflict, and developing indicators to be used by all modules. Steps 4, 5 and 6 are applied in varying ways, using different tools and processes for different modules. In the final, 7th step, recommendations are made for adapting the intervention design according to the results of the Aid for Peace process (Paffenholz, 2005, pp. 55-62).

These modules and steps represent a framework for integrating the AfP into the Project Cycle Management useful for planning, implementing and a PCIA-like framework for assessment or evaluating development and humanitarian interventions. The AfP provides a common methodological framework for different types of interventions by a broad range of actors (local and international, governmental and non-governmental, peace and aid donors, agencies and communities) and for all levels of interventions (macro, sector, policy programme, project) (Paffenholz, 2006, p. 3; 2005, p. 54).

The objectives of the Aid for Peace approach are to help users to, first, plan new, or assess and evaluate existing intervention designs in such a way that they will reduce the risks caused by violent conflict; reduce the possibility of unintended negative effects on the conflict dynamics; and enhance the intervention's contribution to peacebuilding.

Second, it helps users to develop a conflict and peace-monitoring system, or integrate the conflict and peace lens into standard planning, monitoring and evaluation procedures. And finally, the approach helps users assess the success or failure of peace processes on the macro level (Paffenholz, 2005).

In peacebuilding interventions in conflict zones, the AfP ensures the relevance of the intervention in terms of peacebuilding; and monitors, assesses and, ultimately, improves the effects of the intervention on peacebuilding while avoiding risks and problems caused by violent conflict by engaging in a systematic planning, assessment and evaluation process. For other interventions in conflict zones, the AfP reduces the risks that the intervention will encounter in the violent conflict situation. Also, it ensures that the intervention will not have an unintended negative effect on the conflict dynamics while; finally, increasing the chance that it will also contribute to peacebuilding.

The AfP has relevance to this study. It places adequate emphasis on peace, unlike the CSA. Probably, its most remarkable asset for this study is the explicit connection it makes between the conditions in a specific context (peacebuilding needs), the peacebuilding goal of an intervention (relevance) and the actual effects of the intervention's activities on peace and conflict (peace and conflict outcome and impact) (Paffenholz, 2005). Like PCIA, it integrates various tools of other approaches in a transparent and systematic way and "...stresses systematisation of assessment and evaluation" (Neufeldt, 2007, p. 5). However, in spite of its versatility, it appears mechanistic, especially because of its many forms and tools.

### **2.3.5 Conclusion**

These four approaches are relevant for this study. First, each of them are applicable to the three types of interventions —development, humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding— investigated by this study. Second, and to various extents, they are applicable to the different levels of the interventions —project, programme, policy, sector— at the community, regional, and national geographical levels of operation. Furthermore, these

approaches emphasise the need for people living in conflict zones (for which intervention is intended) to own and drive impact assessment and evaluation. Most importantly, to a greater or lesser extent, they are flexible enough to be manageable by the researcher, with little or no assistance, for the purpose of this study. However, they have shortcomings (previously identified) that make it necessary for them to be adapted for the purpose of this study. Aspects of each of the four approaches relevant to this study are emphasised, put together and termed *Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach* (PCSA). The PCSA essentially builds upon the CSA and infuses important aspects of the other three approaches. This is elaborated in Section 2.4.

### **2.3.6 Gender Mainstreaming in Intervention Programming**

People are born female and male, but learn to be boys and girls who grow into women and men. They are taught what the appropriate behaviour and attitudes, roles and activities are for them, and how they should relate to other people. This learned behaviour is what makes up gender identity and determines gender roles (Oxfam Journal, 1993, Vol. 1, No. 2).

PCIA as an emancipatory politics, ethics, or methodology (Abitbol, 2013) has normative commitment to values such as peace, justice and gender equality. Most PCIA frameworks, therefore, have gender impact analysis built into them. As gender-sensitive frameworks, they seek to assess the gendered impact of interventions in the context. *Gender-impact analysis* refers to specific and observed effects of plans, policies, programmes, and services, such as increased income and improved skills on female and male gender.

*Gender mainstreaming* was first coined at the United Nations' third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985 and then explicitly endorsed with the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (PfA) ten years later at the Beijing Conference—the fourth World Conference on Women. The PfA remains the most important international statement on gender equality (Watkins, 2004). Gender mainstreaming is

the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997p 2 in King, 2003, p3).

[a] set of processes and strategies that aims to ensure the recognition of gender issues on a sustained basis [...] an approach that situates gender equality issues at the center of broad policy decisions, institutional structures and resource allocations, and includes women's views as priorities in making decisions about development goals and processes' (NCRFW, n.d).

A distinction between *gender* and *sex* is important in discussing gender mainstreaming. *Sex* refers to the natural distinguishing variable based on biological characteristics such as a person's body contour, features, genitals, hormones, genes, chromosomes and reproductive organs used to classify people as being female or male. *Gender* refers to cultural roles attitudes and values that a society assigns to its women and men, girls and boys, which define their behaviours and relationships. Gender roles are created and maintained by social institutions.

It has been accepted that women in every society have been peculiarly disadvantaged as a result of marginalisation and subordination by the menfolk. Thus the international community began showing special interest on women issues in 1946 when a commission on the Status of Women was set up as the first gender perspective on the International Bill of Human Rights. In 1967, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women—a statement of moral and political, howbeit lacking in contractual force of a treaty—came into being. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in time to be presented at the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women, in Copenhagen 1980. The Development Assistance Committee-Women in Development (DAC-WID) Guiding Principles on Women in Development came into existence in 1983. At the third World Conference on Women 1985, there was a shift from WID to Gender and Development Approach (GAD). GAD is an approach to development that focuses “...on social, economic, political and cultural forces that determine how differently women and men participate in, benefit from, and control resources and activities.”

Gender *equality* and gender *equity* are two key concepts in gender mainstreaming. *Gender equality* means women and men should have equal value, enjoy the same status and conditions and should be accorded equal treatment. It refers to the full equality of men and women to enjoy the complete range of political, economic, civil, social and cultural rights, with no one denied access to these rights, or deprived of them, because of their sex. It means they should benefit equally from the results of development (CEDAW, 1979).

*Gender equality* in intervention, therefore, will overcome stereotypes and prejudices, allowing both sexes to equally contribute to, and benefit from, the intervention. WHO (2001) defines gender equity as “fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits and responsibilities between women and men,” Gender equity goes beyond gender equality. It refers to giving to the disadvantaged gender on the basis of needs, taking steps to compensate for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field. Equity is the means of achieving equality.

According to Heyzer (2003) gender mainstreaming insists that every aspect of a given activity be assessed for its gender implications. King (2007) opines that engendering intervention makes it more efficient, effective and delivers maximum good. The process of gender mainstreaming, in the words of Heyzer:

...requires persistent effort, including regular monitoring, reporting, follow-up training, and evaluation of progress made and obstacles encountered, as well as systems for holding the operation/organisation accountable for achieving its goals. All of this requires resources and, above all, political will at all levels (2003)

A gender-based analysis of interventions (GBAI) determines the gender responsiveness of NDDC plans, programmes and projects. It determines whether or not or the extent to which an intervention programming is gender-responsive. Gender responsiveness of an intervention refers to the consistent and systematic attention given to the differences between women and men in the intervention, with a view to addressing structural gender inequality in the context of the intervention. This is the rationale behind Gender-Responsive Development Planning, also known as Gender-Responsive Planning (GRP). The logic of GRP is that integrating gender considerations makes development planning and programming more people-oriented and people-focused, emphasising their impacts on women in particular. However, in the context of this study, a more relevant terminology will be gender-responsive intervention programming (GRIP), which has the same logic as the GRP. A GBAI Framework (Figure 4 under conceptual frameworks below) developed for this study will be used to determine the extent to which NDDC interventions are gender-responsive.

Integrating a gender-based analysis of intervention (GBAI) in a *post facto* Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment study on the NDDC intervention is important

because the need to pay attention to gender is mentioned in section five of Policy G1 —Strategic Planning Principles— which reads:

A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision making. This entails meaningful involvement of the ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and NGOs—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, including attention to issues such as gender and youth.

Hence, the gendered analysis of the intervention will reveal the extent to which gender is mainstreamed in the interventions in the study area. That is, the extent to which women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences are integrated into the design (conception and planning), implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programmes and projects in the community as well as the policies guiding them. Of particular interest is the extent to which women and men benefit equally and equitably in the intervention and the implications this has for the community.

The rationale behind mainstreaming gender in PCIA is that since women and men have been culturally assigned different social roles, responsibilities and different sources of power and influence, their perspectives on and experiences of a particular intervention, their needs and interests (which at times may be competing) necessarily differ. However, too often, intervention in context lumps all those affected by the conflict and intended beneficiaries of the proposed intervention into one tidy package called *the population*, *community people* or *beneficiary community*. Thus intervening agencies provide them with a set of package of assistance without truly recognising the peculiarities of each of the categories that make up the population or the community.

Consequently, the varying needs of each category of the people and the strengths and capacities they bring to bear in conflict analyses, conflict resolution, intervention programming, peacebuilding and post-settlement reconstruction are often neglected. GBAI involves the analysis of how the intervention impacts gender — gender impacts analysis (GIA). Gender impact analysis is the study of how a policy or programme affects women and men differently. Indicators for assessing the impact of programmes on gender dynamics are whether the programmes:

1. entrench the traditional roles of women and men or it challenges them;
2. build the capacity of a gender at the expense of the other;

3. foster tension among the genders;
4. increase the vulnerability of women and girls both socially and economically.

The goal of gender mainstreaming in intervention programming is to ensure gender equality and gender equity. Gender-Responsive Intervention Programming (GRIP) is therefore be an intervention in which gender is fully mainstreamed. Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Framework was adopted to assess the degree of gender-responsiveness of the NDDC intervention. Introducing gender-sensitive lens to peace and conflict sensitivity will help understand women and girls as well as men and boys' roles as actors (participants in planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation and beneficiaries) and victims of intervention programming.

#### **2.4 Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach/Framework: An Assessment Framework**

Fifteen of the various approaches of mapping the impacts of interactions between interventions and project context were reviewed to build an assessment framework for this study (Table 2.1). These include DFID's Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), World Bank's Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), FEWER, WANEP and CCR's Conflict Analysis and Response Definition, World Vision's Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC), USAID's Conflict Assessment Framework, GTZ's Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Implementation. Four very influential approaches — Bush' *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)*, Anderson's *Do No Harm/Local Capacity for Peace (DNH/LCP)*, Barbolet *et al's Conflict Sensitivity*, and Paffenholz's *Aid for Peace Approach* were critically reviewed and integrated into the *Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach* for this study. The integration is necessary because each has its strengths, weaknesses, and suitability for different types and levels of assessment. Aspects of each of the four approaches relevant to this study were emphasised, put together, and termed *Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach (PCSA)*. The PCSA essentially builds upon the CSA and infuses important aspects of the other three approaches.

Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald and Sheriff's describe conflict sensitivity as

“... an awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, and of the likelihood of further conflict and its likely severity; and the capacity to work with all parties to reduce conflict and/or minimize the



risk of further conflict. It involves understanding the operational context; understanding the interaction between an intervention and that context; the capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive ones.” (2004, p. 61)

There are three key things that demonstrate or define peace and conflict sensitivity in the above extract. First, understanding of the operational context; second, understanding of the interaction between an intervention and that context, and third, the capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid/minimise negative impacts and ensure/maximise positive impacts. These three conditions constitute the mainframe around which Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach/Framework is built. They are about the intervening agency/organisation. Indeed, for an organisation to be peace and conflict sensitive in its intervention programming, it must satisfy these three conditions — understand its operational context, understand the *interaction* between its intervention and that context. Equally, it must possess the *capacity to act* upon this understanding to minimise negative and maximise the positive impacts of its intervention.

Commenting on the next step in peace and conflict impact assessment (2005, p. 44), Bush used the term *Peace and Conflict Sensitivity* (PCS). The context of use suggests expression of an idea similar to conflict sensitivity, with PCIA as the means of achieving it. Whatever Bush’s intention, Peace and Conflict Sensitivity is adopted in this study since it places equal emphasis on the two major concepts in impact assessment and evaluation — *peace* and *conflict*. The term *peace and conflict sensitivity* at least in nomenclature, makes up for the overt emphasis laid on conflict (to the detriment of peace) in the CSA. It also integrates explicit peace concerns into the CSA framework and translates into peace and conflict sensitivity approach. In the minimum, therefore, Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach (PCSA) describes all the ideas of the CSA and goes beyond it to explicitly integrate peace in its processes. Peace and conflict sensitivity can thus be described as the consciousness that intervention in any context, especially one characterised by conflict, is never neutral; and acting in such manner to maximise the *positive* impacts (peacebuilding and conflict reduction) and minimise the *negative* impacts (peace-weakening and conflict-exacerbation) on the conflict situation. The PCSA adopts the intervention-context interaction perspective in conception of impacts (ICI— see section 5.1). The ICI conceptualises impacts as a product of the mutual interactions between intervention and its context alongside

measuring the impacts of these interactions on the project context (and its conflict situation) as either positive or negative.

Positive impacts and negative impacts are thus the two main concepts used to describe the impacts or outcome in PCSA. *Negative impacts* refer to both conflict-supporting impacts and peace-destroying/undermining impacts of interactions. Conflict-supporting impacts lead to conflict exacerbation through increase in tension, suspicion, distrust/ among conflicting groups, acts of violence, and so on (Bush K. , 1998; Bush & Opp, 1999). Peace-destroying/undermining/weakening impacts lead to decrease in tranquillity, trust and mutual confidence amongst groups, weakening of the local fabrics, capacities and infrastructure of peace (Akinyoade D. , 2011).

Positive impacts on the other hand are impacts that support the dynamics and structures of peace (peacebuilding) and weaken the dynamics and structures of violent conflict (Bush's deconstructing or un-building violence). Supporting the dynamics of peace includes harnessing or exploiting what cultural or contemporary opportunities exist for peacebuilding (Anderson's local capacities for peace), leading to increase in tranquillity, confidence-building, consensus, cooperation/collaboration among conflict parties, empowerment in peacebuilding for parties, recognition, social justice, strengthening old and building new local capacities for peace. Conflict-reducing impacts include decrease in tension, ill will, frustration, suspicion, distrust among conflicting groups, acts of violence, empowerment in creative conflict transformation and so on through conflict management workshops and consensus workshops among others (Bush K. , 1998; Bush & Opp, 1999). Positive impact tilts the balance of conflict situation in favour of peace by directly supporting peace and/or by reducing the likelihood of violent conflict.

The PCSA explores the interaction of conflict, peace, and interventions in a conflict setting. It sensitises an intervention for peace and conflict with the aim of ensuring that interventions in contexts contribute positively rather than negatively to the conflict situation. This involves, first, understanding that the peculiarities of a context characterised by conflict make it susceptible to the inevitable interactions between the stages of intervention and the elements of the context. This understanding and corollary actions require conscientious and concerted efforts to develop specific competences in agency's staff and organisational structure and culture, and in its intervention policies. This constitutes the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity (PCSC) of the

organisation. PCSC is the ability of an agency intervening in conflict context to understand the context for which intervention is planned, understand the intervention-context interactions (ICI), and act upon this understanding to avoid/minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts (adapted from the Resource Pack, p. 9). PCSC is thus an agency's capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity (PCS), which will reflect in the organisational structure and culture and in its intervention programming. It includes staff capacity for and mainstreaming PCS in organisational culture and structure on one hand and integrating PCS in the whole intervention programming cycle — planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation on the other hand. It involves integrating peace and conflict analysis, peace indicators, and peace factors into the CSA as described in the Resource Pack.

As earlier adumbrated, PCSA explicitly integrates peace concerns into the CSA to balance the explicit emphasis on conflict in the latter. Hence, while CSA talks of *conflict analysis*, PCSA talks of “peace and conflict analyses” (integrating Paffenholz's conflict and peace analysis in the Aid for Peace approach (Paffenholz, 2005, p. 56)). Also, while CSA, at the planning stage develops indicators such as conflict indicators, project indicators, and interaction indicators (with explicit recognition for conflict factors only), PCSA includes “peace indicators” and explicitly recognises “peace factors” as defined in the FEWER/WANEP's Conflict Analysis and Response Definition; and the FEWER/CIDA's Conflict Diagnostic Handbook (2004, p. 40; p. 57). Conflict indicators “specify what to measure in order to monitor and evaluate the evolution of conflict factors and dynamics that impact a given context” (p. 4). They are used “...to monitor the progression of conflict factors against an appropriate baseline, and to provide targets against which to set contingency planning” (p. 26). They include root causes, proximate causes and conflict triggers in the areas of politics/security, economy and socio-culture. Peace indicators on the other hand specify what to measure in order to monitor and evaluate the evolution of peace factors and dynamics that impact a given context. Peace indicators are used to monitor the progression of peace factors. They include systems, processes and tools sustaining peace in a given society, in the areas of politics/security, economy and socio-culture (2004, p. 40).

Anderson's conceptualisations —transfer of aid's resource, dividers, and connectors— are relevant to this study, hence they are integrated into the PCSA. For instance, aid's resource may explain the reason for the interactions of intervention and

context. Also, its explanation that the “details of programme”, captured by Bush as “how things are being done”, determines whether the impacts on the conflict situation will be negative or positive sheds some light on the nature and dynamics of intervention-context interactions. It also points to possible places to expect and map impacts.

In conclusion, the PCSA is designed to cater to the exigencies of this study. It integrates relevant concepts and assumptions of PCIA, DnH/LCPP, AfP and few other approaches into the CSA framework. It is a robust and flexible framework that underscores and integrates peace. However, a unique feature of the PCSA is its conceptualisation of impacts as products of the interactions between intervention and context, that is, the Intervention-Context-Interaction (ICI) perspective. The PCSA uses the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework (see section 2.5.1) to assess the capacity of an organisation for PCS and the extent to which PCS is integrated in its intervention programming.

#### **2.4.1 Indicators for Assessing Peace and Conflict Impacts**

A key issue in any form of assessment is the issue of *indicator*. There must be indicators against which each aspect of the assessment is made. Many useful indicators have been developed in PCIA to ensure the validity of the assessment. In fact, PCIA frameworks are replete with indicators. In assessing the impacts of the intervention on the context and vice versa, the study employs some indicators. Indicators to assess the negative impacts of the interventions include whether the intervention:

- increases the vulnerability and insecurity of the target beneficiaries of the projects, other community members or other groups not being targeted by the project, and project staff;
- contributes to deepening the root causes of the conflict;
- acts as an escalating factor in the conflict ;
- pushes community members to join ethnic militia and take up arms;
- creates or deepens divisions within the target community;
- introduces new or other conflicts in the community;
- reinforces inequity of class, gender and group;

Similarly, relevant indicators are used to assess the positive impacts of the interventions. These include whether the project:

- builds community cohesion and resilience to resist the impact of conflict;

- opens spaces or opportunities for peace to be built;
- improves relationships between antagonists;
- contributes to resolving structural inequalities and the root causes of conflict;
- is reaching the more marginalised and poorer communities with concrete benefits;
- reflects community ownership and community access to project resources and benefits;
- includes target communities in decision-making.

(Adapted from the Canadian International Development Agency —CIDA— Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Summary by ChhayaJha and Tracy Vienings, 2004).

The study, in the tradition of PCIA, also assessed the impacts of the intervention on gender dynamics, the indicators of which include whether the programmes:

- entrench the traditional roles of women and men or it challenges it;
- build the capacity of a gender at the expense of the other;
- foster tension among the genders;
- increase the vulnerability of women and girls both socially and economically.

In light of the above, some specific questions asked concerning the interventions were:

- What are the criteria for selecting the beneficiaries of the programme?
- Did the selection process of programme beneficiaries reflect the diversity (of groups, interests, etc.) in the region?
- Did the criteria reflect sensitivity to social, political and economic groups in the project environment?
- What impacts did the dynamics of context have on the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the intervention?
- Were the interventions gender-sensitive (by making special provision for women and girls, and men and boys)?
- Did projects exacerbate any particular conflict?
- Did projects intentionally/unintentionally build peace in any instance?
- How sustainable are the interventions?
- How did stakeholders (community and external stakeholders) perceive the Commission and its programmes?
- Are there special provisions for women and girls, and men and boys who have been specially affected by the conflict in the community (For example those

who have lost parents, breadwinners, limbs, sight, properties, homes in the region)?

## **2.5 Conceptual Frameworks**

Conceptual frameworks are narrative or graphical representations of the conceptual status of the main concepts, factors, variables or phenomena under study and their presumed relationships. Conceptual framework brings clarity, focus and explicitness to scientific investigation. It helps in delimiting research and communicating it better. Conceptual framework could be pre-specified (that is, developed a priori before empirical work) or emerge at the latter stages during empirical work —of data collections and analyses. The stage at which it comes in research depends largely on the nature of the research. Researches employing the quantitative approach usually have pre-specified conceptual framework. However, for qualitative research with less rigid structure, the timing of conceptual framework is more flexible (Punch 1999). For the purpose of this study, two relevant sets of indicators are integrated to assess the extent to which peace and conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in the NDDC and in its programming. The first set is developed by Maria Lange (2004) and the second set is developed in the Resource Pack (2004) by a consortium of Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert and Saferworld. This integrated framework of indicators constitutes the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework discussed below.

### **2.5.1 Peace and Conflict-Sensitivity Framework (PCSF)**

Peace and Conflict Sensitivity (PCS) of an intervening agency will be evidenced in the extent to which it has mainstreamed peace and conflict sensitivity in its organisational culture and structure; and in the programming of its intervention. It involves

“... integrating the appropriate attitudes, approaches, tools and expertise into the organisation’s culture, systems, processes and work, such that conflict sensitivity is applied not just to isolated projects but becomes an entire organisational ethos.” (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005, p. 6).

The PCSF was developed in this study to evaluate the capacity of the NDDC for peace and conflict sensitivity. The framework assessed the peace and conflict sensitivity capacity (PCSC) of the Commission. PCSC is demonstrated in two domains of

an agency intervening in conflict-prone region—in its culture and structure and in the programming of its intervention. The first part assessed the potential capacity and the second the demonstrated capacity. Hence the PCSF has two integrated parts—framework to assess PCS in organisational culture and structure as well as framework to assess PCS in its intervention programming. Lange (2004) suggests a five-pillar framework for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in the culture and structure of agencies intervening in conflict areas. It includes institutional commitment; willingness to make changes in organisational culture and institutional structure; support for capacity development; conducive external relationships; and accountability mechanisms.

Mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in intervention programming, on the other hand, is integrating peace and conflict sensitivity into each stage of an intervention. Its components are peace and conflict-sensitive planning; peace and conflict-sensitive implementation; and peace and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation. Together, mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in the culture and structure of agencies and in intervention programming translate into peace and conflict sensitivity capacity (PCSC) of that agency. This capacity is demonstrated in peace and conflict sensitivity of institutional custom, policy and a framework for peace and conflict-sensitive programming of its intervention. This is captured in Figure 2.1 below.

In mainstreaming PCS in an organisation, mobilising “...commitment based on strong motivation is an indispensable driving force” (Lange 2004, p.16). This commitment and motivation is evidenced in organisational leadership support for PCS, the development of peace and conflict-sensitive policies, creating appropriate decision-making systems/structures and committing staff time and financial resources to strengthening a peace and conflict-sensitive organisational culture. A peace and conflict-sensitive organisational culture is characterised by cross-organisational buy-in, participation and ownership, open communication channels on and between all levels of the organisation and facilitating the flow of knowledge and learning. Indeed, “[i]ndividual skills and knowledge are central to achieving positive impact” (Lange, 2004, p. 9).


Mainstreaming PCS in the culture and structure of an organisation involves consistently incorporating peace and conflict-sensitive skills in staff training and re-

cruitment processes. Capacity building measures include development of tool/methodology for PCS, staff training, appraisal and rewards for PCS programming, adoption of peace and conflict-sensitive evaluation mechanisms and procedures. Requisite peace and conflict-sensitive skills for staff include "...understanding of the particular geographical area [and its conflict issues], knowledge of the relevant language(s), relationship-building and analytical skills, and the ability to deal with high stress levels" (Lange, 2004, p. 9).

In mainstreaming PCS in its culture and structure, an organisation has the options of establishing separate peacebuilding unit or integrating it on all levels. The first option provides a clear focal point and signals commitment and priority; however, it faces the risks of becoming marginalised. Hence, it needs to be well-connected to the rest of the organisation and combined with other mechanisms for exchange and learning. Strong systems of accountability are required for mainstreaming PCS. It includes "...appropriate appraisal and incentives systems that encourage peace and conflict sensitive planning and programming and balance individual accountability with the need for learning. This includes documenting and disseminating better practice and rewarding progress to create a positive energy for moving forward" (Lange, 2004, p. 19)

The fifth component refers to the external environment within which the agency implements its policies, that is, its relationships with communities, partners, consultants/contractors, government and donors. According to Lange, "...successful mainstreaming of [peace and] conflict sensitivity demands conducive relationships with groups and actors that influence the conflict sensitivity of the wider response. This includes local partner organisations, donors, other INGOs, and national and international constituencies supporting the organisation." (Lange, 2004, p. 9) An enabling environment, she argues, is of key importance to organisations. Factors such as domestic and international policy environments, funding constraints and partnerships relations all





**Figure 2.1. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011 (Adapted from Lange (2004) and Resource Pack (2004)).*

have implications for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in an organisation. However, the most important thing in this process is how the different stages come together, and not a single stage. According to her, "... putting in place a sophisticated planning system will not make an organisation [peace and] conflict-sensitive unless staff and partners applying the tool, feel ownership of it, know how to use it and are given support to do so" (Lange, 2004, p. 19).

The Resource Pack (2004) provides a set of indicators for evaluating the extent which PCS is mainstreamed into each stage of an intervention; and thus for potentials for negative and positive impacts (Lange, 2004; Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005).

For a peace and conflict-sensitive planning, indicators include:

- Incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-transformation principles into agencies' strategic policies.
- Linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the project in the project design.
- Ensuring all planning processes themselves are conflict-sensitive.
- Sacrificing some speed of delivery to ensure adequate conflict-sensitive planning.

Peace and conflict-sensitive implementation involves:

- Using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies.
- Investing in developing, disseminating and providing training in these.
- Hiring specialist experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters staff.
- Cooperating closely with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics.
- Anticipating changing dynamics and developing contingency plans.

Peace and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation include:

- Monitoring and evaluating programmes according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa.


- Setting flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs.
- Conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities.

(See section 2.3.3 for a more detailed discussion of peace and conflict-sensitive intervention programming).

### **2.5.2 Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Framework**

The GBAI framework (Figure 2.2) evaluates the extent to which gender is mainstreamed in intervention programming. Hence, it involves gender-sensitive community participation, facilitation, logistics and gender equity at each stage of the programming including conception and planning, implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation. Gender mainstreaming in community participation involves setting a representative quota for both sexes to participate as individuals and groups equally or equitably. This may necessitate employing innovative and non-traditional means to mobilise and enrol women and girls at each stage. Bunch (N.D) cites examples such as holding planning sessions where women traditionally gather, providing services to women so they can forgo their daily tasks in order to participate.

At the stage of conception and planning, this may involve ensuring that women and girls, and community-based women and girls group have representative quota. It also includes ensuring that women and girls participate in setting goals and objectives for the intervention. At the stage of implementation, it involves employing representative quota (equality or equity) for both sexes to be selected as beneficiaries of the intervention. This involves affirmative action. In case of physical project involving physically tasking unskilled labour, conscientious effort should be made to bring willing women and girls on board or create alternative or compensatory benefits for them. Equitable participation may involve special empowerment programmes for women and girls where required. However, care must be taken to distinguish between those programmes that truly empower women and girls and those that reinforce their subordination to men. At the level of monitoring and evaluation, women and girls should be part of the monitoring and evaluation team and should be consulted as participants in the evaluation. An essential element is ensuring that both sexes understand the need for gender mainstreaming in the intervention programming.



**Figure 2.2. Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Framework**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011 (Adapted Bunch, (n.d) and Resource Pack (2004)).*

Facilitators or conveners must be trained on gender sensitivity. This is to ensure gender-sensitive language while addressing participants. This also ensures reinforcement of gender sensitivity at different stages of the intervention programming. Also, instructional materials must be gender-sensitive. Gender stereotypes in narrations and illustrations should be avoided. Activities at every stage of intervention must address power imbalance between the sexes. Deliberate effort must be made to empower women and girls in role playing, task assignments, sharing of responsibilities, group leadership, selection of beneficiaries, leading group discussions and other innovative ways. In selecting time, venue, and other logistics, convenience and safety of women and girls should be put into consideration. Special considerations should be provided for women on childcare and conveniences and other things (e.g. transportation) that will ensure their full participation at each stage of the programming.

## **2.6 Theory Development in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment**

...the area of [peace and conflict] impact assessment is least theorised and tends to be left to the so called practitioners who often do not do much beyond “ticking the boxes”...The fact that this area of study is left mainly for the so called practitioners...has often ended in production of rather too much untheorised literature on impact assessment—Anonymous commentator, 2014

Theory is a tool for constructing and explaining reality. It is essentially an attempt to explain the phenomenon being studied using terms more abstract than the terms used to describe the phenomena. Theory may be about what the phenomenon is, its form of existence, and its relationships with other phenomena. Theory serves a number of purposes in scientific works. First, it links the philosophical foundations (ontology and epistemology) to empirical data. It is used to explain empirical data. Moreover, it helps researchers summarise and comprehend the facts (empirical evidences) gathered about phenomena. It also helps to fit facts into meaningful explanatory framework because facts are dumb without theory. In addition, theories highlight which elements of a phenomenon are relevant for study. A scientific research must necessarily have theory in addition to methodological issues. Alemika (2002, p. 9) summarises the role of theory in research as including defining appropriate methods for a research problem; specifying the nature (type, scope, and level) of data required by a research problem; offering conceptual framework or scheme for collecting, organ-

ising, analysing and interpreting data; and predicting facts or outcomes (deterministic, causal or probabilistic).

Theory and empirical data play central roles in scientific research. Scientific studies verify/test or generate/build theory. Theory-testing or theory-verification research tests the scientific propositions of a particular theory (Punch, 1998). Traditionally, positivist (quantitative) research is theory-testing research with clearly-defined theory pre-specified before the empirical work of data collection. Theory building or theory generation research, on the other hand, seeks to end with theory, "...developed systematically from the data we have collected" (Punch, 1998, p. 16). Qualitative research has typically been involved in theory generation. As Punch points out, while both quantitative and qualitative approaches can be used for both verification and generation, theory generation research is more likely to use the unstructured fieldwork techniques of qualitative approach. Theory verification research is useful in areas or fields where there are many unverified theories. Theory generation on the other hand is more suitable in areas or fields with scanty theories.

With few theories developed in the discipline, peace and conflict studies has by far fewer discipline-developed theories compared to older disciplines such as Political Science, Sociology, and Psychology. Though as a multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary field, many theories in other fields are useful in explaining the core field definition and distinctive issues of the field. Nevertheless, there have been repeated calls for the need to build more theories to understand and explain contemporary social issues (Punch, 1998). The need for theory building is pressing in the field of peace and conflict studies, most especially in Africa. The relatively young status of the field, the complexity and dynamism of its phenomena of interest require new theories to understand, explain, and predict its realities. In *Introduction: Research and Education Fundamental to Peace and Security*, King and Sall contend that the field of peace and conflict studies is "...open to a spectrum of conceptions, hypotheses, and theories" (King & Sall, 2007, p. 8). They argue further the need for African peace scholars to develop "...endogenous and alternative theories, methodologies, and analyses forged in the crucible of the epistemological, social-political, cultural, and economic conditions of African realities" (University for Peace Africa Programme, 2007, p. 75).

The area of peace and conflict impact assessment is a relatively young area where there is conspicuous need for theory development. The flurry of activities involving practitioners, policy-makers, researchers, and scholars in PCIA for about two decades has led to appreciable volume of scientific knowledge on the nature, dynamics and the implications of the interactions of intervention and its context. However, while there is relatively high level of development in the practice of PCIA, the level of development of the theory of PCIA is significantly low. The epigraph above (at the beginning of this section) reflects the state of affairs in theorising in peace and conflict impact assessment. Almost from inception, there has been debate on the *usefulness* or *uselessness* of theory in peace and conflict impact assessment. Although all peace and conflict impact-assessment approaches have implicit theory of change, Ross (2003) and Schmelzle (2005), and (Hoffman, 2007) among others have argued for the need to make these theories, their assumptions and propositions explicit.

The need or role of theory in peace and conflict impact assessment was one of the recurrent issues in Berghof's dialogue series on PCIA in 2003 and 2005. In *New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)*, Bush argues that "...in war zones, theory is either useful or useless...there is rarely the luxury of time or space to mull over and contemplate abstractions, however, erudite, parsimonious or elegant". Barbolet et al. (2005) contends that "no one theory would be able to explain all relevant aspects of a peace process in its complexity." Paffenholz asserts that there are enough theories in related fields to make theory-building in impact assessment a non-priority at the time (2005). These views support the arguments for giving inadequate attention to theory-building in PCIA. Interestingly, in the same publication, Bush made a remarkable statement:

Perhaps sometime in the distant future – when whatever will work, has worked – university-based academics will wade in to excavate theories. But for now, the distance between the academy and the field suggests that it may be a long while before we see useful theory

A decade after Bush made this submission, the distance between the academia and the field have gotten closer and some things have worked to somehow indicate an imminent possibility of evolving theory of peace and conflict impact or a form of peace and conflict impact theory (PCIT). Also arguing in favour of theory development, Schmelzle in the same publication, points out that the findings from Utstein

study and INCORE reports support the need for theory development in PCIA. She argues for the role of theory and the need for explicitness of hypotheses and assumptions underlying various methodologies in peace and conflict impact assessment. She identifies "...a lack of theoretical coherence and a lack of explicitness of hypotheses and assumptions, in particular with respect to theories of change, yet a disagreement over whether more theory-building was to be the top priority of the field at present" (2005) as one of the clusters of issues and themes that authors, scholars and practitioners in peace and conflict impact assessment grapple with.

Ross has earlier advocated the need for "...explicit concern with theory in the planning, organisation and evaluation of interventions..." (Ross, 2003, p. 78). Theory in this sense, he claims, refers to local (folk theories) and academic knowledge about the world. He contends that most academic theories of social actions are simple and can be articulated in local terms and then "...can be compared with local theories to clarify similarities and differences to bridge gaps between them" (p. 78). Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff also recognise that "The development of impact-monitoring and evaluation remains an area of huge interest, but one in which there is the least guidance in terms of theory or practice" (Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005, p. 24).

In spite of the need for theory-building supported by empirical evidences, very little has changed in the theory development in peace and conflict impact assessment since Schmelzle's observation in 2005. Hence as Punch (1998) suggests, theory development research should be pursued in PCIA. The usefulness or otherwise of theories of peace and conflict impact assessment will be best adjudged by the affected communities. According to Bush, "...communities on the ground ...[should feel] that such theory construction was more useful compared with the bare foot inductivism that enables survival—even peacebuilding—in violence-prone realities" (2005, p. 34). Useful theories in this regard border on the nature of interventions, context, the triggers and drivers of the interactions of interventions and context, how it happens, why it happens, and its implications, amongst others. It will be based on clear assumptions, employ useful concepts and make testable propositions germane to peace and conflict or positive and negative impacts of interventions in conflict-prone contexts.



### 2.6.1 Why Build Theories of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment?

Nothing is quite so practical as a good theory...Good theory is practical precisely because it advances knowledge in a scientific discipline, guides research toward crucial questions, and enlightens the profession... (Lewin's, 1951:486 cit. in Corley & Gioia, 2011)

PCIA methodologies, frameworks, or approaches have a shared purpose —to ensure that intervention in conflict-prone regions build peace rather than exacerbate conflict. To this end, they seek to maximise the positive and minimise the negative impacts of the intervention. The core assumption of these frameworks is that, in spite of good intentions, intervention in conflict-prone regions can contribute both negatively (by exacerbating conflict) and positively (by building peace) to the conflict situation. Hence there is need to programme intervention with sensitivity or consciousness of this potential in order to do less harm and more good through the intervention.

Apart from these assumptions, there are also shared concepts across PCIA. They include those from the broader field of peace and conflict studies such as peace, peacebuilding, conflict, conflict setting, and conflict exacerbation. Also, there are those germane to the area of peace and conflict impact assessment such as impact assessment, impacts, outcomes, effects, evaluation, intervention, positive impacts, negative impacts, interactions, peace and conflict sensitivity, among others.

Moreover, a number of testable propositions have emerged from these assumptions and the relationships with and among the concepts. Some of the most obvious ones are that intervention in conflict settings is never neutral; intervention in conflict settings has measurable impacts on the (structures and dynamics of peace and conflict) context; and the structures and dynamics of peace and conflict of the context also have measurable impacts on the intervention. Therefore, intervention and its context interact; these impacts can either be negative, conflict-exacerbating impacts or positive, peacebuilding impacts; regular conflict analysis is central to assessing these impacts. Also, there are capacities and infrastructure for peace in various contexts. These might be considered as constituting the core propositions of PCIA. Others are that there is need for sensitivity to peace and conflict issues —structures, dynamics, and processes to achieve positive impacts; as well, the capacity of the intervening agency to peace and conflict-sensitise its programmes has implications for the overall impacts of the interactions of intervention and context for the conflict situation (Abitbol, 2013).

From the foregoing, the building blocks of theory —theoretical assumptions, social concepts and scientific propositions— are all available in PCIA. Hence, the first reason we should build theory in peace and conflict impact assessment is because we have enough building blocks for its development. Doing so is both relevant and timely. Not doing so will be an unexploited opportunity to improve scholarship and practice of PCIA. PCIA is an uncompromisingly practice-oriented area. Since the 1990s when it emerged, PCIA practice has provided huge information from which academics can theorise. The theory-building activities focus on any of the four domains of PCIA — ethics, politics, logistics and methodologies— identified by Bush (Abitbol, 2013). In addition, theories should be prescient by focusing on the possible future domains of PCIA. A theory in PCIA should first and foremost be a theory of practice. Theories of PCIA should be informed by practice and inform practice in a constant back-and-forth interaction between the two.

The four building blocks of theory building —“what”, “how”, “why”, “who”, “where” and “when” (Whetton, 2001) are currently available in the various approaches and frameworks to PCIA. Whetton (2001) citing Dubin (1978) submits that a good theory must have four essential elements —“what”, “how”, “why”, alongside the trio of “who”, “where”, and “when”. These elements essentially describe the three components of social theory discussed in the previous paragraph. Whetton’s model presents a good starting point for engaging theory development in PCIA.

In the context of PCIA, the *what* elements refer to factors, that is, variables, constructs, and concepts that are logically considered as part of explanation of PCIA. Numerous factors such as conflict, peace, peacebuilding, impacts, negative impacts, positive impacts, interactions, intervention, conflict sensitivity, effect, and others have been employed in mapping the conceptual landscape of PCIA. The proliferation of PCIA methodologies has led to multiplicity of factors in explaining the realities of the PCIA domains. While some have condemned this proliferation for various reasons, maybe it is a positive indication for theory development. Because as advised by Whetton, having “too many factors” is in tandem with good practices in theory development. This is because “...recognizing that over time their ideas will be refined. It is generally easier to delete unnecessary or invalid factors than it is to justify additions” (2001, p. 490). Moreover, Whetton advises the balancing of the virtues of parsimony

and comprehensiveness in selecting those factors (from a long list) that will make the final list in theory building efforts.

Beyond mere listing factors, there is need to show how these factors relate to one another. This is the *how* element and it involves showing linkages among the factors in form of conceptual frameworks. This brings conceptual clarification by delineating patterns and it introduces causality. Apparently, all our PCIA approaches have been able to show linkages between most of the *what* elements. For instance how intervention impacts its context and vice versa, how it leads to negative or positive impacts, and so on. This incidentally constitutes strength for theory building. Since most PCIA were developed as frameworks, hence conceptual frameworks, constituting the *how* element of theory building are abundant in PCIA. The *what* and *how* elements, Whetton says, constitute the domain of a theory. This is most insightful as it generates and clarifies an important aspect for consideration in theorising PCIA. And this is “what are the domains of PCIA?” Fortunately, Bush recently answered this question in the conference on PCIA at York University that led to a JPD special edition on PCIA (Abitbol, 2013). Bush identified four domains of PCIA as ethics, politics, logistics and methodologies. At the moment, these seem comprehensive enough, and more domains may be identified later as scientific knowledge in this area progresses. However, the concern for now is what does this imply for theory building, especially, as regards *what* and *how* elements? The implication is that we can identify the factors and describe their relationships in each of these four domains as we theorise or build theory of PCIA.

*Why element* constitutes the underlying dynamics —psychological, social, economic, political— that justify the selection of the factors and their proposed causal relationships. They are the theory’s assumptions. They constitute the credentials providing the reasoning or the basis for trusting or believing in this particular representation of this domain of the PCIA being theorised. How sound is the logic of the fundamental views of the nature, dynamics and implications of intervention, context, impacts, and other things that provide the basis for judging the reasonableness of the proposed conceptualisation. This is probably where most PCIA frameworks fall short. They fail to make explicit the logic underlying their models (Schmelzle, 2005). And this is probably because of their normative orientation for practice with little or no consideration for the academy. Logic, rather than data, is the basis for evaluation (Whetton, 2001) in

the theory building process. Hence building PCIA theory will involve extending the *whats* and *hows* in PCIA frameworks to include the logic behind the *whats* and *hows*. This logic must be sound. That is, it must account for the inclusion of the *whats* and the decisions about their causal relationships. Such explanations include relationships that are yet to be tested if they must be useful for research. There is need to explain the *whys* underlying the *whats* and *hows*. Our propositions should therefore be grounded in the *what*, *how* and *why*. According to Whetton, the *Who*, *Where*, and *When* are temporal and contextual factors that delimit the generalizability of propositions, thus constituting the range of a theory. They situate a theory within a specific time and space. They force theorists to be sensitive to the context of their theories and be context-specific in discussing the generalizability of their theories. Generally, PCIA frameworks have been classified as applicable to different generic contexts such as micro, meso, macro. Some will even lay a strong claim on moving beyond the generic contexts to documenting specific geographical locations (the Niger Delta, Mindanao, etc.) where they have been applied. So, to a large extent, contextualisation is already a hard-wired feature of PCIA, in a sense.

Also, we need to build theories in PCIA because theory development is an indication of maturation of a field/discipline or an area within the field/discipline. Hence, by building theories of PCIA, we demonstrate its maturation as an academic area, build on it, learn from it and benefit from it, theoretically and practically. In addition, building theory will help us bridge the gap between theory and practice in the area. As earlier adumbrated, practice-oriented development has overtaken theory development in the area. Building theories will ensure that the science of PCIA influences its practice.

Every scientific inquiry starts with or ends with theory. In other words, the scientific process of knowledge accumulation, construction, situation, location, deconstruction, either tests or builds theory. This is the basic format of academic enterprise of scientific knowledge production. This issue is central to social science research and cannot be wished away in PCIA. Hence, for academic researchers, theory is non-negotiable in scholarly/research activities. It is either theory begins research or theory emerges from research. Theory “at the beginning” of research is to test theory, while theory “at the end” of research is to build theory. No social science area is complete without these two activities going hand in hand. It goes without saying that to test the-

ory, we must first build it and, once built, we keep testing it to see its fit with new data. This is the scientific enterprise.

Therefore, no matter how much we try, we cannot wish this reality away in our claim of PCIA as a scientific research area. This is not to depreciate the inestimable value of previous brilliant practice-oriented works (of practitioners, researchers, policymakers and scholars) at describing and generating context-specific explanations of realities of aid impacts in conflict context. However, it is to call scholars to arms to wake up to the responsibility and challenge them to build useful scientific theory in impact assessment. Practitioners and practice-oriented scholars have done their fair share of documenting the realities of the interactions of aid and contexts. Theory being a critical tool in the academic enterprises, it is apposite for university-based academics and other interested stakeholders waded in and “excavate theories” to capture, explain, predict and account for the patterns and causal relationships in the interactions of intervention and conflict contexts.

Recently, the tension in the role or need for theory in peace and conflict impact assessment seems to be between building organic or emergent, context-specific theories and building generalizable theories (Abitbol, 2013). However, this tension may be unnecessary because existing PCIA methodologies have abundant building blocks of theory, namely, assumptions, concepts and propositions. Therefore, using appropriate approach, both context-specific and generalizable theories might be possible in peace and conflict impact assessment. Nevertheless, while the building blocks for developing theories of PCIA abound, however, disincentives also abound in the conditions that informed the emergence of the field, the inherited orientation and normative commitment (from Peace Studies) of PCIA, stakeholders’ justifiable preference for practice, and the epistemological contention in social science methodologies. Despite these encumbrances, there is need to bridge the gap between theory and practice by making concerted effort for building theories in the different domains of PCIA. This need informed the study’s objective of understanding and explaining the nature, dynamics, and implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and Odi community context.

### 2.6.2 Inhibitions to theory building in peace and conflict impact assessment

Few suggestions as to the paucity of theory in PCIA's lend themselves to reason. In the first category are those factors that are due to the nature of orientation of the parent (and/or the grandparent) fields and/or disciplines as well as those factors that led to the emergence of the area itself. In another category are those factors that have to do with the epistemological contentions in the social sciences. Yet in another category are those that border on the subtle tension between theory and practice that seems to imperceptibly carry the suggestion that to do one is to ignore the other. However, whatever reasons we concoct as scholars (most especially), researchers and practitioners (forgivably) of PCIA to excuse or justify our not tinkering with theory building, giving the current state of knowledge in the field, is at best lame, also detrimental to praxis, self-limiting and counter-intuitive.

The first inhibition to theory development in PCIA's is probably because it is the nexus of two applied (that is, practice-oriented) fields/disciplines —Peace and Conflict Studies and Development Studies— with normative commitment towards policy and practice. From its parent fields, therefore, PCIA could be presumed to have inherited its normative preference for practice from conception. The field of Peace and Conflict Studies is particularly notorious for suffering from a dearth of theory. It appears that this theory-dearth gene inherited from the grandparent field of Peace and Conflict Studies is dominant in PCIA's. So, PCIA's ordinarily tilt towards practice and suffer from dearth of theory. (Although the field of Peace and Conflict Studies appears to have awoken from its slumber and has started paying attention to theory development with the *excavation* of theories such as democratic and liberal peace theories and other critical peace theories).

Another issue that might have affected the dearth of theory in PCIA's is the concerns that led to and surrounded its emergence as an area of practice and theory. Two factors readily come to mind. First is the nature of the exigencies that led to the emergence of PCIA's, that is, the realisation that aids intended for good could do harm in conflict settings, which compelled practitioners to seize the rein of its development. Interest in impact assessment for peace and conflict sensitivity predates the christening of its foremost approaches —PCIA, Do no Harm, Conflict Sensitivity and Aid for Peace. PCIA's were more or less conceived, midwived and christened by the exigencies of practice and hence by practitioners. Although in real sense, many of them, through

various theoretical contributions to the development of PCIA, would pass as *theorist-practitioners* rather than solely as practitioners. Practitioners (at the individual and organisational levels) rather than scholars/researchers have been most active in its formative years. They therefore developed it in a way that it is most useful for them — practice-oriented.

Consequently, various organisations and individuals came up with different versions or *derivatives* of PCIA to cater to the exigencies of their works. Hence in addition to, and probably as a consequence of, its genetic composition, the midwives of PCIA showed preference for practice of PCIA at the expense of theory building. Foremost individuals at the inception of PCIA such as Kenneth Bush, Mary Anderson, Thania Paffenholz, Barbolet et al., demonstrated a greater motivation and commitment for practice. Midwifing an innovative approach to aid in the midst of conflict, they did not have the luxury to give attention to theory development. Rather, the exigencies of their works demanded concentration on practice — on what works in the midst of life and death situations.

The third factor that probably discouraged theory development was the competition or in-fighting amongst proponents of various versions of PCIA that heralded its development in its early days. The attempts by organisations such as Berghof Center of Constructive Conflict Resolution to bring together various scholars and practitioners working on PCIA to chart the waters of the emergent area resulted in in-fighting or competition among them. Reading through Berghof resources on PCIA, one gets the idea that proponents are more desirous to present and defend their own versions of PCIA jealously than focus on theory building. Consequently, much effort was devoted to defending derivatives to the detriment of theory building in spite of frequent reference to the need for theory building in their discussions.

The exigencies that led to, and surrounded the emergence of, PCIA, therefore, favoured practice rather than theory building. The implication is that not much work was done to make PCIA very useful for academic concern of scientific knowledge generation and the central role of theory in this exercise. Thus PCIA, while inherently making adequate provisions for frameworks for data collection, makes grossly inadequate provision for academic theory-building and theory-testing exercises. What this means is that while these numerous frameworks do explicitly direct scientists to what and where

to look for appropriate data on impact assessment (through indicators), they do not provide explicit theories against which those data could be explained; and theories which could be refined in light of new data collected through their frameworks. Hence, considering the centrality of theory and data in the scientific enterprise, the scientific process of knowledge generation looks somehow partially short-circuited in PCIA.

In a community of practice conference “Assessing the impact of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: A North-South Participatory Research Project” (2013), the tension in the role or need for theory in peace and conflict impact assessment seems to be between building organic or emergent, context-specific theories and building generalizable theories. The contention is whether we are to build context-specific, emergent, organic theories grounded in the realities of each context, following the naturalistic tradition of qualitative methodologists or seek generalizable theory following the rigid hypothetico-deductive tradition of quantitative methodologists. Many individuals in PCIA seem to favour the qualitative methodology, with its explicit and strong bias for accounting for observed realities as understood and interpreted by subjects, that is, individuals living in the realities. The preference of the qualitative methodology for theory building exercise in PCIA is almost natural, given that PCIA champions participatory, people-centred, intervention programming. Both the qualitative methodology, rooted in subjectivism and PCIA, therefore, share the core belief of mapping, understanding and accounting for realities from the perspectives of the subjects living in such realities.

Moreover, the qualitative approach is closer to the natural way human beings investigate the world through inductive reasoning. This makes it less threatening and more acceptable to non-academics. As such, practitioners, in making sense of, and accounting for, realities of aid and conflict contexts, will almost naturally adopt the naturalistic way of qualitative methodology. However, it is generally beyond the intent, interest and competence of practitioners to develop their accounts into scientific theories. Building scientific theory is a rigorous exercise requiring special competences and it falls squarely within the purview of academics. It is their responsibility as social scientists to take the various accounts by practitioners, identify factors, the relationships between them, patterns of these relationships, and make testable propositions about realities in these accounts. Hence from context-specific accounts of realities, similarities, categories, and trends could be identified from which generalizable theories can



be developed. Punch (1998) has earlier made a case for the possibility of generalising case studies through conceptualisations and development of propositions.

Therefore, from qualitatively-generated, organic, context-specific, people-centred theories, we can build more generalizable theories that account for core/essential realities in each context. These theories could then be tested following the hypothetico-deductive tradition of the quantitative methodologists. Obviously then, there is no logical reason for the tension between the qualitative and quantitative approaches (or to take sides with one against another) in PCIA's theory development. In fact, the two methodologies will be complementary and mutually-reinforcing in our theory development effort. This has become the preferred approach among methodologists in the social sciences. However, it is noteworthy here that although the subjectivists or humanistic qualitative methodologies tend to favour theory building and positivistic quantitative methodologies, theory testing, nevertheless, both can be used to either build or test theory in the scientific enterprise.

One of the strongest arguments against theory building in impact assessment hurled by majority of practice-oriented scholar-practitioners is the need to make PCIA's context-specific and make it people-centred and the need to protect the integrity of each context in accounting for its realities. A closely-related argument vigorously trumped is that no single theory can explain the diversity of realities across myriads of contexts of conflict. Yet another subtle argument is that the ever-changing nature and dynamics of conflict environment are not susceptible to theorising. However, scientists have appropriate tools for context-specific, people-centred research and theorising (especially those in qualitative methodology). Also, scientists are quite aware that no single theory can explain all the aspects or dimensions of a single reality, needless to say explaining realities in different contexts. Hence, scientists only try to theorise portions of realities. In fact, one of the descriptions of theory is as a representation, interpretation or construction of an aspect of reality. In addition, while appreciating diversity and fluidity of some realities, scientists, because of the basic assumption of science that the universe is ordered, believe in identifying similarities in diversity and discovering patterns in chaos. Science, in fact, recognises the fluidity of certain realities and the limitation this imposes on theorising about them. This led to such scientific ideas as principle of uncertainty in quantum theory (Heisenberg, 1927) and the principle of irrationality in rational, strategic thinking (Schelling, 1960).

### **2.6.3 A Case in Point in Theory Development**

A commendable attempt at taking practitioners' accounts and churning out useful theory from them is exemplified in an article co-authored by Emiko Noma, Dee Aker, and Jennifer Freeman of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice in *Heeding Women's Voice: Breaking Cycles of Conflict and Deepening the Concept of Peacebuilding* (Noma, Aker, & Freeman, 2012). The authors drew from accounts of 35 women peacemakers from around the world and focus on three —Mary Ann Arnado of the Philippines, Luz Méndez of Guatemala and Zandile Nhlengetwa of South Africa. From these, they developed concepts and propositions that describe how women peacemakers emerge and engage in peacebuilding in conflict contexts. Such concepts as crossing lines of division, building parallel structures, creating and reclaiming space, listening, speaking, and seeing the big picture emerged from the narratives of women peacemakers. The authors were able to identify the overarching theme or the core category in the data (p. 15). Through these conceptualisations and their propositions, the authors described and explained how and why women become peacemakers in conflict situations. This is a good case of generalising from multiple case studies from diverse contexts. They have provided a good starting point, as a theoretical framework for scholars wishing to study women peacemakers or peacebuilders in other contexts. Such studies could be qualitative or quantitative in nature, depending on the focus of the inquiry. Thus their emergent, organic theory from qualitative research could inform hypothetico-deductive theory testing research in the quantitative tradition.

An important lesson here is that while appreciating the uniqueness of each context and trying to preserve the integrity of each case, stakeholders in PCIAAs should also appreciate the similarities of experiences and dynamics, across different cases. That is, although cases of interventions in the Niger Delta and Mindanao may be different in their specifics, there might, be similarities in their essentials. These similarities are the basis for building the second category of theories in PCIAAs. In a more academic sense, insights/findings from each case could be generalised or transferred to account for similar experiences in similar contexts. This will be done through conceptualisations and development of propositions. These are academic processes involving levels of abstraction of concepts to formulate first-order, second-order constructs to account for the phenomena investigated.

#### **2.6.4 Theorising in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment**

Ross (2003) in “PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool” makes strong argument for the need for explicit theory in PCIA. He submits that theory is crucial to practice first because people generally have some theories of how the world works. Understanding these theories may determine the success or failure of intervention. Also, theories make explicit how an intervention is expected to impact on its context and vice versa. In his words, “theory can play a crucial role in priority setting and resource allocation when it identifies sequences, points of maximum impact, and connections among domains” (Ross 2000b cited in 2003).

The caption “theorising in peace and conflict impact assessment” throws up some critical questions. These include what is theorising in PCIA? What should constitute a theory in impact assessment? How should we go about theorising? What should we theorise about? What should be the criteria for assessing theories of impact assessment? Theorising in PCIA could be considered as a continuum having the strict academic and layman’s theories as the two ends of the continuum. At the left end of the continuum of theories in PCIA are the non-academic theories that anthropologists capture as folk theories. That is, people’s explanation of how their world works —an explanation of events or phenomena using local, context-specific terms to describe their experiences/realities. People’s explanation of how their world works will influence the success or failure of interventions. Hence these theories are crucial to PCIA. But beyond the specific contexts, how do we make these relevant to the general theory and practice of PCIA. Probably, first by being sensitive to the existence of these theories and to the implications they have for our interventions. That is, how they might/have interacted with our interventions and vice versa.

On the right end of the continuum is theorising in its strictest academic sense. In the strict academic sense, theorising involves using factors (variables, constructs and concepts) to explain phenomena of interest by showing how the factors are related and the underlying, psychological, social, economic, and political dynamics that justify the selection of factors and the proposed relationships among them (Whetton, 2001). Theory in this sense is academic knowledge of the world. Theorising in PCIA would basically mean making theoretical contributions and building theories. It will involve describing, explaining or accounting for observed regularities about the phenomena germane to PCIA and summarising existing knowledge in the area. It would also neces-

sarily involve prescience in the sense of anticipating, conceptualising and influencing future problem domains in the area.

Theorising in PCIA involves making incremental theoretical contributions to certain of its aspects. Theoretical contributions in PCIA would involve advancing our understanding of the nature and implications of intervention-context interactions by challenging and extending existing knowledge in the area. To begin with, much is required in the area of conceptual clarification in PCIA. Across approaches, there exists (sometimes, unnecessary) multiplicity of concepts to explain similar ideas. Works that bring together such concepts, clarifies them, and provide us with a set of concepts to describe and explain PCIA realities, offering sound logic why some concepts will be jettisoned in favour of others will qualify as theoretical contributions. Also, more works is still required to explain some of the claims of PCIA. Efforts in this direction will constitute theoretical contributions to PCIA.

Academics could theorise in PCIA by building theory from examining existing PCIA approaches/frameworks and/or from (meta-) analysis of data of documented cases of intervention in conflict-prone contexts. This involves critiquing the various PCIA approaches/methodologies to identify, (cross-cutting) assumptions, concepts and propositions in them in order to describe and explain aspects of phenomena in PCIA they are interested in. In addition, academics could build theories by taking documented cases of PCIA or interventions in conflict contexts; identifying and accounting for patterns as well as trends in the nature and implications of intervention alongside context interactions using emergent themes in conceptualisations and developing propositions to describe and explain observed regularities as done in the case of the three scholars earlier presented.

Moreover, academics could embark on theory building researches, using appropriate methodologies. In this sense, they select a particular case or multiple cases of intervention(s) in conflict context(s) as well as investigate and account for the data using context-specific conceptualisations grounded in the data. In this sense, the researchers build a theory to explain the what, how, why alongside the trio of when, where, and who in that particular context, using appropriate methodology —qualitative, quantitative or mixed method. This is building context-specific emergent theories to account for the experiences of stakeholders as regards a particular case of the interactions of

intervention and context. Such activity will most likely be in the traditions of qualitative research, especially grounded theory research strategy, which has explicit orientation towards developing theory grounded in the data collected from the field — people’s experience/interpretation of their realities. Theorising in this sense will involve an in-depth understanding of the case(s), context-specific theorising or theory grounded in data (that is, in realities of peoples’ experiences). Hence, building grounded theory in PCIA may simultaneously be case-study design. For instance, a case of intervention in Mindanao will be studied to understand, explain and document how and why intervention and its context interacted and the implications of these interactions for peace and conflict dynamics in the community. By developing conceptualisations and propositions from the analysis of data, academics could generalise (transfer) their findings to other similar settings, where these propositions are further tested. This back-and-forth process of theory building-theory testing could continue until they are able to describe and explain the nature and implications of the interactions of interventions and contexts.

In addition, theorising includes the realm of prescience, which involves anticipating, conceptualising and influencing future problem domains in PCIA. Corley and Gioia (2011, p. 13) define prescience as “...as the process of discerning or anticipating what we need to know and, equally important, of influencing the intellectual framing and dialogue about what we need to know.” They further posit that “an orientation toward prescience holds some promise for advancing our craft of theory development, as well as enhancing the receptivity of the audiences for our developing theories beyond the academy and, therefore, conferring a greater potential for influencing the organizations and societies we study.” Prescience is therefore essentially futuristic, proactive PCIA in theory and practice.

In conclusion, PCIA as a specialised area of Peace and Development Studies has the basic building blocks of theory building —factors, that is, variables, constructs, and concepts that are logically considered as part of explanation of PCIA; linkages showing the relationships of these factors; and the underlying dynamics —psychological, social, economic, political— that justify the selection of the factors and their proposed causal relationships. Indeed, most notable works on impact assessment, though done by practitioners and scholar-practitioners, are scientific in approach. However, disincentives to theory building also abound in the conditions that informed the emergence

of the field, the inherited orientation and normative commitment of PCIAs, stakeholders' justifiable preference for practice, and the epistemological contention in social science methodologies. In spite of these encumbrances, there are enough incentives for theory building in PCIAs. There is need to bridge the gap between theory and practice by making concerted effort for building both context-specific and generalizable theories in the different domains of PCIA. Such theory will necessarily draw upon previous works in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAs); and identifying cross-cutting assumptions, concepts, and propositions implicit or explicit in them. PCIAs theories are necessarily of practice focusing on any of the four domains of PCIAs — ethics, politics, logistics, and methodologies. It also involves prescience. While practitioners have provided and could provide useful inputs, the responsibilities of excavating scientific theory are essentially academic, and meant for academics.

## **2.7 Grounded Theory**

“Grounded theory is the systematic generation of a theory from data acquired by a rigorous research method. Grounded theory is not findings, but rather an integrated set of conceptual hypotheses. It is just probability statements about relationship between concepts” (Glaser, 1998, p. 3). The first thing to know about the grounded theory is that it is not a theory. It is a systematic research method, a strategy (Punch, 1998). It is a research method aimed at ending with theory grounded in the data. Its purpose is to generate theory *grounded* in (the analyses of) its data. Hence, its objective for collecting and analysing data is to generate theory. Though simply and beautifully described, it has its peculiar rationale, philosophy, strategy, and techniques to data collection, sampling, literature and analysis of its data. Espousing these is what this section is all about. Once understood, it is soon realised that grounded theory, like most qualitative research methods, is similar to the natural way we gather knowledge and build explanations (that is, theories) about our world on day-to-day basis. In a sense, we have all been *grounded theorists* or qualitative researchers one way or the other without recognising it. The section shows how to consciously practice *grounded theory* (GT), especially in building scientific knowledge about the phenomena of interests.

### **2.7.1 Brief History of Grounded Theory**

GT was discovered in the 1960s through a collaborative work in medical sociology by two sociologists —Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss. They studied dying in Californian hospitals and developed and used the constant comparative method (later

known as *grounded theory*). They published their first book, *Awareness of Dying* (1965), which was a great success. The second book, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (1967), was published in response to many methodological questions that followed the *Awareness of Dying*. After this publication, Glaser and Strauss seem to disagree on how to conduct GT. Eleven years later, Glaser published *Theoretical Sensitivity* (1978). Nine years after, Strauss published *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (1987), followed by a joint publication of Strauss and Corbin *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques* (1990).

In a bid to correct what he saw as misconceptions of GT presented in Strauss and Corbin's book, Glaser published *Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence vs. Forcing* in 1992. The 1967 to 1992 publications give the basic history of the development of GT and are also the main publications on methodological statements on GT (Punch, 1998). Glaser has published two more publications —*Examples of Grounded: A Reader* and *More Grounded Theory Methodology: A Reader* critiquing Strauss and Corbin's book. Strauss and Corbin wrote a chapter in Denzin and Lincoln *Handbook* (1994) in which they gave an overview of GT methodology and commented on its emerging nature. Strauss died in 1994 and, in 1998, Glaser published another book *Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions* and dedicated it to Strauss “in remembrance of the journey we started in 1967” and to the “the minus-mentorees throughout the world who are doing”. In 1999 Glaser founded a non-profit web-based organisation —the Grounded Theory Institute (GTI)— dedicated to his own GT methodology. GTI is an online forum for discussion of GT and publishes a journal —The Grounded Theory Review.

GT was developed as a method for the study of complex social behaviour and was initially presented as a method of analysing qualitative data. It thus became associated with qualitative research. Although it arose of the quantitative methods in the sense that it was discovered in a bid to bring the statistical analytic methods (e.g. multivariate analysis) into qualitative data analysis. Therefore, Glaser, especially, argues that it is applicable to quantitative data as well. However, GT is essentially different from positivist theory-testing methodologies in its view of theory. In positivistic research, existing theory is tested for robustness using empirical data. GT, however, does not force data into pre-existing theory or test theory, rather it provides researchers with tools to build and generate theory from data. GT has become a general strategy for re-

search found useful in a variety of research contexts including health research, education, and business, which entails studying high impact dependent variables.

### **2.7.2 Developing Grounded Theory: Key Concepts in Theory and Practice**

The crucial idea in developing a grounded theory (from data collected about a phenomenon being investigated) is finding a core category, at a high level of abstraction but grounded in the data, which accounts for what is central in the data (Punch, 1998). This is a three-step process, with the first being finding conceptual categories in the data, which is the first level of abstraction. The second is finding relationships between these conceptual categories, which is the second and higher level of abstraction. And the third is conceptualising and accounting for these relationships at a higher level of abstraction (Punch, 1998). Its goals, therefore, include formulating concepts, developing hypotheses (from these conceptual ideas) and verifying these hypotheses through constantly comparing concepts developed from data. Hence, it involves both inductive and deductive thinking processes. Induction and deduction in grounded theory are done through the twin, essentially simultaneous, activities of abstracting and constant comparison. So, abstracting and constant comparison are essential parts of the core activities in GT. Other core activities and tools of GT include theoretical sampling, theoretical sensitivity, theoretical relevance, and theoretical saturation, coding, identifying core variables and saturation.

There is need to point out at this juncture that the peculiar relationship of data collection and analysis in GT makes it necessary to discuss data collection and data analysis *pari passu* when presenting this research method. Hence many of the processes or steps of GT discussed below are executed concurrently with some others in real life GT research activities.

#### **2.7.2.1 Theoretical Sampling**

One of the unique features of GT is the relationship between data collection and data analyses. In most research methods, qualitative and quantitative alike, data collection is a distinctive stage from data analyses. That is, all relevant data are usually collected before analysis commences. But in GT, data collection and analyses are iterative and continues throughout the lifespan of the research. This means there is a back-and-forth movement between data collection and data analyses. This is the concept of *theoretical sampling*, in which subsequent data collection is guided by theoretical developments that emerge in the data analysis (Punch, 1998). In GT, a researcher, guided by some



initial research questions, collects a sample (usually small) of data, codes and analyses them.

The next set of data collected (what, whom and where) is guided by the analysis of the previous data collected. This iterative, back-and-forth movement continues until the researcher has sufficient data to describe what is going on in the context and until the point when *theoretical saturation* is reached, which is a point when new data collected are no longer adding new information to what is already known. However, there is the argument that one can never be certain that the categories are saturated since induction has its limits. For instance, fresh data may come along that refute the existing theory. This brings in the concept of *theoretical completeness* as a twin concept to theoretical saturation. In other words, data collection and analysis continues until the researcher has theoretical explanation for what is happening and its key features. That is, when the theory is able to explain the data fully and satisfactorily.

Hence, the key issue in sampling here is not representativeness; rather, it is of allowing the theory to emerge (Collin, Manion and Morrison, 2011). *Theoretical relevance*, that is, “...how the data contribute to the emerging theory and its categories...” is a critical criterion in the data collection and sampling process. Theoretical relevance requires a skill —*theoretical sensitivity*. That is, being sensitive to the theoretical possibilities that all data carry. Theoretical sensitivity is a major emphasis in GT. It requires the analyst opening her thinking about the phenomena being studied. Theoretical sampling is getting more popular in other qualitative methods today. And as Punch (1998) points out, it resembles the normal way human beings act every day when we encounter a puzzling situation. Hence it models the way we have always learned. Theoretical sampling may necessitate reviews or total change of the initial research questions. The essential thing is that data drive the direction of the research.

#### **2.7.2.2 Coding**

Having collected sample data as guided by initial research questions, a researcher analyses the data. This informs the next phase of data collection. This brings us to the next activity in GT research —coding. One needs to know what the generic terms *code* and *coding* mean. Codes are names, tags, or labels. Coding is therefore the process of putting names, tags or labels against pieces of data (Punch, 1998). The data may be individual words, phrases, a whole sentence or more, a part of a picture, and so

on. Most people have coded text without knowing. Highlighting part of a text and tagging it with a label to represent what we consider the central idea is a form of coding. Coding serves as index for the data. The first labels also permit a more advanced coding at the latter stage of the analyses. Hence coding is both the first part of the analysis and part of getting the data ready for subsequent analysis. Coding in qualitative research is different from coding as used in quantitative analysis. In quantitative analysis, data analysts code data from questionnaire into symbols amenable to statistical operations.


Following the three-stage process of developing grounded theory identified above, there are three general types of codes in GT. These are *substantive*, *theoretical* and *core* codes. Substantive codes are the initial conceptual categories generated from the empirical data. However, they are at a higher abstract level than the data. Theoretical codes connect or show the relationship among the categories identified. They bring the substantive codes together and interconnect them using propositions or hypotheses about the data, which will be integrated in the third stage. The core code is the higher-order conceptualisation of theoretical codes which account for these relationships and thus form the basis for theory building. (Punch, 1998). From these three codes come the three coding activities in GT. They are *open coding* which finds the substantive codes; *axial coding* or *theoretical coding*, which uses theoretical codes to connect the main substantive codes; and *selective coding* which isolates and elaborates the higher-order core category (Punch, 1998). Consequently, in coding in GT, the first, second and their objectives are to identify the substantive codes in the data, the theoretical and the core codes respectively. This corresponds with the first, second and third levels of analysis respectively with increasing levels of abstraction. Coding is thus a central issue in GT. However, these coding are likely to overlap and done simultaneously, rather than as separate sequential activities.

Open coding involves *breaking open* or deconstructing the data into manageable chunks (This is why it is called open coding). The point is to understand the phenomenon by opening the theoretical possibilities in the data. It aims at generating abstract conceptual categories more abstract than the data they describe. These can then be used later as building blocks for the theory. It involves exploring the data and breaking it into units to code for meanings, feelings, actions, events and so on (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011). This leads to creation of new codes and categories and

subcategories where necessary. It is not about bringing concepts to the data and no a priori coding scheme is used in open coding. Axial coding (or Glaser's theoretical coding) attempts to link together the categories and codes created during open coding. In other words, the theoretical possibilities and categories broken apart by open coding are put together again or interrelated by putting axis (that is, link) through the data, howbeit in conceptually different ways. *Axial coding* involves exploring codes and examining their interrelationships. *Selective coding* involves deliberately selecting a core code and making explicit its relationship with other codes in those parts of data. Once selected, the core category becomes the centrepiece of the grounded theory. Selective coding includes writing a *story* that builds on the propositions or integrates categories produced by axial coding. The aim of selective coding is integrating and pulling together the developing analyses. The core category being the central focus around which all other concepts, ideas and categories are integrated.

### **2.7.2.3 Abstracting**

The inductive process of GT is seen in the way its theory emerges from its data through moving from one level of abstraction to the other. Abstracting (as in most other qualitative analysis) essentially means that some concepts are at higher level of abstraction than other. Punch (1998) gives a useful conceptual framework to depict levels of abstraction in data analysis. This is adapted in Figure 1 below. At the lowest level of abstraction are the indicators, which are at the most concrete, descriptive level. As the label goes, indicators indicate, that is, they show the presence of something. For instance, hostile remarks made by someone can be considered indicators of the concept of aggression in a particular research on aggression. A researcher working on such study may include other indicators of aggression in order to understand aggression in the given context. Hence, indicators are what qualitative researchers collect in the field in form of data. In abstracting, we infer a concept from an indicator in the data. That is, we are going upwards from a piece of empirical data to a more abstract concept (Punch, 1998). A concept has many indicators and the indicators are interchangeable with each other for the purpose of inferring the concept. However, rather than have pre-specified concepts and indicators, emerging indicators from the data lead to the development of concept in GT.



**Figure 2.3. Qualitative Data Analysis Process**

*Source: Fieldwork, 2013 Adapted from Punch, 1998.*

#### **2.7.2.4 Constant Comparison**

Comparison is a central intellectual activity in qualitative analysis. It is at the heart of GT analysis as it assists in theory generation. In fact the co-founders of GT described grounded theory analysis as the *constant comparative method*. Comparing is essential in abstracting and coding. At the first level of coding, through comparing different indicators in the data, the analyst comes up with more abstract concepts behind the data. Similarly, at the second stage, it is by comparing categories that we are able to link them. Thus comparison helps in raising the level of abstraction. According to Glaser, constant comparison is the process ‘by which the properties and categories across the data are compared continuously until no more variation occurs (1996 cited in Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 600), that is, until saturation is reached. Theoretical saturation is the aim of constant comparison. It involves using negative, discrepant and disconfirming cases to assist the categories and emergent theory to fit all data by comparing new data with existing data and categories in order for the categories to achieve a perfect fit with the data.

According to Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 105-13 cit. in Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2011, p. 600), constant comparison involves four stages. These are comparing incidents and data that are applicable to each category; integrating these categories and their properties; bounding the theory; and setting out the theory. At the first stage, incidents are coded and compared with former incidents in the same and different groups and with other data in the same category. This involves two processes — unitising and categorising. Unitising involves breaking the narratives into the smallest pieces of information or meaningful text, for example, words, phrases, paragraphs. Categorising involves bringing together related the unitised text into the same category, devising rules to describe the properties of the categories, and checking for internal consistency within the unitised text within the categories. The second stage is a stage of *memoing* and further coding, where units being compared change from incidents with incidents to incidents with properties of the category that emerged from previous comparison of incidents. The third stage is a stage of delimitation. The delimitation occurs at the levels of theory and the categories. Major modifications reduce because underlying uniformities and properties are discovered. Theoretical saturation takes place at this stage. The final stage is the stage of writing theory. It occurs when

the researcher, having gathered and generated coded data, memos, and a theory, write the theory in full.

To aid reflexivity and accompany constant comparison, the co-founders of GT recommend that *memoing* should be done simultaneously with constant comparison.

#### **2.7.2.5 Memoing**

“Memos are the theorising write-up of ideas about substantive codes and their theoretically coded relationships as they emerge during coding, collecting and analysing data and during memoing.” (Glaser, 1998, p. 177). Memoing is the writing down of ideas that occur to the researcher during the process of constant comparison and data analysis. A memo is the write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they occur to the analyst while coding (and memoing). It involves writing “...ideas, notes, comments, notes on surprising matters, themes or metaphors, reminders, hunches, draft hypotheses, references to literature, diagrams, questions, draft theories, methodological points, personal points, suggestions for further enquiry, etc...” (Lempert, 2007, p. 245.; Flick, 2009, p. 434 cited in Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2011, p. 600) Memo can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages. It expresses the analyst momentary ideas elaborated using certain concepts. Memos could be as varied as the analyst imagination permits. They may be about any part of the data. According to Punch (1998), memos may be “...substantive, theoretical, methodological, or even personal.” The first two suggest deeper concepts than coding. Memos are useful throughout the stages of the analysis and even may constitute useful part of the report writing later. Coding and *memoing* are essential parts of the style of all qualitative data analysis.

#### **2.7.2.6 Elaborating**

As a concept has many indicators, so also, a category has many properties. Elaborating a category is to specify and compare its additional properties by finding additional indicators of the concept until we reach saturation. Elaborating also means developing and examining its variation systematically by specifying, comparing and developing its properties (Punch, 1998).

### **2.7.3 Grounded Theory (GT) Researchers**

GT is unique in the sense that it sets aside all preconceived ideas and allows the data themselves to give rise to the theory. This demands certain abilities from the GT re-

searchers. Glaser (1996) suggests ability to tolerate uncertainty (no preconceived theory), confusion, setbacks (when new data disconfirm emergent theory), to avoid premature formulation of the theory, but through patiently doing constant comparison allow the emergence of the final theory. There is need for openness to the emergent theory and not forcing data to fit theory by all means. A researcher forces when he lacks the ability to handle confusion and feeling stupid in his study, he argues. GT demands hard work and faithfulness to the rigour of the process. These are summarised as follows:

- tolerance and openness to data and what is emerging;
- tolerance of confusion and regression (feeling stupid when the theory does not become immediately obvious);
- resistance to premature formulation of theory;
- ability to pay close attention to data;
- willingness to engage in the process of theory generation rather than theory testing; it is an experiential methodology;
- ability to work with emergent categories rather than preconceived or received categories.

(Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 599).

#### **2.7.4 Evaluating a Grounded Theory**

The grounded theory of whatever is being theorised must emerge from the data in an unforced manner and explain the data fully and satisfactorily, that is, account for all the data. There are several criteria against which we can evaluate the adequacy or otherwise of the grounded theory. Those suggested in GT literature include originality, resonance (the data, the phenomenon, the participants' experiences and views), usefulness (for different people and groups, for identifying generic processes, for further research, for advancing the field), workability (practicality and explanatory power), fit with the data, relevance (to the situation, to groups, to researchers, to the field) and modifiability (in light of additional data) (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011). Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 237) suggest four key ones. These are:

- The closeness of the *fit* between the theory and the data.
- How readily *understandable* the theory is by the lay persons working in the field, that is, that it makes sense to them.

- The ability of the theory to be *general* to a “multitude of diverse daily situations within the substantive area, not just to a specific types of situation”.
- The theory must enable partial control to be exercised over the process and the structures of day-to-day situations that evolve over time, such that the researcher who is using the theory can have sufficient control of such situations to render it worthwhile to apply the theory to these.

(Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 601)

### **2.7.5 Conclusion**

With explicit orientation and procedure for theory generation, GT is a viable tool for filling the need for theory-building in Peace and Conflict Research, especially in Africa. It is a complete and rigorous research strategy to develop explanatory theory grounded in the data. It was discovered by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s. Developing grounded theory about phenomena under investigation involves some tools, activities and guiding processes. Central activities in GT are abstracting and constant comparison. Others include theoretical sampling, theoretical sensitivity, theoretical relevance, theoretical saturation, theoretical completeness, coding, memoing, and elaborating. There are criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a GT in theorising about its phenomena. These are originality, resonance, usefulness, workability, fit with the data, relevance and modifiability. These and similar ones show GT as a rigorous research strategy. GT has been criticised for presuming that it is not informed by other theories whereas data are laden with theories.

### **2.8 Gaps in the Literature**

Much scholarly works have been done on the Niger Delta Region (NDR), its history, people and culture, its conflicts and interventions in the conflicts (Dike, 1956; Ikime, 1969; Alagoa E. J., 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Albert, 2001a; IPCR, 2002; Isumonah, 2003; Ogbogbo, 2004; Internaitonal Crisis Group, 2006a; Ibaba, 2007). Also, various types of impact assessments in the NDR are covered in the extant literature —social, economic, political, environmental impact assessment (Omotola, 2007; Ojukwu-Ogba, 2009; Aaron & George, 2010). However, the literature has not paid adequate attention to assessing the peace and conflict impacts of the interventions on the context of the NDR and vice versa, using the PCIA framework.



While assessing impacts in social, economic, political, health or environmental terms are useful, in a conflict area, such as the NDR, there has been a growing interest to measure impacts either solely in terms of peace and conflict or in combination with other impacts (Bush K. , 1998; Anderson M. B., 1999; Austin, Fischer, & Wils, 2003; Schmelzle, 2005; Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, & Sheriff, 2005).

Conversely, in the NDR, adequate attention has not been paid to assessing the peace and conflict impacts of, particularly, the FGN socio-economic interventions. The NDDC is the Federal Government of Nigeria's most comprehensive and most capital-intensive socio-economic intervention in the NDR to date, hence there is need to investigate the contributions it has made and/or which it is making to its contexts. In an unpublished Master's dissertation titled "Towards A Conflict Sensitive Development: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Niger Delta Development Commission's Development Interventions in Ilaje Local Government Area" (2004), Akinyoade attempted a PCIA of the NDDC. However, since then, the PCIA literature has grown larger and its methodologies have been rigorously revised. For instance, in 2008, Cole, Mitchell, Ohlsen, Rinaldi, and Unumeri, in *Exploring Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta: A Rough Guide for the Practitioner* presents a framework for conducting peace and conflict-sensitive intervention in the NDR. Hence, there is need to undertake a more rigorous PCIA of the Commission.

From the foregoing, gaps exist in literature on the Niger Delta, the NDDC, and PCIA. Firstly, much has been written on the Niger Delta, its history, people and culture, conflicts, intervention in its conflicts (Dike, 1956; Ikime, 1969; Alagoa E. J., 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Albert, 2001a; IPCR, 2002; Isumonah, 2003; Ogbogbo, 2004; Internaitonal Crisis Group, 2006a; Ibaba, 2007). However, there is no known *ex post facto* peace and conflict impact assessment of the NDDC intervention and its implications on the Niger Delta conflict situation.

Secondly, while literature exists on the NDDC, empirical work on its capacity for peace and conflict-sensitive intervention is not available. Empirical work on its capacity will tell us the extent to which the Commission is capable to deliver on its mandate. Thirdly, while empirical works on gender issues in the Niger Delta exist (Aina, Adeyemi, Waziri, & Samuel, 2009), a gender-based assessment of the interventions of the NDDC and its implications for the context of the interventions is an unexplored

area in literature. Finally, a major gap also exists in theorising on the interactions between intervention and context alongside the implications for the conflict situation, especially in the African context. These are the gaps this study seeks to fill by undertaking an empirical investigation into the interventions of the Niger Delta Development Commission as well as developing an explanatory theory to understand and explain the nature, dynamics and implications of intervention-context interactions and its implication for the Niger Delta conflict situation.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the research methods employed in this study. It covers research design or strategy, sampling and sampling techniques, data collection and data analysis. It also discusses the procedure by which validity and reliability in method and data analysis was achieved in the study. The researcher personally carried out all fieldwork and post-field data handling activities. This ensured the quality of the research work as necessary precautions were taken to produce quality data, analysis and findings.

#### 3.1 Research design

This is an *ex post facto* peace and conflict impact assessment research. It combines the case study and the grounded theory designs in the qualitative research tradition. A peace and conflict-sensitive assessment mainstreams peace and conflict sensitivity into traditional assessment. In other words, it assesses a given programme or intervention with explicit bias for peace and conflict issues. A case study examines cases. In social science research, a case is "...a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context." (Punch, 1998, p. 152). Brewer and Hunter (1989 cited in Punch, 1998) list six types of units, any of which can be the focus of case study, which can be studied in social science research. They are individuals; attributes of individuals; actions and interactions; residues and artefacts of behaviour; settings, incidents and events; and collectivities. The general idea of a case study is to develop fullest understanding of the case. Case study aims at understanding the situation in depth, in its natural setting in order to recognise its complexity and context. It has a holistic focus, with the aim to understand the wholeness and unity of a case (Punch, 1998). Going by Stake's classification, therefore, this study is an *instrumental case study*, which examines a particular

case to give insight into a phenomenon, or to refine a theory (1994 cited in Punch, 1998, p. 152).

Nevertheless, “any particular qualitative research will not necessarily be one thing or the other.” (Punch, 1998, p. 150). Hence, the grounded theory design was combined with case study in order to improve the quality of the study. Grounded theory is a research strategy that aims at generating theory from data. That is, theory that is grounded in the data. Its sole aim is to end up with a theory or theories derived from the analysis of data. Grounded theory is therefore a research strategy and a method of data analysis. Though it uses deduction as well, grounded theory is essentially an inductive technique. It emphasises induction as the main tool for theory development (Glaser, 1998; Punch, 1998). A key issue in grounded theory is theoretical sampling, which describes the relationship between data collection and data analysis (see Data Collection below). Another key issue is the use of literature. Based on its orientation—theory generation—literature reviewing is deliberately delayed until conceptual and theoretical directions within the data are clear. Hence, literature is treated as further data for the analysis (Glaser, 1998; Punch, 1998). The grounded theory strategy is considered appropriate for this study because there has been repeated call for building explanatory theory in Peace and Conflict Studies and especially about the phenomenon under investigation. Also, it is a coordinated, systematic but flexible approach, thus it brings a disciplined and organised approach to analysing qualitative data. Finally, the nature of this study—being an applied research investigating relatively new problems—makes the traditional hypothetico-deductive theory testing/verification approach less appropriate.

### **3.2 Sampling**

No research can study everything about a case, hence the need for sampling within the case. Being qualitative, this study employed a combination of purposive sampling methods for its various desired purposes as required. Sampling decisions for the purpose of this study were made about people to interview, settings or sites and processes to evaluate. Five categories of interviewees—programme beneficiaries, community stakeholders, external stakeholders, the NDDC officials, and the NDDC Consultants—were sampled, using maximum variation sampling. Maximum variation sampling aims at obtaining “...maximum differences of perceptions about a topic among information-rich informants or group” (McMillan and Schumacher, 1997, cited in Introduction to

Designing Qualitative Research). Programme beneficiaries were selected using snowballing (also known as network or chain referral) technique. In snowballing sampling, participants already sampled referred the researcher to other potential participants. Informant sampling was employed in sampling community and external stakeholders while concept/theory sampling was employed in sampling NDDC staff and consultant. Concept/theory sampling selects "...by information-rich persons or situations known to experience the concept or to be attempting to implement the concept/theory" (Trochim, 2006).

Odi community in Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government Area of Bayelsa State was selected, using site selection and comprehensive sampling strategies. Site-selection strategy decides on site where specific events occurred while comprehensive sampling chooses entire group by criteria. Odi community was selected for a number of reasons. One, the community has attracted much intervention after the 1999 massacre. Also, it is an Ijaw community, which is the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta region and fourth largest in Nigeria. Moreover, at the time of the fieldwork, the community was not involved in any violent conflict, which makes it safe for the researcher and participants. Furthermore, preliminary investigation revealed that the community had enjoyed relatively high number of NDDC interventions. Finally, it is home to one of the major NDDC consultants on its agricultural support programme—the Biotechnology Resources Development Centre (BIODEC)—one of which the Commission proudly broadcasts its achievements since 2006. Evaluation included the overall process of the NDDC intervention in the region and particularly in the community. The NDDC intervention evaluated in the community included all available NDDC projects and programmes from 2006 to 2011.

### **3.2.1 Description of participants**

Seventy-eight interviews were conducted on resident community members in Odi. Interviewees included traditional ruler, secretary, and members of the traditional ruling council, chairman, secretary and members of the Community Development Committee, the oldest man in the community, religious leaders, women leader, female and male executives and members of the Odi Youth Council, NDDC project beneficiaries (females and males), school teachers in the community, I/NGOs/ CBOs staff, politicians, and law-enforcement agents. Most of the participants are literate with their level of education ranging from modern school certificate to university education. They

were military officer (retired, now farmer), politicians, university graduates, teachers, Biotechnology Resource Development Centre staff, farmers, fishers and traders. Their ages ranged from late twenties to seventy above.

Twenty-three external stakeholders (non-resident of Odi community) were also interviewed. This included NDDC staff, NDDC consultants, experts on Niger Delta, I/NGOs staff, activists, academics, religious leaders, and professionals. These categories were selected to reflect different aspects and make an objective account of the phenomenon under investigation. Non-resident community stakeholder interviewed were academics, social critics/activists, staff/consultants for NGOs and politicians. NDDC staff interviewed comprised assistant directors and desk officers in Agriculture and Fisheries Directorate, Commercial and Industrial Directorate, Community and Rural Development Directorate, and Youth, Women Culture and Sports Directorate at the headquarters in Port Harcourt, Rivers State Directorate and Bayelsa State Directorate. All NDDC staff and consultants interviewed had a minimum qualification of university education and their ages ranged from mid-thirties to early fifties.

### **3.3 Data Collection**

Data collection covers types of data, methods and instruments for, and ethics in, data collection. Since both case study and grounded theory designs use multiple sources of data and multiple data collection methods, primary and secondary data were collected for the study. Consequently, this study employed key informant and in-depth interviews, official documents, and non-participant observation as methods of data collection. Primary data were collected through key informant interviews (KII), in-depth Interviews (IDIs), and non-participant observation. The researcher took field notes on participant's reactions throughout the duration of the interview. These notes were built into the transcript of the interview and were also used in data analyses. At the end of the interview, participants were informed that they would be furnished with transcript of the interviews if they gave the researcher their individual e-mail address. All NDDC staff and consultants, experts and other external stakeholders provided the required e-mail addresses and the transcript was sent to them for validation. Surprisingly, most of the programme beneficiaries and community stakeholders also provided e-mails contact. The transcripts were sent to them for validation as promised. All these transcripts were validated before commencement of data analysis. At the end of each day, audio

of the interviews were transferred into the researchers laptop with backup copies saved in a flash drive and a memory card.

**Table 3.1. Categories of Interviewees**

S/N	Category of Participants	Number of interviews
<b>A</b>	<b>Resident Community People (RCP)</b>	<b>78</b>
1	Traditional Ruler/Secretary to the Traditional Ruling Council	4
2	Community Development Committee Leaders—Chairman/Secretary	2
3	The oldest man in the community	1
4	Men	8
5	Religious Leaders	3
6	Women Leader	1
7	Women	5
8	Community Youth Leaders (females and males)	4
9	Community Youths (females and males)	12
10	Project beneficiaries (females: males)	20
11	School Principal/Teacher in the community	4
12	I/NGOs/ CBOs staff	5
13	Politicians	6
14	Law-enforcement agents	3
<b>B</b>	<b>NDDC Staff and Consultants</b>	<b>16</b>
1	NDDC Staff	10
2	NDDC Consultants	6
<b>C</b>	<b>Other Stakeholders in the Niger Delta</b>	<b>7</b>
1	Neutral experts on Niger Delta, academics, activists, etc.	7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>101</b>

*Source: Author's Compilation, 2011*

### 3.3.1 Development and Validation of Research Instruments

The instruments for data collection included semi-structured interview guides, digital voice recorder (Olympus WS-510), and digital camera (Nikon Coolpix S570 for picture and video). Five semi-structured interview guides were developed for the five groups of interviewees sampled. These were:

1. IDI Guide for programme beneficiaries.
2. IDI Guide for community stakeholders (excluding project beneficiaries).
3. IDI Guide for the NDDC staff.
4. IDI Guide for the NDDC consultants.
5. IDI Guide for experts and other agencies working in the Niger Delta (and Odi community).

The interview guides address questions covering the mandate of the NDDC and its fulfilment; identification of NDDC intervention in the community; and stage and level of community involvement. NDDC official documents such as the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, NDDC Act, official brochures, Chairman and Managing Director/CEO's speeches at various NDDC events, and NDDC website contents were analysed. Unstructured non-participant observations were carried out at NDDC Offices and its intervention sites in Odi. The drafts of the interview guides were sent to a consultant, Mr Godwin Unumeri, who is a Shell-trained Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment expert and a consultant to Peacebuild, an organisation in Canada that published *Exploring Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta: A Rough Guide for the Practitioner* (2008). He validated the interview guides. Each interview guide contained between nine and 12 questions drawn to elicit information necessary to answer the research questions. The duration of the interviews ranged from less than 10 minutes to over 100 minutes. The recorded interviews were later transcribed for closer study. In Bailey (2008, p. 1), transcription is "...representing audible talk as written words requires reduction, interpretation and representation to make the written text readable and meaningful" (The audio recording was transcribed by the researcher personally at an average of four hours transcription time for every 30 minute of recording. This is consistent with general observations about transcribing time (Lacey and Luff 2007; Bailey 2008,). Transcription, normally time-consuming, was



handled over a period of three months. The transcripts contained about 200, 000 words in Microsoft Word Processor.

Secondary data were collected from NDDC website, NDDC official documents (the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, speeches of key NDDC officials, and NDDC skills acquisition graduation ceremony brochure and community participants' personal file records.

In consonance with most qualitative designs, especially, grounded theory, the process of data collection and data analyses for this study was iterative, that is, there was a back-and-forth movement between the two stages throughout the research project. Also, the principle of *theoretical sampling* (see Section 2.6.2) guided the process. This continued until the stage of *theoretical saturation* (see Section 2.6.2) was achieved. This is a stage when new data was not adding new theoretical elements but rather confirming what has already been found.

### **3.3.2 Ethics in Data Collection**

Some ethical issues were observed in data collection. On the appointed date and time, letters of institutional affiliation or introduction (from the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan) and letter of introduction of the research (written by the researcher and containing information about the research and rights of the participants) were given to each respondent. In cases of NDDC officials and consultants, it took weeks and sometimes months before official approval for the interview was secured. Before commencing the interview, the researcher went over the letter of information about the research with each participant and clarified issues raised by the participant. The ethical issues of voluntary participation, withdrawal of consent, confidentiality and anonymity were stressed to every participant. Also, the researcher asked for the permission to record the interview. The permission was granted in most cases. The researcher then administered consent form to the participant. The interview commenced after the consent form is signed and handed over to the researcher. The interviews were recorded using Olympus WS-510M digital voice recorder.

### **3.4 Data Analysis**

Analysing qualitative data involves coding, memoing, categorisation, identifying patterns and building explanatory theories. It involves two fundamental activities — abstracting and comparing. The essential idea of abstracting “...is that some concepts

are at a higher level of abstraction than others” (Punch, 1998, p. 208). Abstracting involves raising the levels of abstraction from more concrete indicators through first-order concept to second-order concept, and possibly to more abstract and general concepts. Hence, it moves through a continuum from concrete to abstract and from specific to general. Comparison is essential throughout the stages of qualitative data analysis. At the level of coding, comparing different indicators in the data helps to identify more abstract concepts behind the empirical data. Comparison, therefore, leads to raising the level of abstraction, which is essential to conceptual development. Coding at higher level also involves comparing concepts and their properties, thereby helping us to identify more abstract concept (Punch, 1998). Through abstracting and comparison, categories emerge from the data, leading to the emergence of concepts and propositions from the data (Glaser, 1998). Concepts and propositions thus developed may be useful in understanding similar phenomena in contexts similar to the one investigated. Conception and development of propositions are two ways by which case study can be generalised (Punch, 1998). This will help the generalizability or transferability of the findings.

### **3.4.1 ATLAS.ti 7.0: Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analyses Software (CAQDAS) Package**

There are diverse techniques of analysing qualitative data. These techniques are often interconnected, overlapping and complementary, seldom mutually exclusive. The manual approach to qualitative data analysis, with its many variants, was predominant until the mid-1990s when computer application packages for the analysis of qualitative data became available. Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analyses Software (CAQDAS) help qualitative data analyst to do all activities —coding, quoting, memoing, and others that are traditionally done in manual qualitative data analyses. Computer technology saves a great deal of what Lacey and Stuff (2007) call “paper chase” that normally accompany manual qualitative data analysis. ATLAS.ti 7.0, one of the popular computer packages for analysing qualitative data, was used in analysing data collected in this study. The researcher was first introduced to ATLAS.ti in 2008 at the CODESRIA Regional Methodology Workshop, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Competence in using the software was achieved through practice with demo version, video tutorials and manuals for 12 months. The analysis of the data for this study was done with ATLAS.ti version 7.0 released in June 2012. It is a well-stocked workbench for the qualitative analysis of large bodies of textual, graphical, audio, and video data.

It provides the necessary instruments to accomplish the tasks associated with any systematic approach to unstructured data, that is, data that cannot be meaningfully analysed by formal, statistical approaches.

It helps to thoroughly analyse and evaluate, search and query data, to capture, visualise and share findings (Friese, 2011). ATLAS.ti helps user explore the complex phenomenon hidden in the data by letting him manage, extract, categorise, compare, explore, interlink data segments and reassemble meaningful pieces from large amounts of data from a large variety and volume of source documents. Thus the software supports user in discovering patterns and testing hypotheses in creative, flexible yet systematic ways.

With numerous output options and collaboration tools, the analysis is easily accessible to the user and others (Friese, 2011). Qualitative analysis with ATLAS.ti involves two principal levels —the data level and the conceptual level. The data level includes segmentation of data files; coding text, image, audio, and video passages; and writing comments and memos. The conceptual level focuses on linking codes to networks and writing some more comments and memos, which are activities involved in querying data and model-building. Data-level activities include segmenting the data assigned to a project into quotations, adding comments to respective passages (note-making/annotating), and coding selected text passages or data segments, secondary materials, annotations, and memos to facilitate their later retrieval. Initial ideas often find expression through their assignment to a code or memo, to which similar ideas or text selections also become assigned. The latter act of comparing noteworthy segments leads to a creative conception phase that involves higher-level interpretive work and theory-building (Friese, 2011). Conceptual-level work involves querying data in variety of ways, combining complex code queries with variables, exploring relationships between codes and visualising findings using the network tool. ATLAS.ti allows user to visually *connect* selected passages, memos, and codes into diagrams that graphically outline complex relations. This feature virtually transforms text-based workspace into a graphical *playground* for constructing concepts and theories based on relationships between codes, data segments, or memos. This process sometimes uncovers other relations in the data that were not obvious before and still allows user the ability to instantly revert to his notes or primary data selection.

The following sequence of steps describes a common script when working with ATLAS.ti:

1. Create a project, an "idea container," meant to enclose data, all findings, codes, memos, and structures under a single name. This is called a *Hermeneutic Unit* (HU). This is the main workspace—the HU Editor.
2. Next, assign documents, text, graphic, audio and video files, and Google Earth, called Primary Documents (PDs), to the HU. The data files become the source material for the project's primary data and can be located anywhere on the computer or a network. For ease of data management, all data and the ATLAS.ti project file, the HU, should be saved within one folder.
3. Read and select text passages or identify areas in an image or select segments on the timeline of an audio or video file that are of further interest, assign key words (codes), and write comments and memos that contain your thinking about the data. This is the Data-Level working phase.
4. Compare data segments based on the codes you have assigned; possibly assign more data files to the project.
5. Organise PDs, codes, and memos into *families*.
6. Query the data based on the research questions utilising the different tools ATLAS.ti provides. The key words to look for are: simple retrieval, complex code retrievals using the query tool, simple or complex retrievals in combination with variables via the scope button, the co-occurrence explorer (tree and table explorer), the codes -primary document table, Excel and SPSS export of frequency counts for further statistical analysis.
7. Build semantic, prepositional or terminological networks from the codes you have created. These networks, together with the codes and memos, form the framework for emerging theory.
8. Finally, compile a written report based on the memos written throughout the various phases of the project and the networks created and even publish the project as a World Wide Web document or an individual presentation using XML.

Source: (ATLAS.ti 6 User Guide and Reference, 2011).

### **3.5 Ensuring Rigour: Validity and Reliability in Method and Data Analysis**

The onus to demonstrate that qualitative research adheres to a systematic and rigorous method rests on the researcher. This is especially important, given the criticism from those less favourable to the method of qualitative research. This section, therefore, focuses on the issue of rigour in research method and data analyses, especially on the issues of validity and reliability. Validity, meaning the correspondence between the reality studied and the reality reported, or the best available approximation to the truth of propositions, is an important issue in scientific research. It is a contested issue in qualitative research. Some qualitative researchers argue that the validity framework commonly accepted in quantitative research is not acceptable in qualitative research. “They reject the basic realist assumption that there is a reality external to our perception of it. Consequently, it doesn't make sense to be concerned with the “truth” or “falsity” of an observation with respect to an external reality...” (Trochim, 2006). This school argues for different standards for judging qualitative research. Guba and Lincoln (1994, cited in Punch, 1998) suggest four criteria for judging qualitative research. They are credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. They correspond to quantitative criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity.

Methodologists argue about the value and legitimacy of these criteria. Some argue that a correct understanding of the corresponding quantitative criteria will show that those quantitative criteria are applicable to qualitative research as well. However, the purpose of featuring it here is not to support the argument for or against a set of criteria but to show that this study was conducted with full consciousness of certain criteria to ensure quality scientific research. Of the technical meanings of validity — validity of data; overall validity of research, internal validity and external validity— the last two were emphasised throughout the course of the investigation. Internal and external validity have their origin in quantitative research and have found inroads into qualitative research as well. However, they have different meanings in different contexts. In quantitative research, internal validity is concerned with whether a finding that incorporates a causal relationship between two or more variables is sound. External validity refers to the generalizability of the study's findings. That is, the extent to

**Table 3.2. Criteria for Judging Qualitative Research**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Description</b>
1	Credibility	Establishing that the results of qualitative research are credible or believable from the perspective of the participant in the research. Since the purpose of qualitative research is to describe or understand the phenomenon of interest from the participant's eyes, the participants are the only ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the results.
2	Transferability	The degree to which the results of qualitative research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings. Qualitative researcher enhances transferability by doing a thorough job of describing the research context and the assumptions that were central to the research.
3	Dependability	Emphasises the need for the researcher to account for the ever-changing context within which research occurs. It is the researcher's responsibility to describe the changes that occur in the setting and how these changes affected the way the research approached the study.
4	Confirmability	The degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others.

*Source: Trochim, 2006.*

which the findings can be generalised, or transferred to other settings. In qualitative research, internal validity refers to the “...degree to which the interpretations and concepts have mutual meanings between the participants and the researcher” (Trochim, 2006). External validity in qualitative research refers to “...the extension of findings, as grounded theory or as an analytical synthesis that enables others to understand similar situations and apply these findings in subsequent research” (Trochim, 2006). McMillan and Schumacher (1997) suggest some strategies for ensuring internal and external validity in qualitative research. These are presented in tables 3.2 and 3.3 below.

In qualitative research, “validation does not belong in some separate stage of the investigation, but instead as an on-going principle throughout the entire research process.” (O' Connor & Gibson, n.d). In order to ensure rigour in the study, the researcher employed five of the nine strategies enumerated above throughout the entire research process. These were:

1. Prolonged and persistent field work: The first and second phases of the fieldwork spanned 15 months, from June 2010 to September 2011. It covered Bayelsa (Odi, Egboghene, Yenagoa), Edo (Benin, Auchi), and Rivers States (Port Harcourt). Between three and five visits (spanning four to 10 days) were made to each state.
2. Verbatim Account of participants' language: As will be shown later in the findings, participants were quoted verbatim to support findings. This is usual for qualitative research.
3. Mechanically-recorded data: Electronic gadgets —digital voice recorder and digital camera were used for audio recording, video footage and photographs during the fieldwork.
4. Member checking: Meanings of words and symbols were clarified with participants. Also transcribed interviews were sent to participants for validation before inclusion in the data analysis.
5. Participants review: The researcher asked the participants to validate the study's findings. Part of this was done through phone interview. Inputs from participants were worked into the final report. This constituted the third phase of fieldwork.

**Table 3.3. Strategies to Enhance Internal Validity in Qualitative Research**

<b>Strategies to Enhance Design Validity</b>		
	<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Description</b>
1	Prolonged and persistent field work	Allows interim data analysis and corroboration to ensure the match between findings and participant reality.
2	Participant language; verbatim accounts	Obtain literal statements of participants and quotations from documents.
3	Low-inference descriptors	Record precise, almost literal, and detailed descriptions of people and situations.
4	Multiple researchers	Agreement on descriptive data collected by a research team
5	Mechanically recorded data	Use of tape recorders, photographs and videotapes.
6	Participant researcher	Use of participant recorded perceptions in diaries or anecdotal records for corroboration.
7	Member checking	Check informally with participants for accuracy during data collection; frequently done in participant observation studies
8	Participant review	Ask each participant to review researcher's synthesis of all interviews with the person for accuracy of representation; frequently done in interview studies.
9	Negative cases or discrepant data	Actively search for, record, analyse, and report negative cases of discrepant data that are an exception to patterns or that modify patterns found in the data.

*Source: McMillan and Schumacher, 1997.*



**Table 3.4. Strategies to Enhance External Validity in Qualitative Research**

<b>Components that Enable Others to Discover Similar Phenomena or Apply the Findings</b>	
<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Adequate Description in the Study</b>
Research Role	The social relationship of the researcher with the participants.
Informant selection	Criteria, rationale, and decision process used in purposeful sampling.
Social context	The physical, social, interpersonal, and functional social scenes of data collection.
Data collection strategies	The multi-methods employed, including ethnographic observation, ethnographic interview, and documents.
Data analysis strategies	Data analysis process described.
Authentic narrative	Thick description presented as an analytical narrative.
Typicality	Distinct characteristics of groups and/or sites presented.
Analytical premises	The initial theoretical framework or concept that informs the study and others added as the study progresses.
Alternative explanations	Retrospective delineation of all plausible or rival explanations for interpretations.
<b>Other criteria by purpose (after study completed)</b>	
Phenomenology	Understand the complexity of the situation; generates additional case studies.
Grounded theory	Concepts or mini-theory relate to social science; generates verification research with more structured designs.
Critical traditions	Historical revisionism and situatedness to erode ignorance; empowers participants; generates further research; action stimulus.

*Source: McMillan and Schumacher, 1997.*

There are strategies to enhance external validity of qualitative research. In the table 3.4, McMillan and Schumacher highlighted some of these strategies. Some of these were employed to improve the external validity of the findings of this study.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the research method for this investigation. The study is an instrumental case study (in the qualitative tradition), which seeks to understand a particular case —the NDDC intervention in Odi community —to give insight into the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of intervention and context on peace, conflict and gender dynamics. The study employed multiple sources of data and methods including primary and secondary sources; and interviews and documents as methods of data collection. Forty-five participants were interviewed in 78 interview sessions until theoretical sampling was attained. Ethical issues, including informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality and voluntary participation observed during data collection, transcription of interviews and data analysis were also presented. The data were analysed with ATLAS.ti. Finally, procedures for ensuring validity and reliability of this study were also discussed.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### **THE NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION: MANDATE, INTERVENTIONS AND SENSITIVITY TO PEACE AND CONFLICT**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), its vision, mission, mandate and statutory and administrative structure in the first section. The second section presents the Commission's strategies, goals and policies for change and a strategic framework for implementing the NDDC's interventions. In the third section, the relationship of the Commission's mandate, interventions, and the needs of the Niger Delta region (NDR) people is presented. The fourth section discusses the institutional capacity of the NDDC, that is, the extent to which peace and conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in its institutional context and in its intervention programming.

#### **4.1 The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC): Vision, Mission, Mandate, and Institutional Framework**

The need to give special attention to the development of the NDR has been recognised before oil exploration began in the area and before Nigeria's independence. It informed the colonial government's commission of enquiry —Willink Commission of 1957/58— set up to investigate the fears of the minorities and how to allay them. The commission recognised the peculiar developmental needs of the region and recommended a developmental board for the region. To this end, the Nigerian central government, at different times, established specialised agencies to cater to the need of the region. The Balewa administration set up the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) by an act of parliament, and it operated from 1960 to 1966. The failure of NDDB and the increasing political mobilisation of the various ethnic groups in the region informed the setting up of the Presidential Task Force by the 1979/1983 administration. The Task Force was set up in 1980 and 1.5% of the Federation Account was allocated to it to tackle the developmental problems of the region (Master Plan, 2006).

It operated from 1980 to 1985. In 1992, the Babangida administration established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) for provision of infrastructure in the area. OMPADEC lasted from 1992-1999. Through these establishments, the people of the NDR have suffered from rising expectation, relative deprivation, and frustration. The result has engendered aggression and violent conflict among the people.

By the late 1990s, the Niger Delta Region had become a zone where youths disrupted oil production at will and communities frequently engaged in destructive inter- and intra-community strife at the slightest provocation. This was the situation of things when a presidential aspirant, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, visited the region during his election campaign and promised to establish a programme that would proffer urgent and fundamental solution to the developmental needs of the Niger Delta and usher in sustainable prosperity and peace to the area. In fulfilment of his promise, within two weeks of his inauguration, he sent a bill to the National Assembly to establish the Niger Delta Development Commission as an agency to implement a programme for the sustainable development of the NDR. The National Assembly enacted the NDDC Act 2000 on the 12<sup>th</sup> of July 2000 (The NDDC Act, 2000). The NDDC was officially inaugurated on 21<sup>st</sup> December 2000, and established in 2001 (NDDC, 2011). This is deemed the Obasanjo administration's greatest and most significant attempt to grapple with the grievances of the minorities in the oil-producing areas (Isumonah A. V., 2003). The Commission was established with the aim of deliberately influencing the conflict situation in the NDR positively with mandate covering development, humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding interventions.

Hence, the NDDC was birthed into a volatile situation that heralded Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999. Threats from various quarters greeted the NDDC from its inception. One threat related to inclusion of other oil-producing areas in the NDDC bill, another to the location of its headquarters. Yet another contested issue was the position of the Executive Chairman of the Commission. In other words, conflicts among the target beneficiaries heralded the establishment of the Commission. This, in a sense, attests to the conflict exacerbating potential of interventions in contexts. Nonetheless, in the words of ex-President Obasanjo, "the Niger Delta Development Commission has the potential to offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic problems of the Niger Delta people" (Master Plan, 2006). Its vision is to "offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region". It has the mission "...to facili-

tate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful.” (Master Plan, 2006). These clearly describe the Commission as a development (intervention) agency. Since it was established in response to the ND socio-economic problems, which has made the region conflict-prone, the NDDC’s inherent overarching goal is to facilitate the socio-economic development and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta.

The mandate, that is, functions and powers of the Commission are established in Part II of the Act and they include:

1. Formulation of policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta area.
2. Conception, planning and implementation, in accordance with set rules and regulations, of projects and programs for sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation (including roads, jetties and waterways), health, employment, industrialisation, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications.
3. Surveying the Niger Delta in order to ascertain measures necessary to promote its physical and socio-economic development.
4. Preparing Master Plans and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta region and the estimation of the member states of the Commission.
5. Implementation of all the measures approved for the development of the Niger Delta region by the Federal Government and the states of the Commission.
6. Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta region and assisting the member states in the formulation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the resources of the Niger Delta region.
7. Assessing and reporting on any project being funded or carried out in the region by oil and gas companies and any other company, including non-governmental organisations, as well as ensuring that funds released for such projects are properly utilised.
8. Tackling ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in the Niger Delta region and advising the Federal Government

and the member states on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution.

9. Liaising with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution, prevention and control.
10. Executing such other works and performing such other functions, which in the opinion of the Commission are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta region and its people.

(Source: [www.nddc.gov.ng](http://www.nddc.gov.ng); NDDC, 2011).

The Commission's headquarters is located in Port Harcourt with state directorates in each of the nine oil-producing states. The NDDC administrative framework as contained in the NDDC Act includes a 19-member governing council comprising a chairman; one indigene each to represent the nine states; three representatives of non-oil mineral producing states drawn from geopolitical zones not represented in the Commission; one representative of oil-producing companies in the Niger Delta nominated by the oil-producing companies; one person to represent the Federal Ministry of Finance; one person to represent Federal Ministry of Environment; the Managing Director of the Commission; and two executive directors. The chairmanship of the board is rotated amongst the member states in alphabetic order. Part III of the Act establishes the structure of the Commission. The following directorates are established for the Commission:

- (a) the Directorate of Administration and Human Resources;
- (b) the Directorate of Community and Rural Development;
- (c) the Directorate of Utilities Infrastructural Development and Waterways;
- (d) the Directorate of Environmental Protection and Control;
- (e) the Directorate of Finance and Supply;
- (f) the Directorate of Agriculture and Fisheries;
- (g) the Directorate of Planning, Research, Statistics and Management Information System;
- (h) the Directorate of Legal Services;
- (i) the Directorate of Education, Health and Social Services;
- (j) the Directorate of Commercial and Industrial Development; and
- (k) the Directorate of Projects Monitoring and Supervision.

However, the Act gives the board, with the approval of the president, the power to create additional directorates as the need arises. A management committee, comprising the Managing Director as the chairman, two executive directors, and the directors of the directorates established above. The management committee is saddled with the responsibility of general administration of the Commission. The NDDC management currently has 23 members —made up of 19 males and four females. Part III also established the Niger Delta Advisory Committee comprising the governors of the member states and two other individuals appointed by the President of Nigeria. The advisory committee advises the Commission with a view to achieving its objectives. An NDDC State Directorate is established for each state. An administrative structure, similar to the headquarters' (with particular reference to the directorates) exists in the state directorates. However, in place of directorates at the headquarters, we have desks in the state directorates. Hence, we have a desk on community and rural development among others. A clear distinction need be made between the headquarters and the state directorates in the area of intervention. And this is that all interventions are initiated by the headquarters, while the state directorates implement and monitor. According to an NDDC state directorate staff:

...most of the planning is done from the headquarters...So, most of the planning is done over there. What we do is to implement, to monitor...(Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

This may have implications for intervention programming. It gives room for disconnect between planning and implementation. This has also led to different status enjoyed by the staff in the headquarters and the state directorates. The former are reported to feel superior and overbearing in their relationship with the latter. The concepts of “oppressiveness of intervention” and “divisiveness of intervention” (to be explained in chapter five) seem to play out among the staff of the intervening agency as well.

#### **4.2 The NDDC Intervention Strategies: Master Plan and Strategy for Change**

Strategy refers to a carefully-designed method or plan of action to achieve a goal. It also refers to the art or act of developing and carrying out such plans. Since its early days, the Commission recognised the need for strategic approach to fulfilling its mandate. The approach employed a two-phased strategy for the development of the Niger

Delta Region. The strategy includes the immediate and the far-reaching phases. The first phase includes the completion of OMPADEC projects, the new strategic projects, and human development. This was to prevent a vacuum of inactivity while preparing the second phase, which is the development and implementation of the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. For the first phase, the Commission drew up an action plan for immediate take-off projects. This focused on the completion and commissioning of viable projects inherited from OMPADEC. The rationale for these projects is essentially because they were on ground. Projects in this category include water supply; rural electrification; roads maintenance and construction; jetties and shore protection; school building; health centres; land reclamation and dredging.

The phase also included the execution of new strategic projects. These strategic projects are those that make immediate impact on the community and impact on conflict resolution and risk management. According to Chief Onyema Ugochukwu, the first Chairman of the NDDC, the projects were to be equitably distributed to ensure that no community was left out and they must eventually fit into the Master Plan, when completed (cit. in Akinyoade, 2004). The last part of the first phase, based on the principle that any development must start with human beings, focused on human capacity development programmes. Programmes in this category include education support, skill acquisition and computer training, vocational training, community-based surveillance schemes, commercial bus scheme, agriculture support projects, and road, public buildings and utilities maintenance schemes.


The far-reaching strategies developed were to cover a phased development of the entire region. This constitutes the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. The Master Plan is a 260-page document published in 2006 to serve as guide for the NDDC in fulfilling its mandate in the NDR. The Commission adopted the bottom-up approach in developing the Master Plan. The whole idea is to make the ND people the drivers of their own development by involving them in the conception, planning, and implementation of the NDDC's programmes to be executed in their areas (Ugochukwu, 2002 cit. in Akinyoade, 2004). To this end, the Commission held stakeholders' consultative forums in all the nine-member states and some local government areas of the Niger Delta soon after its inauguration. The forums provided opportunity for the people, particularly those at the grassroots, to tell the NDDC what they wanted



and the order of priority in which they wanted it. In addition, communities were encouraged to write the vision of their development to the Commission.

Since its publication, the Master Plan serves as the road map for the social, economic, and physical development of the NDR. Expectedly, it articulates the strategies of the Commission. The strategy, titled “The Master Plan Strategy” is summarised in pages 18 through 26 in the executive summary and fully discussed in pages 161 through 164 of the Master Plan, where it was titled “The Strategy for Change in the Niger Delta Region”. The strategy is rooted in the vision to improve the quality of life of the Niger Delta people (with particular attention to those with the greatest need) by making good use of the region’s rich natural resources for the prosperity of the region (Master Plan, 2006). To achieve this, strategies and specific policies and interventions were adopted. The overarching direction of the development strategy is “...to raise the standards of living above the poverty line, achieve the Millennium Development Goals and progress beyond these to enhance the technological and industrial capacity of the region” (2006, p. 18). The strategy attempts “...to create favourable conditions for greater productivity and economic enterprise in rural and urban areas...” (p. 19). Furthermore, it specifically addresses how to create enabling conditions for enterprise, efficient agriculture and industrialisation in order to utilise the rich natural resources to achieve its vision and mission. The strategy is rooted in an integrated consideration of the dynamic relationship between all aspects of life in the NDR. Hence, it adopts an integrated approach.

The essential elements of the strategy include pursuing poverty reduction, largely through improved agricultural productivity, and development of micro and small-scale enterprises while also pursuing improved infrastructure and industrialisation as engines of accelerated economic growth; institutional development, capacity building and environmental protection as general foundations and enablers. These essential elements of the integrated strategy and their relationships are captured in the Integrated Strategy for the NDR Pyramid (Figure 4.1).



**Figure 4.1. The Integrated Development Strategy (IDS) Pyramid**

*Source: The Master Plan, 2006 p 21.*

According to the Master Plan, the pyramid depicts:

“...the concept of parallel interventions in rural and urban areas, and how the ultimate achievement of the poverty alleviation is based on wealth creation through economic development and fundamental changes, with an underlying emphasis on capacity building for good governance, planning, management, and enterprise.” (p 21)

In the IDS Pyramid, all issues below the apex of the pyramid underpin two key components of the Master Plan strategy —poverty reduction through industrialisation and economic growth. Other issues including human resource development, infrastructure and natural environment conservations are present as necessary conditions to achieve the desired result —development that is sustainable in social, economic and environmental terms (Master Plan, 2006). The integrated approach addresses five critical questions in confronting the causes of poverty and poor living standards in the NDR. The questions are:

1. What are the problems experienced by the people and who experience them?
2. What are the chains of causes leading to a problem and who are the *active stakeholders* causing them?
3. Which interventions are needed to address the causes and change the future outcomes?
4. Are these interventions feasible, taking account of the necessary resources (financial, human and material) and the capacity of *active stakeholders* to change?
5. What would be the *downstream* side effects of these interventions and how to prepare for them? (2006, p. 19).

The strategy identified the causes of poverty and poor living conditions in the NDR as including:

1. poor economic growth;
2. lack of enterprise;
3. poor physical infrastructure;
4. poor governance and management of resources and corruption;
5. unsuitable institutions and regulations;
6. unsuitable political system and economy;

7. poor security of life and property; and
8. inadequate labour force and skills base.

To tackle these, the Master Plan proposes a gradual intervention process including:

1. understand the constraints on the rate of development (not so much financial as human resources, institutions, infrastructure, the construction industry, etc.);
2. start with demonstration projects in rural areas and with pilot projects in urban areas, selecting projects that are likely to succeed and concentrating the professional effort in an integrated set of interventions in each project. Publicity of successful projects in order to spread good practice across the region;
3. build up in parallel a widely-spread human capacity for good integrated planning and for management of change. This entails the discipline of integrative thinking, the relationships with active and passive stakeholders, transparency and accountability, legislative changes and law enforcement, and the role of universities in research and development, adult learning and primary education (Master Plan, 2006).

The integrated approach to promoting economic growth and facilitating poverty reduction involves interventions in many activity sectors but grouped into five thematic areas. The Master Plan's five thematic areas of intervention are economic development, community needs, the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and institutional resources. These constitute the strategic goals, policies and proposals and are briefly discussed below.

1. Economic development aims at reducing poverty and creating jobs, diversifying the economy, supporting better living standards for a growing population, diffusing social tensions and regenerating the urban space. It includes growth in agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture, micro and small enterprises (MSEs), medium and large industries, tourism, solid minerals, financial services and investment promotion.
2. Community needs concern the welfare of individuals within their social and physical environment. It covers health care, housing, water and sanitation, education, vocational training, security/conflict management, social welfare, community development, arts, sports and culture, and women and youth leisure.

3. The natural environment includes the protection of bio-diversity and the quality of air and water. It covers impact of oil and gas operations, waste management, intensive agriculture, and fishing, emissions and waste from industry, emissions from vehicles and planes.
4. Physical infrastructure, which is necessary to accelerate economic growth and human and community welfare, includes energy, telecommunication, transportation, utilities, and community buildings (schools, clinics, etc.).
5. Human and institutional resources including capacity building for good governance and prosperous enterprise. It is deemed necessary for the actualisation of the activities proposed above. It involves good planning and management skills at all levels of government, and a culture of respect for the public, transparency and accountability. In addition, it includes continued professional development requirements for all public officers. Furthermore, it includes labour force skills in all types of economic and social employment; skills and culture of community workers and facilitators; and recognition and respect for human rights amongst community members (Master Plan, 2006).

The strategy for change in the NDR in the Master Plan involves both strategic goals and policies for change.

#### **4.2.1 Strategic goals for change**

Under its strategic goals for change, the NDDC enumerates seven strategic economic and social goals. They include:

1. To increase economic growth in the rural areas by improving the productivity of agriculture and fishing and facilitating micro and small enterprises;
2. To increase economic growth in urban areas by removing obstacles and creating conditions that will encourage private enterprise;
3. To substantially reduce the percentage of people below poverty line;
4. To substantially improve the health of the population including substantial reduction in the incidence of malaria, HIV/AIDS, infant mortality and maternal mortality;
5. To reduce conflict and achieve substantial improvement in social stability and security of lives and property;

6. To halt environmental degradation with the attendant loss of biodiversity and ensure sustainability for future generations;
7. To provide adequate housing for existing and future households.

In order to create enabling conditions for achievement of the economic and social goals, the Master Plan adopts additional six goals, namely:

1. To remove unnecessary regulation and to fully enforce necessary regulation;
2. To improve the accountability and standards of governance and enforcement of law and order;
3. To improve the standards of essential physical infrastructure;
4. To improve supporting services and financing of enterprise;
5. To improve the standards of education and of research and development of useful products; and
6. To protect the natural environment.

#### **4.2.2 Strategic policies for change**

##### **Policy G1-Strategic Planning Principles**

The Commission adopts five key principles to guide its strategic policies to achieve the strategic goals enumerated above. The principles are:

1. Economic growth and surplus income are necessary to pay for the cost of better health protection, living conditions and education;
2. Economic growth can be best achieved by the enterprise of people who find opportunities to supply goods or services for which there is demand in the region and beyond. The great diversity of interests and people who know their environment can produce a wide range of enterprise, if obstacles to their initiatives are removed and necessary conditions exist.

(The first two principles approve the NEEDS strategy, which places emphasis on economic growth and the role of the private sector in it).

3. Good governance at the federal and state levels is a pre-requisite to progress on all other fronts. It must introduce transparent and publicly-accountable practices, remove unnecessary regulation while fully enforcing the necessary regulation; and must develop a greater understanding with *passive* and *active* stake-

holders including entrepreneurs. These measures will reduce corruption and increase effectiveness.

(This third principle endorses the general observation that reforms are necessary in the style and quality of governance for any plan to succeed).

4. Strategic and detailed planning must be integrative and process-oriented; must create the necessary enabling conditions for the planned activities to take off and continue operating; must take account of the *downstream effects* of change and provide for them; and must ensure consistency between social, economic and physical interventions. These measures will reduce waste and increase efficiency and, ultimately, enhance economic growth and social welfare. Pilot projects that employ this approach will be started early on within programmes of growth centres, growth poles and growth communities.

(This fourth principle is adopted specifically by the Master Plan. It comes as a result of findings about resources that are underutilised or wasted due to lack of consideration for the necessary enabling conditions or lack of regard for subsequent impacts of apparently-good projects. It requires focus on the process of change. A focus on the causes of current problems will give a clue as to the most effective remedies. A focus on the process of improvement in any sector will indicate what other sectors have to be involved in creating enabling conditions for change. A focus on the outcomes of proposed change will warn of possible side effects and how to cope with them).

5. A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision-making. This entails the meaningful involvement of the *active* and *passive* stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and NGOs—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, including attention to issues such as gender and youth.

(This principle underscores the fact that the participatory processes adopted for the preparation will be taken forward to implementation phases of the Master Plan when stakeholders will have a continuing role in reviewing the effectiveness of the plan and directly influencing the direction in which it is moving) (Master Plan, 2006).

## **Policy G2-Sustainable Development**

The Master Plan proposes to adopt the principle of sustainable development, defined by the United Nations as “...development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Hence the Master Plan aims to sustain the positive attributes of the NDR (cultural and ecological diversity, natural resources, etc.) while allowing change and progress to improve on the undesirable attributes (poverty, underdevelopment, insecurity, violence, militancy, etc.). This is applicable to the natural environment, the economic, the social and the institutional environment. This implies that in all cases of proposing and implementing development options, balance must be struck between sustaining existing conditions and enabling change with regard to both short and long term impacts of the intervention. With the aid of an analytical framework —community impact evaluation— proposed interventions must be assessed and must strike positive balance between anticipated benefits to the natural environment as well as people of current and future generations, and the anticipated damage to the natural environment alongside people of current and future generations.

### **Policy G3: A shared Approach with NEEDS and SEEDS**

The Master Plan endorses the aims of and proposes to collaborate with NEEDS and SEEDS at the federal and state levels. In collaboration with the federal and state governments and specialised university departments in 2005/2006, it proposes to identify main legislative and regulatory changes, institutional changes, and capacity-building requirements for successful development in the rural and urban areas. Necessary changes and training courses were to be set in motion immediately to prepare the capabilities of rural and urban areas of implementation of the Master Plan (Master Plan, 2006).

#### **4.2.3 The NDDC intervention policies**

For the five thematic areas (covering the seven economic and social goals and the six goals to create the conditions for achieving the economic and social goals) identified above, the NDDC has specific policies for its interventions. These policies address each thematic area. They are presented as follows:

##### **1. Economic Development Policies** **cies)**

**(30 Poli-**



- a. Policies for Economic Development in Rural Areas (*Rural Areas, Agriculture and Fisheries*)
  - (four policies)
  - i. Policy E1—Demonstration projects in rural areas
  - ii. Policy E2—Rural Development Service (RDS)
  - iii. Policy E3—Diversification of rural economy
  - iv. Policy E4—Selection of projects
  
- b. Policies for Economic Development in Urban Areas (six policies)
  - i. Policy E5—Pilot programmes in urban areas
  - ii. Policy E6—Planning and delivery authorities
    - 1. State Development Services (SDS)
    - 2. Review Forum
    - 3. Urban Development Authority (UDA)
    - 4. The role of the NDDC
  - iii. Policy E7—Business development
  - iv. Policy E8—Improved Urban Environment for business, residential communities and housing
  - v. Policy E9—Business parks and town centre development
  - vi. Policy E10—The Urban residential environment
  
- c. General Economic Development Policies for the Region (four policies)
  - i. Policy E11—The education system and economic development
  - ii. Policy E12—Development of a knowledge based economy
  - iii. Policy E13—Promotion of an investor friendly environment
  - iv. Policy E14—Access to finance
  
- d. Policies and Interventions in Oil and Gas (seven policies)
  - i. Policy OG1—using oil and gas to the benefit of the Niger Delta people
  - ii. Policy OG2—review of existing policies, programmes and actions
  - iii. Policy OG3—Conflict mitigation initiatives

- iv. Policy OG4—Credible and transparent procedures for compensation
- v. Policy OG5—Community participation in decisions on oil and gas issues
- vi. Policy OG6—Liaison between government and oil and gas companies
- vii. Policy OG7—Review of planning and environmental policies
- e. Policies for Tourism (nine policies)
  - i. Policy TM1 —Promotion of tourism.
  - ii. Policy TM2 —Comprehensive survey of tourist attractions.
  - iii. Policy TM3 —Cooperation with state, LGAs and other stakeholders.
  - iv. Policy TM4 —Support for sustainable tourism.
  - v. Policy TM5 —Limitation of damage to ecosystems.
  - vi. Policy TM6 —Environmental impact analysis (EIA).
  - vii. Policy TM7 —Environmental quality standards.
  - viii. Policy TM8 —Capacity development in the tourism sector (community organisation, current visitor economic profiles, resident attitude survey, visioning and goal setting, tourism marketing basics, attraction and facility inventory, potential project identification, initial project scoping, impact analysis).
  - ix. Policy TM9 —Development of Oloibiri national oil museum.

## **2. Policy for Human and Community Needs**

The policy on human and community needs has four main categories of goals, including housing goals (two); health care goals (17); education goals which is divided into two categories: improve educational operating standards (7) and to develop links between educational curricula at all levels and the needs of the region's population to support increased economic activity, personal wealth, health, and cohesive communities); and social welfare and community goals. The following are the policies for human and community needs.

- a. Policies for Community Needs (nine policies)

- i. Policy HC1—Integrated planning for human and community needs
- ii. Policy HC2—Building on safe ground
- iii. Policy HC3—Housing
- iv. Policy HC4—Health care
- v. Policy HC5—Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, yellow fever and typhoid
- vi. Policy HC6—Education strategy (regulatory issues)
- vii. Policy HC7—Education issues
- viii. Policy HC8—Community development and social welfare
- ix. Policy HC 9—A network of effective law enforcement agencies
- b. Policies for Arts, Culture and Sports (seven policies)
  - i. Policy CAS1—Promotion of arts, culture and sports
  - ii. Policy CAS2—Improving existing and promoting new facilities
  - iii. Policy CAS3—Revitalisation of museums and cultural centres
  - iv. Policy CAS4—Protection of heritage and historical sites
  - v. Policy CAS5—Annual cultural event
  - vi. Policy CAS6—Galleries and music studios
  - vii. Policy CAS7—A database on facilities

### **The natural environment**

The Master Plan set out 12 goals on the natural environment. A total of 16 policies were set to achieve these. They are enumerated below.

### **3. Policies for environmental intervention**

- i. Policy EN1—Comprehensive review
- ii. Policy EN2—Sustainable appraisal
- iii. Policy EN3—A sustainable development forum
- iv. Policy EN4—Indigenous species
- v. Policy EN5—Management of biological resources
- vi. Policy EN6—Enhanced non-timber forestry products (NTFPs) management
- vii. Policy EN7—Air quality

- viii. Policy EN8—Water quality
- ix. Policy EN9—Environmental education programme
- x. Policy EN10—Waste disposal
- xi. Policy EN11—Floods and erosion management
- xii. Policy EN12—Clearance of invasive species
- xiii. Policy EN13—Enforcement of laws
- xiv. Policy EN14—Demonstration projects
- xv. Policy En15—Stakeholders participation
- xvi. Policy EN16—Oil impacted areas

### **Physical infrastructure**

There are 19 goals under physical infrastructure. These are grouped under four categories, namely telecommunication goals (two), energy goals (four), transportation goals (six), and water and sanitation goals (seven). There are 10 policies on physical infrastructure.

#### **4. Policies for intervention in physical infrastructure**

- i. Policy PI1—Essential physical infrastructure
- ii. Policy PI2—Prioritising infrastructure projects
- iii. Policy PI3—Telecommunications
- iv. Policy PI4—Energy supply and conservation
- v. Policy PI5—Transportation—general
- vi. Policy PI6—The delivery of good transportation
- vii. Policy PI7—Road planning (roads in rural areas, regional roads, roads in urban areas)
- viii. Policy PI8—Waterways
- ix. Policy PI9—Rail and air transportation
- x. Policy PI10—Water and sanitation

#### **5. Human and institutional resources**

There are seven goals for human and institutional resources. There are 14 policies including six policies on a special category —interventions for conflict resolution.

##### **a. Policies for Human Resources**

- i. Policy HR1—Developing skills and expanding knowledge
- ii. Policy HR2—Endorsing the ‘NEEDS’ strategy
- iii. Policy HR3—Civil society and the eradication of corruption
- iv. Policy HR4—Re-professionalising the civil service
- v. Policy HR5—Encouraging private sector initiative
- vi. Policy HR6—Peer review mechanism for the NDRMP
- vii. Policy HR7—Promotion of meritocracy
- viii. Policy HR8—Promoting integrated government

- b. Policies (and Interventions) for Conflict Resolution
  - i. Policy HR9—Reducing conflict
  - ii. Policy HR10—Promotion of core principles
  - iii. Policy HR11—Baseline review of conflict programmes
  - iv. Policy HR12—Establish a committee for peace and security
  - v. Policy HR13—Involvement of partners for sustainable development (PSD) networks
  - vi. Policy HR14—Capacity building conflict resolution skills (2006, pp. 27-46;165-217)

The Commission adopts a two-pronged approach in implementing the thematic areas of its intervention. They are the Infrastructure Development Projects (IDPs) and Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDPs). The IDPs include Roads, Water, Electrification, Schools, Hospitals, Jetties and Canalisation Projects, and free Health Care Programmes. The HCDPs include Computer Training, Skills Acquisition, Mass Transit, Small/Medium Enterprises, Waste Disposal, Agricultural Support, and Globacom Call Centre programmes (NDDC, 2007). The Commission has well-articulated strategies for its interventions. However, as discussed earlier in section 1.1, good intention and articulation are not enough for an agency intervening in conflict zone to avoid negative and make positive contributions to a conflict situation.

#### **4.2.4 The framework for the NDDC intervention strategies**

From the foregoing, the framework for the NDDC intervention strategies refers to the practical implementation of the Commission's strategies. The framework, inferred from the Commission's strategic goals and policies highlighted above, is laid out in this section. From the strategic policies for change, it is evident that the Commission's intervention is aimed at economic prosperity, through income generation and creation and/or expansion of markets. The planning and implementation of the interventions must, nonetheless, be guided by certain principles. The planning must promote good governance, through "...transparent and publicly accountable practices..." and "...develop a greater understanding with passive and active stakeholders..." in order to reduce corruption and increase effectiveness. Furthermore, it must be guided by strategic and detailed planning, which must be integrative and process-oriented. It must create enabling conditions, and be sensitive to the downstream (impact) of the intervention and provide for them in order to reduce waste and increase efficiency, enhance economic growth and social welfare. Finally, to be sound, the planning of the NDDC intervention "...must be based on participatory decision making, involving the mean-

ingful involvement of the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ stakeholders’’. In implementation, the overarching principle is sustainability. Essentially, this means sustaining “...the positive attributes of the Niger Delta Region, while allowing change and progress to improve on the undesirable attributes’ at the natural, economic, social and institutional environments. And finally, the interventions must collaborate with or complement other interventions in the region, especially, NEEDS, SEEDS and CEEDS.

Other critical features of this framework (especially within the context of intervention in human and community needs) are selection criteria, women and youths, and peace and conflict sensitivity. The Commission’s interventions are required to be guided by five criteria discussed on page 217 to 218 of the Master Plan. The first criterion is complementarity between the proposed intervention and other existing programmes or community facilities. Feasibility, for instance, availability of markets, human resources and skills to implement and sustain the intervention, constitute the second criterion. The third criterion is the cost-benefits analysis. The benefits must outweigh the cost. The cost-benefit analysis covers social, natural, economic, and human resources. The fourth criterion is comparative advantage over alternative intervention, that is, opportunity cost of the proposed intervention. The final consideration is human resource development import of the intervention. This includes IT, technological, and managerial skills building potential of the proposed intervention. This is considered as a key criterion because of the need to build world-class human resources in the Niger Delta Region. A key overriding principle for the selection is transparency. According to the Master Plan, “Transparency of the decision criteria used for particular projects and the public scrutiny of the material will reduce the scope for unprofessional or corrupt decisions” (p 218).

The interventions are to be designed to “...create a more harmonious climate within which structural causes of tensions and conflict be addressed’’. The Master Plan notes that the long history of violent conflict in the Niger Delta Region (NDR) has perpetuated a culture of violence. It shows an understanding of the conflict situation when it submits that the Niger Delta conflict is a consequence of

...complex set of factors ranging from ambiguous land ownership, a very weak educational system...unequal access to resources and economic opportunities through to poor governance. Lack of transparent decision-making and allocation of funds, procedures that are considered to be unfair and unjust and institutionalised corruption contribute to the

feeling of political exclusion that is widespread throughout the Niger Delta. (p 215)

It also recognises the potentials of the Commission to mitigate the consequences of conflicts and fight their root causes. Moreover, it recognises local infrastructure for peace in social cohesion and traditional authorities providing positive counterweights in violence prevention. In addition, the Master Plan also emphasised the need to promote the role of women and youth in political decision-making process through its interventions. This is in recognition of the fact that, about half of the NDR population are women and more than 60% are youths. Therefore, integrating women and youth into levels of social and political aspects of the community will reduce the likelihood of violence. All the principles identified above constitute the features of the framework of the strategy for implementing the interventions of the NDDC, as contained in the Master Plan. Hence, this will serve as the framework for assessing the Commission's interventions in Odi community. The principles are:

1. Economic prosperity.
2. Market creation and expansion.
3. Promotion of good governance.
4. Integrative and process-oriented planning:
  - a. Enabling conditions and continuity;
  - b. Impacts assessments
    - ii. Increase positive impacts
    - iii. Reduce waste
    - iv. Income efficiency
5. Participatory decision-making
  - a. Gender-sensitive
  - b. Youth involvement
6. Sustainability.
7. Partnership with other agencies.
8. Transparent selection, decision and public scrutiny of materials.
9. Peace and conflict sensitive.
10. Involvement of women and youths.

### **4.3 The relationship of NDDC intervention strategies, mandate and the needs of the people**

This section discusses the consonance between the NDDC mandate and the intervention strategies and the extent to which the interventions are in line with the expressed needs of the Niger Delta people. First, the study determined the extent to which the

intervention strategies are informed by the mandate of the Commission. Then, it determined the correspondence between the intervention strategies and the needs of the community people. Findings show that the NDDC interventions were clearly informed by its mandate. Obviously, the NDDC interventions correspond with mandates one to four as shown in the Table 4.1 below. The strategic goals and policies of the Commission as discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 relate with the very first mandate of the NDDC. Moreover, its IDPs and HCDPs correlate with the second mandate. However, the conception, planning and implementation of the projects and programmes are not in accordance with set rules and regulations as required by this mandate. This is the locus of the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies, which became characteristic of the Commission during the period under study. In other words, the discrepancy in the intervention strategies and the mandate of the Commission is in *how things are being done* rather than *what is being done*. Some critical policies and principles that the Commission contravened in conception and planning and implementation included promotion of good governance, enabling conditions and continuity, impact assessments, participatory decision-making (gender sensitivity and youth involvement), transparent selection, decision and public scrutiny of materials, and peace and conflict sensitivity (see chapter 5 for full discussion). Table 4.1 below shows the relationship between the NDDC mandate and intervention strategies.



**Table 4.1. Relationship of the NDDC mandate and intervention strategies**

S/N	Mandate	Intervention Strategies
1	Formulation of policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta area.	The strategic goals and policies; the NDDC intervention policies.
2	Conception, planning and implementation, <u>in accordance with set rules and regulations</u> , of projects and programs for sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications.	Infrastructural development projects and the human capacity development programmes. However, the conception, planning, and implementation of the interventions are not done in accordance with the set rules and regulations of the projects and programmes. Main rules and regulations —principles and policies— contradicted include promotion of good governance, participatory planning, transparency, sensitivity to impacts, sustainability, gender sensitivity and youth participation.
3	Surveying the Niger Delta in order to ascertain measures necessary to promote its physical and socio-economic development.	Pre-Master Plan geophysical survey of the NDR.
4	Preparing Master Plans and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta region and the estimation of the member states of the Commission.	The development of the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan

*Source: Fieldwork, 2011.*

The Master Plan was developed after extensive consultation with the Niger Delta people. Findings show that the Commission held stakeholders' consultative forums in all the nine-member states and some local government areas of the Niger Delta soon after its inauguration and prior to the development of the Master Plan. This includes seven briefings at state capital level, 27 needs assessment workshops in the senatorial districts and participatory rural assessments involving 54 communities. Also, it held 10 capacity-building workshops in major towns, including state capitals, and 27 integration workshops at senatorial district level. A final round of stakeholders' workshops was also held in each of the nine states to publicise and discuss the draft Master Plan before presenting it to the Federal Government committees (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2006, p. 118). These allowed the NDDC to listen to the grassroots people and reflect their desires in drawing (its intervention strategies as contained in) the Master Plan. In a general sense, therefore, there is congruence between NDDC intervention strategies and the needs of Niger Delta people.

Most of the community people interviewed agreed that the NDDC interventions in Odi met the critical and felt needs of the community. However, this should be understood within appropriate context of neglect and marginalisation in the region. The long-time neglect and marginalisation made the community to be receptive to any NDDC intervention project or programmes. This is because the interventions necessarily address certain aspects of people's long-felt needs. Hence there is hardly an intervention that does not meet some needs in some ways. The main issue here is prioritisation of these needs. For instance, secretary of the Traditional Council comments:

En, as far as NDDC is concerned...they need to, at least, consult the communities on what are their [communities'] priorities. What do you need? Like Odi now, our biggest problem now is our shore protection...So what I will advise is NDDC should come to the communities, sit with the communities or the leaders of the communities or opinion leaders, on their priority projects, then carry out those project.

Therefore identification and prioritisation of interventions with the beneficiary community is necessary for certain reasons. First, there is a time gap between the development of the Master Plan and the implementation of the interventions studied. Also, the stakeholders' consultations did not include every community. Therefore the socio-economic, ecological and physical challenges peculiar to the communities might not be adequately catered for. Moreover, the changing socio-political conditions in the NDR may bring some discrepancies between the identified intervention strategies and

the contemporary needs of people in the community. Prioritisation of community needs could only be done with the concerned community. For instance, when asked to suggest how the Commission's interventions could be more effective, the community people agreed that participation of the community people right from conception and planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation is the most critical precondition.

#### **4.4 Institutional capacity of the NDDC for Peace and Conflict Sensitivity**

As earlier discussed (see sections 2.3 and 2.4), peace and conflict sensitivity (PCS) in intervention programming is to understand the context for which intervention is planned; understand the interactions between intervention processes and the context; and act upon this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts through peace and conflict-sensitive planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It is described in the Resource Pack as:

“... an awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, and of the likelihood of further conflict and its likely severity; and the capacity to work with all parties to reduce conflict and/or minimize the risk of further conflict. It involves understanding the operational context; understanding the interaction between an intervention and that context; the capacity to act upon this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive ones” (2004, p. 61).

PCS is thus a means to mainstream peace and conflict-sensitivity in all stages of intervention programming. It has three core components —understanding operational context; understanding the interaction between intervention and operational context; and the capacity of the intervening agency to act upon its understanding of the two earlier components- in order to minimise the negative and maximise the positive impacts of its interventions. The third component encapsulates the first two; in the sense that the ability of an intervening agency to *act upon this understanding* presupposes that it has the understanding in the first place. Hence to assess the agency's capacity to act is to assess its understanding of the context and the interactions of intervention as well as the operational context. The institutional capacity to act is termed peace and conflict-sensitivity capacity (PCSC) in this study. The NDDC institutional capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity was assessed using the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework (see section 2.4). The framework has two integrated parts —

PCS of the intervention agency and the PCS of its intervention programming. The first part has five components and the second part, four.

#### **4.4.1 Peace and conflict sensitivity in the NDDC institutional context**

The study used Lange's (2004) five-pillar framework for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity in an organisation (see section 2.4) to assess the PCS of the Commission. Components of this framework are commitment and motivation to peace and conflict sensitivity, readiness to make changes in organisational culture, building staff capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity, and accountability mechanisms and conducive external relations. Corresponding questions asked to determine the presence of each component included these: Is the NDDC committed and motivated for PCS mainstreaming? Is its organisational culture reflective of PCS? Does it build staff capacity for PCS? Does it have accountability mechanisms? And finally, does it enjoy conducive external relations? Answering these questions shows the extent to which the PCS is mainstreamed in the Commission. These are discussed below.

Commitment and motivation could be inferred from the activities and documents of the Commission, especially those that have to do with the board and management. The nature and dynamics of activities characteristic of the NDDC intervention programming makes it difficult for the board and management of the NDDC to have commitment and motivation for peace and conflict sensitivity. Expectedly, the selfish interests and greed that drive the barefaced corruption (see sections 5.1 and 5.2) that characterise these activities are antithetical to factors and processes that drive commitment and motivation for PCS. Although the mission of the Commission has expressed bias for peace and stability, nevertheless, findings show that peace and conflict sensitivity is not explicitly linked with the mandate and values of the NDDC. The analysis of NDDC documents such as MD/CEO speeches, report, and magazines clearly support this claim. In the documents, NDDC reports its achievements in development terms only. Indeed, the Commission reports *success* in terms of the number of projects, or participants in capacity-building training. The implications these have on peace and conflict dynamics of the context are rarely considered in the reports. Samples of the Commission's reports are presented as follows:

A survey conducted by the Commission showed that most of the beneficiaries are either self-employed or gainfully employed in private institutions. The programme has indeed reduced the high index of unem-

ployment in the Region and inculcated the spirit of self-reliance among youths.

(Computer education unit/Skills Acquisition Programme)

Under the scheme, more 1,000 buses and 136 boats have been given to cooperative societies across the nine states that make up the region. Through this means, "by modest estimation, about 11,360 families across the region have been empowered". (Mass Transit Scheme)

Three hundred youths of Bayelsa State have been trained in an NDDC agriculture empowerment programme in various income-yielding enterprises at the Biotechnology Development Agency, Odi, Bayelsa State, while another 1,700 youths in Delta, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and Bayelsa states have been trained at the Songhai Farms, Delta State on fish farming and so on. Now, they are self-employed and doing well. (Agricultural Support Programme).

([www.nddc.gov.ng](http://www.nddc.gov.ng). accessed 21<sup>st</sup> November 2008).

Finally, the responses of the NDDC staff interviewed imply an assumption that, by meeting its target output (what is being done and quantity) in intervention irrespective of the process (how it is being done), the Commission automatically builds peace in the NDR. However, empirical evidence supports claims that quantitative accomplishments in intervention programming may not necessarily translate into peacebuilding in the operational context (Bush K. , 1998; Bush & Opp, 1999; Bush K. , 2003c; Bush K. , 2009; Anderson, 1999; Anderson, 2004; Paffenholz, 2005).

Empirical evidence also shows that peace and conflict sensitivity is not integrated into the Commission's organisational culture, that is, its existing procedures and structures. The procedures of intervention programming, particularly conception and planning are driven by budget and other interests as discussed earlier. Hence, there is hardly any consideration for peace and conflict sensitivity. NDDC personnel interviewed (including those of the Community and Rural Development [CRD]) were completely ignorant of issues relating to peace and conflict sensitivity in the Commission's activities. The CRD has the duty of informing community about NDDC's intended intervention and intervene in conflict arising as a result of the intervention in the community. This suggests that PCS is not mainstreamed in the Commission's organisational structure.

Furthermore, findings show that peace and conflict-sensitivity skills are not integrated into staff training or incorporated into staff recruitment. Staff interviewed were not familiar with terminologies and issues germane to peace and conflict sensitivity. However, since most staff are indigenes of the NDR, they have the advantage of contextual knowledge of the NDR such as knowledge of the geographical area, history of the NDR conflict, and knowledge of one or more NDR indigenous languages. The Directorate of Community and Rural Development is charged with the responsibilities of managing intervention-related conflicts in communities. Personnel of CRD are trained in conflict resolution. But "...it's [the training] so very peripheral. The training is so peripheral. It's not sufficient, ok." These are the words, representative of other participants' responses, of a staff that had participated in the training. He had also attended more intensive training and higher courses in Peace and Conflict Studies, so he was qualified to evaluate the CRD training. This suggests that the training did not build the capacity of the CRD personnel in any appreciable manner commensurable with the responsibilities of their field operations. Also, the CRD's field responsibilities are restricted to introducing the contractor/consultant to the community and mediating in conflict triggered by the NDDC intervention in the community. They are not involved in the conception and planning, as required by the NDDC guiding policy. Hence, even their weak capacity is only restricted to conflict resolution and not full mainstreaming of PCS into staff training and recruitment.

Accountability mechanisms here refer to appraisal and incentives systems encouraging peace and conflict sensitivity in intervention programming. It "...includes documenting and disseminating better practice and rewarding progress to create positive energy for moving forward" (Lange, 2004, p. 19). Nothing of this nature exists in the NDDC. In fact, findings reveal that report of evaluation of past effort do not inform planning of new intervention. This is consistent with the findings discussed under conception and planning. According to an NDDC desk officer,

But, you know, some of the project, I can tell you have not been successful at all. So...assuming that the planning process is democratized...we should have been able to make input, based on our field experience.

Conducive external environment was evaluated in three domains —conducive relationships with other actors (other government agencies, NGOs, INGOs, oil companies' intervention) working in the NDR; buy-in, participation and capacity of commu-

nities; and broader policy environment. Findings show that gap exist for a better coordination of intervention with other organisations pursuing similar goals in the region. For instance, there were organizations such as BIODC, FADAMA, CDB, and NGOs in Odi doing some things that the NDDC has been trying to do through its agricultural support programmes. The NDDC did not partner with organisations like FADAMA, having very similar agricultural programmes, in its agricultural support programmes. However, some participants reported that the FADAMA initiative succeeded whereas the NDDC failed. A partnership with FADAMA would have made the NDDC more successful with its agricultural intervention. For instance, the NDDC could have partnered with FADAMA, in which the NDDC provides the training and get its successful trainees organised into cooperative groups while FADAMA provides the fund and the two organisations jointly monitor the beneficiaries. The partnership that existed between NDDC and BIODC was at the latter's instance. In the second domain, findings revealed that the Commission does not ensure community buy-in or ownership of its intervention. The programming of its intervention are not participatory, hence they do not directly build community's capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity. Rather, Odi community itself has developed its own infrastructure and custom to manage conflicts related to intervention, which oftentimes are not acknowledged in the NDDC intervention programming.

The third domain of the external environment has to do with the socio-political terrain of the NDDC operations. The Nigerian political environment described as characterised by prebendalism (Joseph, 1996) seems hostile to values such as altruism, impartiality or multi-partiality, equality, equity, justice, emancipation, peacebuilding, which are necessary for peace and conflict-sensitive programming. In prebendal politics, state offices become prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups. The Nigerian socio-political environment, which is the context of the NDDC interventions, supports systemic corruption. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), referring to government intervention in the NDR, once warned, "the people of the region should receive this latest dish with apprehension. It will be yet another avenue for corruption and political favouritism" (International Crisis Group, 25 October 2006c). Public perception about the NDDC intervention as a means of corruption and political favouritism has serious negative implications for the NDDC.

Table 4.2 summarises the results of the assessment of peace and conflict sensitivity in the NDDC institutional context, using Lange’s framework. Table 4.3 summarises the answers to pertinent questions in determining the mainstreaming of PCS in the Commission’s institutional context.

#### **4.4.2 Peace and Conflict Sensitivity of the NDDC Intervention Programming**

Peace and conflict sensitivity of intervention programming entails sensitising each stage—conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation—of the intervention for peace and conflict. The generic question to ask at each stage is whether the programming reflects concern for peace and conflict issues in the context. Each stage is assessed using indicators earlier identified in chapter two. Findings show that the NDDC intervention programming has a low sensitivity to peace and conflict. The Commission, nevertheless, has a policy on conflict resolution, which is presumed to have some remote influence on the general intervention programming.

##### ***4.4.2.1 Conception and Planning***

The assessment used the four indicators for peace and conflict sensitive conception and planning presented in section 2.10.2. The first indicator is incorporating principles of peacebuilding and conflict transformation in intervention policies. The NDDC Strategic Policies for Change is documented in page 22 to 46 of the Master Plan. The last section of the policies, Policies and Interventions for Conflict Resolution—Policy HR9 to Policy HR14—contains six explicit policy statements on peacebuilding and conflict transformation. They are: Policy HR9: reducing conflict; Policy HR10: Promotion of core principles; Policy HR11: Baseline review of conflict resolution programmes; Policy HR12: Establish a committee for peace and security; Policy HR13: Involvement of Partners for Sustainable Development (PSD) Network; and Policy HR 14: Capacity -building in conflict resolution skills. In addition, Policy OG3—Conflict Mitigation Initiatives—under Section D on Oil and Gas, is a policy establishing a mechanism on early warning and conflict resolution. Hence, principles of peacebuilding and conflict transformation are incorporated into the Commission’s intervention policies.



**Table 4.2. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in NDDC Institutional Context**

S/N	Concepts	Indicators	Results
1	Institutional commitment	Organisational leadership support for PCS	No
		Development of peace and conflict-sensitive policies	Yes
		Creating appropriate decision-making systems/structures	Fair
		Committing staff time and financial resources to strengthening a peace and conflict-sensitive organisational culture	No
2	Willingness to make changes in organisational culture and institutional structure	Cross-organisational buy-in	No
		Participation and ownership	No
		Open communication channels on and between all levels of the organisation	No
		Facilitating the flow of knowledge and learning	No
		Consistently incorporating peace and conflict-sensitive skills in staff training and recruitment processes.	No
3	Support for staff capacity development	Development of tool/methodology for PCS	No
		Staff training, appraisal and rewards for PCS programming	Weak training only for CRD
		Adoption of peace and conflict-sensitive evaluation mechanisms and procedures.	No
		Requisite peace and conflict-sensitive skills for staff: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• understanding of the particular geographical area [and its conflict issues]</li> <li>• knowledge of the relevant language(s)</li> <li>• relationship-building and analytical skills; and</li> <li>• ability to deal with high stress levels</li> </ul>	No
			Good
			NE*
			NE
NE			

S/N	Concepts	Indicators	Results
		Separate peacebuilding units or integrating it on all levels.	Separate Unit
4	Accountability mechanisms	Appropriate appraisal and incentives systems that encourage peace and conflict-sensitive programming and balance individual accountability with the need for learning.	None
		documenting and disseminating better practice	None
		rewarding progress to create a positive energy for moving forward	None
5	Conducive external Relationships	Conducive relationships with groups and actors that influence the conflict sensitivity of the wider response: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ local partner organisations</li> <li>▪ donors</li> <li>▪ INGOs, and national and international constituencies supporting the organisation</li> <li>▪ domestic and international policy environments</li> <li>▪ funding constraints</li> <li>▪ partnerships relations</li> </ul>	Fair NE Fair Unfair Partial N/E
		Community buy-in or ownership of its intervention; and building community's capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity	No No
	Coherence and seamless fit among the different stages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Sophisticated PCS planning system</li> <li>▪ Staff and partners ownership of the PCS tool</li> <li>▪ Capacity to use it</li> <li>▪ Support to use it</li> </ul>	No No No No

\*Not Evaluated.

Source: Author's Assessment, 2013

**Table 4.3. Answers to Pertinent Questions on PCS in the NDDC Institutional Context**

S/N	Questions	Answers
1	Is the NDDC committed and motivated for PCS main-streaming?	No
2	Is its organisational culture reflective of PCS?	No
3	Does it build staff capacity for PCS?	Very weakly and limited to CRD personnel
4	Does it have accountability mechanisms for PCS?	No
5	Does it enjoy conducive external relations?	Not really

*Source: Author's assessment, 2013*

**Table 4.4. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in the NDDC Intervention Programming**

<b>S/ N</b>	<b>Stages of interven- tion</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Results</b>
1	Peace and conflict sensitive conception and planning	Incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-transformation principles into agencies' strategic policies.	Yes
		Linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the project in the project design.	No
		Ensuring all planning processes themselves are conflict-sensitive.	No
		Sacrificing some speed of delivery to ensure adequate conflict-sensitive planning.	Not applicable
2	Peace and conflict sensitive implementation	Using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies.	No
		Investing in developing, disseminating and providing training in these.	No
		Hiring specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and HQ staff.	No
		Cooperating closely with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics.	No
		Anticipating changing dynamics and developing contingency plans.	No
3	Peace and conflict sensitive monitoring and evaluation	Monitoring and evaluating programmes according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa.	No
		Setting flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs.	No
		Conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities.	No

*Source: Author's Assessment, 2013*

The second indicator is linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the intervention during conception and planning stage. Inasmuch as the Master Plan was developed as a response to, and based on, the analysis of the NDR conflict, in a sense, the Commission linked the analysis of the conflict with the objectives of its generic region-level intervention. However, this is not always the case in designing specific interventions at the community level. This is because, although the Commission depends largely on the Master Plan in conceiving and planning its programmes, the conflict analysis of Odi community context was not done. The NDDC's practice was to intervene through ad-hoc peacebuilding interventions in response to open conflicts. A case in point is the supply of flying boats to *certain people* in Odi community in response to Odi youths' agitations when they obstructed the former NDDC chairman, Larry Koiyan, on Odi-Trofani Road (see section 5.1.3.2).

It appears that the interests of the NDDC board and management, politicians and contractors are paramount in the process of *conceiving and planning* the interventions. Community's interests have a narrow chance of consideration through the activities of Ward 12 (See Sub-section 5.2.2). And finally, available data support the fact that the Commission does not do a peace and conflict-sensitive planning. So the question of sacrificing speed of delivery to ensure adequate peace and conflict-sensitive planning (as also required) does not arise. Hence, characteristic corruption and corporate bad governance appear to be the major reason for the insensitivity of the conception and planning processes to peace and conflict dynamics of the context.

In conclusion, the assessment of the peace and conflict-sensitivity of the conception and planning stage of the NDDC interventions was done using four indicators of peace and conflict-sensitive conception and planning (see section 2.4.1). They are incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-transformation principles into agencies' strategic policies; linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the project in the project design; ensuring all planning processes themselves are conflict-sensitive; and sacrificing some speed of delivery to ensure adequate conflict-sensitive planning. Empirical evidence shows that only the first indicator is present in the Commission's conception and planning stage of intervention. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarise the results of the assessment of the conception and planning.

**Table 4.5. Answers to Pertinent Questions about Mainstreaming PCS in the NDDC Intervention Programming**

S/N	Questions	Answers
1	Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in conception and planning?	No
2	Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in implementation?	No
3	Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in monitoring and evaluation?	No

*Source: Author's Assessment, 2013*

#### **4.4.2. 2 Implementation**

The five indicators of peace and conflict-sensitive implementation as presented in section 2.4.1 include using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies; investing in developing, disseminating and providing training in these; hiring specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters' staff; cooperating closely with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics; and anticipating changing dynamics and developing contingency plans. The corresponding questions to the five indicators include: does the Commission use peace and conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies (e.g. PCIA, CSA, SCA, or any of the frameworks or similar ones to those presented and/or discussed in chapter 2)? Does it invest in developing, disseminating and providing training on these tools and methodologies? Does the NDDC hire specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters staff? Does it cooperate closely with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics? And finally, does the Commission anticipate changing dynamics and develop contingency plans?

Generally speaking, the answer to these questions is “no”. Only one NDDC staff interviewed has heard of peace and conflict impact assessment, conflict-sensitivity or any similar terms. However, he confirmed that the Commission does not use it or any similar methodology in programming its intervention. Analysis of the responses of other staff indicates that they had no knowledge of any of such frameworks or terminologies. The same goes for the NDDC consultants and community people. Community people confirmed that the NDDC interventions do not have elements of peace and conflict sensitivity incorporated into them. No community member remembered the usage of terms germane to peace and conflict sensitivity during the implementation of any of the Commission's intervention. Mr Godwin Unumeri, an expert on PCIA and the Niger Delta describes NDDC implementation in the following terms:

They look at the communities and say, ‘Ok this community needs, maybe a school or a road or any other development project.’ They just go there and they site the project without looking at the effect of this project on the enforcement or weakening of the peace structures. They don't look at that

(Fieldwork: Interview, 06/03/2011).

The participant quoted above is a Shell-trained expert on PCIA and a consultant for Peacebuild Canada on conflict-sensitivity programming in the Niger Delta. He is a Niger Deltan and independent researcher with almost a decade experience in PCIA in the

Niger Delta. He co-authored a resource material on conflict sensitivity in the Niger Delta. Confirming this view, an NDDC desk officer, a former NDDC Community and Rural Development personnel, said

... and that's why we have conflict otherwise there shouldn't be conflict for the CRD [Directorate of Community and Rural Development] to go and resolve. Because if a community is not aware of a project until a contractor arrives, they are bound to say 'contractor come and give us marching ground' [money demanded by the locals to permit the contractors to work in their community] ok, so there is a gap between how it should be done and how it is being done presently. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011)

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) International, a Germany-based organisation in conflict transformation was a lead consultant for the NDDC in drawing the Master Plan. This portrays conflict sensitivity in drawing the Master Plan. However, findings show that the NDDC does not hire specialist, experienced and/or trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters staff for implementation of its intervention at the community level. Rather, personnel of the CRD intervene whenever conflicts arise as a result of an intervention. Findings show that the Commission does not work with potential local partners such as the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the women's group and the community development council in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics. It only informs the Traditional Council at the point of implementing its interventions. Expectedly, this has negative impacts on the implementation of the interventions. A case in point is the conflict triggered between Asanga and Tamanga by the concrete pavement of internal link roads in Odi (see section 5.4.1). Finally, whether the Commission anticipates changing dynamics and develops contingency plans could not be directly ascertained. One could only infer that using the Master Plan and other strategic documents as the main basis for conception and planning intervention to the exclusion of the community people implies that the NDDC may not factor in the changing dynamics of peace and conflict in the NDR. At the level of the community, the Commission intervenes when its intervention causes conflict with the hope of resolving it. Empirical data available is not sufficient to confirm or confute any other contingency plan for changing dynamics of peace and conflict.

In conclusion, using Maria Lange's five indicators of peace and conflict sensitive implementation, findings suggests that the implementation stage of the Commission's intervention is not well-sensitised for peace and conflict dynamics. In other



words, the NDDC does not use peace and conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies or invest in developing, disseminating and providing training in them. Also, it does not hire specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and HQ staff. Although as described earlier, it provides some training for CRD personnel, the training is grossly inadequate. Furthermore, the Commission does not cooperate with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics or developing contingency plans on anticipated change in the dynamics of peace and conflict in the context of the intervention.

#### **4.4.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation**

Indices of peace and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation include monitoring and evaluating programmes according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa; setting flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs; alongside conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities. The corresponding guiding questions here include, first, does the NDDC monitor and evaluate its interventions according to their impact on peace and conflict and vice versa? Second, does it set flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs? And third, does it conduct joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities?

Firstly, the Commission would be able to monitor and evaluate the impact of its interventions on peace and conflict and vice versa if it incorporated peace and conflict concerns in the earlier stages of the intervention programming. Incorporating peace and conflict concerns include setting indicators that cover the process and outcomes as well as outputs of intervention. However, as earlier discussed, the NDDC does not do this. In addition, monitoring and evaluation are not rigorous exercises. Monitoring is done by the NDDC state directorates and it is strictly to ensure that programmes and projects are executed in line with specifications other than peace and conflict concerns. Evaluation is done by NDDC consultants. The NDDC only evaluates the evaluations of those consultants. The NDDC monitoring and evaluation, therefore, leaves out local partners and communities.

In conclusion, the monitoring and evaluation stage of the NDDC intervention is totally insensitive to peace and conflict concerns. This is partially as fallout of the insensitivity of the conception and planning, which fails to take into account peace and conflict indicators against which to monitor and evaluate the impact of the interven-

tion. Hence, projects and programmes are not monitored and evaluated according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa. Also, flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs are not set. Finally, monitoring and evaluation are not conducted with local partners and communities.

Table 4.4 summarises the assessment of the NDDC intervention programming for PCS and 4.5 summarises answers to pertinent questions regarding PCS in the Commission's intervention programming.

## **4.5 Conclusion**

The assessment of the institutional capacity of the NDDC for peace and conflict sensitivity shows that the Commission has abysmally-low capacity. The assessment was done using the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework, which integrated Lange's five pillar framework for mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity into intervention agency, and the conflict-sensitivity of development, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding interventions as proposed by Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005). Empirical evidence shows that PCS is not mainstreamed in the organisational culture and structure and intervention programming of the Commission. Hence, the NDDC's has low Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity (PCSC). The Commission scored very low in PCS in its commitment and motivation, organisational culture, capacity building, accountability and conducive external relations. Findings show that the peace and conflict sensitivity is not mainstreamed in the NDDC as an organisation. Peace and conflict sensitivity is not part of the values that guide the Commission's procedures and it is not integrated in its structures. Also, the NDDC does not integrate peace and conflict sensitivity in the whole organisation, rather it has a separate unit—the Directorate of Community and Rural Development—charged with resolving conflicts generated by its interventions. This arrangement has the potential of marginalising peace and conflict sensitivity, which is exactly the case with the NDDC. Hence, PCS is not well-connected to the rest of the organisation or combined with other mechanisms for exchange and learning. Furthermore, the systems of accountability required for mainstreaming PCS are not available. Finally, the external socio-political environment, characterised by bad governance and debilitating corruption is hostile to the ideals of PCS.

Similarly, the NDDC does not mainstream peace and conflict sensitivity in its intervention programming. Hence conception and planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of its intervention are more traditional rather than peace and conflict sensitive. From the 12 indicators for assessing the peace and conflict sensitivity of the three main stages of intervention programming, the Commission has one indicator at the C&P stage —incorporating principles of peacebuilding and conflict transformation in intervention policies— to its credit. Also at the stage of implementation, the NDDC superficially-trained CRD personnel intervene in intervention-triggered conflicts to support its field operations. In quantitative terms, the NDDC would be scored 1.5 points (generously) out of 12 possible points, that is, 12.5% in mainstreaming PCS in its intervention programming.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE NATURE, DYNAMICS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERACTIONS OF THE NDDC INTERVENTIONS AND ODI COMMUNITY

#### 5.0 Introduction

Investigations revealed that Odi was a beneficiary of a number of NDDC interventions. Physical development projects are more notable than the human development programmes in the community. In fact, to the community members, physical development projects are almost synonymous with the NDDC interventions. It usually took some probing from the researcher for them to identify human capacity development programmes as interventions. Physical development projects in the community include paving of internal link roads, Odi-Trofani Road, Agberiyé-Odonu to Sampo Road, community water project, construction of blocks of classrooms and science laboratories, and community electrification (on-going at the time of the fieldwork). Also, the free medical campaign for the senatorial district is usually done at the General Hospital at Odi.

The presence of Bioresources Development Centre (BIODEC) in the community has attracted agricultural-support training programmes to the community. These often involve the whole Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government Area. Trainings were provided on fish farming, grasscutter (*thryonomys swinderianus*) raising, snail raising, mushroom farming, and honey production. A rice plantation, initially a joint initiative of the Transformation Agric. Tech and the NDDC is also located in the community. However, at the time of the fieldwork, the plantation had not been in operation for about nine months. Members of Odi community have also enjoyed mass transportation scheme in form of distribution of flying boats. The community people reported that Odi had benefited more from the NDDC than many other communities in the local government and even in the NDR, especially during the tenure of Timi Alaibe as Man-

aging Director of the NDDC. Some community people believe that this was partly as a compensation for 1999 Odi massacre. The massacre therefore is significant in assessing the NDDC interventions in the community (Source: Fieldwork, 2011).

This chapter discusses the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and Odi community context. In sections 5.1 to 5.3, the study reconstructed the picture of the intervention programming of the Commission. Each of the three stages —conception and planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation— of the intervention programming is reconstructed and assessed in each section. In reconstructing the picture of what goes on at each stage, the report drew on the data collected from the field, especially the lived experiences of the community people, the NDDC personnel and consultants as well as documents. It investigated, first, whether the NDDC followed its own laid-down guiding policies (as described in the Master Plan and discussed in the last chapter) in its intervention programming. It compares relevant intervention principles and policies with each stage of the intervention programming. With empirical evidence to support its arguments, the report then presents its assessment of the degree to which the Commission's programming of its interventions is in line with the spirit of the Master Plan. The assessment was done with the aid of the 10-point framework presented in the last chapter (see Box 1, section 4.2.4). Section 5.1 presents the conceptualisation and planning stage, while sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the implementation of the NDDC's intervention programming and monitoring and evaluation respectively.

Section 5.4 presents an assessment of the impacts of the NDDC interventions in Odi community. Impacts are discussed as positive and negative as argued in the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Approach framework presented in chapter two. The impacts on gender relations and dynamics were presented in Section 5.5. The chapter introduces a theory of peace and conflict impact and the intervention-context interactions (ICI) model as a conceptual framework for understanding the interactions of the NDDC's intervention and Odi community context in section 5.6. A theoretical explanation of the interactions, including concepts and propositions to understand the nature, dynamics and impacts of the NDDC interventions such as resource-status of intervention, black hole of interactions, likely deprivation, Ward 12, the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention,

and the geniuses of conflict transformation in the community are discussed in section 5.7. and conclusion is presented in 5.8.

Some of the critical questions that this chapter answers include how did the NDDC implement its interventions in Odi community? Was it in line with its strategies laid-out in the Master Plan? What impact does this have on the community —its people and peace and conflict environment? The assessment, therefore, focused on *what* was done, *how* it was done, and its implications or impacts. Assessing the impacts of the NDDC interventions, require an understanding of the status the interventions enjoy in the NDR. Also, the twin issues of corporate governance and corruption as they relate to the NDDC interventions need to be examined. This is done in the next two sections.

### **5.1 Conception and Planning the NDDC Interventions**

This is the first stage of intervention programming where certain problems are identified, their causal linkages analysed, and effective solutions developed. It is a stage of formulating ideas to improve a given situation. The outcome of this process is often embodied in a programme or initiative designed with predefined objectives, activities, implementation process and verifiable indicators of progress (Resource Pack, 2004). Six important planning principles are applicable, and are supposed to guide the conception and planning of the NDDC interventions. Firstly is promotion of good governance through “...transparent and publicly accountable practices...” development of ‘...a greater understanding with ‘passive’ and ‘active’ stakeholders...’ in order to “...reduce corruption and increase effectiveness”. Secondly is that the strategic and detailed planning must be integrative and process-oriented, which must ensure the start and continuity of the planned activities and reckon with downstream effects of change as well as provide for them. Thirdly, sound planning process must be based on participatory decision-making involving active and passive stakeholders, which necessarily must involve community (women and youths inclusive) and NGOs and ensure that their needs are taken into consideration in formulating policies and proposals. Fourthly, it must involve other agencies such as NEEDS, SEEDS, and LEEDS. Fifthly, it must involve transparent selection criteria (of contractors, consultants, beneficiary communities) and public scrutiny of materials. Finally, it must be peace and conflict sensitive.

Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows that the conception and planning (C&P) of the NDDC interventions is more or less a resource-sharing activity characterised by lack of transparency. It involves actors such as the NDDC board, management, staff, contractors/consultants, politicians, and a unique group referred to as *Ward 12* (discussed in the previous section).

Evidence shows that C&P of the NDDC interventions is centralised at the NDDC headquarters in Port Harcourt. The state directorates only monitor the implementation of the interventions. So, essentially, C&P is restricted to the headquarters. The Directorate for Community and Rural Development that has the mandate for planning intervention for communities is conspicuously left out. The Commission's headquarters consult the Master Plan and strategic documents such as NEEDS and the UN Human Development Index to pinpoint the areas of needs already identified. This constitutes the Commission's *needs assessment*. Moreover, budget is a strong factor in the C&P. However, the intended beneficiary community people—resident community people—are conspicuously left out as reported by NDDC staff and community members:

We do what we call needs assessment, and our consultants, who help us to develop the Master Plan, [...] they've identified, centres of critical [needs], critical to the development of the Niger Delta region. We draw our programmes from the Master Plan. We also draw our programmes, am, from the national strategic documents such as NEEDS document and also international document like the Human Development Index, you know, and other United Nations recommended policy documents. [...] So, we rely a lot on other, policy guidelines of government to draw our activities.

—NDDC Staff, Asst. Director, Headquarters (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

First and foremost, there must be some conceptualisation, we must seek the approval of the management and the board and there must be budgetary provision, then we come and do the actual planning [ok]. We determine the cost of the project and we determine the number of the beneficiaries that can benefit from that project. So it's all budget-driven.

—NDDC Top Staff, Commercial and Industrial Directorate, Headquarters. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

But to be frank with you I'll say that nearly 99.9% of projects are not initiated from the CRD [community and rural development]; if I say the Project Directorate or project department I'll also not be saying it accurately as it is, you know. We hardly do needs assessment, ok, and the directorate that should do needs assessment is CRD. So that doesn't exist. But if it doesn't exist, you can say that most of the project that get into the budget for implementation come rather from people who are desirous of doing contract. For example, members of the national assembly, you know. That's how our projects are generated.

—NDDC Staff, State Directorate (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

...earlier on I told you that most of the planning is done from the headquarters.[...] So, most of the planning is done over there. What we do is to implement, to monitor...

—NDDC Staff, State Directorate. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

Now we have an NDDC Master Plan [...] and it is thought that what went into the design of the Master Plan informs us about the gaps out there. The gaps in terms of knowledge, etcetera, so when we design our programmes, we look at the Master Plan, areas of gap, like information technology, that is what informs, you know, our computer training programme. [ok]. Yeah. Basically, that's how...

—NDDC Staff, Desk officer, State Directorate. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

“...they [the NDDC] just bring the programme, [ok] which people will accept if they want... maybe, some people must have been agitating or lobbying for it...” —Male beneficiary, graduate of Niger Delta University(Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011).

They [the NDDC] don't come. They just stay in their office and say, “Ah, I think we suppose to construct this road for them, we suppose to give them en three classroom block, we suppose to give them eh a science block [...] and so the next thing is, you saw a...contractor and ‘En, say I'm coming for NDDC project.’”

—Male member of the community (Secondary school teacher and graduate of the University of Ibadan) (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

NDDC top officials claim that by seeking the views of politicians —the supposed *representative* or *voice* of the people— in their conception and planning, the Commission has already involved the community people. However, one needs to understand that those politicians are at best Ward 12 members. And like other influential actors in the activities surrounding the C&P, they are essentially driven by self-interest. The needs, interests and priorities (financial, material, political or oftentimes a



combination of these) of Ward 12 do not necessarily coincide with those of the community. Community interests are usually secondary to Ward 12 members and thus will likely be jettisoned if contrary to the interests of the Ward 12 members. At best, Ward 12 member's interests will probably be cloaked in community interests in order to negotiate for NDDC interventions. In essence, although they are community members, the *involvement* of members of Ward 12 does not make the C&P of NDDC interventions participatory as assumed by NDDC top officials. Their non-resident status (which is part of what earned them the Ward 12 appellation in the first place) is an indication that they cannot be as much part of the day-to-day realities of the community as indigenes resident in the community. Nonetheless, it may be argued that the Ward 12's involvement somehow links the activities of the C&P to the community context. This is because it is claimed that in some instances, Ward 12 members *consult*, even if clandestinely, with some actors in the community. This, at best, probably makes C&P a poor hybrid of top-down approach and participatory planning.

Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that peace and conflict concerns are not mainstreamed in the C&P of the NDDC intervention (See section 4.4 for a detailed discussion). There seems to be a general assumption in the NDDC that its interventions will naturally lead to peacebuilding in the region. This assumption is captured in the words of an assistant director in the Commission:

...we've discovered that the issues in the Niger Delta came as a result of lack of opportunities, unemployment, lack of skills and capacity. So if you address these issues, issues of restiveness will naturally be addressed. It's not a deliberate point that we address...it [peacebuilding] it's a natural consequence...when you reduce unemployment, crime, restiveness and other vice, similar vices will be reduced...for those who are actually in need of trade, of skills and of jobs, if you give them those opportunities it will check restiveness. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

In conclusion, C&P of the NDDC interventions, during the period under investigation, contradicts the six strategic planning principles and the framework of action identified above and specified in the Master Plan. In other words, there is no explicit stance to promote good governance through "...transparent and publicly accountable practices...". Also, the C&P is not participatory with "...meaningful involvement of active...stakeholders", especially the resident indigenes of the beneficiary community—the critical stakeholders. Contrarily, it is restricted to certain influential individuals

—the Ward 12 group— which is a pseudo-community involvement. Moreover, the selection criteria of contractors, consultants and beneficiaries are not transparent or open to public scrutiny. Rather, they are dependent essentially on the interplay of political influence of people that are “...desirous to do contracts”, the NDDC management staff, consultants, and Ward 12. Furthermore, the Commission has a simplistic assumption of positive correlational relationship between interventions and peace-building. This however, contradicts scientific knowledge in peace and conflict impact assessment as argued in chapters one and two. The Commission, therefore, contradicts its own strategic planning principles and framework for action. This has grievous consequences for the NDDC, its interventions, and the beneficiary community people.

### **5.1.1 Community Participation and C&P of Interventions**

Why would the resident community people be excluded from C&P of interventions meant for them? This contradicts the “Lessons for the Future” (page 110 of the Master Plan), where the NDDC notes the observation of the UNDP as to the flaws of the previous development strategies in Nigeria (and the Niger Delta):

The greatest flaw in these (past) poverty alleviation strategies is their ‘top-down’ approach...It is needless to add that the involvement of the supposed beneficiaries, both in the conception and the implementation of the programmes were conspicuously negligible. (UNDP, 2001)

Moreover, section five of Policy G1 —Strategic Planning Principles— reads:

A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision making. This entails meaningful involvement of the ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and NGOs—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, including attention to issues such as gender and youth. — (2006, p. 23).

Furthermore, Policy HC 8 —Community Development and Social Welfare under the Policies for Human and Community Needs- contains a statement on involvement of critical stakeholders in conception and planning and implementation of the NDDC interventions in communities.

Detailed planning and implementation of all these needs will be conducted in consultation with local communities and with the clear aim of meeting the needs of individuals and families, and enhancing the sense of identity, pride, and mutual responsibility in each community. — (2006, p. 23)

It needs to be re-stated that the leadership of the NDDC must uphold the principles of transparency and accountability and must encourage the full participation of stakeholders in the strategic decision-making processes in line with their concerns interests and well-being (2006, p. 241).

In the light of these and other similar ideas that clearly acknowledge the need for community participation in the Master Plan, there is need to examine why the resident community people, as critical stakeholders, were excluded from participating in the C&P. Empirical evidence shows that resident community people participate in conception and planning of interventions by I/NGOs working in the community. In fact, I/NGOs intervening in Odi community actively involve the community people throughout their intervention programming. Hence, community participation in intervention programming is not an impossible task in Odi community. According to a member of the Odi Traditional Council,

Maybe you are aware these few days this people they call MMP3 or what—a kind of nongovernmental organization, now came here and inform us that every community should supply information on what they need. So some said town hall, some said this, some said boreholes. So they brought money now, people are now working on it. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011)

Given that NGOs involve the critical stakeholders in their intervention programming in Odi community, a critical question from the foregoing, therefore, is “why did the NDDC fail to involve the critical stakeholders as contained in the guidelines?” Probable answers could be either a naïve or deliberate misinterpretation of the above instructions by the NDDC. The Commission naively could presume that the stakeholders workshops held across the region prior to the development of the Master Plan already fulfilled this condition. It is noteworthy that the Commission held seven briefings at state capital level, 27 needs assessment workshops in the senatorial districts and participatory rural assessments involving 54 communities. Also, it held 10 capacity-building workshops in major towns, including state capitals, and 27 integration workshops at senatorial district level. A final round of stakeholders’ workshops was also held in each of the nine states to publicise and discuss the draft Master Plan before presenting it to the Federal Government committees (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2006, p. 118).

The Commission, probably, concludes that this already fulfils the condition of community people's consultations. This was implied in the responses of most of the NDDC staff interviewed. However, the conclusion is, at best, naïve. This is because the quotation from page 241 of the Master Plan comes after the summary of activities that went into its draft on page 118. Hence, the instruction in the plan could only mean that stakeholders' consultations should be a continuous exercise (as explicitly stated by some of the quotes above) even during the implementation of the Master Plan. Hence, deliberate misinterpretation stands to reason better than naïve misinterpretation. Excluding community people from the NDDC intervention planning appears to be a deliberate attempt to support the non-transparent activities and corruption surrounding the sharing of the NDDC resources. Findings reveal that the board and management have deliberately misinterpreted other important due process instructions in order to support their corrupt practices. According to Abubakar, the Orosanye Panel observed that pre-qualification process in the Commission did not follow the provision of Sections 16 (6-9) and 23 the Public Procurement Act (PPA), 2007 for projects within the N250 million approval threshold of the Commission.

The testimony of the Head of Procurement indicated that that Commission's understanding of the Circular issued by the Secretary to the Government of the Federation on Approved Revised Threshold means that prequalification is not required for works below N300 million. This is clearly a misrepresentation of the intention of the Circular, which simply aims at reducing the time involved in the procurement process. (Abubakar, 2011)

The initial stakeholders' consultations prior to the Master Plan are inadequate for the C&P of the intervention. This is because, first, the Master Plan, being an approximation of the aggregate situation of the region, may not fully map and/or cater to realities in each community. Consequently, the realities of each community context — conflict, need gap, and peacebuilding— may slightly vary from those captured in the Master Plan. Second, the Master Plan was published in 2006. Since then, a lot has changed in the Niger Delta and its communities. Hence, the reality on ground may not exactly match what was in the plan. The plan, at best, would then serve as a guide, for needs assessment done with active participation of the community people themselves. From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the exclusion of community people from the C&P of the NDDC intervention is deliberate. This may be a consequence of the barefaced corruption.

### **5.1.2 Implications of the NDDC Approach to Conception and Planning**

Excluding beneficiary communities from actively participating in the conception and planning of interventions in their communities is as a result of a structural cause of conflict, which triggered non-transparent and shady activities of the influential individuals struggling for the NDDC resources. This has serious implications for the community and the NDDC at later stages of intervention programming. First, it leads to duplication of projects leading to unneeded projects in the community and ultimately to wastage of resources. It also increases the likelihood that an intervention will impact negatively on the context and reduces the chances of positive impacts at the implementation stage. The immediate consequences of this at implementation stage are oppression and division of community people by the NDDC interventions (see section 5.4.5 and 5.4.6).

Furthermore, non-participatory planning denies NDDC the opportunity of maximising the potential benefits of its intervention in the community. A former secondary school teacher described a situation that showcases this. According to him, his former school now has three empty science laboratories each constructed by the state government, the Federal Government and the last by the NDDC. However, what the school needed after the first laboratory was constructed is laboratory equipment and a perimeter fence to keep people from encroaching on the school land and driving through the school premises during class sessions. Another consequence of inappropriate consultation is wrong siting of project. For instance, without consulting the school community, an NDDC contractor after consulting the Traditional Council constructed a block of classrooms on a parcel of school land meant for school football pitch. According to a teacher,

Had it been that the school community was consulted, we know what would happen...and then in now organizing the plans of the schools we were not informed. They decided to construct the classrooms in the upland areas where people can use for playground and leave the swamp as a football field. (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

Community people's displeasure over the arrogance of the top-down approach of the NDDC is evident in their suggestions for improving the NDDC intervention in the community. Community participation was the most frequent suggestions that community people (virtually all interviewed) offered for improving the NDDC intervention in the community. Other participants, except few NDDC staff, also agreed that

the Commission needed to do more community consultation to improve its intervention in the communities. However, one NDDC staff argued that the politicians were already representatives of people's views. Community people however, expressed contrary opinion.

Because if they know well that this project is for the masses, at least they would...they should inform all the sectors. They should call meetings, and tell them all. Like..., for instance, you see, as you [researcher] come directly to this place, if NDDC person come and said madam you are the community leader, you are the chief of the women of this place, please so-so-so date we are coming for a meeting. Things that will benefit the women, for that day, you have to gather, not all women but you can gather all representatives of all women communities in Odi so that we can discuss issues that will benefit all you. So also they should go to the youths, they should go to the CDC, the chief —Ereamini-darau (women chief) (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011).

Like what they should do, town hall meeting, you gather the community say 'We are NDDC people we are coming here for this and this is what we want. So what do you want in this community? Let the people decide. If it's a road let the people decide where the road should be. You got my... [ yes]So let the people decide.—Secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Most times, by the time you go out to implement... and that's why we have conflict otherwise there shouldn't be conflict for the CRD to go and resolve. Because if a community is not aware of a project until a contractor arrives, they are bound to say 'contractor come and give us marching ground' ok, so there is a gap between how it should be done and how it is being done presently.—NDDC Staff, Desk Officer in State Directorate (Fieldwork: Interview, 07/07/2011).

In concluding this subsection, evidence suggests that the Commission contradicted the spirit and principles of the Master Plan in the C&P of its interventions in the period under study. The NDDC contradicted the six principles deemed most relevant to the C&P stage. Instead of promoting good governance and ensuring transparency in its activities, findings show that bad governance and corruption characterised the C&P of the interventions. Consequently, leading to the deliberate exclusion of the critical stakeholders, this again is contrary to the guiding principle of participatory planning. The involvement of Ward 12 (to which some NDDC personnel referred as community involvement) at this stage through lobbying for the community is at best a pitiable mockery of community participation. Finally, there is no special sensitivity to peace

and conflict issues in conception and planning. It was assumed that the interventions would ordinarily lead to peacebuilding and reduction of conflict in the beneficiary communities. This, however, as has been shown, contradicts scientific knowledge on intervention programming in conflict context.

## **5.2 Implementing the NDDC Interventions**

This stage in intervention programming involves the process of realising objectives by enacting the activities designed in the C&P stage. It is the operationalisation of the proposal (Resource Pack, 2004). At the implementation stage, the critical stakeholders—the resident community people—become active players in the programming. This is one major distinguishing factor between the previous stage and this stage. The implementation of the NDDC interventions should be guided by the nine principles in the framework for the intervention strategy (see box 1 in section 4.1.2). However, there is need to recreate what happens at the implementation stage of the NDDC interventions before assessing their impacts. The implementation of the two categories of interventions—the infrastructural development projects and the human development programmes—is characteristically different. Hence, there is need to discuss them separately. This is done in the following subsections.

### **5.2.1 Implementing the Infrastructural Development Programmes in Odi**

As noted earlier, the study investigated physical development projects in Odi. These included three road construction projects, construction of blocks of classrooms/laboratories, rural water and electrification. Generally, implementation of physical projects is done with minimal consultation with the community people. Usually, community people will know about the project at the point of execution when they see contractors moving their machines and materials to the community in a bid to commence work. Sometimes, few days to moving into the community, the NDDC officials come to introduce the contractor to the community leadership in an impromptu meeting with the Traditional Council. Many times, some members of the council are unable to attend such meetings. This institutionalises and sustains the *malevolent charity-beggar relationship* (see section 5.2.3), which is rooted in the non-participatory approach to C&P. Community people generally reported the rudeness and overbearingness of this approach. Thus, the approach and the negative feelings it engenders in the community smear the whole process of implementing physical projects and its impacts in the study area. The details are discussed subsequently.

The exclusion of resident community people from the C&P stage is an indirect but major structural cause of conflict at the implementation stage. This point is underscored in the implementation of a number of projects in the community. The first to be discussed is the pavement of the internal link roads in the community. As fallout of inadequate consultation with the community, the contractor who executed the concrete pavement of two kilometres of the internal link roads, unknowingly, decided to pave the awarded two kilometres in one part of Odi—Asanga. The project immediately triggered a low-profile conflict between the Asanga (northern Odi) and the Tamanga (southern Odi). The Asanga-Tamanga dichotomy, a type of what Mary Anderson referred to as dividers, has been part of Odi community life from inception. This is a low-profile rivalry between the two spatial parts of the town, which is indiscernible by outsiders. Consequently, the project pitched the 14 Tamanga chiefs against the 13 Asanga chiefs. However, it was eventually resolved, at the Traditional Council after series of meetings. The resolution was that few metres of the concrete road would be located in Tamanga. Even in Asanga, the siting of the roads triggered competition among the residents. Since Odi is usually waterlogged during rainy season, concrete pavement became a scarce resource which chiefs and other community people wanted to enjoy by having the roads close to their residences paved (Anderson M. B., 2004). According to community respondents,

...A too will want the company to start from their link road, en, B too will want to start from their link road. 'They should start from there first. No from here first.' So, youth can even go to the company and say 'No don't do this one, this one should be the last. Go to that major road first, that is our major road. Finish that road first.' Then some of the elders in the community will now dictate 'No go and do this' and they (contractors) work with the (...) council of chiefs.

—Odi Youth Council Executive (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

It's not an open confrontation. But people begin to murmur. Something like, 'Ok, is it because I don't belong to this group, because I don't belong to this party that is why the road was not cited in my area...' All those things that normally happen. 'Ah-ah, ok, the link road was given to the king because he's a king. And then we also have other places that supposed to have it.'

—Secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

The quotations above show how pavement or internal link roads became a scarce resource and a proximate cause of conflict, impacting on actors and changing



the profile and dynamics of the context. It resulted in suspicion, competition, conflict and eventually cooperation among the community groups (Bush K. , 1998). The Odi Traditional Council chiefs resolved the Asanga-Tamanga conflict peaceably. Investigation showed that the Tamanga had earlier enjoyed the construction of more concrete roads from the local government at the expense of the Asanga. However, they still contested for the NDDC concrete roads because the roads were going to be wider and of better quality than the ones constructed by the local government. A Tamanga chief in the Traditional Council reported:

...so that period we were getting these things, it was at the expense of the...north. So, most of us were not serious, because development can't be in only one side. When local government was constructing all these walkways for the southern part, the, the people from the north never grumbled. So now that it is their turn, though theirs are bigger and wider roads, wider and the work is of a better quality than the ones that the local government did.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Community people, perceiving the project as resources to meet the need for improved roads, mobilised to secure their share in it. First, they mobilised along the Asanga-Tamanga line and, later, on Asanga side, individuals (chiefs, elders) and youth group mobilised to benefit one way or the other. The pull-and-push of siting of the projects, expectedly, impacted on the contractor too. The pressure of different individuals and groups competing for project location and the demand for better quality job by the youths are specific interactions of implementation with contractors —a group of actors.

In consonance with Bush's argument, therefore, physical development projects introduced new dynamics in Odi. A case in point, a dramatic conflict ensued between the Youth Council, the contractor and the Traditional Council during the implementation of the link roads. After the contractor had supposedly completed its job, the Youth Council seized the contractor's equipment. The trigger of the conflict was, according to the youth president, the company's failure to pave up to the two kilometres of roads awarded to Odi and that the quality of the work was substandard. The youths therefore demanded to see the bill of quantity. It led to a major face-off between the Youth Council and the Traditional Council. Observing that the contractor enjoyed the support of the Traditional Council, the youths insinuated that the council must have been com-

promised. It took NDDC officials, who brought the bill of quantity and the men of the State Security Service to resolve the issue in the Amananaowei's (King's) palace. Yet the youths believed that the bill of quantity (BOQ) tendered at the meeting was not genuine. In this conflict case, the implementation of the project triggered aggression from the youths. This is because the youths believed that the community had been relatively deprived compared to Sabagreya, which had better road network and asphalt-tarred roads (as against concrete in Odi) with drainage. Also, the youths were disappointed because the road did not have drainage. The ensuing fracas engendered intense interactions among actors. Causes of the conflict included substandard work, seizure of equipment, demand for BOQ, and distrust. Actors were the Traditional Council, Youth Council, contractors, NDDC staff and officers of the State Security Service (now Department of State Security).

Similarly, the implementation of the Odi-Trofani Road construction triggered conflict between the women's group and the construction company, between the construction company and the youths, and between Odi and Trofani. The conflict between women and the contractor—Elite Company—was the most dramatic. The proximate cause of conflict was the proposed blockage of a channel that women pass through to harvest seafood and firewood to supplement family income. The women's group felt neglected by the menfolk and the Traditional Council due to its nonchalance over the issue. Community women had to embark on non-violent action to make the company construct a bridge instead of blocking the channel. The situation temporarily split the community along female-male line. The proposed action of the company initially had negative impact on the community, however, women's choice of non-violent action led to positive outcome for the women and the entire community. Whether the construction had positive impact on the company (perhaps in lesson learnt in community relations) or negative impact (loss of time, materials and unbudgeted expenses) could not be ascertained as the company was not available for the study.

Furthermore, employment opportunities created by road construction projects is another interesting area for mapping the interactions between implementation and context. Constructions require unskilled labourers. Conventionally, the company hires youths from the communities in its operational context. For instance, in the case of the Odi-Trofani Road construction, youths were hired in both Odi and Trofani when the road was within Odi and Trofani boundaries respectively. However, the construction

triggered a low profile boundary dispute between Odi and Trofani. According to a former member of the Traditional Council at the time of the incident, it was resolved peacefully between the two communities when the Amananaowei (king) of Odi sent some of his chiefs to the king of Trofani. In the same light, the construction of Agberiyé-Odonu to Sampou Road was also a proximate cause of conflict between Odi and Sampou. In the words of a current member of the Traditional Council when Sampou people

...saw that the road was getting to their place, they never wanted to involve Odi in anything employment, in anything [emphasis] at all, compensation, nothing! Odi has to go in, telling the company that 'This road passes through our land so compensation for economic crops and any other valuable, we'll benefit. Employment, we supposed to...' [So we wrote] those letters... The letters we write to the company has to be copied to the NDDC. Because NDDC gave the contract, it's an NDDC road. So the company will tell you, even employment, NDDC gives them the order before they will employ people from any community. — Traditional Council Secretary (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Selection of beneficiaries of employment from the construction work also caused tussles. One such was the conflict between contractors and the youths. Contractors have tendency to pay community youths lower than what is budgeted for and obtainable in cities. This leads to conflict. However, contractors and the youths negotiate and reach mutually-beneficial agreement. There was a case when the contractor wanted to pay seven10,000 naira as monthly salary for unskilled workers from the community. The youths expected the 30,000 which they learnt was in the project proposal and obtainable in cities. The two parties eventually agreed on 22,000 naira before the project was allowed to commence. Hiring of workers also triggers competition, conflict and cooperation among community actors. The temporary nature of construction work sometimes means that there may be more hands than the work available. This means a youth may not be able to work with the company throughout the duration of the work. The community has evolved an arrangement in which someone works for the company for some months and leaves to give room for others. When necessary, the community, Youth Council, or a family introduces this arrangement. Although designed as conflict-management mechanism, the arrangement sometimes brings conflict of its own. There are situations when someone who has spent his agreed period on the job refuses to leave. This brings conflict. This usually happens at the family level.

Land issue is another critical issue that brings conflict during the implementation of the NDDC intervention programming. The NDDC expects beneficiary communities to donate land as their equity contribution to the intervention projects. However, Odi community does not have land of its own. According to a respondent, “...there is no land in Odi called community land.” So, donation of land is a big issue in the community whenever it is needed. A family that donates land expects to benefit from such project through direct employment or contract (e.g. supply of sand) of some sort. This situation also brings competition, conflict and cooperation for resources to the family level. At times, more than one family may have to donate land for a project with each expecting its members to have a share of the compensatory benefits. This may lead to competition and conflict between affected families. Families donating land may sometime expect permanent employment in certain situations. In cases where land is donated for government establishment like school, such family may expect a quota of the permanent appointments in the establishment. In situations where the Commission fails to meet family expectations, conflicts may ensue, sometimes leading to reclaiming the donated land or parts of it, as was reportedly the case in the community junior secondary school land.

In conclusion, there is convincing empirical evidence that implementation of physical projects interacts with the actors, causes, profiles and dynamics of conflict in the context. The physical projects represent limited resources —jobs, paved roads, and opportunities for income through supply of construction materials. This triggered competition, contest and conflict among the community people and groups, the NDDC and contractors. By their very nature and programming, infrastructural interventions become both structural and proximate causes of conflict. The physical projects are mostly responsible for the malevolent charity-beggar relationship (discussed later in section 5.4.4) between the Commission and the community. Actors’ behaviour, motivated by likely deprivation, to appropriate these resources changes the profile and dynamics of conflict within the context. Critical issues in these interactions include the lack/manner of informing about, and involving the community in, projects; selection of beneficiaries, access to jobs, and acquisition of land. This engenders conflicts —intra- and inter-communal, intra-family, and gender conflict. However, the local capacities for peace in Odi comprising traditional and contemporary structures and processes me-

diate the conflicts in a way that minimises their negative effect on the community and on the intervention.

### **5.2.2 Implementing the Human Capacity Development Programmes in Odi**

The Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDPs) are interventions aimed at building the capacity of community people in selected endeavours. The most remarkable one in Odi is the training in modern agricultural practices, which started in 2006 with trainings in aquaculture, mushroom farming, beekeeping, and rearing of grasscut-ter (*thryonomys swinderianus*). Since the trainings go on simultaneously, participants usually choose one or two of the trainings to participate in. The training lasts for two to three days and is held at the Bioresources Development Centre in Odi for communities in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA. Specific number of participants was normally allotted to each community. The last training (before this study) was in 2009. The presence of the Bioresources Development Centre (BIODEC) in Odi has made the community to enjoy many of the NDDC agricultural trainings. The process of implementing the programme in Odi involves contacting the king who in turn sends out the town crier to announce in the town. Interested community members, regardless of age, gender, level of education then apply. Findings show that many community people have gone for the training more than once. Some regard it as a pastime or an opportunity to collect the stipends attached to exercise; while few, who are already in similar business, go to enhance their knowledge, as described by community members:

They just tell the people ‘Just come’ and they go because they know that at the end of the day, at least they will give them entertainment and maybe peanut as workshop fee. So people just go just to re-familiarize themselves to...they will get 1,000 naira for the training or the food...People don’t go there for interest, because there is no serious enlightenment program. And most of the programs are even crash programme.

—Secondary school teacher in Odi (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

...but some of them that went for the training, like maybe some, they went their just to get more knowledge about fish farming [ok]. In fact some of them already have fish ponds within the community. And those ones they are still going on with their business.

—Odi Youth Council Executive (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

The NDDC HCDPs in Odi has only two *success stories* (from 2006 to 2009) of trainees that started the business from the scratch. However, none of them had a thriving business at the time of this research. One case is that of a woman who was provided with fingerlings after the training in 2009. The woman used the soak-away in a rented apartment as a pond for catfish farming. However, her Africa International Television (AIT)-televised *success story* did not go beyond the first harvest as her landlord demanded to use the soak-away. According to her, the NDDC “really wanted to assist” her but she could not raise enough money to buy land in a close place for security of her pond. Findings show that this woman was successful for two reasons that might have been independent of the NDDC. One, she is a staff of the BIODEC, (the Federal Government establishment that was the NDDC consultant for the training) so she had first-hand knowledge of fish farming and support from her colleagues in the office. Two, she could afford to buy quality COPEN feed for her fish, which majority of participants could not. In her words,

...the problem there is that, the way they assist us is not really enough, because they gave us only the fingerlings then the next thing is for us to feed them. Then the feeding aspect was too much that some of us cannot be able to make it...if the NDDC people will not assist us, we cannot make it. We cannot make it in the sense that buying of feeds, I've said it before, it's not easy. You cannot give somebody, maybe hundred pieces of fingerlings or one thousand pieces of fingerlings then you said the person should go ahead and take care of them or feed them, the person cannot. (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011).

The second success story was that of an elderly man, a retired military officer, who specialised in grasscutter rearing. He was the only success out of six people that specialised in grasscutter farming in the community. His farm operated for four years. He closed the business because of lack of farm hands. Availability of fund was also critical to his success story. According to an unsuccessful grasscutter farmer commenting on the man,

He is a patient man and he has some financial backing. So he was able to...If they say bring B-calcium and add to the food of this things. He was able to do it [...] I killed my last ones when my father died and we had...this thing [burial]. So I said that just finish all of them let me use the house to do even if it is poultry. (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011).

There was a remarkable evidence of interactions between implementation of the HCDPs and the elements of the context. The most remarkable interactions were

consequent on the dissonance in the Commission's and the community's understanding of *empowerment*. To the community people, *empowerment* means distributing start-up materials and fund for participants after training. While to the Commission, empowerment was essentially limited to capacity-building training in modern agricultural practices.

In few instances, start-up materials such as tanks and fingerlings were randomly distributed to lucky participants in the 2009 training. Some of the trainees on fish farming were given fingerlings, some GP storage tanks, while others were not given any material assistance. Fingerlings were given to participants who claimed they had ponds while GP tanks were distributed to those who did not have, using ballot system. This also, expectedly, created specific conflicts.

The community people and the NDDC consultants clearly understood training and empowerment as two distinct events, while the NDDC regarded training as empowerment. The dissonance in perspectives was an underlying cause of conflict. It led to conflict between the trainees and the Commission over the non-payment/non-distribution of *empowerment* money (either as grant or loan) and materials. The community people and NDDC consultants' statements below show their understanding and expectations of *human empowerment*:

If NDDC really want to be involved, you don't give people basins to train fish. If you want a grass-cutter, that is an expensive venture. If you give the person 10 thousand, 50 thousand naira, cannot, how much is land because the person has to acquire land to construct a pen that eh, for grass-cutter, it's not easy. So you find out that most of them receive the training but there is no empowerment. So after receiving the training they have nothing. Because I know of some many people... I was even called whether I was interested. I said after training you will not empower me to go into that business, so there's no point.—Secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

One of my colleagues, we call him Odoiga, the NDDC even sent them for training at this... Songhai, they went there did the training and everything. Till today they have not been empowered to do anything. And Adoke, if... had it been he's here, they have not been empowered to do anything. Even the owner of this shop, the husband also went for that training and came back, till today, there is no empowerment. So you have on record that you have trained people, sent them to Songhai on how to do plantain...but where is the empowerment... So, those trainings, you see, is normal something, but I think it is a waste of resources.

If you train only five people instead of 7500 and then come and say ‘yes where is the land?’ Acquire that land, and you say ‘ok you people have acquired land, unearth the ground and prepare the fish pond for them. —Secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

If you may ask others too, they may add that their programmes are not too bad, but one, giving me the knowledge and telling me that after the knowledge you will give me a little empowerment for me to start-up and without that it stills boils down to...that NDDC is not doing fine, it’s not doing fine, maybe, in the aspect of their programs. — Programme beneficiary (male, university graduate) (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Because if they (community people) are trained and empowered they will be able to get employment and when you gain employment you won’t be bordered about going to create problem again [ok] or ferment trouble...Our own is just to train the people and if we are mandated we will get them empowered. You know that one of the major problems we have in this country is that when they give you physical cash, a lot of people divert it to other things. So we sold the idea of instead of giving them cash, they should cost the materials that they are supposed to be empowered with and just mandate us to empower them, giving them the raw material and the enabling environment...

—Training Consultant for the NDDC Agricultural support programme (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

But to my own candid opinion, I don’t think that they meet up that [empowerment], because eh most of the people they are not empowered,...because there is no way you can train somebody and you leave the person for a number of years and you don’t empower the person and you expect the person to just relax like that. And if a person relaxes, everything the person learnt will be forgotten. And clearly by the time you think of empowering them they must have forgotten and the issue will now be diversion of whatever thing that is being given to them...Most of those people that were trained even in 2006 have not been empowered up till this moment...Well, eh to the best of my knowledge, the conflict is most of them who have not been empowered are aggrieved. And eh, when they hear most of the project that are coming up they are still biased whether they are going to be empowered or not, and you know that to make a lot of people to have a kind of lukewarm attitude towards their [NDDC] programme... Because if you train a person and you send the person back home, the person will rise his hope. And after rising hope that he’s going to start something, one week, two weeks the person have not started anything, the person will be frustrated and eh it’s going to affect them, negatively.

—Training Consultant for the NDDC Agricultural support programme (Fieldwork: Interview, 28/11/2011).



The conflict inherent in the dissonance has negative impact on the community-NDDC relations. As far as the HCDPs are concerned, therefore, the dissonance is the major source of negative impact of the Commission's intervention at the implementation stage, impacting on the actors, causes, profile and dynamics of context. The impact on community actors is noticed in the indifference to future NDDC HCDPs. This affected the implementation as the Commission increasingly had to cajole community people to participate in its trainings. However, the HCDPs also had positive impacts on the community. A major positive impact of the HCDPs on the community people is the acquisition of modern skills in agricultural practices in the areas in which they are trained. As noted in the words of the Odi Youth Council president above, the trainings served as capacity-building for farmers already involved in the areas in which trainings were offered. Also, beneficiaries reportedly acquired the knowledge of modern agricultural practices through it. Many felt that, if given the necessary financial assistance at the time of the fieldwork, they would be able to successfully conduct the agricultural businesses in which they were trained.

There are reported cases of competition and conflict amongst community people for participation in the programmes at the early stage of the Commission. Then, competition for the NDDC agricultural trainings was high enough to lead to some conflicts. There were few accusations of partisan political interference in the selection of trainees. This was probably informed by community people's expectation of some financial aid (alias empowerment) to follow the training and thus get their own share of the *national cake*. According to a respondent, "But most of them (community people) felt, form the cooperatives, bring money, share the money." However, persistent failure of the NDDC to live up to its promises (or participants' expectations) of attractive stipends and *empowerment* has made people indifferent to the HCDPs. Subsequently, therefore, they had to be cajoled with promises of stipends to make them abandon their economic activities to participate in the trainings. High expectations and *promise-and-fail* syndrome of NDDC HCDPs is a major contribution to the indifference of the community to the programmes. Generally speaking, HCDPs are trailed by some pathetic stories as related by a respondent.

One of my friends in that place (points towards a direction) too, young, very young boy of my age was also doing it. So he devoted all his time on that stuff (grass-cutter rearing) 'Forget about this', people were telling him 'Write JAMB and go to school o.' Because if he now write

JAMB and go to school, which means who will be there to be taking care of those his animals? So he was devoted on those eh business...but on the long run all of them died. So it's now that he's now going back to school.

—Odi Youth Council President (Fieldwork: Interview, 28/11/2011).

So, initially community actors invested their resources in participating in the HCDPs. However, they have almost nothing to show for it except the few GP tanks still found in Odi community. For instance, with the hope of getting grant or loan as start-up capitals after the trainings, programme participants contributed money to form cooperative society. Eventually, their expectations were not met. Consequently, the youths amongst the participants (from the whole of Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA and other LGAs) protested at the NDDC office in Bayelsa and later at the headquarters in Port Harcourt. They were arrested during their protest at the headquarters. Odi community had to contribute money to bail its youths. Moreover, the agricultural support trainings have no criteria, except interest, for participation. The implication of this is that any member of the community can participate. Certain members of the community were of the opinion that bringing the old, young, literate and illiterate together in training indicates the Commission's lack of seriousness and, therefore, a disincentive for participation. According to a community member,

You don't just gather the old, the young, everybody without looking at...just come and maybe bring one lecturer from UI or one lecturer from UNIPORT and then the man ended up talking and talking and talking and at the close of the day you give them paper. Some of them cannot even read anything...I know the fishing own, it was everybody. And even my mum was involved in it. (Participant and interviewer laughed) Come to think of it, so, it was not just a matter of educated...and that basin (GP tank) up till today is lying in front of my mum's house...There's no way she can use it to do anything.

—Male secondary school teacher in Odi (Fieldwork: Interview, 28/11/2011).

Unlike the IDPs, the interactions of the HCDPs with the community context were relatively fewer and less intense. This is probably due to the fact that the HCDPs offer relatively fewer benefits, hence actors are less motivated to compete for their resources. This suggests that the resource-value of intervention drives the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions and is proportional to the intensity of interactions of interventions and its context. From the foregoing, the sincerity of the Commission for its HCDPs is questionable. If it has just one success story out of dozens trained

in fish farming in Odi community, one wonders why the Commission could not provide financial assistance to acquire or construct a pond when it could afford to televise the woman's case on AIT. This might suggest to the community that the Commission would rather invest in publicity or propaganda than committing to empowerment.

### **5.2.3 Assessing the implementation of the NDDC interventions for consistency with the guidelines of the Master Plan**

As noted earlier, the implementation of the NDDC interventions should be guided by the nine principles in the framework for the intervention strategy (see box 1 in section 4.1.2). In other words, within the community context, the intervention must bring economic prosperity, create and expand market, promote good governance, create enabling conditions and continuity of the initiative (by increasing positive impacts and reducing waste), involve participatory decision-making (giving special attention to women and youths), sustainable, partnership with other agencies, transparent selection decision and public scrutiny of materials, and must be peace and conflict sensitive. The implementation of the interventions in Odi is now examined in the light of each of these principles to determine the extent to which the implementation is consistent with the Commission's principles and policies in the Master Plan.

The first critical question to ask is “do the NDDC interventions bring economic prosperity to Odi or create and expand its market?” The answer to this is in the affirmative. Economic prosperity and opening of the local market were part of objectives of the interventions that were realised. This has been realised more through the IDPs than the HCDPs. For instance, the NDDC inter-communal roads opened up Odi market to their neighbours. Moreover, the temporary jobs, supply of construction materials, increased sales by petty traders and food vendors during construction are other means of economic prosperity (though temporary) for the community. However, evidence suggests significant room for improvements if the principle of good governance is promoted in the implementation.

To promote good governance, the intervention process must be participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follow the rule of law. The implementation of the NDDC interventions is participatory to the extent that it involves the community people not only as passive beneficiaries but also in making certain decisions regarding the interventions. For instance, the community is informed and participation of its members is

sought through the Traditional Council. Also in selecting beneficiaries, Odi community exercises reasonable amount of control. A case in point is the selection of youths to participate in the NDDC training on non-violent conflict transformation. Nomination of youths was done by the community at the level of compound (referred to as community in Odi for political reasons). Criteria for selecting nominees were drawn by Odi people. In addition, selection of youths to be employed for construction works was left to the discretion of the community, which as earlier discussed, had evolved infrastructure for doing this in a non-violent manner.

However, the NDDC does not directly involve women and youth when contacting the community. These two critical community groups, nevertheless, manage to influence decisions about implementing through their agitations. Inasmuch as the NDDC did not directly factor in the different groups in the community, most especially the four cardinal groups—the Traditional Council, the Community Development Committee, the women's group, and the Odi Youth Council—the implementation of its interventions cannot be said to be consensus-oriented. However, as noted earlier, the women and youth groups manage to force or negotiate themselves into such decisions, especially when they believe that their interests are directly jeopardised by the implementation decisions. This, nevertheless, is not the same as officially recognising them and deliberately including them and other interest groups in decisions about implementing the interventions in their community. Only this will satisfy the condition of consensus orientation.

Accountability cannot be achieved without transparency and the rule of law. So, these three are discussed *pari passu*. In the context of this discourse, rule of law includes protection of human rights (especially those of the minorities), impartial law enforcement through impartial and incorruptible police. Transparency requires that decisions and their implementation are done in a manner that follows established rules. It also involves making information freely available and directly accessible to stakeholders, especially, the community people who will be directly affected by such decisions. And finally, it involves providing enough information in easily-understandable forms and media. Within this context, the NDDC should be accountable to its stakeholders, most especially the community people, in implementing its interventions. In selecting beneficiaries for its HCDPs, the NDDC communicates the information through the media and Traditional Council. It also introduces the contractors to the

community in implementing its IDPs. Nonetheless, strategic document and information about its IDPs, such as the bill of quantity is not provided to the community. This also contradicts the eighth guiding principle on transparent selection decision and public scrutiny of materials. Some community people insinuated that the Commission sometimes uses force or threat of the use of force in securing compliance or suppressing agitations. For instance, they reported that the threat of calling FANTANGBE was not uncommon to suppress people's agitations. In the case of the youth agitation against substandard road pavement, however, the youth president claimed that the leader of the State Security Service invited was fair to him. He even supported him. As far as selection of participants is concerned, the HCDPs are generally transparent. This is probably because stakeholders derive meagre benefits from it and, indeed, the NDDC have to cajole people's participation many times. However, on matters such as stipends, grants or loans, the Commission was reported to sometimes misinform the trainees to secure their participation. This, as earlier discussed, led to conflict and violence by the trainees.

Effectiveness and efficiency in this context means the NDDC and its interventions produce results that meet the needs of the beneficiary community while making the best use of available resources. The community people reported that some of the Commission's interventions, particularly, the road construction, on-going rural electrification, and the blocks of classrooms for the community school met the needs of the community. However, they also reported that the borehole project was not sustainable because of substandard materials used and because of lack of community ownership. Also, the construction of science laboratory was wasteful as it was a replication of what the state and the Federal Government had provided. The resources that went into the construction of the laboratory could have been more judiciously used if invested in perimeter fence or provision of laboratory equipment for the school. Generally, there is evidence that although the Commission's interventions met the needs of the people, it does not make the best use of the resources at its disposal. Most glaring proof is the report of the Orosanye Panel referred to earlier. Two main factors militating against effectiveness and efficiency of the NDDC interventions are corruption and the top-down approach to C&P of its intervention.

Equity and inclusiveness in this context requires that all beneficiary community members feel that they have a stake in the NDDC interventions and do not feel ex-

cluded from the mainstream activities. It entails that all groups, particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being through the Commission's interventions. However, the top-down non-participatory approach to C&P excludes the resident community people. They nonetheless participate at the level of implementation of the project as shown earlier. Responsiveness in good governance requires that the NDDC and its interventions serve all stakeholders within a reasonable time frame. There have instances where the Commission responded speedily to certain situations, especially when it involves agitations. A case in point is when the NDDC provided flying boats to some individuals in Odi after the youths protested by blocking the Odi-Trofane Road when the NDDC board chairman was passing. However, generally speaking the Commission is responsive to a certain degree.

In conclusion, the implementation stage, where the NDDC execute activities enacted at the previous conception and planning stage, is strongly influenced by decisions and processes at the previous stage. Also, certain variables such as NDDC organisational culture and structure and the NDR socio-political environment of the operational context exert influences on the implementation. Resident community people are most active at this stage of the NDDC intervention. To a certain extent, they are involved in selection of beneficiaries and, sometimes, influence project siting as well as benefit directly from the intervention. The power play at this stage is less intense than at the C&P stage and involves less influential power brokers at the community level. The activities of community people at this level involve competition, conflict and cooperation over the distribution of the resources of intervention within their space. These were driven by the lure of the resource-status of intervention and the phenomenon of likely deprivation. This situation creates disequilibrium in the power relations between the NDDC and Odi, creating phenomena such as *malevolent charity-beggar*, *oppressiveness of intervention* and *divisiveness of intervention* at the implementation stage. These phenomena, which essentially played out at the implementation stage, are inadvertently and inevitably programmed into the NDDC interventions at the C&P stage. Fortunately, the negative impacts, particularly on conflict, are mediated by the local capacity for peacebuilding available in the community.

### **5.3 Monitoring and Evaluating the NDDC Interventions**

Findings show that the monitoring and evaluation of intervention is done by the NDDC consultants, and not the Commission itself. Even this does not involve the

community members at all. According to the NDDC officials, the Commission is not directly involved in monitoring and evaluation of its intervention because it is understaffed, given the number of interventions it is handling. What the Commission does instead is to evaluate the evaluation report of its consultants.

What we do for most of these projects, we have external consultants... ok who'll do the supervision, the monitoring externally, and evaluation, ok. What we do is to evaluate their own evaluation [both interviewee and interviewer laugh]

—An NDDC Top-ranking officer, CID (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

However, as far as community people are concerned, the NDDC in all practical terms, does not monitor or evaluate its interventions. The community people were asked whether the Commission comes for monitoring, and evaluation a respondent said:

No, no, no, no. Because they also know that they've not done well now. Because when you have not even, not completed your part of the assignment now, how will you come back and then... Until they finish their training, if you have completed your part, that is when you can now come back and say we did this for you, what are you doing about it? What and what?

—A secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

The evaluation too, the community is not involved. They bring in their engineers to come and see the job whether the job is to specification. They only come to the community, if the community need to hear from them. They will just come to his highness' palace and say the job is eh to specification. So there are no monitoring eh committees within the, the community to monitor the project.

—An executive of the Odi Youth Council (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

However, in few occasions, the NDDC state directorate staff came to see what their contractor was doing. At such times, comments of community members as to the standard of the project are usually not taken into consideration. As reported by a respondent,

Even if they come, to my own observation hmmm, even if you make any comment as per their projects here that the company is not doing well. Those who are coming to supervise, hmmm, they are people who have that common understanding with the company on ground, hmmm. Maybe they must have compromised, eh, in some way with the company and so even if they come they will not query the company on what

they are doing. That ‘what you have put on ground is not what we gave to you.’ They will not question, will just come. NDDC is coming to supervise their work, they will just come and then...Or maybe after coming the company manager will just give them some package and then they will not say anything, they will just go.

—A secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011).

The monitoring and evaluation stage has significantly less resources to offer any of the actors previously identified. Also, the resident community people (RCP) are excluded from this stage. For these two reasons, the interactions between intervention and context are at the barest minimum at this stage. Excluding community members foments suspicion of bribery and corruption between the contractor and the NDDC staff in the monitoring and evaluation exercise. There are claims of some low key *settlement* between contractors and the NDDC officers (in the state directorate) responsible for monitoring and evaluation. This cast doubt on the sincerity of the Commission and further compounds the overall apathy of the community to the NDDC interventions.

#### **5.4 Impacts of the NDDC Interventions**

The central notion of this study is that the interactions of interventions and context are never neutral. In their interactions, intervention impacts on the context and the context impacts on the intervention. These impacts could be unintended or intended and could be either negative or positive. This study measures impacts as either negative or positive rather than as peace impacts or conflict impacts. The rationale for this has been argued earlier (see section 2.4). The impacts of the interventions are discussed separately for each of the two intervention strategies —the infrastructural development programmes and the human capacity development programmes.

##### **5.4.1 Positive Impacts of the NDDC Interventions**

Positive impacts are impacts that support the dynamics and structures of peace and weaken the dynamics and structures of violent conflict. The most significant positive impact of the Infrastructural Development Projects (IDPs) is the general feeling that, finally, the region in general and Odi in particular, is receiving the attention of the Federal Government, especially in the area of infrastructural development. This is significant because of the historic neglect by the Federal Government suffered by the region, leading to the pervasive feeling of marginalisation, which constituted a major cause of the Niger Delta conflict. Hence, in spite of the shortcomings of the IDPs



(which were also identified by the community people and other respondents), virtually all the community people interviewed and most of other respondents agreed that the infrastructural development projects have impacted the community and the region positively with regards to removing the perception and realities of marginalisation. As a respondent puts it, “...you see, as a matter of fact, I can say that we were living in the dark ages before this time, to be honest with you.”

Infrastructural development projects in the community included paving of two-kilometre internal link roads, 16-kilometre Odi-Trofani Road, Agbariye-Odonu to Sampo Road, water project, two six-classroom blocks, two three-room science laboratories, staff quarters for government school, completion of guest house, and electrification (ongoing at the time of the fieldwork). Each of these has had some positive impacts on the community. Positive impacts of the pavement of the internal link roads include making intra-community transportation easier and safer, especially during rainy season. Before paving the link roads, walking after rainfall was difficult for pedestrians because the roads were waterlogged. Also, vehicles sometimes splash dirty water in potholes on pedestrians, leading to skirmishes. Also, motorcycles sometimes skid because of the sandy road. A member of the Youth Council reported:

‘... like the roads they have impacted positively on us. Because for some years back, you dress well and then move out...your shoes will be passing waters and potopotos [mud]...It wasn't easy. But when they were able to construct the road...you will walk on the good ground...bike use to fall because we put sand on the road...Those things are not common again, bikes can now move freely. So it has impacted positively on...everybody.’

(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Moreover, the link roads have beautified the town. In addition, the pavement of the link roads spread physical development to the Asanga (northern) part of the community. This is like a compensation for Asanga, earlier excluded from the local government road pavement project which was concentrated in the Tamanga (southern) part of the community. This realisation was a significant rationale for resolving the conflict triggered by the pavement of the internal link roads. Finally, the pavement of internal link roads yields economic benefits to the community. These include provision of employment for the youths (as semi-skilled labourers in the construction), income for suppliers of construction materials such as sand and gravel by the community people

and increased sales for food vendors and restaurant owners. These economic benefits have direct positive effect on conflict by reducing poverty, which is one of the root causes of conflict in the region. Inter-community road construction projects have some positive impacts as well. Generally, such projects bring economic benefits in form of creation of temporary jobs for youths (usually males), markets for suppliers of construction materials such as gravel, sand, and planks for construction (since such materials must be acquired in the local environment), and increased sales for food vendors. Moreover, the Odi-Trofane Road opened up the Odi market to outsiders. As reported by a participant, a politician

“...NDDC now give us another road to Trofane, which has opened up our market. Because they are very good in gaari production and so forth, now the economic benefits are so...” (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011).

In addition to its economic benefits, inter-community road has reduced the dependency on water transportation, saving precious time. As reported by a community participant and beneficiary of the NDDC agricultural programme,

‘You see, before this time, if I want to travel to Sabagreya, just a stone’s throw here. I have to wait for flying boat for up to two hours. Except the boat is full you cannot move. But NDDC now made the road to Sabagreya, to even, eh, Opokuma, Egbedi.’ (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011).

In replacing the community secondary school converted to Federal Government college, the NDDC prevented the sense of loss and deprivation that was consequent on such development. Generally speaking, the physical construction projects, health services and occasional aid by the NDDC reinforce the presence of the Federal Government in the community, further confirming that benefits from the central government is finally trickling down to the community. Therefore, it reduced the feeling of neglect and marginalisation. This include construction projects discussed above, the rural electrification project the free medical campaign for the senatorial district, which is usually done at the General Hospital, Odi, and the NDDC diesel provided for generator during the Odiogorugbaogbe festival. As captured in the words of a religious leader in the community:

Now, everyone now, they see that light is coming and the youths, they are happy, they are waiting for the time when the light will fully be operation, you understand, so...it’s...the NDDC contribution is some-

thing that has to do with making the local people feel that they are part and parcel of the country, number one. Number two, it gives them sense of belonging. Because those things they are hearing that is happening in urban area is like they are seeing, they are trying to see them, small, so they are...they see that ah, with this one now something may happen. So they now feel eh, concern or feel belong, you understand that. (Fieldwork: Interview, 18/09/2011).

Another positive, though unintended, impact of the projects is the indirect way it builds the conflict transformation capacities of the community due to the community's engagement in managing communal conflicts arising from the interventions. Conflicts that emanated from the intense interactions among community groups and individuals are mediated by the local capacity for peace existing in traditional and contemporary institutions alongside structures for conflict management. The frequency of intervention-triggered conflicts necessitates the frequent engagement of these groups and thus builds their capacities for mediating in the conflicts. A noteworthy instance is the opportunity to showcase community women's group's capacity for non-violent conflict transformation. Non-violent direct action increases the cohesiveness of such group and makes the members conscious of their potential influence.

The human capacity development programmes also contribute positively to the community. Through the agricultural support trainings, community people have acquired the knowledge and skills in modern agricultural practices. Capacity acquired has been deployed in personal agricultural practices and agro-businesses like FADAMA. This, to an extent, addresses the issue of occupational disorientation, which was identified as one of the root causes of conflict in the region. Many of the beneficiaries believe that if given necessary material and financial support, they are still able to practice, successfully, what they have learnt. According to a community member,

...even their programs, as you get that knowledge, I think you will now improve on it...Like those who were trained to...en rear en grass-cutter and all those stuff, even if the thing stopped halfway, because of the knowledge they have gained from NDDC, even if you now give them another opportunity they can now excel again. Like people for fish farming, those people too, I think they have gained more knowledge and they are using it. (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011)

Moreover, the trainings provided platform for various categories of community people —old, young, female, male, educated, and illiterate— to come together in a fo-

rum. This serves as an opportunity to mingle and strengthen social relations. Also, it provided a break from the monotony of their daily lives. In addition, stipends paid at the end of the training serve as economic benefit for some of the participants. The distribution of fishing nets and flying boats doused the tension that rose between Odi and Trofani communities when Odi youths complained that since the assumption of office of the NDDC's board chairman by the Trofani-born Larry Koiyan, Odi had not enjoyed NDDC intervention. These conflict-resolution initiatives yielded immediate positive results by dissipating the negative feelings of rivalry, subjugation, and systematic neglect that was building up in Odi. Training youths on non-violence is a direct peacebuilding initiative. It builds the capacity of the youths for nonviolent conflict transformation.

In conclusion, the NDDC interventions have a number of intended and unintended of positive impacts on the study area. Some of the impacts address the causes — structural, proximate and triggers of conflict. The most significant positive impact identified is making people feel the presence of the Federal Government in the community (addressing feelings of neglect and marginalisation). Others include spreading physical development to the community and infrastructural development to the erstwhile disadvantaged part of the community, better intra-community transportation, improving the community physical aesthetics, economic benefits (addressing unemployment, poverty), human capacity building in modern agricultural practices (addressing occupational disorientation and low human capacity), self-awareness of community groups' influence, community groups internal cohesion, creating a new platform for social interactions among community people, opening up of community market and improving trade among the communities. Also, the need to mediate in frequent intervention-triggered conflicts provided an opportunity for the community's conflict transformation capacity to be built.

#### **5.4.2 Negative Impacts of the NDDC Interventions**

The root and supportive framework of the negative impacts of the NDDC interventions are the endemic corruption and widespread bad governance characteristic of the Nigerian society. Thus, the negative impacts are inadvertently and inevitably created throughout the stages of the programming. This starts right from the C&P stage when the critical stakeholders are excluded from the conception and planning of interventions. Having thus been provided the necessary conditions at this stage, the spirals of

negative impacts inevitably become persistent feature of subsequent stages of the intervention programming, culminating in negative impacts. The most significant of the negative impacts of the interventions are described by such phenomena as the promotion of corporate bad governance and entrenchment of corruption, malevolent charity-beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, disempowerment of the community people, and divisiveness of intervention discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Other negative impacts include intra- and inter-communal conflicts, unneeded initiatives and waste, informing and compounding indifference to the NDDC, poor quality physical infrastructure, weakening of the peacebuilding capacity of the community, entrenching gender inequality (see section 5.7), disappointments and frustrations, and dissent. These are discussed subsequently.

The black hole of interactions of influential players at the C&P stage institutionalises and entrenches corruption in the Commission. A similar phenomenon is transferred to less influential actors within the Commission and the beneficiaries compelled by the resource-status of intervention struggle to appropriate available resources at subsequent stages of the intervention. This mainstreams corruption into the intervention and eventually leads to substandard service delivery. As a community youth, a Political Science graduate of Niger Delta University, commented,

...when company A...take the contract to himself and then sublet it to another, maybe...if the contract is two billion...and then you just take one billion and then you too you now give it as sub-contract to another person. This one too will now take its own and give it to another person. So what do you expect this last man to do with the, 300...(Chuckles). What was the contract sum—2 billion. Other persons have taken theirs and they are not even coming down. They have collected theirs at the top. And what is coming to you is 300 million, what are you going to do? You too will want to have your own gain here, at least maybe 100 million or 50 million gain. So the other 250 million, which means you too you want to do a job that can, that this money can cover. So the quality they are talking about that they have written to Abuja is not obtainable at the grassroots. (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

The exclusion of the critical stakeholders from the C&P stage paves way for the unequal power relations between the Commission and the communities. This leads to the malevolent charity-beggar relationship between them and the phenomena of op-

pressiveness and divisiveness of intervention. Moreover, by excluding the community people from C&P, the Commission's interventions sometime are at variance with the felt need of the beneficiary community. Hence, implemented projects sometimes do not address the need of the community. It also leads to lack of community ownership of the interventions. Hence, some projects, like the water project, fall into disrepair. Such edifices regularly remind the community people of resource mismanagement and wastage in the Commission. This has implications on the community psyche as it gives the people the impression that the NDDC is heading towards failure like its predecessors and that the community will slip back into the old situation of neglect and marginalisation. The most recurrent advice offered by all community participants, experts, and some NDDC personnel is that the NDDC needs to bring the community into the C&P stage as recommended by the Master Plan.

As a consequence of excluding the RCP, most interventions lead to conflict among the community people as earlier discussed. The conflicts range from low profile to open conflict and occur at the levels of individuals, families, groups as well as between the community and neighbouring communities. This is part of the divisiveness of the NDDC intervention. However, in Odi community, the painful memory of the 1999 massacre and the local capacity for peace in the community prevent such conflicts from degenerating into violent conflict. Moreover, the interventions impact negatively on the community through oppression. Excluding resident community people, that is, the critical stakeholders, from having a say in crafting the solutions to their community problems sends a negative signal —powerlessness. Hence, it is a form of disempowerment. Since they have to accept whatever is given to them. This is further emphasised through the Commission's threat to blacklist a community as trouble-maker if their *problem is too much*'. This reinforces the charity-beggar relationship, a situation of acute power disequilibrium between the Commission and the community, in which the community power is regularly depleted in favour of the Commission with regard to the intervention.

As regards the HCDPs, the most significant negative impact is the pervasive feelings of disappointment and apathy towards the programmes. Having perpetually failed to live up to its promises in the HCDPs, the community people have come to perceive the programmes as hopelessly moribund. A central issue is *empowerment*, that is, material and financial support for trainees after training. The issue of empow-

erment sometimes leads to violent demonstrations, culminating in the arrest of some demonstrators. Disappointment on stipends is also a cause of conflict between the NDDC and the community people. Consequently, the HCDPs have become very unpopular amongst the community people. Its negative impacts have smeared positive impacts of the Commission's interventions. In fact, most of the participants have to be prodded before they remember the HCDPs as NDDC intervention, and after the prodding, they are not so enthusiastic to discuss the issue.

**Table 5.1. Positive and Negative Impacts of the NDDC's Interventions**

S/N	Positive Impacts	Negative Impacts
1	Brought the presence of the Federal Government into the community (addressing feelings of neglect and marginalisation).	Black hole of interactions.
2	Spread physical development to the community and infrastructural development to the erstwhile disadvantaged part of the community.	Oppressiveness of intervention.
3	Improved intra-community transportation.	Divisiveness of intervention.
4	Improved the community physical aesthetics.	Entrenched acute power disequilibrium between the NDDC and the community, leading to charity-beggar relationship.
5	Economic benefits (addressing unemployment, poverty).	Disempowerment of the community people.
6	Human capacity building in modern agricultural practices (addressed occupational disorientation and low human capacity).	Intra-communal conflicts at the levels of individuals, family, and community groups (e.g. Youth Council versus Traditional Council; Tamanga-Asanga conflict).
7	Self-awareness of community group's influence.	Inter-communal conflict (e.g. Odi-Sampo conflict; Odi-Trofane con-

S/N	Positive Impacts	Negative Impacts
		flict).
8	Community groups internal cohesion.	Community-contractor conflict (e.g. Odi Women versus Elite Company).
9	Trainings provided a diversion from the monotony of everyday activities.	Disownment of unneeded initiatives, leading to disrepair and waste of project, ultimately informing and feeding apathy for the NDDC.
10	Created a new platform for social interactions among community people.	poor quality physical infrastructure.
11	Opened up community market and improved trade among the communities.	Weakened the peacebuilding capacity of the community.
12	The need to mediate in the frequent conflict created provided opportunity for building the community's conflict transformation capacity.	Entrenched gender imbalance (e.g. giving more benefits to male; some programmes designed for women entrench their traditional roles as homemakers).
13	Distribution of flying boats resolved an immediate conflict by dissipating the negative feelings of rivalry, subjugation, and systematic neglect that was building up in Odi.	Feelings of disappointments and frustrations, dissent.
14	Training youths on non-violence built the capacity of the youths for non-violent conflict transformation and peace.	Entrenched corruption through lack of transparency and accountability.

*Source: Author's Assessment, 2013*



## **5.5 Gendered Impacts of the NDDC Interventions**

In order to determine the extent to which the NDDC interventions were engendered, the study first evaluated the extent to which gender is mainstreamed in the NDDC institutional context. It determined whether the NDDC has a gender policy. Adoption of a gender policy is one of the first steps in mainstreaming gender in an organisation. This is because adopting a gender policy is a conscious effort to have gender mainstreamed in an organisation's structure and culture. Moreover, an intervention agency with a gender policy is more likely to have a gender mainstreamed in its intervention. To assess the level and implications of gender mainstreaming of the NDDC interventions, the study participants were asked questions relating to gender-sensitivity of the intervention. The questions included gender disaggregated community members' participation as planners, beneficiaries and evaluators; gender disaggregated analysis of consultants/trainers in the NDDC intervention; and on gender policy of the NDDC and its intervention programming. These were the main basis for the analysis of gender-sensitivity of the Commission's interventions. Secondary documents including the Master Plan and brochure containing the list of beneficiaries of the NDDC skill-acquisition programmes were also consulted.

Empirical evidence shows that the Commission does not have a gender policy as an organisation or, if it does, the policy is not well-known outside the Commission's board membership, which is highly unlikely. A participant—a high ranking NDDC official— noted:

...my sincere answer to that question is that I have not seen...NDDC policy, ok...I wouldn't say it doesn't..., such a policy concerning gender equity, eh, whatever, doesn't exist, I've not seen any, ok. It could be there and I, I guess that, you know, if you have the opportunity of

talking with a board member or a management staff they'll be able to answer that question better, authoritatively as well. (Fieldwork: Interview, 08/07/2011).

Nevertheless, one cannot say that the Commission discriminates against women in job opportunities. A male respondent, an assistant director in a directorate, authoritatively claims "Oh, sure, sure we have more women than men in this directorate, but it may not have been deliberate. Sometimes you look for the very best." Another NDDC Staff in a State directorate claims

"We don't look at gender in being assigned to do work. But as you can see, we have many women in the directorate. But to say this is number of women must go to the field or do this or that, we don't."

(Fieldwork: Interview, 08/07/2011).

Participant observation by the researcher confirms that, in number, women are not discriminated against. In fact, at the time of fieldwork, the Community and Rural Development and the Agriculture and Fisheries Directorates were headed by women. However, only four of the 23-member management board are women.

Similarly, empirical evidence reveals that the Commission does not have a gender policy for its intervention programming. The NDDC Strategic Policies for Change is documented in page 22 to 46 of the Master Plan. The plan has 86 policies covering five thematic areas of economic development, human and community needs, the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and institutional resources. None of the policies was solely on gender. Although gender issues were mentioned in Section A in Goals on Education (pp. 34-35) under Policy for Human and Community Needs. One would have expected women and girls to be listed amongst vulnerable groups that deserve special attention in Social Welfare and Community Goals. The need to build the capacity of women in conflict resolution is also mentioned in Policy HR 14 —Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution. Section five of Policy G1 — Strategic Planning Principles— reads:

A sound planning process has to be based on participatory decision making. This entails meaningful involvement of the 'Active' and 'Passive' stakeholders—public sector, private sector, community and NGOs—and ensuring that their respective needs and constraints are taken into consideration when policies and proposals are formulated, including attention to issues such as gender and youth.

In spite of the above quote, none of the study participants knows of any NDDC gender policy on its intervention programming or of any deliberate attempt by the Commission to ensure gender equity in its intervention programming. In other words, there appears to be no framework to ensure that women and girls, men and boys have equal access in the conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NDDC interventions. As earlier discussed, the Commission only involves members of the intended beneficiary community in the implementation of its interventions. The current *Ereamini da-arau* —the women leader/chief— a primary school head teacher, who had held this position for over a decade at the time of the fieldwork) claims she had never participated in such meetings. Moreover, unlike some NGOs working in Odi, the NDDC had never directly sought the participation of women group in its activities through their leader. She explained the situation as fallout of the patriarchal nature of the traditional African society.

I was not informed...I only heard of it. I only heard of their meeting...I wasn't informed at all...You know, in everything there is monopoly now. In our African society, even this eh...especially Ijaw culture everybody want to bring women down. Everybody wants to put women down. They feel if women come out they will usurp our power. I think that's my belief. So most of the things they refuse to involve women, unless women will react on it.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

So-to-say, I am part of it [the Traditional Council]. So they say I am part of it, but when you are not called upon, you will...you will not even know what they are doing. Because you won't know when programmes are going to...[trails off] and women we are not involved, so you have to wait and look what they are going to do. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

A male respondent and member of the Traditional Council, corroborated her,

You know, I will say African System. The Africans, we look down at women. We feel women can't do anything, they are housewives. They remain in the house and then bring up children. That is, that is the way [...] we see our fathers manage their households. (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

Since gender is not mainstreamed in the NDDC interventions, the NDDC policies and interventions are gender-neutral or gender-blind. That is, the Commission implicitly assumes that its policies and interventions affect everyone the same way re-

ardless of gender. Using the Gender Based Analysis of Intervention (GBAI) Framework presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2), results show that the Commission does not make any deliberate effort to ensure that women and girls are especially encouraged to participate in the programme. This is the case throughout the stages of intervention programming as confirmed by the submissions of community people:

I've not heard any of their programs specify, given number of women.[...] Because most of these their programs they only come to the Bioresource and they will organise it and go. Because they don't come to the community, enlighten the council, [or] sensitise the people ever before they start. They just say they have so-so-so program, they can write to the community or they announce over the radio. Every community just pick; politicians will pick their people, there is so-so-so program the NDDC is trying to organise in Bioresource, Odi. I have included your name o, you go, like that. They just come and go. And those people picking too, unless [...] maybe their girlfriends or their own sisters, if not...it is the male, because we the male take care of the women.—a male beneficiary (over 70years) of the Agricultural training programme (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

...when they tell the town crier to announce, they didn't say anything about only female or male. But they talk about the both people. The both, not only one group of people, or not only youth, or not only women, or the men or something like, no. Everybody should be there, so that they will benefit.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011, a female programme beneficiary).

It is open for everybody, of which, maybe, they said they want to train hundred so they will put it in quota form. And the quota, anybody can come to represent their community. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011, a male programme beneficiary).

In fact, not giving women special encouragement to participate generally lowers women's participation in the NDDC intervention. Casual observation in the community showed that during the day, Odi women were busy, perhaps, more than their men. A number of men (*game men*, as they were called) were busy playing draughts. However, throughout the five days in the community, hardly was any woman found idle. Women were usually engaged in agricultural and economic activities such as small-scale farming, fishing, frying *gari*, collection of firewood, retail businesses, among other endeavours. However, this does not imply that all Ijaw men do is play draughts as some scholars erroneously concluded. Rather, men are usually involved in more physical activities such as large-scale farming and fishing in the high sea. Fishing in the high sea is seasonal and the fish migrate periodically. The migration of fish de-

termines the location of the men —in or out of town. Also, men fish in the night. So during the day when they are in the town, most of them engage in leisure activities until the night time when they embark on their vocation. At times, they leave the town for days.

However, women are usually involved in reproduction activities, which often require personal involvement. The traditional division of labour in the community, therefore, naturally favours men's participation in the NDDC intervention. Women would therefore require special encouragement and accommodation within the NDDC programme schedule in order to be able to participate. They typically find it difficult to abandon their responsibilities in order to attend the NDDC HCDPs. Although the Commission pays stipends to participants, and equal stipends are paid to women and men, both complain that the stipends paid after the training is lower than what was promised. For instance, they claimed that they were paid between 1,000 and 2,000 naira (instead of 15,000 promised) after participating in a two to three day workshop. For women, this amount is too low incentive to make them leave their agricultural and economic activities which yield greater income. Past records of the Commission's failure to pay promised stipend and provide post-training financial and material empowerment seem to further discourage women and girls' participation.

She say the people that they came to train they promised them that they would give them because...they delay them in their farming work, they said they will give them 15,000 [Naira] each but they only bring one, one thousand to them. And they said that they hear, that they have paid the money into their account and they contributed some amount of money, but still they have not seen anything. (Fieldwork: Interview, 18/09/2011, a female beneficiary speaking through an interpreter).

Such disappointment lowered women's participation in the NDDC interventions. In fact, some women would rather give out their nominations to their male counterparts.

As I told you, the list came out and there were a lot of women but most of the women did not participate hoping that this is something that we have been seeing. What is there? And they did not go further...there were less women, you see. Because a lot of these women feel that these things they are not relevant. So, probably in a hundred you see about ten or fifteen.

—A male beneficiary (Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011).

...sometimes they [women] even give out their spaces. Their names might be there [on the list of successful applicants] all right. They will

give it to one of their brothers. ‘Go there abeg. Every time we dey go there wetin we dey benefit?’ There was this...commissioner or something in Niger Delta representing Bayelsa State. The woman from Mende, she came and open this thing there. She actually said ‘The women population is so few, why?’ So she made an effort to lure women but it was not possible.

— A male beneficiary and politician (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Moreover, facilitators of training do not have gender training, hence their language and that of the materials provided for participants are not gender-sensitive. Furthermore, the logistics was not gender-sensitive. For instance, there are no special arrangements for child-care for nursing mothers during the training. There was no evidence of deliberate effort by facilitators to empower female participants during the training. Empirical evidence suggests that in organising and executing training programmes, female and male participants were treated as if their social, economic, political realities, experiences and needs are the same. There was no special recognition and acknowledgement of the inferior status of women in the community and no provision to improve their lot. Hence, gender equity was not considered in the NDDC intervention programming in Odi community. The policy and programming of the NDDC, as the findings reveal, inadvertently support patriarchy. In other words, it maintains an unjust system for the male to benefit more from the NDDC intervention programming at the expense of the female members of the beneficiary community.

However, the NDDC designed some programmes —the Home Management Business Skills (HMBS) —specifically for women. This, nonetheless, may not indicate gender sensitivity. This is because HMBS is designed with a view to helping women perform their traditional roles as homemakers. Therefore, this initiative has the potential of entrenching women as homemakers and preventing men from benefitting in such programmes. So, it will likely lock women and girls, men and boys in their traditional gender roles. This is consistent with the argument of the socialist feminists that patriarchy in the structure of the human society subjugates the female to the male. Hence, there is need to overcome gender blindness in the struggle for development and against shared oppression of women, especially in the developing world. According to an NDDC staff in the CID,

But on the other hand, we do design programmes specifically for the girls and women. We call them home management business skills, ba-

sically designed to cater for the needs of our ladies, girls and ladies. Bearing in mind that if you have a wife and a mother that is being engaged, it might contribute to the well-being and stability of the family, so we do have programmes specifically designed for women. That's not to say that we are shutting women out of the other ones... They select the very best, the most qualified and I do see a couple of ladies there. But the home management skills is specifically designed for our girls and women. So if you see a few men there, it's just by accident.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 07/07/2011, NDDC Staff, Headquarters)

The response of the NDDC Staff, "...if you see a few men there, it's just by accident", shows that already men are considered misfit in HMBS. Therefore, men interested in such programmes may be discouraged or reluctant to apply for such programmes because the HMBS is "...specifically designed for our girls and women." This implies that the Commission by its intervention is suggesting that there are some business skills for women, which men do not have to acquire, and from the list of the HMBS programmes, they are skills for less paying, inferior, women jobs like baking and sowing. This inadvertently indicates the NDDC endorsement for labelling low-paying, low-skill home management jobs as women's jobs, which are not meant for men. This implies that the Commission supports the view that men deserve more rewarding, high profile or highly-skilled work, thus strengthening the traditional view of men as the superior sex group.

Findings also show that, while women are not exempted from other NDDC interventions, special provisions or considerations are not made for them to compete favourably with their male counterparts in benefiting from the programmes. Literature on gender equality and feminism asserts that women have been disadvantaged by the dominant patriarchal structure in the society (Aina, 2009; Mejiuni, 2012). This makes it slightly difficult for them to compete favourably with their male counterparts. Hence, there is need to recognise their disadvantaged position and make deliberate attempt to make them benefit equitably from social programmes. However, this is not the case with the NDDC intervention. According to a high-ranking officer of the Commission:

As I speak to you there is a programme we are running in Turkey, and it's an international welders' programme... I saw a lady there, she came there on merit. She passed the aptitude test. Yes, at the maritime trades. The ladies that came on merit, they did not come as ladies. They came because they were qualified. They passed the aptitude test and every

other test that was required. Those kind of things, I wouldn't say they are not gender sensitive, but they are gender blind. (Fieldwork: Interview, 07/07/2011, NDDC Staff, Headquarters)

However, findings show that some desk officers may use their initiative in mainstreaming gender in implementing some NDDC programmes. A desk officer of the Commission reported:

No, for me, ok, I have a background, before coming to NDDC, I worked with several non-governmental organisations, so I have, you know, schooled in the culture of being gender-sensitive, [ok] ok, so there is nothing that I do, eh, if we have, say maybe a conference, a seminar, I ensure that even if it's not fifty-fifty, then it's sixty-forty [male-female ratio], that's a personal... (Fieldwork: Interview, 07/07/2011, NDDC Staff, State Directorate)

Findings revealed that gender had been mainstreamed by certain NGOs in their interventions in Odi community. Participants reported that NGOs bring women empowerment programmes and involve women in the intervention programming. According to the chairman, Community Development Committee:

Our women leader and her group, they have many projects...programs that they used to attend na [now] and then they have some projects which they want the government to help them. They have programs, like they want to build town hall. That is their meeting hall...It was...only NGOs used to bring, bring those...eh programs. (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011)

From the above, mainstreaming gender in NDDC's interventions in the community is not an impossible task. The question then is why is gender not mainstreamed? Is it a consequence of ignorance or nonchalance?

### **5.5.1 Implications of Gender-Neutrality of the NDDC Interventions**

The gender-neutrality of the NDDC interventions has implications for the context of the intervention. These are evident in four main ways. First, it sometimes brings tension between female and male community members; and often brings tension and suspicion between the women chief and the Traditional Council. As noted earlier the women chief (a member of the Traditional Council herself) claimed she had never been invited to any meeting between the NDDC and the Traditional Council (Actually, the meetings are briefings in the real sense, as NDDC only comes to inform the community leaders of their intervention and introduce the contractors to them. This is



strictly about the IDPs and occurs shortly before the commencement of the intervention).

I was not informed...I only heard of it. I only heard of their meeting...I wasn't informed at all.

So-to-say, I am part of it. So, they say I am part of it, but when you are not called upon, you will...you will not even know what they are doing. Because you won't know when programmes are going to...[trails off] and women we are not involved, so you have to wait and look what they are going to do.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011)

Apparently, from her facial expression and choice of words (the underlined), she resents the idea of excluding her from meetings with the NDDC. The NDDC meetings (or rather briefings) are usually impromptu and this makes it impossible for every member of the Traditional Council, especially, civil servants (which she is), to participate. However, not to have been informed at all is a different case entirely. Another male member of the Traditional Council, also a civil servant (a teacher, like the women chief), reported inability to attend such meetings in some cases, but at least he was informed when the NDDC officials arrived for the impromptu meetings. The women chief interprets this situation as a continued deliberate subjugation of women in the African society, especially the Ijaw culture. The second quotation shows that she feels that the council makes deliberate effort to make her redundant.

“You know, in everything there is monopoly now. In our African society, even this eh...especially Ijaw culture everybody want to bring women down. Everybody wants to put women down. They feel if women come out they will usurp our power. I think that's my belief. So most of the things they refuse to involve women, unless women will react on it.”

(Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011)

The quotation above also hints at deliberate male subjugation of women. She became reflective and distant when she made the statement above (As if it is something she had contemplated and confirmed many times). The tone of her voice suggested to the researcher that men are so afraid of women's power that they have successfully invented several ways to tame them to satisfy men's selfish ends (The way the respondent described the situation made the researcher somehow ashamed of being a man. At the same time, the researcher was slightly jittery thought that the respondent was going to vent her anger on him at this point in the interview. Although not directly

linked to the NDDC intervention, the researcher gathered from some members of the community that the women's leader, a former head teacher in a public primary school, had been recently demoted to a class teacher as a punishment for her political party affiliation. The Labour Party, of which she is a member, ousted Peoples Democratic Party in the election for the House of Representatives. The PDP-controlled state and local government therefore decided to punish her for her political activities).

Also, not involving women in the conception and planning has a tendency to impact negatively on women culturally and economically and, consequently, lead to conflict. For instance, there was a communal conflict involving the traditional ruler, the NDDC contractor and the community women. An NDDC contractor—the Elite Company—had been awarded the construction of Odi-Trofani Road. The road would pass through a channel of a river where women harvest fish, lobster, and firewood for home use and sale. In short, the channel had been a source of household food and income for women for generations. Thus, women have higher stake in the channel. However, Elite Company decided to block the channel since that was cheaper than constructing a bridge. When the community women realised that the men and the Traditional Council were not going to intervene in this, they took charge of their own affairs and reacted. According to the Ereamini da-arau:

They wanted to block the place instead of making bridge so that even this rainy season people can pass through. They were blocking it—the Elite Company—because they think that will be cheaper for them. The community women reacted...Yes the women reacted. So we were called to the king's palace, because we find out that they were not doing anything. So we...we reacted. And actually we went to the Elite, eh the company had to take the complaint of the women and they had to do it. Though the bridge was not properly done, but at least, people can pass through (even this [rainy] season) to go and bring whatever they want to bring...

They [women] were concerned. They are in the kitchen so they're concerned. So if the easy means to go and bring their woods is being blocked and in this [rainy] season, this lobsters that they bring, this season, they make a little money out of it. And even the family they will eat part of it. But most of our men they are feeling unconcerned. If not, the channel is for everybody but you know at least if something happens some people will be touched the most. So the women...felt that it is their right because they are the people going there more, you know the population of the women are more. And people using the place..., is women that uses the place more than the men, so...we went there later and we succeeded in making that bridge...

According to him [king], he set up three committees to go and meet the company. But the company or the people that are working there, but we don't know, that is what we don't know. We now went to take permission from him that whether they agree or not we have to go there. So we went there and got in touch with the white man that was in charge and that unless they agree with us then the road can be built... (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011)

Yes, the whole community women, the whole community women went there. The crowd was so much mighty that eh... (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011)

...so when they are trying to build that place, they were trying to close up that place. The women now woke up, they said 'You cannot.' The company said that they will. So the women, the women leader and all the women in the community stood up and say 'No, we are making use of that place and the company cannot close down that place.' ...So all the women went there when the company was working; went there, stopped the company. All the women o...stopped the work. And the company was trying to prove stubborn. Some of the women that knows how to drive cars took their keys from them, drove the car to different corner, charge [rev] them very well.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011, male respondent).

The above showcases the Ereamini-da-arau submission "so most of the things they [men generally] refuse to involve women, unless women will react on it." And in this case, women reacted, although in a non-violent way. The women's *reaction* was a non-violent demonstration involving almost all the community women. Men felt less concerned and the sincerity of the king's committees set up to look into the case before women intervened directly was questionable.

As well, not mainstreaming women in the Commission's interventions creates more power imbalance between female and male community members by directly empowering men economically. In respect of the IDPs, one way men and boys benefit directly is through direct employment as labourers —semi-skilled and unskilled. Considering that the IDPs have been more regular than the HCDPs and that this has been the trend since the inception of the Commission, one begins to have an idea of what this meant in financial advantage to men and boys over women and girls. As of the time of this fieldwork, the Home Management Business Skills had not been kick-started (although interested people had submitted their applications. The researcher even sighted some applications at CID office at the NDDC headquarters). Male youths, as militants or demonstrators, are usually the beneficiaries of *marching ground* paid by

NDDC contractors to allow them to execute their projects, since they are those that demand it through violent agitations. Hence, through direct employment and *marching ground*, men and boys benefit exclusively from the NDDC physical development projects. As commented by an NDDC staff,

...most times when we talk about youth, especially in the Niger Delta region where, eh, youth, you know, have seen violence, as, you know, as a vehicle for agitation, it tends to exclude women. Young girls, who, naturally, should see themselves as, part of...you know, that category called youth, so because of violence they are unable to come out openly when young people come out, you know, to participate in that process of agitation or advocacy, whatever. (Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

Also, in its ad-hoc responses to agitations arising from its interventions, the NDDC has not been gender sensitive. The Commission's *settlement* usually takes care of the males who are more likely to champion such violent agitations, either against the NDDC or their contractors. As noted by an NDDC staff in the quote above, young females seldom participate in agitations and, since the agitations yield fruit for the *head ones*, that is, the leaders as indicated by a programme beneficiary, females are not likely to reap the fruit of such agitations. Thus, male youths benefit exclusively from NDDC as reapers of tangible fruits of violence—in cash and in kind.

Finally, gender neutrality of the NDDC intervention misses the opportunities for women and girls empowerment, especially through its HCDPs. Women involvement in the entire intervention programming are good avenues for empowering women and promoting gender equity. If, as noted by the Ereamini-da-arau, the Ijaw culture subjugates women, affirmative action to empower women and girls would be a worthwhile goal for the Commission to pursue. However, the Commission fails to exploit this opportunity in programming its intervention. This probably is a case of underutilisation or a skewed prioritisation of the NDDC resources. Empowering women this way may reduce the likelihood for violent agitations in the Niger Delta. Casual observations on the pattern and dynamics of agitations in the Niger Delta reveal that it is engendered. It appears that violent and non-violent agitations are characteristic of male and female agitations respectively in the NDR. In other words, the NDR women are more likely to be involved in non-violent agitations (Aina, Adeyemi, Waziri, & Samuel, 2009) while their male counterparts are more likely to employ violent tactics. Militants are essentially males, and empirical women's non-violent tactics appear to be

more effective. As noted by the Odi youth president in his comment on women's non-violent demonstration against Elite Company,

At that time point in time, are you going to bring police there, when women are taking action? Now because of that action now, that led to the construction of bridge at that place. If not for the women they would have closed up the place. People are now passing there, to go and fetch firewood and do their farming activities. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

The underlined shows the strategic effectiveness of non-violent agitation by Niger Delta women. Hardly can any government justify the use of force against women engaged in non-violent protest. As the case of Odi community shows, women appear to be able to get result for their agitations than youths. Also, the outcome of women's protest is more likely to produce result for the benefit of all. The phenomenon of settling the *head ones* syndrome did not come up during the women's protest, unlike the youths. Hence, it was difficult to discredit their movement. If in their present relatively subjugated state, women are able to achieve this feat, one wonders what they will achieve in their empowered state. Although this aspect of the study is inconclusive, the potentials of women group taking the lead in improving the interventions of the NDDC is worth exploring.

### **5.6 A Peace and Conflict Impact Theory (PCIT)**

An outcome of this study is that a theory of *peace and conflict impact* emerged as a theoretical explanation of the interactions of NDDC's interventions and Odi community context. The *peace and conflict impact theory* offers a theoretical explanation of the nature, dynamics and implications of these interactions. The theory has eight concepts including resource-status of intervention, black hole of interactions, likely deprivation, the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention, local capacities for peace, and Federal Government attention. The theory suggests that the NDDC's interventions are perceived as resources in the Niger Delta and this perception drives the interactions of the interventions and the context from the macro level to the micro level, producing both positive and negative impacts.

In brief, the theory suggests that resource-status that interventions enjoy compels actors at various levels to compete or struggle for it. The struggle takes place in a socio-political and cultural environment characterised by bad governance and endemic

corruption. This leads to a black hole of interactions among influential actors at the macro level (country and ND region) as they decide who gets what, when and where, thereby, impacting on and being impacted by the conception and planning stage. The combined effect of the resource-status of intervention, black hole of interactions, and bad governance and endemic corruption provides sufficient conditions for spirals of negative impacts down the remaining stages of the intervention programming, and thus significantly reduces the positive impacts of the NDDC's interventions in Odi. An immediate outcome of this is that it makes the interventions a scarce commodity, acutely competed for by potential beneficiary communities, thus bestowing the status of charity on the Commission and imposing the status of beggars on the communities in a relationship (malevolent charity-beggar) characterised by acute power disequilibrium. As a charity, the Commission bestows its interventions on communities who usually have no choice but to accept whatever is graciously awarded to them be it good, bad, or ugly. As a direct consequence of the prevailing conditions, the Commission enjoys a considerable amount of power in the power relations in the Commission-community relationship. Taking advantage of this, the Commission programmes its interventions with the barest minimum involvement of the beneficiary community. This makes the intervention programming somewhat oppressive to the community (oppressiveness of intervention). The possibility of being deprived—likely deprivation—of the NDDC's interventions compels the community actors to struggle for the resources at the community level, creating divisions among them (divisiveness of intervention) from the community level to the family and individual levels. In spite of these, the feeling of "...finally we are getting federal government's attention" (in physical and socio-economic deliverables) and the existence in the community of traditional and contemporary institutions as well as processes that moderate intervention-triggered conflicts (local capacities for peacebuilding) cushion the effects of the negative impacts on the community.

### **5.6.1 Intervention-Context Interactions (ICI) Model**

Several authors have convincingly argued the inevitable interactions of intervention and the context where it is situated (Resource Pack 2004; Anderson 1999 & 2004; Bush 2003c and Bush 2009). As earlier discussed, intervention in conflict settings impacts on elements of the context and vice versa. Empirical evidence from the field supports this notion. Against this background, the intervention-context interactions

(ICIs) framework emerged and was adopted as the basis for assessing and explaining the impacts of these interactions on the Odi community context.

As noted by Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005), conceptualising impact in terms of interactions is helpful. They submit “new thinking on topics such as ‘interaction indicators’ shows promise worthy of application and subsequent learning.” The ICI matrix is based on such thinking. The intervention-context interactions (ICIs) are the mutual interactions between stages of an intervention programming and elements of a given conflict context, with their potentials for positive or negative impacts on the conflict situation. This is captured in an ICI Matrix. In the Matrix, alphabets represent the stages of an intervention and elements of a context. P stands for planning, I for implementation, ME for monitoring and evaluation, while, A stands for actors, C for causes, Pr for profile and D for dynamics.

<i>Stages: Planning</i>	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</i>
PA—AP	IA—AI	MEA—AME
PC—CP	IC—CI	MEC—CME
PPr—PrP	IPr—PrI	MEP—PME
PD—DP	ID—DI	MED—DME

**Figure 5.1. Intervention-Context Interactions Matrix**

Source: Fieldwork, 2010.


PA represents the impact of planning on actors, while AP stands for the impact of actors on planning. PA—AP, therefore, represents the interactions between planning and actors. PA may be positive or negative, same goes for AP. In essence, in planning-actors interactions, there are four potential impacts: positive planning-actors (+PA) impact; positive actors-planning (+AP) impact; negative planning-actors impact (-PA); and negative actors-planning (-AP) impact. +PA describes a situation where the planning of an intervention has positive impacts on the actors. Positive AP (+AP) is when actors, through their contributions, impact positively on the planning of an intervention. -PA and -AP are negative impacts of planning on actors and of actors on planning respectively. For instance, planning may involve a party and neglect other(s) or give better treatment or special recognition to a party at the expense of the other(s). This may sustain old tensions or foment new ones among parties. Alternatively, actors' conflict behaviours may disrupt planning or inform bad decisions. The same could be said about other stages as well.

From the foregoing, the planning stage has *four potential impacts* with each of the four elements of the context. In all, it has *sixteen potential impacts* with all the elements of the context —actors, causes, profile and dynamics. These potential impacts have equal number (eight each) of both positive and negative *charges*. Similar cases can be made for other stages (implementation and monitoring and evaluation) as well. This brings the total number of *potential impacts* between intervention and contexts to 48 —24 potential positive and 24 potential negative impacts. This implies



(mathematically speaking) that ICIs carry equal potential to contribute positively or negatively to a given conflict situation.

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**Figure 5. 2. Intervention-Context Interactions Framework**

Source: Fieldwork, 2010.

The ICI framework represents potential, multi-layered, multidirectional interactions between intervention and context. The ICIs potential impacts on the context are in the emergent loop of multi-layered, bi-directional interactions. These interactions produce the dynamics that support peace or conflict in a conflict situation. The ICI perspective

measures impact in terms of the implications of the interactions on conflict situation. It shows the measurable potential impacts that interactions of intervention and conflict context have for the conflict situation. Therefore we can conceive of ICI's *negative impact* and ICI's *positive impact* on a conflict situation. The ICI is a useful framework for understanding and explaining the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and the context of Odi community. Subsequent sections present phenomena that aid such understanding.

## **5.7 The Nature, Dynamics and Implications of the Interactions of the NDDC Interventions and Odi Community Context**

Certain phenomena are critical in understanding the nature, causes, and dynamics; and the short-term and the long-term implications of the interactions of the NDDC intervention and Odi context. The crux of the argument, in general terms, is that stakeholders perceived the NDDC interventions as resources and compete for it in a socio-political environment characterised by pervasive corruption and bad governance. This provided sufficient conditions for spirals of negative consequences that ultimately reduced the overall effectiveness of the interventions. The *resource-status of intervention*, in a wider geopolitical context characterised by bad governance and corruption, triggers a black hole of interactions (at the conception and planning stage) and likely deprivation (among community people at implementation stage), that is, situations in which actors, propelled by greed, need, and fear of marginalisation in distribution of benefits mobilise to appropriate the NDDC resources and benefits for themselves. The interplay of the resource-status of intervention, the Bhis and likely deprivation leads to phenomenon such as the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, which is an acute power disequilibrium characterising the Commission-community relationship in the intervention programming. This relationship manifests in form of oppressiveness of intervention and leads to divisiveness of intervention. Understanding the interconnectedness of these phenomena is critical in understanding the nature, causes, and dynamics; and the short-term and the long-term impacts of the Commission's interventions in the context. These are elaborated in the following subsections.

### **5.7.1 The Resource-status of the NDDC Interventions**

A proper understanding of the impacts of the NDDC interventions requires an understanding of intervention as a resource within a given context. This view of intervention as a resource is consistent with Anderson's conceptual assumption that "[a]lid pro-

grammes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health care, training, etc.) into a resource-scarce environment” (1999; 2004; 2004, p. 47). Expectedly, interventions enjoy the status of a resource in most contexts because it is a socio-economic solution package intended to improve a given social situation. As a solution package, it comes with tangible (financial and material) and non-tangible (prestige, influence, etc.) benefits. These benefits are potential resources that could be exploited by various actors from within and outside the intended operational context of the intervention. According to Anderson, “...these resources represent power and wealth and they become an element of the conflict” (2004, p. 47). Bush concurs with this view when he opines that intervention introduces new dynamics in the context, creating winners and losers (1998; Bush & Opp, 1999) as actors sometimes “...attempt to control and use aid resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side” (2004, p. 47).

The NDDC as an intervention agency (and its interventions) is clearly a resource in the NDR. Its tangible benefits include, Federal Government jobs (for staff and prospective members of staff), contracts (for contractors and consultants —real, pseudo and ghost), physical projects and human capacity development programmes (for Niger Delta communities) and money. The Commission is one of the wealthiest Federal Government parastatals. For instance, funding provisions of the Commission is provided in Part V of the NDDC Act and include:

1. 15 per cent of the total monthly statutory allocations due to member states of the Commission from the Federation Account.
2. 3 per cent of the total annual budget of any oil-producing company operating, onshore and offshore, in the Niger Delta area; including gas-processing companies.
3. 50 per cent of monies due to member states of the Commission from the Ecological Fund.
4. Miscellaneous sources.

The above translate into an annual budget of billions of naira. Although the sources for NDDC funding identified above (especially government) do not always provide the fund in due time, the Commission’s funding is still attractive enough to compel various actors to mobilise to share in the resources it offers. Empirical evidence suggests that the NDDC interventions are perceived as resources by stake-

holders. As such, they become reasons for legitimate and illegitimate motivations to satisfy legitimate needs, actors' insatiable wants and/or opportunities (actors do not want to miss). This showcases the impacts of intervention on actors and vice versa. Actors' perception of intervention as a resource is the main driver of the ICI in Odi. Its occurrence and influence is pervasive throughout the stages of the intervention programming. As a resource in an environment characterised by endemic corruption and bad governance, the NDDC becomes something for which various actors struggle at different levels and stages of the intervention programming. Thus, actors, motivated by need and/or greed, were inspired and compelled to act to appropriate the resources for themselves. The immediate consequences of this compulsive response to resource sharing are the phenomena of *black hole of interactions (Bhis)*, which is triggered at the stage of conception and planning and exert a strong influence on the entire programming; and *likely derivation*, which is a direct fallout of Bhis and the main factor compelling as well as propelling community actors' interactions with intervention as they struggle for its benefits.

### **5.7.2 Black hole of Interactions (Bhis)**

The black hole of interactions is a phenomenon characteristic of the conception and planning stage of the intervention but which exert very strong negative influence on subsequent stages and consequently reducing their effectiveness and positive impacts significantly. It refers to the intense interactions between the resource-rich NDDC interventions and influential actors such as NDDC board members and management staff, politicians, contractors/consultants, high-ranking government officials and a unique phenomenon call *Ward 12*. Bhis was so christened because of its similarity of behaviour with the celestial black hole theorised to exist in the universe. The black-hole concept was developed by the German Astronomer Karl Schwarzschild in 1916, based on Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity. Celestial black holes have gravitational field so strong that, with a body large enough, nothing, including electromagnetic radiation, can escape from its vicinity (Black-hole, Microsoft Encarta Premium, 2009). Light enters but cannot escape the black hole, hence it appears totally black. Similarly in the Bhis, influential actors lobby, manoeuvre, and negotiate in sharing and exploiting the resources of the NDDC interventions in an environment of non-transparency, endemic corruption and bad corporate governance that eventually leave a permanent dent on the whole intervention programming.

The Ward 12 constitutes an important group in the Bhis, hence the need to understand the phenomenon in theorising the impacts of the NDDC intervention in Odi. The Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA has 11 wards (electoral divisions), three of which are in Odi. The Ward 12 phenomenon according to a respondent refers to "...our people that are living outside, that are in Yenagoa (the state capital and largest Ijaw city), that are close to the government...sometimes even if you are not close to Ward 12 you will not have anything (that is, benefits, including NDDC intervention)." Ward 12 constituency thus includes influential individuals such as the NDDC staff and politicians who are indigenes of various communities in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA and who lobby the NDDC and government on behalf of their communities for a share of the NDDC interventions. How influential a community's Ward 12 members are determines the type, quality and quantity of the NDDC intervention in the community. According to resident community people,

...like if you have somebody there, like we have a daughter there [the NDDC] that is...influential there, hmm, she can, she can work out something and say look come and meet the CEO, see what I've done for the town. Like we have this rest house that was just lying fallow [uncompleted], so, the girl now moved and before we knew, they sent a proposal that this thing should go on. (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011).

The road network at Sabagreya is more than this place [Odi]...it's because some of their people are in the NDDC. Even in the state here. The state NDDC representative, the state coordinator or whatever, is from Sabagreya. Then sometimes they also have some of their big men, hmm, they are concerned about the village and so they move to NDDC to lobby for more...projects. They will now liaise with the deputy speaker. The deputy speaker of...the house [the state's House of Assembly] is from Sabagreya too, he's from there. So, all of them will now put heads together, hmm, and then see how they can now [facilitate NDDC interventions for their community]...it's all about the government...if they are assigning project to you, if it's two kilometres, you lobby for more kilometres. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

The existence of the black hole of interactions is supported by the report of a probe panel and the participants' responses. The panel, set up in 2011 and headed by Mr Steve Orosanye, was to identify factors hindering the Commission from performing its statutory functions. The report indicted the former Managing Director/CEO of the Commission, Mr Chibuzor Ugwuoha for misappropriating N511 billion in two years. It also indicted consultants of the Commission and aides to the Nigerian Presi-

dent. It led to the dissolution of the NDDC board, chaired by retired Air Vice Marshal Larry Koiyan, in September 2011. Corrupt practices identified by the committee include zero procurement procedure (contrary to the provisions of Section 16 (6-9) and 23 of the Public Procurement Act (PPA), 2007), and lack of pre-qualification processes for projects within the N250 million approval threshold of the Commission. The black hole appeared to be a characteristic feature of the NDDC since inception. According to an NDDC consultant on agricultural programmes,

...on the books they [NDDC] seem to be doing it, but it...tilts towards interests. Interest of those who...want to...gain from [it]. Whereby the core people in the rural areas are not benefiting from it. So...you know, even though the office is under the presidency...the oversight...is not really...being done in the way it should. And also the finances of...the NDDC is not being monitored...You will see a project, ordinarily, that will not cost up to ten million naira...the Commission end up saying it is 100 million, 200 million and nobody seems, seems to question it. There is no...accountability...You still see...over so many years now that the Commission has started there have not really been emancipation of the Niger Delta region.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 05/07/2011).

Also, an NDDC desk officer commented,

But to be frank with you...I'll say that nearly 99.9% of projects are not initiated from the CRD [the NDDC's Directorate of Community and Rural Development] but from eh, the Projects...ok, if I say the Project Directorate or project department I'll also not be saying it accurately as it is, you know. We hardly do needs assessment...most of the project that get into the budget for implementation come rather from people who are desirous of doing contracts. For example, members of the national assembly, you know. That's how our projects are generated.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 06/07/2011).

Some of the activities that suggest the presence of the Bhis, and identified by the panel, are non-compliance with extant regulations and statutes; and acrimonious and poor interpersonal relationship between the board, the managing director, the executive directors and among top management staff of the Commission (probably due to contention over resources). Others are structural defects and over-centralisation of the Commission's activities; widespread misconception of the role of the Commission by staff and people of the region; ethnicity and factionalisation. The remaining are routine and rampant externalisation of internal problem and disagreements; ineffective supervision by the supervisory agencies of the Commission; and inadequate funding and staffing of the state offices. The report revealed a characteristic high level corruption in

awarding contracts and that the quality of the NDDC projects is generally far below acceptable standards. Thus the Bhis jettisons the injunction for transparency, accountability and full participation of critical stakeholders provided in the Master Plan: “It needs to be re-stated that the leadership of the NDDC must uphold the principles of transparency and accountability...” (2006, p. 241).

However, rather than uphold the principles of transparency and accountability or promote good governance, the NDDC interventions promote bad governance by entrenching corruption and ineffectiveness (real and perceived) through its activities. More than 90% of participants reported various forms of corruption in every stage of the interventions. This was also supported by the report of Orosanye Probe Panel highlighted above. The report led to the dissolution of the NDDC board, chaired by retired Air Vice-Marshal Larry Koinyan, in September 2011. Abubakar in a newspaper report, “Nigeria: NDDC Dirty Deals Exposed,” stated the involvement of aides to the Nigerian president in the NDDC scandal. However, the dissolved board is not the only NDDC board that was reported to be characterised with corruption and bad governance. Empirical evidence shows that, to a lesser or greater degree, this is the characteristic feature of the Commission. The non-transparent and publicly-unaccountable practices characterising the Commission has a general effect of reducing the overall effectiveness of its intervention. The setting up of a probe panel by the Federal Government to investigate the Commission for non-performance testifies to the crippling effect of the corruption in the Commission. The Commission’s usual manner of doing its business, due to the impact of the Bhis, jettisons the injunction for transparency, accountability and full participation of critical stakeholders.

The Bhis thus has a crippling effect on the overall effectiveness of the NDDC interventions. As would be discussed later, the Bhis excludes the resident community people (RCP) from the conception and planning (C&P), limits their participation at the implementation stage and discourages participation at the monitoring and evaluation stage. The immediate negative impact of the Bhis is to exclude critical stakeholders — RCP— for whom the interventions were planned from the C&P stage. This is because the dynamics of the Bhis has little or no concern for the interests of these actors. It is a function of the competition for the resources of the intervention driven by the interplay of outrageous greed, and sometimes business exigencies against the backdrop of endemic bad governance and corruption. These forces are too strong to accommodate the



interests of the RCP, hence their exclusion from C&P. The RCP becomes more actively involved in the intervention process at the level of implementation in the community.

### **5.7.3 Likely Deprivation**

The RCP activities are driven by a phenomenon conceptualised as *likely deprivation*, which appear to be an indirect consequence of the Bhis. Although the NDDC interventions are not the main cause of this phenomenon, they do become sufficient motivations to resuscitate and reinforce it. Likely deprivation is a psycho-social and social-psychological condition in which, driven by fear of real possibility or likelihood of deprivation of benefits (including rights, privileges and other opportunities), individuals and/or groups take actions to secure her/its share of the perceived benefits. This phenomenon resurges among the community actors at the stage of implementation of the intervention. As would be discussed later, individuals and groups in Odi competed for the NDDC resources allocated for the community. The underlying driver of the competition was the fear that, unless they fought for their rights, they would not get it. Likely deprivation can therefore be argued to be prevalent in socio-political arrangements in which the rights and privileges of citizens are not guaranteed in fair and just processes. Thus, they learn to use every means, fair and foul, to secure benefits. Individuals' psychology and groups' social-psychology in Odi is characterised by anticipated deprivation of the benefits/resources of the NDDC unless they struggle for it. This mind-set drives the competition, conflict and cooperation over the resources of the NDDC among the RCP at the implementation stage.

Likely deprivation is a different phenomenon from *relative deprivation* in the sense that the former is a priori (that is, in anticipation of deprivation) while the latter is a posteriori (that is, consideration of past deprivation relative to others). It could be argued that likely deprivation is somehow characteristic of the Nigerian society. It is, however, more pronounced in the NDR due to the interplay of the long history of marginalisation and deprivation and the availability of the intervention benefits and other resources to struggle for. Likely deprivation is both a structural cause and consequence of conflict in the NDR. It results from a loss of faith in public institutions to distribute public goods and services in a fair and equitable manner. The intersection and cross-fertilisation of the resource-status of intervention, Bhis, and likely deprivation lead to more negative impacts of the NDDC interventions in the study area. These impacts

include the malevolent charity-beggar relationship characterising the NDDC-community relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, and divisiveness of intervention. These are explored in the next section.

#### **5.7.4 The Malevolent Charity-beggar Relationship**

The NDDC intervention programming establishes and sustains acute power disequilibrium between the NDDC and the beneficiary community (It is probably an extension of the power disequilibrium characterising citizen-state relationship in Africa where citizens are generally made to feel that government responsibilities towards them are privileges, rather than right). The power relation confers the status of charity on the NDDC and forces the status of a beggar on the community. Over time, the relationship has become malevolent, due essentially, to the effect of the Bhis. Odi community has been compelled to perceive the NDDC interventions as a rare *charity* and scarce resource. So, in whatever form it comes to the community —good, bad or ugly— the community cannot reject it even if it is clearly not needed or there are significant ways to improve it. According to a participant, 'they are developmental projects, people are looking for them and they don't get and you, you have the opportunity to...you are given the opportunity, will you reject it?'

Apparently, the interventions are privileges that the NDDC endows on those who are in its good records. This relationship is most evident in the oppressiveness of the Commission's intervention. The subtle disempowerment of the community starts right from the C&P stage (with the exclusion of the RCP) and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. The community is oppressed when provision of social services put them in a "beggar has no choice" situation. The malevolent charity-beggar relationship makes the NDDC intervention oppressive leading to the phenomenon *oppressiveness of intervention*

#### **5.7.5 Oppressiveness of Intervention**

Empirical evidence suggests that the NDDC interventions are oppressive in Odi. Oppressiveness of intervention is a situation in which beneficiaries are directly oppressed by the intervention either as a consequence of insensitive programming or a by-product of corruption in programming. In the programming of the NDDC interventions, oppressiveness of beneficiaries begins right from the conception and planning stage and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. The oppressiveness of intervention has negative impact on the intervention programming. It manifests in various

forms. The first form is in imperious and imperial manner of excluding RCPs from C&P, thus giving the community no voice in the interventions meant for them. This arrogance suggests that the intervenor assumes knowing and ability to proffer solution to the problems of the intended beneficiaries without necessarily consulting them. This is tantamount to a doctor treating a conscious patient without consulting her. It presupposes that the RCP does not know what they need. Certain key NDDC personnel justify the exclusion of RCP on the grounds that since the politicians, the presumed representatives of the people are involved (as Ward 12, earlier discussed), the community has been involved. Nevertheless, to assume such and thus limit community participation in C&P to Ward 12 elite suggests naivety or deliberate scheme to cover up the Bhis. Marginalising the entire community people this way entrenches the power imbalance between the Ward 12 and the community people. According to a community respondent,

These things [interventions] can only be brought through our big men outside. ...we can do the writing thing but if there's no follow-up from our elite people in the township, they don't care. They don't, they don't care at all [visibly dissatisfied]. Because when they were making the roads, we said look, we wanted more roads to cover certain areas that have not been covered. We wrote that letter but there was no response. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Members of Ward 12 are usually motivated by the personal desire to increase their influence in the community. Hence interventions attracted by Ward 12 may not necessarily be needed by members of the community. Moreover, inasmuch as members of Ward 12 do not appropriately consult the members of the community, their involvement in the Bhis does not constitute community participation in intervention programming. Evidently, from the quote above, the NDDC interventions become commodities that the community can enjoy through the benevolence of its elite. Ineffective communication between the community and the Commission foments dissatisfaction as shown in the participants' (elderly man) visible dissatisfaction. Non-participatory intervention programming is the main cause of oppressive intervention.

The second way by which interventions oppress is in the high-handed manner in which the NDDC personnel, contractors/consultants relate with the community when implementing interventions. The responses of RCP are suggestive of this fact:

Even if they [NDDC contractor/consultant] meet the paramount ruler, they will just go out and do what they want to do. The paramount ruler has no control over them that this and this are what and what I want in my community so that it won't bring problems. So they just come and map out the roads. So when they come with the contractor, the contractor will just come with his drawing, say "This to this will have one road, from so-so-so kilometre, this, this, this, this or this to this will have another road." That is all what the consultant will just come to tell you. That "I'm an engineer and I know what I'm telling you. If we go to the road and we measure it, you will see it" Just like that. So that's the way they do their things.

—A youth (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011).

The moment I hold the file, the file opened and I saw the number of projects meant for the school. And that was why I begin to see...some of the things that were supposed to be done. And immediately, I fired back, I cried out, but I was silenced from Port Harcourt office. Say that, 'You, a civil servant you don't talk anything, because is it only your community that is there? Are there no other communities?' The people that came from the headquarters office are the same people silencing me from telling the truth. It's funny...so, that's the situation. —A secondary school teacher (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

Thirdly, oppression manifests in the *promise and fail* syndrome, a situation whereby the Commission promises and delivers less than promised or the case of selective distribution of benefits. A case in point is the Commission's practice of paying lower stipends than what it promised its beneficiaries in its agricultural capacity-building programme. A case of selective distribution of benefits is evident in the giving of computers to the leaders of agitators in its computer-training programme. This is captured in the view of an elderly female beneficiary,

...the people that came to train promised them that they would give them because...they delay them in their farming work, they said they will give them 15,000 (Naira) each but they only bring one, one thousand to them. And they said that they hear, that they have paid the money into their account and they contributed some amount of money, but still they have not seen anything.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 06/09/2011).

The threat of and the use of force against disappointed and protesting beneficiaries is another form of oppressing the community people. This comes in form of arrest of protesters and exploitation of the community's fear of repetition of the 1999 massacre and fear of further bad publicity for Odi community. According to trainees of the agricultural programmes, the Commission asked beneficiaries to form cooperatives in order to access start-up loans. After they expended their hard-earned financial re-

sources forming those cooperatives, the Commission failed to fulfil its promise. Consequently, according to a participant,

So our boys went over to NDDC [headquarters in Port Harcourt]. They locked our boys, arrested them, locked them. We had to contribute money here again to go and release them. —A beneficiary (Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011).

Oppressiveness is also evident in the real threat of blacklisting any community the Commission considers troublesome —a decision that is entirely at the Commission's discretion. Community people's fear of losing potential interventions, a fear, mainly entertained by the community elders, is regularly exploited by the Commission and its contractors. A protesting community stands the risk of being blacklisted as a *trouble-maker*. This comes with the possibility of stopping the intervention and allocating it to another community as a punishment to the *hostile* community. The fear has become an instrument for pacifying or sometimes beating youths to submission in legitimate and illegitimate agitations. Elders on the other hand, have become placid. The attitude of the elders is expressed in a participant's response:

“...anything about development, I don't want any conflict. Anything that will bring development...there should be no conflict at all because these are things you are not, eh, benefiting from before. Like a community over this way, in the thirties or so, they could have been the first [jaw...town to get a road but because of their hostile this thing, they [benefactor] withdrew and I think that school that was to be established there too was moved, the utensils were moved to Government College Umuahia. I was told that they are now trying to find the roads now by themselves...Something that could have benefitted the whole community in the thirties, see the development that were missed...manpower development, if that thing has been there since the thirties...that's what I continue to tell the youths, anything about development, don't hinder, don't hinder. Because you will benefit at the long run.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011).

The *allow development to take place* attitude, though commendable, is an effective exploitative instrument in subduing the community youths even at such time when they have legitimate reasons to assert their rights as stakeholders in the intervention. According to the Youth Council president:

Sometimes they [the NDDC] will also say that eh, if they [contractors] come to a place and if the community is trying to make trouble they should pack out of that...community and the project will come to an end. Then our community leaders will now fear. 'We don't want what will make this company leave this place o, and all the rest, so nobody to

ferment trouble.' [The elders will] say 'This company is not going anywhere.' Company that is looking for their job, they will not go. So sometimes our leaders too, our leaders too out of fear and maybe their level of understanding, sometimes, you know, do certain things in a different manner to the benefit of the company. You're not even killing the company, this is what they are supposed to do. Then the leaders will now say 'Leave this people o, if you worry them too much, if dem carry their properties go we don lose the work o. This one wey don come we should take am o.' All those stuff. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011)

The Odi 1999 massacre has also been exploited as an instrument of oppression in the NDDC intervention programming in the community. It has a restraining and mollifying impact on the Odi community, thereby making the community to be careful in protesting, even when they have legitimate reasons to do so. It has been employed as self-restraint by the youths themselves or by the elders against the youths. The memory of the incident was still very fresh in the community at the time of the fieldwork. Though it might have attracted sympathy from NGOs and probably, the NDDC, it appears to also be a source of oppression. Community participants reported:

...you know, because something like Odi is said to be a volatile community because of the 1999 and all those things...people are a bit very careful. They are very, very much careful about what happen. But I know that the project...the light [electricity] own [agitations] happened because of youths and contractor. That project was almost suspended for one year because of, eh, crisis like that. (Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011).

So it is youth within themselves, they [say] 'look remember what happened in our community. The town was just burned down. If we do anything now they'll say we have started. That intimidation!...Ah you people have started again, can't you people learn from your mistakes? We'll call FANTANGBE' [a special security task force squad]. And people will say please instead of innocent people to die...(laughs). So People are intimidated. So you only grumble if you don't want open confrontation with the special force, you mellow down. Because if you don't take time, what they will do is selective picking [arrest]. (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

...and when you just think about this community and say if you do anything now, the name will now go up again that Odi people are trying to come up again, all those stuff. That thing for [will] hold us still and you just stay.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011).

The fear of bad publicity for the community therefore restrains the community people from protests. The relatively few intervention-triggered protests are those that reached the breaking point. Even at that, these were still mellowed down by the effect of the 1999 massacre.

### **5.7.6 Divisiveness of Intervention**

Intervention is by nature divisive. This may be due to the fact it has its own goals and become goals of several actors simultaneously. Intervention triggers greed or the desire to satisfy needs among actors, thus inspiring them to deploy their resources in contest for it. In context characterised by conflict where actors are already primed as well as possess soft and hardware for conflict, intervention becomes another goal for which actors compete, creating winners and losers, successful and unsuccessful, the happy and the unhappy. Hence divisiveness is inherent in intervention. In the NDDC intervention in Odi, divisiveness takes the form of unintended effect of intervention and a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy by the NDDC and its contractors. Intervention divides the community people right from the stage of informing them about it. For instance, the Community Development Committee chairman reported

Anything that's outside the community was where I was involved. So anything they are doing within the community they don't want to tell me...

(Fieldwork: Interview, 15/09/2011).

The comment shows that he feels that there were deliberate attempts to leave out the CDC out of the scheme of things in NDDC intervention. The women leader shares similar feelings. Also, the NDDC intervention causes division among and within families. For instance, job opportunities and supply of construction materials split members of families donating land for the intervention. Selective fulfilment of promise to beneficiaries (or *settlement*) of HCDPs also constitutes a form of divisiveness of intervention. As noted by community respondents,

...like we that benefited from them, you know, we are very happy. But those people that, you know, did not benefit from them, you know some of them are not happy.(Fieldwork: Interview, 07/09/2011)

And they [NDDC] promised that they will pay them some amount of money but the head ones [leaders], that is, the higher ones ah, they don't..., she don't know whether they bring them money or they did not bring. But they [other beneficiaries] hear that they bring the money

and people eat [embezzle] the money.(Fieldwork: Interview, 14/09/2011)

The one person [NDDC computer skill trainee], which I came across, he told me categorically that the NDDC promised, so with agitations they only settled persons in the frontline. So as there will be no pressure on them.

(Fieldwork: Interview, 17/09/2011)

We always tell them [youths] that this is a development program. NDDC comes with development. NDDC is not Oil Company that you will say because of this and that... Allow development to take place. Allow development to take place [for emphasis].(Fieldwork: Interview, 1/09/2011)

Also, through a *divide-and-rule* strategy, the NDDC contractors deliberately divide the community for their selfish interests.

...the company's even paying him [former youth president]...so that they [contractor] will take the youth president to themselves so that if there is any conflict that is trying to arise from the youth group in the community, you know that the president will now... (Fieldwork: Interview, 16/09/2011)

Indeed, the NDDC interventions divide. For instance, competition and conflict over the resources of intervention create winners and losers from the C&P stage (among the influential actors) and at the implementation stage among community people. It divides the influential actors in the black hole of interactions at the C&P stage. At the implementation stage, it regularly pitches groups in the community against each other—women's group against the Traditional Council, women against men, the youths against the Traditional Council, thus fracturing the community. It also divides the community along the traditional Asanga-Tamanga geographic line. The division penetrates to the family level as family members are pitched against each other in attempt to appropriate direct and indirect benefits of the NDDC for themselves.

### **5.7.7 The Local Capacity for Peace in Odi**

The full impacts of the negative implications of the NDDC interventions are not directly unleashed on Odi community. There is a screen of community mechanisms and processes, acting like the ozone layer that shields the community from the direct impacts of the negative consequences, and transforms them to less-destructive impacts. These are the geniuses of Odi conflict transformation, that is, its local capacity for peace, in Mary Anderson's term. They include prominent traditional and con-



temporary institutions and/or groups in Odi community that actively participate in cultural, economic, political and social activities of the community. They are therefore inevitably involved in the NDDC interventions brought into the community. These include the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the women's group and the Community Development Committee. These groups frequently have divergent goals as regards the NDDC interventions. However, they have evolved norms, processes and practices that enable them to manage intervention-triggered competition and conflicts arising among themselves, other members/groups in the community or between Odi and other communities to ensure peaceful genius loci for the community. These groups and their activities, including the norms, processes and practices governing them and their relationships constitute the local capacities for peace in Odi. However, the Commission does not make deliberate effort to strengthen these capacities; rather, it inadvertently and sometimes deliberately weakens them. The geniuses have the credit of keeping Odi peaceful in spite of the NDDC's peace and conflict blind approach to intervention programming in the community.

#### **5.7.8. Federal Government's Attention**

The NDDC IDPs are constant reminder of Federal Government's presence in the community. This is the most significant positive impact of the interventions in Odi. Receiving the attention of the federal government this way is significant because of the historic neglect by the Federal Government suffered by the region. Construction of roads, rural electrification, and construction of school facilities, among others address the pervasive feeling of marginalisation, which constituted a major cause of the Niger Delta conflict. Federal Government attention, therefore, is a strong positive impact that offsets some of the negative impacts of the Commission's interventions in the community.

#### **5.7.9 Summary**

The NDDC interventions, perceived as resources by various actors, compel them to mobilise and compete for its benefits. This way, the intervention impacts on the actors. Actors mobilise and appropriate the resources, thereby impacting on the intervention. Thus actors' mobilisation drives the interactions of intervention and context, thus impacting the causes, profile and dynamics of context. Hence, the resource-status of intervention is the epicentre and driver for the ICIs in Odi community. The desire to appropriate the NDDC resource leads to intense interactions among influen-

tial actors —the black hole of interactions— which is supported by endemic bad governance and corruption in the NDR. The black hole exerts strong negative influence on the entire intervention programming cycle, making the intervention programming non-participatory for the resident community people. Odi has influential individuals (Ward 12) who, for various reasons, lobby the NDDC for interventions on behalf of their community, thus participating in the Bhis. Individuals and groups in Odi, like other parts of the Niger Delta and Nigeria, experience likely deprivation, which is a pervasive psycho-social and social-psychological feeling of anticipated possibility of deprivation of the NDDC benefits compelling them to struggle and fight for it. The interplay of the resource-status of intervention, the Bhis and likely deprivation leads to phenomenon such as the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, which is an acute power disequilibrium characterising the Commission-community relationship in the intervention programming. This relationship manifests in form of oppressiveness of intervention and leads to divisiveness of intervention. However, existing geniuses of conflict transformation in Odi mediate the conflict-inducing impacts of the NDDC intervention in the community to ensure that the genius loci of the community is peaceful. Having explained these phenomena, the chapter turns to discussion of the NDDC intervention programming.

## **5.8 Conclusion**

Five physical development projects and four human development programmes in the community were identified in Odi. They are the internal link roads (concrete roads); Odi-Trofani Road; Agberiyé-Odonu to Sampo Road; construction of blocks of classroom/laboratories; and the construction of Odi Guest House. The HCDPs assessed include the agricultural-support programme (different sets of training on farming, fishing and rearing of snail and grasscutter); rice plantation; distribution of flying boat; and the training of youths on non-violence. These were the basis of investigating the interactions between implementation and the context and assessing the impacts of the NDDC interventions. The perception of intervention as resources and the activities it compels from various actors at different stages of the intervention is central to understanding and assessing the impacts of the NDDC intervention in Odi. Also critical to this is the twin evil of corporate bad governance (in the NDDC) and endemic corruption (in the NDR, as in other parts of Nigeria) as providing the environment conducive to such motivations and activities that set in motion spiral of negative impacts throughout the

intervention cycle. The pervasive feeling of likely deprivation is naturally a consequence of the interplay of these factors. These constitute the structural factors that provide the context for, and determine the nature, dynamics and implications of, the NDDC interventions.

At the conception and planning stage, the interplay of these factors makes the intervention interest-driven rather than driven by community needs. Consequently, C&P is almost reduced to resource-sharing activity involving very influential actors such as NDDC board members, NDDC consultants, high-profile politicians and the Ward 12. The resident community people —the critical stakeholders— are conspicuously excluded from this stage. This leads to series of negative impacts in the subsequent stages of intervention. At the implementation stage, when the intervention is fully brought into the community, there are spirals of negative and positive impacts of the intervention in the community. The most notable positive impact is that the interventions are evidence of government's attention, which addresses the pervasive feeling of neglect and marginalisation. Other notable ones include creation of jobs, income-earning activities, opening-up of local market, and capacity-building in modern agricultural practices for the locals. Notable negative impacts of include the institutionalising of the malevolent charity-beggar relationship in the Commission-community relationship, the oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention, and ultimately conflict among the community groups and individuals. However, the competition, contest, and conflict in the community are mediated by the geniuses of the community conflict transformation mechanism. The monitoring and evaluation stage of the intervention is relatively less dramatic because, in all practical terms, it is more of rubber-stamping whatever intervention has been implemented. This, empirical evidence suggests, is a consequence of the structural factors identified above.

Certain changes need to be made to the NDDC's strategies in order to minimise the negative impacts and maximise the positive impacts of the NDDC interventions. These changes would need to address *how* the Commission does its intervention and not the written strategies or *what* (the projects or programmes) the Commission does. These include institutionalising good governance in the NDDC and promoting good governance by its intervention. Also, there is need to change the asymmetric relationship characterising the Commission-community relationship. This will ensure that the resident community people actively participate throughout the stages of the interven-

tion programming. Moreover, there is need for mainstreaming peace and conflict and gender-sensitivity in the NDDC's organisational structure and culture; and in its intervention programming. Furthermore, there is need for explicit and affirmative action on using each intervention to build local capacities for peace. In addition, there is need for I/NGOs to participate in the NDDC interventions in capacity building for locals and the NDDC on certain focus areas and in monitoring and evaluating the NDDC interventions for compliance. Finally, there is need to change the perception and organisational culture of the Commission to intervention programming. Retraining and reorientation may be needed for the NDDC personnel to see themselves as social physicians, like health workers. With these changes in strategies, the likelihood that the Commission will fulfil its mandates will be significantly enhanced.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.0 Introduction

This study was an *ex post facto* impact assessment of the interventions of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). It assessed the Commission's physical Infrastructural Development Projects (IDPs) and Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDPs) in Odi community executed between 2006 and 2011. The overarching objective of the study was to explore the interactions of the interventions and the Odi community context, with a view to explaining their nature and dynamics in peace and conflict terms in the study area. The study assessed the relationship between the interventions, the NDDC mandate and community needs. Also, it assessed the institutional capacity of the Commission for peace and conflict sensitivity as well as the peace and conflict sensitivity of its interventions. It explained the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the interventions and the context.

This investigation was based on the assumption that stages of intervention — conception and planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation— inevitably interact with elements of a conflict context, namely causes, actors, profile and dynamics. And that these interactions do not necessarily translate into peacebuilding in the context. Rather, they have the potential to contribute negatively, exacerbating conflict or positively, building peace in the context. Hence, the interactions of intervention and context have measurable implications. Against this background, the study expected that the interventions of the NDDC must have been interacting with elements of the Odi community. Thus, it presents a good opportunity for empirical investigation into the nature, dynamics and implications of intervention-context interactions (ICI) and ontological claims made in the literature about it. Also, the policy-orientation and normative commitment of Peace and Conflict Studies to emancipatory politics, and values such as social justice, sustainable peacebuilding and development, gender

equality, and so on compel an empirical investigation into the contributions of the NDDC to the NDR conflict situation. This necessitated an evaluation of the capacity of the NDDC for peace and conflict sensitivity alongside gender-based assessment of its interventions. The epistemology of the study, therefore, encompasses both empirical and critical peace studies.

The study was a qualitative research, which combined the Grounded Theory approach and instrumental case study designs. Primary and secondary data were collected for the study. Primary data were collected through key informant and in-depth interviews, content analysis of documents, and non-participant observation. One hundred and one interviews were conducted in Odi. Interviewees included a traditional ruler, secretary, and members of the traditional ruling council, chairman, secretary and members of the Community Development Committee, the oldest man in the community, religious leaders, women's leaders, female and male executives and members of the Odi Youth Council, NDDC project beneficiaries (females and males), school principals and teachers in the community, I/NGOs/ CBOs staff, politicians, and law-enforcement agents. Twenty-three external stakeholders (non-resident of Odi community) were interviewed. This included NDDC staff, NDDC consultants, experts on Niger Delta, I/NGOs staff, activists, academics, religious leaders, and professionals. These categories were selected to reflect different aspects and make an objective account of the phenomenon under investigation. The interview guides addressed questions covering the mandate of the NDDC and its fulfilment; identification of NDDC intervention in the community; and stage and level of community involvement. NDDC official documents such as the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, NDDC Act, official brochures, chairman and managing director/Chief Executive Officer's speeches at various NDDC events, and NDDC website contents were analysed. Unstructured non-participant observations were carried out at NDDC offices and its interventions' sites in Odi. Two conceptual frameworks adopted for the study are the Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Capacity, and Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention frameworks. Summary of key findings are presented in the section below.

The remaining part of this chapter is in three main sections —first is a section on summary of key findings of the study; the second discusses the contributions of the study to knowledge, and the third contains conclusion, policy recommendations and recommendations for further study.

## **6.1 Summary of Key Findings**

This section presents a summary of key findings and the contributions they make to knowledge. A key finding of this study is in describing and explaining the nature, dynamics and implications of the relationship between intervention and context, generally, and particularly between the NDDC'S interventions and Odi community context. It introduced new concepts to understand and explain these phenomena. It accounted for the factors in the phenomena investigated and the relationships between them. It showed the connection between the wider macro socio-political context, the perception of intervention as resources, intervention programming, and impacts at the regional and community levels. Through the ICI, the study showed the possibility of measuring impacts as consequence of the interactions of intervention and context and of theorising the nature, dynamics and implications of these interactions.

### **6.1.1 The NDDC Intervention Strategies**

The NDDC strategy for change is enshrined in the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. "The Strategy for Change in the Niger Delta Region" is rooted in the vision to improve the quality of life of the Niger Delta people by making good use of the region's rich natural resources for the prosperity of the region. The strategy specifically addresses how to create enabling conditions for enterprise, efficient agriculture and industrialisation to utilise the rich natural resources to achieve its vision and mission. The strategy is rooted in an integrated consideration of the dynamic relationship between all aspects of life in the NDR. The strategy includes pursuing poverty reduction; and development of micro and small-scale enterprises; improved infrastructure and industrialisation as engines of accelerated economic growth; institutional development, capacity building and environmental protection as general foundations and enablers. These essential elements of the integrated strategy and their relationships are captured in the Integrated Development Strategy. The strategies are grouped into strategic goals for change and strategic policies for change. The Master Plan's five thematic areas of intervention are economic development, community needs, the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and institutional resources constituting the strategic goals and policies for change. In implementing these strategies, the NDDC groups its interventions into Infrastructural Development Projects (IDPs), that is, physical development projects and Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDPs). Ten policies guide the implementation of the interven-

tions. They are economic prosperity; market creation and expansion; promotion of good governance; integrative and process-oriented planning (enabling conditions and continuity; impact assessments; increase positive impacts, reduce waste, income efficiency); participatory decision-making; sustainability; partnership with other agencies; transparent selection, decision and public scrutiny of materials; peace and conflict sensitive, involvement of women and youth.

### **6.1.2 The Relationship between the NDDC Intervention Strategies, Mandate and the Needs of the People**

Findings show correlations between the NDDC intervention strategies and its mandate. Obviously, the NDDC intervention strategies correspond with mandates one to four. The strategic goals and policies of the Commission correspond with the very first mandate of the NDDC. Moreover, its IDPs and HCDPs correlate with the second mandate. However, the conception, planning and implementation of the projects and programmes are not in accordance with set rules and regulations as required by this mandate. This is the locus of the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies characteristic of the Commission during the period under study. In other words, the discrepancy in the intervention strategies and the mandate of the Commission is in how things are being done rather than what is being done. In addition, there is congruence between the intervention strategies of the NDDC and the needs of people. The NDDC interventions in Odi met the critical and felt needs of the community. However, this should be understood against the background of neglect and marginalisation suffered by the region. The historic neglect and marginalisation make any intervention by the NDDC welcome by the people and such necessarily addresses certain aspects of people's long-felt needs. Hence, there is hardly an intervention that does not meet some needs in some ways. The incongruence comes in in the NDDC and community's prioritisation of these needs.

### **6.1.3 Institutional Capacity of the NDDC for Peace and Conflict Sensitivity**

The study reveals that the institutional capacity of the NDDC for peace and conflict sensitivity is abysmally low. Firstly, the five components of mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity (PCS) in organisations intervening in conflict contexts — commitment and motivation, organisational culture, capacity building, accountability and conducive external relations—are not well mainstreamed in the NDDC. Secondly, PCS is not mainstreamed in its intervention programming. Hence, the NDDC interven-



tion programming —conception and planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation do not show concerns for peace and conflict issues in the context of interventions. The Commission's interventions score abysmally-low on peace and conflict sensitivity. Although there is a policy on peace and conflict issues, and these issues receive scanty references in some other policies, the study found that the available policy does not inform the intervention programming. The availability, therefore, indicates a weak sensitivity to PCS. With abysmally-low capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity, the NDDC cannot, expectedly, deliver peace and conflict-sensitive intervention in the NDR. However, it is possible for an agency to make unintended negative or positive impact in a conflict-prone region, hence the need to still assess the actual impact of the NDDC interventions.

#### **6.1.4 The Impacts of the NDDC Interventions on their Context**

##### ***6.1.4.1 The Intervention-Context Interactions***

This study confirms the existence of bilateral impacts between the interventions and the context. There are indications of interactions between the stages of the NDDC interventions and micro and macro contexts of the beneficiary community and of the NDR respectively. In other words, each stage of the NDDC intervention (conception and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) impacts on and is impacted on by each element of the community context (actors, causes, profile and dynamics of conflict), NDR and even Nigeria at large. These interactions constitute both negative and positive impacts on the context of the intervention. This was represented in a conceptual framework —the intervention-context interactions (ICI). At the C&P stage, the interactions between actors and the intervention is evident in the competition, contest, and conflict over the NDDC resources by influential players such as members of the NDDC board and management, influential politicians, top government officials, and the members of Ward 12. This struggle for resources is intense and takes place within the psycho-social and socio-political space characterised by endemic corruption and bad governance. These interactions are conceptualised as the black hole of interactions. The interactions at this stage sometimes get to the community through the activities of Ward 12 and unsolicited letters for intervention from the community. However, the dynamics of the interactions excluded the resident community people (RCP) from the C&P in a direct contradiction of the guiding principles of the NDDC as contained in

the Master Plan. It also triggered series of negative impacts throughout subsequent stages of the NDDC intervention.

The interventions interact most intensely with elements of Odi community at the implementation stage. The ICI is most intense here because the intervention moves into the community context and actors, causes, profile as well as dynamics interact with the implementation of the intervention. Interactions at this stage are mostly driven by the activities of the community actors as they mobilise at the individual, family, group and community levels to share in the benefits of the intervention. The RCP are the most influential actors in determining the dynamics of the interactions at this stage. Legitimate need, greed and likely deprivation motivate RCP as they compete, contest and cooperate to share the resources of interventions. The RCP's activities sometimes change the implementation of an intervention. Implementations also change RCP's intergroup relations. RCP's activities influence other actors' (contractors/consultants, or NDDC staff) decisions and actions, which also impact (positively or negatively) on the intervention. The implementation therefore changes the dynamics of intergroup relations within the community, between the community and external actors, and between the community and other communities. As such, new causes of conflict may emerge, thus impacting the old causes; and thus changing the profile and changing the dynamics of conflict within the community. However, four cardinal groups in the community —the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the women's group and the Community Development Committee— mediate in the ensuing competition and conflict to guarantee the peaceful genius loci of Odi community. This is discussed below (section 6.1.5.5).

The interaction of intervention and context at the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) stage is minimal. A persuasive explanation for this low key interaction is that the stage involves the barest minimum resources. Hence, the motivation to be involved is weak. This suggests that the NDDC intervention programming is driven by the perception of intervention as resources. In addition, the RCP are totally excluded from this stage of intervention. In fact, the M&E is done by the NDDC consultants while the Commission examines the evaluation of its consultants. Practically excluding RCP from M&E has an overall negative impact on the intervention programming. It foments suspicion of bribery and corruption between the contractor and NDDC staff and

thus cast doubt on the sincerity of the Commission, thereby contributing to community apathy about NDDC interventions.

#### ***6.1.4.2 Positive and Negative Impacts of NDDC's Interventions***

The interactions of NDDC's interventions and the context of the study area have both positive and negative impacts. The IDPs have the most significant positive impacts by bringing the presence of the Federal Government to the community, thus addressing the historic pervasive feeling of neglect and marginalisation in national development. Road projects, electrification and construction of blocks of classrooms have all impacted positively on the study area. However, the processes of deciding on, and implementing, them have significant attendant negative impacts such as creating a black hole of interactions, acute power disequilibrium between the Commission and the community, leading to malevolent charity-beggar relationship in favour of the Commission, oppressiveness of the intervention, divisiveness of the intervention, and conflicts. Therefore, there are ample opportunities for the Commission to improve on its positive contributions to the NDR and minimise its negative contributions. This will be possible by focusing more on how things are being done rather than what is being done. A significant improvement will be made by involving the critical stakeholders, that is, resident community people in the whole intervention programming cycle right from the conception and planning.

#### ***6.1.4.3 The nature, dynamics and implications of ICI impacts in Odi***

Some unique phenomena are germane to understanding the nature, dynamics, and implications of the interactions of intervention and context in the study area. These include resource-status of intervention black hole of interactions, Ward 12, likely deprivation, the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention and the geniuses of Odi conflict transformation (described above). The resource-status of intervention is a phenomenon explaining how actors' perception of intervention as a resource is the main driver of the interactions of stages of intervention and elements of the context. This perception compels actors (motivated by legitimate need, greed, and likely deprivation) to mobilise and compete in accessing/appropriating the intervention's benefits for themselves and their constituencies. Thus, intervention and actors interact, and impact on the causes, profile and dynamics of conflict within the context of intervention. The intensity of interactions is influenced by the amount of resources available. This explains why the interactions are intense at

the C&P and implementation stages. Therefore, the status of intervention as resources is the epicentre and driving force for the intervention-context interactions (ICIs).

The interactions at the C&P stage where interventions and beneficiary communities are determined is characterised by corrupt and non-transparent transactions involving influential actors such as the NDDC management staff, high-profile politicians, contractors/consultants, top government officials, and Ward 12. This constitutes the black-hole of interactions and is supported by the endemic corruption and bad governance in the NDR. The black hole of interactions is intense and non-transparent activities of the influential big players as they lobby, manoeuvre, and negotiate in sharing and exploiting the resources of the interventions. The black hole of interactions constitutes the *conception and planning* of the NDDC intervention. It is characterised by barefaced corruption, lack of transparency and bad corporate governance. It led to the dissolution of the NDDC Board in 2011. The black hole is the singular, most significant source of negative impact —the black-hole effect— of the intervention-conflict interactions on the conflict situation. It thrives on the non-participatory approach, that is, excluding the critical stakeholders —resident community people (RCP)— from the conception and planning of the NDDC intervention programming. It is the direct cause of likely deprivation, oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention in the beneficiary community. It causes, sustains and expresses the power disequilibrium that characterises the NDDC-communities relationship described as the malevolent charity-beggar relationship. The black hole of interactions itself is nested in the characteristic bad governance, weak institutional capacity, and debilitating corruption of the Nigerian social, political and bureaucratic environment. It is thus an expression of the structural violence in the Nigerian state system.

Another remarkable phenomenon is the Ward 12. It is a group of actors comprising influential individuals resident outside Odi community, including politicians, indigenes working with the NDDC or in relevant government establishments who lobby and negotiate on behalf of the community for NDDC interventions. Members of Ward 12 are motivated by the personal desire to increase their political rating in the community. The relative political influence of members of Ward 12 of a community determines the type, quality and quantity of the NDDC interventions the community will enjoy. Interventions attracted by Ward 12 may not necessarily be needed by members of the community. Moreover, inasmuch as members of Ward 12 do not appropri-

ately consult the members of the community, their involvement in attracting interventions to the community does not constitute community participation in intervention conception and planning.

Individuals and groups in the study area experience pervasive psychological and social-psychological feeling of high possibility of deprivation of their rights and privileges except they struggle and fight for it. This is the likely deprivation phenomenon, which is a negative impact of the Bhis. Although the NDDC interventions are not the main cause of this phenomenon, they become sufficient motives to resuscitate it. Likely deprivation resurges and is reinforced among the community actors at the stage of implementation of the intervention. Individual psychology and group social-psychology in Odi are characterised by anticipated deprivation of the benefits/resources of the NDDC unless they struggle for it. This mind-set compels the competition, conflict and sometimes cooperation over the resources of the NDDC among the RCP at the implementation stage. Likely deprivation is a manifest form of loss of faith in public institutions to distribute public goods and services in a fair and equitable manner. The intersection and cross-fertilisation of the resource-status of intervention, black hole of interactions and likely deprivation provide necessary conditions for other negative impacts of the NDDC interventions in the study area. These impacts include the malevolent charity-beggar relationship characterising the NDDC-community relationship, oppressiveness of intervention, and divisiveness of intervention.

In spite of the negative impacts discussed above, the overall impact of the NDDC interventions to the conflict situation in the study area and the NDR is relatively positive. This is consequent upon two factors. First is the fact that the Commission's interventions are perceived as the fulfilment of the long-desired Federal Government tangible presence in the region. The historic neglect by the government (federal, state and local), especially in the area of infrastructural development, suffered by the region makes any intervention in this regard appreciated by the people. Therefore, the long history of marginalisation and underdevelopment in the region makes the NDDC and its activities to represent at least a response to many decades of neglect. Before the advent of the Commission, the community was, as it were, in the dark ages. With the NDDC came a light of hope to a land long forgotten. This view is shared by all community people and some external stakeholders interviewed. However, from the point of view of peace and conflict sensitivity, the Commission's interventions repre-

sent first aid to the long-open wounds of the NDR. The second reason for the relatively positive impacts is the presence of geniuses of intervention-triggered conflict transformation that exist in Odi (and most Niger Delta communities), that is, a repertoire of traditional and contemporary institutions and processes for managing intervention-triggered conflicts, ensured the peacefulness of the community (see 6.1.5.5 below).

#### ***6.1.4.4 The Malevolent Charity-Beggar Relationship, Oppressiveness and Divisiveness of Intervention***

The NDDC intervention programming establishes and sustains acute power disequilibrium between the NDDC and the beneficiary community. The power relation confers the status of charity on the NDDC and forces the status of a beggar on the community. The subtle disempowerment of the community starts right from the C&P stage (with the exclusion of the RCP) and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. Over time, the relationship has become malevolent. The community is oppressed when intervention positions them in a *beggar- has-no-choice* situation. Odi community has been compelled to perceive the NDDC interventions as rare *charity*, scarce resource and privilege that the NDDC endows on those who are in its good records. So, in whatever form it comes to the community —good, bad or ugly — the community must not reject it. The malevolent charity-beggar relationship is most evident in the oppressiveness of the Commission's intervention, leading to the phenomenon *oppressiveness of intervention*. Empirical evidence suggests that Odi community is oppressed by the NDDC intervention in two ways —as a consequence of insensitive programming or by-product of corruption in programming. In the programming of the NDDC interventions, oppressiveness of beneficiaries begins right from the conception and planning stage and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. The oppressiveness of intervention has negative impact on the intervention programming. It manifests in various forms.

This includes, first, the imperious and imperial manner of excluding RCPs from C&P, thus giving the community no voice in the interventions meant for them. Although key NDDC personnel justify the exclusion of RCP on the grounds that since the politicians (the presumed representatives of the people) are involved, that is, as Ward 12, the community has been involved. Nevertheless, to assume such and thus limit community participation in C&P to Ward 12 elite suggests naivety or deliberate scheme to cover up corruption. Marginalising the entire community people this way

entrenches the power imbalance between the Ward 12 and the community people. The second way by which interventions oppress is the high-handed manner in which the NDDC personnel, contractors/consultants relate with the community when implementing interventions. In the third sense, oppression manifests in the *promise-and-fail* syndrome, whereby the Commission promises and delivers less than promised or the case of selective distribution of benefits. The threat of and the use of force against disappointed and protesting beneficiaries is the fourth form of oppressing the community people. This comes in form of arrest of protesters and exploitation of the community's fear of repetition of the 1999 massacre and fear of further bad publicity for Odi community.

The fifth manifestation of oppressiveness is the real threat of blacklisting any community the Commission considers troublesome. Community people's fear of losing potential interventions is regularly exploited by the Commission and its contractors. A protesting community stands the risk of being blacklisted as a *trouble-maker* with the consequence of benefactor stopping the intervention and allocating it to another community as a punishment to the *hostile* community. The Odi 1999 massacre has also been exploited as an instrument of oppression in the NDDC intervention programming in the community. It has a restraining and mollifying impact on Odi community, thereby making the community careful in protesting, even when they have legitimate reasons to do so.

The NDDC intervention in Odi is divisive. This takes the form of unintended effect of intervention and a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy by the NDDC and its contractors. Intervention divides the community people right from the stage of informing them about it. They trigger greed or the desire to satisfy needs among actors, thus inspiring them to deploy their resources in contest for it, thereby creating winners and losers as well as the successful and unsuccessful, the happy and the unhappy factions. It divides the influential actors in the black hole of interactions at the C&P stage. At the implementation stage, it regularly pitches groups in the community against each other—women group against the Traditional Council, women against men, thus dividing the community people along gender lines; the youth against the Traditional Council. It also divides the community along the traditional Asanga-Tamanga geographic line. The division penetrates to the family level as family members (especially males)

are pitched against each other in attempt to appropriate direct and indirect benefits of the NDDC for themselves.

#### **6.1.4.5 The Local Capacity for Peace in Odi**

There are notable traditional and contemporary institutions and groups that are active in the cultural, economic, political and social activities of Odi community. They were therefore inevitably involved in the NDDC interventions brought into Odi. These include the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the Women's group and the Community Development Committee. The groups and their activities, a combination of traditional and contemporary institutions and processes for transforming intervention-triggered conflict non-violently, ensure the characteristic peaceful atmosphere in the community. These groups and their activities, including the norms, processes and practices governing them and their relationships constitute the community mechanisms of conflict transformation. The phenomena could be described as the geniuses of Odi conflict transformation. Although they frequently have divergent goals as regards the NDDC interventions, they have evolved norms, processes and practices that enable them to manage the competition and conflicts arising from the NDDC interventions in such a way as to maintain the characteristic peaceful environment in Odi. Essentially, they are what Mary Anderson indicates as local capacities for peace.

Regarding the NDDC interventions, the groups have a number of motivations in managing the intervention-triggered conflicts. One is the fear of the consequences of being blacklisted by the NDDC as *troublesome*. Two is the fear of losing the much-desired *development* that has long eluded them. This is consistent with an Ijaw adage that translates as "...if your animal is running into the bush, if, you could even cut the tail, you can manage with that tail." The third reason is the fear of reliving the 1999 massacre experience. Thus, the geniuses have the credit of keeping Odi peaceful in spite of the NDDC's peace and conflict blind approach to intervention programming in the community. In spite of the peacebuilding potentials of these groups, the Commission has not made adequate effort to exploit or strengthen these local capacities for peace. Rather, it inadvertently weakens them.

#### **6.1.5 Gender-Neutrality of NDDC Interventions and Implications**

In spite of the popularity of both international and national policy frameworks on gender equality, the NDDC does not have a gender policy. There is also no such policy for its intervention programming. Hence, both the NDDC and its interventions are gender-



neutral or gender-blind. Despite this, women are well-represented (in staffing) in the Commission. Gender-neutrality of the interventions, however, has negative implications for gender equality in the study area. The NDDC interventions entrench the power disequilibrium between females and males in the community. The programming of the interventions systematically gives males more benefits at the expense of their female counterparts. Also, it engenders conflict between the gender roles and discriminates against women. By not mainstreaming gender in its intervention, the NDDC loses by being denied the unique perspective that women could bring to enrich its interventions. In cases where intervention impacted negatively on their livelihood and income, community women took collective non-violent action to demand a change in the implementation, and they succeeded. Women non-violent collective action achieved better result than the usual violent agitations of the youths (essentially male). Hence, the women's non-violent approach offers a potential source of leverage for communities in negotiating intervention with the NDDC. With abysmally-low capacity for gender sensitivity, the NDDC cannot deliver gender-sensitive intervention in the NDR; rather, it entrenches the traditional power imbalance and roles between female and male members of the beneficiary communities.

## **6.2 Contributions to Knowledge**

This study has made some modest contributions to knowledge in the area of peace and conflict impact assessment and Niger Delta studies. In PCIA, it showed the possibility of measuring impact in terms of the interactions between the stages of interventions and the elements of context. Although this was suggested by scholar-practitioners such as Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005), Paffenholz (2005), and Lange (2006), the researcher is not aware of any empirical work in this regard. It introduced the intervention-context interactions (ICI) framework and showed viability in assessing impacts in context. It thus provides a basis for a policy on ICI analysis before projects are implemented, particularly in conflict contexts. This will help to make development more supportive of peace and sustainable development. The ICI is valuable in the area of planning and feedback mechanism in peacebuilding and development. Also, the study introduced frameworks —Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Framework and Gender-Based Analysis of Intervention Framework— for assessing the institutional capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity and gender sensitivity, respectively.

Another notable contribution is its grounded theory on the nature, dynamics and implications of ICI in the study area, using conceptualisations (e.g., resource-status of intervention, and black hole of interactions) and propositions, which provided the explanatory framework for the phenomena investigated. The theory is particularly useful in that it shows how the combined effect of the subconscious motivations of individuals and groups such as greed, need and likely deprivation is connected to the conscious level of group dynamics and power relations to drive and determine the nature, dynamics, and implications of the ICI. It thus links the micro, meso and macro levels of interactions and their implications for the context at the micro level of individuals and the community.

The study contributes to Niger Delta studies, in calling attention to the negative aspects of the NDDC's interventions in the Niger Delta, and Odi in particular. It contributes to understanding why despite the enormity of investment in the Niger Delta, very little has been achieved in terms of poverty reduction and economic growth through infrastructural and human capacity development. It described and explained factors as well as their relationships to map the conceptual landscape of the relationship of intervention and context in the study area. This is achieved by emphasising how (the resource-status of) intervention in an environment characterised by corruption and bad governance can trigger a spiral of negative impacts throughout the stages of intervention. In addition, it emphasised the strong influence of the wider geopolitical context on government interventions in context of conflict. It also shows the critical role of the institutional capacity (for peace and conflict and gender sensitivity) of an intervening agency in peacebuilding through intervention. Nevertheless, it also confirms the existence of local capacity for peace in mediating negative impacts. The grounded theory, "...forged in the crucible of social-political, cultural, and economic conditions of African realities..." (University for Peace Africa Programme, 2007, p. 75) might also prove useful in building the long-sought explanatory theories in PCIAAs. The study thus advances scientific knowledge as it generates new concepts and frameworks for understanding intervention programming in conflict contexts.

Findings add to the body of evidence supporting the need for conflict sensitivity, particularly in relation to service delivery. It is innovative as it brings a fresh perspective to understanding how development has the potential to drive conflict. Though this has been known much earlier, it is an insightful method of scientifically proving it. Findings could promote peace in a post-conflict environment if the stakeholders are

made aware of the negative aspects of economic intervention measures or if stakeholders are mindful of this. Hence, it could inspire thinking and action to promote peace. Also, it has logically shown what leads to what, how, why, and who, where, and when.

### **6.3 Conclusions**

The NDDC adopts the Integrated Development Strategy, which focuses on five themes—economic development, community needs, the natural environment, physical infrastructure, and human and institutional needs—to reduce poverty through industrialisation and economic growth. Specific strategies for achieve this are codified in the 12 strategic goals and three policies for change articulated in the Master Plan. These are broadly grouped into the Infrastructural Development Projects (IDP) and Human Capacity Development Programmes (HCDP). Although there is congruence between the Commission’s mandate and its strategy, the prioritisation of the interventions in the community is slightly out of tune with the felt needs of the community. This might have been contingent on the inevitable change that would have occurred in the socio-economic, political and environmental contexts in the Niger Delta communities, given the time lag between the development of the Master Plan and the implementation of the interventions. Another possible explanation is that the specificities of the micro context of every community in the Niger Delta were not factored into the development of the plan.

The Commission has abysmally-low capacity for peace and conflict and gender sensitivity. While peace and conflict sensitivity is included in its policies, the Commission has no such policy as an organisation and it is very weakly mainstreamed in its interventions. The implication of this is that the Commission is inadvertently doing harm as well as good in its intervention programming. It has no gender policy as an organisation or for its intervention programming. Hence, its interventions are gender blind. This entrenches the traditional gender roles and power relations between females and males in the community. In other words, the NDDC interventions support patriarchy.

The study confirmed that stages of intervention programming interact with elements of the context of the intervention to produce both negative and positive impacts. These interactions are driven by the perception of intervention as a resource in the study area. From the conception and planning stage, the huge resources available in

the NDDC interventions attract powerful actors such as members of the NDDC board and management staff, influential politicians, and contractors/consultants. These actors, characteristically propelled by self-interest, in an environment notorious for bad governance and corruption struggle to appropriate the resources for themselves. This leads to the phenomenon of black hole of interactions, which triggers other negative impacts down the intervention programming process. One of the most notable is its instituting acutely-skewed power relations between the NDDC and the community in favour of the former, leading to the malevolent charity-beggar relationship and ultimately oppression of community through the interventions.

At the implementation stage, when the intervention finally comes into the community, the possibility of losing out on the benefits of the intervention triggers the phenomenon of likely deprivation in the community people. This drives competition for the resources and divides the community along individual, family, group, gender and geographical lines. The monitoring-and-evaluation stage is the least dramatic as the resources available are relatively unattractive and because the participation of the resident community people is not encouraged. The most significant positive impact of the interventions, especially the IDPs, is their role in bringing the presence of the Federal Government into the community or attesting to Federal Government's attention in the community. This countered the effect of neglect, marginalisation and deprivation, and poor infrastructure, which are core conflict causes in the region. It positively impacted on the psycho-social and socio-psychology of individuals, groups and the community. Other positive impacts include economic benefits in form of income generation through job creation, supply of construction materials, compensation, and opening of local market. Also, the IDPs enhance the physical aesthetics of the community.

NDDC interventions are always perceived as resources and thus inspire different motivations in various actors to compete in an atmosphere characterised by endemic corruption and bad governance. The presence of these two phenomena portends great difficulty to preventing and breaking the cycle of negative impacts triggered by the NDDC intervention programming. Overcoming this difficulty requires that NDDC improves *how* it does *what* it is doing by following its articulated guiding principles and policies such as promoting good governance, transparency, participatory decision-making, and mainstreaming peace, conflict and gender sensitivity in its programming. The Commission's best chances of building sustainable peace in the region lies in

bringing the resident community people into its intervention programming right from the C&P. The RCP should be involved through their representatives in the four cardinal groups and directly through town meeting on NDDC intervention. This might shift the power disequilibrium in favour of the community.

## **6.4 Recommendations**

Recommendations of this study cover both policy recommendations and recommendations for further study.

### **6.4.1 Policy Recommendations**

The study suggests the following policy-relevant recommendations which can enhance service delivery of the NDDC.

#### **6.4.1.1 Address Endemic Corruption and Bad Governance in the NDR**

The wider social and political contexts of the NDDC operations have impacts for the programming of the NDDC interventions. Although corruption and bad governance are not peculiar to the region, the presence of resources makes it more susceptible to conflict. This makes the task of building peace through the interventions more difficult. Hence, there is a need for stakeholders (compulsorily involving resident community people) to be very conscious of, and sensitive to, the evil twins of corruption and bad governance alongside the negative effects of these on the overall intervention programming. In addition, stakeholders need to jointly evolve strategies to check corruption and bad governance in the overall intervention programming of the Commission. Furthermore, these checks should be strictly-guarded and continually-evaluated for performance by the stakeholders. Accountability and transparency will be critical in such strategies. Addressing the wider contexts of the NDDC operations is important because, expectedly, whatever happens there, will seep into the Commission and its interventions through a sort of social and political osmosis.

#### **6.4.1.2 Active Resident Community People Participation in all Stages of Intervention Programming**

The current malevolent charity-beggar relationship between the RCP and the NDDC should be addressed. Changing this relationship should start with an affirmative action to empower the RCP by involving them throughout the intervention programming, from the C&P stage onward. Many works in peace and conflict impact assessment have recognised that making beneficiary community own the intervention as a *right* rather than a *privilege* is a way of empowering them (This is also consistent with the

emancipatory dimension of PCIA). This will discourage the emergence of the malevolent charity-beggar relationship and its consequences. Making community people own the intervention should therefore be actively encouraged. This could be achieved by bringing the C&P into the community (as practised by I/NGOs) for participation by the RCP. However, in the minimum, the leaders of the four cardinal community groups could represent the community during the C&P. RCP's participation not only empowers them but also fosters a sense of community ownership of the project, thereby increasing sustainability of interventions. Also, it reduces wastage of resources due to unneeded interventions and duplicity of interventions. Finally, changing the current asymmetric relation may involve a reorientation of both parties (separately and in joint sessions) in which the two parties are made aware of what the appropriate relationship between them should be.

#### **6.4.1.3 Affirmative Action on Building and Exploiting Local Capacities for Peacebuilding through each Intervention**

There is a need for affirmative action on using each intervention to build local capacities for peace. The NDDC is required to identify, acknowledge and utilise the local capacities for peace in the community. This will increase the likelihood that its interventions will support sustainable peacebuilding rather than conflict. The four cardinal groups in the community —Traditional Council, Community Development Committee, the Youth Council and the women's group-- should be involved throughout the programming of the NDDC intervention.

#### **6.4.1.4 Transparency and Accountability**

Making information on budgetary allocation on interventions available and accessible to stakeholders should be made mandatory for the Commission. From the stage of conception, planning and subsequent stages, all actors, most importantly RCP, should have information on budgetary allocations, bill of quantity (in case of IDPs) and other relevant documents. As such, community people can have their own engineers to monitor the service delivery by contractors. Transparency throughout the stages of the intervention will discourage suspicion, which stimulates most conflicts. Information on budgetary allocations and others mentioned above for each project/programme should be made available on website.

#### **6.4.1.5 Mainstream Peace and Conflict and Gender Sensitivity into Interventions**

There is need to mainstream peace and conflict sensitivity and gender in the NDDC organisational structure and culture as well as its intervention programming. Two basic requirements for mainstreaming these are well-articulated policies on conflict, peace and gender in the organisation alongside its intervention programming as well as building the institutional capacity for conflict, peace and gender sensitivity. A clear policy will articulate the goals with clearly-formulated concepts, organisational commitment and practical steps to achieve the goals. Mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitivity and gender has always been a profound political process in organisations because the exercise challenges existing authority and resource allocations, structures, cultures, and norms (Lange, 2004). However, there is need to make the NDDC personnel see PCS and GAD frameworks as means to long-lasting transformation in the Commission and not pure technical frameworks. Such perception might improve their support for the frameworks. To be gender sensitive may require affirmative action for womenfolk to benefit from the NDDC interventions. Moreover, the HMBS programmes should not be marketed as women-specific. Not only will it demean the programmes, it will also entrench the demeaning perception of women's reproduction activities.

#### **6.4.1.6 Changing the NDDC's Perception and Organisational Culture to Intervention Programming**

There is need for change in the perception and organisational culture of the NDDC so that personnel see themselves as social physicians curing the gangrene of conflict in the region. Galtung repeatedly draws a corollary between peace workers and medical practitioners. He describes peace workers as social physicians. The spirit with which medical practitioners are trained to work, which is also evident in the NDDC free medical health team, should therefore be espoused in the Commission. This spirit should be inculcated in the Commission's personnel through reorientation and training.

#### **6.4.2 Recommendations for Further Study**

There is need to replicate this study in a multiple case study research. This will test the transferability of concepts and propositions developed in this study. Such studies, which could be qualitative, quantitative or mixed method, will include more communities in the region. The validity of such ideas as resource-status of intervention, black hole of interactions, Ward 12, divisiveness and oppressiveness of intervention, likely

deprivation, local capacities for peace, and malevolent charity-beggar relationship need to be tested in settings similar to the one investigated. Besides, propositions on the nature, dynamics and implications of the ICI need to be tested in studies. Findings from such studies may inform better theorising and theory development in impact assessment. Development of such theories will inform better programming that contributes to peacebuilding rather than conflict exacerbation in conflict-prone settings.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I



## UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, NIGERIA

### PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES PROGRAMME

### INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES



Director: PROFESSOR O.O. LAYIWOLA, B.A. (Ife), Ph.D. (Leeds)

Tel: 08038357070  
E-mail: delelayiwola@yahoo.com  
Fax: 234-2-8103043. 234-2-8103118  
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Secretary:  
P. B. UNUOFIN, Dip in Public Admin. (Jos); B.Ed; M.Ed. (Ib)  
Tel: 08059323130  
E-mail: bankolepeter@yahoo.com

3<sup>rd</sup> March 2010.

The Director  
Agriculture and Fisheries Directorate  
The NDDC  
Port Harcourt

Dear Sir:

#### MR AKINYOADE VICTOR ADEMOLA

I write to confirm that AKINYOADE, Victor Ademola, with Matriculation Number 118279 is a PhD Candidate of the Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. He is currently working on a research titled "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Human Development Programme of the Niger Delta Development Commission".

The candidate has successfully completed his pre-field seminar and is now allowed to proceed to carry out his field work.

Kindly accord him all necessary assistance

Thank you.

A handwritten signature in blue ink over a circular purple stamp. The stamp contains the text 'INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES' and 'UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN'. The date '8/3/2010' is written in the center of the stamp.

T.K Adekunle, Ph.D  
PG Seminar Co-ordinator  
For Director, Institute of African Studies

APPENDIX II



**UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, NIGERIA**  
**PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES PROGRAMME**  
**INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES**



Director: PROFESSOR ISAAC OLAWALE ALBERT, Ph.D., fspsp

Tel: 08033834639  
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Secretary:  
Morounfoluwa O. Oyebola (Mrs) B.Sc., M.Sc. (Ib.)  
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5<sup>th</sup> April 2012

ATLAS.ti  
Scientific Software Development GmbH, Berlin  
Germany

**LETTER OF INTRODUCTION—AKINYOADE, VICTOR ADEMOLA**

This is to certify that AKINYOADE, Victor Ademola (Matric No: 118279) is a bonafide Ph.D.(Peace and Conflict Studies) candidate of the Institute of African Studies. He desires to purchase ATLAS.ti from your company for the purpose of analyzing his qualitative data.

Please give him all necessary assistance that might be of help to his research work.

Thank you.

*Professor I.O Albert*  
Director

DIRECTOR  
INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES  
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN



## APPENDIX III

Demola AKINYOADE  
Doctoral Research Candidate  
Peace and Conflict Studies Program  
Institute of African Studies  
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria  
GSM 0805 770 2787  
demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com

Dear Ma/Sir:

### LETTER OF INFORMATION

#### **Research Project: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Niger Delta Development Commission Interventions**

Dear Participant,

I wish to invite you to participate in my research on the above topic. The details of the study follow and I hope you will consider being involved. I am conducting this research project for my PhD at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

This research titled **Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Niger Delta Development Commission Interventions** concerns examining the interactions between interventions and its (conflict) contexts. The study seeks to determine the contributions of the Commission to the Niger Delta conflict in order to understand how interventions can contribute positively (i.e. build peace) rather than negatively (exacerbate conflict) in the Niger Delta conflict setting.

The objectives of the study, therefore, include determining the impact of the intervention on the conflict contexts and vice versa. It will evaluate the impact that completed projects or programs have had on the structures and dynamics of peace and conflict in the host communities. Specifically, I am interested in undertaking an empirical analysis of the NDDC capacity for peace and conflict sensitive programming; the peace and conflict sensitivity of its programming; the interactions of selected projects and programmes and their contexts; and the gender sensitivity of the Commission's programming.

The research outcome will contribute to the growing volume of literature on the nexus of peace, conflict, intervention, and gender mainstreaming in conflict situations. It hopes to extend the frontier of knowledge in this field of study. Thus, it is expected to produce findings, rooted in the rigorous analyses of empirical data, which will inform and improve theories, policies and practice in intervention programming. Specifically, it will help us to determine NDDC's current capacity as an agency intervening in conflict situation. Lessons learnt will be useful for policy makers, intervention and funding agencies.

The exercise will rely on semi-structured method using the **in-depth interview**, with questions already prepared, and other questions that may come up during the exercise. I will need your **consent** to include you as a participant in this study. This means oral and tape-recorded

consent or endorsing a consent form. Your participation will be confidential as your identity will not be revealed to anybody except me. Nothing learnt from you will be revealed to other participants, any staff of your organisation or any member of your community. The exercise is **voluntary** and you are free not to respond to the entire questions and also free to stop the interview at any time. This is to ensure your comfort. Should you agree to take part in this research, we will meet for about forty-five to sixty minutes and the interview will normally be audio-taped unless you have objections. If audio-taped, a copy of the transcribed version will be provided and you are free to make necessary changes as you deem fit. In case you are not interested in being audio-taped, then, handwritten notes will be made or made on a laptop, transcribed and a copy will be given to you. You are free to withdraw consent and to discontinue participation in the activity at anytime without prejudice. The audiotapes and transcriptions will be kept in a locked filing cabinet at the researcher's office for five years following thesis submission and then destroyed.

Please be informed that, if at any time you want further information on this research, please feel free to request it. You can contact me by e-mail at [demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com](mailto:demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com). It is anticipated that this research will be completed by the third quarter of 2011. The results may also be presented at conferences or written up in journals without any identifying information.

This project has been approved by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. Should you have any complaints concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, please contact the Postgraduate Coordinator at the following address:

The Postgraduate Coordinator  
Peace and Conflict Studies Programme  
Institute of African Studies  
University of Ibadan  
Nigeria.

Please keep a copy of this information for your record and accept my sincere appreciation for your participation, insights and valuable knowledge, which would be of great importance to this project and I look forward to further contact with you.

Sincerely,



Ademola Victor AKINYOADE,  
Peace and Conflict Studies Programme,  
Institute of African Studies,  
University of Ibadan,  
Nigeria.

GSM: +234 805 770 2787

## APPENDIX IV

Demola AKINYOADE  
Doctoral Research Candidate  
Peace and Conflict Studies Programme  
Institute of African Studies  
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria  
GSM 0805 770 2787  
demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com

1 June 2011  
The Director  
Commercial and Industrial Directorate  
NDDC  
Port Harcourt

Dear Ma/Sir:

### **REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH PURPOSES**

I am Akinyoade, Victor Ademola, a doctorate candidate of Peace and Conflict Studies Program, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. I write to request information on three programmes in your directorate, namely, the Skills Acquisition Programme, the Mass Transit and the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises.

The needed information include:

1. Institutional **policy** on the programming of your projects (i.e. how projects and beneficiaries should be selected, community participation, etc.);
2. Institutional **framework** for implementing, monitoring and evaluating the policy;
3. Official documents detailing the activities of your directorate;
4. Database (online, electronic or hard copy) of your beneficiaries;
5. The challenges your directorate faces in delivering its mandate.

The information requested is required for an evaluation of the contributions of the NDDC to the Niger Delta since its establishment till date. It is therefore needed strictly for academic research purposes and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

I will be most grateful, therefore, if you can designate **one office** and **one field** staff (for each of the three programs) with whom I can conduct in-depth interviews to get the required information. The interview will last between forty-five to sixty minutes. I will like to hold the interview anytime between 7<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> June, 2011. I include a letter of information for your attention and that of the prospective interviewees. Should you so desire, a copy of the study's findings will be made available to your directorate.

I thank you for your anticipated cooperation.

Faithfully,



AKINYOADE, V. ADEMOLA, PhD (in view)  
+2348057702787  
[demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com](mailto:demolaakinyoade@yahoo.com)

**APPENDIX V**

**CONSENT FORM**

I, \_\_\_\_\_ have read the information contained in the Information Sheet for Participants and any questions I have has been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this activity, realising that I may withdraw at any time. I agree that the research data gathered for the study may be published, provided my name is not used.

Signature

Date

\_\_\_\_\_

I agree/disagree to my interview being audio-taped

Signature

Date

\_\_\_\_\_

This project has been approved by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.

Should you have any complaints concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, please contact the Postgraduate Coordinator at the following address:

Peace and Conflict Studies Programme

Institute of African Studies

University of Ibadan

Ibadan,

Nigeria.

**APPENDIX VI**  
**INTERVIEW GUIDE**

**IDI FOR NDDC STAFF (OFFICE AND FIELD/COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICERS) *Evaluating the Capacity of the NDDC for Peace and Conflict Sensitive Programming***

1. Explain the mandate of the NDDC and your role in realising it.
2. What is your understanding of the idea of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) or “conflict sensitivity”?
3. Describe the NDDC policy on PCIA or conflict sensitivity. How is it implemented in the field?  
**Probe:** *Does it include staff capacity building? Which category of staff? Is it mandatory? Does it include field staff? Who conducts the training? Have the respondent been trained? Ask to see or get a copy of the official document on the policy.*
4. Have you heard about the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution’s document Mainstreaming Peacebuilding in Development Programming in Nigeria: A framework? (if yes, probe: does the NDDC make use of it?)
5. (a) How does the NDDC select projects for implementation in host communities?  
(b) How are the beneficiaries of projects selected?

*Note whether stakeholders’ participation (especially community people) is mentioned in any of the two instances above.*

**If yes, probe:** *the participants (who are they? How and why are they selected?);  
The format of the forum (briefing, workshop, conference, village square meeting);  
Is it organized for every new project?*

**If it is not, probe:** *ask directly whether stakeholders’ participation is part of the project and beneficiaries’ selection phases.*

6. (a) How is the NDDC project planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated?

*Note whether conflict analysis, PCIA or conflict sensitivity is mentioned.*

**If it is, probe:** *who participates and how are they selected? How is it done? When is it required in the programming? Name and/or describe the framework of conflict analyses.*

**If it is not, probe:** *is analysis of conflict in the host/neighbouring communities part of the project planning, implementation and monitoring?*

7. (a) Describe a typical crisis that occurs around the NDDC projects in host/neighbouring communities.  
(b) At what stage of the project did the crisis happen?  
(c) How did the NDDC manage the crisis?
8. How does the NDDC ensure that its projects do not lead to conflict in host/neighbouring communities?
9. How does the NDDC ensure that its projects build peace in or among the beneficiary communities? Describe a typical case, please.
10. Does the NDDC a gender policy that it applies to: (a) staff; (b) beneficiaries of it human development projects).

**If yes:** ask respondent to tell you the policy and request to see a copy of it.

**For Field Officers Only**

11. (a) When did you join the NDDC?  
(b) How many times have you been trained?



(c) What did these trainings focus on?

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

**INTERVIEW GUIDE**  
**IDI FOR COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS (Excluding Project Beneficiaries)**  
*Peace and Conflict Sensitivity Evaluation of the NDDC Programming in the Beneficiary Communities*

1. What is your understanding of the purpose for which the NDDC was established?
2. Mention some projects that your community has benefited from the NDDC since it was established?
3. How does the NDDC inform the community about the projects to be implemented and the progress of projects being implemented?
4. How were the projects selected before implementation in your community?
5. Describe your community's involvement in the project programming cycle. Note whether the respondents mention community involvement at the project planning and selection of beneficiaries, implementation, or monitoring and evaluation stages.  
*If not, probe: at what stage of the project was your community involved—project planning and selection of beneficiaries, implementation, monitoring and evaluation?*  
*If at any stage, probe: who are the members of the community involved? How were they selected?*
6. Describe your community members who benefited from this project(s)?
7. (a) What kind of conflicts did these projects cause?  
(b) How was the conflict handled?  
(c) Please mention the category of people that managed the conflict?
8. To what extent have the NDDC projects contributed to peace in your community or between your community and neighbouring communities?
9. What is your understanding of the idea “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment” or “conflict sensitivity”?
  - a. **If known or understood, probe:** was it used for the NDDC projects? Could you describe it and how it is typically used, please? At what stage?
  - b. **If unknown,** would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to ensure that the projects did not start a fresh or ignite old conflicts in your community and or between your community and neighbouring communities? Explain your response, please.  
OR
  - c. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to reduce tension, resolve conflict or build peace in your community and or between your community and neighbouring communities through its projects? How? Explain your response, please.
10. Would you say that the NDDC make any deliberate efforts to ensure that both genders—girls and boys, women and men—benefit equitably from the projects? Explain your response, please. Or which gender benefit more? In what estimated ratio/percentage?

11. What can (a) the NDDC, (b) your community, or (c) other stakeholders do to reduce conflict and build peace in your community.

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

**INTERVIEW GUIDE  
IDI FOR PROGRAMME BENEFICIARIES**

1. What is your understanding of the purpose for which the NDDC was established?
2. Mention some projects that your community has benefited from the NDDC since it was established?
3. How did you hear about the NDDC projects from which you benefited?
4. Describe the criteria and the selection process of the beneficiaries, please. How and why were you selected to benefit from the project?
5. (a) What kind of conflicts did this project(s) cause?  
(b) How was the conflict handled?  
(c) Please mention the category of people that managed the conflict?
6. To what extent have the NDDC projects contributed to peace in your community or between your community and neighbouring communities?
7. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to ensure that the projects did not start a fresh or ignite old conflicts in your community and or between your community and neighbouring communities? Explain your response, please.
8. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to reduce tension, resolve conflict or build peace in your community and or between your community and neighbouring communities through its projects? How? Explain your response, please.
9. Would you say that the NDDC make any deliberate efforts to ensure that both genders—girls and boys, women and men—benefit equitably from the projects? Explain your response, please. Or which gender benefit more? In what estimated ratio/percentage?
10. Describe the attitude of staff (NDDC, consultants) in charge of the project.
11. Which of the following term did you hear the project staff use in the course of the project? “conflict sensitivity”, “peace and conflict impact assessment”, “peacebuilding”, “community participation”, “gender sensitivity”, “gender mainstreaming”, “peace impact,” “conflict impact”
12. What can (a) the NDDC, (b) your community, or (c) other stakeholders do to reduce conflict and build peace in your community?

## INTERVIEW GUIDE

### IDI FOR THE NDDC CONSULTANTS, EXPERTS AND OTHER AGENCIES WORKING IN THE NIGER DELTA

#### **Evaluating Field Staff and Process Capacity for Peace and Conflict Sensitive Programming**

##### **Consultants, Experts and other Agencies**

1. What is your understanding of the mandate of the NDDC? And to what extent has the NDDC been delivering on this mandate?
2. How does the Commission execute its projects in the host communities?
3. Would you say that the NDDC makes any deliberate efforts to ensure that the projects did not start a fresh or ignite old conflicts in host communities and or between host communities and neighbouring communities? Explain your response, please.
4. Would you say that the NDDC made any deliberate efforts to reduce tension, resolve conflict or build peace in your community and or between host communities and neighbouring communities through its projects? How? Explain your response, please.
5. Would you say that the NDDC make any deliberate efforts to ensure that both genders—girls and boys, women and men—benefit equitably from the projects? Explain your response, please. Or which gender benefit more? In what estimated ratio/percentage?
6. Are you aware of the NDDC policy on PCIA, conflict sensitivity or gender sensitivity of its projects? **If yes**, could you describe it, please?
7. (a) Describe any crises that the NDDC projects have caused, please.  
(b) How was the conflict handled?  
(c) Please mention the category of people that managed the conflict?
8. To what extent have the NDDC projects contributed to peace in the Niger Delta, especially in this community and neighbouring communities? Cite typical examples, please.

##### **Consultants and Agencies only**

9. Kindly give background information about your organisation.
10. What is your relationship with the NDDC? When did it start? What has your organisation done with/for the NDDC and what is it doing now, if any?
11. How is your organization helping to fulfil the NDDC mandate?
12. At what level of the NDDC programming is your organization involved?
13. (a) What does your organization do before implementing projects in beneficiary communities?  
(b) Describe your organization's policy on PCIA or conflict sensitivity policy and gender sensitivity, if any?  
(c) What are the entry strategies of your organization into beneficiary communities?  
(d) How do you handle crises arising from your projects during and after implementation?
14. How would you describe the contributions of the NDDC to the Niger Delta situation? How can it be improved?